Q2101 Briefing Guide (Worksheet) - T6B Driver · Simulator Event Briefing Guide JPPT 1542.165B Q2101 Simulator Event Instructor Guide PRIMARY AND INTERMEDIATE MULTI-SERVICE NFO/WSO

T-6B JPPT 1542.165BSimulator Event Briefing Guide

JPPT 1542.165B Q2101

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Q2101 Briefing Guide

(Worksheet)

Planned Route:

Takeoff: KNSE, Rwy 05 Altitude: MOA Limits Route: North MOA Training Device: UTD/OFT

SYLLABUS NOTES: Emphasis is on procedural knowledge and execution of procedures in accordance with the NATOPS Flight Manual.

Special Syllabus Requirement Loss of START READY light during start sequence.

Discuss

a. All Normal Operating Procedures Checklist Ground (line area, taxing….) Reference FWOP, Contact FTI, Squadron SOP’s for further questions Normal Engine Start sequence (using external power - EICAS Video)

b. Abnormal Starts Hot Start (EICAS Video)

Hung Start (EICAS Video)

No Start (EICAS Video)

Critical Action Items

c. Loss of START READY light during start sequence, non PMU abort(EICAS Video)

Time START READY light should remain on prior to Starter Switch – Auto Action to take when START READY light goes out during start

d. Fire Warning on Ground Indications (inside cockpit, lineman…) Procedural Steps

IUT NATOP flights primarly are working within the South MOA

(using battery power - EICAS Video)

JPPT 1542.165B Q2101

e. Emergency Engine Shutdown Reasons for emergency shutdown on the ground as per Flight Manual Critical Action Items

f. Emergency Ground Egress Procedural Steps Safety Precautions (CFS actuation, Ejection Seat…..)

g. Abort Reasons to conduct an aborted takeoff Critical Action Items How to obtain Maximum Braking Action

h. Aircraft Departs Prepared Surface Procedural Steps

i. CFS and Ejection procedures from the ground Safety considerations and seat limitations

Ejection Seat Sequence Mitigation Procedures

Maximum abort speed - definition

Calculate Max Abort Speed (wet runway)

CNATRAINST 1542.165B IUT T-6B NATOPS Cockpit Procedures Q2100 BLOCK

IUT NATOPS GRADE SHEET DATE __________________ INSTRUCTOR __________________________ MEDIA: UTD VT- ________ BRIEF TIME: ________ NAME: __________________________ EVENT:_______________

CTS REF

MANEUVER

MIF Q2101 Q2102 Q2103 Q2104 1 GENERAL KNOWLEDGE / PROCEDURES 3+ X X X X 2 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 3+ X X X X 3 HEADWORK / SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 3+ X X X X 4 BASIC AIRWORK 3+ X X X X 2 ABORT START 3+ X X 2 PMU OFF GROUND START 3+ X 2 FIRE WARNING ON GROUND

(FIRE ANNUNCIATOR ILLUMINATED) 3+ X

2 EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN 3+ X 2 EMERGENCY GROUND EGRESS 3+ X 2 ABORT TAKEOFF 3+ X 2 AIRCRAFT DEPARTS PREPARED SURFACE 3+ X 2 ENGINE FAILURE

IMMEDIATELY AFTER TAKEOFF 3+ X

2 ENGINE FAILURE DURING FLIGHT 3+ X 2 PMU NORMAL AIRSTART 3+ X 2 PMU OFF AIRSTART 3+ X 2 IMMEDIATE AIRSTART 3+ X 2 UNCOMMANDED PROPELLER FEATHER 3+ X 2 UNCOMMANDED POWER CHANGES / LOP 3+ X 2 FIRE WARNING IN FLIGHT

(FIRE ANNUNCIATIOR ILLUMINATED) 3+ X

2 SMOKE AND FUME ELIMINATION 3+ X 2 PMU FAILURE 3+ X 2 CHIP DETECTOR WARNING 3+ X 2 OIL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION

OR LOW OIL PRESSURE 3+ X

2 ELECTRICAL FAILURES 3+ X 2 AVIONICS FAILURES 3+ X 2 FUEL SYSTEMS FAILURES 3+ X 2 HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURES 3+ X 2 OBOGS SYSTEM FAIL 3+ X 2 TRIM SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS 3+ X 2 CONTROLLED EJECTION 3+ X 2 UNCONTROLLED EJECTION 3+ X 2 PRECAUTIONARY EMERGENCY LANDING 3+ X 2 LANDING GEAR EMERGENCY EXTENSION 3+ X 5 IN-FLIGHT CHECKS / FUEL MANAGEMENT 3+ X X X X 7 TASK MANAGEMENT 3+ X X X X 8 COMMUNICATION 3+ X X X X 9 MISSION PLANNING / BRIEFING / DEBRIEFING 1

10 GROUND OPERATIONS 3+ X X X X 11 TAKEOFF 3 12 DEPARTURE 3

SPECIAL SYLLABUS REQUIREMENTS 1 X X Note: Q2104 event will cover any items not completed during the Q2101-3.

SSR’s Q2101 – Loss of START READY light during start sequence. Q2103 –Blindfold Cockpit Check; IUT demonstrates safe knowledge and location of the following: emergency firewall shutoff handle, CFS handle, PCL cutoff, Flap Selector, Landing gear handle, emergency gear handle, back up VHF radio, Bus tie switch, PMU switch, Prop Sys circuit breaker, and pressurization control switch.

Q2104 is also required annually to maintain qualification currency. Conduct across section of normal checklist and emergency procedures critical/non-critical memory items. (10 Minimum, should use OFT) 1542.165B Rev. 03/16/2017

INBOUND TAXI

North Whiting (NSE) Airfield Diagram

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Alternate Run-Up

Primary run-up

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OUTBOUND TAXI

INBOUND TAXI

North Whiting (NSE) Airfield Diagram

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OUTBOUND TAXI

- Primary run-up: RWY 23/32 fill east to west; RWY 14 fill west to east facing 050°.

- Overflow will be to the north side, from east to west, facing 230°.

- Alternate run-up: RWY 5: located at the south end of Rows I and J.

- T-6B shall not exit at midfield after landing; solos shall exit at the end of all runways.

- Primary run-up: RWY 23/32 fill east to west; RWY 14 fill west to east facing 050°.

- Overflow will be to the north side, from east to west, facing 230°.

- Alternate run-up: RWY 5: located at the south end of Rows I and J.

- T-6B shall not exit at midfield after landing; solos shall exit at the end of all runways.

COMTRAWINGFIVEINST 3710.3B COMTRAWINGFIVEINST 3710.3B

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FEBRUARY 2019 FEBRUARY 2019

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GROUND EMERGENCIES

ABORT START PROCEDURE

In the AUTO start mode, if a no start is detected or if a hungor hot start is projected, the PMU should terminate the startsequence. However, the engine start should be aborted man-ually in the following situations:

• ITT rate of increase appears likely to exceed 1000 °C(hot start)

• ITT appears likely to remain between 871-1000 °C for> 5 seconds

• Normal N1 increase is halted (hung start)

• No rise of ITT is evident within 10 seconds after fuelflow indications (no start)

• Red BATT BUS warning message illuminates duringthe start sequence. BATT BUS warning may illumi-nate prior to MFD failure at 12.88 volts. MFD failureand the inability to monitor the start is imminent

• PCL is moved or the ST READY green advisory mes-sage extinguishes during the start sequence

NOTE

Note and report to maintenance the degreeand duration of any overtemperature.

* 1. PCL - OFF; or STARTER switch - AUTO/RESET

NOTE

If start is initiated with PCL in the OFF posi-tion, abort by reselecting AUTO/RESET onthe STARTER switch. If start is initiated withPCL out of the OFF position, but not past theIDLE gate, abort by placing the PCL to OFFor reselecting AUTO/RESET on theSTARTER switch. If the PCL is past theIDLE gate, abort by placing the PCL to OFF.

2. Perform Motoring Run Procedure

• If a start using external power is eitheraborted by the PMU, or manually aborted fora hot, hung, or no start, do not attempt subse-quent starts.

• Repeated PMU aborted start attempts areindicative of engine malfunction.

NOTE

• During ground starts, certain parameters(weak battery, high OAT, high pre-start ITT,

high density altitude, tailwind) may cause thePMU to abort a battery start attempt. Thoughthese parameters are not directly monitoredby the PMU, they cause a rate of rise in N1and/or ITT that are indicative of an impend-ing hung or hot start.

• If a battery start was aborted (PMU or manualabort), connect external power (if available)and perform Motoring Run Procedure. Sub-sequent starts may be attempted if no enginemalfunctions are evident and no limits havebeen exceeded.

MOTORING RUN PROCEDURE

Perform this procedure after any aborted start (auto or man-ual) during which fuel was introduced. Motor the engine toclear residual fuel and/or lower the ITT.

1. PCL - OFF2. IGNITION switch - NORM3. Propeller area - Clear4. STARTER switch - MANUAL for 20 seconds

STARTER switch is not spring-loaded fromMANUAL to NORM.

NOTE

Observe starter duty cycle cool-down period.5. STARTER switch - NORM

FIRE WARNING ON GROUND

The primary indications of an engine fire are illumination ofthe FIRE annunciators. Other indications of an engine fireare visual smoke or fire, engine indications (high ITT, fluc-tuating or high fuel flow), and notification from exteriorsources such as ground crew, tower, or another aircrew.When evidence of a fire exists during start or other groundoperations, perform the Emergency Engine Shutdown OnThe Ground procedure and Emergency Ground Egress pro-cedure if applicable.

EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN ON THE

GROUND

In the event of an engine fire, prop strike, or chip light; if theaircraft appears likely to depart the prepared surface; orshould any other serious ground emergency occur, accom-plish the following:* 1. PCL - OFF

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* 2. FIREWALL SHUTOFF HANDLE - PULL* 3. Emergency ground egress - As required

EMERGENCY GROUND EGRESS

NOTE

In a situation requiring immediate groundegress, the ejection system has the capabilityfor 0/0 ejection.

If emergency egress is required on the ground (Figure 3-1),perform the following steps after the aircraft has come to acomplete stop and the engine has been shut down:* 1. ISS mode selector - SOLO

Failure to ensure that the ISS mode selector isset to SOLO may result in the inadvertentejection of one or both seats.

* 2. Seat safety pin - Install (BOTH)

Failure to insert both ejection seat safety pins(if occupied) before ground egress may resultin inadvertent activation of ejection sequenceand subsequent injury or death when per-forming emergency ground egress.

* 3. PARKING BRAKE - As required* 4. Canopy - Open

IF CANOPY CANNOT BE OPENED OR SITUATIONREQUIRES RIGHT SIDE EGRESS:

* 6. CFS handle - Rotate 90° counterclockwise and pull(BOTH)

• If the canopy fracturing system malfunctionsin conjunction with a canopy latch failure inthe locked position, ejection may be the onlyoption remaining to exit the aircraft. Aircrewshall remove the ejection seat safety pin andensure shoulder straps, lap straps, and legrestraint garters are still attached prior to pull-ing ejection handle.

• To prevent injury, ensure oxygen mask is onand visor is down prior to actuating the CFSsystem.

• Each internal CFS handle activates only theCFS charge for the respective transparency.Both internal CFS handles must be activatedin order to fracture both transparencies (ifrequired).

* 7. Upper fittings, lower fittings, and leg restraint garters- Release (BOTH)

Actuate leg restraint line quick-release lever on left side ofseat or use individual quick-release connectors on legrestraint garters.

NOTE

Oxygen hose, emergency oxygen hose, com-munication leads, and anti-G suit hose willpull free while vacating cockpit and legrestraint lines will pull through leg restraintgarter D rings if released with quick-releaselever.

* 8. BAT, GEN, and AUX BAT switches - OFF* 9. Evacuate aircraft

TAKEOFF EMERGENCIES

There are several factors which affect the pilot’s decision totakeoff or abort. The decision to takeoff or abort should bebased on the following:

• Runway length and condition, terminal weather condi-tions and area traffic.

• If adequate directional control cannot be maintained orany system emergency affecting safety of flight isexperienced prior to Max Abort Speed, the takeoffshould be aborted.

ABORT

If it becomes necessary to abort the takeoff, concentrate onmaintaining aircraft control, specifically directional control,while stopping the aircraft on the remaining runway. Toabort a takeoff, accomplish the following:* 1. PCL - IDLE* 2. BRAKES - AS REQUIRED

Refer to Section II for description of maximum brak-ing.

* 5. CFS handle safety pin - Remove (BOTH)

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condition is indicated by red X’s in the IOAT and ITT count-ers, removal of the ITT pointer on the EICAS display, and byillumination of the PMU FAIL warning on the EICAS. ThePMU will not reset until IOAT drops below 121 °C. Once thePMU is reset (PMU switch cycled from NORM to OFF andback to NORM), IOAT and ITT returns to normal and theEDM FAIL warning should be removed. The EDM is func-tioning normally if the EDM fail was present, but does notappear after the PMU is successfully reset.

Auto Start Operations

To begin an automatic start, advance PCL to auto start posi-tion until the green ST READY advisory illuminates. Fol-lowing the illumination of the ST READY advisory, it willremain illuminated for 3 seconds, even if the PCL is movedout of the auto start position. To prevent initiation of anengine start without auto start protection, ensure the STREADY advisory remains illuminated for more than 3 sec-onds prior to selecting AUTO/RESET with STARTERswitch. Momentarily selecting the STARTER switch toAUTO/RESET while the ST READY advisory remains illu-minated initiates the fully automatic start sequence. ThePMU activates the starter, boost pump, and igniters, and addsfuel at the proper N1 speed. At approximately 50% N1, thestarter and igniters are deenergized and the boost pump isdeactivated if fuel pressure is above 10 PSI. The engine con-tinues to accelerate to idle speed (60-61% N1). The propellerautomatically unfeathers during the start as engine oil pres-

sure rises. The PCL may be advanced to IDLE any time N1is at or above 60%.

NOTE

Figure 1-14 illustrates the approximate PCLhandle positions required for various enginefunctions.

During a normal (auto) start, the PMU continuously moni-tors N1, ITT, and fuel flow. While the ST READY advisoryis illuminated, the PMU can automatically stop fuel flow anddeactivate the igniters and starter at any time to abort the startif necessary to avoid a hung or hot start, or if any engine startparameter is exceeded. If the ST READY advisory extin-guishes for any reason during the start sequence, the PMUwill no longer provide this automatic protection. Any timethis occurs, including after the PCL has been advanced pastthe auto start position, the PMU will not cut off fuel to termi-nate a start. The start must be manually aborted either bymoving the PCL back to OFF, or if the PCL has not beenmoved past the IDLE gate, by reselecting the STARTERswitch to AUTO/RESET. Either action resets the PMU andaborts the autostart. If the PCL has been moved past theIDLE gate, the PCL must be moved to OFF to abort the start.If a start attempt is automatically or manually aborted, per-form Abort Start Procedure in Section III.

The PMU also provides airstart capability, but does not pro-vide engine protection. During an airstart, automatic N1,ITT, and torque limit protection are unavailable, therefore,

Figure 1-15. Fire Warning System

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AIR FORCE TO 1T-6B-1NAVY NAVAIR A1-T6BAA-NFM-100

2-17

• Abort engine start if anything abnormaloccurs during the start sequence, or severedamage could occur to the engine.

• Abort engine start if the PCL is inadvertentlymoved before N1 reaches 60%.

• If the ST READY advisory goes out once thestart switch is placed to Auto/Reset, the startshould be terminated to prevent potentialengine damage.

NOTE

• Engine sounds associated with compressorinstability during start are acceptable as longas PMU allows the start to continue.

• Aural tones are inaudible during engine startuntil the engine’s gas generator indication(N1) is above 50%.

7. Engine Start - Monitor

If a start attempt is aborted (PMU or manualabort), execute Motoring Run Procedure inSection III.

NOTE

With the PCL in any position other than OFF,moving the PCL to OFF or reselecting thestarter switch to AUTO/RESET at any timeduring the start sequence will terminate thestart. If a start is initiated with the PCL inOFF, the start may be aborted by reselectingAUTO/RESET on the starter switch.

8. PCL - Advance past two clicks, then IDLE, at or above60% N1

When moving the PCL forward past IDLE,verify travel past idle by hearing two audibleclicks as the PCL is moved forward.Improper position of the PCL short of the twoaudible clicks could result in inadvertentengine shutdown.

During ground operation and after the engineis started, if the PCL is inadvertently movedto cutoff and the engine is shutting down, donot attempt to relight the engine by movingthe PCL to idle or severe damage could occurto the engine.

9. External power - Disconnected

Ensure PCL, speed brake, and flight controlsare not moved until ground crew is clear ofaircraft.

BEFORE TAXI

1. GEN switch - ON (warning light should extinguish)2. AUX BAT switch - ON3. BLEED AIR INFLOW switch - NORM4. EVAP BLWR control - As required5. AIR COND switch - As required

NOTE

For hot day operations, optimum cockpitcooling is achieved by selecting RAM AIRFLOW switch to OFF and AIR COND switchto ON.

6. AVIONICS MASTER switch - ON

NOTE

After turning ON the GENERATOR switch,allow approximately 10 seconds before turn-ing ON the AVIONICS MASTER switch toallow battery amperage to stabilize.

7. OBOGS - Check (BOTH):a. OBOGS supply lever - ONb. OBOGS concentration lever - Check MAX (light

on) then back to NORMALc. OBOGS pressure lever - Check EMERGENCY

(increased pressure) then back to NORMALd. Check flow indicator for normal operation (BOTH)

NOTE

After initial power-up, the OBOGS FAILannunciator will be inhibited for 3 minutesduring OBOGS monitor warmup.

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GROUND EMERGENCIES

ABORT START PROCEDURE

In the AUTO start mode, if a no start is detected or if a hungor hot start is projected, the PMU should terminate the startsequence. However, the engine start should be aborted man-ually in the following situations:

• ITT rate of increase appears likely to exceed 1000 °C(hot start)

• ITT appears likely to remain between 871-1000 °C for> 5 seconds

• Normal N1 increase is halted (hung start)

• No rise of ITT is evident within 10 seconds after fuelflow indications (no start)

• Red BATT BUS warning message illuminates duringthe start sequence. BATT BUS warning may illumi-nate prior to MFD failure at 12.88 volts. MFD failureand the inability to monitor the start is imminent

• PCL is moved or the ST READY green advisory mes-sage extinguishes during the start sequence

NOTE

Note and report to maintenance the degreeand duration of any overtemperature.

* 1. PCL - OFF; or STARTER switch - AUTO/RESET

NOTE

If start is initiated with PCL in the OFF posi-tion, abort by reselecting AUTO/RESET onthe STARTER switch. If start is initiated withPCL out of the OFF position, but not past theIDLE gate, abort by placing the PCL to OFFor reselecting AUTO/RESET on theSTARTER switch. If the PCL is past theIDLE gate, abort by placing the PCL to OFF.

2. Perform Motoring Run Procedure

• If a start using external power is eitheraborted by the PMU, or manually aborted fora hot, hung, or no start, do not attempt subse-quent starts.

• Repeated PMU aborted start attempts areindicative of engine malfunction.

NOTE

• During ground starts, certain parameters(weak battery, high OAT, high pre-start ITT,

high density altitude, tailwind) may cause thePMU to abort a battery start attempt. Thoughthese parameters are not directly monitoredby the PMU, they cause a rate of rise in N1and/or ITT that are indicative of an impend-ing hung or hot start.

• If a battery start was aborted (PMU or manualabort), connect external power (if available)and perform Motoring Run Procedure. Sub-sequent starts may be attempted if no enginemalfunctions are evident and no limits havebeen exceeded.

MOTORING RUN PROCEDURE

Perform this procedure after any aborted start (auto or man-ual) during which fuel was introduced. Motor the engine toclear residual fuel and/or lower the ITT.

1. PCL - OFF2. IGNITION switch - NORM3. Propeller area - Clear4. STARTER switch - MANUAL for 20 seconds

STARTER switch is not spring-loaded fromMANUAL to NORM.

NOTE

Observe starter duty cycle cool-down period.5. STARTER switch - NORM

FIRE WARNING ON GROUND

The primary indications of an engine fire are illumination ofthe FIRE annunciators. Other indications of an engine fireare visual smoke or fire, engine indications (high ITT, fluc-tuating or high fuel flow), and notification from exteriorsources such as ground crew, tower, or another aircrew.When evidence of a fire exists during start or other groundoperations, perform the Emergency Engine Shutdown OnThe Ground procedure and Emergency Ground Egress pro-cedure if applicable.

EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN ON THE

GROUND

In the event of an engine fire, prop strike, or chip light; if theaircraft appears likely to depart the prepared surface; orshould any other serious ground emergency occur, accom-plish the following:* 1. PCL - OFF

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* 2. FIREWALL SHUTOFF HANDLE - PULL* 3. Emergency ground egress - As required

EMERGENCY GROUND EGRESS

NOTE

In a situation requiring immediate groundegress, the ejection system has the capabilityfor 0/0 ejection.

If emergency egress is required on the ground (Figure 3-1),perform the following steps after the aircraft has come to acomplete stop and the engine has been shut down:* 1. ISS mode selector - SOLO

Failure to ensure that the ISS mode selector isset to SOLO may result in the inadvertentejection of one or both seats.

* 2. Seat safety pin - Install (BOTH)

Failure to insert both ejection seat safety pins(if occupied) before ground egress may resultin inadvertent activation of ejection sequenceand subsequent injury or death when per-forming emergency ground egress.

* 3. PARKING BRAKE - As required* 4. Canopy - Open

IF CANOPY CANNOT BE OPENED OR SITUATIONREQUIRES RIGHT SIDE EGRESS:

* 6. CFS handle - Rotate 90° counterclockwise and pull(BOTH)

• If the canopy fracturing system malfunctionsin conjunction with a canopy latch failure inthe locked position, ejection may be the onlyoption remaining to exit the aircraft. Aircrewshall remove the ejection seat safety pin andensure shoulder straps, lap straps, and legrestraint garters are still attached prior to pull-ing ejection handle.

• To prevent injury, ensure oxygen mask is onand visor is down prior to actuating the CFSsystem.

• Each internal CFS handle activates only theCFS charge for the respective transparency.Both internal CFS handles must be activatedin order to fracture both transparencies (ifrequired).

* 7. Upper fittings, lower fittings, and leg restraint garters- Release (BOTH)

Actuate leg restraint line quick-release lever on left side ofseat or use individual quick-release connectors on legrestraint garters.

NOTE

Oxygen hose, emergency oxygen hose, com-munication leads, and anti-G suit hose willpull free while vacating cockpit and legrestraint lines will pull through leg restraintgarter D rings if released with quick-releaselever.

* 8. BAT, GEN, and AUX BAT switches - OFF* 9. Evacuate aircraft

TAKEOFF EMERGENCIES

There are several factors which affect the pilot’s decision totakeoff or abort. The decision to takeoff or abort should bebased on the following:

• Runway length and condition, terminal weather condi-tions and area traffic.

• If adequate directional control cannot be maintained orany system emergency affecting safety of flight isexperienced prior to Max Abort Speed, the takeoffshould be aborted.

ABORT

If it becomes necessary to abort the takeoff, concentrate onmaintaining aircraft control, specifically directional control,while stopping the aircraft on the remaining runway. Toabort a takeoff, accomplish the following:* 1. PCL - IDLE* 2. BRAKES - AS REQUIRED

Refer to Section II for description of maximum brak-ing.

* 5. CFS handle safety pin - Remove (BOTH)

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* 2. FIREWALL SHUTOFF HANDLE - PULL* 3. Emergency ground egress - As required

EMERGENCY GROUND EGRESS

NOTE

In a situation requiring immediate groundegress, the ejection system has the capabilityfor 0/0 ejection.

If emergency egress is required on the ground (Figure 3-1),perform the following steps after the aircraft has come to acomplete stop and the engine has been shut down:* 1. ISS mode selector - SOLO

Failure to ensure that the ISS mode selector isset to SOLO may result in the inadvertentejection of one or both seats.

* 2. Seat safety pin - Install (BOTH)

Failure to insert both ejection seat safety pins(if occupied) before ground egress may resultin inadvertent activation of ejection sequenceand subsequent injury or death when per-forming emergency ground egress.

* 3. PARKING BRAKE - As required* 4. Canopy - Open

IF CANOPY CANNOT BE OPENED OR SITUATIONREQUIRES RIGHT SIDE EGRESS:

* 6. CFS handle - Rotate 90° counterclockwise and pull(BOTH)

• If the canopy fracturing system malfunctionsin conjunction with a canopy latch failure inthe locked position, ejection may be the onlyoption remaining to exit the aircraft. Aircrewshall remove the ejection seat safety pin andensure shoulder straps, lap straps, and legrestraint garters are still attached prior to pull-ing ejection handle.

• To prevent injury, ensure oxygen mask is onand visor is down prior to actuating the CFSsystem.

• Each internal CFS handle activates only theCFS charge for the respective transparency.Both internal CFS handles must be activatedin order to fracture both transparencies (ifrequired).

* 7. Upper fittings, lower fittings, and leg restraint garters- Release (BOTH)

Actuate leg restraint line quick-release lever on left side ofseat or use individual quick-release connectors on legrestraint garters.

NOTE

Oxygen hose, emergency oxygen hose, com-munication leads, and anti-G suit hose willpull free while vacating cockpit and legrestraint lines will pull through leg restraintgarter D rings if released with quick-releaselever.

* 8. BAT, GEN, and AUX BAT switches - OFF* 9. Evacuate aircraft

TAKEOFF EMERGENCIES

There are several factors which affect the pilot’s decision totakeoff or abort. The decision to takeoff or abort should bebased on the following:

• Runway length and condition, terminal weather condi-tions and area traffic.

• If adequate directional control cannot be maintained orany system emergency affecting safety of flight isexperienced prior to Max Abort Speed, the takeoffshould be aborted.

ABORT

If it becomes necessary to abort the takeoff, concentrate onmaintaining aircraft control, specifically directional control,while stopping the aircraft on the remaining runway. Toabort a takeoff, accomplish the following:* 1. PCL - IDLE* 2. BRAKES - AS REQUIRED

Refer to Section II for description of maximum brak-ing.

* 5. CFS handle safety pin - Remove (BOTH)

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* 2. FIREWALL SHUTOFF HANDLE - PULL* 3. Emergency ground egress - As required

EMERGENCY GROUND EGRESS

NOTE

In a situation requiring immediate groundegress, the ejection system has the capabilityfor 0/0 ejection.

If emergency egress is required on the ground (Figure 3-1),perform the following steps after the aircraft has come to acomplete stop and the engine has been shut down:* 1. ISS mode selector - SOLO

Failure to ensure that the ISS mode selector isset to SOLO may result in the inadvertentejection of one or both seats.

* 2. Seat safety pin - Install (BOTH)

Failure to insert both ejection seat safety pins(if occupied) before ground egress may resultin inadvertent activation of ejection sequenceand subsequent injury or death when per-forming emergency ground egress.

* 3. PARKING BRAKE - As required* 4. Canopy - Open

IF CANOPY CANNOT BE OPENED OR SITUATIONREQUIRES RIGHT SIDE EGRESS:

* 6. CFS handle - Rotate 90° counterclockwise and pull(BOTH)

• If the canopy fracturing system malfunctionsin conjunction with a canopy latch failure inthe locked position, ejection may be the onlyoption remaining to exit the aircraft. Aircrewshall remove the ejection seat safety pin andensure shoulder straps, lap straps, and legrestraint garters are still attached prior to pull-ing ejection handle.

• To prevent injury, ensure oxygen mask is onand visor is down prior to actuating the CFSsystem.

• Each internal CFS handle activates only theCFS charge for the respective transparency.Both internal CFS handles must be activatedin order to fracture both transparencies (ifrequired).

* 7. Upper fittings, lower fittings, and leg restraint garters- Release (BOTH)

Actuate leg restraint line quick-release lever on left side ofseat or use individual quick-release connectors on legrestraint garters.

NOTE

Oxygen hose, emergency oxygen hose, com-munication leads, and anti-G suit hose willpull free while vacating cockpit and legrestraint lines will pull through leg restraintgarter D rings if released with quick-releaselever.

* 8. BAT, GEN, and AUX BAT switches - OFF* 9. Evacuate aircraft

TAKEOFF EMERGENCIES

There are several factors which affect the pilot’s decision totakeoff or abort. The decision to takeoff or abort should bebased on the following:

• Runway length and condition, terminal weather condi-tions and area traffic.

• If adequate directional control cannot be maintained orany system emergency affecting safety of flight isexperienced prior to Max Abort Speed, the takeoffshould be aborted.

ABORT

If it becomes necessary to abort the takeoff, concentrate onmaintaining aircraft control, specifically directional control,while stopping the aircraft on the remaining runway. Toabort a takeoff, accomplish the following:* 1. PCL - IDLE* 2. BRAKES - AS REQUIRED

Refer to Section II for description of maximum brak-ing.

* 5. CFS handle safety pin - Remove (BOTH)

A1-T6BAA-NFM-100 IC 020 A1-T6BAA-FCL-100 IC 019 ATTACHMENT 7

3-7

AIR FORCE TO 1T-6B-1NAVY NAVAIR A1-T6BAA-NFM-100

After a stop which required maximum effortbraking and if overheated brakes are sus-pected, do not taxi into or park in a congestedarea until brakes have had sufficient time tocool. Do not set parking brake.

BARRIER ENGAGEMENT

Aircrews will not call for a raised barrier in the event of anaborted takeoff. If a raised barrier is already up, aircrews willsteer around it, to include departing the prepared surface ifnecessary, or ejecting before engagement.

• Significant aircraft damage can be antici-pated when engaging a raised web barrier andwebbing may preclude normal canopy open-ing.

• If contact with a lowered BAK-15 is immi-nent, discontinue braking before reachinglowered barrier, then recommence once pastbarrier. In the unlikely event that webbingcatches on aircraft, there may be unexpecteddirectional control problems.

AIRCRAFT DEPARTS PREPARED SURFACE

If it appears likely that the aircraft will depart the preparedsurface, execute the Emergency Engine Shutdown On TheGround procedure.

TIRE FAILURE DURING TAKEOFF

IF THE DECISION IS MADE TO STOP:1. Abort

IF TAKEOFF IS CONTINUED:2. Gear and flaps position - Do not change3. Straight-in approach - Execute

Land on side of runway corresponding to thegood tire (put drag in the middle). Maintaindirectional control using rudder, brakes, andnose wheel steering as required.

ENGINE FAILURE IMMEDIATELY AFTER TAKEOFF

(SUFFICIENT RUNWAY REMAINING STRAIGHT

AHEAD)

A complete engine failure immediately after takeoff is anextremely critical emergency requiring immediate actionand decision making by the pilot. Indications are a total lossof power and a fairly rapid reduction in airspeed. A positivenose down pitch change will be needed to maintain a safeflying airspeed. If sufficient runway remains, the best optionis to continue straight ahead and land. If that is not possible,careful consideration of the recovery situation must be made.An early decision to eject may be the best option. Anticipateincreased brake sensitivity when braking above 80 KIAS. Inall cases, control the aircraft energy state through prudentuse of altitude, airspeed, and configuration.

• If insufficient runway remains to landstraight ahead, consider immediate ejection.

• Do not sacrifice aircraft control while trou-bleshooting or lowering gear with emergencysystem.

* 1. AIRSPEED - 110 KNOTS (MINIMUM)* 2. PCL - AS REQUIRED

NOTE

The pilot should select IDLE to use theincreased drag of the not yet feathered pro-peller or select OFF to reduce the sink rate.

* 3. EMER LDG GR HANDLE - PULL(AS REQUIRED)

NOTE

With a loss of hydraulic pressure, landinggear and flaps cannot be lowered by normalmeans.

* 4. Flaps - As required

IN-FLIGHT EMERGENCIES

ENGINE FAILURE DURING FLIGHT

In the event of an engine failure, a decision to eject, land, orairstart must be made. The altitude at which the engine failswill determine the time available to perform the followingprocedures.

Initial indications of engine failure/flameout are: loss ofpower and airspeed; rapid decay in N1, torque, and ITT; andpropeller movement towards feather due to loss of oil pres-

A3-2

AIR FORCE TO 1T-6B-1NAVY NAVAIR A1-T6BAA-NFM-100

Runway Available

Runway available is the runway length minus the aircraftlineup distance.

Takeoff Ground Run Distance

Takeoff ground run distance is defined as that runway dis-tance from brake release to lift-off. It is achieved by follow-ing the normal takeoff distance associated procedures for agiven rotation speed, at the mission-specified weight, ambi-ent temperature, pressure altitude, runway wind and gradi-ent, and appropriate takeoff configuration.

Maximum Braking Speed (VB)

Maximum braking speed is the maximum speed from whichthe aircraft can be brought to a stop without exceeding themaximum design energy absorption capability of the brakes(3.96 Million ft-lb).

Maximum Abort Speed

Maximum abort speed is the maximum speed at which anabort may be started and the aircraft stopped within theremaining runway length. Allowances included in the dataare based on a 3-second reaction at Maximum Abort Speedto recognize decision to abort and select idle power, duringwhich time acceleration continues. Additional allowanceincludes a 3-second period to apply the brakes after idlepower is selected. Speed may increase up to 20 knots duringthis 6-second period. When the abort speed is above rotationspeed, rotation speed (VR) becomes the abort speed.

For operation with a tailwind, maximum braking speed lim-its should be observed (Figure A3-2). If the abort speed isgreater than the maximum braking speed less 20 knots, themaximum braking speed (less 20 knots) becomes the abortspeed.

Lift-off

Lift-off is the moment during takeoff at which 100% of theaircraft weight is first supported by aerodynamic forces andno tires are in contact with the runway.

Distance to 50-foot Obstacle

Distance to 50-foot obstacle is the sum of the takeoff groundrun distance, plus the airborne horizontal distance needed toaccelerate and climb to the 50-foot obstacle height at orabove the obstacle climbout speed.

Rotation Speed

Rotation speed (VR) is the speed which permits attainingobstacle speed at the 50-foot obstacle height above the run-way.

Obstacle Speed

Obstacle speed (VOBS) is the target speed at which the air-craft crosses the 50-foot obstacle height while acceleratingto 140 KIAS at a 15° pitch attitude.

Stall Speed (VS)

Stall speed is the higher of:

1. The airspeed at which the aircraft ceases to fly due to theloss of aerodynamic lift with the input of slow smooth con-trol movements; or

2. The minimum controllable steady flight speed.

Climb Gradient

Climb gradient is the measured change of geometric altitudeversus horizontal distance, typically feet per nautical mile.Charts which present climb gradient are calculated on actual(gross) climb performance.

FACTORS AFFECTING TAKEOFF

Wind Corrections

Accounting for wind when planning takeoff requires thatthe wind direction and speed known. The headwind, tail-wind, or crosswind component can then be determinedusing the Takeoff and Landing Crosswind chart in FigureA3-6.

Headwind and Tailwind

The wind grids include factors of 50% for steady state head-winds and 150% for steady state tailwinds. Reported windcomponents may therefore be apllied directly to the chart.

Crosswind

When determining the crosswind component, enter theTakeoff and Landing Crosswind chart with the sum of thesteady wind value plus the gust increment. The maximumdemonstrated dry runway crosswind for takeoff and landingis 25 knots.

Gusts

The gust increment is obtained from ground meteorologicalsources. It is the difference between the reported steadywind velocity and the reported peak gust velocity. Increase

A3-9

AIR FORCE TO 1T-6B-1NAVY (NAVAIR) A1-T6BAA-NFM-100

Figure A3-4. Maximum Abort Speed - Flaps TO

40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160

ABORT SPEED ~ KIAS

5

10

15

20

25

RC

R

40

30

20

10

0

WIN

D ~

KN

OTS

3210123

RU

NW

AY

GR

AD

IEN

T ~

%

DO

WN

U

P

10000

9000

8000

7000

6000

5000

4000

3000

RU

NW

AY

AVA

IL. ~

FEE

T

5500

5700

5900

6100

6300

6500

6700

6900

WEI

GH

T ~

POU

ND

S

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

-20

AIR

TEM

PER

ATU

RE

~ °F

50

40

30

20

10

0

-10

-20

-30

AIR

TEM

PER

ATU

RE

~ °C

PH

AA

TO003A

BASELINE

WET

ICY

DRY

BASELINE

BASELINE

BASELINE

BASELINEMAXIMUM WEIGHT 6900 LBS

HEA

DW

IND

TAILWIND

FIE

LD

PR

ES

SU

RE

AL

TIT

UD

E ~

100

0 F

EE

T

-2S

L2

46

8

ASSOCIATED CONDITIONS:SET 3O% TORQUERELEASE BRAKES AND SET TAKEOFF POWERABORT TAKEOFF AT OR BELOW ABORT SPEEDMAXIMUM BRAKING WITHOUT SKIDDING TIRESHARD SURFACE RUNWAY

AIRPLANE : T-6BENGINE : PT6A-68DATE : MAR 2OO8DATA BASIS : FLIGHT TEST

& ESTIMATE

MAXIMUM ABORT SPEED - FLAPS TAKEOFF

Given Conditions: Temp: 20C/70FPA: 200 ftA/C wt: 6900 lbs Rwy Avail: 6000 ft Slope: 0%HW: 10 kts RCR: 12 (wet)

Find:Max abort speed = 76 KIAS

Your max abort speed is LESS THAN your rotate speed.

SOMETHING TO CONSIDER!

AIR FORCE TO 1T-6B-1NAVY NAVAIR A1-T6BAA-NFM-100

2-29

ANGLE OF ATTACK (AOA) LANDING

Angle of attack (AOA) landings utilize the normal landingpattern in Figure 2-8 or Figure 2-9 while maintaining opti-mum AOA throughout the final/approach turn. On down-wind, slow to optimum AOA (on-speed amber donut onindexer) prior to the perch/abeam position. After the perch/abeam position, maintain on-speed AOA with pitch andmaintain controlled descent rate with power. Maintain anappropriate angle of bank and line up on runway centerline.On final, coordinate stick and power inputs to land at desiredtouchdown point while continuing to fly on-speed AOA.Round out and touch down normally.

MAXIMUM BRAKING

Maximum braking effectiveness is obtained with a steadyapplication of brakes.

The physical limitations of the tire and brake system make itextremely difficult to consistently achieve maximum brak-ing action, particularly at high speeds where the weight com-ponent is reduced due to lift. A smooth, single application,increasing as airspeed decreases, offers the best brakingopportunity. Great caution should be used when braking atspeeds above 80 KIAS. Locked brakes are difficult to diag-nose until well after the fact. Braking should be discontinuedat the first sign of directional control problems and then cau-tiously reapplied. At speeds below 80 KIAS, the chances ofapproaching maximum braking action are greatly increased.

• The aircraft is not equipped with anti-skid oranti-lock protection. Do not apply wheelbrakes until the aircraft is firmly on theground and the weight is fully on the wheels.If a wheel brake locks up before the weight ofthe aircraft is fully on the wheels, the brakemay not release even with the full weight ofthe aircraft on the wheel. The result may be ablown tire and possible degradation of direc-tional control on the ground.

• After a landing which required maximumeffort braking and if overheated brakes aresuspected, do not taxi into or park in a con-gested area until the brakes have had suffi-cient time to cool. Do not set parking brake.

• If brake pressure appears to fade duringapplication, or brakes are not responding asexpected, fully release brakes, then re-apply.

Both crewmembers must fully release brakesfor this to be effective.

NOTE

All stopping distances computed fromAppendix A are based on maximum braking.Maximum braking is very difficult toachieve. Variables such as brake and tire con-dition, pilot technique, etc., may increasecomputed landing distances.

AFTER LANDING

1. ISS mode selector - SOLO or CMD FWD (Verify ISSmode selector lever is locked in SOLO or CMD FWD)

• Both seats will eject if the ISS is in BOTHand an unpinned ejection handle is pulled,even if the other seat is pinned.

• With the ISS mode selector set to CMDFWD, the crewmember in the rear cockpitinitiates ejection of the rear seat only, and thecrewmember in the front cockpit initiatesejection for both front and rear seats with therear seat ejecting first even if the rear seatejection handle safety pin is installed.

2. Seat safety pin - Install (BOTH)

• Ensure ejection seat safety pin is fullyinserted to preclude inadvertent seat actua-tion.

• In the event of a dropped ejection seat safetypin, do not use the CFS handle safety pin toattempt to safe the ejection seat. The ejectionseat safety pin and the CFS handle safety pinare not interchangeable. Using the CFS han-dle safety pin in place of the ejection seatsafety pin could result in inadvertent seatactuation.

3. PROBES ANTI-ICE switch - OFF 4. Flaps - UP5. Trim interrupt button - Depress (Verify TRIM OFF

and TAD OFF message illuminated and TAD switchmoves to OFF)

6. Trim - Set for takeoff

JPPT 1542.166A C2103

CFS and Ejection procedures from the ground

• A little bit of crew coordination will go a long way as far as safety is concerned if faced with using CFS during ground operations. The idea is coordinating the “CFS – Rotate and Pull” if using the internal CFS handles between front and rear cockpits. There a few techniques to accomplish this task and will be briefed between crewman during the NATOPS preflight brief prior to flight.

• If required, right side egress is possible with use of CFS - ensure oxygen mask is on and visor is down prior to actuating the CFS system. Internal CFS handles activate CFS charge for the respective transparency. External CFS handles activate both CFS charges for each cockpit.

• In a situation (e.g., fire or imminent collision) requiring immediate ground egress, the ejection

system affords a 0/0 ejection capability.

• You should ensure the canopy is going to open before un-strapping (i.e., ensure that it is not jammed by the incident that has led to your Emergency Ground Egress) so as to still be able to eject, should that option of egress need to be exercised.

Ejection Seat Sequencing Mitigation Contingencies

• FCP Incapacitation1. ISS Mode Selector – BOTH2. RCP – Eject

• ICS Failure• “Face curtain” signal serves as the prepatory command

during a controlled ejection. A thumbs up from eachoccupant is required to initiate ejection sequence.

• FCP shall initiate ejection sequence with three “raps” ofthe canopy

• RCP occupant shall initiate ejection ON third “rap”• FCP occupant shall initiate ejection NET ~0.5 seconds

AFTER third “rap”

Misc • Unqualified personnel prohibited

• Must be NATOPS qualified, enrolled in a formal aviation syllabus, or an observer qualified Naval Flight Officer, Flight Surgeon, or AeromedicalSafety Officer

• Delaying ejection below 2,000 ft AGL is notrecommended

• Any delays may negatively impact theejection envelope

• FCP occupant initiates ejection NET ~0.5 secAFTER third “EJECT” call or immediately afterconfirming the RCP occupant has ejected

• Proper manual ejection sequencing requiresthe RCP occupant to eject prior to the FCPoccupant

CRM • RCP Delaying Ejection

• May lead to collision with FCP seat• RCP shall not hesitate or delay ejecting• RCP occupant shall initiate ejection ON third “EJECT” call

• FCP Initiating Ejection Too Soon• May lead to collision with RCP seat• FCP shall initiate ejection NET ~0.5 sec after third

“EJECT” call

Procedures • Dual Flights

• ISS Mode Selector – SOLO in flight (Before Takeoff checks)• RCP occupant shall initiate ejection ON third “EJECT” call• FCP occupant shall initiate ejection NET ~0.5 sec AFTER

third “EJECT” call

• Solo Flights• Normal NATOPS Procedures Apply• Ensure ISS Mode Selector is in SOLO