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CASE 1
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 89651 November 10, 1989
DATU FIRDAUSI I.Y. ABBAS, DATU BLO UMPAR ADIONG, DATU
MACALIMPOWAC DELANGALEN, CELSO PALMA, ALI MONTANA BABAO, JULMUNIR
JANNARAL, RASHID SABER, and DATU JAMAL ASHLEY ABBAS, representing
the other taxpayers of Mindanao, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, and HONORABLE GUILLERMO C. CARAGUE, DEPARTMENT SECRETARY
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.
G.R. No. 89965 November 10, 1989
ATTY. ABDULLAH D. MAMA-O, petitioner, vs. HON. GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Budget, and the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
Abbas, Abbas, Amora, Alejandro-Abbas & Associates for
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 89651 and 89965.
Abdullah D. Mama-o for and in his own behalf in 89965.
CORTES, J.:
The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in thirteen
(13) provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan, 1
scheduled for November 19, 1989, in implementation of Republic Act
No. 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."
These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting the plebiscite
and the Secretary of Budget and Management from releasing funds to
the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2) declare R.A. No. 6734, or
parts thereof, unconstitutional .
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After a consolidated comment was filed by Solicitor General for
the respondents, which the Court considered as the answer, the case
was deemed submitted for decision, the issues having been joined.
Subsequently, petitioner Mama-o filed a "Manifestation with Motion
for Leave to File Reply on Respondents' Comment and to Open Oral
Arguments," which the Court noted.
The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may
generally be categorized into either of the following:
(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution,
and
(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the
Tripoli Agreement.
The Tripoli Agreement, more specifically, the Agreement Between
the government of the Republic of the Philippines of the
Philippines and Moro National Liberation Front with the
Participation of the Quadripartie Ministerial Commission Members of
the Islamic Conference and the Secretary General of the
Organization of Islamic Conference" took effect on December 23,
1976. It provided for "[t]he establishment of Autonomy in the
southern Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines" and
enumerated the thirteen (13) provinces comprising the "areas of
autonomy." 2
In 1987, a new Constitution was ratified, which the for the
first time provided for regional autonomy, Article X, section 15 of
the charter provides that "[t]here shall be created autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic
and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within
the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as
well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines."
To effectuate this mandate, the Constitution further
provides:
Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over
autonomous regions to ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed.
Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted
by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be
vested in the National Government.
Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each
autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the
regional consultative commission composed of representatives
appointed by the President from a list of nominees from
multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic
structure of government for the region consisting of the executive
and representative of the constituent political units. The organic
acts shall likewise provide for special
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courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction
consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national
laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in
a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only the
provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
Sec. 19 The first Congress elected under this Constitution
shall, within eighteen months from the time of organization of both
Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the
provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act
of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers
over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage;
and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the
promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region.
Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions
shall be the responsibility of the local police agencies which
shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in
accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of the
region shall be the responsibility of the National Government.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734 was
enacted and signed into law on August 1, 1989.
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1. The Court shall dispose first of the second category of
arguments raised by petitioners, i.e. that certain provisions of
R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the provisions of the Tripoli
Agreement.
Petitioners premise their arguments on the assumption that the
Tripoli Agreement is part of the law of the land, being a binding
international agreement . The Solicitor General asserts that the
Tripoli Agreement is neither a binding treaty, not having been
entered into by the Republic of the Philippines with a sovereign
state and ratified according to the provisions of the 1973 or 1987
Constitutions, nor a binding international agreement.
We find it neither necessary nor determinative of the case to
rule on the nature of the Tripoli Agreement and its binding effect
on the Philippine Government whether under public international or
internal Philippine law. In the first place, it is now the
Constitution itself that provides for the creation of an autonomous
region in Muslim Mindanao. The standard for any inquiry into the
validity of R.A. No. 6734 would therefore be what is so provided in
the Constitution. Thus, any conflict between the provisions of R.A.
No. 6734 and the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement will not have
the effect of enjoining the implementation of the Organic Act.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the Tripoli Agreement is a
binding treaty or international agreement, it would then constitute
part of the law of the land. But as internal law it would not be
superior to R.A. No. 6734, an enactment of the Congress of the
Philippines, rather it would be in the same class as the latter
[SALONGA, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 320 (4th ed., 1974), citing Head
Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) and Foster v. Nelson, 2 Pet. 253
(1829)]. Thus, if at all, R.A. No. 6734 would be amendatory of the
Tripoli Agreement, being a subsequent law. Only a determination by
this Court that R.A. No. 6734 contravened the Constitution would
result in the granting of the reliefs sought. 3
2. The Court shall therefore only pass upon the constitutional
questions which have been raised by petitioners.
Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally
creates an autonomous region in Mindanao, contrary to the
aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on the autonomous region
which make the creation of such region dependent upon the outcome
of the plebiscite.
In support of his argument, petitioner cites Article II, section
1(1) of R.A. No. 6734 which declares that "[t]here is hereby
created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be composed of
provinces and cities voting favorably in the plebiscite called for
the purpose, in accordance with Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution." Petitioner contends that the tenor of the above
provision makes the creation of an autonomous region absolute, such
that even if only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an
autonomous region would still be created composed of the two
provinces where the favorable votes were obtained.
The matter of the creation of the autonomous region and its
composition needs to be clarified.
Firs, the questioned provision itself in R.A. No. 6734 refers to
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution which sets forth the
conditions necessary for the creation of the autonomous
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region. The reference to the constitutional provision cannot be
glossed over for it clearly indicates that the creation of the
autonomous region shall take place only in accord with the
constitutional requirements. Second, there is a specific provision
in the Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act,
which incorporates substantially the same requirements embodied in
the Constitution and fills in the details, thus:
SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes
cast by the constituent units provided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1
of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which shall be held not
earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one hundred twenty
(120) days after the approval of this Act: Provided, That only the
provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces
and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the
Autonomous Region shall remain the existing administrative
determination, merge the existing regions.
Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of
the autonomous region shall take effect only when approved by a
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority
vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the
autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority
is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region. It
may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the
thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article
II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The
single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No.
6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be
an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and
cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise
it. [See III RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 482-492
(1986)].
As provided in the Constitution, the creation of the Autonomous
region in Muslim Mindanao is made effective upon the approval "by
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite
called for the purpose" [Art. X, sec. 18]. The question has been
raised as to what this majority means. Does it refer to a majority
of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in all the constituent
units, or a majority in each of the constituent units, or both?
We need not go beyond the Constitution to resolve this
question.
If the framers of the Constitution intended to require approval
by a majority of all the votes cast in the plebiscite they would
have so indicated. Thus, in Article XVIII, section 27, it is
provided that "[t]his Constitution shall take effect immediately
upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite held for the purpose ... Comparing this with the
provision on the creation of the autonomous region, which
reads:
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in
a plebiscite called for the
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purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic
areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the
autonomous region. [Art. X, sec, 18, para, 2].
it will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous
region is made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the
plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the
constituent units and the proviso underscores this. for if the
intention of the framers of the Constitution was to get the
majority of the totality of the votes cast, they could have simply
adopted the same phraseology as that used for the ratification of
the Constitution, i.e. "the creation of the autonomous region shall
be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite called for the purpose."
It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a
simple majority of votes approving the organic Act in individual
constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all
constituent units put together, as well as in the individual
constituent units.
More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is
also the sense in which the vote requirement in the plebiscite
provided under Article X, section 18 must have been understood by
the people when they ratified the Constitution.
Invoking the earlier cited constitutional provisions, petitioner
Mama-o, on the other hand, maintains that only those areas which,
to his view, share common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics should be properly included within the coverage of
the autonomous region. He insists that R.A. No. 6734 is
unconstitutional because only the provinces of Basilan, Sulu,
Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte and Maguindanao and the
cities of Marawi and Cotabato, and not all of the thirteen (13)
provinces and nine (9) cities included in the Organic Act, possess
such concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and other
relevant characteristics. By including areas which do not strictly
share the same characteristics. By including areas which do not
strictly share the same characteristic as the others, petitioner
claims that Congress has expanded the scope of the autonomous
region which the constitution itself has prescribed to be
limited.
Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down
the standards by which Congress shall determine which areas should
constitute the autonomous region. Guided by these constitutional
criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share
common attributes is within the exclusive realm of the
legislature's discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would
have to go into the wisdom of the law. This the Court cannot do
without doing violence to the separation of governmental powers.
[Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139 (1936); Morfe v.
Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424].
After assailing the inclusion of non-Muslim areas in the Organic
Act for lack of basis, petitioner Mama-o would then adopt the
extreme view that other non-Muslim areas in Mindanao should
likewise be covered. He argues that since the Organic Act covers
several non-Muslim areas, its scope should be further broadened to
include the rest of the non-Muslim areas in Mindanao in
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order for the other non-Muslim areas denies said areas equal
protection of the law, and therefore is violative of the
Constitution.
Petitioner's contention runs counter to the very same
constitutional provision he had earlier invoked. Any determination
by Congress of what areas in Mindanao should compromise the
autonomous region, taking into account shared historical and
cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other
relevant characteristics, would necessarily carry with it the
exclusion of other areas. As earlier stated, such determination by
Congress of which areas should be covered by the organic act for
the autonomous region constitutes a recognized legislative
prerogative, whose wisdom may not be inquired into by this
Court.
Moreover, equal protection permits of reasonable classification
[People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1963); Laurel v. Misa, 76 Phil. 372
(1946); J.M. Tuason and Co. v. Land tenure Administration, G.R. No.
L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413]. In Dumlao v. Commission
on Elections G.R. No. 52245, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 392], the
Court ruled that once class may be treated differently from another
where the groupings are based on reasonable and real distinctions.
The guarantee of equal protection is thus not infringed in this
case, the classification having been made by Congress on the basis
of substantial distinctions as set forth by the Constitution
itself.
Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on
the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantee on free
exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection centers on a
provision in the Organic Act which mandates that should there be
any conflict between the Muslim Code [P.D. No. 1083] and the Tribal
Code (still be enacted) on the one had, and the national law on the
other hand, the Shari'ah courts created under the same Act should
apply national law. Petitioners maintain that the islamic law
(Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran, which makes it part of divine
law. Thus it may not be subjected to any "man-made" national law.
Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by enumerating possible
instances of conflict between provisions of the Muslim Code and
national law, wherein an application of national law might be
offensive to a Muslim's religious convictions.
As enshrined in the Constitution, judicial power includes the
duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable. [Art. VIII, Sec. 11. As a
condition precedent for the power to be exercised, an actual
controversy between litigants must first exist [Angara v. Electoral
Commission, supra; Tan v. Macapagal, G.R. No. L-34161, February 29,
1972, 43 SCRA 677]. In the present case, no actual controversy
between real litigants exists. There are no conflicting claims
involving the application of national law resulting in an alleged
violation of religious freedom. This being so, the Court in this
case may not be called upon to resolve what is merely a perceived
potential conflict between the provisions the Muslim Code and
national law.
Petitioners also impugn the constitutionality of Article XIX,
section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 which, among others, states:
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. . . Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting
favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the
plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall
remain in the existing administrative regions:Provided, however,
that the President may, by administrative determination, merge the
existing regions.
According to petitioners, said provision grants the President
the power to merge regions, a power which is not conferred by the
Constitution upon the President. That the President may choose to
merge existing regions pursuant to the Organic Act is challenged as
being in conflict with Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution
which provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
It must be pointed out that what is referred to in R.A. No. 6734
is the merger of administrative regions, i.e. Regions I to XII and
the National Capital Region, which are mere groupings of contiguous
provinces for administrative purposes [Integrated Reorganization
Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the land by Pres.
dec. No. 1, Pres. Dec. No. 742]. Administrative regions are not
territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays [see Art. X, sec. 1 of the
Constitution]. While the power to merge administrative regions is
not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which
has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the
exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments
[see Art. X, sec. 4 of the Constitution]. There is no conflict
between the power of the President to merge administrative regions
with the constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the
merger of local government units because the requirement of a
plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities,
municipalities or barangays, not to administrative regions.
Petitioners likewise question the validity of provisions in the
Organic Act which create an Oversight Committee to supervise the
transfer to the autonomous region of the powers, appropriations,
and properties vested upon the regional government by the organic
Act [Art. XIX, Secs. 3 and 4]. Said provisions mandate that the
transfer of certain national government offices and their
properties to the regional government shall be made pursuant to a
schedule prescribed by the Oversight Committee, and that such
transfer should be accomplished within six (6) years from the
organization of the regional government.
It is asserted by petitioners that such provisions are
unconstitutional because while the Constitution states that the
creation of the autonomous region shall take effect upon approval
in a plebiscite, the requirement of organizing an Oversight
committee tasked with supervising the transfer of powers and
properties to the regional government would in effect delay the
creation of the autonomous region.
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Under the Constitution, the creation of the autonomous region
hinges only on the result of the plebiscite. if the Organic Act is
approved by majority of the votes cast by constituent units in the
scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous region
immediately takes effect delay the creation of the autonomous
region.
Under the constitution, the creation of the autonomous region
hinges only on the result of the plebiscite. if the Organic Act is
approved by majority of the votes cast by constituent units in the
scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous region
immediately takes effect. The questioned provisions in R.A. No.
6734 requiring an oversight Committee to supervise the transfer do
not provide for a different date of effectivity. Much less would
the organization of the Oversight Committee cause an impediment to
the operation of the Organic Act, for such is evidently aimed at
effecting a smooth transition period for the regional government.
The constitutional objection on this point thus cannot be sustained
as there is no bases therefor.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality
[Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387 (1925); Salas v. Jarencio,
G.R. No. L-29788, August 30, 1979, 46 SCRA 734; Morfe v. Mutuc,
supra; Peralta v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-47771, March 11, 1978, 82
SCRA 30]. Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts
thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such
a declaration. otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the
grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 6734, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to
overcome the presumption. The dismissal of these two petitions is,
therefore, inevitable.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
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CASE 2
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 91023 July 13, 1990
METROPOLITAN TRAFFIC COMMAND WEST TRAFFIC DISTRICT, petitioner,
vs. HON. ARSENIO M. GONONG, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 at Manila, and DANTE S. DAVID,
respondents.
Dante S. David for and in his own behalf as private
respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
We deal here with a practice known to many motorists in Metro
Manila: the removal of the license plates of illegally parked
vehicles. This was challenged by the private respondent in the
regional trial court of Manila, which held the practice unlawful.
The petitioner is now before us, urging reversal of the decision
for grave abuse of discretion.
The original complaint was filed with the said court on August
10, 1989, by Dante S. David, a lawyer, who claimed that the rear
license plate, of his car was removed by the Metropolitan Traffic
Command while the vehicle was parked on Escolta. He questioned the
petitioner's act on the ground not only that the car was not
illegally parked but, more importantly, that there was no ordinance
or law authorizing such removal. He asked that the practice be
permanently enjoined and that in the meantime a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued.
Judge Arsenio M. Gonong issued a temporary restraining order on
August 14, 1989, and hearings on the writ of preliminary injunction
were held on August 18, 23, and 25, 1989. The writ was granted on
this last date. The parties also agreed to submit the case for
resolution on the sole issue of whether there was a law or
ordinance authorizing the removal of the license plates of
illegally parked vehicles. The parties then submitted simultaneous
memoranda in support of their respective positions, following which
the respondent judge rendered the assailed decision.
