RESEARCH ORGANIZATION - HRO · obligation bonds for college student loans at an August 10, 1991, election, then approved an identical proposition ... Allowing judges to deny bail

Proposition1

Texas House of Representatives August 20, 2009

HOUSERESEARCHORGANIZATION focus report

No. 81-8

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Amendments Proposedfor November 2009 Ballot

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Amending the Constitution ................................................................................................ 2

Previous Election Results ..............................................................................................4

Proposition 1 Authorizinglocalfinancingtobuybufferareasnearmilitaryinstallations .................. 5 2 Requiring appraisal of residence homesteads based on homestead value .............. 7 3 Allowing stateenforcementofuniformpropertyappraisalstandards ..................... 9 4 EstablishingtheNationalResearchUniversityFund .............................................. 10 5 Allowing consolidated boards of equalization for appraisal districts ................... 14 6 RenewingVeterans’LandBoardbondauthorityforlandandmortgageloans ... 15 7 AllowingmembersoftheTexasStateGuardtoholdciviloffice ............................... 17 8 Authorizing the state to contribute resources to veterans’ hospitals ..................... 19 9 Establishing a right to use and access public beaches ............................................. 21 10 Allowingboardmembersofemergencyservicesdistrictstoservefouryears ....2311Restrictinguseofeminentdomaintotakingpropertyforpublicpurposes ................ 25

Page 2 House Research Organization

mending the ConstitutionA Texas voters have approved 456 amendments to the state Constitution since its adoption in 1876. Eleven more proposed amendments will be submitted for voter approvalatthegeneralelectiononTuesday,November3,2009.

Joint resolutions

The Texas Legislature proposes constitutional amendments in joint resolutions that originate in eithertheHouseofRepresentativesortheSenate.Forexample,Proposition1ontheNovember3,2009,ballotwasproposedbyHouseJointResolution(HJR)132,introducedbyRep.FrankCorteandsponsoredintheSenatebySen.JeffWentworth.Art.17,sec.1oftheConstitution requires that a joint resolution be adopted byatleastatwo-thirdsvoteofthemembershipofeachhouseoftheLegislature(100votesintheHouse,21votesintheSenate)tobepresentedtovoters.Thegovernorcannot veto a joint resolution.

Amendmentsmaybeproposedineitherregularorspecial sessions. A joint resolution includes the text of theproposedconstitutionalamendmentandspecifiesanelectiondate.Ajointresolutionmayincludemorethanoneproposedamendment.Forexample,HJR14byCorte,adoptedbythe81stLegislatureearlierthisyear,includes two propositions to amend the Constitution on thisyear’sballot:onerestrictinguseofeminentdomainauthorityandanotherestablishingaNationalResearchUniversityFundtoassistemergingresearchuniversities.HJR36byOttoincludesthreeseparatepropositionstoamendtheConstitution,eachconcerningpropertytaxation.Thesecretaryofstateconductsarandomdrawing to assign each proposition a ballot number if more than one proposition is being considered.

Ifvotersrejectanamendmentproposal,theLegislaturemayresubmitit.Forexample,thevotersrejected a proposition authorizing $300 million in general obligation bonds for college student loans at an August 10,1991,election,thenapprovedanidenticalpropositionattheNovember5,1991,electionaftertheLegislaturereadoptedtheproposalandresubmitteditinessentiallythe same form.

Ballot wording

TheballotwordingofapropositionisspecifiedinthejointresolutionadoptedbytheLegislature,which has broad discretion concerning the wording. In rejecting challenges to the ballot language for proposed amendments,thecourtsgenerallyhaveruledthatballotlanguageissufficientifitdescribestheproposedamendmentwithsuchdefinitenessandcertaintythatvoters will not be misled. The courts have assumed that voters become familiar with the proposed amendments beforereachingthepollsandthattheydonotdecidehowtovotesolelyonthebasisoftheballotlanguage.

Election date

TheLegislaturemaycallanelectionforvoterconsideration of proposed constitutional amendments onanydate,aslongaselectionauthoritieshaveenoughtime to provide notice to the voters and print the ballots. Forexample,earlyinits2007regularsession,the80thLegislatureadoptedSJR13byAveritt,aproposedconstitutional amendment to make a proportionate reductionintheschoolpropertytaxfreezeamountfortheelderlyanddisabled,andsettheelectionforSaturday,May12,2007,auniformelectiondatewhenmanylocaljurisdictionsalsoheldelections.Inrecentyears,including2009,mostproposalshavebeensubmittedattheNovembergeneralelectionheldinodd-numberedyears.However,anotherrecentexceptionwasin2003,whenalljoint resolutions proposing constitutional amendments adoptedbythe78thLegislatureduringits2003regularsessionsetSaturday,September13,2003,astheelectiondate.

Publication

TexasConstitution,Art.17,sec.1requiresthatabriefexplanatorystatementofthenatureofeachproposedamendment,alongwiththeballotwordingforeach,bepublished twice in each newspaper in the state that prints officialnotices.Thefirstnoticemustbepublished50to60daysbeforetheelection.Thesecondnoticemustbepublishedonthesamedayofthefollowingweek.Also,

House Research Organization

Proposition

Page 3

thesecretaryofstatemustsendacompletecopyofeachamendmenttoeachcountyclerk,whomustpostitinthecourthouseatleast30dayspriortotheelection.

Thesecretaryofstatepreparestheexplanatorystatement,whichmustbeapprovedbytheattorneygeneral,andarrangesfortherequirednewspaperpublication. The estimated total cost of publication twice innewspapersacrossthestateis$90,882,accordingtothe Legislative Budget Board.

Enabling legislation

Someconstitutionalamendmentsareself-enactingand require no additional legislation to implement their provisions.OtheramendmentsgrantdiscretionaryauthoritytotheLegislaturetoenactlegislationina

particular area or within certain guidelines. These amendmentsrequire“enabling”legislationtofillinthe details of how the amendment would operate. The Legislatureoftenadoptsenablinglegislationinadvance,making the effective date of the legislation contingent on voter approval of a particular amendment. If voters rejecttheamendment,thelegislationdependentontheconstitutional change does not take effect.

Effective date

Constitutional amendments take effect when the officialvotecanvassconfirmsstatewidemajorityapproval,unlessalaterdateisspecified.Statewideelectionresultsaretabulatedbythesecretaryofstateandmustbecanvassedbythegovernor15to30daysfollowing the election.


revious Election ResultsPProposition 1: Transferring constitutional facilities funding for Angelo State University FOR 696,426 66.3% AGAINST 353,922 33.7%

Proposition 2: Authorizing general obligation bonds to finance student loans FOR 718,282 65.8% AGAINST 372,659 34.2%

Proposition 3: Annual 10 percent cap on increases in homestead taxable value FOR 769,908 71.5% AGAINST 306,830 28.5%

Proposition 4: General obligation bonds for state agency construction and repair projects FOR 627,609 58.2% AGAINST 451,440 41.8%

Proposition 5: Allowing a temporary property tax freeze for smaller city development FOR 690,650 66.0% AGAINST 355,583 34.0%

Proposition 6: Property tax exemption for a personal vehicle used for business activities FOR 800,005 73.7% AGAINST 285,537 26.3%

Proposition 7: Selling property acquired through eminent domain to former owner at original price FOR 867,973 80.3% AGAINST 212,555 19.7%

Proposition 8: Revisions to home equity loan provisions FOR 823,189 77.6% AGAINST 238,136 22.4%

Proposition 9: Exempting residence homesteads of totally disabled veterans from property taxation FOR 932,418 86.2% AGAINST 149,275 13.8%

Proposition 10: Deleting constitutional references to county office of inspector of hides and animals FOR 806,652 76.6% AGAINST 246,914 23.4%

Proposition 11: Requiring legislators to cast record votes on final passage FOR 893,686 84.5% AGAINST 163,553 15.5%

Proposition 12: Authorizing $5 billion in general obligation bonds for highway improvements FOR 670,186 62.6% AGAINST 400,383 37.4%

Proposition 13: Allowing judges to deny bail in certain cases involving family violence FOR 916,173 83.9% AGAINST 176,189 16.1%

Proposition 14: Permitting judges reaching mandatory retirement age to finish their terms FOR 814,148 75.0% AGAINST 271,245 25.0%

Proposition 15: Authorizing general obligation bonds to fund cancer research FOR 673,763 61.5% AGAINST 422,647 38.5%

Proposition 16: Bonds for water and sewer services to economically distressed areas FOR 650,533 60.8% AGAINST 419,914 39.2%

AnalysesofthesixteenproposalsontheNovember6,2007,ballotappearinHouseResearchOrganizationFocusReportNo.80-8,Constitutional Amendments Proposed for November 2007 Ballot,August24,2007.

Source: Secretary of State’s Office


Proposition1

Page 5

AuthorizingcityandcountyfinancingtobuybufferareasnearmilitaryinstallationsHJR132byCorte(Wentworth)

Background

TexasConstitution,Art.3,sec.52prohibitstheLegislaturefromauthorizinganycounty,city,town,orother political subdivision to lend its credit or to grant publicmoneyorathingofvaluetoaidanyindividual,association,orcorporation.Thesectionhasbeenamendedseveraltimes,includingtheadditionofsec.52-a,whichauthorizesaloanorgrantofpublicmoneyfor economic development purposes.

TaxCode,ch.311governstheuseoftaxincrementfinancing.Localgovernmentsusetaxincrementfinancingtomakestructuralimprovementsandinfrastructure enhancements within a designated reinvestment area. These improvements often are undertakentopromotetheviabilityofexistingbusinesses and to attract new commercial enterprises to the area. The costs of the improvements are repaid byfuturetaxrevenuesderivedfromthepropertyinthearea.

Digest

Proposition 1 would authorize the Legislature to allow cities and counties to issue bonds or notes to financetheacquisitionofbufferareasoropenspacesnexttomilitaryinstallationstopreventencroachmentortoconstructroadways,utilities,orotherinfrastructuretoprotectorpromotethemissionofthemilitaryinstallation.Thecityorcountycouldpledgeincreasesinpropertytaxrevenuesfromtheareatorepaythebondsor notes.

Theballotproposalreads:“Theconstitutionalamendmentauthorizingthefinancing,includingthroughtaxincrementfinancing,oftheacquisitionbymunicipalitiesandcountiesofbufferareasoropenspacesadjacenttoamilitaryinstallationfortheprevention of encroachment or for the construction of roadways,utilities,orotherinfrastructuretoprotectorpromotethemissionofthemilitaryinstallation.”

Supporters say

Proposition1isnecessarytograntclear,specificauthorization for cities and counties to use bonds or notestobuylandtocreatebufferareasaroundmilitaryinstallations. Questions have been raised about whether citiesandcountieshavethisconstitutionalauthority,andProposition1wouldsettlethosequestions.Whilelocalentitiescurrentlymayissuebondstobuylandinblightedareasthatmeetcertainurbanrenewalcriteria,landaroundmilitaryinstallationsoftendoesnotmeetthese criteria.

Proposition 1 would allow cities and counties to addressagrowingneedtoprotectmilitaryinstallationsfromencroachmentbypreventingorlimitingdevelopment of the surrounding area. Texas is home tonumerousmilitaryinstallations,andinsomeareas,commercial and residential development has moved closerandclosertothefacilities,resultinginproblemsforboththemilitaryfacilitiesandthoseinvolvedinthedevelopment.Forexample,homesandschoolsmaybeincompatiblewithartilleryexercisesorothermilitarytraining.Inothercases,excessivelightfromnearbydevelopmentscanmakemilitaryoperationsdifficult.Inatleastonecase,atSanAntonio’sCampBullis,development has reduced trees and foliage around the installationandmayhaveforcedendangeredspeciesandotherwildlifeintotheboundariesofthefacility.Theseproblemscanmakeitdifficultforthefacilitiestoperformorexpandtheirmissions,whichultimatelycould lead to closure of the base.

Proposition 1 would give local governments a tool to help prevent and address the problems that come withtheencroachmentofdevelopmentnearmilitaryinstallations. Cities and counties would be able to issue bonds or notes to raise the funds to purchase land around militaryinstallationsasabufferzoneortoconstructinfrastructure,suchasroadsorutilities,todivertthepath of future development from the installation or otherwisepromotethemissionoftheinstallation.Whilethelandaroundmilitaryinstallationsmaybeprotected


throughland-userestrictions,zoning,orothermethods,Proposition 1 would give cities the additional option of purchasing the land.

It would be appropriate to allow the Legislature to authorize cities and counties to expend public fundsforthepublicpurposeofaidinglocalmilitaryinstallations because of the vital role the installations playinthenation’ssecurityandtheirimportancetolocaleconomies.Militaryfacilitiesoftenserveasthecornerstonesoflocaleconomies,providingjobsandothereconomicbenefits,andProposition1wouldgivecitiesandcountiesawaytoprotectthesebenefits.Proposition 1 would ensure that expenditures of public fundswereappropriatebyrequiringthattheybespentonlyforbufferzonestopreventencroachmentorforinfrastructure to protect or promote the mission of the militaryinstallation.

Proposition1wouldnotforceanylocaljurisdictiontoissuebondsortoincreasetaxes.AnydecisiontousetheauthorityinProposition1wouldbemadeonthelocallevel,andbondsornoteswouldhavetobeapprovedlocally,eitherbyvotersorthegoverningbodyofthecityorcounty.Uncheckedencroachmentonmilitaryinstallationscouldleadtointerferenceinthefacilities’mission,orevenclosure,whichcouldharmalocaleconomyandtaxpayersmorethanwouldalocallyapproved bond issue. Cities and counties would have the additionaloptionofusingtaxincrementfinancingbypledgingincreasesoraportionofincreasesinpropertytaxrevenueinaspecifiedzonetotherepaymentofthebonds or notes issued.

Proposition1wouldnotinanywayencouragethe use of eminent domain or change current law on acquiringpropertyforapublicpurpose.Proposition1could result in fewer proposed takings of land through eminentdomainbecausecitiescouldturnfirsttousingbond proceeds to purchase land at market value and in

somecasescouldbuythelandforaplannedbufferzoneyearsbeforetheywouldhaveconsideredusingeminentdomain to acquire the land.

Opponents say

Whileprotectingmilitarybasesisaworthygoal,cities and counties should not be given another reason toincreasepropertytaxes.Higherpropertytaxesusedtofinancebondstopurchaselandorbuildinfrastructurecouldoverburdenpropertyownerswhoalreadycarryaheavyload.Proposition1couldfurtherincreasethetaxburdenonotherpropertyownersifitresultedinlandinapotentialbufferzonebeingpurchasedbyacityorcountyand,aspubliclyownedproperty,nolongercouldbe taxed.

Notes

HB4130byCorte,theenablinglegislationforProposition1,wasplacedontheGeneralStateCalendarin the House during the 2009 regular session of the 81st Legislature,butdiedwhennofurtheractionwastaken.HB 4130 would have authorized cities and counties to issuebondsornotes,includingtaxincrementbondsor notes authorized under the state’s Tax Increment FinancingAct,tofinancetheacquisitionofbufferareasoropenspacesadjacenttomilitaryinstallations.Thebufferareaswouldhavebeensolelyforthepreventionofencroachmentorfortheconstructionofroadways,utilities,orotherinfrastructuretoprotectorpromotethemissionofthemilitaryinstallation.IfHB4130hadbeenapprovedbytheLegislature,itwouldhavetakeneffectDecember1,2009,ifaconstitutionalamendmentsuchas Proposition 1 authorizing the Legislature to enact suchlegislationwereapprovedbythevoters.


Proposition2

Page 7

Proposition

Requiring appraisal of residence homesteads basedsolelyontheirhomesteadvalueHJR36byOtto(Williams)

Background TexasConstitution,Art.8,sec.1requiresallrealandtangiblepersonalpropertytobetaxedinproportionto its value. Determining the “highest and best use” of aparticularpieceofpropertyisagenerallyacceptedpropertyappraisaltechniqueusedtohelpdeterminethemarketvalueofrealproperty.Amongrealestateappraisers,“highestandbestuse”isthatwhichislegallypermissible,physicallypossible,financiallyfeasible,andmostprofitable.ThetermisnotdefinedbytheTaxCode.

Digest

Proposition2wouldamendArt.8,sec.1oftheTexas Constitution to authorize the Legislature to provide for taxation of a residence homestead based solelyontheproperty’svalueasaresidencehomestead,regardlessofwhethertheresidentialuseofthepropertybytheownerwasconsideredthehighestandbestuseoftheproperty.

Theballotproposalreads:“Theconstitutionalamendment authorizing the legislature to provide for theadvaloremtaxationofaresidencehomesteadsolelyonthebasisoftheproperty’svalueasaresidencehomestead.”

Supporters say

Theconstitutionalrequirementthatpropertybe taxed in proportion to its value has all too often meantthatcountytaxappraisershavevaluedpropertybased on its “highest and best use” rather than on its currentuse.Forexample,aresidentialpropertyinornearacommercialdistrictmaybevaluedbasedonitscommercialpotentialeventhoughitcurrentlyisbeingused as a residence. Proposition 2 and its enabling legislation would require that the market value of a residencehomesteadbedeterminedbyitsvalueasaresidencehomestead,regardlessofwhetherthatisthehighestandbestuseoftheproperty.

SomeTexashomeownershaveseentheirpropertyappraisalsdoubleorevenquadrupleinashortperiod,notbecausethevalueoftheirhomesincreased,butbecausethehighestandbestuseofthelanddramaticallychanged.Whilethe10-percentcaponannualincreasesin taxable value of residence homesteads mitigates the impactoflargeincreasesinappraisedmarketvalue,itstillmeansthateveryyearthetaxesonthepropertywillrisesubstantially.Wherepropertyuseisrestrictedbyzoningregulations,residentialhomesteadsaresomewhatprotected from dramatic changes in highest and best use—forexample,fromresidentialtocommercial.Butthoseareasofthestatenotcoveredbyzoningregulations are susceptible to substantial increases in appraisedvaluebasedsolelyonchangesoflanduseinthe area where the homestead happens to be located.

Texasalreadyprotectscertaintypesofpropertyfromlarge appraisal increases due to changes in highest and bestuse.Forexample,thetaxablevalueofagriculturalortimberlandisappraisedbasedontheland’scapacitytoproduceagriculturalortimberproducts,notonitsmarketvalue,whichusuallyismuchhigher.Residencehomesteads do not have such protection.

Proposition 2 would protect Texas homesteads from increasesduetochangesinhighestandbestusebyallowing the Legislature to ensure that the properties wereappraisedonlyonthebasisoftheproperty’svalue as a residence homestead. These protections are especiallynecessarytoprotecthomeownerswhoseneighborhoods are in transition from residential to commercial use. This limitation on the appraisal process wouldapplyonlytoresidencehomesteads,nottootherresidentialpropertysuchasapartmentsorvacationhomes.

Opponents say

Proposition2wouldarbitrarilymovethepropertyappraisalprocessfurtherawayfromatruevaluationofpropertyaccordingtoitsworth.Accordingtosomeestimates,allowingresidentialhomesteadpropertytobevaluedbasedsolelyonitsresidentialuseandexempted


Proposition

from a highest and best use valuation would reduce taxablepropertyvalues,therebyreducinglocaltaxrevenue and requiring a local tax increase or spending cuts to offset the revenue loss. The owners of residence homesteadsalreadyreceiveasubstantialbenefitfromthe10-percentannuallimitationontheincreaseinthetaxablevalueoftheirproperty,plusothervalueexemptionsandtaxfreezesthatownersofothertypesofpropertydonotreceive.

Whenschooldistricts’propertyvaluesperstudentarelower,thestatemustprovideadditionalfundingtothesedistrictsundertheFoundationSchoolProgram’sequalization formulas. The state cannot afford to

increaseitsobligationsinthismanner,especiallywhenstatefinancesareexpectedtobespreadthinoverthenextfewyears.

Notes

HB3613byOtto,theenablinglegislationenactedbythe81stLegislatureduringits2009regularsessionandsignedbythegovernor,wouldrequirethatthelandof a residence homestead be appraised as a residence and not based on the highest and best use of the property.Thisprovisionwouldtakeeffectonlyifvotersapprove Proposition 2.


Proposition3

Page 9

Proposition

Allowing state enforcement of uniform propertyappraisalstandardsandproceduresHJR36byOtto(Williams)

Background

TexasConstitution,Art.8,sec.23(b)requiresthatthe administrative and judicial enforcement of uniform standardsandproceduresforappraisalofpropertyforproperty(advalorem)taxpurposesbeprescribedbystatuteandoriginateinthecountywherethetaxisimposed.

Digest

Proposition 3 would remove the current constitutional requirement that administrative and judicial enforcement of uniform standards and proceduresforpropertyappraisaloriginateinthecountywhere the tax is imposed.

Theballotproposalreads:“Theconstitutionalamendment providing for uniform standards and proceduresfortheappraisalofpropertyforadvaloremtax purposes.”

Supporters say

Proposition 3 would authorize the Legislature to enact laws that would require local appraisal districts to follow best practices and standard procedures to ensure appropriate and accurate appraisals that determine thevalueofpropertyfortaxationpurposes.StatewideuniformityandequityofappraisalprocessescanbeachievedonlybyamendingtheTexasConstitutiontoallowdirectstateenforcementauthorityandoversightoflocal appraisals.

Propertyownersacrossthestatehaveseenlargeincreasesintheappraisedvalueoftheirproperty.Manypropertyownersclaimtheseincreasesareinequitableandarecausedbydifferinglocalappraisalpracticesandmethodsacrossdifferentappraisaldistricts.However,the Texas Constitution requires that administrative and judicial enforcement of uniform standards and proceduresforappraisalofpropertyoriginatein

thecountywherethetaxisimposed.Thisprovisionhas been interpreted to mean that the state has little meaningfulsupervisoryoradministrativepoweroverthestandards and methods that local appraisal districts use tovalueproperty.

PropertylocatedinoneTexascountyshouldbeappraised in the same manner and according to the same rulesassimilarpropertylocatedinanotherTexascounty.Taxpayersshouldbeabletoenforceuniformityandequitythroughmeaningfulstateoversight.Proposition3wouldallowthestatetooverseetheappraisalsystemdirectlyandtakethenecessaryactiontoaddressinequitiesandinconsistenciesinpropertyappraisal.

Opponents say

Proposition3isunnecessary.ThestatealreadyexertsinfluenceoverpropertyappraisalstandardsandpracticesthroughtrainingprovidedtoappraisersbythestateComptroller’sOfficeandthroughthecomptroller’sannualpropertytaxstudy.Inthepropertytaxstudy,thestatecomparesitsownpropertyvaluefindingstotheappraisalvaluesproducedbylocalappraisaldistricts.Ifthelocalvaluesvarytoomuchfromthosearrivedatbythestate,localschooldistrictsrisklosingsomestatefunding.Thepropertyvaluestudyalreadyprovidessufficientenforcementandincentivesforlocalappraisaldistrictstoproduceaccuratepropertyvaluations.

Proposition 3 could lead to a loss of local control. Countyappraisaldistrictsknowtheirlocalmarketsandeconomicrealitiesbetterthanstateofficialsdo.Enforcing standards at the state level could impose a one-size-fits-allsolutionthatmightnotproducethemostaccurate appraisals for each local district.

The Legislature did not enact enabling legislation for Proposition 3. It would be better for the electorate to wait and see what kind of laws the Legislature proposes toenforcestatewideuniformityoflocalappraisalstandardsbeforegrantingbroadauthoritytotheLegislature to enact such laws.


Proposition4

Proposition Proposition

Establishing the National Research UniversityFundHJR14byCorte(Duncan)

Background

TexasConstitution,Art.7,sec.17authorizestwohigher education funds to provide capital support for Texas public institutions of higher education that are not eligible to receive proceeds from the Permanent UniversityFund(PUF),theendowmentthatsupportscapitalspendingatcertaininstitutionsoftheUniversityofTexasandtheTexasA&Msystems.Oneofthefunds,thePermanentHigherEducationFund(PHEF),wasestablishedbytheLegislaturestartingin1995undertheauthorityofArt.7,sec.17(i)andwasintendedeventuallytobecomeapermanentendowmenttosupportnon-PUFinstitutions.From1996to2001,thePHEFendowmentreceivedappropriationsofabout$50millionperyear.Infiscal2002,the$50millionappropriationwasreduced,andtheLegislaturehasmadenoappropriationstothePHEFendowmentsince2003.The estimated current value of the corpus is about $500 million.

Whilethenon-PUFinstitutionshavenotyetbenefitedfromthePHEFendowment,since1985theyhave received capital spending support through annual appropriationsrequiredbyArt.7,sec.17,knownastheHigherEducationFund(HEF).TheHEFconsistsofgeneral revenue fund appropriations of no less than $100 millionperyear,andeachofthenon-PUFinstitutionsreceives at least a minimum annual allocation amount setbystatute.Institutionsmayusetheirallocationstoacquireland,constructandequipbuildingsorotherpermanentimprovements,repairorrehabilitatebuildings,orpurchasecapitalequipment,librarybooks,andlibrarymaterials.TheyalsomayusetheirallocationstopaydebtserviceonHEF-backedbonds.Forfiscal2010-11,theLegislatureappropriated$525millionfortheHEFallocations.

The Constitution requires that investment income ofthePHEFendowmentbecreditedbacktothefunduntil the fund balance reaches $2 billion. As with the PUF,thecorpusofthePHEFcannotbespent.Whenthefundbalancereaches$2billion,90percentofthe

incomegeneratedbytheendowmentwillbedistributedannuallytothenon-PUFinstitutionsandwillreplacetheconstitutionallyguaranteedHEFgeneral-revenueallocations.

Texashasthreetier-oneresearchuniversities,alsocalledflagshipuniversities—theUniversityofTexasatAustinandTexasA&MUniversity,bothpublic,state-supportedinstitutions,andRiceUniversity,aprivateinstitution. “Tier one” is used to describe the status associatedwithhigh-performingresearchuniversities.Some attributes of these institutions include membership in the American Association of Universities; at least $100millioninfederalresearchgrantsannually;thesizeofendowments;thequalityofthefacultyandthenumberoffacultywithmembershipinoneofthenationalacademies;thenumberoffacultyawards;thenumber of doctorates awarded; and selective admissions.

The Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board classifiesresearchuniversitiesintwocategories:research universities and emerging research universities. The public institutions designated as emerging research universitiesinTexasare:

TexasTechUniversity;•theUniversityofTexasatArlington;•theUniversityofTexasatDallas;•theUniversityofTexasatElPaso;•theUniversityofTexasatSanAntonio;•theUniversityofHouston;and•theUniversityofNorthTexas.•

Digest

Proposition4wouldamendTexasConstitution,Art.7byaddingsec.20toestablishtheNationalResearchUniversityFund(NRUF)forthestatedpurposeofprovidingadedicated,independent,andequitablesourceof funding to enable emerging research universities in this state to achieve national prominence as major research universities.


Proposition

Page 11

The balance of the Permanent Higher Education Fund(PHEF)endowmentwouldbetransferredtothecreditoftheNRUFasofJanuary1,2010,andtheconstitutionalauthorizationforthePHEFendowmentwouldberepealed.TheNRUFwouldconsistofmoneytransferredordepositedtothefundandanyinterestor other return on investment assets of the fund. The Legislature could dedicate state revenue to the fund.

EligibilitycriteriaforreceivingdistributionsfromthefundwouldbeestablishedbytheLegislature.Eligible state universities could use distributions fromthefundonlyforthesupportandmaintenanceof educational and general activities that promoted increasedresearchcapacityattheuniversity.Eligibleinstitutionsthatreceiveddistributionsinatwo-yearbudgetperiod(fiscalbiennium)wouldremaineligibleinsubsequentbudgetperiods.TheUniversityofTexasatAustinandTexasA&MUniversitywouldnotbeeligibletoreceivemoneyfromthefund.

TheLegislaturewouldadministerthefund,whichwould be invested in the manner and according to standardsforinvestmentofthePermanentUniversityFund.Theportionofthetotalreturnoninvestmentassets of the fund that would be available for appropriationinatwo-yearbudgetperiodwouldbetheportionnecessarytoprovide,asnearlyaspracticable,astable and predictable stream of annual distributions to eligible state universities and to maintain the purchasing power of the investment assets of the fund.

Everytwo-yearbudgetperiod,theLegislaturewouldbe required to allocate or provide for the allocation of fundstoeligiblestateuniversities.Themoneywouldbe allocated based on an equitable formula established bytheLegislatureoranagencydesignatedbytheLegislature. The Legislature would have to review and adjusttheformulaattheendofeachtwo-yearbudgetperiod.

Ineachtwo-yearbudgetperiod,theLegislaturecould appropriate all or a portion of the total return onallinvestmentassetsoftheNRUFforthepurposesof the fund. The Legislature could not increase distributions from the fund if the purchasing power of investmentassetsforanyrolling10-yearperiodwerenot preserved. The amount appropriated from the fund inanyfiscalyearwouldbecappedat7percentoftheinvestment assets’ average net fair market value. Until

the fund had been invested long enough to determine the purchasingpowerovera10-yearperiod,theLegislaturecould authorize another means of preserving the purchasing power of the fund.

Theballotproposalreads:“Theconstitutionalamendmentestablishingthenationalresearchuniversityfund to enable emerging research universities in this state to achieve national prominence as major research universities and transferring the balance of the higher educationfundtothenationalresearchuniversityfund.”

Supporters say

Proposition4anditsenablinglegislation,HB51byBranch,wouldestablishapathwayforemergingresearchuniversitiesinTexastoachievenationallyrecognized,tier-onestatus.Theproposedamendmentwouldestablishafundthatwouldbeadedicated,long-term source of funding for eligible institutions. It would transferthelong-dormantpermanentHEFendowmenttoaNationalResearchUniversityFundforthepurposeofboostingstate-supportedresearchuniversitiestonationalprominence.Itwouldnotaffectnordiminishtheyearlydistribution of general revenue allocations that provide capitalspendingsupportforthenon-PUFinstitutions.

TheneedforahighlyeducatedworkforceinTexascannotbeoverstated,andProposition4wouldbeaneweffortinpursuingthatgoal.Tier-oneuniversities,generallydefinedasthosethatannuallycommitmorethan$100milliontoresearch,arecriticalinkeepingthe state in the forefront of research as competition increasesfortalent,ideas,andeconomicdevelopment.IfTexasistoachieveagloballycompetitiveworkforce,it must make dramatic gains in the education of its population.Tier-oneuniversitiesareoneofthebestwaystodevelopahighlyskilledworkforce,especiallyinthesciences,engineering,andprofessionalfieldscritical to economic success.

Texastrailsotherstatesinthenumberoftier-oneresearchuniversities.Californiahasninetier-oneuniversities,andNewYorkhasseven.Lackofmajorresearch and development infrastructure is costing Texas billionsofdollarseveryyearinlostopportunitiestoattract research funding.


Texas has a population of more than 24 million and onlythreetier-oneinstitutions:UT-AustinandTexasA&MUniversity,whicharepublic,andRiceUniversity,whichisprivate.Itisnosurprisethatthestate’stop-notch public institutions have more applicants than theycanadmit.Texasislosingmorethan10,000highschoolgraduatesayeartodoctoral-grantinguniversitiesinotherstates.Atthesametime,thestateisrecruitingonly4,000studentsperyearfromotherstates,resultinginanetlossof6,000studentsayear.Thepresenceofadditionaltier-oneuniversitieswouldexpandtheeducational opportunities available to Texas students and keep more of them in the state. AprincipalreasontheUniversityofTexasatAustinandTexasA&MUniversityhavereachedtheleveloftier-onestatusislong-term,sustainedfundingfromthePermanentUniversityFund.Proposition4proposestotaptheunusedfundsintheinactivePHEFendowmentbecausetwo-yearappropriationsalonecannotcreateatier-oneuniversity.Havingdedicated,guaranteedfunding would allow emerging research institutions toachievetier-onestatus,whichwouldallowthemtoattract and retain top talent while generating important research.

Theeligibilitycriteriasetbystatuteforreceivingdistributions from the fund should be stringent because Texasuniversitiesstrivingfortier-onestatuswouldbecompetingnotonlywitheachother,butnationally.Currently,noneofthesevenuniversitiesdesignatedasemergingresearchinstitutionsmeetstheeligibilityrequirements,whichwouldsethighgoalsforwhichtheywouldhavetostrivetoattaintier-onestatus.

Opponents say

Whilethegoalofaddingnewtop-tierstateuniversitiesislaudable,inthistimeofeconomicdownturnandfiscalrestraintTexasshouldfocusmoreofitslimitedresources,includingthefundsinthePHEFendowment,onthoseinstitutionsthataretheclosesttoattainingtier-onestatus.Becauseoftheurgencyofdevelopingmorenationallycompetitiveresearchuniversities,itwouldmakemoresensetotargetthoseemerging research institutions farthest along the path to attainingnationaltier-onestatusratherthanspreadtoothinlyfundingforallseveninstitutionsdesignatedasemerging research universities.

Other opponents say

The funding criteria in the enabling legislation couldbetoodifficultforsomeinstitutions—especiallyhistoricallyunderfundedinstitutionsandthosethatprimarilyserveminorities—toachieve.Someinstitutionswouldstartatadisadvantagebecausetheyhave not been granting doctoral degrees as long as others,andtheeligibilitycriteriawouldperpetuatethisdisadvantage. The number of doctoral degrees required should be lower or the populations served should be taken into account. Targeting areas of population growth,especiallytheborderregion,wouldmakemoresenseifthestatewereseriousaboutservinghigh-growth,underservedareas.

Notes

HB51byBranch,theenablinglegislationenactedbythe81stLegislatureduringits2009regularsessionandsignedbythegovernor,wouldestablisheligibilitycriteria for institutions to receive distributions from theNationalResearchUniversityFund.ThisprovisionwouldtakeeffectonlyifvotersapproveProposition4.ThebillstipulatesthatmoneycouldnotbedistributedfromtheNRUFbeforethetwo-yearstatebudgetperiodbeginningSeptember1,2011.Aninstitutionwouldhavetomeetspecificcriteria,includingbeingdesignatedasanemergingresearchuniversity,andwouldhavetospend $45 million in restricted research funds for two consecutiveyears.Institutionsalsowouldhavetomeetfourofsixcriteria:

an endowment of at least $400 million;•the awarding of at least 200 doctor of •philosophydegreesineachofthetwopreviousyears;top-flightfaculty,basedonprofessional•achievementandrecognition,includingmembership in national academies; high-achievingfreshmenfortwoyears;•designation as a member of the Association of •Research Libraries or its equivalent; and high-qualitygraduatelevelprograms,based•onthenumberofgraduatelevelprograms,admissionstandardsforthoseprograms,andlevel of institutional support for graduate students.


Proposition

Page 13

HJR14includestwounrelatedpropositionsproposing two different constitutional amendments. HJR14originallyproposedonlyachangeineminentdomainauthority,butwasamendedlateinthe2009regular session to add the provisions of Proposition 4,whichwouldconvertthecorpusofthePermanentHigherEducationFundendowmentintoanewNationalResearchUniversityFund.Proposition11,theeminentdomainprovisionsinHJR14,isdiscussedstartingonpage 25 of this report.


Proposition5

Proposition5Allowing consolidated boards of

equalization for appraisal districtsHJR36byOtto(Williams)

Background

TexasConstitution,Art.8,sec.18(c)requirestheLegislaturetoprovideforasingleboardofequalization,alsoknownasanappraisalreviewboard,foreachentitythatappraisesthevalueofpropertyfortaxationpurposes.TaxCode,sec.6.41establishesanappraisalreview board for each appraisal district. An appraisal review board is authorized to resolve disputes between taxpayersandtheappraisaldistrict.Theboard’sprimaryfunction is to hear appeals of the appraised value of taxableproperty.UnderArt.8,sec.18(c),themembersof the appraisal review board must be residents of the areacoveredbytheappraisaldistrictandmaynotbeelectedofficialsofeitheracountyorthegoverningbodyofanothergovernmentalentitythatleviestaxes.

MostTexascountiesarecoveredbytheirowncentralappraisaldistricts.RandallandPottercounties,whichcontainAmarillo,shareaconsolidatedappraisaldistrict but have separate appraisal review boards.

Digest

Proposition5wouldamendTexasConstitution,Art.8,sec18(c)toallowtwoormoreadjoiningappraisal districts to form a single consolidated board of equalization(appraisalreviewboard).

Theballotproposalreads:“Theconstitutionalamendment authorizing the legislature to authorize a single board of equalization for two or more adjoining appraisal entities that elect to provide for consolidated equalizations.”

Supporters say

Proposition 5 would authorize the Legislature to allow adjoining counties to form consolidated appraisal reviewboards,whichcouldoperatemoreefficiently

thanseparateboards.Manysparselypopulatedcountieshaveadifficulttimefindingenoughqualifiedandwilling candidates to sit on their appraisal review boards. Proposition 5 would allow counties to join togetherandpooltheirtalent.Havingfullystaffedandqualifiedappraisalreviewboardswouldhelpensureamoreprofessional,equitable,andtimelyappraisalreview process.

TheConstitutionalreadyallowstheLegislaturetoauthorizecountiestoconsolidateappraisalservices,and Proposition 5 also would allow consolidation of the appraisal review boards that consider appeals of appraisals. Counties that share appraisal functions report significantsavingsandimprovementsinefficiencyandquality.Countiesshouldbeallowedtoshareappraisalreview board functions as well. Counties that chose to establish joint appraisal review boards would have to be contiguous,soboardmemberswouldbeneighboringresidents familiar with valuation issues in their immediate area.

Opponents say

Onlyresidentsofanappraisaldistrictshoulddecideappealsofappraisalsofpropertylocatedinthat district. Local appraisal review boards know their countymarketsandlocaleconomicrealities.Bringinginoutsidersfromanothercountycouldresultinalossoflocal control of a local issue.

Notes

HB3611byOtto,theenablinglegislationenactedbythe81stLegislatureduringits2009regularsessionandsignedbythegovernor,wouldallowtheboardsof directors of two or more adjoining central appraisal districts to form a consolidated appraisal review board byinter-localcontract.ThisprovisionwouldtakeeffectonlyifvotersapproveProposition5.


Proposition6

Page 15

Proposition

Renewing Veterans’ Land Board bond authorityforlandandmortgageloansHJR116byCorte(VandePutte)

Background

TheVeterans’LandBoard(VLB),establishedbyTexasConstitution,Art.3,sec.49-b,issuesandsellsstategeneralobligationbondstofinancelandpurchasesand mortgage loans for Texas veterans. The VLB administers these programs through the General Land Office.Becausethebondsarebackedbythestate’scredit,themoneyraisedthroughissuanceofthebondsisrepaidatalowerrateofinterest,whichinturnallowsalower-than-marketinterestrateonthehousingandland-purchaseloanstoveteransfinancedbythebonds.

Through the Veterans’ Housing Assistance Program (VHAP),theVLBmakeshomemortgageloansofupto$325,000towardthepurchaseofahomebyqualifiedTexas veterans. VHAP loans are funded with bond proceedsandothermoneydepositedintotheVeterans’HousingAssistanceFundortheVeterans’HousingAssistanceFundII.

TheTexasVeterans’LandProgram(VLP)providesupto$80,000inloanstoqualifiedveteranstopurchasetracts of land of at least one acre. The VLB purchases the tract of land in which the Texas veteran is interested and resells it to the interested person. VLP loans are fundedwithbondproceedsandothermoneydepositedintotheVeterans’LandFund. Since1946,votershaveapproved,inincrements,a total of $4 billion in general obligation bonds to fund theVLBland-purchaseprogramand,startingin1983,thehome-mortgageloanprogram.Themostrecentbondauthorizationfortheseprograms,in2001,authorizedtheVLB to issue up to $500 million in additional general obligationbondstoprovidehome-mortgageloanstoTexas veterans.

TexasConstitution,Art.3,sec.49-jlimitstheamountofstatedebtthatmaybeissuedthatispayablefromtheGeneralRevenueFund.Thelimitationdoesnotapplytobondsthatarereasonablyexpectedtobe paid from other revenue sources and do not draw on general revenue funds. The Bond Review Board classifiesthebondsauthorizedfortheVLB’sveterans’

home-mortgageandland-purchasefinancingprogramsasself-supportinggeneralobligationbondsbecausethebond debt is expected to be paid from revenues received throughtheprogramstheysupport,includinginvestmentincomeandrepaymentoftheprincipalandtheinterestand fees on the loans made to participating veterans.

Digest

Proposition6wouldamendTexasConstitution,Art.3,sec.49-b(w)toauthorizetheVeterans’LandBoardtoprovidefor,issue,andsellstategeneralobligationbonds for the purpose of selling land or providing home-mortgageorland-purchaseloanstoTexasveterans. The principal amount of outstanding bonds never could exceed the total principal amount of state generalobligationbondspreviouslyauthorizedforthesepurposesbypriorconstitutionalamendments. These bonds would not be included in the calculationoftheamountofstatedebtpayablefromtheGeneralRevenueFundusedtodeterminethestatedebtlimitunderArt.3,sec.49-j.ThebondproceedswouldberequiredtobedepositedinorusedtobenefitandaugmenttheVeterans’LandFund,theVeterans’HousingAssistanceFund,ortheVeterans’HousingAssistanceFundII,asdeterminedappropriatebytheVeterans’Land Board.

Theballotproposalreads:“Theconstitutionalamendment authorizing the Veterans’ Land Board to issue general obligation bonds in amounts equal to or lessthanamountspreviouslyauthorized.”

Supporters say

Proposition 6 would help secure uninterrupted bondingauthorityfortheVLBtocontinuefinancingland purchases and home mortgages for Texas veteransatlower-than-marketratesasarewardfortheirservice.TheVLB’scurrentbondingauthoritytofund the Veterans’ Housing Assistance and Veterans’ Landprograms,whichhaveservedmorethan120,000


veteranssincetheirinception,isforecasttobeexhaustedattheendof2009.Proposition6notonlywouldreplenishtheVLB’sbondingauthoritytomeettheshort-termdemandforfinancingtheseprogramsbut would prevent the VLB from having to engage inthecumbersomeprocessofperiodicallyseekingvoterapprovaltofundtheseveterans’benefitsintheforeseeable future.

Proposition 6 would “evergreen” the bonding authorityfortheVeterans’HousingAssistanceandVeterans’Landprograms,meaningthattheVLBcouldissuenewbondstofundtheseprogramsasalready-issued bonds are retired. Voters demonstrated their approvalofthistypeoffundingmechanismin2001whentheyapprovedaconstitutionalamendmentauthorizingadditionalbondauthorityfortheVeterans’HousingAssistanceProgramthatsimilarlyallowsmorebonds to be issued as existing bonds are retired — up tothe$500millionauthorizedbytheamendment.Proposition6simplywouldtakethisapproachastepfurtherby“evergreening”allofthebondingauthoritythatvoterspreviouslyhaveapprovedfortheVLBloanprograms.

Overtheyears,votershaveapprovedconstitutionalamendments authorizing issuance of a total of $4 billion inbondsforfinancingveterans’landpurchasesandhomeloans.Almostallofthosebondshavebeenissued,butabout$2billionofthebondsissuedyearsagohavesince been retired or redeemed. If Proposition 6 were approved,this$2billion,aswellastheprincipalamountofanyexistingbondsretiredinthefuture,stillwouldbeavailable to fund the VLB loan programs.

Underthecurrentsystem,theamountofbondspreviouslyissuedandeventuallypaidoffcountsagainst the total amount of bonds authorized to be issued,despitethefactthatthosebondsnolongerareoutstanding and the debt has been retired. Even though thevoterspreviouslyhaveapprovedmorethanenoughbondcapacitytosatisfytheneedsoftheloanprograms,theymustbeaskedonceagaintoauthorizeadditionalbondcapacitywhennewfundingisneeded.

Because of the limited rate at which new program fundingisrequired,thefundingmechanisminProposition6likelywouldmeanthattheVLBwouldneveragainneedtoseeknewbondauthorityfortheVeterans’ Housing Assistance and Veterans’ Land

programs.Useoftheprogramsislimitedbyveterans’demandforloans,aswellasaprohibitioninfederaltaxlawagainstissuingmorethan$250millioninqualifiedveterans’mortgagebondsperyear.

Proposition 6 would make obtaining funding for the Veterans’ Housing Assistance and Veterans’ Land programsmorestableandefficient.Historically,whenfundingfortheseprogramshasbeenexhausted,thevoters have had to approve new funding in increments of up to $500 million. If funding is exhausted sooner thanexpected,someveteransmaybeunabletoobtaintheprogrambenefitstheyseekuntiltheLegislatureandthevotershaveapprovedadditionalbondingauthority.

The “evergreening” process that would be authorizedbyProposition6alsowouldbesafeforTexastaxpayers.TheVLB’sveterans’loanprogramsareself-sufficient.Thebondobligationsarefullypaidwithfundinvestmentincomeandwiththeprincipal,interest,andfeepaymentsmadebyparticipatingveterans.Theserevenue sources provide stable funding for the program. Because the VLB uses conservative underwriting standardsforitsloanprograms,theyhistoricallyhavehadaverylowforeclosurerate.Despitetherecenteconomic challenges that have caused foreclosure ratesinothermarketstoskyrocket,theforeclosurerateonlandandhomemortgageloansissuedbytheVLBprograms has remained less than 0.5 percent.

Opponents say

Proposition 6 in effect would authorize the Veterans LandBoardtoissuemorethan$2billioninnewstate-backedbondsfortheveterans’land-purchaseandmortgage-loanprograms,aconsiderableexpansionofstatedebt.Voterswouldbere-authorizingtheissuanceofbondsoriginallyauthorizedaslongas60yearsagoand since paid off and retired.

Statebondsarelong-termdebtandgenerallyarenotissuedandultimatelyretireduntildecadesaftertheyoriginallywereauthorizedbythevoters.ThereauthorizationofbondsallowedbyProposition6shouldapplyonlytothosebondspreviouslyauthorizedandretiredasofthisyear,andanybondsretiredinthefutureshouldhavetobereauthorizedbythevotersbeforetheycouldbereissuedasstatedebt.


Proposition7

Page 17

PropositionProposition

Allowing members of the Texas State Guard toholdcivilofficeHJR127byP.King(Carona)

Background

TexasConstitution,Art.16,sec.40prohibitsacivilofficialfromholdingmorethanonecivilofficeforwhichtheofficialispaidunlesstheotherofficeis:

a justice of the peace;•acountycommissioner;•anotarypublic;•a postmaster;•anofficerorenlistedpersonintheNational•Guard,NationalGuardReserve,OfficersReserveCorps,orOrganizedReservesoftheUnited States;aretiredofficerorretiredenlistedpersoninthe•UnitedStatesArmy,AirForce,Navy,MarineCorps,orCoastGuard;aretiredwarrantofficer;or•anofficerordirectorofasoilorwater•conservation district.

Thestate’smilitaryforcesconsistoftheTexasNational Guard and the Texas State Guard. The Texas NationalGuardhastwocomponents:theTexasArmyNational Guard and the Texas Air National Guard. TheTexasNationalGuardmaybeorderedtoactivedutyinthestatebythegovernortoprovidetrainedandequippedmilitarypersonneltoassistcivilauthoritiesintheprotectionoflifeandpropertyandthepreservationoflawandorderinTexas.Italsoisafirst-linereservecomponentoftheU.S.ArmyandAirForceandmaybecalledtoactivefederalservicebythepresidentforwar,nationalemergencies,ornationalsecurityaugmentation.

TheTexasStateGuardisanall-volunteerstatereservemilitaryforce,subjecttoactivedutywhencalledbythegovernortoservethestateinatimeofemergency.TheTexasStateGuardactivelyparticipatesinstatewidecommunityprogramsbyprovidingavarietyofservices,includingsecurity,trafficandcrowdcontrol,andsearchesformissingchildren.TheTexasState Guard provides trained and equipped individuals to supplement the Texas National Guard and replaces the Texas National Guard when that force is called to federal service.

Digest

Proposition7wouldamendTexasConstitution,Art.16,sec.40toaddofficersandenlistedmembersoftheTexasStateGuardandanyothermilitiaormilitaryforceorganized under state law to the exceptions from the prohibitionagainstholdingdualoffices.

Theballotproposalreads:“TheconstitutionalamendmenttoallowanofficerorenlistedmemberoftheTexasStateGuardorotherstatemilitiaormilitaryforcetoholdotherciviloffices.”

Supporters say

Proposition7simplywouldcorrectanoversightintheTexasConstitutionbyaddingofficersandenlistedmembers of the Texas State Guard and other Texas militaryforcestothelistofofficesthatcivilofficialscanholdwhileholdinganotheroffice.Currentexceptionstothedual-office-holdingprohibitionallowofficialstoservetheircountrybyalsoholdingofficeintheNationalGuardandmilitaryreserves.However,theTexasStateGuardandotherTexasstatemilitaryforceswereoverlooked during earlier amendments to this section exempting other members of the National Guard and Reserves.

TheStateGuardhasbeenveryactiveinrecentyearsandprovidesvitalservicestoTexasintimesofdisaster.Manycivilofficialsaremembersorwouldliketo become members of the Texas State Guard or other Texasmilitaryforces.Proposition7wouldallowthemtodosowhilestillholdinganotherciviloffice.BeinganofficerorenlistedpersonintheTexasStateGuardormilitiaisnotincompatiblewithbeingacivilofficial,suchasamemberofacitycouncilorschoolboard.Thereisnoinherentconflictofinterestbetweenthetwooffices,sothereisnoreasonnottoallowapersontoserve in both positions.


Opponents say

Addingnewexceptions,howeverjustified,totheconstitutionalprohibitionagainstdualoffice-holdingonlywouldcompoundtheproblemofrequiringthatspecificofficesbeexcludedbyaconstitutionalamendment.Instead,allspecificexceptionstodualoffice-holdingshouldbeeliminatedfromtheTexasConstitution and replaced with a general prohibition againstholdingtwoofficessimultaneously,whileauthorizingtheLegislaturetomakeanyneededexceptionsbystatute.

Texascourtshavewell-establishedstandardsfordeterminingwhethertwoofficesheldbythesame

personareincompatibleduetooverlappingauthorityorconflictingloyalties.Thesedeterminationsshouldbemadeonacase-by-casebasisratherthantryingtoanticipateeverypotentialexceptionintheConstitution,whichalreadyistoolengthyandneedlesslydetailed.

Notes

SB833byCarona,enactedbythe81stLegislatureduringits2009regularsessionandsignedbythegovernor,statesthatmembershipinthestatemilitaryforcesisnotconsideredacivilofficeofemolument.ThisprovisionwilltakeeffectJanuary10,2010,ifthevoters approve Proposition 7.


Proposition8

Page 19

8Background

About1.7millionveteranscurrentlyliveinTexas.The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs operates nine in-patientveterans’hospitalsinTexas—inAmarillo,BigSpring,Bonham,Dallas,Houston,Kerrville,SanAntonio,Temple,andWaco.Infederalfiscalyear2008,veterans’hospitalsinTexasrecordedalmost51,000in-patientvisitsfromveteransinthestate.TheU.S.Department of Veterans Affairs also contracts with hospitals throughout the state to provide certain services forveteranslivinginareaswherethereisnotanearbyveterans’ hospital or where the local veterans’ hospital isatcapacityandunabletoprovidecare.Forexample,therecurrentlyisnotanin-patientveterans’hospitalintheRioGrandeValley,buttherearecontractfacilitiesinBrownsville,Edinburg,Harlingen,andMcAllenthatprovide certain medical services for veterans.

Digest

Proposition8wouldaddTexasConstitution,Art.16,sec.73toauthorizethestatetocontributemoney,property,andotherresourcestoestablish,maintain,andoperate veterans’ hospitals in Texas.

Theballotproposalreads:“Theconstitutionalamendmentauthorizingthestatetocontributemoney,property,andotherresourcesfortheestablishment,maintenance,andoperationofveteranshospitalsinthisstate.”

Supporters say

Proposition 8 would grant clear constitutional authorityforthestatetocontributeresourcestoestablish,operate,andmaintainveterans’hospitals.Art.3,sec.51oftheTexasConstitutionprohibitsthegrantofpublicmoneytoanyindividual,associationofindividuals,municipality,orothercorporation,andstatesupport for a veterans’ hospital could run afoul of this prohibition. This constitutional amendment would allow

Texasvoterstheopportunitytoensurebeyondquestionthat the state could contribute to a federal initiative to build,operate,andmaintainveterans’hospitalsinthestate.

Veteranshavesacrificedmuchtokeeptheircountrysafeandsecureanddeservetohavereadyaccesstothebenefitsthattheyhaveearned.Proposition8wouldencourage the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs to partnerwiththestatetoestablish,maintain,andoperateveterans’ hospitals across the state as the need arises. Withonlyalimitednumberofveterans’hospitalsinTexas,therisingcostoftravelingtothesefacilitiescanimpedeordelaynecessaryhealthcareforsomeveterans and place a burden on the families of those veterans admitted to a veterans’ hospital far from home. Proposition 8 would improve access to medical care for Texasveterans,especiallyinunderservedareassuchastheRioGrandeValley.

Statevoterspreviouslyhaveapprovedconstitutionalamendmentstoallowhousingandland-purchaseloan assistance funding for veterans and for funding of veterans’ rest homes and veterans’ cemeteries. A constitutional amendment would be an appropriate mechanismtoensurethatthestatehastheauthorityto contribute to veterans’ hospitals as well. The statealreadyhasenteredintopartnershipwiththefederal government to develop seven veterans’ home facilities—inAmarillo,BigSpring,Bonham,ElPaso,Floresville,McAllenandTemple—andthreeveterans’cemeteries—inAbilene,Killeen,andMission—andcoulddothesameifnecessarytoencouragethefederalgovernment to locate a new veterans’ hospital in Texas.

Opponents say

Amending the Texas Constitution to authorize the statetocontributemoney,property,andotherresourcesfortheestablishment,maintenance,andoperationofveterans’hospitalsisnotnecessary.TheConstitutionwould not prevent the state from contributing to aveterans’hospital,andtheLegislatureenacteda

Authorizing the state to contribute resources to veterans’ hospitalsHJR7byFlores(Hinojosa)


statutethisyeartoallowsuchacontributionwithoutmakingthatstatutoryauthorizationcontingentonaconstitutionalamendment.Whilethestatepreviouslyhas approved several constitutional amendments for veterans’housingandland-purchaseloanassistanceprograms and for the funding of veterans’ rest homes andcemeteries,theseamendmentsprimarilyconcernedthe funding mechanisms for these programs.

Amending the state Constitution to send a message to the federal government to build a veterans’ hospital inTexaslikelywouldhavelittleornoeffectonthefederal government’s decision. The federal government has been contracting with private hospitals to augment in-patientandemergencycareforveteransratherthan constructing expensive new veterans’ hospitals. Moreover,specificallyauthorizingstatecontributionsforveterans’hospitalfacilitiesthatpreviouslyhavebeenfundedexclusivelybythefederalgovernmentcould

lead to the expectation that the state would contribute a portion of the funding for future facilities.

Notes

HB2217byFlores,enactedbythe81stLegislatureduringits2009regularsessionandsignedbythegovernor,requirestheTexasVeteransCommissionandthe Department of State Health Services to work with theU.S.DepartmentofVeteransAffairsandanyotherappropriatefederalagencytoproposetheestablishmentofaveterans’hospitalintheRioGrandeValleyregion.HB2217alsoallowsthestatetocontributemoney,property,andotherresourcesfortheestablishment,maintenance,andoperationofaveterans’hospitalintheRioGrandeValleyregion.HB2217tookeffectJune19,2009,andwasnotcontingentonvoterapprovalofaconstitutional amendment.


Proposition9

Page 21

Proposition

Background

TheTexasOpenBeachesAct,NaturalResourcesCode,ch.61,enactedbytheLegislaturein1959,grantsthepublicafreeandunrestrictedrighttoaccessstate-ownedbeachesandarighttouseanypublicbeachorlarger area extending from the line of mean low tide to the line of vegetation bordering the Gulf of Mexico. The lineofvegetationisdefinedastheseawardboundaryofnaturalvegetationthatspreadscontinuouslyinland.The act applies to all beaches to which the public has acquired a right of use or an easement under principles of Texas common law.

The act prohibits the construction of a barrier that interferes with the free and unrestricted right to access anduseanypublicbeachsubjecttothepublicbeacheasement.ThecommissioneroftheGeneralLandOfficemustenforcetheopenbeacheslawstrictlytopreventencroachments against public access to beaches. The act also authorizes the commissioner to adopt rules regulating construction that would limit public access to and use of the beach landward of and bordering a public beachuptothefirstpublicroadgenerallyparalleltothebeach,ortowithin1,000feetofmeanhightide.

Thelineofvegetation,andthereforethepublicbeach,canshiftbecauseoferosion,storms,orconstruction of seawalls and other manmade barriers. TheNaturalResourcesCodedefineshowbeachboundariesmaybedeterminedwhenthereisnoclearlymarkedlineofvegetationandinotherinstances,suchasareas adjacent to certain seawall structures.

Digest

Proposition 9 would amend the Texas Constitution byaddingArt.1,sec.33toestablishthepublic’sunrestrictedrighttouse,andhaveaccesstoandfrom,public beaches. The right would be dedicated as a permanent public easement.

Establishing a right to use and access public beachesHJR102byRaymond(Hinojosa)

Apublicbeachwouldbedefinedasastate-ownedbeach bordering on the seaward shore of the Gulf ofMexico,extendingfromthemeanlowtidetothelandwardboundaryofstate-ownedsubmergedland.Italsowouldincludeanylargerareafromthelineofmeanlow tide to the line of vegetation bordering on the Gulf of Mexico to which the public had acquired a continuous right of use or an easement under Texas common law.

The Legislature could enact laws to protect the right of the public to access the beach and to protect the easement from interference and encroachments. The constitutional provision would not create a private right of enforcement.

Theballotproposalreads:“Theconstitutionalamendmenttoprotecttherightofthepublic,individuallyandcollectively,toaccessandusethepublic beaches bordering the seaward shore of the Gulf of Mexico.”

Supporters say

Proposition9wouldstrengthentheOpenBeachesActintworespects—byenshriningitintheTexasConstitutionandbyputtingittoapublicvotetodemonstrate the extent of support among Texas voters for open beaches. The amendment would not change current practices but would highlight core principles in current law that have been accepted and acknowledged in common law and in state statutes.

In addition to securing open beaches against anyfuturelegislativeorjudicialactionthatcouldunderminethisimportantlegalprinciple,approvalof Proposition 9 would be a vote of support for open beaches in Texas. The state has numerous valuable natural coastal resources that Texans are able to access andenjoy.Avotetosecureopenbeacheswouldsenda strong message that the state’s residents wish to preserve access to these resources for present and future


generations.AddingtheamendmenttothefirstarticleintheConstitution,theTexasBillofRights,wouldaffirmthat access to and use of public beaches in Texas is a fundamental right.

Whileweathereventsandnaturalprocessesalongthecoasthaveputsomepropertyownersinthedifficultsituation of not being able to build new structures or losing structures that end up on public beaches due to erosion,thisisariskthatabeachfrontpropertyownerassumesandisfullyawareofwhenbuyingorbuildingahouseadjacenttoapublicbeach.Earnestmoneycontracts,deeds,andtitlepoliciesallcontainprovisionsalerting owners to the risks of natural events moving the lineofvegetationandpotentiallycausingtheirprivatestructurestobecomelocatedonapublicbeach.Owningahomenearthebeachisinherentlyrisky,ashurricanesandotherweathereventscanirreparablydamageahouse or change the boundaries of the public beach.

Opponents say TheOpenBeachesActalreadyprovidestoomuchauthoritytothestatetorestricttherightofprivatelandownerstoenjoytheirproperty.Placingthisstatutein the Constitution would validate and entrench overbearingstatepracticesthateffectivelypunishpropertyownersforeventsbeyondtheircontrol.

Proposition 9 would lock into the Constitution a law thathasallowedthestatetoforcepropertyownerstoremove structures that end up on the public beach when it shifts due to weather events and erosion. The state historicallyhasassumedapubliceasementonpropertylocated on public beaches without compensating propertyownerswhenthevegetationlineshifts.Manyhomes along the Gulf Coast were in existence before erosionorwindsandstormsurgefromweatherevents,suchashurricanes,movedthelineofvegetation,leavingtheir homes and other structures on the public beach.


Proposition10

Page 23

Proposition

Background

TexasConstitution,Art.3,sec.48-eauthorizestheLegislaturetocreateemergencyservicesdistricts(ESDs).ESDsarepoliticalsubdivisionsestablishedbylocalvotersthatprovideemergencymedicalservices,ambulanceservices,ruralfirepreventionandcontrolservices,orotheremergencyservicesauthorizedbytheLegislature.ESDsaregovernedbyHealthandSafetyCode,ch.775.TexasConstitution,Art.3,sec.48-eauthorizes the commissioners courts of participating countiestolevyapropertytax,asapprovedbydistrictvoters,ofnotmorethan10centsforevery$100ofvaluefor the support of ESDs.

Eachofthe283currentlyestablishedESDsisledbyafive-memberboardofcommissioners,whosemembersservetwo-yearterms.Membersareappointedorelected,dependingontheareacoveredbytheservicedistrict.Bystatute,theonlyESDsforwhichboardmembersareelectedarethosewhollywithinHarrisCounty(31ESDs)andthosethatcovermorethanonecounty(eightESDs).TheboardmembersforotherESDsareappointedbythecountycommissionerscourtofthecountyinwhichthedistrictislocated.

Thetwo-yeartermlimitforallemergencyservicescommissionersisestablishedbyArt.16,sec.30oftheTexasConstitution,whichgenerallylimitsthetermofallofficestotwoyearsunlesstheConstitutionspecifiesotherwise.

Digest

Proposition10wouldamendArt.16,sec.30(c)ofthe Texas Constitution to authorize the Legislature to allowmembersofthegoverningboardofanemergencyservicesdistricttoservetermsofuptofouryears,ratherthanthecurrentmaximumtwo-yearterm.

Theballotproposalreads:“Theconstitutionalamendment to provide that elected members of the governingboardsofemergencyservicesdistrictsmayservetermsnottoexceedfouryears.”

Supporters say

ByauthorizingtheLegislaturetoincreasethemaximum terms for ESD board members from two yearstofouryears,Proposition10wouldpromotestabilityandcontinuityonESDboardsandallowboard members more time to acquire experience in providingforemergencyservicestotheircommunities.Thegeneraltwo-yeartermwasestablishedinthe19thcenturytolimittheauthorityofthegovernment,butlongertermshavebecomenecessaryundercertaincircumstancestoallowboardmemberstolearnfullythe duties of their positions and provide experienced leadership.

The Texas Constitution has been amended several timestoallowtheLegislaturetosetfour-yeartermsfortheboardmembersofcertaingovernmentalentities,notablyhospitaldistricts,whosedutiessometimesrelatetoandoverlapwithESDs.HB2529byHarless,theenablinglegislationforProposition10,wouldapplyfour-yeartermsforESDboardmembersonlytothosedistricts for which the board members are elected. Ultimately,thetimespentbydistrictboardmembersrunningforelectionandre-electioneverytwoyearsistimetakenawayfromservingtheircommunities.

Theelectionforemergencyservicescommissionersservingtwo-yeartermssometimeshasledtothepoliticizationofwhatissupposedtobeanessentiallynonpartisanoffice.ESDboardmemberelectionsfortwo-yeartermsareheldeveryyearsincethetermsofboard members are staggered so that the entire board does not come up for election all at the same time. These frequentelectionstypicallyhavelowvoterturnout,whichcouldallowawell-fundedcandidatewhotoutedpartisanpoliticalpositionstoinfluencetheoutcomeofanelection.Byallowinglongerterms,Proposition10would help shield members of the governing board of anESDfromimproperpoliticalinfluenceandconstantcampaigningandensurethattheywereselectedonthebasis of their credentials and experience.

AllowingboardmembersofemergencyservicesdistrictstoservefouryearsHJR85byHarless(Patrick)


Opponents say

Proposition 10 would diminish public oversight ofthemembersofthegoverningboardsofemergencyservicesdistricts.Emergencyservicesdistrictshavegreat powers and responsibilities. Those ESD board members who are elected should be held accountable tothevotersbyelectioneverytwoyears,thesameasmembers of the Texas House of Representatives. Voters should be able to exercise the same level of local control ofboardmembersofESDsthattheydowithotherelectedofficials.

Theargumentthatfrequentelectionsofemergencyservicescommissionersleadstoover-politicizationis misplaced because these elections are nonpartisan. Candidates who inject inappropriate partisan politics into nonpartisan elections risk having such tactics

backfireduetovoterresentment.Thecurrentsystemprovides adequate protection against improper political interference.

Notes

HB2529byHarless,theenablinglegislationenactedbythe81stLegislatureduringits2009regularsessionandsignedbythegovernor,wouldtakeeffectonJanuary10,2010,onlyifvotersapproveProposition10.HB2529wouldamendtheHealthandSafetyCodetoincreasefromtwoyearstofouryearsthetermofservicefortheboardmembersofanESDlocatedwhollyinacountywithapopulationofmorethan3million(HarrisCounty)orlocatedinmorethanonecounty.Thebillwould require the election for ESD commissioners to be heldeverytwoyears,ratherthanannually,forstaggeredfour-yearterms.


Proposition11

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Proposition

Restricting use of eminent domain to taking propertyforpublicpurposesHJR14byCorte(Duncan)

Background

TexasConstitution,Art.1,sec.17prohibitsaperson’spropertyfrombeingtaken,damaged,ordestroyedforpublicusewithoutadequatecompensationor consent of the owner. The power of government to claimprivatepropertyforpublicbenefitiscommonlyreferredtoaseminentdomainauthority.Texashasgrantedthisauthoritytogovernments,specialdistricts,andsomeprivateentitiesthatservepublicfunctions,such as utilities and hospitals.

The79thLegislature,initssecondcalledsessionin2005,enactedSB7byJanek,whichprohibitsgovernmental or private entities from using eminent domainauthoritytotakeprivatepropertyifthetaking:

confersaprivatebenefitonaparticularprivate•partythroughtheuseoftheproperty;isforapublicusethatmerelyisapretextto•conferaprivatebenefitonaparticularprivateparty;orisforeconomicdevelopmentpurposes,unless•economicdevelopmentisasecondarypurposethatresultsfrommunicipalcommunitydevelopment or municipal urban renewal activitiestoeliminateanexistingaffirmativeharmonsocietyfromslumorblightedareas.

SB 7 was enacted in response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London,545U.S.469(2005),whichbroadlyalloweduseofeminentdomain for economic development purposes but also permittedstatestorestrictsuchauthority.

TheTexasUrbanRenewalLaw,underLocalGovernmentCode,ch.374,definesa“blightedarea”asanareathatisnotaslumbutischaracterizedbydeteriorating infrastructure and hazardous conditions. Undersec.374.016,municipalitiesmayuseeminentdomaintoacquirepropertyindesignatedareasifthemunicipalitydeterminesthatatleast50percentofthestructuresintheareaaredilapidatedbeyondthepointoffeasiblerehabilitationorotherwiseareunfitforrehabilitation and that other characteristics of blight

exist,suchasovercrowdingofstructuresontheland,mixedusesofstructures,deficientstreets,ordeficienciesinpublicutilitiesorrecreationalandcommunityfacilities.

