Political Law Case Digests 2

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS [2]: THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATEREPUBLIC VS SANTOS IIIG.R. No. 160453, November 12, 2012CRUZ

DOCTRINE:

All river beds remain property of public dominion and cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless previously declared by the Government to be alienable and disposable.

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the Government, such as a presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act or statute.

FACTS:

Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the RTC in Paranaque City. The property, which had an area of 1,045 square meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio, Paranaque City, and was boundedin the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio,Jr.), in the Southeast by the Paranaque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan.

On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the latter's co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the property had been formed through accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for more than 30 years.

The City of Paranaque opposed the application for land registration, stating that it needed the property for its flood control program; that the property was within the legal easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and that assuming that the property was not covered by the legal easement, title to the property could not be registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that the property was an orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion.

RTC: In favor of petitionersCA: Affirmed RTC decision

ISSUE:

WON the land claimed is an alienable and disposable land hence Government specifically City of Paranaque in this case cannot claim ownership.

HELD:

NO. The land is belongs to the inalienable public domain.Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the Government. It is indispensable, therefore, that there is a showing of a title from the State. Occupation of public land in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.

Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which declares river beds that are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters as ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land occupied by the new course, and which gives to the owners of the adjoining lots the right to acquire only the abandoned river beds not ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land affected by the natural change of course of the waters only after paying their value), all river beds remain property of public dominion and cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless previously declared by the Government to be alienable and disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown to be already declared to be alienable and disposable, respondents could not be deemed to have acquired the property through prescription.

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the Government, such as a presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

In the case of Menguito v Republic and Republic v. Sarmiento, a notation on a survey plan that the land is alienable and disposable is not a sufficient proof. For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in thiscase) must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.

We find applicability of the ruling in the mentioned case, the notation in the survey plan of Lot 4998-B stating it is alienable and disposable is not a sufficient proof. The rulings of RTC and CA was reversed and set aside.

CIR vs CAMPOS RUEDAG.R. No. L-13250. October 29, 1971

DOCTRINE:

A foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line with Pound's formulation that it be a politically organized sovereign community independent of outside control bound by ties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of law.

Theinternational zoneof Tangier,even if it is not recognized bythe Philippine Government as a state or even if w/o international personalitya, could avail of the reciprocal provisions of our Tax Code

FACTS:

Maria Cerdeira is a Spanish national and was a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to her death. At the time of her demise she left, among others, intangible personal properties in the Philippines. Antonio Campos Rueda, as administrator of the estate of Maria Cerdeira, filed a provisional estate and inheritance tax return on all the properties of the latter. The CIR, pending investigation, issued an assessment for state and inheritance taxes in the amount of P369,383.96, which tax liabilities were paid by petitioner. Campos Rueda filed an amended return wherein intangible personal properties with the value of P396,308.90 were claimed as exempted from taxes. The CIR, pending investigation, issued another assessment for estate and inheritance taxes in the amount of P469,665.24. In a letter, the CIR denied the request for exemption on the ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.

Hence, CIR demanded the payment of the sums representing deficiency estate and inheritance taxes including ad valorem penalties, surcharges, interests and compromise penalties. In a letter, Campos Rueda requested for the reconsideration of the decision denying the claim for tax exemption of the intangible personal properties and the imposition of the ad valorem penalties. However,the CIR denied request. The denial is premised on the grounds that there was no reciprocity [with Tangier, which was moreover] a mere principality, not a foreign country. Consequently, CIR demanded the payment of a total of P161,874.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes including surcharges, interests and compromise penalties.The matter was then elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals. In ruling against the contention of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the appealed decision states: "In fine, we believe, and so hold, that the expression "foreign country", used in the last proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a government of that foreign power which, although not an international person in the sense of international law, does not impose transfer or death upon intangible person properties of our citizens not residing therein, or whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It is, therefore, not necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by our Government order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits of the proviso of Section 122 of our Tax. Code."ISSUE:

Whether or not the acquisition of international personality is a condition sine qua non to Tangier being considered a "foreign country".

HELD:

NO. International personality is not required to be considered as a foreign country.

Even on the assumption then that Tangier is bereft of international personality petitioner has not successfully made out a case. Note that four days prior to the filing of this petition, In Collector of Internal Revenue vs. De Lara, it was specifically held by the court that: "Considering the State of California as a foreign country in relation to Section 122 of our Tax Code we believe and hold, as did the Tax Court that the Ancilliary Administrator is entitled to exemption from the inheritance tax on the intangible personal property found in the Philippines." There can be no doubt that California as a state in the American Union was lacking in the alleged requisite of international personality. Nonetheless, it was held to be a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122 of the NIRC. Even prior to the De Lara ruling, this Court did commit itself to the doctrine that even a tiny principality, that of Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality in the traditional sense, did fall under this exempt category.

It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line with Pound's formulation that it be a politically organized sovereign community independent of outside control bound by ties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of law. It is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an organized corporate society under a government with the legal competence to exact obedience its commands. It has been referred to as a body-politic organized by common consent for mutual defense and mutual safety and to promote the general welfare. Correctly has it been described as "the juridical personification of the nation." This is to view it in the light its historical development. The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international personality. It is a territorial society divided into government and subjects, claiming within its allotted area a supremacy over all other institutions. It is the power entrusted to its government to maintain within its territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter into international relations. With the latter requisites satisfied, international law does not exact independence as a condition of statehood.

SHIPSIDE INC. VS CAG.R. No. 143377, February 20, 2001

DOCTRINE:

The Republic of the Philippines cannot be barred by the rules on prescription

BCDA is not a mere agency of the Government but a corporate body performing proprietary BCDA is not a mere agency of the Government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions.

FACTS:

April 1960, Lots No. 1 and 4, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-381 in the name of Rafael Galvez, were sold by the latter to Filipina Mamaril, Cleopatra Llana, ReginaBustos, and Erlinda Balatbat. Thereafter, in August. 1960, Mamaril, et al. sold the same lots to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company and the latter in turn conveyed the property to Shipside Incorporated, herein petitioner, on1963, resulting in the issuance of new Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-57 10.

Unknown to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, OCT No. 0-381 was already declared null and void and was ordered cancelled by the then Court of First Instance of La Union, in its order dated February 1, 1963. The decision of the CFI became final and executor on October 23, 1973.

On April 21, 1999 (24 years after), the Office of the Solicitor General, after being notified that the aforesaid order remained unexecuted despite the writ of execution issued by the trial court, filed a complaint for revival of judgment and cancellation of titles before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union.

Petitioner Shipside, Inc. moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging, among others that the respondent Republic was not the real party-in-interest and that the cause of action was already barred by prescription (impt contentions). The trial court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss and its motion for reconsideration was likewise turned down. Petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals through petition for certiorari and prohibition. The appeal court denied the petition as well as the motion for reconsideration.

Other contentions of Petitioner are as follows:(1) the complaint stated no cause of action because only final and executory judgments may be subject of an action for revival of judgment;(2) the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest because the real property covered by the Torrens titles sought to be cancelled, allegedly part of Camp Wallace (Wallace Air Station), were under the ownership and administration of the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) under Republic Act No. 7227;(3) plaintiff's cause of action is barred by prescription;(4) twenty-five years having lapsed since the issuance of the writ of execution, no action for revival of judgment may be instituted because under Paragraph 3 of Article 1144 of the Civil Code, such action may be brought only within ten (10) years from the time the judgment had been rendered.

ISSUE:

1. WON the Republic of the Philippines can maintain the action for revival of judgment in this case.2. WON Republic can be barred by extinctive prescription.

HELD:

No to (1) and (2)

As a general rule, it is plain that an action for revival of judgment must be brought within ten years from the time said judgment becomes final. Taking these 2 provisions in consideration:1. Article 1144(3) provides that an action upon a judgment "must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues."2. Section 6, Rule 39 provides that a final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry, but that after the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.

But this rule on prescription does not run against the state.

While it is true that prescription does not run against the State, the same may not be invoked by the government in this case since it is no longer interested in the subject matter. While Camp Wallace may have belonged to the government at the time Rafael Galvez's title was ordered cancelled in Land Registration Case No. N-361, the same no longer holds true today.

Why? Because R.A 7227 and Proc. No. 216 transferred Wallace Air Bases/Areasor simply called military reservations to Bases and Conversion Development Authority (BCDA). With the transfer of Camp Wallace to the BCDA, the government no longer has a right or interest to protect. Consequently, the Republic is not a real party in interest and it may not institute the instant action. Nor may it raise the defense of imprescriptibility, the same being applicable only in cases where the government is a party in interest.

The rule that prescription does not run against the State does not apply to corporations or artificial bodies created by the State for special purposes, it being said that when the title of the Republic has been divested, its grantees, although artificial bodies of its own creation, are in the same category as ordinary persons

The BCDA is an entity invested with a personality separate and distinct from the government. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7227 reads:

SECTION 3. Creation of the Bases Conversion and Development Authority. There is hereby created a body corporate to be known as the Conversion Authority which shall have the attribute of perpetual succession and shall be vested with the powers of a corporation.

It may not be amiss to state at this point that the functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. While public benefit and public welfare, particularly, the promotion of the economic and social development of Central Luzon, may be attributable to the operation of the BCDA, yet it is certain that the functions performed by the BCDA are basically proprietary in nature. The promotion of economic and social development of Central Luzon, in particular, and the country's goal for enhancement, in general, do not make the BCDA equivalent to the Government. Other corporations have been created by government to act as its agents for the realization of its programs, the SSS, GSIS, NAWASA and the NIA, to count a few, and yet, the Court has ruled that these entities, although performing functions aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, are not government-function corporations invested with governmental attributes. It may thus be said that the BCDA is not a mere agency of the Government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions.

By raising the claim of imprescriptibility, a claim which cannot be raised by the BCDA, the Government not only assists the BCDA. Moreover, to recognize the Government as a proper party to sue in this case would set a bad precedent as it would allow the Republic to prosecute, on behalf of government-owned or controlled corporations, causes of action which have already prescribed, on the pretext that the Government is the real party in interest against whom prescription does not run, said corporations having been created merely as agents for the realization of government programs.

Addl info: Since the portion in dispute now forms part of the property owned and administered by the Bases Conversion and Development Authority, it is alienable and registerable real property.

The civil case filed by RP is ordered dismissed w/o prejudice to the right of BCDA to institute proper action.

MELCHORA CABANAS vs. FRANCISCO PILAPILG.R. No. L-25843. July 25, 1974Gatacelo

DOCTRINE:

This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every Stat. The judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest.

FACTS:

The insured, Florentino Pilapil had a child, Millian Pilapil, with a married woman, the plaintiff, Melchora Cabanas. She was ten years old. The defendant, Francisco Pilapil, is the brother of the deceased.

The deceased insured himself and instituted as beneficiary, his child, with his brother to act as trustee during her minority. Upon his death, the proceeds were paid to him. Hence this complaint by the mother, with whom the child is living, seeking the delivery of such sum. She filed the bond required by the Civil Code. Defendant would justify his claim to the retention of the amount in question by invoking the terms of the insurance policy.

Trial Court: judgment ordering the defendant to deliver the proceeds of the policy in question to plaintiff. Articles 320 provides: "The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance. Article 321 states: "The property which the unemancipated child has acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under parental authority and whose company he lives; . . ."

ISSUE:

WON the doctrine of parens patriae finds application in this case.[Walang discussion sa facts kung ano contentions ng parties; bigla na lang sumulpot yang parens patriae na yan, ganyan.]

HELD:

Yes. The Court adheres to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest. Certainly the judiciary as the instrumentality of the State in its role of parens patriae cannot remain insensible to the validity of the mothers plea. The United States Supreme Court opines: "This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties." What is more, there is this constitutional provision vitalizing this concept. It reads: "The State shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution." If, as the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutional mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did.

ANASTACIOLAUREL vs. ERIBERTOMISAG.R. No. L-409, January 30, 1947

DOCTRINE:

Military occupant cannot repeal or suspend operation of law of treason.

Facts:

Laurel, a Filipino citizen, was arrested in Camarines Sur by the United States Army and was interned under a commitment order "for his active collaboration with the Japanese during the Japanese occupation," but in September, 1945, he was turned over to the Commonwealth Government, and since then has been under the custody of the respondent Director of Prisons.

The Court denied the petition forhabeas corpusfiled byLaurel (this was discussed in another case). Laurel posited the theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic:

ISSUE:

WON the law on treason is suspended in times of belligerent occupation.

HELD:

No. A citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier. The subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy during a war, "although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of international law of our times."

The words "temporary allegiance," as descriptive of the relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy toward the military government established over them, may, at most, be considered similar to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives and does not do away with the absolute and permanent allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own government or sovereign.

Just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort. Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed against the national security of the legitimate government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation.

In short, military occupant cannot repeal or suspend operation of law of treason. Since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason.

Adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their own government without the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are not to aid them in their military operation against the resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them all of their own independence or sovereignty such theory would sanction the action of invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence and repressing the exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political suicide.

Just as treason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same way treason may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same government and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that: "The government established by this Constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine Independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines."

N.B. Although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers of a de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the country and the protection of his army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience.

WILLIAM F. PERALTA vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONSG.R. No. L-49, November 12, 1945

DOCTRINE:

During a belligerent occupation, the political laws of the occupied territory are merely suspended, subject to revival under the principle of jus postliminium upon the end of the occupation. But non-political laws are deemed continued unless changed by the belligerent occupant since they are intended to govern the relations of individuals as among themselves.

FACTS:

Peralta, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila, was prosecuted for the crime of robbery pursuant to Act 65 (issued during the Japanese occupation). He was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, created in section 1 of Ordinance No. 7 promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines.

Peralta filed a petition for habeas corpus on the ground that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction "was a political instrumentality of the military forces of the Japanese Imperial Army, the aims and political purposes of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as well as those of the United States of America, and therefore, null and voidab initio", and he is being punished by a law created to serve the political purpose of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines.

The Solicitor General supports Peralta and states that Court of Specialand Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created and the summary procedure prescribed therefor are tinged with political complexion, do not afford a fair trial, violate the Constitution of the Commonwealth, and impair the constitutional rights of accused persons under their legitimate Constitution.

Some of the features of the summary procedure are: that the court may interrogate the accused and witnesses before trial in order to clarify the points in dispute; that the refusal of the accused to answer the questions may be considered unfavorable to him, among others.

ISSUE:

1. WON the Constitution of the Commonwealth or of Republic should be applied.2. WON the (a) court, (b) summary procedure, and (c) Act 65 are valid under the laws of nation.3. WON reoccupation renders the subject act invalid.

HELD:1. No. As the so-called Republic of the Philippines was ade factogovernment of the second kind (of paramount force -- existence is maintained by active military power within the territories, and against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government|), the questions involved in the present case cannot be decided in the light of the Constitution of the Commonwealth Government, because the belligerent occupant was totally independent of the constitution of the occupied territory in carrying out the administration over said territory.

The Constitution of the so-called Republic of the Philippines can neither be applied, since the validity of an act of a belligerent occupant cannot be tested in the light of another act of the same occupant, whose criminal jurisdiction is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. The government established over an enemy's territory during the military occupation may exercise all the powers given by the laws of war to the conqueror over the conquered, and is subject to all restrictions which that code imposes. Its character is the same and the source of its authority the same. In either case it is a government imposed by the laws of war, and so far as it concerns the inhabitants of such territory or the rest of the world, those laws alone determine the legality or illegality of its acts.

The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a sovereign state independent from any other government by the Filipino people, was in truth and reality, a government established by the belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of occupation.

2. Yes.a. The so called Republic of the Philippines, being a governmental instrumentality of the belligerent occupant, had the power or was competent to create the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. No question may arise as to whether or not a court is of a political complexion, for it is a mere governmental agency charged with the duty of applying the law to cases falling within its jurisdiction. Its judgments and sentences may be of political complexion or not depending upon the nature or character of the law so applied.

b. There is also no question as to the power or competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate the law providing for such procedure. The only restrictions or limitations imposed upon the power of a belligerent occupant to alter the laws or promulgate new ones, especially the criminal law as well as the laws regarding procedure, so far as it is necessary for military purposes, that is, for his control of the territory and the safety and protection of his army, are those imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience. It is obvious that the summary procedure under consideration does not violate these precepts. It cannot be considered as violating the laws of humanity and public conscience, for it is less objectionable, even from the point of view of those who are used to the accusatory system of criminal procedure, than the procedural laws based on the semi-inquisitorial or mixed system prevailing in France and other countries in continental Europe.

c. It was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate, through the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines,Act No. 65of the said Assembly, which penalizes the crimes of robbery and other offenses as new crimes and offenses demanded by military necessity, incident to a state of war, and necessary for the control of the country by the belligerent occupant, the protection and safety of the army of occupation, its support and efficiency, and the success of its operations. They are not the same ordinary offenses penalized by the Revised Penal Code. The act aims to prevent food and other necessaries from reaching the "guerrillas" which were harassing the belligerent occupant from every nook and corner of the country and to preserve the food supply and other necessaries in order that in case of necessity, the Imperial Japanese forces could easily requisition them.

3. Yes. During a belligerent occupation, the political laws of the occupied territory are merely suspended, subject to revival under the principle of jus postliminium upon the end of the occupation. But non-political laws are deemed continued unless changed by the belligerent occupant since they are intended to govern the relations of individuals as among themselves.

Most acts penalized by Act 65 were political in nature. Peralta was prosecuted for robbery connected with the supervision, control and distribution of foods and other necessaries. The law effectively penalized the robbery of its food resources by its enemies, particularly the guerrillas. The SC said that such offense is political in nature.

All judgments of political nature of the courts during the Japanese regime ceased to be valid upon the restoration of the national government by virtue of the principle of postliminium. Though no redress can be claimed by the prisoner as to the sentence he has already served, the law that convicted him has also ceased validity. As such the detained prisoner must be released. The writ of habeas corpus was granted.

Postliminium a principle of public international law that provides for the invalidity of all illegitimate acts that an occupant may have performed on a given territory after its recapture by the legitimate sovereign.

SOUTHEAST ASIAN FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT CENTER-AQUACULTURE DEPARTMENT (SEAFDEC-AQD) vs. NLRCG.R. No. 86773. February 14, 1992; 206 SCRA 283LAZARO

DOCTRINE:

International organizations enjoy immunity from local jurisdiction.

FACTS:

SEAFDEC-AQD is a department of an international organization, the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center, organized through an agreement entered into in Bangkok, Thailand on December 28, 1967 by the governments of Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines with Japan as the sponsoring country.

On April 20, 1975, private respondent Juvenal Lazaga was employed as a Research Associate on a probationary basis by the SEAFDEC-AQD and was appointed Senior External Affairs Officer on January 5, 1983. Thereafter, he was appointed to the position of Professional III and designated as Head of External Affairs Office with the same pay and benefits.

On May 8, 1986, petitioner Lacanilao in his capacity as Chief of SEAFDEC-AQD sent a notice of termination to private respondent informing him that due to the financial constraints being experienced by the department, his services shall be terminated at the close of office hours on May 15, 1986 and that he is entitled to separation benefits equivalent to one (1) month of his basic salary for every year of service plus other benefits. Because of petitioner's failure to pay private respondent his separation pay, the latter filed on March 18, 1987 a complaint against petitioners for non-payment of separation benefits plus moral damages and attorney's fees with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.

PETITIONER'S ALLEGATION: NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case inasmuch as the SEAFDEC-AQD is an international organization and that private respondent must first secure clearances from the proper departments for property or money accountability before any claim for separation pay will be paid, and which clearances had not yet been obtained by the private respondent.

LABOR ARBITER AND NLRC: ruled in favor of private respondent.

ISSUE:

WON NLRC has jurisdiction over petitioner.

HELD:

No. Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD) (established in Iloilo), enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is located. Permanent international commissions and administrative bodies have been created by the agreement of a considerable number of States for a variety of international purposes, economic or social and mainly non-political. In so far as they are autonomous and beyond the control of any one State, they have a distinct juridical personality independent of the municipal law of the State where they are situated. As such, according to one leading authority they must be deemed to possess a species of international personality of their own.

Pursuant to its being a signatory to the Agreement, the Republic of the Philippines agreed to be represented by one Director in the governing SEAFDEC Council and that its national laws and regulations shall apply only insofar as its contribution to SEAFDEC of "an agreed amount of money, movable and immovable property and services necessary for the establishment and operation of the Center" are concerned. It expressly waived the application of the Philippine laws on the disbursement of funds of petitioner SEAFDEC-AQD.

One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization: besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-state.

MINUCHER vs. CAG.R. No. 142396. February 11, 2003

DOCTRINE:

IF THE ACTS GIVING RISE TO A SUIT ARE THOSE OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT DONE BY ITS FOREIGN AGENT, ALTHOUGH NOT NECESSARILY A DIPLOMATIC PERSONAGE, BUT ACTING IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, THE COMPLAINT COULD BE BARRED BY THE IMMUNITY OF THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN FROM SUIT WITHOUT ITS CONSENT.

FACTS:

Petitioner Khosrow Minucher, an Iranian national, was charged for violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972." The narcotic agents who raided the house of Minucher were accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo. Minucher was acquitted by the trial court of the charges. Minucher filed a civil case before the Regional Trial Court of Manila for damages on account of what he claimed to have been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity.

ISSUE:

WON private respondent Scalzo, although he cannot invoke diplomatic immunity (kasi di nya na-prove yung diplomatic status nya), can invoke the defense of state immunity from suit.

HELD:

Yes. While the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain contentious, it was sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked for the United States Drug Enforcement Agency and was tasked to conduct surveillance of suspected drug activities within the country on the dates pertinent to this case. If it should be ascertained that Arthur Scalzo was acting well within his assigned functions when he committed the acts alleged in the complaint, the present controversy could then be resolved under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit. The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded.

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns. The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two countries, certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, as well as the participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the "buy-bust operation" conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of the latter but they give enough indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties. All told, this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency allowed by the Philippine government to conduct activities in the country to help contain the problem on the drug traffic, is entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit.

PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY vs. PGDE668 SCRA 406 G.R. No. 176628. March 19, 2012

DOCTRINE:

The application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of sovereign transactions and not in cases of commercial activities or economic affairs.

FACTS:

PTA, an agency of the Department of Tourism, whose main function is to bolster and promote tourism, entered into a contract with Atlantic Erectors, Inc. (AEI) for the construction of the Intramuros Golf Course Expansion Projects for a contract price of P57,954,647.94. The civil works of the project commenced. Since AEI was incapable of constructing the golf course aspect of the project, it entered into a sub-contract agreement with PHILGOLF, a duly organized domestic corporation, to build the golf course amounting to P27,000,000.00. The sub-contract agreement also provides that PHILGOLF shall submit its progress billings directly to PTA and, in turn, PTA shall directly pay PHILGOLF. PHILGOLF filed a collection suit against PTA amounting to P11,820,550.53, plus interest, for the construction of the golf course. PTA, as a government entity, invokes its state immunity.

ISSUE:

WON PTA can invoke state immunity.

HELD:No. The application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of sovereign transactions and not in cases of commercial activities or economic affairs. The State, in entering into a business contract, descends to the level of an individual and is deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued. Since the Intramuros Golf Course Expansion Projects partakes of a proprietary character entered into between PTA and PHILGOLF, PTA cannot avoid its financial liability by merely invoking immunity from suit.SSS VS. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. L-41299. February 21, 1983.Muez

DOCTRINE:

SSS' own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in Court. These words "sue and be sued" embrace all civil process incident to a legal action. So that, even assuming that the SSS, as it claims, enjoys immunity from suit as an entity performing governmental functions, by virtue of the explicit provision of the aforecited enabling law, the Government must be deemed to have waived immunity in respect of the SSS, although it does not thereby concede its liability.

FACTS:

Sometime in March, 1963 the spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio Cruz applied for and were granted a real estate loan by the SSS with their residential lot located in Rizal as collateral. The spouses executed on March 26, 1963 the corresponding real estate mortgage. From the proceeds of the real estate loan the mortgagors constructed their residential house on the mortgaged property and were furnished by the SSS with a passbook to record the monthly payments of their amortizations. The mortgagors, plaintiffs herein, complied with their monthly payments although there were times when delays were incurred in their monthly payments which were due every first five (5) days of the month. On July 9, 1968, defendant SSS filed an application with the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal for the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed by the plaintiffs on the ground, among others:

'That the conditions of the mortgage have been broken since October, 1967 with the default on the part of the mortgagor to pay in full the installments then due and payable on the principal debt and the interest thereon, and, all of the monthly installments due and payable thereafter up to the present date

The Cruz spouses, together with their daughter Lorna C. Cruz, instituted before the Court of First Instance of Rizal an action for damages and attorney's fees against the Social Security System (SSS) and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, alleging, among other things, that they had fully and religiously paid their monthly amortizations and had not defaulted in any payment.

The Trial Court rendered judgment against SSS directing it to pay damages in favor of the plaintiff spouses. On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower courts decision. Hence, the instant petition.

SSS contends, among others, that it is not liable for damages not being a profit-oriented governmental institution but one performing governmental functions.

ISSUE:

WON SSS can be made legally responsible for its acts through a judicial action.

HELD:

Yes. SSS can be made legally responsible for its acts through a judicial action.

To our minds, there should be no question on this score considering that theSSSis a juridical entity with a personality of its own.It has corporate powers separate and distinct from the Government.SSS'own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be sued inCourt. These words "sue and be sued" embrace all civil process incident to a legal action. So that, even assuming that theSSS, as it claims, enjoys immunity from suit as an entity performing governmental functions, by virtue of the explicit provision of the aforecited enabling law, the Government must be deemed to have waived immunity in respect of theSSS, although it does not thereby concede its liability. That statutory law has given to the private citizen a remedy for the enforcement and protection of his rights. TheSSSthereby has been required to submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. Whether theSSSperforms governmental or proprietary functions thus becomes unnecessary to belabor. For by that waiver, a private citizen may bring a suit against it for varied objectives, such as, in this case, to obtain compensation in damages arising from contract, and even for tort.

The proposition that the SSS is not profit-oriented was rejected in the case of SSS Employees' Association vs. Hon. Soriano. But even conceding that the SSS is not, in the main, operated for profit, it cannot be denied that, in so far as contractual loan agreements with private parties are concerned, the SSS enters into them for profit considering that the borrowers pay interest, which is money paid for the use of money, plus other charges.What is of paramount importance in this controversy is that an injustice is not perpetrated and that when damage is caused to a citizen, the latter should have a right of redress particularly when it arises from a purely private and contractual relationship between said individual and the System.

The SC ruled that there was clear negligence on the part of SSS when they mistook the loan account of Socorro J. Cruz for that of private respondent Socorro C. Cruz. Its attention was called to the error, but it adamantly refused to acknowledge its mistake. The SSS can be held liable for nominal damages. This type of damages is not for the purpose of indemnifying private respondents for any loss suffered by them but to vindicate or recognize their rights which have been violated or invaded by petitioner SSS. As to all other damages, the SC deleted them for lack of basis.

BUREAU OF PRINTING VS. THE BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (NLU)G.R. No. L-15751. January 28, 1961.

DOCTRINE:

The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative Code of 1916. Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its objection.

FACTS:

Respondent Bureau of Printing Employees Association (NLU) filed a complaint alleging that Serafin Salvador (Acting Secretary of the Dept. of General Services) and Mariano Ledesma (Director of the Bureau of Printing) have been engaging in unfair labor practice by interfering with, or coercing the employees of the Bureau of Printing, particularly the members of the complaining association, in the exercise of their right to self-organization and discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of their employment in order to discourage them from pursuing their union activities.

Answering the complaint, the petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma denied the charges of unfair labor practices attributed to them and prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioners, by way of affirmative defenses, alleged, among other things, that:1. that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical personality to sue and be sued;1. that said Bureau of Printing is not an industrial concern engaged for the purpose of gain but is an agency of the Republic performing governmental functions

The trial judge of the Industrial Court sustained the jurisdiction of the court on the theory that the functions of the Bureau of Printing are "exclusively proprietary in nature," and, consequently, denied the prayer for dismissal.

Petitioners brought the case to this court through the present petition for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE:

WON Court of Industrial Relations acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner Bureau of Printing.

HELD:

No. The CIR did not acquire jurisdiction over the petitioner Bureau of Printing.

The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such instrumentality of the Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged with the execution of all printing and binding, including work incidental to those processes, required by the National Government and such other work of the same character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the (Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be authorized to undertake . . .." (Sec. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code.) It has no corporate existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the General Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing needs of the Government, it is primarily a service bureau and is obviously, not engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary profit.

This Court has already held in a long line of decisions that the Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the complaint for unfair labor practice filed against institutions or corporations not organized for profit and, consequently, not an industrial or business organization. This is so because the Industrial Peace Act was intended to apply only to industrial employment, and to govern the relations between employers engaged in industry and occupations for purposes of gain, and their industrial employees.

Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. (Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of Court.) Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its objection.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE VS. NLRCG.R. No. 104269. November 11, 1993.

DOCTRINE:

Where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.

FACTS:

The Department of Agriculture (herein petitioner) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Agency in the various premises of the petitioner. On 13 September 1990, several guards of the Sultan Security Agency filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for damages,before the Regional Arbitration Branch X of Cagayan de Oro City,against the Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency.

The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on 31 May 1991, finding herein petitioner jointly and severally liable with sultan Security Agency for the payment of the money claims, aggregating P266,483.91, of the complainant security guards. The petitioner and Sultan Security Agency did not appeal the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Thus, the decision became final and executory.

The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution, commanding the City Sheriff to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the two respondents. The City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the petitioner, i.e., one unit Toyota Hi-Ace, one unit Toyota Mini Cruiser, and one unit Toyota Crown.

A petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction, was filed by the petitioner with the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC"), Cagayan de Oro. The petition was dismissed for lack of basis.

Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Certiorari. Petitioner asserts the NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.

ISSUE:1. WON The Department of Agriculture is immune from suit pursuant to the doctrine of Non-suability of the State.2. WON a Writ of Execution may be issued against it.HELD:1. No. The doctrine only conveys, "the state may not be sued without its consent;" its clear import then is that the State may at times be sued.2. No. When the State gives its consent to be sued, it does not thereby necessarily consent to an unrestrained execution against it.REASONS:1. The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys, "the state may not be sued without its consent;" its clear import then is that the State may at times be sued.The States' consent may be given either expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general lawor a special law.In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, (AN ACT DEFINING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS MAY BE SUED, [1923]) , where the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties."Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaimor when it enters into a contract.In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, relied upon by theNLRCand the private respondents, is not, however, without qualification. Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign functions and another which is done in its proprietary capacity.In US vs Ruiz, This court held that: The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contracts relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.

In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character.

But, be that as it may, the claims of private respondents, i.e., for underpayment of wages, holiday pay, overtime pay and similar other items, arising from the Contract for Security Services, clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083, gives the consent of the State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, . . ." Pursuant, however, toCommonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 1445, the money claim should first be brought to the Commission on Audit.2. As to the Writ of Execution, when the State gives its consent to be sued, it does not thereby necessarily consent to an unrestrained execution against it. Tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has a liability.In Republic vs. Villasor this Court, in nullifying the issuance of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and executory judgment, has explained, thus

The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.

SANDERS vs. VERIDIANOG.R. No. L-46930. June 10, 1988.Murillo

DOCTRINE:Acts of public officers in the discharge of their official duties are covered under the state immunity doctrine.

FACTS:

Sanders was the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo City. Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base. Private respondents were both employed as gameroom attendants in the special services department of the NAVSTA. On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from full-time part-time. Their reaction was to protest this conversion and to institute grievance proceedings under the U.S. Department of Defense. The result was a recommendation for the reinstatement of the private respondents to permanent full-time status plus backwages.

In a letter addressed to petitioners, Sanders disagreed with the said result and asked for the rejection of the recommendation. The letter contained the statements that: a) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and Wyers have proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be difficult employees to supervise;" among others.

The petitioners then claimed that the letters contained libelous imputations that had exposed them to ridicule and caused them mental anguish. The private respondents also made it clear that the petitioners were being sued in their private or personal capacity. However, the petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity.

ISSUE:

W/N petitioners are covered under the state immunity doctrine

HELD:

Yes. SC found the complained acts were done by petitioners in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services, had supervision over its personnel, and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. It is not disputed that the letter he had written was in fact a reply to a request from his superior for more information regarding the case of the private respondents. As for Moreau, what he is claimed to have done was write the Chief of Naval Personnel for concurrence with the conversion of the private respondents' type of employment even before the grievance proceedings commenced. This act is clearly official in nature.

Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have to conclude that the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As they have acted on behalf of that government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, that is responsible for their acts. There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued.

REPUBLIC VS SANDOVALG.R. No. 84607. March 19, 1993.

DOCTRINE:

The State's recommendation to indemnify the victims of a certain case does not amount to waiver of immunity from suits.

FACTS:

Mendiola massacre. Basically, this was about the farmers' continuing struggle for genuine agrarian reform. In 1988, they held a massive rally - together with progressive groups and thousands of marchers - which resulted to a deadly clash between civilians and military/policemen. 12 were confirmed dead, all of whom were from the side of the protesting civilians. Due to this, the commission formed by President Aquino (to probe the incident) decided to make recommendations such as the prosecution of erring officers, policemen, and civilians.

The last and the most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the deceased and wounded victims of the Mendiola incident to be compensated by the government. It was this portion where petitioners invoke in their claim for damages from the government. The petitioners were not able to recover anything from the government years after.

ISSUE:

W/N petitioners can sue the State for damages after said recommendation

HELD:

No. The recommendation made by the Commission regarding indemnification of the heirs of the deceased and the victims of the incident by the government does not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State. In effect, whatever may be the findings of the Commission, the same shall only serve as the cause of action in the event that any party decides to litigate his/her claim. Therefore, the Commission is merely a preliminary venue. The Commission is not the end in itself. Whatever recommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the State immediately, such recommendation not having become final and executory. This is precisely the essence of it being a fact-finding body.Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that then President Aquino may have done or said, the same are not tantamount to the State having waived its immunity from suit. The President's act of joining the marchers, days after the incident, does not mean that there was an admission by the State of any liability.

US vs RUIZG.R. No. L-35645. May 22, 1985

DOCTRINE:

Acts devoted to essential aspects of the state are also covered under State immunity

FACTS:

The USA had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the military bases agreement between the Philippines and the US. Respondent alleges that it won in the bidding conducted by the US for the construction of wharves in said base that was merely awarded to another group. For this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him against the US.

ISSUE:

W/N the US naval base, in bidding for said contracts, exercised governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity

HELD:

Yes. The traditional role of the state immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is necessary consequence of the principle of independence and equality of states. However, the rules of international law are not petrified; they are continually and evolving and because the activities of states have multiplied. It has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts and private, commercial and proprietory acts. The result is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign and governmental acts.

In this case, the projects are integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both US and Philippines. Indisputably, it is a function of the government of the highest order. They are not utilized for, nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

RCBC vs. De CastroG.R. No. L-34548. November 29, 1988GOMEZ

FACTS:

In a civil case entitled Badoc Planters, Inc. vs. Phil. Virginia Tobacco Administration, et al., the CFI of Rizal, Quezon City Branch IX issued an Order (Partial Judgment) on January 15, 1970 by the then Presiding Judge San Diego. The said order required defendants to pay jointly and severally, the plaintiff Badoc Planters, Inc.