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In ruling for the complainant, Judge Gonong held that LOI 43,
which the defendant had invoked, did not empower it "to detach,
remove and confiscate vehicle plates of motor vehicles illegally
parked and unattended as in the case at bar. It merely authorizes
the removal of said vehicles when they are obstacles to free
passage or continued flow of traffic on streets and highways." At
any rate, he said, the LOI had been repealed by PD 1605. Moreover,
the defendant had not been able to point to any MMC rule or
regulation or to any city ordinance to justify the questioned act.
On the allegation that the practice was "the root cause of graft
and corruption or at the very least the equivalent of street racket
among defendant's deployed agents," His Honor made the following
pointed observations:
At this juncture, it may not be amiss to say, that if the
arbitrary and capricious detachment and confiscation of vehicles
plates illegally parked and unattended as in the act complained of
in the instant case, the image of the man clothed in a traffic or
police uniform will be greatly impaired if not cursed with
disrespect on the part of those who have suffered at his hands.
Worse, he will cease (if he had not already ceased) to be the
law-abiding, courageous and valiant protector of a citizen of the
Republic that he is meant to be, and instead his real oppressor and
enemy, thereby fortifying the contemporaneous public perception
that he is a dyed-in-the-wool extortionist if not an unmitigated
chiseler. 1
It bears noting that this petition should have been filed first
with the Court of Appeals, which has concurrent jurisdiction with
this Court on decisions of the regional trial courts involving
questions of law. However, in view of the importance of the issue
raised, we have decided to take cognizance thereof under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court so we can address and resolve the question
directly.
Upon the filing of this petition, we issued a temporary
restraining order dated February 6, 1990, to prevent enforcement of
the said decision until further orders from this Court. Thereafter,
we required a comment from the private respondent, to which the
petitioner filed a reply as also directed.
The petitioner reiterates and reinforces its argument in the
court below and insists that LOI 43 remains in force despite the
issuance of PD 1605. It contends that there is no inconsistency
between the two measures because the former deals with illegally
parked vehicles anywhere in the Philippines whereas the latter
deals with the regulation of the flow of traffic in the Metro
Manila area only. The two measures may be enforced together because
implied repeals are not favored and, furthermore, to look at them
another way, LOI 43 is the special law dealing only with illegal
parking while PD 1605 is the general law dealing with all other
kinds of traffic violations. The special law must of course prevail
over the general law. The petitioner also deplores the above-quoted
remarks of the trial judge, pointing out that the parties had
agreed to limit the issue to whether there was a statutory basis
for the act complained of. And even assuming that abuses have been
committed in the enforcement of LOI 43, the remedy is not to
disregard it or consider it revoked but to prosecute the guilty
parties.
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In his comment, the private respondent argues that LOI 43 has
been repealed by PD 1605, which specifies all the sanctions
available against the various traffic violations, including illegal
parking. He stresses that removal and confiscation of the license
plates of illegally parked vehicles is not one of them, the
penalties being limited in the decree to imposition of fine and
suspension or revocation of driver's licenses or certificates of
public convenience, etc. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. He
agrees that the special law prevails over the general law but
maintains it is PD 1605 that is the special law because it is
applicable only on Metro Manila and LOI 43 that is the general law
because it was intended to operate throughout the country. As for
his allegation that the challenged practice is a source of graft,
he maintains that it was not improper to discuss it in his
memorandum because it was pertinent to the central issue under
consideration. Finally, he claims that removal and confiscation of
the license plate without notice and hearing violates due process
because such license plate is a form of property protected by the
Bill of Rights against unlawful deprivation.
In its reply, the petitioner faults the private respondent for
belatedly raising the constitutionality of LOI 43, suggesting
faintly that this should not be permitted. In any case, it
maintains, the license plate is not property in the constitutional
sense, being merely the identification of the vehicle, and its
"temporary confiscation" does not deprive the owner of the use of
the vehicle itself. Hence, there is no unlawful taking under the
due process clause. The petitioner also takes issue with the
contention that it is PD 1605 that should be considered the special
law because of its limited territorial application. Repeal of LOI
43 on that ground would run counter to the legislative intention as
it is in fact in Metro Manila that the problem of illegal parking
is most acute.
LOI 43, entitled Measures to Effect a Continuing Flow of
Transportation on Streets and Highways, was issued on November 28,
1972, with the following pertinent provisions:
Motor vehicles that stall on the streets and highways, streets
and sidewalks, shall immediately be removed by their owners/users;
otherwise said vehicles shall be dealt with and disposed in the
manner stated hereunder;
1. For the first offense the stalled or illegally parked vehicle
shall be removed, towed and impounded at the expense of the owner,
user or claimant;
2. For the second and subsequent offenses, the registry plates
of the vehicles shall be confiscated and the owner's certificate of
registration cancelled. (Emphasis supplied).
PD 1605 (Granting the Metropolitan Manila Commission Central
Powers Related to Traffic Management, Providing Penalties, and for
Other Purposes) was issued, also by President Marcos, on November
21, 1978, and pertinently provides:
Section 1. The Metropolitan Manila Commission shall have the
power to impose fines and otherwise discipline drivers and
operators of motor vehicles for
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violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations in
Metropolitan Manila in such amounts and under such penalties as are
herein prescribed. For his purpose, the powers of the Land
Transportation Commission and the Board of Transportation under
existing laws over such violations and punishment thereof are
hereby transferred to the Metropolitan Manila Commission. When the
proper penalty to be imposed is suspension or revocation of
driver's license or certificate of public convenience, the
Metropolitan Manila Commission or its representatives shall suspend
or revoke such license or certificate. The suspended or revoked
driver's license or the report of suspension or revocation of the
certificate of public convenience shall be sent to the Land
Transportation Commission or the Board of Transportation, as the
case may be, for their records update.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 3. Violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and
regulations, committed within a twelve-month period, reckoned from
the date of birth of the licensee, shall subject the violator to
graduated fines as follows: P10.00 for the first offense, P20.00
for the second offense, P50.00 for the third offense, a one-year
suspension of driver's license for the fourth offense, and a
revocation of the driver' license for the fifth offense: Provided,
That the Metropolitan Manila Commission may impose higher penalties
as it may deem proper for violations of its ordinances prohibiting
or regulating the use of certain public roads, streets or
thoroughfares in Metropolitan Manila.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5. In case of traffic violations, the driver's license
shall not be confiscated but the erring driver shall be immediately
issued a traffic citation ticket prescribed by the Metropolitan
Manila Commission which shall state the violation committed, the
amount of fine imposed for the violation and an advice that he can
make payment to the city or municipal treasurer where the violation
was committed or to the Philippine National Bank or Philippine
Veterans Bank or their branches within seven days from the date of
issuance of the citation ticket.
If the offender fails to pay the fine imposed within the period
herein prescribed, the Metropolitan Manila Commission or the law
enforcement agency concerned shall endorse the case to the proper
fiscal for appropriate proceedings preparatory to the filing of the
case with the competent traffic court, city or municipal court.
If at the time a driver renews his driver's license and records
show that he has an unpaid fine, his driver's license shall not be
renewed until he has paid the fine and corresponding
surcharges.
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xxx xxx xxx
Section 8. Insofar as the Metropolitan Manila area is concerned,
all laws, decrees, orders, ordinances, rules and regulations, or
parts thereof inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly. (Emphasis supplied).
A careful reading of the above decree will show that removal and
confiscation of the license plate of any illegally parked vehicle
is not among the specified penalties. Moreover, although the
Metropolitan Manila Commission is authorized by the decree to
"otherwise discipline" and "impose higher penalties" on traffic
violators, whatever sanctions it may impose must be "in such
amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed." The
petitioner has not pointed to any such additional sanctions,
relying instead on its argument that the applicable authority for
the questioned act is LOI 43.
The petitioner stresses that under the decree, "the powers of
the Land Transportation Commission and the Board of Transportation
over such violations and punishment thereof are (hereby)
transferred to the Metropolitan Manila Commission," and one of such
laws is LOI 43. The penalties prescribed by the LOI are therefore
deemed incorporated in PD 1605 as additional to the other penalties
therein specified.
It would appear that what the LOI punishes is not a traffic
violation but a traffic obstruction, which is an altogether
different offense. A violation imports an intentional breach or
disregard of a rule, as where a driver leaves his vehicle in a
no-parking area against a known and usually visible prohibition.
Contrary to the common impression, LOI 43 does not punish illegal
parking per se but parking of stalled vehicles, i.e., those that
involuntarily stop on the road due to some unexpected trouble such
as engine defect, lack of gasoline, punctured tires, or other
similar cause. The vehicle is deemed illegally parked because it
obstructs the flow of traffic, but only because it has stalled. The
obstruction is not deliberate. In fact, even the petitioner
recognizes that "there is a world of difference between a stalled
vehicle and an illegally parked and unattended one" and suggests a
different treatment for either. "The first means one which stopped
unnecessarily or broke down while the second means one which
stopped to accomplish something, including temporary rest. 2
LOI 43 deals with motor vehicles "that stall on the streets and
highways' and not those that are intentionally parked in a public
place in violation of a traffic law or regulation. The purpose of
the LOI evidently is to discipline the motorist into keeping his
vehicle in good condition before going out into the streets so as
not to cause inconvenience to the public when the car breaks down
and blocks other vehicles. That is why, for the first offense, the
stalled vehicle is immediately towed at the owner's expense to
clear the street of the traffic obstruction. Where it appears that
the owner has not learned from his first experience because the
vehicle has stalled again, presumably due to his failure to repair
it, the penalty shall be confiscation of the license plate and
cancellation of the certificate of registration petition.
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It is worth noting that it is not the driver's license that is
confiscated and canceled when the vehicle stalls on a public
street. The LOI goes against the vehicle itself. The object of the
measure is to ensure that only motor vehicles in good condition may
use the public streets, and this is effected by confiscating the
license plates and canceling the certificates of registration of
those vehicles that are not roadworthy.
In the case of the private respondent, it is not alleged or
shown that his vehicle stalled on a public thoroughfare and
obstructed the flow of traffic. The charge against him is that he
purposely parked his vehicle in a no parking area (although this is
disputed by him).itc-asl The act, if true, is a traffic violation
that may not be punished under LOI 43. The applicable law is PD
1605, which does not include removal and confiscation of the
license plate of the vehicle among the imposable penalties.
Indeed, even if LOI 43 were applicable, the penalty of
confiscation would still not be justified as it has not been
alleged, much less shown, that the illegal parking was a second or
subsequent offense. That circumstance must be established at a
trial before a court of justice where the vehicle owner shall have
a right to be heard in his defense. The second or subsequent
offense cannot be simply pronounced by the traffic authorities
without hearing and without proof. Confiscation of the registry
plate without a judicial finding that the offense charge is a
second or subsequent one would, unless the owner concedes this
point, be invalid.
While it is true that the license plate is strictly speaking not
a property right, it does not follow that it may be removed or
confiscated without lawful cause. Due process is a guaranty against
all forms of official arbitrariness. Under the principle that ours
is a government of laws and not of men, every official must act by
and within the authority of a valid law and cannot justify the lack
of it on the pretext alone of good intentions. It is recalled that
more than seventy years ago, the mayor of Manila deported one
hundred seventy prostitutes to Davao for the protection of the
morals and health of the city. This Court acknowledged his
praiseworthy purpose but just the same annulled his unauthorized
act, holding that no one could take the law into his own hands. 3
We can rule no less in the case before us.
We find that there is no inconsistency between LOI 43 and PD
1605, whichever is considered the special law either because of its
subject or its territorial application. The former deals with motor
vehicles that have stalled on a public road while the latter deals
with motor vehicles that have been deliberately parked in a
no-parking area; and while both cover illegal parking of motor
vehicles, the offense is accidental under the first measure and
intentional under the second. This explains why the sanctions are
different. The purpose of the LOI is to discourage the use of the
public streets by motor vehicles that are likely to break down
while that of the decree is to penalize the driver for his defiance
of the traffic laws.
As it has not been shown that the private respondent's motor
vehicle had stalled because of an engine defect or some other
accidental cause and, no less importantly, that it had stalled on
the road for a second or subsequent time, confiscation of the
license plate cannot be justified under LOI 43. And neither can
that sanction be sustained under PD 1605, which clearly
provides
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that "in case of traffic violations, (even) the driver's license
shall not be confiscated," let alone the license plate of the motor
vehicle. If at all, the private respondent may be held liable for
illegal parking only and subjected to any of the specific penalties
mentioned in Section 3 of the decree.
We recognize the problem of the traffic policeman who comes upon
an illegally parked and unattended vehicle and is unable to serve a
citation on the offending driver who is nowhere in sight. But that
problem is not addressed to the courts; it is for the legislative
and administrative authorities to solve. What is clear to the Court
is that the difficulty cannot be avoided by the removal of the
license plate of the offending vehicle because the petitioner has
not shown that this penalty is authorized by a valid law or
ordinance.
The petitioner complains that the respondent judge did not
confine himself to the issue agreed upon by the parties and made
gratuitous accusations that were not only irrelevant but virtually
condemned the whole traffic force as corrupt. Assuming that this
issue was indeed not properly raised at the trial, the Court is
nevertheless not inhibited from considering it in this proceeding,
on the basis of its own impressions on the matter.
This Court is not isolated from the mainstream of society and
secluded in a world of its own, unconcerned with the daily lives of
the rest of the nation. On the contrary, the members of this Court
mix with the people and know their problems and complaints. And
among these are the alleged abuses of the police in connection with
the issue now before us.
It is claimed that the removal of the license plates of
illegally parked motor vehicles in Metro Manila has become a
veritable gold mine for some police officers. To be sure, we do not
have hard, provable facts at hand but only vague and
unsubstantiated rumors that could be no more than malicious and
invented charges. Nevertheless, these accusations have become too
prevalent and apparently too persuasive that they cannot be simply
swept under the rug.
The widespread report is that civilian "agents," mostly street
urchins under the control and direction of certain policemen,
remove these license plates from illegally parked vehicles and
later discreetly suggest to the owners that these may be retrieved
for an unofficial fee. This ranges from P50.00 to P200.00,
depending on the type of vehicle. If the owner agrees, payment is
usually made and the license plate returned at a private
rendezvous. No official receipt is issued. Everything is done
quietly. The owners, it is said, prefer this kind of fast
settlement to the inconvenience of an official proceeding that may
entail not only the payment of a higher fine but also other
administrative impositions, like attendance at a traffic
seminar.
The Court is not saying that these reports are true nor is it
stigmatizing the entire police force on the basis of these
unsubstantiated charges. But it does believe and stress that the
proper authorities should take official notice of these reports
instead of blandly dismissing them as mere canards that do not
deserve their attention and concern. An inquiry is in our view
indicated. The old adage that where there's smoke there's fire is
not necessarily true and can hardly be the rationale of a judicial
conclusion; but the Court feels just the same that serious
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steps should be taken, especially because of the persistence of
these charges, to determine the source of the smoke.
We realize the seriousness of our traffic problems, particularly
in Metro Manila, and commend the earnest efforts of the police to
effect a smoother flow of vehicles in the public thoroughfares for
the comfort and convenience of the people. But we must add, as a
reminder that must be made, that such efforts must be authorized by
a valid law, which must clearly define the offenses proscribed and
as clearly specify the penalties prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Court holds that LOI
43 is valid but may be applied only against motor vehicles that
have stalled in the public streets due to some involuntary cause
and not those that have been intentionally parked in violation of
the traffic laws. The challenged decision of the trial court is
AFFIRMED in so far as it enjoins confiscation of the private
respondent's license plate for alleged deliberate illegal parking,
which is subject to a different penalty. The temporary restraining
order dated February 6, 1990, is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
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CASE 3
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 152774 May 27, 2004
THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS, represented by its Governor,
HERMILANDO I. MANDANAS, petitioner, vs. HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO,
Executive Secretary and Chairman of the Oversight Committee on
Devolution; HON. EMILIA BONCODIN, Secretary, Department of Budget
and Management; HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The Province of Batangas, represented by its Governor,
Hermilando I. Mandanas, filed the present petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, to declare as unconstitutional and void certain provisos
contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAA) of 1999, 2000
and 2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each
corresponding year the amount of five billion pesos
(P5,000,000,000.00) of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the
Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) and imposed
conditions for the release thereof.
Named as respondents are Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo,
in his capacity as Chairman of the Oversight Committee on
Devolution, Secretary Emilia Boncodin of the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM) and Secretary Jose Lina of the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG).
Background
On December 7, 1998, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 48 entitled "ESTABLISHING A
PROGRAM FOR DEVOLUTION ADJUSTMENT AND EQUALIZATION." The program
was established to "facilitate the process of enhancing the
capacities of local government units (LGUs) in the discharge of the
functions and services devolved to them by the National Government
Agencies concerned pursuant to the Local Government Code."1 The
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Oversight Committee (referred to as the Devolution Committee in
E.O. No. 48) constituted under Section 533(b) of Republic Act No.
7160 (The Local Government Code of 1991) has been tasked to
formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary
for its effective implementation.2 Further, to address the funding
shortfalls of functions and services devolved to the LGUs and other
funding requirements of the program, the "Devolution Adjustment and
Equalization Fund" was created.3 For 1998, the DBM was directed to
set aside an amount to be determined by the Oversight Committee
based on the devolution status appraisal surveys undertaken by the
DILG.4 The initial fund was to be sourced from the available
savings of the national government for CY 1998.5 For 1999 and the
succeeding years, the corresponding amount required to sustain the
program was to be incorporated in the annual GAA.6 The Oversight
Committee has been authorized to issue the implementing rules and
regulations governing the equitable allocation and distribution of
said fund to the LGUs.7
The LGSEF in the GAA of 1999
In Republic Act No. 8745, otherwise known as the GAA of 1999,
the program was renamed as the LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE
EQUALIZATION FUND (LGSEF). Under said appropriations law, the
amount ofP96,780,000,000 was allotted as the share of the LGUs in
the internal revenue taxes. Item No. 1, Special Provisions, Title
XXXVI A. Internal Revenue Allotment of Rep. Act No. 8745 contained
the following proviso:
... PROVIDED, That the amount of FIVE BILLION PESOS
(P5,000,000,000) shall be earmarked for the Local Government
Service Equalization Fund for the funding requirements of projects
and activities arising from the full and efficient implementation
of devolved functions and services of local government units
pursuant to R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That such amount shall be released
to the local government units subject to the implementing rules and
regulations, including such mechanisms and guidelines for the
equitable allocations and distribution of said fund among local
government units subject to the guidelines that may be prescribed
by the Oversight Committee on Devolution as constituted pursuant to
Book IV, Title III, Section 533(b) of R.A. No. 7160. The Internal
Revenue Allotment shall be released directly by the Department of
Budget and Management to the Local Government Units concerned.
On July 28, 1999, the Oversight Committee (with then Executive
Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora as Chairman) passed Resolution Nos.
OCD-99-003, OCD-99-005 and OCD-99-006 entitled as follows:
OCD-99-005
RESOLUTION ADOPTING THE ALLOCATION SCHEME FOR THE PhP5 BILLION
CY 1999 LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE EQUALIZATION FUND (LGSEF) AND
REQUESTING HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA TO
APPROVE SAID ALLOCATION SCHEME.
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OCD-99-006
RESOLUTION ADOPTING THE ALLOCATION SCHEME FOR THE PhP4.0 BILLION
OF THE 1999 LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE EQUALIZATION FUND AND ITS
CONCOMITANT GENERAL FRAMEWORK, IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES AND
MECHANICS FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION AND RELEASE, AS PROMULGATED BY THE
OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ON DEVOLUTION.
OCD-99-003
RESOLUTION REQUESTING HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA TO APPROVE THE REQUEST OF THE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ON
DEVOLUTION TO SET ASIDE TWENTY PERCENT (20%) OF THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT SERVICE EQUALIZATION FUND (LGSEF) FOR LOCAL AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION PROJECTS AND OTHER PRIORITY INITIATIVES FOR LGUs
INSTITUTIONAL AND CAPABILITY BUILDING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES AND MECHANICS AS PROMULGATED BY THE
COMMITTEE.
These OCD resolutions were approved by then President Estrada on
October 6, 1999.
Under the allocation scheme adopted pursuant to Resolution No.
OCD-99-005, the five billion pesos LGSEF was to be allocated as
follows:
1. The PhP4 Billion of the LGSEF shall be allocated in
accordance with the allocation scheme and implementing guidelines
and mechanics promulgated and adopted by the OCD. To wit:
a. The first PhP2 Billion of the LGSEF shall be allocated in
accordance with the codal formula sharing scheme as prescribed
under the 1991 Local Government Code;
b. The second PhP2 Billion of the LGSEF shall be allocated in
accordance with a modified 1992 cost of devolution fund (CODEF)
sharing scheme, as recommended by the respective leagues of
provinces, cities and municipalities to the OCD. The modified CODEF
sharing formula is as follows:
Province : 40%
Cities : 20%
Municipalities : 40%
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This is applied to the P2 Billion after the approved amounts
granted to individual provinces, cities and municipalities as
assistance to cover decrease in 1999 IRA share due to reduction in
land area have been taken out.
2. The remaining PhP1 Billion of the LGSEF shall be earmarked to
support local affirmative action projects and other priority
initiatives submitted by LGUs to the Oversight Committee on
Devolution for approval in accordance with its prescribed
guidelines as promulgated and adopted by the OCD.
In Resolution No. OCD-99-003, the Oversight Committee set aside
the one billion pesos or 20% of the LGSEF to support Local
Affirmative Action Projects (LAAPs) of LGUs. This remaining amount
was intended to "respond to the urgent need for additional funds
assistance, otherwise not available within the parameters of other
existing fund sources." For LGUs to be eligible for funding under
the one-billion-peso portion of the LGSEF, the OCD promulgated the
following:
III. CRITERIA FOR ELIGIBILITY:
1. LGUs (province, city, municipality, or barangay),
individually or by group or multi-LGUs or leagues of LGUs,
especially those belonging to the 5th and 6th class, may access the
fund to support any projects or activities that satisfy any of the
aforecited purposes. A barangay may also access this fund directly
or through their respective municipality or city.
2. The proposed project/activity should be need-based, a local
priority, with high development impact and are congruent with the
socio-cultural, economic and development agenda of the Estrada
Administration, such as food security, poverty alleviation,
electrification, and peace and order, among others.
3. Eligible for funding under this fund are projects arising
from, but not limited to, the following areas of concern:
a. delivery of local health and sanitation services, hospital
services and other tertiary services;
b. delivery of social welfare services;
c. provision of socio-cultural services and facilities for youth
and community development;
d. provision of agricultural and on-site related research;
e. improvement of community-based forestry projects and other
local projects on environment and natural resources protection and
conservation;
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f. improvement of tourism facilities and promotion of
tourism;
g. peace and order and public safety;
h. construction, repair and maintenance of public works and
infrastructure, including public buildings and facilities for
public use, especially those destroyed or damaged by man-made or
natural calamities and disaster as well as facilities for water
supply, flood control and river dikes;
i. provision of local electrification facilities;
j. livelihood and food production services, facilities and
equipment;
k. other projects that may be authorized by the OCD consistent
with the aforementioned objectives and guidelines;
4. Except on extremely meritorious cases, as may be determined
by the Oversight Committee on Devolution, this portion of the LGSEF
shall not be used in expenditures for personal costs or benefits
under existing laws applicable to governments. Generally, this fund
shall cover the following objects of expenditures for programs,
projects and activities arising from the implementation of devolved
and regular functions and services:
a. acquisition/procurement of supplies and materials critical to
the full and effective implementation of devolved programs,
projects and activities;
b. repair and/or improvement of facilities;
c. repair and/or upgrading of equipment;
d. acquisition of basic equipment;
e. construction of additional or new facilities;
f. counterpart contribution to joint arrangements or collective
projects among groups of municipalities, cities and/or provinces
related to devolution and delivery of basic services.
5. To be eligible for funding, an LGU or group of LGU shall
submit to the Oversight Committee on Devolution through the
Department of Interior and Local Governments, within the prescribed
schedule and timeframe, a Letter Request for Funding Support from
the Affirmative Action Program under the LGSEF, duly signed by the
concerned LGU(s) and endorsed by cooperators and/or beneficiaries,
as well as the duly signed Resolution of Endorsement by the
respective Sanggunian(s) of the LGUs concerned. The
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LGU-proponent shall also be required to submit the Project
Request (PR), using OCD Project Request Form No. 99-02, that
details the following:
(a) general description or brief of the project;
(b) objectives and justifications for undertaking the project,
which should highlight the benefits to the locality and the
expected impact to the local program/project arising from the full
and efficient implementation of social services and facilities, at
the local levels;
(c) target outputs or key result areas;
(d) schedule of activities and details of requirements;
(e) total cost requirement of the project;
(f) proponent's counterpart funding share, if any, and
identified source(s) of counterpart funds for the full
implementation of the project;
(g) requested amount of project cost to be covered by the
LGSEF.
Further, under the guidelines formulated by the Oversight
Committee as contained in Attachment - Resolution No. OCD-99-003,
the LGUs were required to identify the projects eligible for
funding under the one-billion-peso portion of the LGSEF and submit
the project proposals thereof and other documentary requirements to
the DILG for appraisal. The project proposals that passed the
DILG's appraisal would then be submitted to the Oversight Committee
for review, evaluation and approval. Upon its approval, the
Oversight Committee would then serve notice to the DBM for the
preparation of the Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) and
Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA) to effect the release of funds to
the said LGUs.
The LGSEF in the GAA of 2000
Under Rep. Act No. 8760, otherwise known as the GAA of 2000, the
amount of P111,778,000,000 was allotted as the share of the LGUs in
the internal revenue taxes. As in the GAA of 1999, the GAA of 2000
contained a proviso earmarking five billion pesos of the IRA for
the LGSEF. This proviso, found in Item No. 1, Special Provisions,
Title XXXVII A. Internal Revenue Allotment, was similarly worded as
that contained in the GAA of 1999.
The Oversight Committee, in its Resolution No. OCD-2000-023
dated June 22, 2000, adopted the following allocation scheme
governing the five billion pesos LGSEF for 2000:
1. The PhP3.5 Billion of the CY 2000 LGSEF shall be allocated to
and shared by the four levels of LGUs, i.e., provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays, using the following
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percentage-sharing formula agreed upon and jointly endorsed by
the various Leagues of LGUs:
For Provinces 26% or P 910,000,000
For Cities 23% or 805,000,000
For Municipalities 35% or 1,225,000,000
For Barangays 16% or 560,000,000
Provided that the respective Leagues representing the provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays shall draw up and adopt the
horizontal distribution/sharing schemes among the member LGUs
whereby the Leagues concerned may opt to adopt direct financial
assistance or project-based arrangement, such that the LGSEF
allocation for individual LGU shall be released directly to the LGU
concerned;
Provided further that the individual LGSEF shares to LGUs are
used in accordance with the general purposes and guidelines
promulgated by the OCD for the implementation of the LGSEF at the
local levels pursuant to Res. No. OCD-99-006 dated October 7, 1999
and pursuant to the Leagues' guidelines and mechanism as approved
by the OCD;
Provided further that each of the Leagues shall submit to the
OCD for its approval their respective allocation scheme, the list
of LGUs with the corresponding LGSEF shares and the corresponding
project categories if project-based;
Provided further that upon approval by the OCD, the lists of
LGUs shall be endorsed to the DBM as the basis for the preparation
of the corresponding NCAs, SAROs, and related budget/release
documents.
2. The remaining P1,500,000,000 of the CY 2000 LGSEF shall be
earmarked to support the following initiatives and local
affirmative action projects, to be endorsed to and approved by the
Oversight Committee on Devolution in accordance with the OCD
agreements, guidelines, procedures and documentary
requirements:
On July 5, 2000, then President Estrada issued a Memorandum
authorizing then Executive Secretary Zamora and the DBM to
implement and release the 2.5 billion pesos LGSEF for 2000 in
accordance with Resolution No. OCD-2000-023.
Thereafter, the Oversight Committee, now under the
administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, promulgated
Resolution No. OCD-2001-29 entitled "ADOPTING RESOLUTION NO.
OCD-2000-023 IN THE ALLOCATION, IMPLEMENTATION AND RELEASE OF THE
REMAINING P2.5 BILLION LGSEF FOR CY 2000." Under this resolution,
the amount of one billion pesos of the LGSEF was to be released in
accordance with
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paragraph 1 of Resolution No. OCD-2000-23, to complete the 3.5
billion pesos allocated to the LGUs, while the amount of 1.5
billion pesos was allocated for the LAAP. However, out of the
latter amount, P400,000,000 was to be allocated and released as
follows: P50,000,000 as financial assistance to the LAAPs of LGUs;
P275,360,227 as financial assistance to cover the decrease in the
IRA of LGUs concerned due to reduction in land area; and
P74,639,773 for the LGSEF Capability-Building Fund.
The LGSEF in the GAA of 2001
In view of the failure of Congress to enact the general
appropriations law for 2001, the GAA of 2000 was deemed re-enacted,
together with the IRA of the LGUs therein and the proviso
earmarking five billion pesos thereof for the LGSEF.
On January 9, 2002, the Oversight Committee adopted Resolution
No. OCD-2002-001 allocating the five billion pesos LGSEF for 2001
as follows:
Modified Codal Formula P 3.000 billion
Priority Projects 1.900 billion
Capability Building Fund .100 billion
P 5.000 billion
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the P3.0 B of the CY 2001 LGSEF which is
to be allocated according to the modified codal formula shall be
released to the four levels of LGUs, i.e., provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays, as follows:
LGUs Percentage Amount
Provinces 25 P 0.750 billion
Cities 25 0.750
Municipalities 35 1.050
Barangays 15 0.450
100 P 3.000 billion
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the P1.9 B earmarked for priority
projects shall be distributed according to the following
criteria:
1.0 For projects of the 4th, 5th and 6th class LGUs; or
2.0 Projects in consonance with the President's State of the
Nation Address (SONA)/summit commitments.
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RESOLVED FURTHER, that the remaining P100 million LGSEF
capability building fund shall be distributed in accordance with
the recommendation of the Leagues of Provinces, Cities,
Municipalities and Barangays, and approved by the OCD.
Upon receipt of a copy of the above resolution, Gov. Mandanas
wrote to the individual members of the Oversight Committee seeking
the reconsideration of Resolution No. OCD-2002-001. He also wrote
to Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo urging her to disapprove said resolution
as it violates the Constitution and the Local Government Code of
1991.
On January 25, 2002, Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo approved Resolution
No. OCD-2002-001.
The Petitioner's Case
The petitioner now comes to this Court assailing as
unconstitutional and void the provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000
and 2001, relating to the LGSEF. Similarly assailed are the
Oversight Committee's Resolutions Nos. OCD-99-003, OCD-99-005,
OCD-99-006, OCD-2000-023, OCD-2001-029 and OCD-2002-001 issued
pursuant thereto. The petitioner submits that the assailed provisos
in the GAAs and the OCD resolutions, insofar as they earmarked the
amount of five billion pesos of the IRA of the LGUs for 1999, 2000
and 2001 for the LGSEF and imposed conditions for the release
thereof, violate the Constitution and the Local Government Code of
1991.
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution is invoked as it
mandates that the "just share" of the LGUs shall be automatically
released to them. Sections 18 and 286 of the Local Government Code
of 1991, which enjoin that the "just share" of the LGUs shall be
"automatically and directly" released to them "without need of
further action" are, likewise, cited.
The petitioner posits that to subject the distribution and
release of the five-billion-peso portion of the IRA, classified as
the LGSEF, to compliance by the LGUs with the implementing rules
and regulations, including the mechanisms and guidelines prescribed
by the Oversight Committee, contravenes the explicit directive of
the Constitution that the LGUs' share in the national taxes "shall
be automatically released to them." The petitioner maintains that
the use of the word "shall" must be given a compulsory meaning.
To further buttress this argument, the petitioner contends that
to vest the Oversight Committee with the authority to determine the
distribution and release of the LGSEF, which is a part of the IRA
of the LGUs, is an anathema to the principle of local autonomy as
embodied in the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
The petitioner cites as an example the experience in 2001 when the
release of the LGSEF was long delayed because the Oversight
Committee was not able to convene that year and no guidelines were
issued therefor. Further, the possible disapproval by the Oversight
Committee of the project proposals of the LGUs would result in the
diminution of the latter's share in the IRA.
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Another infringement alleged to be occasioned by the assailed
OCD resolutions is the improper amendment to Section 285 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 on the percentage sharing of the IRA
among the LGUs. Said provision allocates the IRA as follows:
Provinces 23%; Cities 23%; Municipalities 34%; and Barangays 20%.8
This formula has been improperly amended or modified, with respect
to the five-billion-peso portion of the IRA allotted for the LGSEF,
by the assailed OCD resolutions as they invariably provided for a
different sharing scheme.
The modifications allegedly constitute an illegal amendment by
the executive branch of a substantive law. Moreover, the petitioner
mentions that in the Letter dated December 5, 2001 of respondent
Executive Secretary Romulo addressed to respondent Secretary
Boncodin, the former endorsed to the latter the release of funds to
certain LGUs from the LGSEF in accordance with the handwritten
instructions of President Arroyo. Thus, the LGUs are at a loss as
to how a portion of the LGSEF is actually allocated. Further, there
are still portions of the LGSEF that, to date, have not been
received by the petitioner; hence, resulting in damage and injury
to the petitioner.
The petitioner prays that the Court declare as unconstitutional
and void the assailed provisos relating to the LGSEF in the GAAs of
1999, 2000 and 2001 and the assailed OCD resolutions (Resolutions
Nos. OCD-99-003, OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006, OCD-2000-023, OCD-2001-029
and OCD-2002-001) issued by the Oversight Committee pursuant
thereto. The petitioner, likewise, prays that the Court direct the
respondents to rectify the unlawful and illegal distribution and
releases of the LGSEF for the aforementioned years and release the
same in accordance with the sharing formula under Section 285 of
the Local Government Code of 1991. Finally, the petitioner urges
the Court to declare that the entire IRA should be released
automatically without further action by the LGUs as required by the
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
The Respondents' Arguments
The respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
urge the Court to dismiss the petition on procedural and
substantive grounds. On the latter, the respondents contend that
the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the
assailed resolutions issued by the Oversight Committee are not
constitutionally infirm. The respondents advance the view that
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution does not specify that the
"just share" of the LGUs shall be determined solely by the Local
Government Code of 1991. Moreover, the phrase "as determined by
law" in the same constitutional provision means that there exists
no limitation on the power of Congress to determine what is the
"just share" of the LGUs in the national taxes. In other words,
Congress is the arbiter of what should be the "just share" of the
LGUs in the national taxes.
The respondents further theorize that Section 285 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, which provides for the percentage sharing
of the IRA among the LGUs, was not intended to be a fixed
determination of their "just share" in the national taxes. Congress
may enact other laws, including appropriations laws such as the
GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, providing for a
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different sharing formula. Section 285 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 was merely intended to be the "default share" of the
LGUs to do away with the need to determine annually by law their
"just share." However, the LGUs have no vested right in a permanent
or fixed percentage as Congress may increase or decrease the "just
share" of the LGUs in accordance with what it believes is
appropriate for their operation. There is nothing in the
Constitution which prohibits Congress from making such
determination through the appropriations laws. If the provisions of
a particular statute, the GAA in this case, are within the
constitutional power of the legislature to enact, they should be
sustained whether the courts agree or not in the wisdom of their
enactment.
On procedural grounds, the respondents urge the Court to dismiss
the petition outright as the same is defective. The petition
allegedly raises factual issues which should be properly threshed
out in the lower courts, not this Court, not being a trier of
facts. Specifically, the petitioner's allegation that there are
portions of the LGSEF that it has not, to date, received, thereby
causing it (the petitioner) injury and damage, is subject to proof
and must be substantiated in the proper venue, i.e., the lower
courts.
Further, according to the respondents, the petition has already
been rendered moot and academic as it no longer presents a
justiciable controversy. The IRAs for the years 1999, 2000 and
2001, have already been released and the government is now
operating under the 2003 budget. In support of this, the
respondents submitted certifications issued by officers of the DBM
attesting to the release of the allocation or shares of the
petitioner in the LGSEF for 1999, 2000 and 2001. There is,
therefore, nothing more to prohibit.
Finally, the petitioner allegedly has no legal standing to bring
the suit because it has not suffered any injury. In fact, the
petitioner's "just share" has even increased. Pursuant to Section
285 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the share of the
provinces is 23%. OCD Nos. 99-005, 99-006 and 99-003 gave the
provinces 40% of P2 billion of the LGSEF. OCD Nos. 2000-023 and
2001-029 apportioned 26% of P3.5 billion to the provinces. On the
other hand, OCD No. 2001-001 allocated 25% of P3 billion to the
provinces. Thus, the petitioner has not suffered any injury in the
implementation of the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000
and 2001 and the OCD resolutions.
The Ruling of the Court Procedural Issues
Before resolving the petition on its merits, the Court shall
first rule on the following procedural issues raised by the
respondents: (1) whether the petitioner has legal standing or locus
standi to file the present suit; (2) whether the petition involves
factual questions that are properly cognizable by the lower courts;
and (3) whether the issue had been rendered moot and academic.
The petitioner has locus standi to maintain the present suit
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The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has
"alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions."9 Accordingly, it has been
held that the interest of a party assailing the constitutionality
of a statute must be direct and personal. Such party must be able
to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid,
but also that he has sustained or is in imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and
not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must
appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be
denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or
that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute or act complained of.10
The Court holds that the petitioner possesses the requisite
standing to maintain the present suit. The petitioner, a local
government unit, seeks relief in order to protect or vindicate an
interest of its own, and of the other LGUs. This interest pertains
to the LGUs' share in the national taxes or the IRA. The
petitioner's constitutional claim is, in substance, that the
assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD
resolutions contravene Section 6, Article X of the Constitution,
mandating the "automatic release" to the LGUs of their share in the
national taxes. Further, the injury that the petitioner claims to
suffer is the diminution of its share in the IRA, as provided under
Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991, occasioned by the
implementation of the assailed measures. These allegations are
sufficient to grant the petitioner standing to question the
validity of the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and
2001, and the OCD resolutions as the petitioner clearly has "a
plain, direct and adequate interest" in the manner and distribution
of the IRA among the LGUs.
The petition involves a significant legal issue
The crux of the instant controversy is whether the assailed
provisos contained in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD
resolutions infringe the Constitution and the Local Government Code
of 1991. This is undoubtedly a legal question. On the other hand,
the following facts are not disputed:
1. The earmarking of five billion pesos of the IRA for the LGSEF
in the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and re-enacted
budget for 2001;
2. The promulgation of the assailed OCD resolutions providing
for the allocation schemes covering the said five billion pesos and
the implementing rules and regulations therefor; and
3. The release of the LGSEF to the LGUs only upon their
compliance with the implementing rules and regulations, including
the guidelines and mechanisms, prescribed by the Oversight
Committee.
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Considering that these facts, which are necessary to resolve the
legal question now before this Court, are no longer in issue, the
same need not be determined by a trial court.11 In any case, the
rule on hierarchy of courts will not prevent this Court from
assuming jurisdiction over the petition. The said rule may be
relaxed when the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for
the exercise of this Court's primary jurisdiction.12
The crucial legal issue submitted for resolution of this Court
entails the proper legal interpretation of constitutional and
statutory provisions. Moreover, the "transcendental importance" of
the case, as it necessarily involves the application of the
constitutional principle on local autonomy, cannot be gainsaid. The
nature of the present controversy, therefore, warrants the
relaxation by this Court of procedural rules in order to resolve
the case forthwith.
The substantive issue needs to be resolved notwithstanding the
supervening events
Granting arguendo that, as contended by the respondents, the
resolution of the case had already been overtaken by supervening
events as the IRA, including the LGSEF, for 1999, 2000 and 2001,
had already been released and the government is now operating under
a new appropriations law, still, there is compelling reason for
this Court to resolve the substantive issue raised by the instant
petition. Supervening events, whether intended or accidental,
cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a
grave violation of the Constitution.13Even in cases where
supervening events had made the cases moot, the Court did not
hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to
formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and
public.14
Another reason justifying the resolution by this Court of the
substantive issue now before it is the rule that courts will decide
a question otherwise moot and academic if it is "capable of
repetition, yet evading review."15 For the GAAs in the coming years
may contain provisos similar to those now being sought to be
invalidated, and yet, the question may not be decided before
another GAA is enacted. It, thus, behooves this Court to make a
categorical ruling on the substantive issue now.
Substantive Issue
As earlier intimated, the resolution of the substantive legal
issue in this case calls for the application of a most important
constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy.16 In
Article II of the Constitution, the State has expressly adopted as
a policy that:
Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local
governments.
An entire article (Article X) of the Constitution has been
devoted to guaranteeing and promoting the autonomy of LGUs. Section
2 thereof reiterates the State policy in this wise:
Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall
enjoy local autonomy.
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Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the
Constitution confines the President's power over the LGUs to one of
general supervision.17 This provision has been interpreted to
exclude the power of control. The distinction between the two
powers was enunciated in Drilon v. Lim:18
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an
act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the
act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to
do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The
supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are
followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he
have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not
observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform
to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for
doing the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to
it that the rules are followed.19
The Local Government Code of 199120 was enacted to flesh out the
mandate of the Constitution.21 The State policy on local autonomy
is amplified in Section 2 thereof:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the
policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions
of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to
enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment
of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a
more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local
government units shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization
shall proceed from the National Government to the local government
units.
Guided by these precepts, the Court shall now determine whether
the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001,
earmarking for each corresponding year the amount of five billion
pesos of the IRA for the LGSEF and the OCD resolutions promulgated
pursuant thereto, transgress the Constitution and the Local
Government Code of 1991.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the
OCD resolutions violate the constitutional precept on local
autonomy
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution reads:
Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as
determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them.
When parsed, it would be readily seen that this provision
mandates that (1) the LGUs shall have a "just share" in the
national taxes; (2) the "just share" shall be determined by law;
and (3) the "just share" shall be automatically released to the
LGUs.
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The Local Government Code of 1991, among its salient provisions,
underscores the automatic release of the LGUs' "just share" in this
wise:
Sec. 18. Power to Generate and Apply Resources. Local government
units shall have the power and authority to establish an
organization that shall be responsible for the efficient and
effective implementation of their development plans, program
objectives and priorities; to create their own sources of revenue
and to levy taxes, fees, and charges which shall accrue exclusively
for their use and disposition and which shall be retained by them;
to have a just share in national taxes which shall be automatically
and directly released to them without need of further action;
...
Sec. 286. Automatic Release of Shares. (a) The share of each
local government unit shall be released, without need of any
further action, directly to the provincial, city, municipal or
barangay treasurer, as the case may be, on a quarterly basis within
five (5) days after the end of each quarter, and which shall not be
subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national
government for whatever purpose.
(b) Nothing in this Chapter shall be understood to diminish the
share of local government units under existing laws.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines "automatic"
as "involuntary either wholly or to a major extent so that any
activity of the will is largely negligible; of a reflex nature;
without volition; mechanical; like or suggestive of an automaton."
Further, the word "automatically" is defined as "in an automatic
manner: without thought or conscious intention." Being "automatic,"
thus, connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory.
As such, the LGUs are not required to perform any act to receive
the "just share" accruing to them from the national coffers. As
emphasized by the Local Government Code of 1991, the "just share"
of the LGUs shall be released to them "without need of further
action." Construing Section 286 of the LGC, we held in Pimentel,
Jr. v. Aguirre,22viz:
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic feature
of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of
LGUs in the National internal revenue. This is mandated by no less
than the Constitution. The Local Government Code specifies further
that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within
five (5) days after every quarter of the year and "shall not be
subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national
government for whatever purpose." As a rule, the term "SHALL" is a
word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning. The
provision is, therefore, IMPERATIVE.
Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding, effective
January 1, 1998, of 10 percent of the LGUs' IRA "pending the
assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating
Committee of the emerging fiscal situation" in the country. Such
withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law.
Although temporary, it is equivalent to a
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holdback, which means "something held back or withheld, often
temporarily." Hence, the "temporary" nature of the retention by the
national government does not matter. Any retention is
prohibited.
In sum, while Section 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as an advisory
effected in times of national crisis, Section 4 thereof has no
color of validity at all. The latter provision effectively
encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local governments. Concededly,
the President was well-intentioned in issuing his Order to withhold
the LGUs' IRA, but the rule of law requires that even the best
intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the
Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be carried
out by legal methods.23
The "just share" of the LGUs is incorporated as the IRA in the
appropriations law or GAA enacted by Congress annually. Under the
assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, a portion of
the IRA in the amount of five billion pesos was earmarked for the
LGSEF, and these provisos imposed the condition that "such amount
shall be released to the local government units subject to the
implementing rules and regulations, including such mechanisms and
guidelines for the equitable allocations and distribution of said
fund among local government units subject to the guidelines that
may be prescribed by the Oversight Committee on Devolution."
Pursuant thereto, the Oversight Committee, through the assailed OCD
resolutions, apportioned the five billion pesos LGSEF such
that:
For 1999
P2 billion - allocated according to Sec. 285 LGC
P2 billion - Modified Sharing Formula (Provinces 40%;
Cities 20%; Municipalities 40%)
P1 billion projects (LAAP) approved by OCD.24
For 2000
P3.5 billion Modified Sharing Formula (Provinces 26%;
Cities 23%; Municipalities 35%; Barangays 16%);
P1.5 billion projects (LAAP) approved by the OCD.25
For 2001
P3 billion Modified Sharing Formula (Provinces 25%;
Cities 25%; Municipalities 35%; Barangays 15%)
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P1.9 billion priority projects
P100 million capability building fund.26
Significantly, the LGSEF could not be released to the LGUs
without the Oversight Committee's prior approval. Further, with
respect to the portion of the LGSEF allocated for various projects
of the LGUs (P1 billion for 1999;P1.5 billion for 2000 and P2
billion for 2001), the Oversight Committee, through the assailed
OCD resolutions, laid down guidelines and mechanisms that the LGUs
had to comply with before they could avail of funds from this
portion of the LGSEF. The guidelines required (a) the LGUs to
identify the projects eligible for funding based on the criteria
laid down by the Oversight Committee; (b) the LGUs to submit their
project proposals to the DILG for appraisal; (c) the project
proposals that passed the appraisal of the DILG to be submitted to
the Oversight Committee for review, evaluation and approval. It was
only upon approval thereof that the Oversight Committee would
direct the DBM to release the funds for the projects.
To the Court's mind, the entire process involving the
distribution and release of the LGSEF is constitutionally
impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or "just share" of the
L