ANTONIO CO VS ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVESG.R. Nos. 92191-92, 30 July 1991Gutierrez, Jr.,
J.
FACTS:Ong won the Congressional Election of Second District of
Northern Samar. The other electioneers were Balinquit and Co. The
two questioned the citizenship of Ong contending that he is not a
Filipino citizen before the House Electoral Tribunal. HRET decided
in favor of Ong and Balinquit and Co brought the petition to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:Whether or not Ong is a natural born Filipino
citizenship.
RULING:Yes, Ong is a natural born Filipino Citizen. Ong became a
Filipino Citizen through his mother and not through his father. It
is unnecessary to trace the citizenship of Ong to his father since
his father was already a Filipino citizen when he was born. The
citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine whether or
not the respondent chose to be a Filipino when he came of age. At
that time and up to thepresent, both mother and father were
Filipinos. Ongcould not have elected any other citizenshipunless he
first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of a
foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a problem of
election, there was no foreign nationality of his father which he
could possibly have chosen.
THE NOTTEBOHM CASE(Liechtenstein v. Guatemala)ICJ, 06 April
1955
FACTS:Nottebohm, born September 16, 1881, in Hamburg, Germany,
possessed German citizenship. Although he lived in Guatemala from
1905 until 1943 he never became a citizen of Guatemala. On October
9, 1939, Nottebohm applied to become a naturalized citizen of
Liechtenstein. The application was approved and he became a citizen
of Liechtenstein. He then returned to Guatemala on his
Liechtenstein passport and informed the local government of his
change of nationality. When he tried to return to Guatemala once
again in 1943 he was refused entry as an enemy alien since the
Guatemalan authorities did not recognize his naturalization and
regarded him as still German. It has been suggested that the timing
of the event was due to the recent entry of the United States and
Guatemala into the Second World War.
He was later extradited to the United States, where he was held
at an internment camp until the end of the war. All his possessions
in Guatemala were confiscated. After his release, he lived out the
rest of his life in Liechtenstein.
The Government of Liechtenstein granted Nottebohm protection
against unjust treatment by the government of Guatemala and
petitioned the International Court of Justice. However, the
government of Guatemala argued that Nottebohm did not gain
Liechtenstein citizenship for the purposes of international law.
The court agreed and thus stopped the case from continuing.
ISSUE:Whether or not the Liechtenstein may claim restitution and
compensation to the Government of Guatemala on behalf of Nottebohm
who was a citizen thereof.
RULING:Although the Court stated that it is the sovereign right
of all states to determine its own citizens and criteria for
becoming one in municipal law, such a process would have to be
scrutinized on the international plane where the question is of
diplomatic protection. The Court upheld the principle of effective
nationality, (the Nottebohm principle) where the national must
prove a meaningful connection to the state in question. This
principle was previously applied only in cases of dual nationality
to determine which nationality should be used in a given case.
In this case, Nottebohm had forfeited his German nationality and
thus only had the nationality of Liechtenstein. However, the Court
pointed out that he always retained his family and business
connections with Germany and that there is nothing to indicate that
his application for naturalization in Liechtenstein was motivated
by any desire to dissociate himself from the Government of his
country. There is thus the absence of any bond of attachment with
Liechtenstein, but there is a long-standing and close connection
between him and Guatemala, a link which his naturalization in no
way weakened. For these reasons the Court held the claim of
Liechtenstein to be inadmissible.NATIONALITY DECREES IN TUNIS AND
MOROCCOAdvisory Opinion of 7 February 1923 (Series B No. 4)
FACTS:A decree was promulgated by the Bey of Tunis which enacts
that: Every person born in the territory of the Kingdom of parents
one of whom was also born there is a Tunisian. The President of the
French Republic likewise issued a Decree which states that: Every
person born in the Regency of Tunis of parents of whom one who was
also born there is French. Similar legislation as introduced in
Morocco (French Zone).
The British Ambassador in Paris protested to the French
Government against the application to British subjects of the
decrees promulgated in Tunis and also stated that his Government
was unable to recognize that the decrees put into force in the
French Zone of Morocco ere applicable to persons entitled to
British nationality. The British Government then proposed to the
French that the matter should be referred to the Court. However the
French Government refused to submit the matter to arbitral or
judicial settlement, thus, the dispute as submitted to the Council
of the League of Nations.
ISSUE:Whether or not the dispute, international law, solely a
matter of domestic jurisdiction.
RULING:The exclusive jurisdiction of States embraces matters
which are not in principle regulated by international law. The
extent of this jurisdiction, which, in the opinion of the Court,
includes in principle, questions of nationality, varies with the
development of international relations; it is therefore a purely
relative question. Moreover, even as regards matters falling within
this domain, the right of a State to use its discretion may be
restricted by the effect of international obligations.
Nevertheless, a dispute, which, in principle, falls within the
domestic jurisdiction of a State, is not removed from that domain
simply because international engagements are invoked.
From this point of view, the Court considers the contention that
France enjoys in Tunis and Morocco the same exclusive right to
legislate on questions of nationality as in France itself, and that
the local sovereignty of the protected State in conjunction with
the public powers exercised by the protecting State may be
equivalent to full sovereignty. Thus, the Court arrives at the
conclusion that the dispute in question does not relate to a matter
which, by international law, is solely within the domestic
jurisdiction of France; the Council therefore is competent to deal
with the dispute laid before it by Great Britain regarding the
nationality decrees in Tunis and Morocco.
UNITED STATES VS WONG KIM ARK169 U.S. 649, 28 March 1898
FACTS:Wong Kim Ark was born in 1873 in San Francisco, California.
His parents were both Chinese immigrants and remained subjects of
the Chinese emperor while they lived in the United States. Ever
since he was born, Wong Kim Ark lived in California. Congress
passed the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, which denied citizenship
to any Chinese immigrants and did not allow any new immigrant
laborers to come from China until 1892. In 1890, Wong Kim Arks
parents returned to China. He visited them that same year, but came
back to San Francisco, recognized as a native-born citizen by the
U.S. Customs officials. In 1894, when he was 21 years old, he went
back to China to visit his parents again. In 1895, he attempted to
re-enter the United States, but U.S. customs officials denied his
entry, claiming this time that he was not a U.S. citizen.
ISSUE:Whether or not Wong Kim Ark is a U.S. citizen by birth.
RULING:Yes. The Chinese Exclusion Act was passed 14 years after the
Fourteenth Amendment, so it cannot possibly control the meaning of
the amendment. Justice Horace Gray wrote the opinion of the Supreme
Court, which stated that, the Act must be construed and executed in
subordination to the Fourteenth Amendment. The court held that the
government cannot deny citizenship to anyone born within the United
States, including Wong Kim Ark. Furthermore, if he was a citizen,
then the Chinese Exclusion Act could not apply to him. Wong Kim
Arks parents, in particular, were not engaged in any diplomatic or
official capacity in the United States at any time.
CASE CONCERNING BARCELONA TRACTION, LIGHT, AND POWER COMPANY,
LTDBelgium v. SpainJudgment of 05 February 1970 (ICJ)
FACTS:Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company, Ltd was a
corporation incorporated in Canada, with Toronto headquarters, that
made and supplied electricity in Spain. It had issued bonds to
non-Spanish investors, but during the Spanish Civil War, the
Spanish government refused to allow BTLP to transfer currency to
pay bondholders the interest they were due. In 1948 a group of
bondholders sued in Spain to declare that BTLP had defaulted on the
ground it had failed to pay the interest. The Spanish court allowed
their claim. The business was sold, the surplus distributed to the
bondholders, and a small amount was paid to shareholders. The
shareholders in Canada succeeded in persuading Canada and other
states to complain that Spain had denied justice and violated a
series of treaty obligations. However, Canada eventually accepted
that Spain had the right to prevent BTLP from transferring currency
and declaring BTLP bankrupt. Of the shares, 88 per cent were owned
by Belgians, and the Belgian government complained, insisting the
Spanish government had not acted properly. They made an initial
claim at the International Court of Justice in 1958, but later
withdrew it to allow negotiations. Subsequent negotiations broke
down, and a new claim was filed in 1962. Spain contended that
Belgium had no standing because BTLP was a Canadian company.
ISSUE:Whether or not the Belgium has the standing to represent
its citizens in their claim to BTLP.
RULING:The International Court of Justice held that Belgium had
no legal interest in the matter to justify it bringing a claim.
Although Belgian shareholders suffered if a wrong was done to the
company, it was only the company's rights that could have been
infringed by Spain's actions. It would only be if direct
shareholder rights (such as to dividends) were affected, that the
state of the shareholders would have an independent right of
action. It was a general rule of international law that when an
unlawful act was committed against a company, only the state of
incorporation of the company could sue, and because Canada had
chosen not to, this was the end. The idea of a "diplomatic
protection" of shareholders was unsound because it would create
confusion and insecurity in economic relations as shares are
'widely scattered and frequently change hands'. The court also said
that a state is bound to give the same legal protection to foreign
investments and nationals, either for natural or legal persons,
when it admits them to its territory.
ROBERTS CLAIMUnited States of America v. United Mexican States02
November 1926
FACTS:Harry Roberts is an American citizen who was arbitrarily
and illegally arrested by Mexican authorities, who held him
prisoner for a long time in contravention of Mexican law and
subjected him to cruel and inhumane treatment throughout the entire
period of confinement. He was imprisoned for nineteen (19) months.
Thus, the United States asks that an indemnity be paid by the
Government of Mexico in the sum of $17,650 for the wrongful
treatment, loss of income and attorneys fees of the accused.
ISSUE:Whether or not the Government of United States may claim
indemnity for the mistreatment done by another State to their
citizen.
RULING:Facts with respect to equality of treatment of aliens and
national may be important in determining the merits of a complaint
of mistreatment of an alien. But such equality is not the ultimate
test of the propriety of the acts of authorities in the light of
international law. That test is, broadly speaking, whether aliens
are treated in accordance with ordinary standards of civilization.
Thus, the treatment of Roberts would warrant an indemnity on the
ground of cruel and inhumane imprisonment.
Moreover, the respondent Government has not denied that, under
the Convention of September 8, 1923, acts of authorities of San
Luis Potosi may give rise claims against the Government of Mexico.
Thus, the Commission is of the opinion that claims can be
predicated on such acts.
LAURA M.B. ET AL CLAIMUnited States of America v. United Mexican
States16 November 1925
FACTS:The present claim is instituted by the United States of
America on behalf of Laura May Buffington Janes, individually, and
as guardian of her to minor children. This is made to claim for
losses and damages amounting to $25,000.00 for the murder of Byron
Everett Janes, an American citizen. It is alleged that the Mexican
authorities did not take proper steps to apprehend and punish the
perpetuator of the murder who is a citizen of Mexico.
ISSUE:Whether or not the claim will prosper.
RULING:The evidence presented by the claimant government
established lack of diligence of Mexican authorities in
apprehending the killer of American citizen. International awards
have held that, if a State shows serious lack of diligence in
apprehending and/or punishing culprits, its liability is a
derivative liability, assuming the character of some kind of
complicity with the perpetrator himself and rendering the State
responsible for the very consequences of the individuals
misdemeanor.
The present case is one of nonrepression. Thus, the
international delinquency in this case is separate from the private
delinquency of the culprit. The culprit is liable for having killed
or murdered an American national; the Government is liable for not
having measured up to its duty of diligently prosecuting and
properly punishing the offender. The culprit has transgressed the
penal code of his country; the State has transgressed a provision
of international law as to State duties.
B.E. CHATTIN CLAIMUnited States of America v. United Mexican
States23 July 1927
FACTS:This claim is made by the United States of America against
the United Mexican States on behalf of B.E. Chattin, an American
national. Chattin, an employee of Southern Pacific Railroad Company
of Mexico, was arrested on a charge of embezzlement. He was tried,
convicted and sentenced for two-year imprisonment but was released
from the jail as a consequence of disturbances caused by Madero
revolution. He then returned to the United States. It is alleged
that the arrest, the trial and the sentence were illegal, that the
treatment in jail as inhuman, and that Chattin as damaged to the
extent of $50,000.00, which amount Mexico should pay.
ISSUE:Whether or not the claim of USA will prosper considering
the fact that Chattin escaped from jail.
RULING:The Commission concluded that the treatment of Chattin
amounts to an outrage, to bad faith, to willful neglect of duty and
to an insufficiency of governmental action amounting to injustice
committed by Mexicos judiciary. Although the illegal arrest of
Chattin was not proven, the irregularity of court proceedings was
proven with reference to absence of proper investigations,
insufficiency of confrontations, withholding from the accused the
opportunity to know all of the charges brought against him, undue
delay of the proceedings, making the hearing in open court a mere
formality, and a continued absence of seriousness on the part of
the Court. Moreover, the Commission found that Chattin suffered
mistreatment in prison. Taking into consideration the above
circumstances that this is a case of direct governmental
responsibility and that Chattin, because of his escape, has stayed
in jail for eleven months instead of for two years, the Commission
allowed the USA in behalf of the claimant damages in the sum of
$5,000.00, without interest.
NORTH AMERICAN DREDGING CO. OF TEXAS CLAIMNorth American
Dredging Company of Texas (USA) v. United Mexican States31 March
1926
FACTS:This case is before this Commission on a motion of the
Mexican Agent to dismiss. It is put forward by the United States of
America on behalf of North American Dredging Company of Texas, an
American corporation, for the recovery of the sum of $233,523.30
with interest thereon, the amount of losses and damages alleged to
have been suffered by claimant for breaches of a contract for
dredging at the port of Salina Cruz. The contract was entered into
between the claimant and the Government of Mexico at Mexico City.
In their contract, specifically in Article 18, Calvo Clause was
incorporated by Mexico as an indispensable provision, not separable
from the other provisions of the contract, was subscribed to by the
claimant for the purpose of securing the award of the contract.
ISSUE:Whether or not the Commission cannot hear the case for the
claim is based on an alleged non-performance of contract
obligations and that the claimant has no right to submit any claims
connected with the contract to an international commission due to
the Calvo clause contained in the contract.
RULING:The Commission decided that the case as presented was not
within its jurisdiction. The Commissioners construe Article 18 of
the contract before the Commission in this case to mean that with
respect to all matters involving the execution, fulfillment, and
interpretation of that contract the claimant bound itself to
exhaust all remedies afforded under Mexican law by resorting to
Mexican tribunals or other duly constituted Mexican authorities
before applying to its own Government for diplomatic or other
protection, and that this article imposes no other limitation upon
any right of claimant.
It was further held that said provision in the contract was not
intended to and does not prevent claimant from requesting its
Government to intervene in its behalf diplomatically or otherwise
to secure redress for any wrong which it may heretofore have
suffered or may hereafter suffer at the hands of the Government of
Mexico resulting from a denial of justice, or delay of justice, or
any other violation by Mexico of any right which claimant is
entitled to enjoy under the rules and principles of international
law, whether such violation grows out of this contract or
otherwise. Therefore, the clause will not preclude his Government
from espousing, or the tribunal from considering, other claims
based on the violation of international law.
BANCO NACIONAL DE CUBA VS SABBATINO376 U.S. 398, 23 March
1964
FACTS:A contract to purchase Cuban sugar from a wholly owned
subsidiary of Compania Azucarera Vertientes-Camaquey de Cuba (CAV)
a corporation organized under Cuban law was made by Farr, Whitlock
& Co. (Farr) an American commodities broker. The CAV stock was
principally owned by United States residents. The agreement was for
Farr to pay for the sugar in New York upon the presentation of the
shipping documents. After this deal, a law was enacted in Cuba
which empowered the government to nationalize forcefully,
expropriation of property or enterprise in which American nationals
had an interest. Hence, the sugar which Farr had contracted was
expropriated from Compania Azucarera. Farr however entered into
contracts which was similar to the one made with CAV with the Banco
Para el Comercio de Cuba, which was an instrumentality of the
government. This was done by Farr in order to obtain consent from
the Cuban government before a ship carrying sugar could leave Cuba.
A bill of lading which was also an instrumentality of the Cuban
government was assigned by the bank to Banco Para el Comercio de
Cuba, who presented the bills and a sight draft as required under
the contract to Farr in New York in return for payment. After CAV
notified Farr of its claim to the proceeds as rightful owner of the
sugar, Farr refused the documents.
This action of Farr resulted in a court order which appointed
Sabbatino as receiver of CAVs New York assets and enjoined it from
removing the payments from the state. Based on the allegation of
the conversion of the bills of lading seeking to recover the
proceeds thereof from Farr and to enjoin Sabbatino, the receiver
from exercising dominion over such proceeds, the Banco Nacional
instituted this action. A summary judgment was granted against
Banco Nacional by the district court on the grounds that the Act of
State Doctrine does not apply when the foreign act in question is
in violation of international law. The court of appeals also upheld
this judgment.
ISSUE:Whether or not the Judiciary has the authority to examine
the validity of taking of property within its own territory by a
foreign sovereign even if the taking violated International
Law.
RULING:No. The judiciary, in line with the Act of State Doctrine
will not examine the validity of a taking of property within its
own territory by a foreign sovereign government recognized by this
country in the absence of international agreements to the contrary,
even if the taking violates customary international law. Even in a
situation whereby international law has been violated, the clear
implication of past cases is that the Act of State Doctrine is
applicable because the Act of State doctrine does not deprive the
courts of jurisdiction once acquire over a case. The damages of
adjudicating the propriety of such expropriation acts, regardless
of whether the State Department has it did in this case, asserted
that the act violated international law are too far-reaching for
the judicial branch to attempt. Hence the judgment of the court of
appeals is reverse and the case remanded back to the district
court.TEXACO OVERSEAS PETROLEUM CO. VS LIBYAInternational Arbitral
Award (1977)
FACTS:A decree to nationalize all Texacos rights, interest and
property in Libya was promulgated by Libya. This action of the
Libyan Government led Texaco to request for arbitration, but it was
refused by Libya. A sole arbitrator was however appointed by the
International Court of Justice on Texacos request, and Libya was
found to have breached its obligations under the Deeds of
Concessions and was also legally bound to perform in accordance
with their terms.
