Realist Perspective On Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy

IRJMSH Vol 5 Issue 4 [Year 2014] ISSN 2277 – 9809 (0nline) 2348–9359 (Print)

International Research Journal of Management Sociology & Humanity Page 377

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Realist Perspective On Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy

By Ms. Looke Kumari

Realist perspective views survival and security of state as supreme national interest in

international system characterized by anarchy. Each nation state attempts to maximize its power

to promote its national interest at the expense of others. The international system is defined in

terms of great powers like bipolar, unipolar and multipolar world and that great power tends to

exercise hegemony. Any foreign policy and decision of political leaders must be assessed in

terms its outcome. This perspective became dominant framework for explaining foreign policy

behavior after Second World War.

Scholars and experts do believe that Indian foreign policy orientation has always been realist and

pragmatic despite Nehru idealism and policy of non alignment. This realist orientation got more

manifest and profound expression after collapse of Soviet Union in 1990.

Prof. Rajesh Rajagopalan, contends that, a reinterpretation of the Nehruvian and traditional

model of Indian Foreign policy reveals the difference in the new revisionist literature on what

should be the constituent of a realist foreign policy. These range from hyper power perspective

(HPP) to the national power perspective (NPP) to the liberal power perspective (LPP) on grand

strategy. For NPP, nuclear weapons are political tools and they tend to be deterrence optimistic

as against HPP, which stoutly oppose any moderation in the nuclear policy. The LPP like the

HPP represents a post cold war evolution. LPP give least attention to military might as see

diplomacy and trade having dominant roles in international politics.

India being a soft power has minimalist perceptive on the use of military power due to the fairly

secure international strategic security conditions and thus, gains from hard power is not on cards

for India. These structural conditions limit the advocacy of hard power perspectives. There is

another side to this debate were in some invoke Nehru’s strategy to emphasize on greater ethical

content in India’s grand strategy. This view is critical of the changes in the post cold war Indian

foreign policy (Rajagopalan 2010).



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During much of the cold war India showed ideological toward tilt Soviet Union. Nehru, principal

architect of India’s Foreign policy was more critical of United States and Atlantic Alliance than

malfeasances of Soviet Union as latter were sympathetic to the aspiration of the Third world.

Nehru successor while professing non alignment openly collaborated with Soviet Union on a

range of global issues like Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan.

After the collapse of Soviet Union, Indian policy makers sought to devise a policy free of Soviet

embrace that could promote domestic economic development augment India’s military capability

and help India to achieve great power status in the international system. This necessitated the

need to reorient foreign policy toward United States and Western alliance to advance India

national interest.

In initial years of 1990’s both India and US began a ‘strategic friendship’ if not a strategic

partnership because huge asymmetry of power. Despite the fact US did not show any decisive

shift in its Pro-Pakistan stance, the Indo-US diplomatic and military relationship developed

slowly and half heartedly.

Parallel to this new development Indian leadership decided to achieve nuclear power status in

May 1998 by conducting five nuclear tests in Pokharan (Rajasthan), which attracted wrath of

international community including US. India made it clear that it will not be the first country to

use nuclear weapon against another state and that nuclear test in more driven by threat perception

and minimal deterrence in South Asia region.

J.N. Dixit (2004) justifies India’s acquiring the nuclear bomb on account of various factors. The

nuclear capacity of India will help structure a strategic balance in its neighborhood given the

presence of major powers in the region. Pakistan relation with other nuclear weapon powers such

as China and USA cannot be ignored by India. Threat from Pakistan of primary importance to

India. Citing Steve Wiessman and Herbert Krosney ‘Islamic bomb’ Dixit held that Pakistan

under Zulifiquar Ali Bhutto was developing nuclear weapon two years before India and 1974 test

in Pokhran Bhutto reason was that Pakistan must have overwhelming superiority in non

conventional weapon so that India would never be able to defeat Pakistan in conventional

warfare. Pakistan consistently increased its nuclear weapon and missile capacities from 1972

onwards. By 1981, Pakistan was in possession of limited number of nuclear devices with



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assistance from Chinese expertise and know how Pakistan was capable of adopting nuclear and

missile posture against by 1996-97. The firing of potential IRBM missile Ghauri and claim of

Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. Abdul Qudir Khan that Pakistan had an effective military nuclear

arsenal could not have taken lightly. Increasing nuclear and missile capacities of China since

1964 have made China an accepted and acknowledged member of nuclear weapon club.

Major powers like France and China conducted nuclear test as late as 1996 just CTBT was being

finalized. Besides US and Russia retains more than 10,000 nuclear weapons and massive number

of other strategic and tactical warheads. Therefore Indian threat perception in the context of

international weapon environment are realistic and the response in term of international

precedents. The UK and France despite guaranteed nuclear security umbrella provided by USA

and NATO.

Moreover, India nuclear weaponisation is motivated more by political and strategic purpose than

operational military intentions. India will opt for the latter under compelling and unavoidable

circumstances. The nuclear status also affirms India’s self reliance in sophisticated level of

technological capacities in the sphere of nuclear physics and nuclear engineering with capacities

for computer simulation and subcritical tests in future. With newly acquired nuclear status, India

has achieved a strategic position as balancing factor both in regional and international power

equation.

Sumit Ganguly (1999), also supports J.N Dixit observation that nuclear threats from

neighbouring China and Pakistan were pivotal not only in stimulating and shaping earlier nuclear

program but in driving the final 1998 nuclear breakout division. The evolution of nuclear

program and 1998 tests were product of calculated political choices based upon consideration of

national security and incremental and fitful acquisition of the capability to manufacture nuclear

weapon. It is not driven by prestige and status in the international system. If India’s prestige had

so concerned its policy makers the test should have come much earlier especially in the waning

day of the cold war when the country found itself adrift in the international order.

Rodney W. Jones (2000), argues the evidence does not support Ganguly assertion. Although

1962 Chinese invasion and China’s detonation of its first nuclear weapon in 1964 gave India a

temporary reason to fear China militarily but over the next three decades China made no active



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nuclear threats against India nor did it deploy nuclear weapon specifically to target India. Infact,

,China had no contentious objectives in India beyond the resolving border dispute. Since late

1980’s China has cooperated with India and opened bilateral trade. Chinese security assistance to

Pakistan was modest and represented no challenge to India conventional military superiority over

Pakistan. China rational for its nuclear deterrent draws from its historical conflict with Russia,

Japan and USA including Korea war.

The nuclear and missile threat from Pakistan in real but it developed in reaction Indian

precedents and military pressure. Pakistan secretly started to develop Indian nuclear weapon

capability in 1972 only after 1971 Indo-Pakistan war. There would have better chances of

Pakistan joining NPT or checking its weapon program at an early stage of India had joined same

non proliferation regime. Although India’s signing NPT would have meant accepting legal

constraints on its own nuclear programme. These could have been lifted in the event of a grave

threat to supreme interest (eg. China). This it becomes difficult to justify nuclear status, in terms

of security threat. Infact, Islamic Pakistan possession of nuclear bomb make the region more

security sensitive. The threat of nuclear holocaust in the South Asia attracts attention of

international community including USA. There has been qualitative increase – in US pressure on

India cap reduce and eliminate nuclear weapon in subcontinent.

The collapse of Soviet Union marked the end of highly favorable arms transfer relationship that

had enabled to India to maintain modern military. The historic event also denied India virtual

guarantee against Chinese nuclear blackmail and support of veto-wielding power in UN Security

Council. Faced with inexorable realities of post cold war period, Indian leadership dropped their

rhetoric- one behalf of third world at the United Nations and in other multinational fora and

began to dispense with their anti American ranting on matters ranging from global disarmament

to climate change to international trade negotiation. India started to demonstrate Pro-American

approach even as most Indian policy makers across the political stratum condemned the

American led coalition attack on Iraq in 1991, India allowed refueling of American aircraft in

Bombay in their way to gulf. India has also indorsed the Bush administration plan to withdraw

from 1972, Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty so as to be able to pursue national missile defense

system. The quest for missile defense it was argued meant a shift away from chilling world of

nuclear deterrence based on mutually absurd destruction (Ganguly 2003). India wanted to



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acquire similar technologies in order to guard against China increasing nuclear reach and to

establish ‘escalation dominance’ (the ability to trump an adversary capabilities at all level of

conflict) over nuclear armed Pakistan. As United States remains ambivalent about making

missile defense technologies available to India, latter turned to Israel as an alternative supplier

(Ganguly 2004). After 9/11 attack, India offered the United State full intelligence cooperation

and even access to Indian military bases. However, much to India’s dismay, Washington sought

cooperation of Pakistan in its war against Taliban and Alqaida.

Though, unhappy with renewed US-Pakistan nexus. New Delhi sought to expand military

cooperation with United States. India now sees military cooperation as a means of enhancing the

training, readiness and skill of its own troops. Since May 2002, the two countries have held a

series of joint military exercises both in the United States and in around India. The healthy

atmosphere of strategic relation between US and India received big momentum during President

Bush administration reconceived the framework of US engagement with New Delhi. He

removed many of sanction imposed after 1998 nuclear test opened the door for high

technological cooperation, lent political support to India’s own war on terrorism ended historical

US tilt towards Pakistan on Kashmir and repositioned the United States in the Sino-Indian

equation by drawing closer to New Delhi.(Rajamohan 2006).

In response, India backed Bush administration on missile defense, lent active support to

operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan by protecting US assets in transit through strait of

Malacca in 2002, agreed to work with United States on multinational military operation outside

of UN framework and voted twice with Washington against Iran – an erstwhile Indian ally – at

the International Atomic energy agency. India also came close to sending a division of troops to

Iraq in the summer of 2003, before pulling back at the last moment.

India’s increasing strategic closeness with US since 1991 has been driven by the belief that only

by fundamentally changing its relationship with world, sole superpower could it achieve its

larger strategic objective, improving global position and gaining leverage in its relations with

other great power.

The nuclear pact signed by Bush and Singh in July 2005 in intended to create the basis for a true

alliance between United States and India – almost encouraging India to work in the US favor as



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global balance of power shifts (Rajamohan 2006). The deal which opens the door for nuclear

trade for India is landmark step toward cementing strategic ties with USA, over China.

India is replacing the idea of ‘autonomy’ with the notion of India’s becoming a responsible

power. The recognition that its political choices have global consequences, India is now less

averse to choosing sides on specific issues. Alliance formation and balancing are tools in the kits

of all great powers. So, they are likely to be in India as well (Rajamohan 2006).

The long term strategic relation with United States depends on shared interest and political

capacity to act on them together not mere capability of India to form alliances. The USA expects

that shared interest such as balancing China and countering radical Islam – well provide the basis

for long term strategic cooperation.

As India is reluctant to play second fiddle to China in Asia and the Indian Ocean region and

comfortable of working with distant superpower – there is a structural reason for India to favor

greater security cooperation with USA. New Delhi has vigorously worked to prevent Myanmar

from falling completely under China influence. India is also expanding military ties with

Southeast Asian nation such as Japan, South Korea etc.

Some Critics maintain that alignment with USA might make India a prime target for Islamist

extremist. India however cannot compromise with radical Islam and must fight it with resolve as

India worked with Russia, Iran and Central Asian states to counter Taliban by supporting the

Northern Alliance in mid 1990’s.

While India has acknowledged that US support is necessary for India’s rise to be successful, it

will never become another US ally in the mold of United Kingdom or Japan. Nor will it be an

Asian France, seeking tactical independence within framework, of a formal alliance. Given the

magnitude of global security challenges the USA needs more than meek allies. A rising India

may be difficult at times but it will act broadly to defend and promote many interests it shares

with Washington. The asymmetry of power between India and United States has made it

imperative for former to be cautious about America global dominance. India has actively sought

to cultivate a robust political and security relationship with France, which includes military to

military contacts, high level bilateral exchanges and weapon deals. At the same time it also

developed military relationship with Israel to acquire high tech weaponary and technology.



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Bharat Karnad (2006), advocates hard real politick in the sense that possession of ‘absolute

weapon’ or military power is must for being great power in anarchic international system. The

United Nations like any other international organization have become handmaiden of the

powerful India must augment its military power first through harnessing indigenous capabilities

in key sectors like atomic energy and defense industry to have national self respect.

If India thinks of Pakistan as a enemy, make Bangladesh out to be a threat, then India reduced to

strategic insignificance and no one can take India seriously. The need is to co opt lesser states

like Pakistan and Bangladesh through preferential trade agreements, economic incentives,

technological assistance and then utilize the ever widening circle of co-opted/cooperative states

to consolidate a growing sphere of influence and as a launch pad for their larger ambition.

Security Council seat is not given to the beggars. India will gain respect and seat by acting its

size and realizing its ambition not because of moral power. Despite having traditional attributes

of great powers like size, location, human and natural resources. India foreign military policy

lacks in vision, conviction, strategy and will which have so far been evidenced only sporadically

in Indian policy. Indian Government needs to push a policy with convergence of above factors.

Brahma Chellaney (2006), believes that India rise to great power status depends to a large extent

upon how India builds a constructive, mutually beneficial relationship with USA, which will

remain the dominant player in the foreseeable future. The nature a extent of India relationship

with United States would influence its relationship with other players in the region and in wider

world. He argues that dynamic goal oriented Foreign policy can a long way to enhance India

international profile, role and influence, Indian foreign policy, regrettably has been characterized

by too much adhocism, risk aversion and post facto rationalization. If India behaves like a power

confined to South Asia it will be treated like one.

Siddharth Varadarajan (2006), contends that challenge for Indian foreign policy is not the nature

of its relationship with US, but its relationship with South Asia. In the early years, there was a

consciousness about India as an Asian country which gradually went away. The security issue of

energy and kind of role that India plays within Asian context is very important. India relationship

with Pakistan and Bangladesh holds the key. India needs to harness the benefits that will accrue

from one billion dollar pipeline of CNG from Iraq to India but has been hesitant because of

security implication of pipeline transversing Pakistan. On this issue of pipeline Pakistan is



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willing to drop its Kashmir first policy but the fact that Pakistan will give more immediately is

holding us back. Of course US is important but what we do in the region will play much richer

dividend for India as world power.

Radha Kumar(2006), observes that the fact that US is and will remain dominant world player,

foreseeable future does not mean that India has to align its policies in relation to what US does or

does not do in exclusion to other relationship. The end of the bipolar world has left a number of

new spaces open for a range of different multilateral activities at different level. India has quite

skillfully expanded multilateral connection as potential source of strength.

India’s relationship with Middle East, North Africa, and Gulf States as well Southeast Asia has

been of great success. The last fifteen years have witnessed phenomenal success through a series

of multilateral and bilateral engagement with Southeast Asia. Moreover India also needs to

sufficiently utilize strength of Indian Diaspora which is most assertive Diaspora in the US today.

Ecologist critics, Sunita Narain draws attention to the issue of ecological and environmental

security which is hardly part of jargon of foreign security and diplomacy but US position in the

issue has implication for other countries including India. There are multilateral negotiations and

agreements on climate, biodiversity, forest deserts, hazardous waste etc. regarding Kyoto

protocol, US says there should no commitment, join the US camp, then they will not ask for any

commitment in long term, only voluntary action. If India supports it, this it will be a weak and

compromised position. There is need to move beyond traditional debate about security and

understand the insecurity that global ecological problems like climate change will cause us.

Achin Vanaik(2004), rejects the very principle of national interest so dear to realist scholars in

explaining the turn in Indian foreign policy since 1990. The notion of national interest is

essentially principle of justification and is too inadequate a concept for the purpose of explaining

and too indeterminate a concept for purpose of guidance. Any course of action, including

complete opposites can be claimed as warranted by national interest one can both support or

oppose alliances with very same country in name of national interest.

The post cold war pattern is of a basically hub and spokes arrangement with US at the hub and

connected by separate and pokes bilaterally to all the major powers, each of which is more

concerned about developing and sustaining its relationship with US, than moving against the



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hub. In other words various major powers are bandwagoning to a greater or lesser degree with

US, rather striving seriously to challenge it. The rightward shift in Indian foreign policy is

integral part of much wider and general rightward shift by elite and middle classes of India over

the last two and a half decades both preceding and following the end of cold war. It is outcome

of tumultuous upheavals that have changed the social, cultural and political landscape of India

even foreign policy establishment nurtures the illusion that it is unaffected by such rightwing

transformation and is only following imperatives of national interest in changed times. Sectional

interest ordinary Indians, so distant from foreign policy concern, perception of US as global

bully, contrasts sharply with perception of an Indian elite that actively consents to being part of

US empire projects. It consents because it realizes that it can benefit substantially from

perpetuation and consolidation of a global neoliberal economic order. It may prefer a US that is

more internationally tamed and not so unilateralist and militaristic. But the Indian states that

serves such dominant class interest is not to take any risks in trying to bring this about.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion stipulates that in greatly altered global order. Indian leadership is more

aligned to United States in order to have strategic leverage in relation with other major powers.

The increasing strategic political and military engagement with the sole superpower is bringing

tangible benefit for India. This however showed not foreclose us to see the asymmetry of power

and resources between the countries as also the US unilateralist and interventionist tendencies as

exemplified by the Iraq invasion and persistent threat to Iran and other countries who challenge

their hegemony. US overt and covert support of Pakistan in the South Asia region is also

something. India needs to be concerned of alignment with US has also made India prime target

for radical Islam. These concerns are real and Indian foreign policy establishment much ensure

that India should not reduced to second fiddle to US in the name of achieving augmenting global

status through alliance with US. As Bharat Karnad emphasis that national self respect does not

stem from moral power or international goodwill but from military and economic power.

India nuclear status and indigenous defence capability must be supplemented by Indian

leadership strategic manouring to resolve the seemingly intractable dispute like Kashmir issue,

boundary dispute with China. Unless India shows required political will to settle these long

standing issue, India’s influence will remain mostly confined to South Asia and its immediate



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envious. India must move beyond an adhoc strategy to reach lasting and acceptable solution to

all stakeholders. Though hardcore realist summit Ganguly rejects any grand coalition of third

world states in conjunction with Russia, China to balance American power as it will not help

achieve great power status as fractions coalition will be based upon little more than anti

Americanism there is no denying the fact that mere existence of such coalition may acts as a

deterrence for US to act unilaterally. As no strategic analyst can predict as to when ‘friends can

turn to foe’ an alternative bloc/alliance could serve long term national interest. More importantly,

if India want to achieve great power status it cannot come merely through alliance, India will

have to better its economic record. Neither its military prowess nor its status as a nuclear weapon

state will grant it a leading role in world affair unless India mounts a significant effort to address

endemic poverty, chronic hunger and malnutrition. Indian economy must be robust along with

ensuring quality of life its population in order to deal with any global economic downturn and

resource shortage. At the same time Indian leadership should endeavour to provide an alternative

moral vision different from existing one where not only powerful but also less resourceful would

have equal say in shaping policy and decision affecting whole humanity.

Ummu Salma Bava, contends that the changes at the global and regional level, particularly in

Asia, which is witnessing the rise of two super powers – China and India. Driven by a strong

economic performance and a growing political awareness and changing Asian power structure,

India is seeking a large role for itself both in the region and at the global level. A combination of

international and domestic factors is defining the contours of India’s Foreign Policy, which is

increasingly in the spotlight as an emerging Asian. As a developing country and an emerging

power, it is confronted by different agendas where it is part recipient and simultaneously it seeks

to influence the emerging global power structure. It has brought Indian Foreign Policy at

crossroads today, as it seeks to balance a normative approach with realist purssuit of national

interest.

India’s foreign policy has changed dramatically in the last ten years, there is a growing

importance of factors like trade, technology, commerce and investment in foreign policy; broader

interpretation of security is one that encompasses wider national interest and not simply the

security of the country’s borders;greater strategic partnerships with other countries and clearer

views on global issues.



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Realist Perspective On Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy

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