Digest

Proposition11wouldamendTexasConstitution,Art.1,sec.17torestrictthetakingofpropertytoinstancesinwhichthetaking,damage,ordestructionwasprimarilyforownership,use,andenjoymentbythestate,alocalgovernment,orthepublicatlargeorbyanentitygiventheauthorityofeminentdomainunderthelaw or for the elimination of urban blight on a particular parcel. Public use would not include the taking of propertyfortransfertoaprivateentityfortheprimarypurpose of economic development or enhancement of tax revenues.

OnorafterJanuary1,2010,theLegislaturecouldenactageneral,local,orspeciallawgrantingthepowerofeminentdomaintoanentityonlybyatwo-thirdsvoteof all the members elected to each house.

Theballotproposalreads:“Theconstitutionalamendmenttoprohibitthetaking,damaging,ordestroyingofprivatepropertyforpublicuseunlesstheactionisfortheownership,use,andenjoymentofthepropertybytheState,apoliticalsubdivisionoftheState,thepublicatlarge,orentitiesgrantedthepowerof eminent domain under law or for the elimination ofurbanblightonaparticularparcelofproperty,butnot for certain economic development or enhancement oftaxrevenuepurposes,andtolimitthelegislature’sauthoritytograntthepowerofeminentdomaintoanentity.”

Supporters say

Proposition11wouldaddkeyprotectionsagainstabusesofthepowerofeminentdomainbydefiningin the Constitution the legitimate purposes for which propertymaybetaken.Currentlanguageinthe


Constitutiongoverningeminentdomainisverybroad,statingthatnoperson’spropertyshouldbetakenforapublic use without adequate compensation. The existing languagedoesnotspecifywhatconstitutesalegitimate“publicuse.”InenactingSB7,theLegislaturetookanimportant step in reforming eminent domain law and practicesinthestatebyprohibitingthetakingofprivatepropertyprimarilyforeconomicdevelopmentpurposesortoconferaprivatebenefitonaprivateentity.However,SB7leftopenanumberofissues,includingestablishing a new constitutional framework to restrict theuseofeminentdomaintoclearlypublicpurposes.

A constitutional amendment would have both practicalandsymbolicvalueinprotectingprivateproperty—practicalvalueinplacingclearrestrictionsontheuseofeminentdomainandsymbolicvalueinsending a strong message from the Legislature and votersthateminentdomainmustbeusedforverylimitedpurposesonlywhenabsolutelynecessary.Afurther restriction would require the Legislature to approveanynewgrantofeminentdomainauthoritybyatwo-thirdsvoteofthemembershipofeachchamber.

Therequirementthatanytakingofprivatepropertybesolelyfor“ownership,use,andenjoyment”ofthestate or a local government or the public as a whole wouldconveyacommonconceptfoundinfederalandother laws. The language would require a condemning authoritytokeepthepropertyinitsownership,occupytheproperty,andusethepropertyforsomeproductivepurpose.Itwouldprohibitapublicentityfromtakingpropertyandthen,ineffect,transferringtherightstothatpropertytoaprivateentitybyallowingittoown,occupy,andprofitfromtheproperty.Further,itwouldprohibitacquiringpropertythrougheminentdomainwithnoclearplanstoputthepropertytoapressinguse.

Noprivatepropertyshouldbetakenwithoutacompelling reason and plan for its use. Proposition 11 would place this intent in the Constitution in general termsthatwouldpreventmanyabuses,butwouldnotaffect legitimate takings. According to the Legislative BudgetBoard,thisconstitutionalchangewouldnothaveasignificantfiscalimpactonthestateoronlocalgovernments.Proposition11alsowouldapplytothewiderangeofpartiesauthorizedbylawtoexerciseeminentdomainauthorityandsubjectthemtothesamerequirementsaspublicentities.Secondaryusesoftakenproperty,suchasleasingspaceinanairportorhospital,would be allowed.

Proposition11wouldprotectpropertyownersfromsuchmisusesofeminentdomainauthorityastakingapropertyonthegroundthatitisblighted,thentransferringthepropertytoanotherprivateinterest in the name of economic redevelopment. The amendment would resolve a problem with eminent domainpowernotaddressedbyexistinglaw,whichallows municipalities to condemn and clear whole neighborhoods at a time as long as 50 percent of the affected properties are determined to be blighted. This allowsmunicipalitiestotakethepropertiesofhonest,hardworkingresidentsandbusinesspeoplemerelyduetohazardsthatmayexistinpartoftheirneighborhood,whichsubvertsindividualpropertyrightsforanill-definednotionofacommongood.

UnderProposition11,propertyownersnolongerwould be subjected to condemnation due to overall neighborhood conditions because each parcel would havetobereviewedindependentlyanddeterminedtobeblighted.Protectingpropertyrightsofestablishedowners who have been able to maintain their properties indistressedareaswouldallowthoseownersactivelytopartake in the revitalization of their own communities.

Opponents say

Proposition 11 could have unintended consequences byintroducinglanguageintotheConstitutionthatcourts ruling on eminent domain cases could interpret in varyingways.Theproposedconstitutionalamendmentcouldcreateagreyareaaroundthelegitimateusesofeminent domain and be an invitation for future litigation thatwouldbecostlyforthestateandlocalgovernments.If a court found that the new language prohibited certainusesofeminentdomainthatpreviouslyhadbeenconsideredlegitimate,thenewinterpretationwouldbedifficulttochange.Forinstance,theamendmentwouldnotapplyto“incidentaluses”norallowthe“transfer”ofpropertytoaprivateentityforthe“primarypurposeofeconomicdevelopment.”Thelackofdefinitionforthesekeytermswouldallowcourtstoassumeasignificantroleindetermininghowtheamendmentwouldapplyinpractice.

The Constitution is not the proper forum for testing new legal terms and provisions concerning eminent domainthatmayhaveuncertainimplications.Ifthecourts interpret these constitutional changes in an unforeseenmanner,theywouldbeverydifficultto


Proposition

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changeorclarify.Itwouldbemoreappropriatetotestthesenewlawsinstatutoryformfirstbeforelockingthem into the Constitution.

Proposition11woulderodeamunicipality’sabilityto designate a blighted area and use its eminent domain authoritytopromoteurbanrenewal,whichisimportantforlong-termurbanvitality.Municipalgovernmentsuse their power of eminent domain to clear blighted areas for urban renewal as an absolute last resort. Such actionsrequireexpensiveandlong-termrelocations,courtproceedings,demolitions,andplanningefforts.Municipalitiesseldomtrytousetheireminentdomainauthorityundertheblight-removalprovisionsunlesstheyareleftwithnootheroptionstocorrectrampanthealthandsafetyconcernsthataffectthequalityoflifeofeveryonelivingintheneighborhood.

UnderProposition11,municipalitieswouldhavetomakeablightdeterminationoneachpropertyindividually.Blightedareasoftenarepoorlyplattedandun-surveyedandcontainunconventionallyshapedlotsthatlackproperdocumentation.Propertyownersinblightedareascanbedifficulttolocate,and no allowance would be made for owners who had vacated,abandoned,orotherwiseneglectedpropertyforlongperiods.Thiswouldlimitamunicipality’sabilitytoaddressstructuralsafetyhazards,inadequateinfrastructure,andlimitedcommercialopportunities.Removing an important and longstanding tool available tocitieswoulddiminishtheirabilitytoimprovethequalityoflifeofresidentswhoneedthemostassistance.

Other opponents say

Proposition 11 could increase the number of entities thatcouldbegrantedauthoritytouseeminentdomain,contrarytothegeneralintentoftheamendmenttolimituseofthisauthority.Aprovisionthatwouldallowthe Legislature to enact a law granting the power of eminentdomaintoan“entity”byatwo-thirdsvoteofeachhousecouldprovidethenecessarylegalbasisforexpandingthetypesofentitiesgiventhispower.Theamendmentdoesnotspecifythetypesof“entities”thatcouldbegrantedeminentdomainauthority,whichcouldrange from local governments to private corporations or utilities. This broad language could allow a wide range of entities to seek the power of eminent domain from theLegislature.Thetwo-thirdsvoterequirementisnotsufficienttopreventfuturemisuseofanyexpandedeminent domain power.

Notes

HJR14includestwounrelatedpropositionsproposingtwodifferentconstitutionalamendments.HJR14originallyproposedonlyachangeineminentdomainauthority,butwasamendedlateintheregularsessiontoaddtheprovisionsofProposition4,whichwouldconvert the corpus of the permanent Higher Education FundendowmentintoanewNationalResearchUniversityFund.Proposition4isdiscussedstartingonpage 10 of this report.

Steering Committee:

David Farabee, Chairman Bill Callegari, Vice Chairman Drew Darby Harold Dutton Dan Gattis Yvonne Gonzalez Toureilles Carl Isett Susan King Jim McReynolds Jose Menendez Geanie Morrison Elliott Naishtat Rob Orr Joe Pickett Todd Smith

Staff:

John H. Reagan BuildingRoom 420P.O. Box 2910Austin, Texas 78768-2910

(512) 463-0752

www.hro.house.state.tx.us

HOUSE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION

Tom Whatley, Director; Laura Hendrickson, Editor; Rita Barr, Office Manager/Analyst; Catherine Dilger, Kellie Dworaczyk, Tom Howe, Andrei Lubomudrov, Carisa Magee, Blaire Parker, Research Analysts

RESEARCH ORGANIZATION - HRO · obligation bonds for college student loans at an August 10, 1991, election, then approved an identical proposition ... Allowing judges to deny bail

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