Therafter, Judge San Diego was promoted as a Justice of the CA so herein public respodent (Judge De Castro) took over and acted on the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion filed by BADOC. Judge De Castro granted said Motion.

Accordingly, the Branch Clerk of Court on the very same day, issued a Writ of Execution addressed to Special Sheriff Faustino Rigor, who then issued a Notice of Garnishment addressed to the General Manager and/or Cashier of RCBC, requesting a reply within five (5) days to said garnishment as to any property which the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA) might have in the possession or control of petitioner or of any debts owing by the petitioner to said defendant. Upon receipt of such Notice, RCBC notified PVTA thereof to enable the PVTA to take the necessary steps for the protection of its own interest.

Respondent PVTA filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was eventually granted. The court set aside the Orders of Execution and of Payment and the Writ of Execution. It likewise ordered petitioner and BADOC "to restore, jointly and severally, the account of PVTA with the said bank in the same condition and state it was before the issuance of the aforesaid Orders by reimbursing the PVTA of the amount of P 206, 916.76 with interests at the legal rate from January 27, 1970 until fully paid to the account of the PVTA.

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by herein petitioner was denied. It then appealed to the CA. CA in turn certified this case to the SC as it involves purely questions of law.

ISSUE:

WON PVTA funds are public funds exempt from garnishment

HELD:

PVTA funds are subject to garnishment.

RA No. 2265 created the PVTA as an ordinary corporation with all the attributes of a corporate entity subject to the provisions of the Corporation Law. Hence, it possesses the power "to sue and be sued" and "to acquire and hold such assets and incur such liabilities resulting directly from operations authorized by the provisions of this Act or as essential to the proper conduct of such operations."

Among the specific powers vested in the PVTA are: 1) to buy Virginia tobacco grown in the Philippines for resale to local bona fide tobacco manufacturers and leaf tobacco dealers [Section 4(b), R.A. No. 2265]; 2) to contracts of any kind as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of its purpose with any person, firm or corporation, with the Government of the Philippines or with any foreign government, subject to existing laws [Section 4(h), R.A. No. 22651; and 3) generally, to exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act [Section 4(k), R.A. No. 2265.]

From the foregoing, it is clear that PVTA has been endowed with a personality distinct and separate from the government which owns and controls it. Accordingly, this Court has heretofore declared that the funds of the PVTA can be garnished since "funds of public corporation which can sue and be sued were not exempt from garnishment."In National Shipyards and Steel Corp. v. CIR [G.R. No. L-17874, August 31, 1964, 8 SCRA 781], this Court held that the allegation to the effect that the funds of the NASSCO are public funds of the government and that as such, the same may not be garnished, attached or levied upon is untenable for, as a government-owned or controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the government. This court has likewise ruled that other govemment-owned and controlled corporations like National Coal Company, the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA), the National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO) the National Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC) and the Price Stabilization Council (PRISCO) which possess attributes similar to those of the PVTA are clothed with personalities of their own, separate and distinct from that of the government [National Coal Company v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 46 Phil. 583 (1924); Bacani and Matoto v. National Coconut Corporation et al., 100 Phil. 471 (1956); Reotan v. National Rice & Corn Corporation, G.R. No. L-16223, February 27, 1962, 4 SCRA 418.] The rationale in vesting it with a separate personality is not difficult to find. It is well-settled that when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation [Manila Hotel Employees' Association v. Manila Hotel Co. and CIR, 73 Phil. 734 (1941).]

Inasmuch as the Tobacco Fund, a special fund, was by law, earmarked specifically to answer obligations incurred by PVTA in connection with its proprietary and commercial operations authorized under the law, it follows that said funds may be proceeded against by ordinary judicial processes such as execution and garnishment. If such funds cannot be executed upon or garnished pursuant to a judgment sustaining the liability of the PVTA to answer for its obligations, then the purpose of the law in creating the PVTA would be defeated. For it was declared to be a national policy, with respect to the local Virginia tobacco industry, to encourage the production of local Virginia tobacco of the qualities needed and in quantities marketable in both domestic and foreign markets, to establish this industry on an efficient and economic basis, and to create a climate conducive to local cigarette manufacture of the qualities desired by the consuming public, blending imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco to improve the quality of locally manufactured cigarettes [Section 1, Republic Act No. 4155.]MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI VS. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. Nos. 89898-99. October 1, 1990

FACTS:

The present petition for review is an off-shoot of expropriation proceedings initiated by petitioner Municipality of Makati against private respondent Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc., Home Building System & Realty Corporation and one Arceli P. Jo, involving a parcel of land and improvements thereon located at Mayapis St., San Antonio Village, Makati and registered in the name of Arceli P. Jo.

An action for eminent domain was filed on May 20, 1986. Attached to petitioner's complaint was a certification that a bank account had been opened with the PNB Buendia Branch under petitioner's name containing the sum of P417,510.00, made pursuant to the provisions of P.D. No. 42. After due hearing where the parties presented their respective appraisal reports regarding the value of the property, respondent RTC judge rendered a decision on June 4, 1987, fixing the appraised value of the property at P5,291,666.00, and ordering petitioner to pay this amount minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00 which was earlier released to private respondent.After this decision became final and executory, private respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. This motion was granted by respondent RTC judge. After issuance of the writ of execution, a Notice of Garnishment dated January 14, 1988 was served by respondent sheriff Silvino R. Pastrana upon the manager of the PNB Buendia Branch. However, respondent sheriff was informed that a "hold code" was placed on the account of petitioner.Private respondent filed a motion praying that an order be issued directing the bank to deliver to said sheriff the unpaid balance. On the other hand, petitioner filed a motion to lift the garnishment, on the ground that the manner of payment of the expropriation amount should be done in installments which the respondent RTC judge failed to state in his decision.Pending resolution of the above motions, petitioner filed a Manifestation informing the court that the subject property is now owned by PS Bank, Inc (PSB). Thereafter, respondent trial judge subsequently issued an order which among other things ordered PNB Buendia Branch to immediately release to PSB the corresponding balance of P4,953,506.45.Petitioner field a motion for reconsideration (MFR). Petitioner contended that its funds at the PNB Buendia Branch could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law, citing the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio [G.R. No. L-20322, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 899].

Respondent judge denied petitioners MFR. On appeal, the CA dismissed the same for lack of merit.

On appeal to the SC, Petitioner alleged for the first time that it has actually 2 accounts with PNB Buendia Branch:(1) Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 exclusively for the expropriation of the subject property, with an outstanding balance of P99,743.94.(2) Account No. S/A 263-530850-7 for statutory obligations and other purposes of the municipal government, with a balance of P170,098,421.72, as of July 12, 1989.Admitting that its PNB Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 was specifically opened for expropriation proceedings it had initiated over the subject property, petitioner poses no objection to the garnishment or the levy under execution of the funds deposited therein amounting to P99,743.94. However, it is petitioner's main contention that inasmuch as the assailed orders of respondent RTC judge involved the net amount of P4,965,506.45, the funds garnished by respondent sheriff in excess of P99,743.94, which are public funds earmarked for the municipal government's other statutory obligations, are exempted from execution without the proper appropriation required under the law.

ISSUE:

WON public funds earmarked for the municipal governments other statutory obligations, are exempted from execution without the proper appropriation required under the law

HELD:

There is merit in this contention. The funds deposited in the second PNB Account No. S/A 263-530850-7 are public funds of the municipal government. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute.

More particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether real or personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution.

The foregoing rule finds application in the case at bar. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987, less the sum of P99,743.94 deposited in Account No. S/A 265-537154-3, no levy under execution may be validly effected on the public funds of petitioner deposited in Account No. S/A 263-530850-7.

Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no legal recourse. Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefor [Viuda De Tan Toco v. The Municipal Council of Iloilo, supra; Baldivia v. Lota, 107 Phil. 1099 (1960); Yuviengco v. Gonzales, 108 Phil. 247 (1960)].

The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice. In the case at bar, considering that valuable property has been taken, the compensation to be paid fixed and the municipality is in full possession and utilizing the property for public purpose, for three (3) years, the Court finds that the municipality has had more than reasonable time to pay full compensation.

FONTANILLA VS. MALIAMANG.R. No. L-55963. December 1, 1989

FACTS:

On August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pickup owned and operated by respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a government agency, then driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said agency as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners, and Restituto Deligo, at Maasin, San Jose City along the Maharlika Highway. As a result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo were injured and brought to the San Jose City Emergency Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred to the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where he died.

Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent NIA who, at the time of the accident, was a licensed professional driver and who qualified for employment as such regular driver of respondent after having passed the written and oral examinations on traffic rules and maintenance of vehicles given by National Irrigation Administration authorities.

Spouses Fontanilla filed a case for damages (death benefits) and actual expenses for the death of their son. CFI of Nueva Ecija ruled in favor of spouses Fontanilla. NIA then filed its motion for reconsideration which CFI denied. NIA then appealed to CA.

ISSUE:

WON the award of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees is legally proper in a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict which resulted in the death of the son of herein petitioners

HELD:

The liability of the State has two aspects, namely:

1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special agents only. 2. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises) where it becomes liable as an ordinary employer.

In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for the damage caused by the tortious acts or conduct of its special agent.

Under paragrah 6 of Art. 2180, the State has voluntarily assumed liability for acts done through special agents. The State's agent, if a public official, must not only be specially commissioned to do a particular task but that such task must be foreign to said official's usual governmental functions. If the State's agent is not a public official, and is commissioned to perform non-governmental functions, then the State assumes the role of an ordinary employer and will be held liable as such for its agent's tort. Where the government commissions a private individual for a special governmental task, it is acting through a special agent within the meaning of the provision.The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government exercising proprietary functions.

Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridical personality and not a mere agency of the government. Since it is a corporate body performing non-governmental functions, it now becomes liable for the damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act of its driver-employee. In this particular case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and as such, it becomes answerable for damages.This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon the existence of negligence on the part of respondent NIA. The negligence referred to here is the negligence of supervision.

At this juncture, the matter of due diligence on the part of respondent NIA becomes a crucial issue in determining its liability since it has been established that respondent is a government agency performing proprietary functions and as such, it assumes the posture of an ordinary employer which, under Par. 5 of Art. 2180, is responsible for the damages caused by its employees provided that it has failed to observe or exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of the driver.

It should be emphasized that the accident happened along the Maharlika National Road within the city limits of San Jose City, an urban area. Considering the fact that the victim was thrown 50 meters away from the point of impact, there is a strong indication that driver Garcia was driving at a high speed. This is confirmed by the fact that the pick-up suffered substantial and heavy damage as above-described and the fact that the NIA group was then "in a hurry to reach the campsite as early as possible", as shown by their not stopping to find out what they bumped as would have been their normal and initial reaction.

Evidently, there was negligence in the supervision of the driver for the reason that they were travelling at a high speed within the city limits and yet the supervisor of the group, Ely Salonga, failed to caution and make the driver observe the proper and allowed speed limit within the city. Under the situation, such negligence is further aggravated by their desire to reach their destination without even checking whether or not the vehicle suffered damage from the object it bumped, thus showing imprudence and reckelessness on the part of both the driver and the supervisor in the group.Significantly, this Court has ruled that even if the employer can prove the diligence in the selection and supervision (the latter aspect has not been established herein) of the employee, still if he ratifies the wrongful acts, or take no step to avert further damage, the employer would still be liable.PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS. GRP PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN, ET AL.G.R. No. 183591. October 14, 2008GOMEZ

FACTS:

On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, the SC issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same.Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic principles and agenda on the following aspects of the negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. With regard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply agreed "that the same be discussed further by the Parties in their next meeting."

On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel