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Texto completo In defense of a hermeneutics of music, Hermann Kretzschmar, musician, public educator, and
author of a series of concert guides, Führer durch den Konzert-Saal (1887-90), published an essay in 1903 that
identifies certain core issues in any attempt to assess the possibility of a musical hermeneutics (Kretzschmar
1903/1988, from which all quotations in this essay are taken). These issues have surfaced repeatedly in
subsequent discussion of the nature of musical criticism and analysis (see, among many others, Kerman 1980,
Newcomb 1984, Nattiez 1990, Burnham 1992, Kramer 1992 and Rothfarb 1992), and it is part of my aim here to
use Kretzschmar's essay as a springboard for reflecting on some of the dilemmas that face today's music
analyst. I am specifically interested in the interface between hermeneutics and analysis, or more precisely,
between hermeneutics and theory-based analysis, and I will attempt to call into question the viability of the
opposition while endorsing hermeneutics as the more fruitful site for analysis. By analysis, I mean the technical
study of a musical work. And by "theory-based analysis," for which Schenker's method will serve here as anexemplar, I refer to technical study that is grounded in an explicit music theory. Although no analysis is, in
principle, unconstrained by theory, some approaches are more casual than others about making explicit their
enabling structures. Hence the need to recognize what would otherwise be a tautological category, theory-
based analysis.
The origins of hermeneutics in scriptural, legal, and literary interpretation are by now too well-known to require
rehearsal in this context (Bent 1994:1-27 offers a concise introduction). Understood broadly as the art or
science of interpretation, hermeneutics would seem to occupy a natural and indeed indispensable place within
the normal activities of musicians. Composers, performers, and listeners are regularly engaged in various acts
of interpretation, acts that would need to be represented in a comprehensive hermeneutics of music. While theperformer is charged with bringing the musical work to life, it is the listener as analyst or interpreter who, in
Kretzschmar's scheme, plays the central role in fashioning a musical hermeneutics.
But who is this listener? Music analysis can scarcely proceed without postulating a listener, yet the difficulty of
specifying the relevant features of a listening subject has led writers to invoke a variety of constructs, some of
them hypothetical, many of them designed to evade the challenge of providing an ethnographically secure
characterization. Thus we have the naive listener, the educated listener, the trained listener, the ordinary
listener, the competent listener, even the ideal listener. While the category of an untutored listener serves the
purposes of certain empirical researches into our cognitive capacities as music-making or music-consuming
subjects, it is the category of the tutored or trained listener that matters to the hermeneuticist. Listeners are
made, not born. Denouncing the view that music needs no interpretation, Kretzschmar describes the
"uninstructed listener" as somebody who "will not get further than sense impressions"; he or she needs to be
instructed.
Instructing the listener is a multifaceted and challenging activity, which is why the aims of music education vary
so widely throughout the world. Still, it is possible to sense some agreement in the view that, because music is a
cultural artifact, interpretation is richest when it draws on culturally-sanctioned meanings. Kretzschmar's
understanding of the aims of hermeneutics acknowledges the value of such insider insights without discounting
the usefulness of technical knowledge and, by implication, the analyst's story-telling ability:
[The aim of hermeneutics is] to penetrate to the meaning and conceptual content enclosed within the forms
concerned, to seek everywhere for the soul beneath the corporeal covering, to identify the irreducible core of thought in every sentence of a writer and in every detail of an artist's work; to explain and analyze the whole by
obtaining the clearest possible understanding of every smallest detail -and all this by employing every aid that
technical knowledge, general culture and personal talent can supply.
The view that 'technical knowledge' should be put in service of a higher interpretative exercise seems
unexceptionable as an ideal. Yet the practical acquisition of such knowledge often requires more than a casual
commitment from the student. This may partly explain the emergence of analysis as a discipline in its own right
in the late nineteenth century (Bent 1980/87:6). Certainly the great technical achievements in twelve-tone
theory, set theory and Schenkerian analysis-to name only the most prominent-are not likely to have been
accomplished had the technical procedure not been erected as an end in itself-however provisionally-rather
than as a means to an end. Criticism of theory-based analysis as myopic, or as failing to reflect the
heterogeneous experiences of listeners: such criticism overlooks the point that resisting the urge to apply
analytical method prematurely is a necessary stage in the consolidation of a field's technical resources. In any
case, underestimating the sheer labor involved in providing a solid technical framework for the accurate
description of musical structure is only one sign of misunderstanding. More profound is underestimating the
difficulty in making a credible and unforced transition between the narratives enshrined in a theory-based
analysis and those that emerge from a less bounded, and interpretatively more promiscuous, hermeneutic
effort. Facile homologies and quick marriages of convenience between structural patterns (emerging from
theorybased analysis) and elements of expression (emerging from hermeneutics), although justifiable if one
views criticism as a constellation, a juxtaposition of different, not obviously complementary, insights, still leave
many questions unanswered.
A crucial although easily overlooked distinction between hermeneutic and theory-based analysis is that whereas
the former relies on language, the latter often uses graphs, symbols, and a metalanguage to convey its findings.
The enterprise of musical hermeneuticists from Kretzschmar to Lawrence Kramer is inconceivable outside a
realm in which the polysemic nature of verbal language plays a central role. Here, for example, is how
Kretzschmar interprets the beginning of the development section of the first movement of Bruckner's Fourth
Symphony:
The development begins in a dreamlike state with the solemn opening motif of the first theme, colored with bolddissonances in striking Romantic fashion [an example is given here]. It then turns to broad elaborations upon
the motif expressing joy in nature; these are distinguished from those in the exposition by a generally more
serious manner. The devoutly Christian character that marks Bruckner's symphonies out from hundreds of
others takes control of his imagination at this point. The section ends with chorale-like strains in which trumpets
carry the melody. As these fade away softly, the second theme of the movement enters (in G major), though
with augmented rhythms and thus imbued with the spirit of churchly piousness. (1898/1994:111-12)
And here is how Lawrence Kramer reacts to the closing bars of the Sarabande from J. S. Bach's D-minor
French Suite:
[The resolution] arrives... only after the discomfort of the right hand has returned, typically (but nonethelesshauntingly, uncannily) in the left. Once embarked on the final cadence, the left hand must negotiate an awkward
stretch supporting a pungent (if no longer exotic) dissonance before relaxing into the close (example omitted).
But something implacable lingers. The cadence can never wholly contain the disseminal force of the dissonance
whose traces it incorporates for both the hand and the ear.
Must the cinder be silent? Bach's fourth chord is not; it is the cinder as palpable cry, burning and burnt.
(1995:242)
By contrast, and choosing more or less at random, Schenker's comprehensive analysis of Chopin's so-called
Revolutionary Étude is presented in his unique graphology, laid out on several levels of structure, and without
verbal commentary (Schenker 1932/69). Only the descriptive labels on the graphs themselves force the analyst
to engage with words, which is not to say that the graph is not thoroughly saturated with concepts, or that
interpreting it inevitably requires the mediation of language (see Agawu 1989 for further discussion). Finally,
here is how Alien Forte begins a discussion of set complexes in Scriabin's Ninth Piano Sonata Op. 68:
Two 8-element sets are formed in the first two measures: 8-27 and 8-13. Each contains its complement.... Pc
set 4.27 is the sustained sonority in the lower parts in measure 42, while 4-13 is the melodic figure connecting
6-Z50 and 6-27 in measure 43.... Pc sets 4-13 and 4-27 (and their complements) form part of the R^sub l^ and
R^sub p^ transitive quadruple cited in section 2.6. (1973:116)
Although the distinction between a verbal hermeneutics and a symbol-oriented theory-based analysis
oversimplifies a complex situation, it helps us to understand aspects of the contemporary debate over musical
interpretation (see, for example, Kramer 1992 and Burnham 1992). E. T. A. Hoffmann's famous 1810 review of
Beethoven's Fifth Symphony is sometimes held up as a shining example of a balanced analysis, one that does
not stop at technical description but explicates the effects on the listener of Beethoven's procedures (Bent
1994:18 and 1996:115-19). Vivid images, poetic flights, and suggestive metaphor enliven the description of
phrase structure, orchestration and the succession of key areas. It could be argued, however, that the apparent
success in integrating the technical with the metaphorical is possible precisely because the technical here is at
a fairly basic level. There is, for example, almost no discussion of voice-leading or hypermeter in Hoffmann's
essay, aspects that would normally feature in a theory-based analysis. One only needs to compare Hoffmann's
account with Schenker's admittedly later analysis to see the difference in technical residue (Schenker 1925).
Arnold Whittall has noted a similarly modest amount of technical data in the writings of some of today's
hermeneuticists (Dunsby 1996:132). The question remains, however: Just how much technical detail is needed
in order for the hermeneuticist to escape the charge of shunning the elements of structure? One answer would
be that that depends entirely on the goals of the analysis. And it is here that the theory-based analyst's data
may seem to harbor an excess, an unusable surplus of dubious value (Agawu 1997).
One thing that is obscured in the presentation of hermeneutics and theory-based analysis as verbal and non-
verbal respectively is the set of conflicting impulses played out within Schenker's own development and in the
tradition of Schenkerian analysis that followed, hi the works of his earliest maturity (such as the Harmonielehre
of 1906), Schenker's writing is marked by what we would now call a hermeneutic attitude. By the time of his
most influential treatise, Der freie Satz, however, the theoretical concerns with explaining the structure of tonalmasterpieces consistently and systematically seemed to overshadow, but not eliminate, the hermeneutic ones.
The impulse to systematize was motivated in part by a desire to guarantee the explanatory potential of his
theory and to enhance its pedagogical value. If some of what Milton Babbitt called the "normative irrelevancies"
(Babbitt 1968:166) of Schenkerian theory have allowed his critics to argue that applications of the theory tend to
be unnecessarily prescriptive, that they simply reproduce the theory in an analytical form, we may also note the
stylistic variety that has accompanied subsequent analytical applications of the theory (compare, for instance,
Jonas 1934/ 1982 with Forte and Gilbert 1982). Significant, too, and undermining the simple linear reading of
Schenker's overall development is what has been called the 'Americanization of Schenker', that is, the
substitution of scientific or technical language for a poetic or figurative one (Rothstein 1986/1990). RobertSnarrenberg has recently drawn attention to "the American abandonment of Schenker's organicism," showing
how some of Schenker's metaphors of procreation were transformed in the American reception of his theories,
thus retreating from some of his aesthetic commitments (1994). The writing and rewriting of Schenker in order
to cast his theory as a closed set of replicable and verifiable moves ultimately eliminates prominent traces of the
hermeneutic impulse from his work.
Is a theory-based musical hermeneutics possible? Schenker's theory is so central to music theory pedagogy
and professional competence that it is easy to misconstrue the value of this mode of analysis and, in particular,
to overlook what Edward Said calls the "self-sufficiency" of analytical method (1989). In Schenker's mature
theory, prolonged counterpoint serves as the foundation of musical structure. Idealized voice-leading, codified in
Fux's treatise of 1725, formed an important backdrop to Schenker's work. Together with ideas of elaboration of
simpler models, as found, for example, in C. P. E. Bach, Schenker developed a comprehensive theory that
enables masterpieces-and here, he and Kretzschmar are in agreement that the focus should be on
'masterpieces'-to be understood in terms of a conceptual journey from an ideal background through various
phases of middleground to a unique foreground. If the precise nature of the "bridges" from strict counterpoint to
free composition remains uncertain, it is partly because the more palpable thematic and gestural elements of
the musical surface, the form-building elements in one view of the compositional process (Réti 1951), are not
always plausibly understood as generated by a prior counterpoint, however canonically correct the generative
process might be. Nor is it the most persuasive compositional explanation to say that the true meaning of a
given foreground emerges only from a consideration of underlying layers. What about the foreground in its
intertextual dialogue with other foregrounds, or in relation to the characteristic gestures that formed a kind of
ordinary language for musical discourse in the 18th and 19th centuries? Still, for the analysis of tonal structure,
the Schenkerian approach remains a cogent, elegant and powerful theory.
Understanding musical structure for Schenkerians comes from the practical activity of doing, and it is precisely
this hands-on approach that guarantees its greatest pleasure. The practicing Schenkerian analyst is brought
into close contact with the notes of a tonal work, forced to hear, rehear, and recompose sections of the work in
order to conceptualize its coherence in terms of an underlying Ursatz. The pedagogical value of this kind of
activity is stunning, second only to the value of hands-on musical performance. But whereas analysis makes
epistemological claims, performance does not, except in the very general sense in which every performance
indexes an interpretation of the work. Although some theorists would reject outright any suggestion that
sensuality is an epistemological gain in music analysis (Matthew Brown and Douglas J. Dempster, for example,
oppose music theory as a 'rational pursuit' with 'mystical and emotive acts, such as worshipping, being moved
by, or becoming one with [the music]' [1989:65]), the suspicion that analysis facilitates close involvement with
the music as an end in itself is not so easily dismissed. Unlike, say, archival study, analysis does not always
proceeded cumulatively. The author of the 50th analytical essay on the 'Eroica' Symphony is not obliged to
demonstrate full acquaintance with the previous 49 essays, any more than the 100th recording of the Eroica is
expected to be acquainted with the previous 99. It may be, then, that certain analyses are better evaluated as
we would evaluate a performance, not as contributions to a discursive, constructed field of knowledge but asevents which make an immediate or delayed impact, or none at all.
Theory-based analysts would probably contest the accusation that their methods provide an excuse, albeit an
elevated one, to live with the music they love. But how can one contest such an accusation when the record of
theoretical and analytical demonstration overwhelmingly favors the core repertory of European music, rarely
venturing into territory inhabited by Kleinmeister? And what is one to make of the theoretically messy (Cohn
1992) recent attempts to beef up the thematic content of analysis by following Schenker's and Burkhart's lead in
looking for so-called 'motivic parallelisms' (Burkhart 1978)? Isn't there more than a hint of apology here, a lame
effort to convince skeptics that Schenkerians, too, can deal with issues of surface drama, agency, and narrative
embodied in a work's theme(s), and therefore that aural salience is not undervalued in this mode of analysis?What of similarlymotivated efforts to bring analysis and performance into alliance, to show that theory-based
analysis can have some relevance to performance? Couldn't one argue that the strength of analysis derives
precisely from its resistance to performance application, and that to push this particular alliance is to limit rather
than extend the explanatory scope and power of theory?
Theory-based analyses carry a considerable amount of baggage that bespeaks an 'internal' hermeneutics. It is
for this reason that we should be wary of attempts to incorporate full-fledged Schenkerian analyses into
hermeneutic readings (see, for example, Kramer 1992 and Jackson 1995). Kretzschmar stresses the
importance of character and sense, aligning himself with proponents of an aesthetics of content in opposition to
those, like Hanslick, who advocate an aesthetics of form. If music "cannot objectify or present unaided exact
images or concepts," then how can we get at its content? All analytical theories of music, and Schenker's in
particular, make implicit or explicit claims about the content of a work. But the claims are highly diverse, and
some of them embrace a spiritual dimension only accessible to believers. Kretzschmar suggests that, in
explicating a piece of instrumental music, we look for the 'affections', that is, "the characteristic qualities of
sensations, images and ideas." These affections are "incarnate in musical phrases, themes, and figures, either
in isolation or in associations and amalgamations such as are possible only in music." That Kretzschmar takes
his cue from the Baroque Affektenlehre is consistent with his own very great passion for Baroque music. Nor is
it particularly surprising that an agenda like Kretzschmar's has not been implemented with any conviction in the
Anglo-American music-theoretical community. Rather than acknowledge the limitations of the Schenkerian
vision, spokespersons are more likely to question the significance of something as ostensibly subjective,
superficial and elusive as the Affections, likening them to the dress as distinct from the body, elements of
expression not of structure. Schenkerian-based studies like Johnson's, far from suggesting that the Schenkerian
prejudice about the Affections and similar aspects of the musical experience no longer endures, actually
demonstrate only a token concern with 'extra-musical' meaning. In grounding the analyses in voice-leading
graphs, one ensures their autonomy and untranslatability. Not until one is prepared to give up the foundational
status of the graph will it be possible to develop a musical hermeneutics that can do justice to Schenkerian
insights.
Talk of Affections is necessarily talk of norms and convention, for the emotional associations of the Affections
are only accessible to members of a given interpretive community. For all their apparent concern with norms of
tonal behavior, however, theory-based analysts have not yet taken up the study of conventions with any great
conviction. For critics who feel that the traffic in conventions must involve principally surface rather than
subsurface musical patterns, study of compositionally relevant conventions necessitates a reclaiming of the
foreground. And this, in turn, signals a return to hermeneutics.
Among competing approaches to interpreting the musical foreground, one fruitful approach recognizes the play
on familiar styles and conventional gestures as an important source of a work's affect, character and meaning.
The subjects of musical discourse or 'topics' that Leonard Ratner drew attention to nearly two decades ago
(Ratner 1980, elaborated in Allanbrook 1983 and Agawu 1991) had always been with us, and were already
serving the ends of interpretation in the writings of some theorists and aestheticians from the eighteenth centuryon. Indeed Kretzschmar's own insistence, in a tiny example from his article, that a passage in Berlioz' Grande
messe des morts is not in waltz-rhythm invokes the notion of topic, the implicit claim being that unless topics are
properly recognized, interpretation (in the sense of performance) will be impoverished. To hear in Mozart's
String Quintets or Piano concertos the play on familiar topoi is to become freshly aware of the extent to which
he deployed conventional styles in highly imaginative ways. No analysis of works in dramatic genres like opera
and piano concerto can afford to treat the play of topic as something superficial, an aspect of the foreground to
be set aside as soon as the search for deeper, qualitatively superior patterns of the middleground and
background begins. The foreground may well be what it is all about.
Analyzing the play of topic in late 1 Sth-century music is held to be significantly incomplete if it does not yield anaccount of the emotional scenario produced by the particular succession of topics. Referring to the topic 'march'
in the first movement of Beethoven's late String Quartet, op. 132, Robert Hatten insists on its tragic character,
'tragic' being understood as an 'expressive genre' (1992: 9192). Hatten's position here is consistent with that of
Kretzschmar, who hopes, further, that an instructed listener to 'pure' instrumental music will not only recognize
shifts from the majestic to the tender, or from tranquillity to excitement, but be forced to ask why this particular
succession is chosen by the composer.
An overarching characterization of emotional or affective states often displays a predictable morphology.
Conventional scenarios like tragic-to-transcendent, or tragic-to-triumphant, which Hatten finds in the music of
Beethoven (Hatten 1994), exist at such a gross level of musical organization that a demonstration of their
pertinence would require a more systematic explication of 'lower levels' of the emotional scenario, a fleshing out
of the journey from background to foreground. Unlike Schenker's Ursatz, however, a plot of Affections is not an
idealized construct embodying structural functions but a concrete and immediate presence, one determined by
the character and sense of the work. Affections exist only at one level of structure. Furthermore, given the
uncertainty or banality of the plots of broad emotional succession in tonal music, one may well be justified in
detaching the more or less concrete topics of musical discourse from the emotions they give rise to. Still,
Kretzschmar, Hatten, and others would consider it something of a retreat if one detached topic from its
emotional clothing. The work's character, they will argue, cannot be properly explained without some reference
to its emotional life.
Explanation is not universally admired in talk about music, and it may be that one of the differences between
theory-based accounts of structure and hermeneutic accounts of meaning rests on the issue of verification.
Whereas the structuralist analysis, given its dependence on a prior theory, makes possible a verification of
method, the hermeneutic effort, by its dependence on an unformalized (but not unformalizable) theory, allows it
to be assertive or suggestive, persuasive or rhetorical, without being held back by the deliberations of proof. It is
for this reason that hermeneutic analyses more nearly approximate verbal performances than some theory-
based analyses. Although no a priori value can be assigned to either mode of analysis, it is becoming
increasingly clear that the hermeneutic impulse is more in tune with the spirit of postmodern inquiry, and that the
scientific model of analysis no longer holds the hegemonic status that it did in the 1960s and 1970s, having now
been, if not superseded, then at least hotly challenged by a literary or narrative model in the 1990s.
Finally, the apparent bifurcation of hermeneutic and theorybased modes of analysis may be understood within
the framework of a sociology of musical knowledge that takes due cognizance, first, of the strong contemporary
impetus towards post-disciplinarity, and second, of the advantages of giving voice to one's subjective
impressions of music(s) (Cusick 1995) and text(s) (KielianGilbert 1997). Both developments amount to a
decisive vote for hermeneutics, for it is structuralism's closed procedures and symbolic language that
sometimes restrict the open-ended flights of poetic fancy that a hermeneutic analysis revels in. Kretzschmar
sought to "penetrate behind the notes themselves, and their configurations, to the feelings," a progression that
may be glossed as originating in structuralism ("the notes themselves, and their configurations") and terminating
in hermeneutics ("the feelings"). But the engagement with "the notes themselves" did not, for Kretzschmar andhis followers, entail the application of a full-fledged theory like Schenker's for tonal music. It would seem then,
given the unbounded framework within which hermeneutics works, that it is the more likely to accommodate
different listeners' insights into works of music. Theory-based analysis becomes hermeneutic only at the point at
which it dissolves its conceptual props into a more open and flexible narrative space. Kretzschmar envisioned
the field of musical hermeneutics as "the conclusion-the last and richest harvest-of all musical theory as such,"
and while that may strike some as totalizing and ambitious, recent debates about the nature of musical
discourse suggest that we could do worse than keep that vision alive even as we dispense with-or transcend-his
analytical method.
References
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References
Author Bibliography
Author selection of six items. Complete list available from the author.
KOFI AGAWU
1997 "Prolonged Counterpoint in Mahler," in Mahler Studies, ed. Stephen Hefling (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press), pp. 217-47.
1995a African Rhythm: A Northern Ewe Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
1995b "The Invention of African Rhythm," Journal of the American Musicological Society 48 (3): 380-95.
1992a "Theory and Practice in the Analysis of the Nineteenth-Century lied," Music Analysis 11 (1): 3-36.