Pursuing a Unifying Paradigm for Psychotherapy

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Pursuing a Unifying Paradigm for Psychotherapy:Tasks, Dialectical Considerations, and

Biopsychosocial Systems MetatheoryJack C. Anchin

University at Buffalo, State University of New York

This article focuses on salient issues and directions in pursuing a unifyingparadigm for psychotherapy. This endeavor is placed in historical context, followed by discussion of the authors definition of unification and ofbenefits that can accrue from this pursuit. Subsequently, attention is devotedto the core challenge of reconciling the quest for unity with the enormous,

functionally invaluable plurality of knowledge elements deriving from themultiple paradigms guiding psychotherapy theory, research, and practice.Based on Staats (1991, 1999), three tasks necessary for addressing thistension are delineated: undertaking unifying theory analysis to reduce con-ceptual redundancy; developing bridging theory to unify divergencies, facil-itated by dialectical thinking and formulation; and unifying research meth-odologies in psychotherapy. Discussion then turns to biopsychosocial

systems metatheory as a framework for a unifying psychotherapeutic para-digm. In this context, the author examines interrelationship and process as fundamental unifying principles; insights from cybernetics, chaos theory,and their synthesis; and implications of the systems paradigm for unification-oriented scientific inquiry.

Keywords: psychotherapy, plurality and unity, dialectical, biopsychosocial, systems meta-theory

Over the course of its history within the natural and social sciences, the

provocative concept of unification has acquired variable meanings. Forexample, for Otto Neurath, one of the principal figures in the Vienna Circle

Jack C. Anchin, Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, State University ofNew York.

An earlier version of this article was presented at the symposium The Evolution ofPsychotherapy: Is Unification in Reach? at the 19th Annual Conference of the Society for theExploration of Psychotherapy Integration, New York City, May 4, 2003.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Jack C. Anchin, 4444Main Street, Snyder, NY 14226. E-mail: [email protected]

Journal of Psychotherapy Integration Copyright 2008 by the American Psychological Association

2008, Vol. 18, No. 3, 310 349 1053-0479/08/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0013557

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and the Unity of Science movement, unification was holistic, referring to acoordinated aggregation (Cat, Cartwright, & Chang, 1996, p. 352) of allof the sciences necessitated by the fact that the prediction and control of

concrete events and phenomena in natural settings requires the differentscientific disciplines and theories to work together (Cat et al., 1996, p.352). As vividly explained in Neuraths words:

Certainly different kinds of laws can be distinguished from each other; for example,chemical, biological, or sociological laws. However, it can not be said of a predictionof a concrete individual process that it depend [sic] on one definite kind of law only.For example, whether a forest will burn down at a certain location on earth dependsas much on the weather as on whether human intervention takes place or not. Thisintervention, however, can only be predicted if one knows the laws of humanbehavior. That is, under certain circumstances, it must be possible to connect all kindsof laws with each other. Therefore all laws, whether chemical, climatological, orsociological, must be conceived as parts of a system, namely of unified science.(Neurath, cited by Cat et al., 1996, p. 352)

In marked contrast, Oppenheim and Putnam (1958) viewed the properdirection of unification to be reductive. As succinctly described by Galison(1996), for these philosophers of science the Unity of Science meant, quiteexplicitly, the pyramidal hierarchy that reduced one domain of science toanother. The great natural span of the sciences built solidly one layerupon the next, from the laws of elementary particle physics up through the

atomic, molecular, cellular, multicellular, psychological, and social sci-ences (p. 5). Oppenheim and Putnam (1958) stated with equal and com-pelling explicitness the ultimate implication of their conception, namelythe possibility that all science may one day be reduced to microphys-ics . . . (p. 27).

The notable diversity that has characterized meanings of unity acrossall of the sciences (cf. Galison, 1996; Wilson, 1998) is no less evident in thefield of study that can be properly called unification psychology, a rich andstill evolving domain of inquiry centered on the more restricted yet intrigu-

ingand certainly contendedgoal of unifying the discipline of psychol-ogy as a whole (see, e.g., Anchin, in press-b; Chao, 2002; de Groot, 1989;Gilgen, 1987; Henriques, 2003, 2004, in press; Kendler, 1987, 2002; Koch,1981; Royce, 1987; Staats, 1987, 1991, 1999; Sternberg, 2004; Sternberg &Grigorenko, 2001; Viney, 1989; Wertheimer, 1988; Yanchar & Slife, 1997;Yela, 1987). These considerations of definitional variability underscore theimportance of explicitly defining what one has in mind when using suchterms as unification and unifying in any scientific context. In addition toreducing confusion and facilitating communication, articulating these ref-

erents also provides a critical frame of reference for interpreting andappraising ensuing assertions, elaborations, and recommendations. I there-fore turn next to this definitional step, providing the context for theprincipal aim of this article, which is to delineate some salient issues and

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directions in pursuing a unifying paradigm for one field within psychology:theory, research, and practice in psychotherapy.

DEFINING UNIFICATION IN PSYCHOTHERAPY

My conception of unification in psychotherapy draws significantly onthe aforementioned literature on unification psychology. Theorists in thatdomain have presented a compelling body of analyses articulating an arrayof critical issues and directions pertaining to efforts at unifying psycholog-ical phenomena, and rather than trying to reinvent the wheel, I believe thatwe would be wise indeed to draw upon the benefits of their numerous

insights and extrapolate them to the project of developing a unifyingpsychotherapy paradigm. In this vein, to my way of thinking, unification inpsychotherapy means the development of a singular paradigm that pullstogether and interrelates, in one organizing theoretical framework, all ofthe major accumulating elements of knowledge pertaining to personality,psychopathology, and psychotherapy. Moreover, such a framework, oper-ating as a unifying paradigm, would fundamentally guide how we thinkabout and conceptualize the wealth of phenomena pertinent to psycho-therapy, how we scientifically study those phenomena, and how, in the

domain of practice, we apply the products of those efforts and synthesizethem with the principles, procedures, and processes of psychotherapy.

No small task! Indeed, a project of enormously challenging propor-tions, Staatss (1987) contention about pursuing unification in the disciplineof psychology as a whole is equally applicable to pursuit of a unifyingpsychotherapeutic paradigm: This is not work for an individual but for amultitudetheoreticians, philosophers, methodologists, experimentalists,and practitioners (p. 14). Yet, the overarching justification for this array ofindividuals collaboratively devoting concerted time and effort to the am-

bitious project of unifying psychotherapeutically related knowledge lies inthe opportunities it offers to advance conceptualizations and investigationsof psychopathology and psychotherapy, and intimately related, to developtherapeutic principles, procedures, and processes that can progressivelyheighten psychotherapeutic efficacy. As Wampold (2001) cogently demon-strated, the absolute efficacy of psychotherapy has been established:

From the various meta-analyses conducted over the years, the effect size related toabsolute efficacy appears to fall within the range of .75 to .85. A reasonable anddefensible point estimate for the efficacy of psychotherapy would be .80, a value

used in this book. This effect would be classified as a large effect in the socialsciences, which means that the average client receiving therapy would be betterthan 79% of untreated clients, that psychotherapy accounts for about 14% of thevariance in outcomes, and that the success rate would change from 31% for thecontrol group to 69% for the treatment group. (pp. 7071)

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However, is it a given that psychotherapys absolute efficacy hasreached its apex? Or, from the vital standpoint of continuing to advanceour field, can we indeed push the effect size for absolute efficacy even

beyond this already impressive level? Theoretically and operationally tack-ling these questions and their implications constitute inviting challenges forour field as we make our contribution to advancing the art and science ofpsychotherapy in the 21st century. Forging a paradigm that cohesivelyunifies our accumulating knowledge, our investigative techniques and ourprinciples of therapeutic application may well provide a principal routetoward achieving this salutary goal of further heightening therapys abso-lute efficacy. Along the way, and of significant value in its own right, thevery process of reflecting on and dialoguing about a unifying paradigm

dramatically surfaces and thereby offers the field opportunities to construc-tively wrestle with core issues in psychotherapeutic science and practice(compare, e.g., Fisch, 2001, and Wolfe, 2001)and to do so within acontext that is itself unifying.

RECONCILING PLURALITY AND UNITY: TASKS IN

DEVELOPING A UNIFYING PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC

PARADIGM

Foremost among those issues is the fact that, most fundamentally, weare dealing with a staggering number and variety of knowledge elementsemanating from the pluralism characterizing the field of psychotherapy andbehavior change. The five major paradigms that dominate our erathebiological, psychoanalytic/psychodynamic, cognitivebehavioral, humanis-tic/experiential, and systems paradigmsare themselves each composed ofdifferent models and conceptualizations. When we then lay out from each

ofthose models all of the key theoretical terms, concepts, propositions, andempirical findings that pertain to the structure and function of personality,the nature of psychopathology, and the principles, methods, processes, andoutcomes of psychotherapy, we have before us a diversity of knowledgeelements that is absolutely mind-boggling. How do we reconcile, on theone hand, the goal of bringing order to all of this dissimilarity to form acomprehensive, systematically interrelated, and coherent body of knowl-edge about personality, psychopathology, and psychotherapy with, on theother hand, a pluralism that is pragmatically and functionally invaluable,

given the ineffable complexities of our subject matter?In the words of William James (1907/1992), the critical issue here ishow to hit the balance between the one and the many (p. 71). Inaddressing this intriguing tension between plurality and unity as it pertains



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to psychotherapy, theorists interested in unification psychology partly pointthe way. Here I highlight three particular directions of such work, espe-cially drawing on the comprehensive conceptions of Arthur Staats and

developing his perspectives in their specific application to the domain ofpsychotherapy.

Addressing Conceptual Redundancy and Similarity Through Unifying

Theory Analysis

To illustrate, one of the essential tasks we need to undertake is what

Staats (1991) has referred to as unifying theory analysis. The idea here isthat some degree of the diversity in our vast collectivity of knowledgeelements in the field of psychotherapy and behavior change is artificial, inthat we are dealing with marked similarities, if not outright redundancies.As Staats (1991) stated, there are many common concepts and principlesand findings in which commonality is not recognized because they aredescribed in different languages and are parts of different theories (p.905). Or, as Yanchar and Slife (1997) succinctly encapsulated this issue,the same fundamental phenomena are described using different terms

(with perhaps subtly different meanings) (p. 243). The upshot is thatsignificant domains of consensus that may simply be awaiting discoveryfor example, essential psychological structures composing personality, keypsychosocial processes that sustain psychopathology, and principles ofeffective psychotherapycontinue to elude us.

Characterized by Hishinuma (1987) as one of the foundational direc-tions of work toward constructing a unified body of psychotherapeuticallyrelated knowledge, unified theory analyses require incisive theoreticalstudies that identify and explicate significant similarities and redundancies

in specific conceptual elements and principles composing different theo-retical conceptions of personality, psychopathology, and therapeutic pro-cess and intervention. In thereby abstract[ing] the resemblances betweenthe theories treated.. . .a body of principles, concepts, and analyses couldbe formulated that would be consensual in nature, that would be acceptedas recognized knowledge, and that would serve to draw separate empirical-theoretical endeavors together (Staats, 1987, p. 41).

Hishinuma (1987) presented an elaborate unifying theory analysis inhis penetrating study of commonalities between psychoanalytic theory and

cognitive dissonance theory, and the method he deploys, as he rightfullysuggests, can also serve as a prototype for the nature of such comparativeanalyses. Another exemplar of this high level of cross-theory similarityin concepts and principles may be found in core facets of relational

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psychoanalysis (e.g., Frank, 1999, 2002) and Kieslers (1996) interpersonalcommunications approach to psychotherapy. For example, as discussed ingreater detail elsewhere (Anchin, 2002), despite differences in language,

striking similarities are clearly evident in the relational analytic concept ofcountertransference and the interpersonal communications concept of im-pact messages, as well as in certain relational analytic perspectives ontherapist self-disclosure and principles of therapist metacommunication ininterpersonal communications therapy. Still other domains of conceptualsimilarity of acute pertinence to the therapeutic arena inviting unifiedtheory analysis are evident. For example, mapping a significant realm ofcovert interpersonally related structure and processes are the parallelformulations encompassed by Horowitzs (1991; Baccus & Horowitz, 2005)

role relationships model, Benjamins (1996, 2003) internal working modelsin terms of important persons and their internalized representations(IPIRs), Safrans (Safran & Segal, 1990; Scarvalone, Fox, & Safran, 2005)interpersonal schemas construct, and Franks (2002) concept of internal-ized relational patterns. Still more global are an array of circular processconceptions of psychopathology (Anchin, 2002, p. 307), specificallyAndrewss (1991) self-confirmation model, Carsons (1982) self-fulfillingexpectancy model, Franks (2002) enactment concept, Kieslers (1996)maladaptive transaction cycle, Strupp and Binders (1984; cf. Levenson,

1995, 2003) cyclical maladaptive pattern, and Wachtels (Wachtel, Kruk, &McKinney, 2005) cyclical psychodynamics conception.In addition to these content domains, innumerable other clinically

centered conceptual similarities or redundancies await discerning theoret-ical analysis. For those whose interest is piqued by this direction of unifyingwork, a challenging exercise containing both analytic and synthetic ele-ments is to reflect on different bodies of theory pertaining to personality,psychopathology, and psychotherapy and to glean concepts and principlesthat, while linguistically different, nevertheless encompass highly overlap-

ping and in some instances virtually redundant phenomena. As in thecountertransference/impact message commonality, such points of theoret-ical similarity may also provide an expedient entree into effecting substan-tive integrations between some of the related conceptions and principlessurrounding the common concepts.

Bridging Theory to Unify Divergencies and the Potency of Dialectical

Thinking

We also need to sharply crystallize fundamental areas of divergence indifferent conceptions of personality, psychopathology, and psychothera-



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peutic processes, including posited mechanisms of change. As Staats (1987,1991) made clear, not infrequently such divergencies can be of such mag-nitude that they constitute schisms, wherein the positions are polar, [and

therefore] the research and theory developments they inspire are also inopposition (Staats, 1987, p. 42). Nevertheless, rather than viewing, apriori, these principal differences as immutable (Staats, 1987) and incom-mensurable (Kuhn, 1970, 2000) because of underlying philosophical differ-ences or metatheoretical incompatibilities, we have the highly potent op-tion of instead seeing any such dissimilarity as a problem to be solved(Staats, 1991, p. 907; cf. Anchin, in press-b). Adopting this perspective, wecan in turn take up the challenge of developing what has been designatedas bridging theory (Staats, 1987, 1991, 1999), whereby disparate bodies of

psychological knowledge can be integrated into a coherent whole, or atleast connected in a theoretically meaningful, rather than merely an eclec-tic, manner (Yanchar & Slife, 1997, p. 243). In its broadest outlines,necessarythough not necessarily sufficientaspects of constructing abridging theory include (a) sectioning off a meaningful content area orissue in relation to which two theories significantly deviate, (b) relative tothose different positions, meticulously analyzing the respective theoreticalconcepts, propositions, and findings that constitute that separation in orderto sharply crystallize the points of difference, as well as any similarities, and

then, (c) armed with this detailed understanding of the composition andbases of these different positions in relation to the issue at hand, construct-ing a theory that shows how these two discrepant theoretical perspectivescan in fact be put together, thereby productively interrelating the knowl-edge encompassed by each.

Given that constructing bridging theory is fundamentally a process oftheory development and that this process by definition centers on interre-lating essentially divergent positions on a given issue, an especially valuablefacilitator of the conceptual bridging process may lie in dialectical modes ofthinking and formulation. Neimeyer and Mahoney (1995) spoke to theunderlying rationale: Dialectics honors the dynamic role of contrast ingenerating development (p. 404). This contrast-rooted dialectical dynamicpermeates developmental change processes in multiple domains, includingnot only individual personality (e.g., Linehan, 1993), interpersonal rela-tionships (e.g., Baxter & Montgomery, 1998), and society (e.g., Buss, 1979),but also ideas themselves (cf. Dunning, 1997; Hanna, 1994). Indeed,Rychlaks (1976b) passionate call for appreciating the singular relevance

and heuristic power of dialectical thinking for the social and human sci-ences warrants reiteration. Alluding to social scientists who have soreadily patterned their conceptual models on the paradigms of naturalscience (Kuhn, 1970) (p. 1), Rychlak (1976b) sought

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to show how this naive acceptance of natural-science description has eclipsed a vitalside of human nature, one that mustbe captured if social science is ever to achievecredibility. This side has to do with the dialectic or dialectical description ofbehaviors, events, societies, and so on. Here is an ancient conception so pervasive

in human affairs, so pregnant with meaning for analysis, so useful as heuristic aidthat to have ignored it these many decades into the century almost constitutes anact of irresponsibility on the part of modern social science. (p. 1)

While multiple meanings have come to define a dialectic, Rychlak(1976b) crystallized that the core meaning (p. 14) is that of bipolarity,wherein two elements stand in direct and dynamic opposition or contra-diction to one another. Prototypically embodied in Hegels classic thesisantithesis duality, others have depicted this configuration in terms ofbinary oppositions (Dunning, 1997, p. 4), internal opposing forces

(Linehan, 1993, p. 32), and unified opposites (Baxter & Montgomery,1998, p. 4). Downing (2000), contributing an important elaboration thatfurther underpins dialecticisms direct pertinence to bridging theory, dis-tinguished between dialectic as an ontology and as a method. With regardto the former, [a]s an ontology [dialectic] assumes that the oppositionswhich we see are inherent in nature . . . (Downing, 2000, p. 258), or asLinehan (1993) stated it, reality is not static, but is comprised of internalopposing forces. . . . [W]ithin each one thing or system, no matter howsmall, there is polarity . . . (p. 32). The inverse of this conception, hence an

inextricably related facet of a dialectical ontology, is that of interrelated-ness and wholeness. Dialectics assumes a systems perspective on reality(Linehan, 1993, p. 31), thereby emphasizing holism and totality but at thesame time the splitting of a totality into its contradictory parts and theexamination of the parts as they relate to each other (Lenin, 1915/1977)(Greenberg & Pascual-Leone, 1995, p. 169). Erbes (2004) succinctly inte-grated these various ideas: Rather than focus on one idea, issue, or poleof a dialectic, dialectical thought suggests that we understand the world bylooking at both sides of any dialectic. Only by studying their dynamic

interplay as a whole can a phenomenon be understood (p. 205).Erbess remarks also reflect the unification-relevant cross-over fromdialectics as an ontology to dialectics as a method. As Downing (2000, p.258) and Buss (1979, p. 76) explained, in applying a dialectical method, oneseeks to understand a given phenomenon or process through essentiallyundertaking a dialogueor in Radnitzkys (1970) terms, a tackingprocedure (p. 23)between the opposing sides of the bipolarity, recog-nizing that each, being an integral part of the whole, contains distinctlyvalid elements of knowledge about the phenomenon or process under

consideration. This type of conceptual analysis and interactional investiga-tion, a kind of inquiry which is rigorous and disciplined without being rigidand dogmatic (Hanna, 1994, p. 129), can deepen understanding of aphenomenon or process and offers the potentiality for formulating ex-



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panded, more encompassing conceptualizationsa sine qua non of bridg-ing theory.

In words that resonate with the language of bridging theory, Fosha

(2004) encapsulated what many discussions of dialecticism emphasize asthe characteristic advancement in knowledge that derives from the dialec-tical tacking process: the apparent contradiction can be resolved at adifferent level, wherein the two seemingly mutually exclusive positions canbe interrelated. The new understanding that comes from weaving themtogether is deeper and more comprehensive than the understanding cap-tured by either side of the dichotomy (p. 83). An approximation to thistype of higher-order synthesis is well illustrated by Franks (1999, 2002)integrative relational psychoanalytic approach. Through methodical anal-

ysis and weaving together of the opposed poles constituting differentdualities stemming from various analytic approaches, for example, theindividual and the social, one- and two-person models, the intrapsychic andthe interpersonal, self-representations and object representations (Anchin,2002, p. 303), Frank forged a higher-order theoretical synthesis that ad-vances the understanding of personality and psychopathology in ways thatare indeed deeper and more comprehensive than the understandings pro-vided by either pole considered alone in relation to any of the aforemen-tioned dualities.

However, the fine-grained complexity of theories of psychotherapynecessitates mindfulness of the particular challenges of constructing bridg-ing theories in the therapeutic domain. In this regard, it is essential torecognize that the resolution of opposites through synthesis is not the soledirection that dialectical reasoning and formulation must take. Too manypeople think that dialectic means the Hegelian formula of thesisantithesissynthesis and nothing else (Rychlak, 1976a, pp. 134135).Thus, in a different form of dialectically based bridging, opposing poles areintentionally maintained as separate and yet coexistent in the service of

needing and benefiting from one another through a dynamic movement ofcontinuous reciprocity. Downing (2004) provided an excellent example ofthis alternative to resolution-through-synthesis in his discussion of the needfor therapists

to embody a movement between conviction and uncertainty in their daily work withclients (Downing, 2000). This dialectic would recognize that psychotherapists can-not function without theory, which provides coherence and conviction, and thatpsychotherapists must strive to remain uncertain of the truth, comprehensiveness,and usefulness of theory . . . . Uncertainty needs to be checked by conviction, just

as conviction needs to be upset by uncertainty. (p. 139)

The upshot of the bridge between conviction and uncertainty drawn bythis alternative form of dialectical conceptualization is a therapeutic pro-

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cess that is more comprehensive, advanced, and potentially beneficial tothe patients treatment than either pole taken alone.

Bridging theories within the field of psychotherapy would be intended

to unify knowledge through the ongoing process of interrelating disparateconcepts, findings, positions, and research methodologies pertaining tosuch core domains as the description and explanation of personality de-velopment and functioning, the nature of psychological health and disor-der, and principles, procedures, and processes that constitute effectivetreatment. Given that different models of psychotherapy continue to dis-agree on an array of key issues encompassed by these domains, opportu-nities to construct bridging theories are enormous.1 Taking the lead fromStaatss (1996) observation that Bridging theory and how to construct it

needs specialized consideration (p. 29), it is submitted here that in view ofthe singular manner in which it ontologically embraces and methodologi-cally tackles opposition and contradiction, dialectical thinking constitutesan approach to inquiry and formulation strikingly suited to the formulationof unifying bridging theories.

And while dialecticism can by no means be expected to be the solepathway towards theoretical bridging, it is interesting to consider that eachinstance of bridging theory achieved through a dialectical conceptualiza-tion constitutes, in microcosmic fashion, a bridging of the superordinate

dialectic between plurality and unityperhaps a fractal representation ofthe unifying process. Thus, drawing on but two of innumerable possibleexamples, whether interest lies in developing bridging theory between theholistic emphasis of the existential approach in contrast to the microana-lytic, reductionistic thrust of many cognitive behavioral approaches(Staats, 1987), or in constructing a theoretical bridge between a focus onhealth and the patients resourcefulness versus [a] focus on pathology andthe patients disturbance (Fosha, 2004, p. 83), it seems to me that weadvance the sophistication of our understanding and of the clinical prac-

tices that follow far more by addressing these and other principal dichot-omies through the frame of both/and rather than that of either/or (seeDerrida, 1978). And it is precisely this both/and framework that conjoinsbridging theory and dialectical thinking.

1 For multiple examples of marked divergencies between paradigms in theoretical con-cepts and positions having direct pertinence for personality, psychopathology, and psycho-therapy, see Staatss (1987) Table 1, The Humanistic and Experimental-Behavioristic

Schism (p. 17), Mahoneys (1991) Table 8.4, Views of Emotion in Different Metatheories(pp. 205207), and Foshas (2004) delineation of eight distinct dialectical(process, oscillating,

dual focus) common factors (p. 80) that pertain to different dimensions of the therapistsstance vis-a-vis the patient and the clinical material (p. 83) derived from four contemporaryapproaches to brief integrative psychotherapy.



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Unifying Methodological Paradigms

In addition to extracting commonalities residing within conceptual

similarities and redundancies obscured by dissimilar theoretical languages,and constructing meaningful theory that creatively bridges disparate con-cepts and principles, the quest for a unifying paradigm in psychotherapymust confront head-on the fact that personality, psychopathological phe-nomena, and psychotherapeutic processes and outcomes are investigatedwith widely varying methods of inquiry. Substitute the word psychotherapyfor the word psychology in the following observation, and its pertinence toour field of study is evident: There are various methods of research inpsychology that produce observations that underlie divided positions, and

the methods themselves become the basis for division, opposition, andmutual ignorance, even when related or complementary phenomena areinvolved (Staats, 1991, p. 906). Indeed, over the decades of the 20thcentury and into the present one, a remarkably diverse collection ofapproaches for studying psychotherapy and the correlative domains ofpersonality and psychopathology has evolved, yet these have been charac-teristically dichotomized into two very different methodological paradigms,each spawned by a distinctly different set of traditions (see Anchin, 2008).

Although different designations have been used to capture these two

methodological frameworks, the most incorporative linguistic differentia-tion may lie in distinguishing between the empiricist-quantitative and thehermeneutic-qualitative paradigms, respectively (see, e.g., Anchin, 2008;Messer, 1992; Packer & Addison, 1989; Woolfolk, Sass, & Messer, 1988).While the brief treatment offered here cannot possibly do justice to thediversity of methods and complexity of issues associated with each of theseparadigms (e.g., Anchin, 2005, 2006, 2008; Frommer, Langenbach, &Streeck, 2004; Krippner, 2001; Mahajan, 1997; Messer, 1992; Mahoney,1991; Packer & Addison, 1989; Polkinghorne, 1983; Ray, 2000; Rennie,2004; Slife & Williams, 1995, 1997; Staats, 1987; Turner, 1967; von Wright,1971; Wertz, 2001; Woolfolk et al., 1988; Woolfolk & Richardson, 2008),incorporating elements of analysis offered by the latter theorists andinvestigators allows for certain distinguishing, prototypic features to benoted. Thus, methodologies encompassed by the empiricist-quantitativeparadigm, steeped in the tradition of modernism and the natural sciences,have been characterized as positivistic, detached, acontextual, objective,atomistic, reductionistic, experimental, deterministic, nomothetic, and fo-

cused on explanation through discovering causal laws that are universaland hence generalizable. Methodologies encompassed by the hermeneutic-qualitative paradigm, fed by the twin tributaries of humanistic psychologyand postmodernism, have been depicted as postpositivistic, participatory,

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contextual, subjective, constructive, holistic, agentive, experiential, phe-nomenological, idiographic, and focused on understanding through inter-preting personal meanings embedded in actual lived experiences of being-

in-the-world.A unifying psychotherapeutic paradigm, to be considered at all viable,would need to include among its foundational bases a framework thatvalues as equally legitimate and important the distinctly different ways ofknowing (Messer, 1992, p. 149) afforded by these divergent methodolog-ical paradigms. At one level this clearly points to the practical solution ofmethodological pluralism, which has frequently been proposed by otherswith an interest in creating greater unification among diverse approaches topsychological science (e.g., Downing, 2000; Messer, 1992; Polkinghorne,

1983; Safran & Messer, 1997; Yanchar & Slife, 1997). Though not alwayscharacterized as such, this solution to the issue of methodological diversityrepresents another vivid application of the dialectical method.

Yanchar and Slife (1997) presented a beautifully clear explanation ofthe rationale for and benefits of methodological pluralism:

methodological pluralism would allow for more comprehensive understandings ofpsychological phenomena. Many contend that the use of a single investigativemethod fails to provide a full account of psychological life. This is because allmethods presumably come attuned to certain aspects of reality, while being blind to

other aspects of reality (Howard, 1983; Polkinghorne, 1983; Slife & Williams, 1995).For example, a qualitative method, which captures peoples phenomenologicalexperience, cannot provide detailed information regarding the biological correlatesof such experience. At least two distinct types of method would be required toprovide an account that incorporated both phenomenology and biology. In thissense, scientists who use a methodological pluralism could provide a more com-prehensive account of psychological phenomena by using a set of diverse methodsthat provide multiple profiles of psychological life. A more comprehensive accountcould presumably be rendered as different profiles were combined into a coherentpicture that did not omit crucial details. Therefore, the value of methodologicalpluralismindeed, the genuine strength of methodological pluralismlies in itsability to provide such diverse profiles of psychological life and to join them into an

integrated whole (Polkinghorne, 1983; see also Bryman, 1984; Denzin, 1978). (p. 246)

Recently, Sternberg and Grigorenko (2001) articulated an approach tothe unification of psychology in which methodological pluralism lies at thevery core. Referred to as unified psychology (p. 1069), the latter entailsthe multiparadigmatic, multidisciplinary, and integrated study of psycho-logical phenomena through converging operations (p. 1069). In turn, theconcept of converging operations refers to the use of multiple methodol-ogies for studying a single psychological phenomenon or problem (p.

1071). In elaborating this concept, Sternberg and Grigorenko (2001) ech-oed facets of Yanchar and Slifes (1997) characterization of methodologicalpluralism cited above, but in terms that bring another important nuance ofunderstanding to the value of this methodological strategy:



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The basic idea is that any one operation is, in all likelihood, inadequate for thecomprehensive study of any psychological phenomenon. The reason is that anymethodology introduces biases of one kind or another, often of multiple kinds.By using multiple converging methodologies (i.e., converging operations) for the

study of a single psychological phenomenon or problem, one averages over sourcesof bias. (p. 1071)

Deploying methods associated with both empiricist-quantitative andhermeneutic-qualitative paradigms as converging operations in order todevelop more comprehensive and unified understandings is but one level ofa solution to methodological diversity. Equallyand perhaps even morechallenging to a broadening endorsement of methodological pluralism arefundamental epistemological issues (see, e.g., Anchin, 2008; Downing,2000, 2004; Polkinghorne, 1983; Safran & Messer, 1997; Yanchar & Slife,1997). Intricately tied to distinctly different ontological positions, the em-piricist-quantitative and hermeneutic-qualitative paradigms, apart from thespecifics and intricacies of their respective sets of methodologies, embodyopposed foundational assumptions as to what constitutes legitimate andmeaningful knowledge about human beings and different criteria for eval-uating the scientific admissibility of any given knowledge claim. The pros-pects of cohesively interrelating the very diverse kinds of knowledgeproduced by empiricist-quantitative and hermeneutic-qualitative method-ologies is enhanced to the extent that these significant epistemologicaldifferences are reconciled.

Different pathways to such reconciliation have in fact been proposed.For example, as summarized by Yanchar and Slife (1997), one directionsuggested by some entails development of an indigenous epistemologythat, tailored to the distinct nature of psychological phenomena and knowl-edge, would offer a metalevel set of rules for evaluating all knowledgeclaims, eventually allowing for the accumulation, and perhaps integration,of data collected with different methods (Polkinghorne, 1983) (p. 247).

While a compelling direction of epistemological development, Yancharand Slife (1997) pointed out that advances in this direction have not beenparticularly strong and in fact, some argue that this work will never bebrought to fruition (e.g., Koch, 1993; Sugarman, 1992; Wertheimer, 1987)(p. 247). Moreover, others contend that the development of an indigenousepistemology will not be possible without more fundamental and, in somecases, extratheoretical, considerations (e.g., Yanchar & Kristensen,1996b) (p. 247). An alternative direction is that of epistemological plu-ralism intimately tied to dialectical thinking (Anchin, 2008; Downing, 2000,

2004), wherein an investigator of psychotherapy and its related fieldsapproaches those domains of study and makes methodological decisionsand choices undergirded by a dialectical epistemic position that recognizesthe merits and the blindspots of each paradigms premises as to what

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constitutes legitimate, meaningful, and valid knowledge. However, thisrationally appealing alternative, as Downing (2000) pointed out, is coun-terposed by formidable obstacles (p. 269) of a cognitive, emotional, and

experiential nature, issues that he goes on to address in a most thought-provoking manner.A highly creative analysis by R. Elliott (2008) provided epistemic

justification for methodological pluralism through a uniquely differentapproach to bringing together the distinct contributions offered by empir-icist-quantitative and hermeneutic-qualitative ways of knowing. Usingvarious methods of conceptual analysis (e.g., Lakoff and Johnsonslinguistic metaphor analysis), Elliott carefully deconstructed and delin-eated the meanings of several key epistemological verbsthat is, verbs of

Knowing (p. 43)specifically describing, interpreting, explaining,and understanding. Elliotts findings with regard to the latter two verbsare highlighted here because of their particular centrality in differentiatingbetween empiricism and hermeneutics; his summarization only hints at theilluminating nature of his analyses: [A]re Explaining and Understandingfundamentally different ways of Knowing? Yes, they differ in structure(mediated vs. direct knowledge), direction (toward general simplicity vs.unique complexity), and effect (constructing a conceptual model vs. creat-ing a relationship) (p. 40). As Elliott made explicitly clear in his discus-

sion, more deeply understanding and appreciating the richness and com-plexity of meanings actually encompassed by the verbs explaining andunderstanding makes it abundantly clear that both ways of knowing areessential to, and so can play complementary roles in, psychotherapyresearch.

Whatever shape it may take, a more coalescent epistemology seemsinstrumental to the methodological pluralism that would be integral to thedevelopment of a unifying psychotherapy paradigm. Groundedness in anepistemic position that embraces the value of empiricist-quantitative and

hermeneutic-qualitative ways of knowing provides a solid foundation for thendrawing, at an operational level, from both methodological paradigms withinthe context of pragmatic assessment of the research projectfor example, thespecific purposes of the investigation, the questions therefore being asked, andthe context within which the inquiry is being undertaken (see, e.g., Fishman,1999; Martin, 2000; Polkinghorne, 1983). In the fully liberated investigativeclimate intrinsic to methodological pluralism, researchers could thus under-take the creative development of different ways of combining specific empir-icist and hermeneutic methodologies or components of each in the service of

developing more comprehensive and unified understandings.R. Elliotts (2001, 2002) hermeneutic single-case efficacy design(HSCED) is one such illustration of a methodological synthesis of herme-neutic and empiricist ways of thinking and knowing. As summarized by R.



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Elliott (2001), HSCED uses a mixture of quantitative and qualitativeinformation to create a rich case record that provides positive and negativeevidence for the causal influence of therapy on client outcome (p. 317).

Hill and colleagues (Kasper, Hill, & Kivlighan, in press; Hill et al., inpress) two case studies of therapist immediacy, a metacommunicativeintervention entailing clienttherapist discussion and processing of theirhere-and-now relationship, provide additional illustrations of combiningempiricist and hermeneutic methodologiesspecifically as a scientific ap-proach to shedding more comprehensive light than either methodologyalone on a singular interventions processes, outcomes, and their interre-lationships (see Anchin, in press-a). Integrating single-case research, ele-ments of change process research, and both quantitative and qualitative

methods, the investigators undertake highly intensive analysis and concep-tual crystallization of both in-session client changes effected by differenttypes of therapist immediacy and how these changes may influence differ-entially assessed outcomes at postsession, termination, and follow-up.These studies by Elliott and by Hill and her colleagues demonstrate thatunification, at the level of methods, is a process of weaving togetherotherwise disparate epistemological and methodological elements, creatinga picture of what a more holistic clinical science and the nature of findingsit produces can entail, not least of which is an expansion and deepening of

the fields evidentiary knowledge base about a given interventions ef-fectsand effectiveness (Anchin, in press-a).

BIOPSYCHOSOCIAL SYSTEMS METATHEORY: A

FRAMEWORK FOR A UNIFYING PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC

PARADIGM

These are but three of the inviting tasks, patterned after those of Staats(1991), necessary for developing an increasingly unified body of therapeu-tically related psychological knowledge, and from my perspective, thesedirections respect plurality while trying to consolidate it in ways thatenhance its value and impact. Looking down the road and thinking of theseand other routes as converging pathways, I offer some speculations as tothe shape that this emerging unifying paradigm may take and bring intosharper detail certain of its major defining features and their implications.

For a number of reasons, I believe that over time a paradigm that

emerges as unifying the field of psychotherapy will partially incorporatesome variation or descendant of general systems theory (von Bertalanffy,1968) integrated with the biopsychosocial model of human health andillness (cf. Anchin, 2003a; Engel, 1980; Kiesler, 1999; Magnavita, 2005;

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Millon & Davis, 1996; Schwartz, 1988). This projection is anchored in theview that unifying knowledge in any field of endeavor requires metatheorycomprising a conceptual scaffolding that is sufficiently broad to encompass

all of the specific knowledge domains distinctly pertinent to the field underconsideration, that can serve as a coherent framework for systematicallyinterrelating the essential knowledge elements within and among thosedomains, and that extends conceptual tendrils into other fields of study.Henriques (2003) stressed these points in discussing the insufficiency ofrecent approaches to unifying psychology as a whole:

[C]urrent unified approaches have failed not because they have been too generalbut because they have not been general enough. What is needed is a metatheo-retical framework that crisply defines the subject matter of psychology, demon-strates how psychology exists in relationship to the other sciences, and allows oneto systematically integrate the key insights from the major perspectives in a mannerthat results in cumulative knowledge. (p. 152)

For the field of psychotherapy, systems theory integrated with thebiopsychosocial model forges a metatheoretical paradigm containinghighly heuristic capacities for serving these unifying functions (cf.Schwartz, 1988), and in the context of those unifying processes, for givingrise to ever more potent strategies, principles, and methods of therapeuticintervention (see Anchin & Magnavita, 2006).

As discussed elsewhere (Anchin, 2002, 2003a), foundational to systemstheory is an all-inclusive, holistic conception of the human being that at oneand the same time embraces the multilevel structural complexity of humanpersonality and yet the inherently unified manner in which this structurefunctions within the contextual circumstances at hand. The biopsychosocialmodel of health and illness comprehensively defines the composition of thisintegrated complexity. It encompasses and delineates the multiple andintricately constituted subsystems, from microlevels to macrolevels, that inthoroughly interdependent fashion comprise the individual qua living sys-

tem: in the biological domain, genetic, anatomical, physiological, and bio-chemical subsystems; in the psychological domain, cognitive, affective, andmotivational subsystems, each of whose constitutive processes occur alonga continuum of awareness ranging from acute consciousness to thorough-going unconsciousness; and in the social domain, the verbal/linguistic sub-system of speech and the overt behavioral subsystem, which is itself com-posed of multiple nonverbal channels. Further, the social domain of thebiopsychosocial model underscores that events occurring within andamong all of the aforementioned subsystems continuously spin out in

relation to and are reciprocally interpenetrated by an individuals socialsurround, a multiplex environment that is itself a domain of systems-within-systems (e.g., dyadic, familial, community, cultural groups, society).This biopsychosocial systems framework also integrates the vibrant domain



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of subjective experience, the very lifeblood of human personality in itsindividual and social journey through the vicissitudes of the life span.Providing a valuable gateway into the integrated complexity of the biopsy-

chosocial system, the experiential, phenomenological dimension is by nomeans isomorphic with any of the biopsychosocial subsystems, but rather itis the felt coalescence of simultaneously operative and interactive biologi-cal, cognitive, affective, motivational, verbal, and behavioral subsystems asthese proceed vis-a-vis the individuals ecological, social environmentalcircumstances.2 In thus incorporating subjective experience within its pur-view, systems theory concurrently integrates essential phenomena thatinfuse the realm of personal subjectivity, for example, intentionality, pur-pose, and meaning (cf. Krippner, Ruttenber, Engelman, & Granger, 1985).

Interrelationship and Process as Unifying Principles

Fused with this biopsychosocial rendering of human functioning and itscontinuous experiential concomitants, general systems theorys capacity toserve as a unifying paradigm for psychotherapy is ontologically and epis-temologically undergirded by two key principles: the irreducibility of in-terrelationship and its manifestation in process.

A core postulate of systems theory is the interrelatedness that existsamong all of the subsystems comprising any given living system, such thatthe prodigious array of variables comprising the human organisms biopsy-chosocial matrix is viewed as thoroughly interconnected and reciprocallyinteractive through a highly complex network of relationships (Capra,1996, p. 37). Inextricably related, the qualities that manifest at the level ofthe whole (the system level) (Schwartz, 1988, p. 308) emerge, not from theproperties of the individual subsystems themselves, but rather from thepatterns of organization (also called structures) (Polkinghorne, 1983,

p. 144) that characterize this network of interrelationships. Schwartz(1988), pointing out that these emergent properties are ubiquitous innature (Miller, 1978) (p. 308), illustrated their interrelational foundations:

The classic example of emergent properties concerns the individual properties ofhydrogen and oxygen as atoms versus the unique properties that emerge whenhydrogen and oxygen unite and become the molecular system we call water. Theunique properties of water expressed as a liquid at room temperature cannot bepredicted by studying the behavior of hydrogen and oxygen independently (i.e.,

2 Anticipating the key systems concept ofemergence discussed in the next section, recent

formulations of consciousness as an emergent property are highly convergent with thisconception of ones experiential phenomenology as a felt coalescence (see, e.g., Silberstein,2001).

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ununited) as separate gases at room temperature. The unique behaviors of wateronly emerge when hydrogen and oxygen interact in such a way as to become aunified, organized chemical system. (pp. 308309)

Extrapolating to the psychotherapeutic context, the manner in whichphenomena emerge holistically from patterns of interaction among sub-systems and their specific properties can be clinically illustrated by thehighly unpleasant subjective impact experienced by a therapist vis-a-vis anenraged borderline patient. Experienced at a particular moment in asession, that felt reaction is a rapidly emergent phenomenon that emanates,not from the separate and independent qualities of the patients accusatorycontent at the verbal subsystem level, excessively high volume and shrilltone at the paralinguistic level, piercing gaze, or the patients hand abruptly

slapping the desk, but rather from the commixture of all of these propertieswithin the form of a unified enactment (Anchin, 2002; Frank, 2002).Similarly, the rage fueling this enactment is an emergent property arisingfrom rapid-fire interaction between the patients biochemically linked af-fective irritability, a series of statements just made in a certain tone of voiceby the therapist, the patients cognitive construal of and consequent mean-ings attributed to those statements, and within these mutually interactivecontexts, the patients self-defensive interpersonal motivations. Each ofthese events is necessary, but not sufficient, to trigger rage; it takes the

multiple interactions among them to spark the experience and expressionof that volatile emotional state. From a biopsychosocial systemic perspec-tive, then, comprehensively understanding events and properties charac-terizing a given subsystem during a given segment of time (e.g., content andfeatures characterizing an individuals cognitive or affective or behavioralsubsystem) necessitates grasping the nature of its dynamic interrelation-ships with events characterizing other subsystems comprising the biopsy-chosocial matrix. In turn, networks of interaction among all of thesesubsystems give rise to the qualities expressed at the level of the whole.

Characteristics of both any selected subsystem of the biopsychosocialsystem and of the system as a whole can thus also be seen to be thoroughlycontextual in nature. Capra (1996) pointed out that such contextualthinking (p. 37) is one of the great strand[s] of systems thinking (p. 42).However, the latter goes on to indicate that there is another strand ofequal importance . . . . [T]his second strand is process thinking (Capra,1996, p. 42). Thus, while, as noted above by Polkinghorne (1983), patternsof organized interrelationship among subsystems can be conceptualized asstructures, it is important to also bear in mind that in systems thinking

every structure is seen as the manifestation of underlying processes(Capra, 1996, p. 42). That is, the organized configuration of relationshipsamong subsystems and their specific features (e.g., a particular, integratedconfiguration of self-referential beliefs, mood, and overt interpersonal



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actions) that can be mapped as having a particular structure unfolds, in realtime, as a fluid process of interwoven multivariate activity. This principaldimension of systemic understanding is well expressed in the form of a

recommendation offered by Fay (1996) as one among 12 theses summingup his compelling multicultural philosophy of science (p. 241):

Think processurally, not substantively (that is, think in terms of verbs, not nouns). Include time as a fundamental element in all social entities. See movementtransformation, evolution, changeeverywhere. Much social thought reifies activi-ties and processes, turning them into things with fixed identities: the self or thissociety or culture are treated as objects with definitive boundaries and essentialstructure . . . . But social and psychological entities are activities, not things. Con-sequently, they are better described by means of verbs rather than nouns. We talkof human beings as if they were entities like stones, and not continuous processesof activityforgetting that being is a gerund, and that it refers to an ongoing

process. (p. 242)

These conceptions underscore the enormous network of multivariateinterrelationships and processes encompassed by the biopsychosocial sys-tems paradigm, which in its integrated-subsystems composition has suffi-cient metaconceptual breadth to encompass the vast plurality of phenom-ena, ranging from microlevels to macrolevels, differentially mappedandto varying degrees empirically substantiatedby current theoretical mod-els. Importantly, however, the biopsychosocial systems framework does not

specify in an a priori way the specific terminology and concepts for map-ping those subsystems, operating instead as a metatheoretical frameworkthat serves an organizing function. To the extent that an increasinglyinterconnected body of psychotherapeutically related knowledge develops,casting this within a biopsychosocial systemic framework thus seems all themore logical. The latter provides this unifying framework without theexclusionary processes that place constraints on the ontology of psycho-therapy. Moreover, in spotlighting as a core postulate the intrinsic inter-relatedness of phenomena that in real time is manifested in processural

fashion, the biopsychosocial systems paradigm, in its basic epistemology, isisomorphic with the philosophy of unification, which fundamentally re-volves around showing that phenomena are interwoven.

Biopsychosocial Interrelationships and Processes: Insights From

Cybernetics, Chaos Theory and Their Synthesis

A paradigm explicitly constructed out of the fusion of the biopsycho-

social model with specific concepts and principles of systems theory notonly creates an organizing framework for systematically interrelating ac-cumulating knowledge about biological, psychological, and social sub-systems in relation to personality, psychopathology, and psychotherapy. It

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also points to directions for unified clinical theory and research built uponsystemically based insights into different types of dynamics characterizingthose biopsychosocial interrelationships and processes. Currently those

insights derive especially from cybernetics and chaos theory, two majorschools of systems thinking. Although each approach encompasses differ-ent emphases, their common ground is the study of nonlinear dynamicalsystems, and while these can involve nonliving natural systems (e.g.,weather patterns), the human biopsychosocial system constitutes the mostelaborate living nonlinear dynamical system.

Most fundamentally, a dynamical system is anything that moves,changes, or evolves in time (Williams, 1997, p. 11), while the nonlinear-ity of such a system denotes that the latters variations through time and

during a demarcated segment of time emerge from the unfolding of com-plex nonlinear interconnections and processes among its components orsubsystems. Nonlinearity as it pertains to interrelationships and processesis characterized by several dimensions. Among these is magnitude of effect,wherein, in a nonlinear interconnection, the relationship between twothings is not always proportional (e.g., an increase in X does not necessarilymean a proportional increase or decrease in Y) (Goerner, 1995, p. 5); so,for instance, a very small increase in X (e.g., the dosage level of a psych-otropic) may produce a very large increase in Y (e.g., degree of improve-

ment in the patients mood). In contrast, linearity is marked by propor-tionality in the magnitude of effect: A small change in X produces aproportionately small change in Y, while a large change in X produces aproportionately large change in Y.

Linearity and nonlinearity can also be differentiated in terms of direc-tionality of influence. As elaborated by Lasser and Bathory (1997), a linearrelationship is characterized by a unidirectional flow of causal influencebetween two variables: X (e.g., a particular motive) affects Y (e.g., enact-ment of a specific interpersonal action), and Y may then affect Z (e.g., thefeeling engendered in the interpersonal recipient of that action), but thedirection of influence is always one way. By contrast, in a nonlinearrelationship variables are characterized by bidirectional, or mutual,causation. Goerner (1995), using the word interdependence (p. 5) tocapture this reciprocal influence process, gave some flavor for the typesof interdependence that can transpire in a nonlinear dynamical system;by extrapolation, her depiction also begins to sketch out the diversekinds of interrelationships within, between, and among specific biolog-

ical, psychological, and social subsystems, however conceptually typolo-gized, that a unifying body of psychotherapeutically related knowledgewould seek to capture when guided by a nonlinear, dynamical, biopsy-chosocial systems paradigm:



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Interdependence can be (1) instantaneous, as in X and Y affect each other; (2)circular, as in X affects Y, which affects Z, which affects X; (3) self-reflexive, as inX affects itself; or (4) networked, where X, Y, and Z have complex interrelationships.Interdependence ties to concepts such as feedback, circular causality, recursion, and

self-reflexivity. (Goerner, 1995, p. 5)

The imposing complexity of the biopsychosocial systems nonlinearprocesses is further underlined by the fact that these different types ofinterdependence, and still others that may exist, are also all. . . happeningat the same time (van Gelder & Port, 1995, p. 23) because of multiplesimultaneous interactions (p. 23).

Against this backdrop, cybernetics and chaos theory key in on partic-ular facets of human biopsychosocial nonlinear dynamics that constitutevaluable directions for unified study and understanding that also containimportant therapeutic implications. As elaborated elsewhere (Anchin,2003a), cybernetics concentrates on the fundamentally goal-directed andpurposive nature of living systems, and within that organic teleologicalcontext (cf. Rychlak, 1988; Mundale & Bechtel, 1996), on how systemsregulate themselves in the service of effectively steering toward their aims,goals, or preferred states. Broadly speaking, an individuals goals at a givenpoint in time may range anywhere from achieving or maintaining a steadystate of functional and experiential equilibrium to effecting radical change,or they may entail attaining desired states falling anywhere in betweenthese two poles.3 However, the point to be emphasized in the presentcontext is that to succeed in attaining his or her goals, whatever they maybe, it is a sine qua non that an individual must have a way of regulatinghimself or herself.

Feedback loops, the prototypic embodiment of nonlinear interrelation-ships among variables (cf. Richardson, 1991), are fundamental to thisself-regulatory process. These loops operate continuously as an individualrecursively gauges his or her current status in relation to a desired goalstate, discerns from that informational feedback differences that may existbetween the current and desired state, and institutes self-corrective actionsto the extent that deviations are occurring. Still more specifically, self-regulation in the service of goal attainment characteristically requires an

3 Certainly a more elaborate characterization of the intentional, goal-oriented nature of

human functioning is possible. Ford and Nichols (1987), for example, presented a highlyinclusive and detailed taxonomy of human goals broadly categorized into desired within-person consequences (p. 295), further differentiated into various affective, cognitive, and

subjective organization goals, and desired person-environment consequences (p. 295),differentiated, in turn, into an array of social relationship and task goals. Moreover, as Winell

(1987) elaborated, goals are multidimensional (e.g., range of time/generality, active/inactive,and rational/irrational), and they are often hierarchically organized in ways that change overtime.

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interplay between negative and positive feedback loops, the former damp-ening (i.e., reducing or diminishing) interconnected biopsychosocial sub-system processes that have the potential to inhibit or otherwise derail the

individuals movement toward a desired state, the latter amplifying (i.e.,augmenting or intensifying) interrelated multisubsystem processes thatfoster effective goal-directed movement. By virtue of shifting loop dom-inance (Richardson, 1991, p. 34), an unfolding goal-oriented process mayat times be dominated by a positive (amplifying) feedback loop and atother times by a negative (dampening) feedback loop, while during otherperiods, variously paced oscillations between positive and negative loopsmay transpire, underscoring the dynamic character of self-regulatory pro-cesses as complex biopsychosocial systems, for example, individuals, dyads,

or families, pursue their respective teleologic agendas within changingenvironments and circumstances.The emphasis placed on self-regulation by the cybernetics branch of

systems thinking is valuable in shedding light on dynamic processes offeedback-mediated synchronization among biological, psychological, andsocial subsystems within the context of holistic human purposiveness.However, because cybernetics is historically rooted in the study of thestructure and functioning of closed, mechanical systems, an exclusivelycybernetics systems conception of the human biopsychosocial system pre-

sents a picture of the latter skewed in the direction of well-ordered pro-cesses and the maintenance of systemic stability, even as the system pur-sues its goals. Chaos theory decisively balances this orderly picture of thehuman biopsychosocial system. A field that has exploded across the scien-tific landscape over the past 2025 years, chaos theory teaches thatinstability and disorder are. . .widespread in nature (E. Elliott & Kiel,1996, p. 2) and indeed intrinsic to natural nonlinear dynamical systems.However, as chaos theory also emphasizes, within such irregularity anddisequilibrium lie the potent seeds of highly formative transformational

processes that increase complexity and thereby systemic adaptability,growth, and development (see, e.g., Barton, 1994; Mahoney, 1991;Mahoney & Moes, 1997).

Applied specifically to the human biopsychosocial system, chaos the-ory takes as its starting point the limited but persistent fluctuation thatoccurs in the familiar and more or less predictable patterns of interrela-tionship among biopsychosocial subsystems and the environment that char-acterize personality structure and functioning during steady states. Phe-nomenologically, steady states are those periods in our lives where we feel

that we know ourselves (Butz & Chamberlain, 1998, p. 24), an emergentexperience spawned by the prevailing stability in our biopsychosocialstructural integrity, functional capacities, and subjectivity. Steady states,however, are not static. At any given moment in time, a steady state is also



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characterized by variation and flux; for example, neurotransmitter levels,moods, intensity of motivations, thoughts about self and others, socialsystem events, actions relative to those social contexts, and subjective

experience vary, shift, and change. There is, as Gleick (1987) put it,a delicate balance between the forces of stability and the forces ofinstability (p. 309). Mahoney (1991) conveyed a parallel idea in differentterms: Living systems like ourselves exist as dynamic tensions of equili-brating (balancing or ordering) and disequilibrating (unbalancing ordisordering) processes (p. 419). To no small extent, this is an organicdialectical process hardwired into the very stuff of the human biopsycho-social system.

The insights of chaos theory sharply illuminate developments when

this delicate balance and dynamic tension is upset. The triggering precip-itant may be one or more of the endogenous subsystem fluctuations alludedto above, for example, steady intensification of a certain affective statefostered by an interrelated and recurring self-referential cognitive thread,which may itself be tied to the individuals transition into a particulardevelopmental stage. Or particular perturbations in the system may bekicked off or exacerbated by exogenous factors, for example, a psychoso-cial stressor of sudden onset or one that has been ongoing but whoseintensity is now rapidly increasing. Whatever the initiating source or

sources, the essentially stable biopsychosocial patterning that characterizesa steady state may become disrupted and the individual can shift into thepivotal, increasingly disequilibrial phase denoted by the concept of chaos.

Providing a pivotal link between cybernetics thinking and chaos the-ory, Richardson (1991, pp. 308313) speculated as to the role played byshifting dominance of feedback loops in the development of chaos, andProskauer and Butz (1998) provided an explanation in precisely thoseterms. Substitute the phrase biopsychosocial system for family system in thefirst sentence of the following quotation, and their analysis of the powerful

effects of unimpeded dominance by positive feedback loops has resoundingpertinence for how an individual may move from order into chaos:

Positive feedback can greatly amplify the impact of small disturbances on systembehavior, but this effect is highly dependent on the relative strength of the negativefeedback elements that maintain the stability of the family system. More precisely,the deviation-amplifying effects of positive feedback create an accelerating changeprocess whenever a critical variable (or combination of variables) deviates beyonda threshold defined by the limits of the systems capacity to maintain its steady state.Once positive feedback becomes relatively strong, the stability of a system is fragile.After a critical threshold is crossed, the accelerating change process can quicklyproliferate throughout the system, drastically altering its usual characteristics . . . .

(Proskauer and Butz, 1998, p. 195)

These drastic alterations in usual characteristicsthat is, in thesteady state of stable personality structure and functioningmay entail

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disturbances of varying intensities, frequencies, and durations in any com-bination of biological, cognitive, affective, motivational, behavioral, orsocialinterpersonal processes, including the nature of impacts on and

reciprocal overt reactions of others. Collectively, however, this period ofdistinct upheaval in the biopsychosocial system defines a chaotic phase:disruption, disorder, confusion, and irregularity (Chamberlain, 1998, p.11). Importantly, however, and essential to the technical meaning of chaos,within this structural, functional, and phenomenological disorder in thebiopsychosocial system, patterning emerges, giving what we construe to bedifferent psychopathologies their distinct form, shape, and character. Andyet, with the individual in a phase of marked flux, the door to significantchange has also opened. As well depicted by Perna and Masterpasqua

(1997), systems in chaos are in a phase of maximum probability, meaningthat basic structural change in the system is more likely here and thatdevelopment could follow any one of many trajectories. To anthropomor-phize, a system in chaos takes the stance I dont know. It is thus open toany number of evolutionary paths (p. 9).

For a given individual, the prospective paths emerging from a chaoticphase are not wholly predictable, but among them, chaos theory highlightsa living systems inherent, adaptive capacity to engage in self-restructuringprocesses to create a new, more differentiated and hence complex pattern

of organization. Indeed, self-organization has emerged as perhaps thecentral concept in the systems view of life, and like the concepts offeedback and self-regulation, it is linked closely to networks (Capra, 1996,p. 83). Self-generating new order out of chaos, reorganization of thebiopsychosocial system is a holistic process of personality growth anddevelopment, entailing intertwined structural changes throughout the webof relationships that bind biological, psychological, and social subsystemsinto a coherent unity. And as these interrelated changes and their moreconstructive consequences transpire, different subjective states are surely

experienced. When this process of unified restructuring occurs in optimaldirections, a healthier, more adaptive and resilient individual emerges,entering a new steady state in which he or she is capable of assimilatingperturbations like the ones that initiated [his or her] transformation (aswell as others not yet encountered) (Mahoney, 1991, p. 419). However,Mahoney (1991) also made the vital point that emerging from a chaoticphase with a healthier personality structure is not inevitable: [S]omesystems will settle into a less viable structure and suffer the consequences . . . .Some systems will lack the capacities, resources, or good fortune to sustain

a successful transformation, in which case they will struggle (chronically)and/or degenerate in the process (p. 419).Chaos theory deploys a number of specific concepts that capture with

greater detail the intricacies of these nonlinear dynamical processes that



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characterize a living systems progression from a steady state encompassingpersistent fluctuation amid stability, the movement into chaos, the nature ofthe chaotic phase itself, the transition out of chaos through self-organizational

processes that optimally breed new, higher-order structures and system-wide organizational patterning, through settling into a new steady statecharacterized by greater complexity and adaptability. Illustrative key in-terrelational concepts include sensitive dependence on initial conditions,far-from-equilibrium conditions, transitional states, unpredictability,strange attractors, bifurcations, structural coupling, and irreversibility (see,e.g., Barton, 1994; Chamberlain, 1998; Kossman & Bullrich, 1997). Thepoint that I underscore here is that, applied to the human biopsychosocialsystem, the consistent referents for all of these highly heuristic concepts are

differential types of nonlinear interactive dynamics within and amongbiological, psychological, and social structures and processes during par-ticular segments of time, thus mapping nonlinear systemic processesthrough which an individual develops, grows, and changes in a holistic,unified way.

In my view, insights and principles of cybernetics and chaos theoryconstitute complementary branches of systems thinking. When synthe-sized, they encompass essential phases of a comprehensive unifying frame-work for understanding human structure, functioning, and process during

periods of psychological health, disorder, and transitions between them.Briefly, during the essential stability characterizing steady states, an indi-vidual engaging in the day-to-day business of life is not just functioning, butfunctioning with intentionality, moving his or her life on a daily basis indirections oriented by pursuing immediate, short-term, and long-term de-sired states and consequences and experiencing in the process the varyingdegrees of gratification, purpose, and meaning in life that derive therefrom(Anchin, 2003a; Yalom, 1980). Integral to such periods, the individual isengaging, on the whole, in effective self-regulation. That is, despite con-

tinuous fluctuations of varying magnitudes in the dynamic biopsychosocialmatrix, processes within and among different subsystem domains are beingsufficiently well managed and synchronized through the interplay of posi-tive and negative feedback loops, the former promoting interconnectedbiological, psychological, and social processes that facilitate effectivemovement toward attaining desired states and goals, and the latter inhib-iting or reducing processes that tend to derail and otherwise impedeeffective goal pursuit.

But alas, during the course of a given period of steady state function-

ing, there inevitably arise stronger-than-usual impediments or disruptionsto effectively regulating varying combinations of biopsychosocial processesessential to goal attainment, whether due to principally endogenous factorsor due to exogenous factorsalthough, given the nature of nonlinear

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causality, the emergence of either type of disturbance is likely derivativefrom complex interactions. This process of disturbance, stimulating grow-ing turbulence in heretofore stable biopsychosocial structuralization,

functioning, and experience, heightens the difficulty of effective self-regulation and in turn effective pursuit of desired states and consequences.This configuration may mark the beginning of movement into a chaoticstate. If the individual is unable to sufficiently generate dampening nega-tive feedback processes, whether from within (e.g., coping self-statements;psychological defenses; mindfulness; methods of relaxation) or throughdrawing on external resources (e.g., input and support from significantothers; medication), the amplifications stemming from insufficiently op-posed positive feedback loops may escalate, progressively moving the

individual into the more intensified biopsychosocial disorder, symptom-atology, and subjective pain that compose a chaotic phase. From there,individual transformation may move in any number of directions, rangingfrom personal growth and development spawned by self-restructuringprocesses that create a more differentiated, complex, and resilient biopsy-chosocial structure, to sustaining structural impairments that result incompromised levels of functioning, negatively toned experiential concom-itants, and potentially more chronic sequelea.

It is during this critical time, when the individual is in the state of

maximum probability noted above, that psychotherapeutic processes andinterventions may wield their greatest potency for facilitating the move-ment of biopsychosocial restructuring in salutary directions. In develop-mental terms, the individual may be in what Vygotzky referred to as thezone of proximal development (see, e.g., Young, 1997, chaps. 5 & 6),interpretable as the accelerated pace or heightened level of developmentthat an individual is capable of when a developmental process is under-taken with the guidance and collaboration of a capable other, as opposedto the pace and level when undertaken independently. This timely inter-

section within the zone of proximal development between a high level ofindividual biopsychosocial disorder and disequilibrium (Mahoney &Moes, 1997, p. 186) and growth-promoting relational and interventionalprocesses may also constitute a unifying explanation for the robust findingby outcome research that the major positive effects of psychotherapy occurin the first six to eight sessions (Anchin, 2003b; Budman & Gurman, 1988).

Viewed through still a broader lens, such a rather rapid period ofsignificant growth and change may represent the therapeutic equivalent ofEldredge and Goulds (1972; Gould, 1989; Gould & Eldredge, 1979) sem-

inal, evolutionarily tied concept ofpunctuated equilibrium. Complementing(see, e.g., Mahoney, 1991, pp. 127128) the gradualism of Darwinian the-ory, which held that evolution occurs through a process of exceedinglyslow, continuous change, Eldredge and Goulds now widely accepted con-



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ception asserted that evolution can also occur through sudden, discontin-uous episodes of rapid transformation that punctuate prolonged periods ofequilibrium and stability. Chaos theoreticians within the psychological and

clinical sciences (e.g., Chamberlain, 1998; Goerner, 1995; Masterpasqua,1997) have discussed the pertinence of this concept for human develop-ment, growth, and change. Extrapolated specifically to the realm of psy-chotherapy, the latter may be construed as a process wherein patient andtherapist expeditiously capitalize on a naturalistically precipitated punc-tuation in the patients prior biopsychosocial equilibrium through ac-tive, collaborative work within the zone of proximal development torapidly effect healthier biopsychosocial restructuralization, functioning,and experience.

Implications of The Systems Paradigm For Unification-Oriented

Scientific Inquiry and Methodology

In key respects, scientific inquiry into personality, psychopathology,and psychotherapy guided by a systemic framework offers a sharp contrastto investigations embedded in the unidirectional causational model that

has long dominated psychological science. And in these differences liehighly pertinent methodological implications for the evolution of a unifyingpsychotherapeutic paradigm. Philosophical considerations provide a foun-dation for elaborating these differences.

In a discussion of metaphysical models that guide theory construction andthe nature of research across diverse areas of inquiry, Overton and Reese(1973) pointed out that application of a unidirectional model of causation isembedded in a mechanistic world view that, when applied to psychology,results in a reactive organism model of man [sic] (p. 69). In this view, persons

and machines are analogous: As with a machine, the individual is inherently atrest, becoming activated only when impinged upon by triggering forces. Ex-planations of human behavior thus adhere to the linearity concept: Since theperson is inherently inactive and a recipient of mobilizing forces, emittedbehaviors are equivalent to dependent variable effects that are explicable bylinking them to their independent variable causes. More specifically, theisolation of reliable causeeffect relationships is accepted as the necessary andsufficient form of causal explanation (cf. Bowers, 1973). Further, it is impor-tant to note that while the mechanistic/reactive model is equipped to meta-

theoretically handle the complexities of human behavior through interactioneffects uncovered by analysis of variance data approaches, the interaction isnot between cause and effect, but between causes . . . [and therefore] isconsistent with the mechanistic position (Overton & Reese, 1973, p. 78).

336 Anchin


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Overton (1985) succinctly encapsulated key elements of the approach toscientific inquiry that derive from the mechanistic/reactive model: The . . .research policy of this programor what Overton and Reese earlier re-

ferred to as corollary model issuesencourages practitioners of the pro-gram to work within a framework of elementaristic or reductionistic anal-ysis, to consider all change and organization as the product of contingentantecedent factors, and to represent all change as strictly additive orcontinuous in nature (p. 287).

It would be ludicrous to suggest that the mechanistic/reactive modeland its related research paradigm has been of limited value in our effortsto understand the vast complexities of psychotherapy and its intimatelyrelated domains of personality and psychopathology. In the same respect,

it would be thoroughly unrealistic to suggest that clinical researchers curtailapplication of traditional experimental methods in favor of newer meth-odological techniques. By the same token, it would be exceedingly impru-dent to deny what Cronbach (1957) recognized a half-century ago, namelythat methodology constrains both the kinds of questions that can be askedand the kinds of answers that can be provided. I know of no one who hasstated this issue more eloquently than Bowers (1973) in his assertion thatthe wedding of method and metaphysics can conspire against the veryreality of phenomena that might otherwise have some claim to scientific

objectivity (p. 331).It is precisely in this respect that the systems paradigm calls intoquestion the continued dominance of the linear, mechanistic/reactivemodel and its attendant research program. Features and properties of thesystems approach correspond to an alternative metaphysical model, whichOverton and Reese (1973) referred to as the organismic model (cf.Schwartz, 1988, pp. 298299). In this model, the basic metaphor . . . is theliving organism, an organized whole. The whole is organic rather thanmechanical . . . (p. 69). Reflected in psychology in the active organism

model of man [sic] (p. 70), the individual is conceptualized as inherentlyand spontaneously active, the source of behaviors as opposed to beingmerely activated by triggering forces. Further, the organism and the envi-ronmentan environment far more often than not highly social in com-positionstand in a reciprocal relationship to one another, a conceptionthat implicitly embodies feedback and its processes of bidirectional, asopposed to unidirectional, causality. Accordingly, the term interactionassumes vitally different meaning in this alternative metaphysical model,referring not to the interdependency of causes but rather to mutual inter-

dependence between various parts or subsystems of the organism orbetween the organism, its subsystems, and the environment (p. 79). Trans-lated into its implications for scientific inquiry, the organismic model givesrise to a far different research program, one that encourages its practitio-



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ners to work within a holistic-analytic framework, to consider change andorganization as necessary and consequently open to a structure-functionanalysis, and to represent change as both continuous and discontinuous

(Overton, 1985, p. 288).The organismic model calls for expansion of the traditional linearresearch paradigm, which is not fully adequate to capture the interrela-tional, processural complexities of the human organism in its inherentlyunified biopsychosocial structuralization and functioning. Systemically ori-ented approaches to investigation are highly coordinate with this expandedresearch approach. For example Krippner (2001), indicating that chaoticsystems inquiry offers a fresh approach that is both process oriented andsteeped in evolutionary thought (p. 298), went on to explain that chaos

methodology shifts emphasis from linear relationships of cause and effectto more interactive approaches that stress the importance of definingpatterns, form, self-organization, and adaptive qualities of complex pro-cesses (p. 298). Gilgen (1995) explicitly articulated the unifying implica-tions that he envisioned as residing in this alternative methodology:

[R]ather than reducing the intricacies of a complex situation via experimentalrestrictions or statistical manipulations, one could design research projects thatrevealed the patterns of change that define the system. The thought occurred to methat psychologists could now study the whole elephant rather than mere bits andpieces. Such an approach to psychological inquiry is, of course, intrinsically inte-grative and may offer strategies for generating a truly comprehensive body ofpsychological knowledge. (pp. xvxvi)

Systemic methodologies by no means obviate the value and impor-tance of the traditional reductionistic linear approach to scientific inquiry,including its vital contributions to developing a unifying paradigm forpsychotherapy. As Barton (1994) crucially pointed out, the various meth-odologies, both linear and nonlinear, are mutually compatible, not contra-dictory. They can be used to study different aspects of a system, depending

on which is most appropriate for addressing the specific question at hand(pp. 1213). As in other contexts discussed above, there is a distinctlydialectical flavor to this perspective.

Scientific investigation of the psychother

Pursuing a Unifying Paradigm for Psychotherapy

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