ISSUE:Whether or not a reference made to general principles of
law in the International Arbitration may be a sufficient criterion
for the internationalization of a contract.
RULING:Yes. Whenever reference is been made to general
principles of law in the international arbitration context, it is
always held to be a sufficient criterion for the
internationalization of a contract. The lack of adequate law in the
state considered and the need to protect the private contracting
party against unilateral and abrupt modifications of law in the
contracting state is a justification to the recourse to general
principles. Though international law involves subjects of a
diversified nature, legal international capacity is not solely
attributable to a state. A private contracting party, unlike a
state, has only a limited capacity and is limited to invoke only
those rights that he derives from his contract.
Applying Libyan law or international law in the arbitration
proceedings was a conflict encountered by in this case. Though the
contract itself deferred to Libyan law, the court noted that Libyan
law does not preclude the application of international law, but
that the two must be combined in order to verify that Libyan law
complies with international law. Even though the right of a state
to nationalize is recognized by international law, this right in
itself is not a sufficient justification not to regard its
contractual obligations.
CASE CONCERNING ELECTRONICA SICULA S.P.A (ELSI)United States of
America v. ItalyI.C.J. Rep. 1989, 20 July 1989
FACTS:On 6 February 1987, the United States filed an application
with the International Court of Justice instituting proceedings
against Italy in respect of a dispute arising out of the
requisitioning of the plant and assets of Raytheon-Elsi S.p.A, an
Italian company based in Sicily but wholly owned by two US
corporations. The parties requested that the matter be referred to
a Chamber of the Court.
In March/April 1968, the ELSI suffered bankruptcy and as
subsequently sold at a reduced price to the State-owned Industria
Elettronica Telecommunicazioni S.p.A. (ELTEL). The United States
claimed that the requisition had caused the bankruptcy of the
company, thereby violating several substantive and procedural
rights guaranteed by the FCN Treaty. On the other hand, Italy
raised a preliminary objection to the admissibility of the claim on
the ground that local remedies had not been exhausted and, in any
event, flatly denied any violation of the Treaty and that supposed
that there is a violation of its obligations, no injury had been
caused for which payment of indemnity would be justified.
ISSUE:Whether or not Italy impaired Raytheons right to manage
and control under Article III (2) of the 1948 FCN and failed to
provide the full protection and security dictated by treaty and
international law under Article V (1) and (3).
RULING:The I.C.J. held that Italy had not violated the FCN
Treaty. Despite the court's broad interpretation of the treaty, the
court found that the United States failed to state a claim absent a
direct causal link between the mayor's requisition order and ELSI's
bankruptcy. The court determined that the core claim was found in
article III of the treaty: impairment of the right to manage and
control. Although the Italian courts found the requisition order
unjustifiable, the I.C.J. was left to determine the financial
position of ELSI. If ELSI's position was so precarious that
Raytheon and Machlett would not have been able to manage and
control it before the requisition order, then ELSI was already
deprived of the rights allegedly impaired by the order. The court
also considered whether the orderly liquidation plan was still
feasible as of March 31, 1968, after the dismissal of ELSI's
employees, and found that the United States had failed to establish
the feasibility of liquidation. Italy's actions or omissions were
found not to have directly impaired the management and control of
ELSI, thereby leaving no cause of action.
CASE CONCERNING THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR
RELATIONSParaguay v. United States of America98/22, International
Court of Justice (ICJ), 9 June 1998
FACTS:On 3 April 1998, Paraguay instituted proceedings against
the United States before the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
in a dispute concerning alleged violations of the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations (1963). It maintained that Mr. Angel
Francisco Breard, a Paraguayan national, was tried and sentenced to
death without the State of Virginia advising him of his right to
assistance by the consular officers of Paraguay, as required by
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. The Convention came into force
in the United States on 24 December 1969.
ISSUE:Whether or not the Paraguay is entitled to restitution in
integrum for the alleged violation of the United States of its
international legal obligations to Paraguay as provided under the
Vienna Convention.
RULING:According to the findings of the Court, the merits of the
case were only concerned with the preservation of rights and the
prevention of irreparable damage to those rights which were the
subject of the dispute. With a view to the fact that the execution
was ordered for 14 April 1998 and the execution would render it
impossible for the Court to order the relief Paraguay sought, the
Court found that the circumstances required it to indicate the
provisional measures requested by Paraguay. The Court stated
expressly that it was not concerned with the question of the death
penalty as such nor with any activity as a court of appeal, but
only with the resolution of an international dispute between two
States.
THE LAGRAND CASEGermany v. United States of AmericaI.C.J. 2001
I.C.J. 466.
FACTS:A suit which claimed the United States law enforcement
personnel failed to advice aliens upon their arrest of their rights
was filed by Paraguay, Germany and Mexico at the international
Court of Justice. The plaintiffs also claimed that as a remedy for
violation of the Vienna Convention, state courts should review and
reconsider the death sentences to determine if the lack of consular
access prejudiced the aliens. The Germans case involved LaGrand and
his brother who were executed before the matter came to the I.C.J.
The Court found that the U.S. had breached its obligations to
Germany under the Vienna Convention by not giving notice about
LaGrand and his brother of right to consular notification, and by
failing to provide judicial review of the conviction and
sentence.
ISSUE:Whether or not the United States breached its legal
obligation provided under the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations.
RULING:Yes. A state that breaches its obligations to another
under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations by failing to
inform an arrested alien of the right to consular notification and
to provide judicial review of the aliens conviction and sentence
also violate individual rights held by the alien under
international law. The meaning adduced to the phrase authorities
shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under
this subparagraph of Article 36 suggests that the rights to be
informed of their rights under the Convention is an individual
right of every national of a state that is party to the
Convention.
AVENA AND OTHER MEXICAN NATIONALS CASEMexico v. United States of
AmericaJudgment, I.C.J. Reports 2004, 12, General List No. 12831
April 2004
FACTS:On 9 January 2003 Mexico instituted proceedings against
the United States of America in a dispute concerning alleged
breaches of Articles 5 and 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations of 24 April 1963 in relation to the treatment of a number
of Mexican nationals who had been tried, convicted and sentenced to
death in criminal proceedings in the United States. On 9 January
2003 Mexico also asked the Court to indicate provisional measures,
and in particular to order the United States to take all measures
necessary to ensure that no Mexican national was executed pending a
final decision of the Court.
ISSUE:Whether or not the United States of America breached its
obligations to Avena and other Mexican national and to Mexico under
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
RULING:The court concluded that in 51 of the cases, excluding
those of Csar Roberto Fierro Reyna, Roberto Moreno Ramos, and
Osvaldo Torres Aguilera, the United States had breached their
obligation as set forth under Article 36 paragraph 1 of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations by not informing the appropriate
Mexican consular post without delay. By not doing so, the U.S. had
also deprived Mexico of the right to provide assistance to its
nationals. In regards to Csar Roberto Fierro Reyna, Roberto Moreno
Ramos, and Osvaldo Torres Aguilera, by not allowing a review and
reconsideration of their convictions and sentences, the United
States also violated Article 36, paragraph 2 of the convention. As
reparation in this case, the United States of America must provide
review and reconsideration of convictions and sentences of the
Mexican nationals and implement specific measures to ensure
non-repetition.
CASE CONCERNING UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR STAFF IN
TEHRANUnited States of America v. IranJudgment of 24 May 1980
FACTS:This case was brought to the International Court of
Justice by the United States of America against Iran in response to
the Iran hostage crisis, where United States diplomatic offices and
personnel were seized by militant revolutionaries.
ISSUE:Whether or not the Government of Iran has violated a
number of the legal obligations imposed upon it by the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
RULING:The Court issued an Order of Provisional Measures which
ordered a preservation of the respective rights and obligations the
two countries owed one another pending the final decision of the
court. More specifically, the Court unanimously declared Iran
should ensure the restoration of the U.S. embassy in Tehran to U.S.
possession, release the hostages, and afford diplomatic officials
full protections as afforded by international law.
The ICJ considered the case in hand in two phases. The first
phase referred to the armed attack on the US Embassy in Tehran by
militants and students of Iran. The question asked was whether the
militants and the students were 'agents' of the Iranian Government
and therefore, acting on their behalf. The second phase comprises
the whole series of facts which occurred following the completion
of the occupation of the US Embassy by militants and the seizure of
the Consulates.
DEL MONTE CORPORATION-USA VS COURT OF APPEALSG.R. no. 136154,
February 7, 2001Bellosillo, J.
FACTS:In a distributorship agreement, petitioner Del Monte
Corporation-USA appointed private respondent Montebueno Marketing
as the sole and exclusive distributor of its Del Monte products in
the Philippines. Such agreement provided for an arbitration clause
that all disputes arising out of or relating to the Agreement or
the parties relationship, including the termination thereof, shall
be resolved by arbitration. Immediately after its appointment,
private respondent MMI appointed Sabrosa Foods, Inc. (SFI), with
the approval of petitioner DMC-USA, as MMIs marketing arm to
concentrate on its marketing and selling function as well as to
manage its critical relationship with the trade. On 3 October 1996
private respondents MMI, SFI and MMIs Managing Director Liong Liong
C. Sy (LILY SY) filed a Complaint against petitioners DMC-USA and
others alleging that DMC-USA products continued to be brought into
the country by parallel importers despite the appointment of
private respondent MMI as the sole and exclusive distributor of Del
Monte products thereby causing them great embarrassment and
substantial damage.
ISSUE:Whether the dispute between the parties warrants an order
compelling them to submit to arbitration.
RULING:RA 876 expressly authorizes arbitration of domestic
disputes, foreign arbitration as a system of settling commercial
disputes was likewise recognized when the Philippines adhered to
the United Nations "Convention on the Recognition and the
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958" under the 10 May
1965 Resolution No. 71 of the Philippine Senate, giving reciprocal
recognition and allowing enforcement of international arbitration
agreements between parties of different nationalities within a
contracting state. A careful examination of the instant case shows
that the arbitration clause in the Distributorship Agreement
between petitioner DMC-USA and private respondent MMI is valid and
the dispute between the parties is arbitrable. However, only
parties to the Agreement, i.e., petitioners DMC-USA and its
Managing Director for Export Sales Paul E. Derby, Jr., and private
respondents MMI and its Managing Director LILY SY are bound by the
Agreement and its arbitration clause as they are the only
signatories thereto. Consequently, referral to arbitration in the
State of California pursuant to the arbitration clause and the
suspension of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 2637-MN pending the
return of the arbitral award could be called for but only as to
petitioners DMC-USA and Paul E. Derby, Jr., and private respondents
MMI and LILY SY, and not as to the other parties in this case.
LM POWER ENGINEERING CORP. VS CAPITOL INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION
GROUPS, INC.G.R. no. 141833, March 26, 2003Panganiban, J.
FACTS:Petitioner LM Power Engineering Corporation and Respondent
Capitol Industrial Construction Groups Inc. entered into a
Subcontract Agreement involving electrical work at the Third Port
of Zamboanga. Upon completing its task under the Contract,
petitioner billed respondent. Contesting the accuracy of the amount
of advances and billable accomplishments listed by the petitioner,
the respondent refused to pay. Respondent also took refuge in the
termination clause of the Agreement.
Because of the dispute, petitioner filed a Complaint for the
collection of the amount representing the alleged balance due it
under the Subcontract. Instead of submitting an Answer, respondent
filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the Complaint was
premature, because there was no prior recourse to arbitration.
ISSUE:Whether or not the dispute between the parties is
arbitrable.
RULING:The dispute arose from the parties incongruent positions
on whether certain provisions of their Agreement could be applied
to the facts. The instant case involves technical discrepancies
that are better left to an arbitral body that has expertise in
those areas. In any event, the inclusion of an arbitration clause
in a contract does not ipso facto divest the courts of jurisdiction
to pass upon the findings of arbitral bodies, because the awards
are still judicially reviewable under certain conditions. Clearly,
the resolution of the dispute between the parties herein requires a
referral to the provisions of their Agreement. Within the scope of
the arbitration clause are discrepancies as to the amount of
advances and billable accomplishments, the application of the
provision on termination, and the consequent set-off of
expenses.
FRABELLE FISHING CORP. VS PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE
CO.G.R. no. 158560, August 17, 2007Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
FACTS:Respondents, Philam Properties Corporation, Philippine
American Life Insurance Company, and PERF Realty Corporation,
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (1996 MOA) whereby each
agreed to contribute cash, property, and services for the
construction and development of Philamlife Tower. They executed a
Deed of Assignment (1996 DOA) wherein they assigned to Frabelle
Properties Corporation (Frabelle) their rights and obligations
under the 1996 MOA with respect to the construction, development,
and subsequent ownership of Unit No. 38-B located at the 38th floor
of Philamlife Tower. The parties also stipulated that the assignee
shall be deemed as a co-developer of the construction project with
respect to Unit No. 38-B. Frabelle, in turn, assigned to Frabelle
Fishing Corporation (Frabelle Fishing), petitioner herein, its
rights, obligations and interests over Unit No. 38-B. Petitioner
Frabelle Fishing and respondents executed a Memorandum of Agreement
(1998 MOA) to fund the construction of designated office floors in
Philamlife Tower. The dispute between the parties started when
petitioner found material concealment on the part of respondents
regarding certain details in the 1996 DOA and 1998 MOA and their
gross violation of their contractual obligations as condominium
developers. Petitioner then referred the matter to the Philippine
Dispute Resolution Center, Inc. (PDRCI) for arbitration. However,
respondents manifested their refusal to submit to PDRCIs
jurisdiction. Thus, the petitioner filed with the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) a complaint for reformation of
instrument, specific performance and damages against
respondents.
ISSUE:Whether the parties should initially resort to
arbitration.
RULING:Paragraph 4.2 of the 1998 MOA mandates that any dispute
between or among the parties shall finally be settled by
arbitration conducted in accordance with the Rules of Conciliation
and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce.
Petitioner referred the dispute to the PDRCI but respondents
refused to submit to its jurisdiction. It bears stressing that such
arbitration agreement is the law between the parties. They are,
therefore, expected to abide by it in good faith.
It has previously held that arbitration is one of the
alternative methods of dispute resolution that is now rightfully
vaunted as the wave of the future in international relations, and
is recognized worldwide. To brush aside a contractual agreement
calling for arbitration in case of disagreement between the parties
would therefore be a step backward.
JORGE GONZALES VS HON. OSCAR B. PIMENTELG.R. No. 167994, January
22, 2007Tinga, J.
FACTS:This case stemmed from the petition to compel arbitration
filed by respondent Climax-Arimco while the complaint for the
nullification of the Addendum Contract was pending before the DENR
Panel of Arbitrators. The petition for arbitration was subsequently
filed and Climax-Arimco sought an order to compel the parties to
arbitrate pursuant to the said arbitration clause. Gonzales then
filed an Answer with Counterclaim questioning the validity of the
Addendum Contract containing the arbitration clause alleging that
the Addendum Contract containing the arbitration clause is void in
view of Climax-Arimcos acts of fraud, oppression and violation of
the Constitution. Thus, the arbitration clause, Clause 19.1,
contained in the Addendum Contract is also null and void ab initio
and legally inexistent. The RTC then issued an order requiring
Gonzales to proceed with arbitration proceedings and appointing
retired CA Justice Jorge Coquia as sole arbitrator.
ISSUE:Whether or not the dispute is subject to arbitration.
RULING:Arbitration, as an alternative mode of settling disputes,
has long been recognized and accepted in our jurisdiction. Foreign
arbitration, as a system of settling commercial disputes of an
international character, was recognized when the Philippines
adhered to the United Nations "Convention on the Recognition and
the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958," under the 10
May 1965 Resolution No. 71 of the Philippine Senate, giving
reciprocal recognition and allowing enforcement of international
arbitration agreements between parties of different nationalities
within a contracting state. The enactment of R.A. No. 9285 further
institutionalized the use of alternative dispute resolution
systems, including arbitration, in the settlement of disputes.
Thus, a clause in a contract providing that all matters in dispute
between the parties shall be referred to arbitration is a contract.
Moreover, the doctrine of separability or severability enunciates
that an arbitration agreement is independent of the main
contract.
In this case, Gonzaless argument that the Addendum Contract is
null and void making the arbitration clause therein void is not
tenable. First, the proceeding in a petition for arbitration under
R.A. No. 876 is limited only to the resolution of the question of
whether the arbitration agreement exists. Second, the separability
of the arbitration clause from the Addendum Contract means that
validity or invalidity of the Addendum Contract will not affect the
enforceability of the agreement to arbitrate. Thus, Gonzaless
petition should be dismissed.
THE CAROLINE VS. UNITED STATES11 U.S. 7 Cranch 496 496
(1813)
FACTS:An information was filed against the Caroline which was
founded upon an alleged violation either of the 1st section of an
act of Congress, passed on March 22, 1794, entitled An act to
prohibit the carrying on the slave trade from the United States to
any foreign place or country, or of the Act which was passed on
March 2, 1807, entitled An act to prohibit the importation of
slaves into any port or place within the jurisdiction of the United
States from and after the first day of January in the year of our
Lord one thousand eight hundred and eight. By the act of 1794, the
fitting or sailing of a ship, for the purpose of a traffic in
slaves to any foreign country, subjects the ship, concerned in such
traffic, to forfeiture.
The Act of 1807 enacts that if any ship within the jurisdiction
of the United States shall be fitted out or caused to said by any
person, either as master, factor or owner, 'for the purpose of
procuring any negroe, mulatto or person of color from any foreign
country to be transported to any place whatsoever within the
jurisdiction of the United States, to be held, sold, or disposed of
as slaves, or to be held to service or labor,' shall be forfeited
to the United States. It was admitted by the Claimant, that the
Caroline came into this port equipped like any common merchant
vessel, that she did, after her arrival, receive fitments and take
on board articles calculated for the slave-trade only.
ISSUE:Whether or not the Caroline should be forfeited to the
United States for its violation of either Act of 1794 or the Act of
1807.
RULING:The Court decided that a libel for forfeiture must be
particular and certain in all the material circumstances which
constitute the offense. The vessel is only liable to forfeiture
when she shall have been actually fitted, equipped or prepared, not
while she is fitting, equipping, or preparing. The degree of
equipment ought to have been stated that the Court might judge
whether it were such fitting, or equipment as is contemplated by
the law. Upon every information for a penalty, the offence should
be fully proved. This case is like that of Moodie v. Ship Alfred,
in which this Court decided that the ship was not illegally fitted
out, although she had taken on board some articles calculated for
war.
CASE CONCERNING MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES IN AND
AGAINST NICARAGUANicaragua v. United States of AmericaICJ, 27 June
1986
FACTS:Nicaragua brought a suit against the United States on the
ground that the United States was responsible for illegal military
and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua. The United
States challenged the jurisdiction of the I.C.J when it was held
responsible for illegal military and paramilitary activities in and
against Nicaragua in the suit the plaintiff brought against the
defendant in 1984. Though a declaration accepting the mandatory
jurisdiction of the Court was deposited by the United States in a
1946, it tried to justify the declaration in a 1984 notification by
referring to the 1946 declaration and stating in part that the
declaration shall not apply to disputes with any Central American
State.
Apart from maintaining the ground that the I.C.J lacked
jurisdiction, the States also argued that Nicaragua failed to
deposit a similar declaration to the Court. On the other hand,
Nicaragua based its argument on its reliance on the 1946
declaration made by the United states due to the fact that it was a
state accepting the same obligation as the United States when it
filed charges in the I.C.J. against the United States.
Also, the plaintiff intent to submit to the compulsory
jurisdiction of the I.C.J. was pointed out by the valid declaration
it made in 1929 with the I.C.Js predecessor, which was the
Permanent Court of International Justice, even though Nicaragua had
failed to deposit it with that court. The admissibility of
Nicaraguas application to the I.C.J. was also challenged by the
United States.
ISSUE:Whether or not the United States breached its obligations
under International law.
RULING:The ICJ ruled in favor of Nicaragua and against the
United States and awarded reparations to Nicaragua. The ICJ held
that the U.S. had violated international law by supporting the
Contras in their rebellion against the Nicaraguan government and by
mining Nicaragua's harbors. The United States refused to
participate in the proceedings after the Court rejected its
argument that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The
U.S. later blocked enforcement of the judgment by the United
Nations Security Council and thereby prevented Nicaragua from
obtaining any actual compensation.
The Court found in its verdict that the United States was "in
breach of its obligations under customary international law not to
use force against another State", "not to intervene in its
affairs", "not to violate its sovereignty", "not to interrupt
peaceful maritime commerce", and "in breach of its obligations
under Article XIX of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation between the Parties signed at Managua on 21 January
1956."
LEGALITY OF THE THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONSAdvisory Opinion
of 8 July 1996
FACTS:A request for an advisory opinion as to whether states are
permitted to use nuclear weapons under international law was laid
on the table of the International Court of Justice by the U.N.
General Assembly.
ISSUE:Whether or not threats or use of nuclear weapons are
permitted under international law.
RULING:Yes. Under certain circumstance, threat or use of nuclear
weapons are permitted under international law. The threat or use of
nuclear weapons in all circumstances is not authorized or
prohibited by either the customary or conventional international
nuclear law.
Under the U.N. Charter, the threat or use of nuclear weapons
would be considered legal if all requirements of Article 51 which
deals with states rights to self-defense are met. However, in
whatever the situation can be, a state obligation exists to pursue
in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to
nuclear disarmament in all its aspect under strict and effective
international control.
THE LOCKERBIE CASELibya v. United States1992 I.C.J. Rep. 114, 14
April 1992
FACTS:On December 21, 1988, Pan American Flight 103, on its way
to New York's John F. Kennedy Airport, exploded over Lockerbie,
Scotland. All 259 passengers on board were killed. Eleven Lockerbie
residents were also killed as the shattered civilian carrier
crashed to the ground. The investigation that followed indicated
that Libya and Libyan agents were almost exclusively responsible
for the bombing. On November 14, 1991, the United States handed
down indictments against Abdel Basset Ali Al-Megrahi and Lamen
Khalifa Fhimah for their role in the murder of the passengers and
crew of Flight 103.
Libya argued that under the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against Civil Aviation (the Montreal Convention),
Libya could either extradite or prosecute the suspects themselves.
Libya chose to prosecute the suspects themselves. However, the
United States and the UK took the case to the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) which issued two resolutions that urged
Libya to hand over the bombing suspects.
ISSUE:Whether or not the resolutions issued by UN Security
Council is binding to Libya.
RULING:Under Article 39 of the United Nations Charter, it allows
the UNSC to take enforcement actions to restore international
peace. It also provided under its Article 103 that, "In the event
of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any
other international agreement, their obligations under the present
Charter shall prevail and under Article 25 of the same charter,
member States must follow UNSC resolutions. Thus, the ICJ found
that the UNSC resolutions were permissible, and the Libya must hand
over the suspects. Moreover, UNSC decisions are binding and cannot
be subjected to judicial review of the ICJ.
ARMED ACTIVITIES ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CONGODemocratic
Republic of Congo v. UgandaJudgment of 19 December 2005
FACTS:The Democratic Republic of Congo filed its application to
the ICJ in June 1999, alleging that acts of armed aggression
carried out by Uganda on DRC territory constituted a flagrant
violation of the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the
Organization of African Unity. Jurisdiction was found under Article
36(2) of the Statute of the Court; the DRC and Uganda have accepted
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.
On July 1, 2000, the Court issued provisional measures requiring
that both parties refrain from any action, which might prejudice
the rights of the other party or which might aggravate or extend
the dispute.
ISSUE:Whether or not the Uganda violated several international
laws including International Human Rights Law and International
Humanitarian Law.
RULING:The Court found that Uganda violated the principles of
non-use of force in international relations and of
non-intervention. The Court additionally found that the DRC in turn
violated obligations owed to Uganda under the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations of 1961.
The Court found that the acts or omission of Ugandan Peoples
Defense Force (UPDF) were attributable to Uganda, even where such
acts may have been outside the scope of a soldiers or officers
authority, as the UPDF is a State organ. It further noted that
States obligations under human rights instruments do not cease in
the case of armed conflict. The Court concluded that the acts
committed by UPDF and its officers and soldiers violated customary
international law as reflected in Articles 25, 27, 28, 43, 46 and
47 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, and also violated the following
treaty obligations of Uganda.
The Court also found that the Vienna Convention continues to
apply regardless of whether a state of armed conflict exists, and
further requires accommodation for safe evacuation of diplomatic
personnel in the event of conflict. It also requires the respect of
diplomatic property and premises in the event diplomatic relations
are breached between the sending and receiving States. This
principle was upheld in United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff
in Tehran.
Therefore, the Court granted DRCs request for reparations,
noting under prior precedent that it is well established in general
international law that a State which bears responsibility for an
internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to make full
reparation for the injury caused by that act. In the event the
parties fail to reach a settlement, the amount of reparations will
be determined by the Court at a future proceeding.
LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIAYugoslavia
v. United States of AmericaICJ, 1 June 1999
FACTS:On 29 April 1999, the (former) Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY) instituted proceedings before the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) against the United States of America for
violation of the obligation not to use force, resulting from the
bombing of Yugoslav territory by the United States and other Member
States of NATO. Concurrent to this Application, the FRY submitted a
request for the indication of provisional measures, calling on the
ICJ to order the United States to cease immediately its acts of use
of force and to refrain from any further threat or act of force
against the FRY.
In filing the Application, the FRY relied on Article IX of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, 1948 and
Article 38(5) of the Rules of the Court. These articles state,
respectively, that disputes between contracting parties relating to
the interpretation, application or fulfillment of the Convention
shall be submitted to the ICJ, and that applications filed against
States which have not accepted the Courts jurisdiction cannot
proceed unless and until that State accepts the Courts jurisdiction
for the purposes of the case.
ISSUE:Whether or not the USA violated its obligation not to use
force.
RULING:In delivering its decision on 2 June 1999 the ICJ first
sought to emphasize its deep concern over the human tragedy in
Kosovo, and declared its profound concern with the use of force in
the Yugoslav territories, which it deemed to raise very serious
issues of international law. Nevertheless, the ICJ reiterated the
fundamental principle of its Statute that it cannot settle a
dispute between states in the absence of the consent of those
states to its jurisdiction. Furthermore, it reminded the parties
that it was unable to indicate provisional measures without first
establishing prima facie jurisdiction in a case.
On the issue of prima facie jurisdiction, the ICJ ruled that
whilst it was indisputable that both the United States and the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are parties to the Genocide
Convention, a reservation made to Article IX by the United States
declaring that its specific consent is needed before any dispute is
submitted to the ICJ, meant that Article IX could not constitute a
basis for jurisdiction. Regarding Article 38(5), the Court said
that in the absence of consent by the United States it lacked even
prima facie jurisdiction. As a result, in rejecting the FRYs
request for provisional measures by twelve votes to three, the
Court concluded that it manifestly lacked jurisdiction to entertain
Yugoslavias Application.
HAMDAN VS RUMSFELD548 U.S. 557, 29 June 2006
FACTS:Hamdan was charged with conspiracy to commit offences
triable by a military commission and was granted Habeas Corpus to
dispute this charge. It is alleged that Hamdan was engaged in
actions in preparation of the September 11, 2001 attacks against
the United States. Militia forces in Afghanistan that were fighting
the Taliban captured Hamdan and turned him over to the U.S.
Military in 2002. He was transferred to Guantanamo Bay, a United
States occupied Military base. After a year of being detained
without any charges being brought against him, President Bush
declared that he had committed acts triable by a military
commission. He was charged with one count of conspiracy to commit
offenses triable by the commission. This commission is created by
military necessity, not by statute or constitutional power. This
commission has a presiding officer and at least three other
members. The accused is afforded military counsel, and a copy of
the charges against him. This hearing may be conducted outside the
presence of the accused for the accused does not have a right to
see all evidence or hear all witness statement against him for
purposes of national security. After being tried and convicted of
conspiracy, Hamdan apply for a writ of Habeas Corpus stating he
deserved all the constitutional rights afforded to him at trial,
the writ was granted.
ISSUE:Whether Hamdan committed a crime triable by military
commissions and such commission is constitutional.
RULING:No. The President at a time of war has the power to try
and punish crimes against the laws of nations. This is the
constitutional provision used to show that military commission
tribunals are legal. However, this court concluded that only
certain circumstances allow for offense to be triable in a military
commission. Those offenses are; 1) in place of civilian courts when
marital law has been declared; 2) temporary military government in
occupied territory or in lands where there is no government to try
cases; and 3) when the crime is an incident to the conduct of war
which violate the laws of war. The court states that only the 3rd
type applies, however the charge of conspiracy is not an incident
to the conduct of war. Incidents of war are accusations of actual
conduct, not the attempt or planning of such conduct. Inchoate
criminal charges belong in a federal court or court martial
proceeding. Secondly this commission violates not only
constitutional rights afforded an individual, but also rules
established by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the
Geneva Conventions. A military commission tribunal must have rules
and regulations that do not fall short of at least a military court
marshal proceeding. The lack of presence and ability to see the
evidence and witness before you is not constitutional. Therefore,
Hamdan should not be tried in front of this commission. This court
reversed the commissions charges of conspiracy.