Pubcorp Cases

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FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 145368. April 12, 2002] SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, respondent. D E C I S I O N KAPUNAN, J.: On June 13, 1991, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 223 constituting a Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebration in 1998. The Committee was mandated to take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress.[1] Subsequently, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 128, reconstituting the Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998. It renamed the Committee as the National Centennial Commission. Appointed to chair the reconstituted Commission was Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel. Presidents Diosdado M. Macapagal and Corazon C. Aquino were named Honorary Chairpersons.[2] Characterized as an ad-hoc body, the existence of the Commission shall terminate upon the completion of all activities related to the Centennial Celebrations.[3] Like its predecessor Committee, the Commission was tasked to take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress. Per Section 6 of the Executive Order, the Commission was also charged with the responsibility to prepare, for approval of the President, a Comprehensive Plan for the Centennial Celebrations within six (6) months from the effectivity of the Executive Order. E.O. No. 128 also contained provisions for staff support and funding: Sec. 3. The Commission shall be provided with technical and administrative staff support by a Secretariat to be composed of, among others, detailed personnel from the Presidential Management Staff, the National Commission for Culture and the Arts, and the National Historical Institute. Said Secretariat shall be headed by a full time Executive Director who shall be designated by the President. Sec. 4. The Commission shall be funded with an initial budget to be drawn from the Department of Tourism and the presidents Contingent Fund, in an amount to be recommended by the Commission, and approved by the President. Appropriations for succeeding years shall be incorporated in the budget of the Office of the President. Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo 98 Corporation (Expocorp) was created.[4] Petitioner was among the nine (9) Expocorp incorporators, who were also its first nine (9) directors. Petitioner was elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer. On August 5, 1998, Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng delivered a privilege speech in the Senate denouncing alleged anomalies in the construction and operation of the Centennial Exposition Project at the Clark Special Economic Zone. Upon motion of Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Cosetengs privilege speech was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation (The Blue Ribbon Committee) and several other Senate Committees for investigation. On February 24, 1999, President Joseph Estrada issued Administrative Order No. 35, creating an ad hoc and independent citizens committee to investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding the Philippine centennial projects, including its component activities. Former Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag was appointed to chair the Committee. On March 23, 1999, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed with the Secretary of the Senate its Committee Final Report No. 30 dated February 26, 1999. Among the Committees recommendations was the prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Salvador Laurel, chair of NCC and of EXPOCORP for violating the rules on public bidding, relative to the award of centennial contracts to AK (Asia Construction & Development Corp.); for exhibiting manifest bias in the issuance of the NTP (Notice to Proceed) to AK to construct the FR (Freedom Ring) even in the absence of a valid contract that has caused material injury to government and for participating in the scheme to preclude audit by COA of the funds infused by the government for the implementation of the said contracts all in violation of the anti-graft law.[5] Later, on November 5, 1999, the Saguisag Committee issued its own report. It recommended the further investigation by the Ombudsman, and indictment, in proper cases of, among others, NCC Chair Salvador H. Laurel for violations of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, Section 4(a) in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713, and Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. The Reports of the Senate Blue Ribbon and the Saguisag Committee were apparently referred to the Fact-finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman. On January 27, 2000, the Bureau issued its Evaluation Report, recommending: 1. that a formal complaint be filed and preliminary investigation be conducted before the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB), Office of the Ombudsman against former NCC and EXPOCORP chair Salvador H. Laurel, former EXPOCORP President Teodoro Q. Pea and AK President Edgardo H. Angeles for violation of Sec. 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended in relation to PD 1594 and COA Rules and Regulations; 2. That the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau of this Office, act as the nominal complainant.[6] In an Order dated April 10, 2000, Pelagio S. Apostol, OIC-Director of the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau, directed petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit and those of his witnesses. On April 24, 2000, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion to Dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of said office. In an Order dated June 13, 2000, the Ombudsman denied petitioners motion to dismiss. On July 3, 2000, petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the June 13, 2000 Order but the motion was denied in an Order dated October 5, 2000.

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On October 25, 2000, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari. On November 14, 2000, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau issued a resolution finding probable cause to indict respondents SALVADOR H. LAUREL and TEODORO Q. PEA before the Sandiganbayan for conspiring to violate Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to Republic Act No. 1594. The resolution also directed that an information for violation of the said law be filed against Laurel and Pea. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the resolution with respect to Laurel but dismissed the charge against Pea. In a Resolution dated September 24, 2001, the Court issued a temporary restraining order, commanding respondents to desist from filing any information before the Sandiganbayan or any court against petitioner for alleged violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. On November 14, 2001, the Court, upon motion of petitioner, heard the parties in oral argument. Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a public officer because: A. EXPOCORP, THE CORPORATION CHAIRED BY PETITIONER LAUREL WHICH UNDERTOOK THE FREEDOM RING PROJECT IN CONNECTION WITH WHICH VIOLATIONS OF THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES WERE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED, WAS A PRIVATE CORPORATION, NOT A GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATION. B. THE NATIONAL CENTENNIAL COMMISSION (NCC) WAS NOT A PUBLIC OFFICE. C. PETITIONER, BOTH AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NCC AND OF EXPOCORP WAS NOT A PUBLIC OFFICER AS DEFINED UNDER THE ANTI-GRAFT & CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT.[7] In addition, petitioner in his reply[8] invokes this Courts decision in Uy vs. Sandiganbayan,[9] where it was held that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman was limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, i.e., over public officers of Grade 27 and higher. As petitioners position was purportedly not classified as Grade 27 or higher, the Sandiganbayan and, consequently, the Ombudsman, would have no jurisdiction over him. This last contention is easily dismissed. In the Courts decision in Uy, we held that it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the corresponding information/s against petitioner in the regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. In its Resolution of February 22, 2000, the Court expounded: The clear import of such pronouncement is to recognize the authority of the State and regular provincial and city prosecutors under the Department of Justice to have control over prosecution of cases falling within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The investigation and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman relate to cases rightfully falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770 (An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman, and for other purposes) which vests upon the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan And this is further buttressed by Section 11 (4a) of R.A. 6770 which emphasizes that the Office of the Special Prosecutor shall have the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Thus, repeated references to the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction clearly serve to limit the Ombudsmans and Special Prosecutors authority to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. [Emphasis in the original.] The foregoing ruling in Uy, however, was short-lived. Upon motion for clarification by the Ombudsman in the same case, the Court set aside the foregoing pronouncement in its Resolution dated March 20, 2001. The Court explained the rationale for this reversal: The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause any illegal act or omission of any public official is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee. The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15(1) giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and Section 11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases. Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases. The grant of this authority does not necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and employees by other courts. The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and employees. Indeed, it must be stressed that the powers granted by the legislature to the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of office. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute

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is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and employees of the government and to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him work under his supervision and control. The law likewise allows him to direct the Special Prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11 (4c) of RA 6770. The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees is one of the most important functions of the Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770, the Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with such power to make him a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public office. A review of the development of our Ombudsman law reveals this intent. [Emphasis in the original.] Having disposed of this contention, we proceed to the principal grounds upon which petitioner relies. We first address the argument that petitioner, as Chair of the NCC, was not a public officer. The Constitution[10] describes the Ombudsman and his Deputies as protectors of the people, who shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Among the awesome powers, functions, and duties vested by the Constitution[11] upon the Office of the Ombudsman is to [i]nvestigate any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. The foregoing constitutional provisions are substantially reproduced in R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989. Sections 13 and 15(1) of said law respectively provide: SEC. 13. Mandate. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people shall act promptly on complaints file in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people. SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases; x x x. The coverage of the law appears to be limited only by Section 16, in relation to Section 13, supra: SEC 16. Applicability. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office. In sum, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance by a public officer or employee of the government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations.[12] Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989, however, defines who public officers are. A definition of public officers cited in jurisprudence[13] is that provided by Mechem, a recognized authority on the subject: A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.[14] The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an office.[15] Petitioner submits that some of these characteristics are not present in the position of NCC Chair, namely: (1) the delegation of sovereign functions; (2) salary, since he purportedly did not receive any compensation; and (3) continuance, the tenure of the NCC being temporary. Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government as [t]he most important characteristic in determining whether a position is a public office or not. The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or contract is that the creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer.[16] Did E.O. 128 delegate the NCC with some of the sovereign functions of government? Certainly, the law did not delegate upon the NCC functions that can be described as legislative or judicial. May the functions of the NCC then be described as executive? We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.[17] The executive function, therefore, concerns the implementation of the policies as set forth by law. The Constitution provides in Article XIV (Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports) thereof:

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Sec. 15. Arts and letters shall enjoy the patronage of the State. The State shall conserve, promote, and popularize the nations historical and cultural heritage and resources, as well as artistic creations. In its preamble, A.O. No. 223 states the purposes for the creation of the Committee for the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998: Whereas, the birth of the Republic of the Philippines is to be celebrated in 1998, and the centennial presents an important vehicle for fostering nationhood and a strong sense of Filipino identity; Whereas, the centennial can effectively showcase Filipino heritage and thereby strengthen Filipino values; Whereas, the success of the Centennial Celebrations may be insured only through long-range planning and continuous developmental programming; Whereas, the active participation of the private sector in all areas of special expertise and capability, particularly in communication and information dissemination, is necessary for long-range planning and continuous developmental programming; Whereas, there is a need to create a body which shall initiate and undertake the primary task of harnessing the multisectoral components from the business, cultural, and business sectors to serve as effective instruments from the launching and overseeing of this long-term project; x x x. E.O. No. 128, reconstituting the Committee for the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998, cited the need to strengthen the said Committee to ensure a more coordinated and synchronized celebrations of the Philippine Centennial and wider participation from the government and non-government or private organizations. It also referred to the need to rationalize the relevance of historical links with other countries. The NCC was precisely created to execute the foregoing policies and objectives, to carry them into effect. Thus, the Commission was vested with the following functions: (a) To undertake the overall study, conceptualization, formulation and implementation of programs and projects on the utilization of culture, arts, literature and media as vehicles for history, economic endeavors, and reinvigorating the spirit of national unity and sense of accomplishment in every Filipino in the context of the Centennial Celebrations. In this regard, it shall include a Philippine National Exposition 98 within Metro Manila, the original eight provinces, and Clark Air Base as its major venues; (b) To act as principal coordinator for all the activities related to awareness and celebration of the Centennial; (c) To serve as the clearing house for the preparation and dissemination of all information about the plans and events for the Centennial Celebrations; (d) To constitute working groups which shall undertake the implementation of the programs and projects; (e) To prioritize the refurbishment of historical sites and structures nationwide. In this regard, the Commission shall formulate schemes (e.g. lease-maintained-and-transfer, build-operate-transfer, and similar arrangements) to ensure the preservation and maintenance of the historical sites and structures; (f) To call upon any government agency or instrumentality and corporation, and to invite private individuals and organizations to assist it in the performance of its tasks; and, (g) Submit regular reports to the President on the plans, programs, projects, activities as well as the status of the preparations for the Celebration.[18] It bears noting the President, upon whom the executive power is vested,[19] created the NCC by executive order. Book III (Office of the President), Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power), Section 2 describes the nature of executive orders: SEC. 2. Executive Orders. Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders. [Underscoring ours.] Furthermore, the NCC was not without a role in the countrys economic development, especially in Central Luzon. Petitioner himself admitted as much in the oral arguments before this Court: MR. JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO: And in addition to that expounded by Former President Ramos, dont you agree that the task of the centennial commission was also to focus on the long term over all socio economic development of the zone and Central Luzon by attracting investors in the area because of the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo. FORMER VICE PRESIDENT SALVADOR H. LAUREL: I am glad Your Honor touched on that because that is something I wanted to touch on by lack of material time I could not but that is a very important point. When I was made Chairman I wanted the Expo to be in Batangas because I am a Batangeo but President Ramos said Mr. Vice President the Central Luzon is suffering, suffering because of the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo let us try to catalize [sic] economic recovery in that area by putting this Expo in Clark Field and so it was done I agreed and Your Honor if I may also mention we wanted to generate employment aside from attracting business investments and employment. And the Estrada administration decided to junk this project there 48, 40 thousand people who lost job, they were employed in Expo. And our target was to provide 75 thousand jobs. It would have

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really calibrated, accelerated the development of Central Luzon. Now, I think they are going back to that because they had the airport and there are plan to revive the Expo site into key park which was the original plan. There can hardly be any dispute that the promotion of industrialization and full employment is a fundamental state policy.[20] Petitioner invokes the ruling of this Court in Torio vs. Fontanilla[21] that the holding by a municipality of a town fiesta is a proprietary rather than a governmental function. Petitioner argues that the holding of a nationwide celebration which marked the nations 100th birthday may be likened to a national fiesta which involved only the exercise of the national governments proprietary function.[22] In Torio, we held: [Section 2282 of the Chapter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code] simply gives authority to the municipality to [celebrate] a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed, was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance, the maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the town, nonetheless it is [a] private undertaking as distinguished from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are for public service. As stated earlier, there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the true nature of an undertaking or function of a municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular case are to be considered and will be decisive. The basic element, however beneficial to the public the undertaking may be, is that it is government in essence, otherwise, the function becomes private or propriety in character. Easily, no governmental or public policy of the state is involved in the celebration of a town fiesta. Torio, however, did not intend to lay down an all-encompassing doctrine. Note that the Court cautioned that there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the true nature of an undertaking or function of a municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular case are to be considered and will be decisive. Thus, in footnote 15 of Torio, the Court, citing an American case, illustrated how the surrounding circumstances plus the political, social, and cultural backgrounds could produce a conclusion different from that in Torio: We came across an interesting case which shows that surrounding circumstances plus the political, social, and cultural backgrounds may have a decisive bearing on this question. The case of Pope v. City of New Haven, et al. was an action to recover damages for personal injuries caused during a Fourth of July fireworks display resulting in the death of a bystander alleged to have been caused by defendants negligence. The defendants demurred to the complaint invoking the defense that the city was engaged in the performance of a public governmental duty from which it received no pecuniary benefit and for negligence in the performance of which no statutory liability is imposed. This demurrer was sustained by the Superior Court of New Haven Country. Plaintiff sought to amend his complaint to allege that the celebration was for the corporate advantage of the city. This was denied. In affirming the order, the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut held inter alia: Municipal corporations are exempt from liability for the negligent performance of purely public governmental duties, unless made liable by statute. A municipality corporation, which under permissive authority of its charter or of statute, conducted a public Fourth of July celebration, including a display of fireworks, and sent up a bomb intended to explode in the air, but which failed to explode until it reached the ground, and then killed a spectator, was engaged in the performance of a governmental duty. (99 A.R. 51) This decision was concurred in by three Judges while two dissented. At any rate the rationale of the Majority Opinion is evident from [this] excerpt: July 4th, when that date falls upon Sunday, July 5th, is made a public holiday, called Independence Day, by our statutes. All or nearly all of the other states have similar statutes. While there is no United States statute making a similar provision, the different departments of the government recognize, and have recognized since the government was established, July 4th as a national holiday. Throughout the country it has been recognized and celebrated as such. These celebrations, calculated to entertain and instruct the people generally and to arouse and stimulate patriotic sentiments and love of country, frequently take the form of literary exercises consisting of patriotic speeches and the reading of the Constitution, accompanied by a musical program including patriotic air sometimes preceded by the firing of cannon and followed by fireworks. That such celebrations are of advantage to the general public and their promotion a proper subject of legislation can hardly be questioned. x x x Surely, a town fiesta cannot compare to the National Centennial Celebrations. The Centennial Celebrations was meant to commemorate the birth of our nation after centuries of struggle against our former colonial master, to memorialize the liberation of our people from oppression by a foreign power. 1998 marked 100 years of independence and sovereignty as one united nation. The Celebrations was an occasion to reflect upon our history and reinvigorate our patriotism. As A.O. 223 put it, it was a vehicle for fostering nationhood and a strong sense of Filipino identity, an opportunity to showcase Filipino heritage and thereby strengthen Filipino values. The significance of the Celebrations could not have been lost on petitioner, who remarked during the hearing: Oh, yes, certainly the State is interested in the unity of the people, we wanted to rekindle the love for freedom, love for country, that is the over-all goal that has to make everybody feel proud that he is a Filipino, proud of our history, proud of what our forefather did in their time. x x x. Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public office, and petitioner, as its Chair, is a public officer. That petitioner allegedly did not receive any compensation during his tenure is of little consequence. A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of the position. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good.[23] Hence, the office of petitioner as NCC Chair may be characterized as an honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative office or an office of profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation or fees are attached.[24] But it is a public office, nonetheless. Neither is the fact that the NCC was characterized by E.O. No. 128 as an ad-hoc body make said commission less of a public office.

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The term office, it is said, embraces the idea of tenure and duration, and certainly a position which is merely temporary and local cannot ordinarily be considered an office. But, says Chief Justice Marshall, if a duty be a continuing one, which is defined by rules prescribed by the government and not by contract, which an individual is appointed by government to perform, who enters on the duties pertaining to his station without any contract defining them, if those duties continue though the person be changed, -- it seems very difficult to distinguish such a charge or employment from an office of the person who performs the duties from an officer. At the same time, however, this element of continuance can not be considered as indispensable, for, if the other elements are present it can make no difference, says Pearson, C.J., whether there be but one act or a series of acts to be done, -- whether the office expires as soon as the one act is done, or is to be held for years or during good behavior.[25] Our conclusion that petitioner is a public officer finds support in In Re Corliss.[26] There the Supreme Court of Rhode Island ruled that the office of Commissioner of the United States Centennial Commission is an office of trust as to disqualify its holder as elector of the United States President and Vice-President. (Under Article II of the United States Constitution, a person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States is disqualified from being appointed an elector.) x x x. We think a Commissioner of the United States Centennial Commission holds an office of trust under the United States, and that he is therefore disqualified for the office of elector of President and Vice-President of the United States. The commission was created under a statute of the United States approved March 3, 1871. That statute provides for the holding of an exhibition of American and foreign arts, products, and manufactures, under the auspices of the government of the United States, and for the constitution of a commission, to consist of more than one delegate from each State and from each Territory of the United States, whose functions shall continue until close of the exhibition, and whose duty it shall be to prepare and superintend the execution of the plan for holding the exhibition. Under the statute the commissioners are appointed by the President of the United States, on the nomination of the governor of the States and Territories respectively. Various duties were imposed upon the commission, and under the statute provision was to be made for it to have exclusive control of the exhibit before the President should announce, by proclamation, the date and place of opening and holding the exhibition. By an act of Congress approved June 1st, 1872, the duties and functions of the commission were further increased and defined. That act created a corporation, called The Centennial Board of Finance, to cooperate with the commission and to raise and disburse the funds. It was to be organized under the direction of the commission. The seventh section of the act provides that the grounds for exhibition shall be prepared and the buildings erected by the corporation, in accordance with plans which shall have been adopted by the United States Centennial Commission; and the rules and regulations of said corporation, governing rates for entrance and admission fees, or otherwise affecting the rights, privileges, or interests of the exhibitors, or of the public, shall be fixed and established by the United States Centennial Commission; and no grant conferring rights or privileges of any description connected with said grounds or buildings, or relating to said exhibition or celebration, shall be made without the consent of the United States Centennial Commission, and said commission shall have power to control, change, or revoke all such grants, and shall appoint all judges and examiners and award all premiums. The tenth section of the act provides that it shall be the duty of the United States Centennial Commission to supervise the closing up of the affairs of said corporation, to audit its accounts, and submit in a report to the President of the United States the financial results of the centennial exhibition. It is apparent from this statement, which is but partial, that the duties and functions of the commission were various, delicate, and important; that they could be successfully performed only by men of large experience and knowledge of affairs; and that they were not merely subordinate and provisional, but in the highest degree authoritative, discretionary, and final in their character. We think that persons performing such duties and exercising such functions, in pursuance of statutory direction and authority, are not to be regarded as mere employees, agents, or committee men, but that they are, properly speaking, officers, and that the places which they hold are offices. It appears, moreover, that they were originally regarded as officers by Congress; for the act under which they were appointed declares, section 7, that no compensation for services shall be paid to the commissioners or other officers, provided for in this act, from the treasury of the United States. The only other officers provided for were the alternates appointed to serve as commissioners when the commissioners were unable to attend. Having arrived at the conclusion that the NCC performs executive functions and is, therefore, a public office, we need no longer delve at length on the issue of whether Expocorp is a private or a public corporation. Even assuming that Expocorp is a private corporation, petitioners position as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Expocorp arose from his Chairmanship of the NCC. Consequently, his acts or omissions as CEO of Expocorp must be viewed in the light of his powers and functions as NCC Chair.[27] Finally, it is contended that since petitioner supposedly did not receive any compensation for his services as NCC or Expocorp Chair, he is not a public officer as defined in Republic Act No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and is, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. Respondent seeks to charge petitioner with violation of Section 3 (e) of said law, which reads: SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. A public officer, under R.A. No. 3019, is defined by Section 2 of said law as follows: SEC. 2. Definition of terms. As used in this Act, the term x x x

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(b) Public officer includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government as defined in the preceding paragraph. [Emphasis supplied.] It is clear from Section 2 (b), above, that the definition of a public officer is expressly limited to the application of R.A. No. 3019. Said definition does not apply for purposes of determining the Ombudsmans jurisdiction, as defined by the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989. Moreover, the question of whether petitioner is a public officer under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act involves the appreciation of evidence and interpretation of law, matters that are best resolved at trial. To illustrate, the use of the term includes in Section 2 (b) indicates that the definition is not restrictive.[28] The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is just one of several laws that define public officers. Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code, for example, provides that a public officer is: x x x any person who, by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment by competent authority, takes part in the performance of public functions in the Government of Philippines, or performs in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official, of any rank or class. Section 2 (14) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987,[29] on the other hand, states: Officer as distinguished from clerk or employee, refers to a person whose duties not being of a clerical or manual nature, involves the exercise of discretion in the performance of the functions of the government. When used with reference to a person having authority to do a particular act or perform a particular person in the exercise of governmental power, officer includes any government employee, agent or body having authority to do the act or exercise that function. It bears noting that under Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees), one may be considered a public official whether or not one receives compensation, thus: Public Officials include elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the career or non-career service including military and police personnel, whether or not they receive compensation, regardless of amount. Which of these definitions should apply, if at all? Assuming that the definition of public officer in R.A. No. 3019 is exclusive, the term compensation, which is not defined by said law, has many meanings. Under particular circumstances, compensation has been held to include allowance for personal expenses, commissions, expenses, fees, an honorarium, mileage or traveling expenses, payments for services, restitution or a balancing of accounts, salary, and wages.[30] How then is compensation, as the term is used in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 3019, to be interpreted? Did petitioner receive any compensation at all as NCC Chair? Granting that petitioner did not receive any salary, the records do not reveal if he received any allowance, fee, honorarium, or some other form of compensation. Notably, under the by-laws of Expocorp, the CEO is entitled to per diems and compensation.[31] Would such fact bear any significance? Obviously, this proceeding is not the proper forum to settle these issues lest we preempt the trial court from resolving them. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The preliminary injunction issued in the Courts Resolution dated September 24, 2001 is hereby LIFTED. SO ORDERED. Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), no part due to close relation to a party. [1] A.O. 223, Section 1. The same section provided for the Committees composition as follows: x x x. The Committee shall be composed of six (6) representatives from the Presidential Commission for Culture and the Arts (PCCA), and five (5) representatives from the Philippine Centennial Foundation, Inc. (PCFI). They shall be appointed by the President upon their nomination by their respective groups. The Committee members shall elect among themselves the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, and such other officers as they may deem necessary. The Committee was also granted the following duties and powers: 1. To undertake the overall study, formulation and implementation of programs and projects on the utilization of culture, arts, and media as vehicles for value education in the context of the Centennial Celebration; 2. To act as principal coordinator for all the activities related to awareness and celebration of the centennial; 3. To constitute sub-committees and working groups which shall undertake the implementation of the program and projects; and 4. To call upon the assistance of any government agency or instrumentality and corporation, and to invite private individuals and organizations to assist it in the performance of its tasks. (Id., at Section 2.)

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[2] Other members of the Commission were the Secretaries of Education, Culture and Sports, National Defense, Interior and Local Government, Tourism, Trade and Industry, Public Works and Highways, Transportation and Communications, and Budget and Management, the Press Secretary, two (2) representatives each from the Senate and the House of Representatives, two (2) representatives from the Judiciary, the Executive Director of the National Historical Institute, three (3) representatives from the National Commission for Culture and Arts, three (3) representatives from the Philippine Centennial Foundation, Inc., and other members from the government and the private sectors, as may be designated later. (E.O. No. 128, Section 1.) [3] Id., at Section 5. [4] The purposes of the corporation were set forth in Article 2 of the Articles of Incorporation, thus: PRIMARY PURPOSE To set up and establish the Philippine Centennial International Exposition 1998 (EXPO 98), a project of the National Centennial Commission envisioned and mandated under Executive Order No. 128, series of 1993, in the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ) within the Provinces of Pampanga and Tarlac, Philippines as created, defined and delineated under Proclamation No. 163, series 1993, of the President of the Philippines and furtherance of said purpose; 1. To operate, administer, manage, implement, and develop EXPO 98 conformably to and in accordance with the Detailed Feasibility study and Master Plan for said Exposition prepared by DOUGLAS/GALLAGHER, INC. and approved by the President of the Philippines; 2. To exercise oversight functions and overall jurisdiction over the operations of EXPO 98 as well as manage and oversee all plans, programs, and activities related to the implementation and operation of said Exposition; 3. To regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of utilities, services, and infrastructure works in all the site components of EXPO 98 and its support facilities; 4. To oversee the preparations for the implementation of the participation of countries, groups, organizations, and entities at EXPO 98; 5. To establish linkages with participating countries and coordinate their programs and activities relevant to the theme of EXPO 98; 6. To provide and prescribe the guidelines for the design and fabrication of the pavilions of participating countries that played a significant role in Philippine historical development and of other participating groups, organizations, and entities which would be reflective of the following objectives of EXPO 98 -- a) showcase the national vision of the Philippines, highlighted by a rich history and culture, and its traditional heritage and diverse cultural influences; b) express eloquently the Filipinism sentiment of the Philippine Centennial; c) strengthen cultural and historical linkages between Philippines and participating countries; d) create an image of the Philippines as a country with rich trade and tourism potentials; and e) project the Filipino character and strengthen the sense of national pride and patriotism among the Filipino people. 7. To conceive and devise varied promotional strategies towards creating awareness and appreciation of EXPO 98 as the centerpiece of the national celebrations in 1998 of the centennial of the declaration of Philippine Independence and beyond that as a permanent site for the Filipino people to honor their rich heritage; 8. To encourage and invite the active and meaningful participation of the private sector in managing and overseeing EXPO 98; and 9. To forge strategic partnerships and joint ventures with local and international investors and developers in the development, maintenance, operation, and management of EXPO 98 on a turn-key basis. SECONDARY PURPOSES (1) To purchase, acquire, own, lease, sell and convey real properties such as lands, buildings, factories and warehouses and machineries, equipment and other personal properties as may be necessary or incidental to the conduct of the corporate business, and to pay in cash, shares of its capital stock, debentures and other evidences of indebtedness, or other securities, as may be deemed expedient, for any business or property acquired by the corporation. (2) To borrow or raise money necessary to meet the financial requirements of its business by the issuance of bonds, promissory notes and other evidences of indebtedness, and to secure the repayment thereof by mortgage, pledge, deed of trust or lien upon the properties of the corporation or to issue pursuant to law shares of its capital stock, debentures and other evidences of indebtedness in payment for properties acquired by the corporation or for money borrowed in the prosecution of its lawful business; (3) To invest and deal with the money and properties of the corporation in such manner as may from time to time be considered wise or expedient for the advancement of its interests and to sell, dispose of or transfer the business, properties and goodwill of the corporation or any part thereof for such consideration and under such terms as it shall see fit to accept; (4) To aid in any manner any corporation, association, or trust estate, domestic or foreign, or any firm or individual, any shares of stock in which or any bonds, debentures, notes, securities, evidences of indebtedness, contracts, or obligations of which are held by or for this corporation, directly or indirectly or through other corporations or otherwise;

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(5) To enter into any lawful arrangement for sharing profits, union of interest, unitization or farmout agreement, reciprocal concession, or cooperation, with any corporation, association, partnership, syndicate, entity, person or governmental, municipal or public authority, domestic or foreign, in the carrying on of any business or transaction deemed necessary, convenient or incidental to carrying out any of the purposes of this corporation; (6) To acquire or obtain from any government or authority, national, provincial, municipal or otherwise, or a corporation, company or partnership or person, such charter, contracts, franchise, privileges, exemption, licenses and concessions as may be conducive to any of the objects of the corporation; (7) To establish and operate one or more branch offices of agencies and to carry on any or all of its operations and business without any restrictions as to place or amount including the right to hold, purchase or otherwise acquire, lease, mortgage, pledge and convey or otherwise deal in with real and personal property anywhere within the Philippines; (8) To conduct and transact any and all lawful business, and to do or cause to be done any one or more of the acts and things herein set forth as its purposes, within or without the Philippines, and in any and all foreign countries, and to do everything necessary, desirable or incidental to the accomplishment of the purposes or the exercise of any one or more of the powers herein enumerated, or which shall at any time appear conducive to or expedient for the protection or benefit of this corporation. [5] Rollo, p. 10. [6] Id., at 134-135. [7] Id., at 15. [8] Id., at 296-297. [9] 312 SCRA 77 (1999). [10] Art. XI, Sec. 12. [11] Art. XI, Sec. 13 (1). [12] Section 22 extends these investigatory powers, under certain conditions, to private persons: SEC. 22. Investigatory Power. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the power to investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. In all cases of conspiracy between an officer or employee of the government and a private person, the Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have jurisdiction to include such private person as the evidence may warrant. The officer or employee and the private person shall be tried jointly and shall be subject to the same penalties and liabilities. [13] E.g., Fernandez vs. Ledesma, 7 SCRA 620 (1963); Aparri vs. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231 (1984). [14] F.R. Mechem, A Treatise on the law of Public Offices and Officers, 1. [15] Id., at 4-10. See also 63C Am Jur 2d, Public Officers and Employees 1. [16] Id., at 4. [17] Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141 (1998). [18] Id., at Sec. 2. [19] Constitution, Article VII, Section 1. [20] Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the Constitution provides: Section 1. x x x. The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. x x x. In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. x x x. [21] 85 SCRA 599 (1978). [22] Rollo, p. 466. [23] Id, at 7, 15. See also Triste vs. Leyte State College Board of Trustees, 192 SCRA 326 (1990) [24] Id., at 13. [25] Id., at 8. Emphasis supplied.

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[26] 23 Am Rep. 538 (1876). [27] See Yasay vs. Desierto, 300 SCRA 494 (1998). [28] Preclaro vs. Sandiganbayan, 247 SCRA 454 (1995). [29] Executive Order No. 292. [30] 15 C.J.S. Compensation, p. 654. [31] Rollo, p. 470. ============= Facts: President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 223 "constituting a Committee which was mandated "to take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress."Subsequently, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 128, "reconstituting the said Committee and renamed it as the "National Centennial Commission." Appointed to chair was Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel. Presidents Diosdado M. Macapagal and Corazon C. Aquino were named Honorary Chairpersons. Vice President Laurel by virtue of his chairmanship also became the chairman of EXPOCORP, a corporation organized to undertake the Freedom Ring Project in relation to the centennial celebration. Later in 1999, investigation was conducted by an independent committed due to allegations of graft and corruption against Laurel as NCC and EXPOCORP chair. The committee recommended the filing of charges by the Ombudsman upon which the Office of the Ombudsman took cognizance of the case. Laurel then questioned the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman by filing this petition, saying that (1) EXPOCORP was a private corporation, (2) that NCC is not a public office and (3) that he is not a public officer as defined in the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Issue: Whether or not the contentions of Vice President Laurel are correct. Held: No. The Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance by a public officer or employee of the government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations. However, is NCC a public office? Yes, it is because it exercises executive functions by implementing the policies set forth in the Constitution regarding history and cultural heritage, thus satisfying an important element of public office: the delegation of sovereign functions. It also follows that Laurel is a public officer. That he did not receive compensation is of no consequence. A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of the position. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good. Hence, the office of petitioner as NCC Chair may be characterized as an honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative office or an office of profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation or fees are attached. It bears noting that under Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees), one may be considered a public official whether or not one receives compensation, thus: Public Officials include elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the career or non-career service including military and police personnel, whether or not they receive compensation, regardless of amount. ======================== Laurel v Desierto digest Laurel v. Desierto GR No. 145368, April 12, 2002 Facts: Petitioner Vice-President Salvador Laurel was appointed as the head of the National Centennial Commission, a body constituted for the preparation of the National Centennial celebration in 1998. He was subsequently appointed as the Chairman of ExpoCorp., and was one of the nine (9) incorporators. A controversy erupted on the alleged anomalies with the bidding contracts to some entities and the petitioner was implicated. By virtue of an investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, the petitioner was indicted for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019). The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman, which was denied. He further filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied, hence this petition for certiorari. The petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and contended that he is not a public officer since ExpoCorp is a private corporation. Issue: W/N the petitioner is a public officer Yes, the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case of the petitioner since he is a public officer. The NCC is an office performing executive functions since one of its mandate is to implement national policies. Moreover, the said office was established by virtue of an executive order. It is clear that the NCC performs sovereign functions, hence it is a public office. Since petitioner is chair of the NCC, he is therefore a public officer. The fact that the NCC was characterized by EO 128 as an 'ad-hoc body' make it less of a public office. Finally, the fact that the petitioner did not receive any compensation during his tenure is of no consequence since such is merely an incidence and forms no part of the office. - See more at: http://lawsandfound.blogspot.com/2012/08/laurel-v-desierto-digest.html#sthash.VeIqHRBs.dpuf ============== Art. 14, Sec. 15, COnsti -- ARTS AND CULTURE Section 14. The State shall foster the preservation, enrichment, and dynamic evolution of a Filipino national culture based on the principle of unity in diversity in a climate of free artistic and intellectual expression.

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=== Today is Saturday, June 20, 2015 search REPUBLIC ACT No. 3019 ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT Section 1. Statement of policy. It is the policy of the Philippine Government, in line with the principle that a public office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. Section 2. Definition of terms. As used in this Act, that term (a) "Government" includes the national government, the local governments, the government-owned and government-controlled corporations, and all other instrumentalities or agencies of the Republic of the Philippines and their branches. (b) "Public officer" includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government as defined in the preceding subparagraph. (c) "Receiving any gift" includes the act of accepting directly or indirectly a gift from a person other than a member of the public officer's immediate family, in behalf of himself or of any member of his family or relative within the fourth civil degree, either by consanguinity or affinity, even on the occasion of a family celebration or national festivity like Christmas, if the value of the gift is under the circumstances manifestly excessive. (d) "Person" includes natural and juridical persons, unless the context indicates otherwise. Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense. (b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other part, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law. (c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for whom the public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government permit or license, in consideration for the help given or to be given, without prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act. (d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private enterprise which has pending official business with him during the pendency thereof or within one year after its termination. (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. (f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party. (g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby. (h) Director or indirectly having financing or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest. (i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or having a material interest in any transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of which he is a member, and which exercises discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the same or does not participate in the action of the board, committee, panel or group. Interest for personal gain shall be presumed against those public officers responsible for the approval of manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or irregular transaction or acts by the board, panel or group to which they belong. (j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled. (k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him on account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance of its authorized release date.

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The person giving the gift, present, share, percentage or benefit referred to in subparagraphs (b) and (c); or offering or giving to the public officer the employment mentioned in subparagraph (d); or urging the divulging or untimely release of the confidential information referred to in subparagraph (k) of this section shall, together with the offending public officer, be punished under Section nine of this Act and shall be permanently or temporarily disqualified in the discretion of the Court, from transacting business in any form with the Government. Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person having family or close personal relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any other person having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with the government, in which such public official has to intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The word "close personal relation" shall include close personal friendship, social and fraternal connections, and professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free access to such public officer. (b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof. Section 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for any relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, of the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene, directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with the Government: Provided, That this section shall not apply to any person who, prior to the assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom he is related, has been already dealing with the Government along the same line of business, nor to any transaction, contract or application already existing or pending at the time of such assumption of public office, nor to any application filed by him the approval of which is not discretionary on the part of the official or officials concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites provided by law, or rules or regulations issued pursuant to law, nor to any act lawfully performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of a profession. Section 6. Prohibition on Members of Congress. It shall be unlawful hereafter for any Member of the Congress during the term for which he has been elected, to acquire or receive any personal pecuniary interest in any specific business enterprise which will be directly and particularly favored or benefited by any law or resolution authored by him previously approved or adopted by the Congress during the same term. The provision of this section shall apply to any other public officer who recommended the initiation in Congress of the enactment or adoption of any law or resolution, and acquires or receives any such interest during his incumbency. It shall likewise be unlawful for such member of Congress or other public officer, who, having such interest prior to the approval of such law or resolution authored or recommended by him, continues for thirty days after such approval to retain such interest. Section 7. Statement of assets and liabilities. Every public officer, within thirty days after the approval of this Act or after assuming office, and within the month of January of every other year thereafter, as well as upon the expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation or separation from office, shall prepare and file with the office of the corresponding Department Head, or in the case of a Head of Department or chief of an independent office, with the Office of the President, or in the case of members of the Congress and the officials and employees thereof, with the Office of the Secretary of the corresponding House, a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year: Provided, That public officers assuming office less than two months before the end of the calendar year, may file their statements in the following months of January. Section 8. Dismissal due to unexplained wealth. If in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act Numbered One thousand three hundred seventy-nine, a public official has been found to have acquired during his incumbency, whether in his name or in the name of other persons, an amount of property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be a ground for dismissal or removal. Properties in the name of the spouse and unmarried children of such public official may be taken into consideration, when their acquisition through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown. Bank deposits shall be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this section, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary. Section 9. Penalties for violations. (a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years, perpetual disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income. Any complaining party at whose complaint the criminal prosecution was initiated shall, in case of conviction of the accused, be entitled to recover in the criminal action with priority over the forfeiture in favor of the Government, the amount of money or the thing he may have given to the accused, or the value of such thing. (b) Any public officer violation any of the provisions of Section 7 of this Act shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the Court. The violation of said section proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public officer, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him. Section 10. Competent court. Until otherwise provided by law, all prosecutions under this Act shall be within the original jurisdiction of the proper Court of First Instance. Section 11. Prescription of offenses. All offenses punishable under this Act shall prescribe in ten years. Section 12. Termination of office. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.

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Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him. Section 14. Exception. Unsolicited gifts or presents of small or insignificant value offered or given as a mere ordinary token of gratitude or friendship according to local customs or usage, shall be excepted from the provisions of this Act. Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted to prejudice or prohibit the practice of any profession, lawful trade or occupation by any private person or by any public officer who under the law may legitimately practice his profession, trade or occupation, during his incumbency, except where the practice of such profession, trade or occupation involves conspiracy with any other person or public official to commit any of the violations penalized in this Act. Section 15. Separability clause. If any provision of this Act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstances is declared invalid, the remainder of the Act or the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected by such declaration. Section 16. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect on its approval, but for the purpose of determining unexplained wealth, all property acquired by a public officer since he assumed office shall be taken into consideration. Approved: August 17, 1960 The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation ====== DMCI can demolish Torre de Manila if it wanted to activist Celdran June 17, 2015 5:49pm 2389 110 0 2706 Tags: DMCI Holdings SC stops construction of Torre de Manila SC stops construction of Torre de Manila. The controversial 46-storey Torre de Manila condominium looms in the background from the Rizal Monument at Luneta Park in Manila on Tuesday, June 16. The Supreme Court ordered the stop in the construction of the high-rise building which has outraged Philippine conservationists for allegedly ruining views of a national monument. AFP/Jay Directo Culture activist Carlos Celdran claimed on Wednesday that real estate developer D.M. Consunji Inc. (DMCI Homes) has the capabilities to demolish the high-rise condominium Torre de Manila that mars the visual corridors of Rizal Monument in Luneta Park. "DMCI ito. They are a mining company. If they can make Semirara Island disappear, they can make that building disappear. DMCI is very good in demolishing things. They are into mining... To tear down is not a technological impossibility. Kayang kaya nila iyon," he claimed in an interview with GMA News TV's "News To Go" on Wednesday. DMCI Holdings Inc., the parent of DMCI homes, also holds the exclusive rights to explore, mine and develop the coal resources in the 5,500-hectare Semirara Island in Caluya, Antique. Other minerals on the island are limestone and silica. Celdran issued his statement after the Supreme Court imposed a temporary restraining order suspending the construction of Torre de Manila. The high-rise condominium is already 30.7 percent complete, with ongoing structural activities at the 32nd floor, according to DMCI's construction update as of December 19, 2014. According to the "Guidelines on Monuments Honoring National Heroes, Illustrious Filipinos and other Personages" of the National Historical Commission of the Philippines (NHCP), vista points and visual corridors to monuments should be clear for "unobstructed viewing appreciation and photographic opportunities." But DMCI also broke the zoning laws, Celdran pointed out. "The real problem here is that they broke the zoning laws. Iyong floor-to-height ratio diyan, kailangan seven stories high lang... May permit sila, but we need to investigate how they got those papers," he said. Also a tour guide of Manila, Celdran said that most of the tourists he encountered so far frowned upon Torre de Manila. "Some people say that this would never happen in their country. If they have a national hero and a national monument, they would never allow a large corporation or the whims of a rich man do something like this," he said. Celdran lauded the SC ruling since it showed that the Filipino people can go after large corporations and their mistakes. "The thing I like about this TRO is that it showed the Filipino people that oligarchs or large corporations like this can be questioned, can be stopped, and can be taken to task for things that they do and abuses that they do," he added. Trisha Macas/VS, GMA News More from: http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/505618/news/metromanila/dmci-can-demolish-torre-de-manila-if-it-wanted-to-activist-celdran

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======== Today is Saturday, June 20, 2015 search Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008 ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners, vs. HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents. D E C I S I O N CORONA, J.: This petition for prohibition1 seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 93352 (Attrition Act of 2005). RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board).3 It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.4 The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in the excess collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue.5 The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF) or his/her Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) or his/her Undersecretary, the Director General of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) or his/her Deputy Director General, the Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC or their Deputy Commissioners, two representatives from the rank-and-file employees and a representative from the officials nominated by their recognized organization.6 Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress.7 The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate and issue the implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335,8 to be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created for such purpose.9 Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all other government agencies. In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel. Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law. In their comment, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, question the petition for being premature as there is no actual case or controversy yet. Petitioners have not asserted any right or claim that will necessitate the exercise of this Courts jurisdiction. Nevertheless, respondents acknowledge that public policy requires the resolution of the constitutional issues involved in this case. They assert that the allegation that the reward system will breed mercenaries is mere speculation and does not suffice to invalidate the law.

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Seen in conjunction with the declared objective of RA 9335, the law validly classifies the BIR and the BOC because the functions they perform are distinct from those of the other government agencies and instrumentalities. Moreover, the law provides a sufficient standard that will guide the executive in the implementation of its provisions. Lastly, the creation of the congressional oversight committee under the law enhances, rather than violates, separation of powers. It ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy and serves as a check to any over-accumulation of power on the part of the executive and the implementing agencies. After a careful consideration of the conflicting contentions of the parties, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA 9335, except as shall hereafter be discussed. Actual Case And Ripeness An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial adjudication.10 A closely related requirement is ripeness, that is, the question must be ripe for adjudication. And a constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the governmental act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.11 Thus, to be ripe for judicial adjudication, the petitioner must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision of the Court.12 In this case, aside from the general claim that the dispute has ripened into a judicial controversy by the mere enactment of the law even without any further overt act,13 petitioners fail either to assert any specific and concrete legal claim or to demonstrate any direct adverse effect of the law on them. They are unable to show a personal stake in the outcome of this case or an injury to themselves. On this account, their petition is procedurally infirm. This notwithstanding, public interest requires the resolution of the constitutional issues raised by petitioners. The grave nature of their allegations tends to cast a cloud on the presumption of constitutionality in favor of the law. And where an action of the legislative branch is alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.14 Accountability of Public Officers Section 1, Article 11 of the Constitution states: Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism, and justice, and lead modest lives. Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged by its holder not for his own personal gain but for the benefit of the public for whom he holds it in trust. By demanding accountability and service with responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, patriotism and justice, all government officials and employees have the duty to be responsive to the needs of the people they are called upon to serve. Public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties. This presumption necessarily obtains in favor of BIR and BOC officials and employees. RA 9335 operates on the basis thereof and reinforces it by providing a system of rewards and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC to exceed their revenue targets and optimize their revenue-generation capability and collection.15 The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary is required to rebut it. It cannot be overturned by mere conjecture or denied in advance (as petitioners would have the Court do) specially in this case where it is an underlying principle to advance a declared public policy. Petitioners claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will turn BIR and BOC officials and employees into "bounty hunters and mercenaries" is not only without any factual and legal basis; it is also purely speculative. A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal one.16 To invalidate RA 9335 based on petitioners baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it. Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officers may by law be rewarded for exemplary and exceptional performance. A system of incentives for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not anathema to the concept of public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces dedication to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to public service of deserving government personnel. In United States v. Matthews,17 the U.S. Supreme Court validated a law which awards to officers of the customs as well as other parties an amount not exceeding one-half of the net proceeds of forfeitures in violation of the laws against smuggling. Citing Dorsheimer v. United States,18 the U.S. Supreme Court said: The offer of a portion of such penalties to the collectors is to stimulate and reward their zeal and industry in detecting fraudulent attempts to evade payment of duties and taxes. In the same vein, employees of the BIR and the BOC may by law be entitled to a reward when, as a consequence of their zeal in the enforcement of tax and customs laws, they exceed their revenue targets. In addition, RA 9335 establishes safeguards to ensure that the reward will not be claimed if it will be either the fruit of "bounty hunting or mercenary activity" or the product of the irregular performance of official duties. One of these precautionary measures is embodied in Section 8 of the law: SEC. 8. Liability of Officials, Examiners and Employees of the BIR and the BOC. The officials, examiners, and employees of the [BIR] and the [BOC] who violate this Act or who are guilty of negligence, abuses or acts of malfeasance or misfeasance or fail to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duties shall be held liable for any loss or injury suffered by any business establishment or taxpayer as a result of such violation, negligence, abuse, malfeasance, misfeasance or failure to exercise extraordinary diligence. Equal Protection

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Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is equality under the same conditions and among persons similarly situated; it is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are classified based on substantial differences in relation to the object to be accomplished.19 When things or persons are different in fact or circumstance, they may be treated in law differently. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union,20 this Court declared: The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the [S]tate. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality o