EN BANC RE: REQUEST OF NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID[1] TO
EXEMPT LEGAL AID CLIENTS FROM PAYING FILING, DOCKET AND OTHER FEES.
A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC
possible to those who are in need thereof the masses. Hence,
every chapter of the IBP must establish and operate an adequate
legal aid office. WHEREAS, the Legal Aid Office of the IBPMisamis
Oriental Chapter has long been operational, providing free legal
services to numerous indigent clients, through the chapters members
who render volunteer services in the spirit of public service;
August 28, 2009
x---------------------------------------------------x
WHEREAS, the courts, quasi-judicial bodies, the various
mediation centers and prosecutors offices are collecting fees, be
they filing, docket, motion, mediation or other fees in cases, be
they original proceedings or on appeal; WHEREAS, IBP Legal Aid
clients are qualified under the same indigency and merit tests used
by the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), and would have qualified for
PAO assistance, but for reasons other than indigency, are
disqualified from availing of the services of the PAO, like the
existence of a conflict of interests or conflicting defenses, and
other similar causes; WHEREAS, PAO clients are automatically exempt
from the payment of docket and other fees for cases, be they
original proceedings or on appeal, by virtue of the provisions of
Section 16D of R.A. 9406 (PAO Law), without the need for the filing
of any petition or motion to declare them as pauper litigants;
WHEREAS, there is no similar provision in any substantive law or
procedural law giving IBP Legal Aid clients the same benefits or
privileges enjoyed by PAO clients with respect to the payment of
docket and other fees before the courts, quasijudicial bodies and
prosecutors offices; WHEREAS, the collection of docket and other
fees from the IBP Legal Aid clients poses an additional strain to
their next to nonexistent finances; WHEREAS, the quarterly
allowance given by the National Legal Aid Office to the IBP Misamis
Oriental Chapter is insufficient to even cover the incidental
expenses of volunteer legal aid lawyers, much less answer for the
payment of docket and other fees collected by the courts,
quasi-judicial bodies and prosecutors offices and mediation fees
collected by the Philippine Mediation Center; NOW THEREFORE, on
motion of the Board of Officers of the IBPMisamis Oriental Chapter,
be it resolved as it is hereby resolved, to move the IBP National
Legal Aid Office to make the necessary requests or representations
with the Supreme Court, the Philippine Mediation Center, the
Department of Justice and
RESOLUTION CORONA, J.: On September 23, 2008 the Misamis
Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
promulgated Resolution No. 24, series of 2008.[2] The resolution
requested the IBPs National Committee on Legal Aid[3] (NCLA) to ask
for the exemption from the payment of filing, docket and other fees
of clients of the legal aid offices in the various IBP chapters.
Resolution No. 24, series of 2008 provided: RESOLUTION NO. 24,
SERIES OF 2008 RESOLUTION OF THE IBPMISAMIS ORIENTAL CHAPTER FOR
THE IBP NATIONAL LEGAL AID OFFICE TO REQUEST THE COURTS AND OTHER
QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES, THE PHILIPPINE MEDIATION CENTER AND
PROSECUTORS OFFICES TO EXEMPT LEGAL AID CLIENTS FROM PAYING FILING,
DOCKET AND OTHER FEES INCIDENTAL TO THE FILING AND LITIGATION OF
ACTIONS, AS ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS OR ON APPEAL. WHEREAS, Section 1,
Article I of the Guidelines Governing the Establishment and
Operation of Legal Aid Offices in All Chapters of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (otherwise known as []Guideline[s] on Legal
Aid[]) provides: Legal aid is not a matter of charity. It is a
means for the correction of social imbalances that may often lead
to injustice, for which reason, it is a public responsibility of
the Bar. The spirit of public service should therefore unde[r]ly
all legal aid offices. The same should be so administered as to
give maximum possible assistance to indigent and deserving members
of the community in all cases, matters and situations in which
legal aid may be necessary to forestall injustice. WHEREAS, Section
2 of the same provides: In order to attain the objectives of legal
aid, legal aid office should be as close as
the National Prosecution Service and other quasi-judicial
agencies to effect the grant of a like exemption from the payment
of filing, docket and other fees to the IBP Legal Aid clients as
that enjoyed by PAO clients, towards the end that IBP Legal Aid
clients be automatically exempted from the filing of the
abovementioned fees; RESOLVED FURTHER, that copies of this
Resolution be furnished to Supreme Court Chief Justice Honorable
Reynato S. Puno, IBP National President Feliciano M. Bautista, the
IBP Board of Governors, Secretary of Justice Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez,
the National Supervisor of the Philippine Mediation Center, the
National Labor Relations Commission, the Civil Service Commission
and other quasi-judicial bodies and their local offices; RESOLVED
FINALLY to move the IBP Board of Governors and National Officers to
make the necessary representations with the National Legislature
and its members to effect the filing of a bill before the House of
Representatives and the Senate granting exemption to IBP Legal Aid
clients from the payment of docket, filing and or other fees in
cases before the courts, quasi-judicial agencies and prosecutors
offices and the mediation centers. Done this 23 day of September
2008, Cagayan De Oro City. Unanimously approved upon motion
severally seconded.[4]rd
some expense which indigent clients could ill-afford, clients
also lack knowledge on how to go about the tedious process of
obtaining these documents; (c) Although the IBP is given an annual
legal aid subsidy, the amount it receives from the government is
barely enough to cover various operating expenses;[8] While each
IBP local chapter is given a quarterly allocation (from the legal
aid subsidy),[9] said allocation covers neither the incidental
expenses defrayed by legal aid lawyers in handling legal aid cases
nor the payment of docket and other fees collected by the courts,
quasi-judicial bodies and the prosecutors office, as well as
mediation fees and Considering the aforementioned factors, a
directive may be issued by the Supreme Court granting IBPs indigent
clients an exemption from the payment of docket and other fees
similar to that given to PAO clients under Section 16-D of RA 9406.
In this connection, the Supreme Court previously issued a circular
exempting IBP clients from the payment of transcript of
stenographic notes.[10]
(d)
(e)
The Court noted Resolution No. 24, series of 2008 and required
the IBP, through the NCLA, to comment thereon.[5] In a comment
dated December 18, 2008,[6] the IBP, through the NCLA, made the
following comments: (a) Under Section 16-D of RA[7] 9406, clients
of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) are exempt from the payment of
docket and other fees incidental to the institution of action in
court and other quasi-judicial bodies. On the other hand, clients
of legal aid offices in the various IBP chapters do not enjoy the
same exemption. IBPs indigent clients are advised to litigate as
pauper litigants under Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court;
They are further advised to submit documentary evidence to prove
compliance with the requirements under Section 21, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, i.e., certifications from the barangay and the
Department of Social Welfare and Development. However, not only
does the process involve
At the outset, we laud the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the IBP
for its effort to help improve the administration of justice,
particularly, the access to justice by the poor. Its Resolution No.
24, series of 2008 in fact echoes one of the noteworthy
recommendations during the Forum on Increasing Access to Justice
spearheaded by the Court last year. In promulgating Resolution No.
24, the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the IBP has effectively
performed its duty to participate in the development of the legal
system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the
administration of justice.[11] We now move on to determine the
merits of the request.
ACCESS TO JUSTICE: MAKING AN IDEAL A REALITY
Access to justice by all, especially by the poor, is not simply
an ideal in our society. Its existence is essential in a democracy
and in the rule of law. As such, it is guaranteed by no less than
the fundamental law: Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and
quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be
denied to any person by reason of poverty.[12] (emphasis
supplied)
(b)
The Court recognizes the right of access to justice as the most
important pillar of legal empowerment of the marginalized sectors
of our society.[13] Among others, it has exercised its power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights[14] to open the doors of justice to the
underprivileged and to allow them to step inside the courts to be
heard of their plaints. In particular, indigent litigants are
permitted under Section 21, Rule 3[15] and Section 19, Rule 141[16]
of the Rules of Court to bring suits in forma pauperis. The IBP,
pursuant to its general objectives to improve the administration of
justice and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility
more effectively,[17] assists the Court in providing the poor
access to justice. In particular, it renders free legal aid under
the supervision of the NCLA.
SEC. 22. Other factors. The effect of the Legal Aid Service or
of the failure to render the same upon the Rule of Law, the proper
administration of justice, the public interest involved in given
cases and the practice of law in the locality shall likewise be
considered. SEC. 23. Private practice. Care shall be taken that the
Legal aid is not availed of to the detriment of the private
practice of law, or taken advantage of by anyone for personal ends.
SEC. 24. Denial. Legal aid may be denied to an applicant already
receiving adequate assistance from any source other than the
Integrated Bar. The means and merit tests appear to be reasonable
determinants of eligibility for coverage under the legal aid
program of the IBP. Nonetheless, they may be improved to ensure
that any exemption from the payment of legal fees that may be
granted to clients of the NCLA and the legal aid offices of the
various IBP chapters will really further the right of access to
justice by the poor. This will guarantee that the exemption will
neither be abused nor trivialized. Towards this end, the following
shall be observed by the NCLA and the legal aid offices in IBP
chapters nationwide in accepting clients and handling cases for the
said clients: A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC (IRR): Re: Rule on the Exemption
From the Payment of Legal Fees of the Clients of the National
Committee on Legal Aid and of the Legal Aid Offices in the Local
Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Rule on the
Exemption From the Payment of Legal Fees of the Clients of the
National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) and of the Legal Aid Offices
in the Local Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) ARTICLE I Purpose Section 1. Purpose. This Rule is issued for
the purpose of enforcing the right of free access to courts by the
poor guaranteed under Section 11, Article III of the Constitution.
It is intended to increase the access to justice by the poor by
exempting from the payment of legal fees incidental to instituting
an action in court, as an original proceeding or on appeal,
qualified indigent clients of the NCLA and of the legal aid offices
in local IBP chapters nationwide. ARTICLE II
A NEW RULE, A NEW TOOL FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE Under the IBPs
Guidelines Governing the Establishment and Operation of Legal Aid
Offices in All Chapters of the IBP (Guidelines on Legal Aid), the
combined means and merit tests shall be used to determine the
eligibility of an applicant for legal aid: ARTICLE VIII TESTS SEC.
19. Combined tests. The Chapter Legal Aid Committee or the [NCLA],
as the case may be, shall pass upon the request for legal aid by
the combined application of the means test and merit test, and the
consideration of other factors adverted to in the following
sections. SEC. 20. Means test. The means test aims at determining
whether the applicant has no visible means of support or his income
is otherwise insufficient to provide the financial resources
necessary to engage competent private counsel owing to the demands
for subsistence of his family, considering the number of his
dependents and the conditions prevailing in the locality. The means
test shall not be applicable to applicants who fall under the
Developmental Legal Aid Program such as Overseas Filipino Workers,
fishermen, farmers, women and children and other disadvantaged
groups. SEC. 21. Merit test. The merit test seeks to ascertain
whether or not the applicants cause of action or his defense is
valid and chances of establishing the same appear reasonable.
Definition of Terms Section 1. Definition of important terms.
For purposes of this Rule and as used herein, the following terms
shall be understood to be how they are defined under this Section:
(a) Developmental legal aid means the rendition of legal services
in public interest causes involving overseas workers, fisherfolk,
farmers, laborers, indigenous cultural communities, women, children
and other disadvantaged groups and marginalized sectors;
Disinterested person refers to the punong barangay having
jurisdiction over the place where an applicant for legal aid or
client of the NCLA or chapter legal aid office resides; Falsity
refers to any material misrepresentation of fact or any fraudulent,
deceitful, false, wrong or misleading statement in the application
or affidavits submitted to support it or the affidavit of a
disinterested person required to be submitted annually under this
Rule which may substantially affect the determination of the
qualifications of the applicant or the client under the means and
merit tests; Legal fees refers to the legal fees imposed under Rule
141 of the Rules of Court as a necessary incident of instituting an
action in court either as an original proceeding or on appeal. In
particular, it includes filing or docket fees, appeal fees, fees
for issuance of provisional remedies, mediation fees, sheriffs
fees, stenographers fees (that is fees for transcript of
stenographic notes) and commissioners fees; Means test refers to
the set of criteria
used to determine whether applicant is one who has money or
property sufficient available for food, shelter basic necessities
for himself his family; (f)
the no and and and
Merit test refers to the ascertainment of whether the applicants
cause of action or his defense is valid and whether the chances of
establishing the same appear reasonable and Representative refers
to the person authorized to file an application for legal aid in
behalf of the applicant when the said applicant is prevented by a
compelling reason from personally filing his application. As a
rule, it refers to the immediate family members of the applicant.
However, it may include any of the applicants relatives or any
person or concerned citizen of sufficient discretion who has
first-hand knowledge of the personal circumstances of the applicant
as well as of the facts of the applicants case. ARTICLE III
Coverage
(g) (b)
(c)
(d)
Section 1. Persons qualified for exemption from payment of legal
fees. Persons who shall enjoy the benefit of exemption from the
payment of legal fees incidental to instituting an action in court,
as an original proceeding or on appeal, granted under this Rule
shall be limited only to clients of the NCLA and the chapter legal
aid offices. The said clients shall refer to those indigents
qualified to receive free legal aid service from the NCLA and the
chapter legal aid offices. Their qualifications shall be determined
based on the tests provided in this Rule. Section 2. Persons not
covered by the Rule. The following shall be disqualified from the
coverage of this Rule. Nor may they be accepted as clients by the
NCLA
(e)
and the chapter legal aid offices. (a) Juridical persons; except
in cases covered by developmental legal aid or public interest
causes involving juridical entities which are non-stock, non-profit
organizations, non-governmental organizations and peoples
organizations whose individual members will pass the means test
provided in this Rule; Persons who do not pass the means and merit
tests; Parties already represented by a counsel de parte; Owners or
lessors of residential lands or buildings with respect to the
filing of collection or unlawful detainer suits against their
tenants and Persons who have been clients of the NCLA or chapter
legal aid office previously in a case where the NCLA or chapter
legal aid office withdrew its representation because of a falsity
in the application or in any of the affidavits supporting the said
application.
NCLA and the legal aid offices in local IBP chapters. The NCLA
or the chapter legal aid committee, as the case may be, shall pass
upon requests for legal aid by the combined application of the
means and merit tests and the consideration of other relevant
factors provided for in the following sections. Section 2. Means
test; exception. (a) This test shall be based on the following
criteria: (i) the applicant and that of his immediate family must
have a gross monthly income that does not exceed an amount double
the monthly minimum wage of an employee in the place where the
applicant resides and (ii) he does not own real property with a
fair market value as stated in the current tax declaration of more
than Three Hundred Thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos. In this
connection, the applicant shall execute an affidavit of indigency
(printed at the back of the application form) stating that he and
his immediate family do not earn a gross income abovementioned, nor
own any real property with the fair value aforementioned, supported
by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of
the applicants affidavit. The latest income tax return and/or
current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached to the
applicants affidavit. (b) The means test shall not be applicable to
applicants who fall under the developmental legal aid program such
as overseas workers, fisherfolk, farmers, laborers, indigenous
cultural communities, women, children and other disadvantaged
groups. Section 3. Merit test. A case shall be considered
meritorious if an assessment of the law and evidence at hand
discloses that the legal service will be in aid of justice or in
the furtherance thereof, taking into consideration the interests of
the party and those of society. A case fails this test if, after
consideration of the law and evidence presented by the applicant,
it appears that it is intended merely to harass or injure the
opposite party or to work oppression or wrong. Section 4. Other
relevant factors that may be considered. The effect of legal aid or
of the failure to render the same upon the rule of law, the proper
administration of justice, the public interest involved in a given
case and the practice of law in the locality shall likewise be
considered. ARTICLE V
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Section 3. Cases not covered by the Rule. The NCLA and the
chapter legal aid offices shall not handle the following: (a) Cases
where conflicting interests will be represented by the NCLA and the
chapter legal aid offices and Prosecution of criminal cases in
court. ARTICLE IV Tests of Indigency Section 1. Tests for
determining who may be clients of the
(b)
Acceptance and Handling of Cases Section 1. Procedure in
accepting cases. The following procedure shall be observed in the
acceptance of cases for purposes of this Rule: (a) Filing of
application An application shall be made personally by the
applicant, unless there is a compelling reason which prevents him
from doing so, in which case his representative may apply for him.
It shall adhere substantially to the form made for that purpose. It
shall be prepared and signed by the applicant or, in proper cases,
his duly authorized representative in at least three copies.
Applications for legal aid shall be filed with the NCLA or with the
chapter legal aid committee. The NCLA shall, as much as possible,
concentrate on cases of paramount importance or national impact.
Requests received by the IBP National Office shall be referred by
the NCLA to the proper chapter legal aid committee of the locality
where the cases have to be filed or are pending. The chapter
president and the chairman of the chapters legal aid committee
shall be advised of such referral. (b) Interview The applicant
shall be interviewed by a member of the chapter legal aid committee
or any chapter member authorized by the chapter legal aid committee
to determine the applicants qualifications based on the means and
merit tests and other relevant factors. He shall also be required
to submit copies of his latest income tax returns and/or current
tax declaration, if available, and execute an affidavit of
indigency printed at the back of the application form with the
supporting affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the
truth of the applicants affidavit. After the interview, the
applicant shall be informed that he can follow up the action on his
application after five (5) working days. (c) Action on the
application The chapter legal aid committee shall pass upon every
request for legal
aid and submit its recommendation to the chapter board of
officers within three (3) working days after the interview of the
applicant. The basis of the recommendation shall be stated. The
chapter board of officers shall review and act on the
recommendation of the chapter legal aid committee within two (2)
working days from receipt thereof; Provided, however, that in
urgent matters requiring prompt or immediate action, the chapters
executive director of legal aid or whoever performs his functions
may provisionally act on the application, subject to review by the
chapter legal aid committee and, thereafter, by the chapter board
of officers. The action of the chapter board of officers on the
application shall be final. (d) Cases which may be provisionally
accepted. In the following cases, the NCLA or the chapter legal aid
office, through the chapters executive director of legal aid or
whoever performs his functions may accept cases provisionally
pending verification of the applicants indigency and an evaluation
of the merit of his case. Where a warrant for the arrest of the
applicant has been issued; Where a pleading has to be filed
immediately to avoid adverse effects to the applicant; Where an
appeal has to be urgently perfected or a petition for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus filed has to be filed immediately; and (iv)
(e) Other similar urgent cases.
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Assignment of control number Upon approval of the chapter board
of officers of a persons application and the applicant is found to
be qualified for legal assistance, the case shall be assigned a
control number. The numbering shall be consecutive starting from
January to December of every year. The control number shall also
indicate the region and the chapter handling the case. Example:
Region[18]
Chapter GM
Year Manila 03 099
Month 2009
Number -
(a)
(f)
Issuance of a certification After an application is approved and
a control number duly assigned, the chapter board of officers shall
issue a certification that the person (that is, the successful
applicant) is a client of the NCLA or of the chapter legal aid
office. The certification shall bear the control number of the case
and shall state the name of the client and the nature of the
judicial action subject of the legal aid of the NCLA or the legal
aid office of a local IBP chapter. The certification shall be
issued to the successful applicant free of charge. Section 2.
Assignment of cases. After a case is given a control number, the
chapter board of officers shall refer it back to the chapter legal
aid committee. The chapter legal aid committee shall assign the
case to any chapter member who is willing to handle the case. In
case no chapter member has signified an intention to handle the
case voluntarily, the chapter legal aid committee shall refer the
matter to the chapter board of officers together with the names of
at least three members who, in the chapter legal aid committees
discretion, may competently render legal aid on the matter. The
chapter board of officers shall appoint one chapter member from
among the list of names submitted by the chapter legal aid
committee. The chapter member chosen may not refuse the appointment
except on the ground of conflict of interest or other equally
compelling grounds as provided in the Code of Professional
Responsibility,[19] in which case the chapter board of officers
shall appoint his replacement from among the remaining names in the
list previously submitted by the chapter legal aid committee. The
chapter legal aid committee and the chapter board of officers shall
take the necessary measures to ensure that cases are
well-distributed to chapter members. Section 3. Policies and
guidelines in the acceptance and handling of cases. The following
policies and guidelines shall be observed in the acceptance and
handling of cases:
First come, first served Where both the
complainant/plaintiff/petitioner and defendant/ respondent apply
for legal aid and both are qualified, the first to seek assistance
shall be given preference. Avoidance of conflict of interest Where
acceptance of a case will give rise to a conflict of interest on
the part of the chapter legal aid office, the applicant shall be
duly informed and advised to seek the services of a private counsel
or another legal aid organization. Where handling of the case will
give rise to a conflict of interest on the part of the chapter
member assigned to the case, the client shall be duly informed and
advised about it. The handling lawyer shall also inform the chapter
legal aid committee so that another chapter member may be assigned
to handle the case. For purposes of choosing the substitute
handling lawyer, the rule in the immediately preceding section
shall be observed.
(b)
(c)
Legal aid is purely gratuitous and honorary No member of the
chapter or member of the staff of the NCLA or chapter legal aid
office shall directly or indirectly demand or request from an
applicant or client any compensation, gift or present for legal aid
services being applied for or rendered. Same standard of conduct
and equal treatment A chapter member who is tasked to handle a case
accepted by the NCLA or by the chapter legal aid office shall
observe the same standard of conduct governing his relations with
paying clients. He shall treat the client of the NCLA or of the
chapter legal aid office and the said clients case in a manner that
is equal and similar to his treatment of a paying client and his
case. Falsity in the application or in the affidavits Any falsity
in the application or in the affidavit of indigency or in the
affidavit of a disinterested person shall be sufficient cause for
the NCLA or chapter legal aid office to withdraw or terminate the
legal aid. For this purpose, the chapter board of officers shall
authorize the handling
(d)
(e)
lawyer to file the proper manifestation of withdrawal of
appearance of the chapter legal aid office in the case with a
motion for the dismissal of the complaint or action of the erring
client. The court, after hearing, shall approve the withdrawal of
appearance and grant the motion, without prejudice to whatever
criminal liability may have been incurred. Violation of this policy
shall disqualify the erring client from availing of the benefits of
this Rule in the future. (f) Statement in the initiatory pleading
To avail of the benefits of the Rule, the initiatory pleading shall
state as an essential preliminary allegation that (i) the party
initiating the action is a client of the NCLA or of the chapter
legal aid office and therefore entitled to exemption from the
payment of legal fees under this Rule and (ii) a certified true
copy of the certification issued pursuant to Section 1(e), of this
Article is attached or annexed to the pleading. Failure to make the
statement shall be a ground for the dismissal of the action without
prejudice to its refiling. The same rule shall apply in case the
client, through the NCLA or chapter legal aid office, files an
appeal. (g) Attachment of certification in initiatory pleading A
certified true copy of the certification issued pursuant to Section
1(e), of this Article shall be attached as an annex to the
initiatory pleading. Failure to attach a certified true copy of the
said certification shall be a ground for the dismissal of the
action without prejudice to its refiling. The same rule shall apply
in case the client, through the NCLA or chapter legal aid office,
files an appeal. (h) Signing of pleadings All complaints,
petitions, answers, replies, memoranda and other important
pleadings or motions to be filed in courts shall be signed by the
handling lawyer
and co-signed by the chairperson or a member of the chapter
legal aid committee, or in urgent cases, by the executive director
of legal aid or whoever performs his functions. Ordinary motions
such as motions for extension of time to file a pleading or for
postponement of hearing and manifestations may be signed by the
handling lawyer alone. (i) Motions for extension of time or for
postponement The filing of motions for extension of time to file a
pleading or for postponement of hearing shall be avoided as much as
possible as they cause delay to the case and prolong the
proceedings. Transfer of cases Transfer of cases from one handling
lawyer to another shall be affected only upon approval of the
chapter legal aid committee.
(j)
Section 4. Decision to appeal. (a) All appeals must be made on
the request of the client himself. For this purpose, the client
shall be made to fill up a request to appeal. (b) Only meritorious
cases shall be appealed. If the handling lawyer, in consultation
with the chapter legal aid committee, finds that there is no merit
to the appeal, the client should be immediately informed thereof in
writing and the record of the case turned over to him, under proper
receipt. If the client insists on appealing the case, the lawyer
handling the case should perfect the appeal before turning over the
records of the case to him. Section 5. Protection of private
practice. Utmost care shall be taken to ensure that legal aid is
neither availed of to the detriment of the private practice of law
nor taken advantage of by anyone for purely personal ends.
ARTICLE VI Withdrawal of Legal Aid and Termination of Exemption
Section 1. Withdrawal of legal aid. The NCLA or the chapter legal
aid committee may, in justifiable instances as provided in the next
Section, direct the handling lawyer to withdraw representation of a
clients cause upon approval
of the IBP Board of Governors (in the case of the NCLA) or of
the chapter board of officers (in the case of the chapter legal aid
committee) and through a proper motion filed in Court. Section 2.
Grounds for withdrawal of legal aid. Withdrawal may be warranted in
the following situations: (a) In a case that has been provisionally
accepted, where it is subsequently ascertained that the client is
not qualified for legal aid; Where the clients income or resources
improve and he no longer qualifies for continued assistance based
on the means test. For this purpose, on or before January 15 every
year, the client shall submit an affidavit of a disinterested
person stating that the client and his immediate family do not earn
a gross income mentioned in Section 2, Article V, nor own any real
property with the fair market value mentioned in the same Section;
When it is shown or found that the client committed a falsity in
the application or in the affidavits submitted to support the
application; When the client subsequently engages a de parte
counsel or is provided with a de oficio counsel; When, despite
proper advice from the handling lawyer, the client cannot be
refrained from doing things which the lawyer himself ought not do
under the ethics of the legal profession, particularly with
reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial officers,
witnesses and litigants, or the client insists on having control of
the trial, theory of the case, or strategy in procedure which would
tend to result in incalculable harm to the interests of the client;
When, despite notice from the handling lawyer, the client does not
cooperate or coordinate with the handling lawyer to the prejudice
of the proper and effective rendition of legal aid such as when the
client fails to provide documents necessary to support his case or
unreasonably fails to attend hearings when
his presence thereat is required; and (g) When it becomes
apparent that the representation of the clients cause will result
in a representation of conflicting interests, as where the adverse
party had previously engaged the services of the NCLA or of the
chapter legal aid office and the subject matter of the litigation
is directly related to the services previously rendered to the
adverse party.
(b)
Section 3. Effect of withdrawal. The court, after hearing, shall
allow the NCLA or the chapter legal aid office to withdraw if it is
satisfied that the ground for such withdrawal exists. Except when
the withdrawal is based on paragraphs (b), (d) and (g) of the
immediately preceding Section, the court shall also order the
dismissal of the case. Such dismissal is without prejudice to
whatever criminal liability may have been incurred if the
withdrawal is based on paragraph (c) of the immediately preceding
Section. ARTICLE VII Miscellaneous Provisions Section 1. Lien on
favorable judgment. The amount of the docket and other lawful fees
which the client was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any
judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the
court otherwise provides. In case, attorneys fees have been awarded
to the client, the same shall belong to the NCLA or to the chapter
legal aid office that rendered the legal aid, as the case may be.
It shall form part of a special fund which shall be exclusively
used to support the legal aid program of the NCLA or the chapter
legal aid office. In this connection, the chapter board of officers
shall report the receipt of attorneys fees pursuant to this Section
to the NCLA within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. The NCLA
shall, in turn, include the data on attorneys fees received by IBP
chapters pursuant to this Section in its liquidation report for the
annual subsidy for legal aid. Section 2. Duty of NCLA to prepare
forms. The NCLA shall prepare the standard forms to be used in
connection with this Rule. In particular, the NCLA shall prepare
the
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
following standard forms: the application form, the affidavit of
indigency, the supporting affidavit of a disinterested person, the
affidavit of a disinterested person required to be submitted
annually under Section 2(b), Article VI, the certification issued
by the NCLA or the chapter board of officers under Section 1(f),
Article V and the request to appeal. The said forms, except the
certification, shall be in Filipino. Within sixty (60) days from
receipt of the forms from the NCLA, the chapter legal aid offices
shall make translations of the said forms in the dominant dialect
used in their respective localities. Section 3. Effect of Rule on
right to bring suits in forma pauperis. Nothing in this Rule shall
be considered to preclude those persons not covered either by this
Rule or by the exemption from the payment of legal fees granted to
clients of the Public Attorneys Office under Section 16D of RA 9406
to litigate in forma pauperis under Section 21, Rule 3 and Section
19 Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. Section 4. Compliance with Rule
on Mandatory Legal Aid Service. Legal aid service rendered by a
lawyer under this Rule either as a handling lawyer or as an
interviewer of applicants under Section 1(b), Article IV hereof
shall be credited for purposes of compliance with the Rule on
Mandatory Legal Aid Service. The chairperson of the chapter legal
aid office shall issue the certificate similar to that issued by
the Clerk of Court in Section 5(b) of the Rule on Mandatory Legal
Aid Service. ARTICLE VIII Effectivity Section 1. Effectivity. This
Rule shall become effective after fifteen days following its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
A FINAL WORD Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a
remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium. Where there is a right, there must be
a remedy. The remedy must not only be effective and efficient, but
also readily accessible. For a remedy that is inaccessible is no
remedy at all. The Constitution guarantees the rights of the poor
to free access to the courts and to adequate legal assistance. The
legal aid service rendered by the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP
chapters nationwide addresses only the right to adequate legal
assistance. Recipients of the service of the NCLA and legal aid
offices of IBP chapters may enjoy free access to courts by
exempting them from the payment of fees assessed in connection with
the filing of a complaint or action in court. With these twin
initiatives, the guarantee of Section 11, Article III of
Constitution is advanced and access to justice is increased by
bridging a significant gap and removing a major roadblock.
WHEREFORE, the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines is hereby COMMENDED for helping increase the access
to justice by the poor. The request of the Misamis Oriental Chapter
for the exemption from the payment of filing, docket and other fees
of the clients of the legal aid offices of the various IBP chapters
is GRANTED. The Rule on the Exemption From the Payment of Legal
Fees of the Clients of the National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA)
and of the Legal Aid Offices in the Local Chapters of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) (which shall be assigned
the docket number A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC [IRR] provided in this
resolution is hereby APPROVED. In this connection, the Clerk of
Court is DIRECTED to cause the publication of the said rule in a
newspaper of general circulation within five days from the
promulgation of this resolution. The Office of the Court
Administrator is hereby directed to promptly issue a circular to
inform all courts in the Philippines of the import of this
resolution. SO ORDERED.
The above rule, in conjunction with Section 21, Rule 3 and
Section 19, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the Rule on Mandatory
Legal Aid Service and the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases,
shall form a solid base of rules upon which the right of access to
courts by the poor shall be implemented. With these rules, we equip
the poor with the tools to effectively, efficiently and easily
enforce their rights in the judicial system.
EN BANC Can the Courts grant to our Foundation who works for
indigent and underprivileged people, the same option granted to
indigent people? The two Executive Judges, that we have approached,
fear accusations of favoritism or other kind of attack if they
approve something which is not clearly and specifically stated in
the law or approved by your HONOR. Can your Honor help us once
more?
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION BERSAMIN, J.: In his letter dated May 22, 2009 addressed
to the Chief Justice, Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi, administrator of the
Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., wrote: The Good Shepherd
Foundation, Inc. is very grateful for your 1rst. Indorsement to pay
a nominal fee of Php 5,000.00 and the balance upon the collection
action of 10 million pesos, thus giving us access to the Justice
System previously denied by an up-front excessive court fee. The
Hon. Court Administrator Jose Perez pointed out to the need of
complying with OCA Circular No. 42-2005 and Rule 141 that reserves
this privilege to indigent persons. While judges are appointed to
interpret the law, this type of law seems to be extremely detailed
with requirements that do not leave much room for interpretations.
In addition, this law deals mainly with individual indigent and it
does not include Foundations or Associations that work with and for
the most Indigent persons. As seen in our Article of Incorporation,
since 1985 the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. reached-out to the
poorest among the poor, to the newly born and abandoned babies, to
children who never saw the smile of their mother, to old people who
cannot afford a few pesos to pay for common prescriptions, to
broken families who returned to a normal life. In other words, we
have been working hard for the very Filipino people, that the
Government and the society cannot reach to, or have rejected or
abandoned them. To answer the query of Mr. Prioreschi, the Courts
cannot grant to foundations like the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc.
the same exemption from payment of legal fees granted to indigent
litigants even if the foundations are working for indigent and
underprivileged people. The basis for the exemption from legal and
filing fees is the free access clause, embodied in Sec. 11, Art.
III of the 1987 Constitution, thus: Sec. 11. Free access to the
courts and quasi judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance
shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. The
importance of the right to free access to the courts and quasi
judicial bodies and to adequate legal assistance cannot be denied.
A move to remove the provision on free access from the Constitution
on the ground that it was already covered by the equal protection
clause was defeated by the desire to give constitutional stature to
such specific protection of the poor.[1] In implementation of the
right of free access under the Constitution, the Supreme Court
promulgated rules, specifically, Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of
Court,[2] and Sec. 19, Rule 141, Rules of Court,[3] which
respectively state thus: Sec. 21. Indigent party. A party may be
authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent
if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is
satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property
sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities
for himself and his family. We shall be privileged if you find time
to visit our orphanage the Home of Love and the Spiritual Retreat
Center in Antipolo City. Grateful for your understanding, God bless
you and your undertakings.
RE: QUERY OF MR. ROGER C. PRIORESCHI RE EXEMPTION FROM LEGAL AND
FILING FEES OF THE GOOD SHEPHERD FOUNDATION, INC.
A. M. No. 09-6-9-SC
Promulgated: August 19, 2009
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket
and other lawful fees, and of transcripts of stenographic notes
which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the
docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from
paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case
favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides. Any
adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time
before judgment is rendered by the trial court. If the court should
determine after hearing that the party declared as an indigent is
in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper
docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the
clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the
court, execution shall issue for the payment thereof, without
prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose. (22a)
Sec. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees.
Indigent litigants (a) whose gross income and that of their
immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum
wage of an employee and (b) who do not own real property with a
fair market value as stated in the current tax declaration of more
than three hundred thousand (P300,000.00) pesos shall be exempt
from payment of legal fees. The legal fees shall be a lien on any
judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent litigant
unless the court otherwise provides. To be entitled to the
exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit
that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross income
abovementioned, and they do not own any real property with the fair
value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested
person attesting to the truth of the litigants affidavit. The
current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached to the litigants
affidavit. Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or
disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to dismiss the
complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that party,
without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been
incurred. The clear intent and precise language of the aforequoted
provisions of the Rules of Court indicate that only a natural party
litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd
Foundation, Inc., being a corporation invested
by the State with a juridical personality separate and distinct
from that of its members,[4] is a juridical person. Among others,
it has the power to acquire and possess property of all kinds as
well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in
conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization.[5]
As a juridical person, therefore, it cannot be accorded the
exemption from legal and filing fees granted to indigent litigants.
That the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is working for indigent and
underprivileged people is of no moment. Clearly, the Constitution
has explicitly premised the free access clause on a persons
poverty, a condition that only a natural person can suffer. There
are other reasons that warrant the rejection of the request for
exemption in favor of a juridical person. For one, extending the
exemption to a juridical person on the ground that it works for
indigent and underprivileged people may be prone to abuse (even
with the imposition of rigid documentation requirements),
particularly by corporations and entities bent on circumventing the
rule on payment of the fees. Also, the scrutiny of compliance with
the documentation requirements may prove too time-consuming and
wasteful for the courts. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Good
Shepherd Foundation, Inc. cannot be extended the exemption from
legal and filing fees despite its working for indigent and
underprivileged people.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 176339, January 10, 2011]
DO-ALL METALS INDUSTRIES, INC., SPS. DOMINGO LIM AND LELY KUNG
LIM, PETITIONERS, VS. SECURITY BANK CORP., TITOLAIDO E.
PAYONGAYONG, EVYLENE C. SISON, PHIL. INDUSTRIAL SECURITY AGENCY
CORP. AND GIL SILOS, RESPONDENTS.
While the negotiations were on going, the Lims claimed that they
continued to use the property in their business. But the Bank
posted at the place private security guards from Philippine
Industrial Security Agency (PISA). The Lims also claimed that on
several occasions in 2000, the guards, on instructions of the Bank
representatives Titolaido Payongayong and Evylene Sison, padlocked
the entrances to the place and barred the Lims as well as DMI's
employees from entering the property. One of the guards even
pointed his gun at one employee and shots were fired. Because of
this, DMI was unable to close several projects and contracts with
prospective clients. Further, the Lims alleged that they were
unable to retrieve assorted furniture, equipment, and personal
items left at the property.
DECISION ABAD, J.:
This case is about the propriety of awarding damages based on
claims embodied in the plaintiff's supplemental complaint filed
without prior payment of the corresponding filing fees.
From 1996 to 1997, Dragon Lady Industries, Inc., owned by
petitioner spouses Domingo Lim and Lely Kung Lim (the Lims) took
out loans from respondent Security Bank Corporation (the Bank) that
totaled P92,454,776.45. Unable to pay the loans on time, the Lims
assigned some of their real properties to the Bank to secure the
same, including a building and the lot on which it stands (the
property), located at M. [1] de Leon St., Santolan, Pasig City.
The Lims eventually filed a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City for damages with prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order (TRO) or preliminary injunction
against the Bank and its co-defendants [2] Payongayong, Sison,
PISA, and Gil Silos. Answering the complaint, the Bank pointed out
that the lease contract allowed it to sell the property at any time
provided only that it gave DMI the right of first refusal. DMI had
seven days from notice to exercise its option. On September 10,
1999 the Bank gave notice to DMI that it intended to sell the
property to a third party. DMI asked for an extension of its option
to buy and the Bank granted it. But the parties could not agree on
a purchase price. The Bank required DMI to vacate and turnover the
property but it failed to do so. As a result, the Bank's buyer
backed-out of the sale. Despite what happened, the Bank and DMI
continued negotiations for the purchase of the leased premises but
they came to no agreement.
In 1998 the Bank offered to lease the property to the Lims
through petitioner Do-All Metals Industries, Inc. (DMI) primarily
for business although the Lims were to use part of the property as
their residence. DMI and the Bank executed a two-year lease
contract from October 1, 1998 to September 30, 2000 but the Bank
retained the right to pre-terminate the lease. The contract also
provided that, should the Bank decide to sell the property, DMI
shall have the right of first refusal.
The Bank denied, on the other hand, that its guards harassed DMI
and the Lims. To protect its property, the Bank began posting
guards at the building even before it leased the same to DMI.
Indeed, this arrangement benefited both parties. The Bank alleged
that in October of 2000, when the parties could not come to an
agreement regarding the purchase of the property, DMI vacated the
same and peacefully turned over possession to the Bank.
On December 3, 1999, before the lease was up, the Bank gave
notice to DMI that it was pre-terminating the lease on December 31,
1999. Wanting to exercise its right of first refusal, DMI tried to
negotiate with the Bank the terms of its purchase. DMI offered to
pay the Bank P8 million for the property but the latter rejected
the offer, suggesting P15 million instead. DMI made a second offer
of P10 million but the Bank declined the same.
The Bank offered no objection to the issuance of a TRO since it
claimed that it never prevented DMI or its employees from entering
or leaving the building. For this reason, the RTC directed the Bank
to allow DMI and the Lims to enter the building and get the things
they left there. The latter claimed, however, that on entering the
building, they were unable to find the movable properties they left
there. In a supplemental complaint, DMI and the Lims alleged that
the Bank surreptitiously took such properties, resulting in
additional actual damages to them of over P27 million.
The RTC set the pre-trial in the case for December 4, 2001. On
that date, however, counsel for the Bank moved to reset the
proceeding. The court denied the motion and allowed DMI and the
Lims to present their evidence ex parte. The court
eventually reconsidered its order but only after the plaintiffs
had already presented their evidence and were about to rest their
case. The RTC declined to recall the plaintiffs' witnesses for
cross- examination but allowed the Bank to present its [3]
evidence. This prompted the Bank to seek relief from the Court of
Appeals (CA) [4] and eventually from this Court but to no
avail.
3. Whether or not the Bank is liable to DMI and the Lims for the
machineries, equipment, and other properties they allegedly lost
after they were barred from the property.
The Court's Rulings During its turn at the trial, the Bank got
to present only defendant Payongayong, a bank officer. For
repeatedly canceling the hearings and incurring delays, the RTC
declared the Bank to have forfeited its right to present additional
evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision.
One. On the issue of jurisdiction, respondent Bank argues that
plaintiffs' failure to pay the filing fees on their supplemental
complaint is fatal to their action.
On September 30, 2004 the RTC rendered a decision in favor of
DMI and the Lims. It ordered the Bank to pay the plaintiffs
P27,974,564.00 as actual damages, P500,000.00 as moral damages,
P500,000 as exemplary damages, and P100,000.00 as attorney's fees.
But the court absolved defendants Payongayong, Sison, Silos and
PISA of any liability.
But what the plaintiffs failed to pay was merely the filing fees
for their Supplemental Complaint. The RTC acquired jurisdiction
over plaintiffs' action from the moment they filed their original
complaint accompanied by the payment of the filing fees due on the
same. The plaintiffs' non-payment of the additional filing fees due
on their additional claims did not divest the RTC of the
jurisdiction it already had over the [6] case.
The Bank moved for reconsideration of the decision, questioning
among other things the RTC's authority to grant damages considering
plaintiffs' failure to pay the filing fees on their supplemental
complaint. The RTC denied the motion. On appeal to the CA, the
latter found for the Bank, reversed the RTC decision, and dismissed
[5] the complaint as well as the counterclaims. DMI and the Lims
filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same,
hence this petition.
The Issues Presented
Two. As to the claim that Bank's representatives and retained
guards harassed and intimidated DMI's employees and the Lims, the
RTC found ample proof of such wrongdoings and accordingly awarded
damages to the plaintiffs. But the CA disagreed, discounting the
testimony of the police officers regarding their investigations of
the incidents since such officers were not present when they
happened. The CA may be correct in a way but the plaintiffs
presented eyewitnesses who testified out of personal knowledge. The
police officers testified merely to point out that there had been
trouble at the place and their investigations yielded their
findings.
The issues presented in this case are:
The Bank belittles the testimonies of the petitioners' witnesses
for having been presented ex parte before the clerk of court. But
the ex parte hearing, having been properly authorized, cannot be
assailed as less credible. It was the Bank's fault that it was
unable to attend the hearing. It cannot profit from its lack of
diligence.
1. Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction to hear and
adjudicate plaintiff's supplemental complaint against the Bank
considering their failure to pay the filing fees on the amounts of
damages they claim in it; Domingo Lim and some employees of DMI
testified regarding the Bank guards' unmitigated use of their
superior strength and firepower. Their testimonies were never
refuted. Police Inspector Priscillo dela Paz testified that he
responded to several complaints regarding shooting incidents at the
leased premises and on one occasion, he found Domingo Lim was
locked in the building. When he asked why Lim had been locked in, a
Bank representative told him that they had instructions to prevent
anyone from taking any property out of the premises. It was only
after Dela [7] Paz talked to the Bank representative that they let
Lim out.
2. Whether or not the Bank is liable for the intimidation and
harassment committed against DMI and its representatives; and
Supreme Court can grant exemptions to the payment of the fees
due the courts and these exemptions are embodied in its rules.
Payongayong, the Bank's sole witness, denied charges of harassment
against the Bank's representatives and the guards. But his denial
came merely from reports relayed to him. They were not based on
personal knowledge. Besides, as correctly pointed out by the CA,
plaintiffs had the burden of proving that the movable properties in
question had remained in the premises and that the bank was
responsible for their loss. The only evidence offered to prove the
loss was Domingo Lim's testimony and some undated and unsigned
inventories. These were self-serving and uncorroborated.
While the lease may have already lapsed, the Bank had no
business harassing and intimidating the Lims and their employees.
The RTC was therefore correct in adjudging moral damages, exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees against the Bank for the acts of their
representatives and building guards.
Three. As to the damages that plaintiffs claim under their
supplemental complaint, their stand is that the RTC committed no
error in admitting the complaint even if they had not paid the
filing fees due on it since such fees constituted a lien anyway on
the judgment award. But this after-judgment lien, which implies
that payment depends on a successful execution of the judgment,
applies to cases where the filing fees were incorrectly assessed or
paid or where the court has discretion to fix [8] the amount of the
award. None of these circumstances obtain in this case.
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition and
REINSTATES with modification the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City in Civil Case 68184. The Court DIRECTS
respondent Security Bank Corporation to pay petitioners DMI and
spouses Domingo and Lely Kung Lim damages in the following amounts:
P500,000.00 as moral damages, P500,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
P100,000.00 for attorney's fees. The Court DELETES the award of
actual damages of P27,974,564.00.
SO ORDERED. Here, the supplemental complaint specified from the
beginning the actual damages that the plaintiffs sought against the
Bank. Still plaintiffs paid no filing fees on the same. And, while
petitioners claim that they were willing to pay the additional
fees, they gave no reason for their omission nor offered to pay the
same. They merely said that they did not yet pay the fees because
the RTC had not assessed them for it. But a supplemental complaint
is like any complaint and the rule is that the filing [9] fees due
on a complaint need to be paid upon its filing. The rules do not
require the court to make special assessments in cases of
supplemental complaints.
To aggravate plaintiffs' omission, although the Bank brought up
the question of their failure to pay additional filing fees in its
motion for reconsideration, plaintiffs made no effort to make at
least a late payment before the case could be submitted for
decision, assuming of course that the prescription of their action
had not then set it in. Clearly, plaintiffs have no excuse for
their continuous failure to pay the fees they owed the court.
Consequently, the trial court should have treated their
Supplemental Complaint as not filed.
Plaintiffs of course point out that the Bank itself raised the
issue of non-payment of additional filing fees only after the RTC
had rendered its decision in the case. The implication is that the
Bank should be deemed to have waived its objection to such
omission. But it is not for a party to the case or even for the
trial court to waive the payment of the additional filing fees due
on the supplemental complaint. Only the
THIRD DIVISION
The Facts:
[G.R. No. 152272, March 05, 2012]
JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ANDRES C.
BAUTISTA, BRIGIDO DIMACULANGAN, DOLORES P. PRADO, IMELDA DE LA
CRUZ, EDITHA C. DY, FLORENCIA M. MERCADO, LEOVINO C. DATARIO, AIDA
A. ABAYON, NAPOLEON M. DIMAANO, ROSITA G. ESTIGOY AND NELSON A.
LOYOLA, PETITIONERS, VS. FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC., FIL ESTATE
ECOCENTRUM CORPORATION, LA PAZ HOUSING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
WARBIRD SECURITY AGENCY, ENRIQUE RIVILLA, MICHAEL E. JETHMAL AND
MICHAEL ALUNAN, RESPONDENTS.
On January 20, 1999, Juana Complex I Homeowners Association,
Inc. (JCHA), together with individual residents of Juana Complex I
and other neighboring [5] subdivisions (collectively referred as
JCHA, et. al.), instituted a complaint for damages, in its own
behalf and as a class suit representing the regular commuters and
motorists of Juana Complex I and neighboring subdivisions who were
deprived of the use of La Paz Road, against Fil-Estate Land, Inc.
(Fil-Estate), Fil-estate Ecocentrum Corporation (FEEC), La Paz
Housing & Development Corporation (La Paz), and Warbird
Security Agency and their respective officers (collectively
referred as Fil-Estate, et al.).
[G. R. NO. 152397]
FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC., FIL ESTATE ECOCENTRUM CORPORATION, LA PAZ
HOUSING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, WARBIRD SECURITY AGENCY,
ENRIQUE RIVILLA, MICHAEL E. JETHMAL AND MICHAEL ALUNAN,
PETITIONERS, VS. JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
ANDRES C. BAUTISTA, BRIGIDO DIMACULANGAN, DOLORES P. PRADO, IMELDA
DE LA CRUZ, EDITHA C. DY, FLORENCIA M. MERCADO, LEOVINO C. DATARIO,
AIDA A. ABAYON, NAPOLEON M. DIMAANO, ROSITA G. ESTIGOY AND NELSON
A. LOYOLA, RESPONDENTS.
The complaint alleged that JCHA, et al. were regular commuters
and motorists who constantly travelled towards the direction of
Manila and Calamba; that they used the entry and exit toll gates of
South Luzon Expressway (SLEX) by passing through right-of-way
public road known as La Paz Road; that they had been using La Paz
Road for more than ten (10) years; that in August 1998, Fil-estate
excavated, broke and deliberately ruined La Paz Road that led to
SLEX so JCHA, et al. would not be able to pass through the said
road; that La Paz Road was restored by the residents to make it
passable but Fil-estate excavated the road again; that JCHA
reported the matter to the Municipal Government and the Office of
the Municipal Engineer but the latter failed to repair the road to
make it passable and safe to motorists and pedestrians; that the
act of Fil-estate in excavating La Paz Road caused damage,
prejudice, inconvenience, annoyance, and loss of precious hours to
them, to the commuters and motorists because traffic was re-routed
to narrow streets that caused terrible traffic congestion and
hazard; and that its permanent closure would not only prejudice
their right to free and unhampered use of the property but would
also cause great damage and irreparable injury.
DECISION Accordingly, JCHA, et al. also prayed for the immediate
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or a writ of
preliminary injunction (WPI) to enjoin Fil-Estate, et al. from
stopping and intimidating them in their use of La Paz Road.
MENDOZA, J.:
Before the Court are two (2) consolidated petitions assailing
the July 31, 2001 [1] [2] Decision and February 21, 2002 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA[3] G.R. SP No. 60543, which
annulled and set aside the March 3, 1999 Order of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 25, Bian, Laguna (RTC), granting the
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
and upheld the June 16, 2000 [4] Omnibus Order denying the motion
to dismiss.
On February 10, 1999, a TRO was issued ordering Fil-Estate, et
al, for a period of twenty (20) days, to stop preventing, coercing,
intimidating or harassing the [6] commuters and motorists from
using the La Paz Road.
Subsequently, the RTC conducted several hearings to determine
the propriety of the issuance of a WPI.
On February 26, 1999, Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion to
dismiss arguing that the complaint failed to state a cause of
action and that it was improperly filed as a class [8] suit. On
March 5, 1999, JCHA, et al. filed their comment on the motion to
dismiss [9] to which respondents filed a reply.
[7]
On March 3, 1999, the RTC issued an Order JCHA, et al. to post a
bond.
[10]
granting the WPI and required
al. alleged in their complaint that they had been using La Paz
Road for more than ten (10) years and that their right was violated
when Fil-Estate closed and excavated the road. It sustained the RTC
ruling that the complaint was properly filed as a class suit as it
was shown that the case was of common interest and that the
individuals sought to be represented were so numerous that it was
impractical to include all of them as parties. The CA, however,
annulled the WPI for failure of JCHA, et al. to prove their clear
and present right over La Paz Road. The CA ordered the remand of
the case to the RTC for a full-blown trial on the merits.
On March 19, 1999, Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion for
reconsideration arguing, among others, that JCHA, et al. failed to
satisfy the requirements for the issuance of [12] a WPI. On March
23, 1999, JCHA, et al. filed their opposition to the motion. In
G.R. No. 152272, JCHA, et al. come to this Court, raising the
following issues: The RTC then issued its June 16, 2000 Omnibus
Order, denying both the motion to dismiss and the motion for
reconsideration filed by Fil-Estate, et al.
[11]
Hence, these petitions for review.
(A)
Not satisfied, Fil-Estate, et al. filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the CA to annul (1) the Order
dated March 3, 1999 and (2) the Omnibus Order dated June 16, 2000.
They contended that the complaint failed to state a cause of action
and that it was improperly filed as a class suit. With regard to
the issuance of the WPI, the defendants averred that JCHA, et al.
failed to show that they had a clear and unmistakable right to the
use of La Paz Road; and further claimed that La Paz Road was a
torrens registered private road and there was neither a voluntary
nor [13] legal easement constituted over it.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN HOLDING THAT A FULL-BLOWN
TRIAL ON THE MERITS IS REQUIRED TO DETERMINE THE NATURE OF THE LA
PAZ ROAD, HAD DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF
SUPERVISION.
(B)
On July 31, 2001, the CA rendered the decision partially
granting the petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby partially GRANTED. The Order
dated March 3, 1999 granting the writ of preliminary injunction is
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE but the portion of the Omnibus Order
dated June 16, 2000 denying the motion to dismiss is upheld.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS
FAILED TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, HAD DECIDED NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH
THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE [15] SUPREME COURT.
In G.R. No. 152397, on the other hand, Fil-Estate, et al. anchor
their petition on the following issues: SO ORDERED.[14]
I. The CA ruled that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause
of action when JCHA, et
The Court of Appeals declaration that respondents Complaint
states a cause of action is contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence.
II.
The Court of Appeals pronouncement that respondents complaint
was properly filed as a class suit is contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence.
III.
In their Memorandum, Fil-Estate, et al. explain that La Paz Road
is included in the parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates
of Title (TCT) Nos. T-120008, T90321 and T-90607, all registered in
the name of La Paz. The purpose of constructing La Paz Road was to
provide a passageway for La Paz to its intended projects to the
south, one of which was the Juana Complex I. When Juana Complex I
was completed, La Paz donated the open spaces, drainage, canal, and
lighting facilities inside the Juana Complex I to the Municipality
of Bian. The streets within the subdivisions were then converted to
public roads and were opened for use of the general public. The La
Paz Road, not being part of the Juana Complex I, was excluded from
the donation. Subsequently, La Paz became a shareholder of FEEC, a
consortium formed to develop several real properties in Bian,
Laguna, known as Ecocentrum Project. In exchange for shares of
stock, La Paz contributed some of its real properties to the
Municipality of Bian, including the properties constituting La Paz
Road, to form part of the Ecocentrum Project.
[17]
The Court of Appeals conclusion that full blown trial on the
merits is required to determine the nature of the La Paz Road is
contrary to existing laws and [16] jurisprudence.
JCHA, et al. concur with the CA that the complaint sufficiently
stated a cause of action. They, however, disagree with the CAs
pronouncement that a full-blown trial on the merits was necessary.
They claim that during the hearing on the application of the writ
of injunction, they had sufficiently proven that La Paz Road was a
public road and that commuters and motorists of their neighboring
villages had used this road as their means of access to the San
Agustin Church, Colegio De San Agustin and to SLEX in going to
Metro Manila and to Southern Tagalog particularly during the rush
hours when traffic at Carmona Entry/Exit and Susana Heights
Entry/Exit was at its worst.
Fil-Estate, et al. agree with the CA that the annulment of the
WPI was proper since JCHA, et al. failed to prove that they have a
clear right over La Paz Road. Fil-Estate, et al. assert that JCHA,
et al. failed to prove the existence of a right of way or a right
to pass over La Paz Road and that the closure of the said road
constituted an injury to such right. According to them, La Paz Road
is a torrens registered private road and there is neither a
voluntary nor legal easement constituted over it. They claim that
La Paz Road is a private property registered under the name of La
Paz and the beneficial ownership thereof was transferred to FEEC
when La Paz joined the consortium for the Ecocentrum Project.
Fil-Estate, et al., however, insist that the complaint did not
sufficiently contain the ultimate facts to show a cause of action.
They aver the bare allegation that one is entitled to something is
an allegation of a conclusion which adds nothing to the
pleading.
JCHA, et al. argue that La Paz Road has attained the status and
character of a public road or burdened by an apparent easement of
public right of way. They point out that La Paz Road is the widest
road in the neighborhood used by motorists in going to Halang Road
and in entering the SLEX-Halang toll gate and that there is no
other road as wide as La Paz Road existing in the vicinity. For
residents of San Pedro, Laguna, the shortest, convenient and safe
route towards SLEX Halang is along Rosario Avenue joining La Paz
Road.
They likewise argue that the complaint was improperly filed as a
class suit for it failed to show that JCHA, et al. and the
commuters and motorists they are representing have a well-defined
community of interest over La Paz Road. They claim that the
excavation of La Paz Road would not necessarily give rise to a
common right or cause of action for JCHA, et al. against them since
each of them has a separate and distinct purpose and each may be
affected differently than the others.
Finally, JCHA, et al. argue that the CA erred when it voided the
WPI because the public nature of La Paz Road had been sufficiently
proven and, as residents of San Pedro and Bian, Laguna, their right
to use La Paz Road is undeniable.
The Courts Ruling
The issues for the Courts resolution are: (1) whether or not the
complaint states a
cause of action; (2) whether the complaint has been properly
filed as a class suit; and (2) whether or not a WPI is
warranted.
With respect to the issue that the case was improperly
instituted as a class suit, the Court finds the opposition without
merit.
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of
action as an act or omission by which a party violates the right of
another. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains
three (3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely:
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class suit,
as follows:
(1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative
obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the
defendant in violation of said legal right.[18]
Sec. 12. Class suit. When the subject matter of the controversy
is one of common or general interest to many persons so numerous
that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them
which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and
representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned
may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest
shall have the right to intervene to protect his individual
interest.
The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action
is determined by its [19] averments regarding the acts committed by
the defendant. Thus, it must contain a concise statement of the
ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiffs [20] cause
of action. To be taken into account are only the material
allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and circumstances or
other matters aliunde are not [21] considered.
The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are:
1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general
interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous
that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the
parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or
representative [24] of the class and can fully protect the
interests of all concerned.
In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all
commuters and motorists who use La Paz Road. As succinctly stated
by the CA: The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the
complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not
admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid [22]
verdict in accordance with the prayer of said complaint. Stated
differently, if the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient
basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not
be dismissed regardless of the defense that may [23] be asserted by
the defendant.
In the present case, the Court finds the allegations in the
complaint sufficient to establish a cause of action. First, JCHA,
et al.s averments in the complaint show a demandable right over La
Paz Road. These are: (1) their right to use the road on the basis
of their allegation that they had been using the road for more than
10 years; and (2) an easement of a right of way has been
constituted over the said roads. There is no other road as wide as
La Paz Road existing in the vicinity and it is the shortest,
convenient and safe route towards SLEX Halang that the commuters
and motorists may use. Second, there is an alleged violation of
such right committed by Fil-Estate, et al. when they excavated the
road and prevented the commuters and motorists from using the same.
Third, JCHA, et al. consequently suffered injury and that a valid
judgment could have been rendered in accordance with the relief
sought therein.
The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the closure and
excavation of the La Paz Road, is initially shown to be of common
or general interest to many persons. The records reveal that
numerous individuals have filed manifestations with the lower
court, conveying their intention to join private respondents in the
suit and claiming that they are similarly situated with private
respondents for they were also prejudiced by the acts of
petitioners in closing and excavating the La Paz Road. Moreover,
the individuals sought to be represented by private respondents in
the suit are so numerous that it is impracticable to join them all
as parties and be named individually as plaintiffs in the
complaint. These individuals claim to be residents of various
barangays in Bian, Laguna and other barangays in San Pedro,
Laguna.
Anent the issue on the propriety of the WPI, Section 3, Rule 58
of the Rules of Court lays down the rules for the issuance thereof.
Thus:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and
the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the acts
complained of, or in the performance of an act or acts, either
for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the
act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work
injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, or agency or a person is doing,
threatening, or attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to
be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of
the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding,
and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
Due process considerations dictate that the assailed injunctive
writ is not a judgment on the merits but merely an order for the
grant of a provisional and ancillary remedy to preserve the status
quo until the merits of the case can be heard. The hearing on the
application for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is
separate and distinct [29] from the trial on the merits of the main
case. The evidence submitted during the hearing of the incident is
not conclusive or complete for only a "sampling" is needed to give
the trial court an idea of the justification for the preliminary
injunction pending [30] the decision of the case on the merits.
There are vital facts that have yet to be presented during the
trial which may not be obtained or presented during the [31]
hearing on the application for the injunctive writ. Moreover, the
quantum of [32] evidence required for one is different from that
for the other. WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. Accordingly,
the July 31, 2001 Decision and February 21, 2002 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60543 are AFFIRMED.
A writ of preliminary injunction is available to prevent a
threatened or continuous irremediable injury to parties before
their claims can be thoroughly studied and [25] adjudicated. The
requisites for its issuance are: (1) the existence of a clear and
unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and
paramount [26] necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
For the writ to issue, the right sought to be protected must be a
present right, a legal right which must be shown to [27] be clear
and positive. This means that the persons applying for the writ
must show that they have an ostensible right to the final relief
prayed for in their [28] complaint.
In the case at bench, JCHA, et al. failed to establish a prima
facie proof of violation of their right to justify the issuance of
a WPI. Their right to the use of La Paz Road is disputable since
they have no clear legal right therein. As correctly ruled by the
CA:
Here, contrary to the ruling of respondent Judge, private
respondents failed to prove as yet that they have a clear and
unmistakable right over the La Paz Road which was sought to be
protected by the injunctive writ. They merely anchor their
purported right over the La Paz Road on the bare allegation that
they have been using the same as public road right-of-way for more
than ten years. A mere allegation does not meet the standard of
proof that would warrant the issuance of the injunctive writ.
Failure to establish the existence of a clear right which should be
judicially protected through the writ of injunction is a sufficient
ground for denying the injunction.
Consequently, the case should be further heard by the RTC so
that the parties can fully prove their respective positions on the
issues.
CORONA, J.:
THIRD DIVISION IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF
A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS Present: G.R. No. 154598
This is a petition to review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, the July 5, 2002 resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals,
Sixteenth Division, in CA G.R. SP No. 70501 dismissing the petition
for habeas corpus on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack
of substance. The dispositive portion[2] read:
RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for and in behalf of the minor child
SEQUEIRA JENNIFER DELLE FRANCISCO THORNTON Petitioner,
PANGANIBAN,J., Chairman, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,* CORONA and CARPIO
MORALES, JJ.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for habeas corpus on
the grounds that: a) this Court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the petition; and b) the petition is not
sufficient in substance.
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were
married on August 28, 1998 in the Catholic Evangelical Church at
United Nations Avenue, Manila. A year later, respondent gave birth
to a baby girl whom they named Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco
Thornton.
- versus -
However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored
as a plain housewife. She wanted to return to her old job as a
guest relations officer in a nightclub, with the freedom to go out
with her friends. In fact, whenever petitioner was out of the
country, respondent was also often out with her friends, leaving
her daughter in the care of the househelp.
ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON, Respondent. Promulgated: Petitioner
admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she continued
her carefree ways. On December 7, 2001, respondent left the family
home with her daughter Sequiera without notifying her husband. She
told the servants that she was bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit,
Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.
August 16, 2004 Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in
the designated Family Court in Makati City but this was dismissed,
presumably because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan.
Petitioner then went to Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of
respondent and their daughter. However, he did not find them there
and the barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a
certification[3] that respondent was no longer residing there.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondents
cellular phone bills showing calls from different places such as
Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitioner
then filed another petition for habeas corpus, this time in the
Court of Appeals which could issue a writ of habeas corpus
enforceable in the entire country.
BP 129 and RA 7902 insofar as the jurisdiction of this Court to
issue writ of habeas corpus in custody of minor cases is concerned?
The simple answer is, yes, it did, because there is no other
meaning of the word exclusive than to constitute the Family Court
as the sole court which can issue said writ. If a court other than
the Family Court also possesses the same competence, then the
jurisdiction of the former is not exclusive but concurrent and such
an interpretation is contrary to the simple and clear wording of RA
8369.
However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the
ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case. It ruled
that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family
courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas
corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980):
Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court
(now Court of Appeals) has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas
corpus whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This
conferment of jurisdiction was re-stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995),
an act expanding the jurisdiction of this Court. This jurisdiction
finds its procedural expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court.
Petitioner argues that unless this Court assumes jurisdiction
over a petition for habeas corpus involving custody of minors, a
respondent can easily evade the service of a writ of habeas corpus
on him or her by just moving out of the region over which the
Regional Trial Court issuing the writ has territorial jurisdiction.
That may be so but then jurisdiction is conferred by law. In the
absence of a law conferring such jurisdiction in this Court, it
cannot exercise it even if it is demanded by expediency or
necessity.
In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was
enacted. It provides:
Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law is not within the
authority of this Court or any court for that matter to determine.
The enactment of a law on jurisdiction is within the exclusive
domain of the legislature. When there is a perceived defect in the
law, the remedy is not to be sought form the courts but only from
the legislature.
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. The Family Courts shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the
following cases: The only issue before us therefore is whether the
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus
in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision
in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction
over such petitions.
xxx
xxx
xxx
b. Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus
in relation to the latter.
The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly repeal
In his comment, the Solicitor General points out that Section 20
of the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in
Relation to Custody of Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, effective May
15, 2003) has rendered the issue moot. Section 20 of the rule
provides that a petition for habeas corpus may be filed in the
Supreme Court,[4] Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and,
if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines.[5]
The petition is granted. The Court of Appeals should take
cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that
revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving
the custody of minors.
The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA
7902 and BP 129 since, by giving family courts exclusive
jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers intended it to
be the sole court which can issue writs of habeas corpus. To the
court a quo, the word exclusive apparently cannot be construed any
other way.
To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the
petition for habeas corpus involving a minor child whose
whereabouts are uncertain and transient will not result in one of
the situations that the legislature seeks to avoid. First, the
welfare of the child is paramount. Second, the ex parte nature of
habeas corpus proceedings will not result in disruption of the
childs privacy and emotional well-being; whereas to deprive the
appellate court of jurisdiction will result in the evil sought to
be avoided by the legislature: the childs welfare and well being
will be prejudiced.
We disagree with the CAs reasoning because it will result in an
iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like petitioner without
legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals
who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for
would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts
whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial
jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place
to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a
habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of
recourse could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when
they passed the Family Courts Act of 1997. As observed by the
Solicitor General:
This is not the first time that this Court construed the word
exclusive as not foreclosing resort to another jurisdiction. As
correctly cited by the Solicitor General, in Floresca vs. Philex
Mining Corporation,[6] the heirs of miners killed in a workrelated
accident were allowed to file suit in the regular courts even if,
under the Workmens Compensation Act, the Workmens Compensation
Commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction over such cases.
We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General
that:
Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the avowed policy of the
State is to protect the rights and promote the welfare of children.
The creation of the Family Court is geared towards addressing three
major issues regarding childrens welfare cases, as expressed by the
legislators during the deliberations for the law. The legislative
intent behind giving Family Courts exclusive and original
jurisdiction over such cases was to avoid further clogging of
regular court dockets, ensure greater sensitivity and
specialization in view