Radicalization and counter- radicalization at British universities: Muslim encounters and alternatives

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Radicalization and counter-radicalization at Britishuniversities: Muslim encountersand alternativesKatherine E. Brown & Tania SaeedPublished online: 30 May 2014.

To cite this article: Katherine E. Brown & Tania Saeed (2014): Radicalization andcounter-radicalization at British universities: Muslim encounters and alternatives, Ethnicand Racial Studies, DOI: 10.1080/01419870.2014.911343

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Radicalization and counter-radicalizationat British universities: Muslim encounters

and alternatives

Katherine E. Brown and Tania Saeed

(Received 5 October 2012; accepted 24 March 2014)

AbstractThis paper explores the ‘spaces’ left over for Muslims to be ‘radical’ and themanagement of minority identities in light of their securitization in the UK.The paper considers a key site of this management of ‘radical’ identities: theuniversity. The university works as prototypical case because of the ways instudent activism and identity are a priori drawn together but also because ofthe prevalence of higher education among terrorists in the UK and USA. As aresult, universities have been specifically targeted in counterterrorism andcounter-radicalization measures. The paper reveals through student narrativeshow security discourses of ‘radicalization’ constrain their activism, universityexperience and identities. Yet, alternative identity constructions emerge thatwork against the moderate/radical binary. These narratives show howincomplete the process is of incorporating Muslims into the nation.

Keywords: Islam; radicalization; counter-terrorism; university; gender; activism

Introduction

It seems almost trite to state that since 9/11 and the 2005 London bombings,Muslims in the UK are increasingly viewed through a lens of suspicion,cast as aliens and considered permanently vulnerable to ‘radicalization’(Choudhury and Fenwick 2011; Jackson 2007; McDonald and Yaser 2011;Mythen, Walklate, and Khan 2009; Vertigans 2010). The impact onMuslims have been significant: increases in stop and searches, hate crime,prejudice and Islamophobia. In part, the state has responded by promoting a‘moderate Islam’ in the name of counter-radicalization. However, there isconcern that as ‘acceptable Muslims’ are ‘folded into the nation’, spaces forMuslim criticality and activism are lost (Brown 2010; Puar 2007; Ramadan

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2010). This article examines how Muslims seek to construct activism andcritical citizenship under such conditions, by looking at one of the mostpolitically active spaces in the country: the university.

Radicalization and universities

According to advocates of the radicalization narrative, it offers a dynamicapproach to understanding extremism and terrorism. Neumann (2013)argues that there are two types of radicalization studied: processes resultingin ‘cognitive extremism’ and those resulting in ‘behavioural extremism’.Both, however, are usually summarized as what happens before the ‘bombgoes off’ (Neumann 2008, 4). Radicalization is variously blamed uponexposure to ideology, victimization, alienation, socialization, social net-works, the internet, deficiencies in family bonds, trauma, relative social andeconomic deprivation, and ‘cultures of violence’ (Bjorgo and Horgan 2008;Dalgaard-Nielsen 2008; Juergensmeyer 2003; McCauley and Moskalenko2008; Silber and Bhatt 2008; Wiktorowiz 2005). This broad-brushapproach has encouraged governments to believe that they can pre-emptfuture terrorist attacks through a range of interventions in everyday life(Coolseat 2011; Sageman 2007; Volintiru 2010). However, as the list ofpossible causes indicates, and as Githens-Mazer (2012, 2010) specificallynotes, the pathways of radicalization have yet to be identified, much lessthe correct points in which to interrupt the process. Indeed, research onradicalization processes and vulnerable populations are best summarized as‘exploratory’ rather than ‘explanatory’ (Bouhana and Wikstrom 2011).

As the processes involved remain undetermined, radicalization isfrequently reduced to the profiling of traits or attributions of signs ofradicalization in ‘vulnerable’ or ‘at-risk’ populations. Situated within theWar on Terror, these signs are typically associated with certain ‘types’ ofMuslims – bearded men, veiled women, converts (see e.g. Kepel 2004).This occurs because of an assumed conflict between ‘Muslimness’ and aWestern identity. While those engaging in radicalization research are keento say that they are not ‘targeting’ Islam, as Lynch (2013) argues, a movefrom being concerned with a small number of Muslims, to suspecting‘radical Muslim sects’, to suspecting all young Muslims frequentlyconflates Islam with ‘radicalization’ and ‘terrorism’. For example, notliving a ‘British’ lifestyle renders a Muslim (or community) disenfran-chised or rebellious and therefore a suspect-radical (Bartlett and Miller2012; Briggs and Birdwell 2009; DCLG 2007, 21; Hickman et al. 2011;Kabir 2010). Consequently ‘radicalization’ encompasses a broad concernwith a way of life rather than specific behaviours or actions, which hasallowed for the securitization of ordinary and unexceptional lives,including those of students (Amnesty International 2006; Hussain andBagguley 2012; Kundnani 2012). The irony is that attending university is

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normally viewed as a sign of an aspirational enfranchised and successfulindividual, yet, as discussed later, it is also viewed as a site and trigger ofradicalization for Muslims.

These concerns with ‘ways of life’ are highly gendered. Muslim menare viewed as security risks, who since the Rushdie affair have beenstereotyped as troublemakers and extremists. However, since King’sCollege London student Roshonora Chodhary attempted to assassinateMP Stephen Timms in 2010, and Samina Malik’s conviction as the ‘lyricalterrorist’,1 the Muslim female stereotype oscillates between oppressedvictim and violent radical – former remains dominant (Gottschalk andGreenberg 2011; Tyrer and Ahmed 2006). On the one hand, veiled womenpersonify a security threat, with the niqab in particular viewed as both adirect security threat as the person behind it remains hidden, and anideological threat, physically interrupting the progressive landscape ofBritain. This security narrative is explicit in the justifications of univer-sities that have banned the niqab, such as Imperial College London. Onthe other hand, veiled women are portrayed as victims in forced marriages,honour killings and female circumcision, who most benefit from being‘folded into the nation’ (Afshar et al. 2005; Brown 2008; Puar 2007, 24;Werbner 2007). As the narratives of our participants later illustrate, suchgendered stereotypes are generalized to the entire female Muslimpopulation thereby restricting the space that they have to be politicallyactive or be progressively radical as students. Furthermore, thosemodelling ‘radicalization’ do not treat gender as a variable: there is onlyone research paper looking at the radicalization of women specifically(Badran 2006), and research on women’s roles assumes that they are thepawns of men (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007). It is for these reasons andthe gendered differential impact of counterterrorism (Satterthwaite andHuckerby 2013) that female Muslim students are the focus of this article.

Yet, despite concerns raised over the extant understanding of radicaliz‐ation, the UK’s current strategy considers radicalization as a cause for stateconcern. It aims to counter radicalization at different levels and stagesincluding interrupting the ‘process of radicalization’ for individuals whoshow signs of being radicalized (HMG 2011a, 8). The UK counterterrorismstrategy, CONTEST, specifically in the Preventing Violent Extremism(PREVENT) section, views the signs and causes of radicalization asdisenfranchisement, a search for identity at times of crisis, increasingreligiosity and religious symbolism, implicitly some form of psychologicalweakness, and a connection with others holding such beliefs, includingthrough virtual networks. It is also seen to be identifiable at particularlocations, including mosques, hospitals, schools and universities (HMG2011b, 68, 85, 108; HMG 2013).

Because of the prevalence of higher education among Western extremistgroups and individuals who have participated in terrorist attacks in the UKand USA, a simple assumption has been made: that university is a

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significant meeting point, trigger or birthplace of radicalization (Adam,2010; Barrett, Sawer, and Rayment, 2010; Krueger 2008). Despite ahistory of radical student politics, it is reported that radicalization is a‘growing problem’ in universities (Curtis 2005; Gardner 2006; Glees andPope 2005; Harrison 2011). In public debates, responsibility for ‘radica-lization’ is placed upon universities because of their alleged failure toknow their students or to control student activities. Staff are nowencouraged to ensure the ‘welfare’ of their Muslim or Asian-lookingstudents by looking out for signs of radicalization: their academic writings,participation in university societies, or their withdrawal from mainstreamuniversity life (Dodd 2006; Gallagher 2012; HMG 2011a, 76). Muslimchaplains are also encouraged to challenge extremist views on campus and‘provide pastoral care for Muslim students’ (HMG 2013, 6). UniversitiesUK also created Safe Campus Communities2 in 2013 that presentscounter-extremism as a student safety issue. This linking of welfare,safety and counterterrorism signifies the pathologizing of the universityexperience. Furthermore universities are to prevent students from beingradicalised in the first place by denying space for radicalism and reducingexposure to existing radicals and radical ideas. In 2005, the EducationSecretary demanded a ‘clamp down on student extremists’ (Taylor andSmithers 2005); the call was repeated by the Home Secretary in 2011(Gardham 2011) and again by David Cameron (2013) as he announced the‘Tackling Extremism Report’. To help universities fulfil their obligation tochallenge extremist ideology on campuses, ‘ten regional coordinators’have been appointed to assist them ‘strengthen the approach to the Preventagenda on the ground’ (Secretary of State for the Home Office 2012, 8).The government has also provided guidance for the police to helpuniversities through reports like ‘Prevent Police and Universities’(ACPO 2012). Universities in these policies and initiatives are presentedas inherently radical spaces – distinct from ordinary life – and Muslimstudents become vulnerable and at risk to radicalization as a result ofinhabiting this location. Therefore, Muslim students’ radical activities,such as organizing student movements around local or global politicalissues, are not rooted in the causes themselves but in the intersection of theuniversity environment and an already suspect Muslim identity.

Methodology

The paper draws on findings from a larger study on British Muslimwomen with Pakistani backgrounds studying in universities acrossEngland,3 and their experiences, encounters, responses and reactions toIslamophobia.4 University selection was based on the location and studentdemographic composition of each institution. The participants wereapproached through a variety of university societies. The aim of such an

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approach was to ensure a varied representation in religious observanceand activism. Interviews were conducted by the co-author, and carriedout in accordance with the research ethical guidelines stipulated byher university’s ethics committee and in line with requirements outlinedby Christians (2005, 139–154). An interview guide was followed forexploring Islamophobia and security, but participants were providedopportunities to discuss other issues. Most interviews were held in publiclocations on university campuses, although a few students preferred avideo call interview. On average, the interviews were between ninetyminutes and two hours long. The one factor that could not be controlledwas the status of the interviewer, who was both an insider by virtue ofbeing female, Muslim and Pakistani, but also an outsider for someparticipants since she did not wear any visible religious identifiers.However, her insider status as a Pakistani became the most importantconnector with participants, who immediately asked about her affiliationwith Pakistan, and comfortably shared anecdotes about Pakistan and theirPakistani heritage. The interview data were transcribed and analysed usinga thematic narrative analysis approach influenced by Riessman (2008) andLabov and Waletzky (2003). The analytical categories were determinedthrough an overview of the transcribed data outlining themes aroundidentity and meaning, politics and student activism. The analysis from thestudent participants was then compared against other sources to determineconsistency within narratives and themes. The findings are based on asmall sample size; hence the results are not generalizable. However, thestudy provides crucial insights into how an insecure narrative aboutMuslims interferes with everyday experiences of young Muslims.

Cases

Radical students

Hafsa, a twenty-two-year-old law student in North East England, says:

when they use terms like radicalization in a context that is definitelydefinitely negative, associated with suicide bombers, they automaticallyput in the general public including the Muslim population’s head thatradicalization of your religion is really bad. By that they stop you fromgoing into the extreme of your religion, or really looking too much into it,and they make you realize, that if you are a moderate Muslim, the one whochills and hangs out, has a beard occasionally, you’re okay because you aremoderate, but the moment you start going too much into your religion bethat daari, (beard) hijab, whatever praying a little more, fasting more, thenyou are in the danger zone. You are in the zone that you can become one ofthose fundamentalists, you can become an extremist, so its one of those verysubconscious subtle way of putting in the people and the masses head thatthis is not right.

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Hafsa started wearing the hijab in her second year at university but hadpreviously struggled with it because she was fearful of being perceived as‘in the zone’ of fundamentalism and of Islamopobia. For her Islamophobiais attributed to a negative stereotype of ‘the Muslim radical’ reinforced bymedia and state actors. Her struggle in practising her religion is one thathas been highlighted by other participants in this study. Fazia, a twenty-two-year-old humanities student from West Yorkshire, describes such astruggle for Muslims who simply want to practise their religion withoutthe label ‘radical Muslim’:

On one end you have Muslim extremists trying to radicalize and on theother you have British people trying to force liberal Islam on people whojust want to practise Islam in its traditional form which has no hatred in it,no extremism in it, no oppression of women or slaves you know everyonehas rights.

Fazia blurs the distinction between ‘radical’ and ‘liberal’ by introducinga new category ‘traditional Islam’ that tries to reject the negativeconnotations of ‘radical’ and absorb ‘liberal’ goods such as humanrights, but without the imposition of ‘moderate’ Islam as shaped by thegovernment. Therefore, the categories move beyond simply binaries andtake on what Tyrer (2010) calls ‘degrees of alterity’. Despite these sub-hegemonic attempts to blur categories, Tyrer (2010, 105) observes that itis ultimately the ‘White man’ who decides who is an acceptable orunacceptable Muslim – the ‘White man’ determines who are tolerated ‘atgiven places under given conditions in a given ghetto’, or who at otherpoints are simply erased. Hence, the space to define what it means tobe a Muslim by Muslims themselves is often removed, a constrictionthat is quite evident for Hafsa and Fazia, as well as other participantsin the study. While Hafsa wears the hijab and Fazia wears the niqab,the radical stereotype is also problematic for women without religioussignifiers, as Aisha, a twenty-two-year-old humanities student inLondon, observes:

You know when people look at me and they see I wear jeans I look quitemodern and stuff but I pray. They look at me and they say they can’t believethat I pray, you know those kind of anti Islamic comments. It kind of makesthem scared because they look at me and think if people like her arereligious then imagine how fanatical the others who wear headscarfs are…Radical for me would be somebody who is a fanatic, who is not willing tolisten to other people’s opinion, who think they have a grasp of religion.Because if you think about it in Islam there is no such thing as radical…you cannot be a little bit of Muslim and a little bit of something else, youare either a Muslim or you are not. … Someone radical for me is just thesame as somebody who is mental and goes on a killing spree. … Moderateis kind of, almost like degrading in a sense. If someone said to me I am a

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moderate Muslim, I would be offended. I would be like you don’t knowwhat is in my heart. I’d be like what just because I am not wearing aheadscarf. As a Muslim person if someone calls me moderate it is saying tome that you are not practising your faith properly. Either way you are kindof damned, whether you are an extremist or a moderate, you don’t want tobe either really.

Like Fazia and Hafsa, Aisha rejects the concept of ‘moderate’ as thenatural opposite to ‘radical’, and denies the possibility of being ‘radical inIslam’. Rather, radical is defined as irrationality and violence that anyoneis capable of.

Despite also struggling with such stereotypes, other Muslim students areconscious of the importance of radicalism within the university context,and try to reclaim the term but find they are unable to do so:

I disagree with the term radicalisation in general… I think because it hasbecome a taboo word to be called a radical. But before it was something tobe proud of – radicals are our best activists in history, radicals were peoplewho changed thoughts, changed society through their radicalism. … Studentactivism is radical but the way we use student activism is not even related to“radicalism” which is seen as behind closed doors their thoughts changing.(Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS) Representative 2011)

As this interviewee explains, the distinction between student activism andradicalism is often unclear, where Muslim students in particular have totread with caution, lest they are accused of being a ‘radical’.

Their fears are not unfounded. In 2007, five British Muslim students atBradford University were jailed for downloading and sharing ‘extremistmaterial’ highlighting similar concerns (BBC 2007). In 2008, they werereleased after a Court of Appeal decision that determined that theprosecution team have to demonstrate that the material was intended forterrorist use (The Times 2008). The Islamic Human Rights Commissionsaid it hoped that the Appeal Court’s judgement would stop the‘criminalisation of Muslim youth for downloading and reading materialthat is widely available to everyone’ (BBC 2008). Yet in May 2008, astudent and member of staff of Nottingham University were arrested fordownloading an edited version of al-Qaeda’s training manual from the USgovernment website (Newman 2008). A university spokesman stated that‘there was no reasonable rationale for this person to have that informa-tion… The police were called in on the basis of reasonable anxiety andconcern’ (cited in Newman 2008). The two were eventually released and,in 2011, Nottinghamshire police stated that ‘there was “no evidence” tosuggest that’ the student ‘was involved in terrorism’, and accepted‘liability for an [the student’s] unlawful stop and search’ (Shabir 2011).In these cases, the material that was downloaded was widely available to

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the public, yet it was the ‘Muslim’ identity of the student that made themradical.

The radical female: a problem of the veil

Female Muslim university students are more often accused of being ‘aradical’ if they wear a niqab. The decision by Imperial College London in2005 to ban the veiling of the face on security grounds realizes theirconcerns (Garner 2005). One graduate, who removed the niqab to continuestudying at Imperial College, observed:

Of course no girl would mind taking her niqab off at security checkpoints ifthis was the only way, but the reason why the niqab is not easy to be takenoff, is literally because it is part of Islamic worship… a choice for theMuslim woman. (Khaled 2012)

Security narratives claim that by insisting on a degree of anonymity inpublic spaces, veiled Muslim women provide unreasonable opportunitiesfor terrorists. Abbas and Siddique (2012) make a similar point, noting howMuslim men and women are using clothing (beards and veils) as a sign ofresistance against anti-Muslim sentiment but that these choices areperceived as a form of softer radicalization. The representative fromFOSIS discussing the issue of the niqab mentions other cases of control bythe university-security apparatus:

it was a college student who wasn’t allowed to enrol into college if she worethe niqab. They gave all sorts of excuses, that oh because of security reasonsyou can’t put it on, problems with identification. So she said okay for my IDcard I can take a picture without the niqab for you. She was prepared to dothat. She said if in class people have trouble understanding me then I won’twear it in class. So she was prepared to make those concessions just to beaccepted and enrolled. But they over ruled it saying no you can’t wear theniqab. They just did not want someone on campus wearing the niqab. Thatis happening. By the way that is why generally hate crime in particular iswidely known to be under reported, it is a battle for us.

A consequence of linking women’s veiling choices to security threats isthat women who wear the hijab (and niqab) become targets of anti-Muslim, Islamophobic sentiments. As Farzana, a twenty-year-old medicalstudent in South West England, notes:

You are putting an X on yourself, that here I am, I am Muslim. You areputting yourself out there whether you want to or not. I mean that is thewhole point, you cover up, you lower your gaze and you hope that peopledon’t look at you, that is the whole point. It is the whole modesty thing. Butin a way people will look at you more, and in that way you are a target.

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Then if something goes wrong, they look to you like if something ishappening in a Muslim country, oh it is your people.

Thus, attempts to make university spaces ‘more secure’ and safe learningenvironments by denying Muslim women the right to wear a niqab havehad the reverse effect for all Muslim female students. Furthermore what ismissed in these securitized debates is the intensely religious element ofsuch choices; for Fazia wearing the niqab is her way of practising herfaith. While negative perceptions about the niqab have resulted inIslamophobic encounters with what she calls ‘ignorant people’, she is‘steadfast’ in her commitment to her faith, saying:

I’ve never felt like I’ve got to take this off. I’m learning to drive, I’m goingto uni, its not stopped me from that. I can go out wherever I want to. I go totheme parks, go to parks, do things that people who don’t wear it do it.

Here, Fazia is claiming her place, quite literally, in Great Britain. Yet she isdenied any space of acceptance within the discourse of ‘British values’where her physical existence is seen as a threat. She continues:

the women who wear the niqab, people read newspapers… a lot of peoplesee it saying if she’s in the country why can’t she conform to what normalpeople in the country do. People think you are trying to rebel against what isgoing on in the country but its not that: you are practising your ownreligion, each person has the right to practise their own religion you know.

However, as Edmunds (2012a) notes, such claims to citizenship andrecognition of religious subjecthood through rights-based discourses havenot been entirely successful. Even the European Court of Human Rightshas been unwilling to place human rights above the security claims ofstates, and accepts the argument of European states that wearing the hijabin secular countries is a sign of religious extremism and therefore a threatto public order (Edmunds 2012a).

These examples demonstrate how the veiled figure is more than just asecurity threat, or a ‘fear’ of the unseen. Despite the young woman’swillingness to compromise her beliefs in order to be allowed access tohigher education, she cannot be tolerated in the college environment. LikeFazia, this further brings into question her Britishness, which is disputedbecause of her refusal to conform to the dictates of Western liberalsocieties. As Monshipouri (2010, 47) argues, it signals to Muslim citizensthat their acceptance in the public sphere is premised on their abandoningthe cultural and religious practices that are central to their identity.However, doubting a Muslim’s British identity then ironically overlookshow ‘Muslim assertiveness’, often in the face of ‘attacks on Muslims’, is‘derived not from Islam or Islamism but from contemporary Westernideas about equality and multiculturalism’ (Modood 2006, 46). Such

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encounters with British Muslim citizens, where their religion is seen asdivisive, underestimates the extent to which the freedom to express one’sreligion freely is in fact a marker of a fully adjusted social being, who ismerely expressing her religious freedom as a free citizen in a liberalWestern society. Tariq Ramadan (2010, 25) captures this, when heobserves that ‘new kinds of citizens are emerging’ who are ‘integrated’and maintain their ethnic and religious differences such as in dress, foodand skin colour.

Islamic societies and the radical

Although radicalization narratives emphasize the ‘radical individual’,counter-radicalization policies on universities include attempts to monitorand constrain university Islamic groups. In a widely cited reportsupporting such interference, Glees argues that ‘[i]t is in this environment[university] that these groups can flourish without being detected’ (cited inTaylor and Smithers 2005). In April 2006, Hizb-ut-Tahrir membersreignited the debate by protesting that they were falsely accused of beinga terrorist group. Their actions were part of a campaign to have themremoved from the National Union of Students (NUS) ‘no-platform’ list butwas reported as primarily about rising radicalization on British campuses.Attempts were made in the media to show how support for Hizb-ut-Tahrir was widespread among Muslim students and their representativeorganizations (Lewis 2006). FOSIS responded by arguing that althoughmany Muslim students disagreed with Hizb-ut-Tahrir they supported itsright to free speech and further that such support did not demonstrate thatFOSIS or other Muslim students are ‘influenced by a hardcore of extre-mists’ or that this ‘represents a new and dangerous flirtation withradicalism’ (Khan 2006). However, individuals like Umar FaroukAbdulmutallab (the would-be Christmas Day bomber and ex-president ofUniversity College London’s Islamic society) problematize the position ofstudent Islamic societies. In 2008, and in 2010, the Centre for SocialCohesion (CSC) issued reports and survey data indicating ‘extreme’beliefs among Muslim students and FOSIS (CSC 2010; Thorne and Stuart2008). They emphasized invited external speakers and linked support forliving according to sharia with radicalization. There was a strong reactionto the CSC’s findings, with the NUS president responding:

The CSC… set out to basically tarnish all Islamic societies as beingbreeding grounds of terror and basically saying “keep an eye on Muslims oncampus as they are likely to cause lots of trouble” … the last thing we needis a right wing think tank coming along and actually undermining thefantastic work that goes on in Islamic societies, to promote social cohesion,to find places for religious expression and to champion the education and

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welfare of Muslim students on campus, so I set out to stand side by side,with FOSIS, in opposing that report. (cited in CSC 2010)

As FOSIS defended its student societies, student members were alsoconstantly urged to defend their society’s right to exist. In her interview,Tehmina, a twenty-year-old student union representative, discusses theproblems that Islamic societies face:

I think 7/7 really changed, really made it difficult for Muslim students, andalso more difficult for things like Islamic societies. There was a discussionabout whether they should be allowed to have Islamic societies, which is abit of a contradiction when you have got Christian societies and Jewishsocieties. … I think those events national and international events, they allhave a say on how we live our daily lives, how women in particular inhigher education, Muslim women in particular how they can access it[services] and all.

Nadia, a twenty-year-old law student and the head sister of an Islamicsociety in a West Yorkshire university, highlights this struggle:

From the Islamic society perspective it is really interesting because peopleare like wow these guys will radicalize the students because the purpose ofthe Islamic society is to radicalize because this is the whole thing the mediaplayed upon. And even if you say this time and time again that there areonly a minority of people who do this. If you look at every single case ofpeople who were affiliated with the Islamic society, the people whoradicalized them were not part of the Islamic society. And even with uswe had a few guys arrested a few years ago, the people who radicalizedthem were off campus and they had nothing to do with the Islamic societyand the Islamic society is trying to you know get rid of them so for us it isdifficult because people do build that view.

The consequences of this targeting of FOSIS within a ‘radicalization’framework are a decline of membership and a fear of acknowledgingmembership, as the FOSIS representative says:

When you hear these stories about Islamic societies as being extreme andthey do this and that, especially after the Christmas bomber plot, we did geta sense that some parents and actually I hear this from friends of mine whosay my parents don’t want me to get involved in Islamic society you knowthey don’t want that trouble, you know they are there to study they don’twant to get involved in all the drama. They don’t agree with it but theywould rather avoid that happening to their child.

In creating a nexus between universities and security, Muslim studentactivism is tainted with perceptions of extremism and terrorism. Theseperceptions propagated by media and state actors alike influence their right

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to be Muslim, without prejudice. Being Muslim, or as Hafsa calls it‘going into the extreme of your religion, or really looking too much intoit’, does not by default make one a radical.

Alternative activism

Rootes (1980, 473) observes how ‘student movements are creatures of thesocieties in which they occur and as such they evince, in variable measure,all the excellences and deformities of their circumstances’. This is also truefor Muslim student movements that have been organized around localconcerns about prayer room access or halal5 meat, to the moreinternational concerns about Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq, Afghanistan orKashmir (Ahmad 2001; Tyrer and Ahmad 2006). Despite obstacles inpractising their faith and participating in student politics, the intervieweesnonetheless actively engage in such ‘glocal’ politics and challengeIslamopohobia. However, while recent student politics tend to includeprotests, direct action or formal forms of campaigning (Crossley 2008),the activism that the participants of this study employ is more usually atthe individual level through the medium of dialogue. This approach is alsoreflected in Islamic societies where there is a continuous insistence on themedium of dialogue to overcome misunderstanding and holding IslamicAwareness weeks has become a capstone event of this approach. As Faziaargues:

I think people need the Islamic society to try and educate non-Muslimpeople, tell them what Islam is about. You get a lot of things on TV thatmake it out as though Muslim people hate non-Muslims which I think iscompletely wrong: no one has the right to judge anybody else, nobody.

The interviewees feel a responsibility to initiate such education anddialogue at a personal level, as Farzana explains:

Talking to people helps a lot and that is something which I think a lot ofpeople struggle with. They don’t think that it is their duty to explain to thisgirl sitting next to her why she is dressed like this. … She doesn’t have tobut if they have a dialogue it would help. While you are at uni, if you couldtell your immediate friends why you have to rush off five times a day, if youcould tell people you have to pray and this is what Islam stands for littlelittle things like that but people don’t seem to do… We all need to take alittle bit of responsibility for doing that because the thing is I cant stop anegative but I can make a positive… So if we all stop being negative, letthem keep talking but we should be a positive role model.

Through dialogue, Farzana is trying to make herself ‘known’ in the publicsphere, so that she, and by extension Islam, are no longer anonymousghettoized strangers (Turner 2007).

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The current sociopolitical climate has also created a need for youngstudents to be more active outside of ‘parochial’ Muslim concerns(Ramadan 2010). While Muslim student activism will require more timeand effort to develop in an environment where many students are eitherapolitical or afraid of the repercussions of being too ‘progressivelyradical’, there are some students who are beginning to take charge.Tehmina is one such student, actively involved in student politics; sheargues:

I think in terms of the Muslim community itself, I think for too long theyhave taken the back seat. Because they have taken the back seat and nottaken a lead for so long this is what happens. You should never let otherpeople make decisions for you, if its regarding you or your community or agroup of Muslim students or a Muslim students movement, you need to takea lead on it and not wait for other people. For too long we have done thatand now we have seen what happens when you make the other people whohave no clue tick the boxes for too long.

Their participation in formal and informal student politics represents waysin which their active but critical citizenship is being expressed. It is alsostriking the ways in which the participants’ activism is framed as an‘everyday’ experience rather than a distinct subset of activities moretypical of student protest. It is also notable that their activism is framedaround a clear understanding of ‘Islam’ that is neither ‘radical’ nor‘moderate’.

Conclusion

The interviewees reveal that the radical/moderate binary dominate theirlived experiences as female Muslim students and as participants in thepublic sphere more generally. It serves to curtail the space that they haveto be ‘ordinary’ students, and to be publicly Muslim in the UK. Theirpresence on campuses, especially if veiled, is seen as a threat to the‘liberal’ tradition of British values and academia. It seems that Muslimwomen are free to enter universities but they may not become students inthe fullest sense: they may not be ‘radical’ students. To preserve the‘liberal’ space of the university, Muslim radical signs and practices are castoutside, granting emotional security to the ‘liberal student’ and ‘virtuouscitizen’ (Turner 2007, 293). Despite this, the university remains a ‘radical’space in public debates: no longer open spaces of political and academicfreedom, but policed and surveyed.

The interviewees’ responses to radicalization discourses have beenrooted in a ‘radical’ tradition of student activism and liberal humanrights – proclaiming rights to protest, of movement, association andfreedom to worship. As Edmunds (2012b) argues, through their ‘realized

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citizenship’ of networks and activism, these Muslim women are talkingback to the state and university authorities in a language that they cannoteasily resist. This is not the ‘good Muslim woman’ moulded from orient-alist stereotypes that policies and practitioners of counter-radicalizationanticipate (Brown 2008; McGhee 2008). However those interviewed areuncomfortable with the association of radicalism with violence, andare hesitant to reclaim the term as forcibly as other once-taboo labelshave been. Consequently they participate in a quiet activism, workingoutside of formal forums and public spaces to initiate low-key dialogue onan everyday basis. Engaging in ‘free communication’ in the public sphere,by reversing their anonymity through speech, they attempt to challenge thea priori assumption that they are hostile radical strangers (or enemies)within (Turner 2007, 300).

By considering not only how radicalization discourses impact onMuslim female students, but also their responses, we see that they cannotbe completely ‘folded into the nation’ (Puar 2007). The term ‘radical’instead folds them into a securitized student life. If this archetypical eliteliberal subset of ‘acceptable Muslims’ – ‘good’,’ moderate’, integrated,educated, female Muslims – cannot be free from suspicion and be criticalcitizens, then there is little space for other less privileged Muslims toescape the radical ghetto (Turner 2007; Tyrer 2010). Further, if theuniversity (as the archetypical site of free debate and communication) canno longer provide discursive and physical mobility for all, then there isalso little manoeuvre for ‘radicals’ within other spaces under theconstraints of radicalization and counter-radicalization discourses.

Notes

1. She was cleared on appeal.2. http://www.safecampuscommunities.ac.uk3. To ensure anonymity, the names and locations of universities will not be revealed, andpseudonyms are used or other labels according to participants’ wishes.4. We do not engage with debates about the nature, relevance and specificity of Islamophobia.We note its links to other forms of discrimination based on class, gender, age and sexualorientation and Othering practices experienced by other minority groups (Esposito and Kalin2011; Meer 2012). Islamophobia is understood here as a form of ‘racialization’ of Muslims basedon their ethnic and religious identity, and culture (Meer and Modood 2010).5. ‘Literally “released” from prohibition’ (Halliday 2002, 13).

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KATHERINE E. BROWN is a Lecturer in the Defence StudiesDepartment, King’s College London.ADDRESS: Defence Studies Department, King’s College London, JointServices Command and Staff College, Defence Academy, ShrivenhamSN6 8TS, UK. Email: [email protected]

TANIA SAEED is a Researcher in the Department of Education,University of Oxford.ADDRESS: Department of Education, University of Oxford, 15 NorhamGardens, Oxford OX2 6PY, UK. Email: [email protected]

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