G.R. No. 121069
February 7, 2003
no evidence presented in Civil Case No. 8289-M by either of the
parties and that the decision 3 therein was based on a compromise
agreement. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a
decision in favor of the plaintiffs, the decretal portion of which
reads as follows: "WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby made in favor of
plaintiffs, the Court hereby declares plaintiffs as the sole and
absolute owners of the properties covered by Tax Declarations Nos.
28960 and 28961 of Hagonoy, Bulacan, and orders the defendants to
respect, acknowledge and confirm the right of ownership of
plaintiffs over the whole property described above, to remove
whatever improvements introduced by them thereon, and to pay the
plaintiffs, solidarily and severally P10,000.00 as attorneys fees
and costs of suit. "SO ORDERED."4
BENJAMIN CORONEL AND EMILIA MEKING VDA. DE CORONEL, petitioners,
vs. FLORENTINO CONSTANTINO, AUREA BUENSUCESO, AND THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS,respondents.DECISION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: This
refers to the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of
the Court of Appeals, 1 dated March 27, 1995, in CA-G.R. CV No.
44023 which affirmed the decision of the Regional 2 Trial Court of
Bulacan, Branch 8, dated April 12, 1993 in Civil Case No. 105-M-91
; and the resolution of said appellate court, dated July 4, 1995,
denying the motion for reconsideration of its decision. The factual
background of the case is as follows: The subject property consists
of two parcels of land situated in Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan,
designated as Cadastral Lots Nos. 5737 and 5738. The property is
originally owned by Honoria Aguinaldo. One-half (1/2) of it was
inherited by Emilia Meking Vda. de Coronel together with her sons
Benjamin, Catalino and Ceferino, all surnamed Coronel. The other
half was inherited by Florentino Constantino and Aurea Buensuceso.
On February 20, 1991, Constantino and Buensuceso filed a complaint
for declaration of ownership, quieting of title and damages with
prayer for writ of mandatory and/or prohibitory injunction with the
Regional Trial Court of Bulacan (Branch 8) against Benjamin, Emilia
and John Does, docketed as Civil Case No. 105-M-91. Plaintiffs
allege that: on April 23, 1981, Jess C. Santos and Priscilla
Bernardo purchased the property belonging to Emilia and her sons by
virtue of a deed of sale signed by Emilia; on June 21, 1990, Santos
and Bernardo in turn sold the same to Constantino and Buensuceso by
virtue of a compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 8289-M; they are
the owners of the subject property and defendants have illegally
started to introduce construction on the premises in question; and
pray that "defendants respect, acknowledge and confirm the right of
ownership of the plaintiffs to the share, interest and
participation of the one-third (1/3) portion of the above described
property".l^vvphi1.net After defendants filed their Answer,
pre-trial ensued wherein the parties stipulated that: (1) the
property in question was previously owned by Honoria Aguinaldo,
one-half (1/2) of which was inherited by the defendants while the
other half was inherited by the plaintiffs from the same
predecessor; (2) it was admitted by counsel for the defendants that
there was a sale between Jess Santos and the plaintiffs covering
the subject property; and (3) that there was
On appeal brought by defendants, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the lower court and denied defendants motion for
reconsideration. Hence, herein petition brought by defendants,
raising the following issues: "I. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONTRACT [OF]
SALE EXECUTED BY A PARENT-CO-OWNER, IN HER OWN BEHALF, IS
UNENFORCEABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE SHARES OF HER CO-HEIRS-CHILDREN;
"II. WHETHER OR NOT THE MINOR CHILDREN CAN RATIFY UNAUTHORIZED
ACTIONS OF THEIR PARENTS; "III. WHETHER OR NOT THE CO-HEIRS ARE
INDISPENSABLE DEFENDANTS IN AN ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF OWNERSHIP
AND QUIETING OF TITLE; "IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEED OF SALE WHICH
IS A PRIVATE DOCUMENT WAS SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED WHEN THE COUNSEL
FOR THE DEFENDANTS5 PETITIONERS ADMITTED ONLY ITS EXISTENCE BUT NOT
ITS CONTENTS." The third issue was raised by the petitioners for
the first time with the Court of Appeals. They claim that the
complaint should have been dismissed because private respondents
failed to
1
implead the heirs of Ceferino and Catalino who died in 1983 and
1990, respectively, in their complaint as indispensable parties. We
do not agree. A careful reading of the "Kasulatan ng Bilihang
Patuluyan" which is a private document, not having been duly
notarized, shows that only the share of Emilia in the subject
property was sold because Benjamin did not sign the document and
the shares of Ceferino and Catalino were not subject of the sale.
Pertinent portions of the document read as follows: "KASULATAN NG
BILIHANG PATULUYAN "PANIWALAAN NG LAHAT: "Kaming mag-iinang Emilia
Micking Vda. Coronel at Benjamin M. Coronel kapwa may sapat na
gulang, Pilipino, naninirahan sa nayon ng Sta. Monica, Hagonoy,
Bulacan, sa kasulatang ito ay malaya naming: "P I N A T U T U N A Y
A N "Na, kami ay tunay na nagmamay-ari ng isang lagay na lupang
Bakuran na minana namin sa aming Lolong yumaong Mauricio Coronel,
na ang ayos, takal at kalagayan ay ang sumusunod: "ORIGINAL
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 5737 "Bakuran sa nayon ng Sta. Monica,
Hagonoy, Bulacan na may sukat na 416 Square Meters ang kabuuan 208
Square Meters Lot A-1 ang kalahati nito na kanilang ipinagbibili.
"x x x x x x x x x "Na, dahil at alang-alang sa halagang DALAWAMPUT
LIMANG LIBONG PISO (P25,000) salaping Pilipino, na aming tinanggap
sa kasiyahang loob namin, buhat sa mag-asawang Jess C. Santos at
Prescy Bernardo, kapwa may sapat na gulang, Pilipino at naninirahan
sa nayon ng Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan, sa bisa ng kasulatang
ito, ay aming isinasalin, inililipat at ipinagbibili ng bilihang
patuluyan ang lahat ng aming dapat na makaparte sa lupang Bakuran
Nakasaad sa dakong unahan nito, sa nabanggit na Jess C. Santos at
Prescy Bernardo o sa kanilang tagapagmana at kahalili. "Na, ako
namang Jess C. Santos, bilang nakabili, ay kusang loob ding
nagsasaysay sa kasulatang ito na ako ay kasangayon sa lahat ng
ditoy nakatala, bagaman ang lupang naturan ay hindi pa nahahati sa
dapat magmana sa yumaong Honoria Aguinaldo. "Na, sa aming kagipitan
inari naming ipagbili ang aming karapatan o kaparte na minana sa
yumaong Guillermo Coronel ay napagkasunduan namin mag-iina na
ipagbili ang bakurang ito na siyang makalulunas sa aming
pangangailangan x x x."
6
"Na, kaming nagbili ang magtatanggol ng katibayan sa pagmamayari
sa lupang naturan, sakaling may manghihimasok. SA KATUNAYAN NITO,
kami ay lumagda sa kasulatang ito sa bayan ng Malabon, Rizal
ngayong ika-23 ng Abril, 1981. (Signed) EMILIA MICKING Vda. CORONEL
Nagbili (Unsigned) BENJAMIN M. CORONEL Nagbili (Signed) JESS C.
SANTOS Nakabili (Signed) PRISCILLA BERNARDO 7 Nakabili"
Thus, it is clear, as already stated, that petitioner Benjamin
did not sign the document and that the shares of Catalino and
Ceferino in the subject property were not sold by them. Since the
shares of Catalino and Ceferino were not sold, plaintiffs
Constantino and Buensuceso have no cause of action against them or
against any of their heirs. Under Rule 3, Section 7 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, indispensable parties are parties in
interest without whom no final determination can be had of an
action. In the present case, the heirs of Catalino and Ceferino are
not indispensable parties because a complete determination of the
rights of herein petitioners and respondents can be had even if the
said heirs are not impleaded. Besides, it is undisputed that
petitioners never raised before the trial court the issue of the
private respondents failure to implead said heirs in their
complaint. Instead, petitioners actively participated in the
proceedings in the lower court and raised only the said issue on
appeal with the Court of Appeals. It is a settled rule that
jurisdictional questions may be 8 raised at any time unless an
exception arises where estoppel has supervened. In the present
case, petitioners participation in all stages of the case during
trial, without raising the issue of the trial courts lack of
jurisdiction over indispensable parties, estops them from
challenging the validity of the proceedings therein. Further, the
deed of sale is not a competent proof that petitioner Benjamin had
sold his own share of the subject property. It cannot be disputed
that Benjamin did not sign the document and therefore, it is
unenforceable against him.l^vvphi1.net Emilia executed the
instrument in her own behalf and not in representation of her three
children.
2
Article 493 of the Civil Code states: "Each co-owner shall have
the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership." Consequently, the sale
of the subject property made by Emilia in favor of Santos and
Bernardo is limited to the portion which may be allotted to her
upon the termination of her coownership over the subject property
with her children. As to the first, second and fourth issues it has
been established that at the time of 9 execution of the "Kasulatan
ng Bilihang Patuluyan" on April 23, 1981 , the subject property was
co-owned, pro-indiviso, by petitioner Emilia together with her
petitioner son Benjamin, and her two other sons, Catalino and
Ceferino. No proof was presented to show that the coownership that
existed among the heirs of Ceferino and Catalino and herein
petitioners has ever been terminated. Applying Articles 1317 and
1403 of the Civil Code, the Court of Appeals ruled that through
their inaction and silence, the three sons of Emilia are considered
to have ratified the aforesaid sale of the subject property by
their mother. Articles 1317 and 1403 (1) of the Civil Code provide:
"Art. 1317. No one may contract in the name of another without
being authorized by the latter, or unless he has by law a right to
represent him. "A contract entered into in the name of another by
one who has no authority or legal representation or who has acted
"beyond his powers shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified,
expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been
executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting party.
"Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they
are ratified: "(1) Those entered into in the name of another person
by one who has been given no authority or legal representation, or
who has acted beyond his powers. x x x x x x x x x" We do not agree
with the appellate court. The three sons of Emilia did not ratify
the sale. 10 In Maglucot-Aw vs. Maglucot we held that:
"Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily
adopts and gives sanction to some unauthorized act or defective
proceeding, which without his sanction would not be binding on him.
It is this voluntary choice, knowingly made, which amounts to a
ratification of what was theretofore unauthorized, and becomes the
authorized act of the party so making the ratification. No evidence
was presented to show that the three brothers were aware of the
sale made by their mother. Unaware of such sale, Catalino, Ceferino
and Benjamin could not be considered as having voluntarily remained
silent and knowingly chose not to file an action for the annulment
of the sale. Their alleged silence and inaction may not be
interpreted as an act of ratification on their part. We also find
no concrete evidence to show that Ceferino, Catalino and Benjamin
benefited from the sale. It is true that private respondent
Constantino testified that Benjamin took money from Jess Santos but
this is mere allegation on the part of Constantino. No other
evidence was presented to support such allegation. Bare
allegations, unsubstantiated by 11 evidence, are not equivalent to
proof under our Rules of Court. Neither do the records show that
Benjamin admitted having received money from Jess Santos. Even
granting that Benjamin indeed received money from Santos,
Constantinos testimony does not show that the amount received was
part of the consideration for the sale of the subject
property.1a\^/phi1.net To repeat, the sale is valid insofar as the
share of petitioner Emilia Meking Vda. de Coronel is concerned. The
due execution of the "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Patuluyan" was duly
established when petitioners, through their counsel, admitted
during the pre-trial conference that the said 12 document was
signed by Emilia. While petitioners claim that Emilia erroneously
signed it under the impression that it was a contract of mortgage
and not of sale, no competent evidence was presented to prove such
allegation. Hence, Jess C. Santos and Priscilla Bernardo, who
purchased the share of Emilia, became co-owners of the subject
property together with Benjamin and the heirs of Ceferino and
Catalino. As such, Santos and Bernardo could validly dispose of
that portion of the subject property pertaining to Emilia in favor
of herein private respondents Constantino and Buensuceso. However,
the particular portions properly pertaining to each of the
co-owners are not yet defined and determined as no partition in the
proper forum or extrajudicial settlement among the parties has been
effected among the parties. Consequently, the prayer of respondents
for a mandatory or prohibitory injunction lacks merit. WHEREFORE,
the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
3
1. Plaintiffs-private respondents Florentino Constantino and
Aurea Buensuceso are declared owners of one-half (1/2) undivided
portion of the subject property plus the one-fourth () undivided
share of defendant-petitioner Emilia Meking Vda. de Coronel; and,
defendantpetitioner Benjamin Coronel together with the heirs of
Catalino Coronel and the heirs of Ceferino Coronel are declared
owners of one-fourth () share each of the other one-half (1/2)
portion of the subject property, without prejudice to the parties
entering into partition of the subject property, judicial or
otherwise. 2. The order of removal of the improvements and the
award of the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as attorneys
fees and costs of suit are DELETED. No costs.SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing and Callejo, Sr., JJ.,
concu
Gertrudes as a widow. On 2 March 1956, TCT No. 43100 was issued
in the name of "Gertrudes Isidro," who was also referred to therein
as a "widow." On 2 December 1973, Adriano died. It does not appear
that he executed a will before his death. On 5 February 1985,
Gertrudes obtained a loan from petitioners, the spouses Alexander
and Adelaida Cruz, in the amount of P15,000.00 at 5% interest,
payable on or before 5 February 1986. The loan was secured by a
mortgage over the property covered by TCT No. 43100. Gertrudes,
however, failed to pay the loan on the due date. Unable to pay her
outstanding obligation after the debt became due and payable, on 11
March 1986, Gertrudes executed two contracts in favor of petitioner
Alexander Cruz. The first is denominated as "Kasunduan" which the
parties concede is a pacto de retro sale, granting Gertrudes one
year within which to repurchase the property. The second is a
"Kasunduan ng Tuwirang Bilihan," a Deed of Absolute Sale covering
the same property for the price of P39,083.00, the same amount
stipulated in the "Kasunduan." For failure of Gertrudes to
repurchase the property, ownership thereof was consolidated in the
name of Alexander Cruz in whose name TCT No. 130584 was issued on
21 April 1987, canceling TCT No. 43100 in the name of Gertrudes
Isidro. On 9 June 1987, Gertrudes Isidro died. Thereafter, her
heirs, herein private respondents, received demands to vacate the
premises from petitioners, the new owners of the property. Private
respondents responded by filing a complaint as mentioned at the
outset. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the RTC rendered a
decision in favor of private respondents. The RTC held that the
land was conjugal property since the evidence presented by private
respondents disclosed that the same was acquired during the
marriage of the spouses and that Adriano contributed money for the
purchase of the property. Thus, the court concluded, Gertrudes
could only sell to petitioner spouses her one-half share in the
property. The trial court also ruled that no fraud attended the
execution of the contracts. Nevertheless, the "Kasunduan,"
providing for a sale con pacto de retro, had superseded the
"Kasunduan ng Tuwirang Bilihan" the deed of absolute sale. The
trial court did not consider the pacto de retro sale an equitable
mortgage, despite the allegedly insufficient price. Nonetheless,
the trial court found for private respondents. It rationalized that
petitioners failed to comply with the provisions of Article 1607 of
the Civil Code requiring a judicial order for the consolidation of
the ownership in the vendee a retro to be recorded in the Registry
of Property. The dispositive portion of the RTC's Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered:
G.R. No. 125233
March 9, 2000
Spouses ALEXANDER CRUZ and ADELAIDA CRUZ, petitioners, vs.
ELEUTERIO LEIS, RAYMUNDO LEIS, ANASTACIO L. LAGDANO, LORETA L.
CAYONDA and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.KAPUNAN,
J.: Private respondents, the heirs of spouses Adriano Leis and
Gertrudes Isidro, filed an action before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig seeking the nullification of the contracts of sale
over a lot executed by Gertrudes Isidro in favor of petitioner
Alexander Cruz, as well as the title subsequently issued in the
name of the latter. Private respondents claimed that the contracts
were vitiated by fraud as Gertrudes was illiterate and already 80
years old at the time of the execution of the contracts; that the
price for the land was insufficient as it was sold only for
P39,083.00 when the fair market value of the lot should be
P1,000.00 per square meter, instead of P390.00, more or less; and
that the property subject of the sale was conjugal and,
consequently, its sale without the knowledge and consent of private
respondents was in derogation of their rights as heirs. The facts
that gave rise to the complaint: Adriano and Gertrudes were married
on 19 April 1923. On 27 April 1955, Gertrudes acquired from the
then Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR) a
parcel of land with an area of one hundred (100) square meters,
situated at Bo. Sto. Nio, Marikina, Rizal and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42245. The Deed of Sale
described1
4
1. Declaring Exhibit G "Kasunduan ng Tuwirang Bilihan" Null and
Void and declar[ing] that the title issued pursuant thereto is
likewise Null and Void; 2. Declaring the property in litigation as
conjugal property; 3. Ordering the Registry of Deeds of Marikina
Branch to reinstate the title of Gertrudes Isidro; 4. Ordering the
plaintiff[s] [sic] to comply with the provision[s] of Article 1607
in relation to Article 1616 of the Civil Code; 5. Ordering the
defendant[s] to pay plaintiff[s] P15,000.00 nominal damages for the
violation of plaintiffs' rights; 6. Ordering the defendant[s] to
pay plaintiff[s] the sum of P8,000.00 as and for attorney's fees;
7. Dismissing defendant[s'] counterclaim; and 8. Ordering
defendant[s] to pay the cost of suit. SO ORDERED.2
heirs, which includes his widow Gertrudes, who is entitled to
the same share as that of each 6 of the legitimate children. Thus,
as a result of the death of Adriano, a regime of co-ownership arose
between Gertrudes and the other heirs in relation to the property.
Incidentally, there is no merit in petitioners' contention that
Gertrudes' redemption of the property from the Daily Savings Bank
vested in ownership over the same to the exclusion of her
co-owners. We dismissed the same argument by one of the petitioners
in Paulmitan 7 vs. Court of Appeals, where one of the petitioners
therein claimed ownership of the entire property subject of the
case by virtue of her redemption thereof after the same was
forfeited in favor of the provincial government for non-payment of
taxes. We held however, that the redemption of the land "did not
terminate the co-ownership nor give her title to the entire land
subject of the co-ownership." We expounded, quoting our
pronouncement in Adille vs. Court 8 of Appeals: The petition raises
a purely legal issue: May a co-owner acquire exclusive ownership
over the property held in common? Essentially, it is the
petitioner's contention that the property subject of dispute
devolved upon him upon the failure of his co-heirs to join him in
its redemption within the period required by law. He relies on the
provisions of Article 1515 of the old Civil Code, Article 1613 of
the present Code, giving the vendee a retrothe right to demand
redemption of the entire property. There is no merit in this
petition. The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner
with respect to his share alone (CIVL CODE, art. 1612; CIVIL CODE
(1889), art. 1514.). While the records show that petitioner
redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses
therefor, that did not make him the owner of all of it. In other
words, it did not put to end the existing state of co-ownership
(Supra, Art. 489). There is no doubt that redemption of property
entails a necessary expense. Under the Civil Code: Art. 488. Each
co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to
contribute to the expenses of preservation of the thing or right
owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt
himself from this obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided
interest as may be equivalent to his share of the expenses and
taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the
coownership. The result is that the property remains to be in a
condition of co-ownership. While a vendee a retro, under Article
1613 of the Code, "may not be compelled to consent to a partial
redemption," the redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the
property in its totality does not vest in him ownership over it.
Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles the
vendee a retro to retain the property and consolidate title
5
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals in vain. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
holding that since the property was acquired during the marriage of
Gertrudes to Adriano, the same was presumed to be conjugal property
under Article 160 of the Civil Code. The appellate court, like the
trial court, also noted that petitioner did not comply with the
provisions of Article 1607 of the Civil Code. Petitioners are now
before this Court seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court
of Appeals. First, they contend that the subject property is not
conjugal but is owned exclusively by Gertrudes, who was described
in the Deed of Sale between Gertrudes and the DANR as well as in
TCT No. 43100 as a widow. Second, assuming the land was conjugal
property, petitioners argue that the same became Gertrudes'
exclusively when, in 1979, she mortgaged the property to the Daily
Savings Bank and Loan Association. The bank later foreclosed on the
mortgage in 1981 but Gertrudes redeemed the same in 1983. The
paraphernal or conjugal nature of the property is not determinative
of the ownership of the disputed property. If the property was
paraphernal as contended by petitioners, Gertrudes Isidro would
have the absolute right to dispose of the same, and absolute title
and ownership was vested in petitioners upon the failure of
Gertrudes to redeem the property. On the other hand, if the
property was conjugal as private respondents maintain, upon the
death of 3 Adriano Leis, the conjugal partnership was terminate,
entitling Gertrudes to one-half of the 4 property. Adriano's rights
to the other half, in turn, were transmitted upon his death to
his
5
thereto in his name (Supra, art. 1607). But the provision does
not give to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire
property. It does not provide for a mode of terminating a
co-ownership. It is conceded that, as a rule, a co-owner such as
Gertrudes could only dispose of her share in the property owned in
common. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 493. Each
co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect
of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the coowners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership. Unfortunately
for private respondents, however, the property was registered in
TCT No. 43100 solely in the name of "Gertrudes Isidro, widow."
Where a parcel of land, forming past of the undistributed
properties of the dissolved conjugal partnership of gains, is sold
by a widow to a purchaser who merely relied on the face of the
certificate of title thereto, issued solely in the name of the
widow, the purchaser acquires a valid title to the land even as
against the heirs of the deceased spouse. The rationale for this
rule is that "a person dealing with registered land is not required
to go behind the register to determine the condition of the
property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens on the
property which are noted on the face of the register or the
certificate of title. To require him to do more is to defeat one of
9 the primary objects of the Torrens system." As gleaned from the
foregoing discussion, despite the Court of Appeals' finding and
conclusion that Gertrudes as well as private respondents failed to
repurchase the property within the period stipulated and has lost
all their rights to it, it still ruled against petitioners by
affirming the Regional Trial Court's decision on the premise that
there was no compliance with Article 1607 of the Civil Code
requiring a judicial hearing before registration of the property in
the name of petitioners. This provision states: Art. 1607. In case
of real property, the consolidation of ownership in the vendee by
virtue of the failure of the vendor to comply with the provisions
of article 1616 shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property
without a judicial order, after the vendor has been duly heard. The
aforequoted article is intended to minimize the evils which the
pacto de retro sale has caused in the hands of usurers.1wphi1 A
judicial order is necessary in order to determine the true nature
of the transaction and to prevent the interposition of buyers in
good faith while 10 the determination is being made. It bears
stressing that notwithstanding Article 1607, the recording in the
Registry of Property of the consolidation of ownership of the
vendee is not a condition sine qua non to the transfer
of ownership. Petitioners are the owners of the subject property
since neither Gertrudes nor her co-owners redeemed the same within
the one-year period stipulated in the "Kasunduan." The essence of a
pacto de retro sale is that title and ownership of the property
sold are immediately vested in the vendee a retro, subject to the
resolutory condition of repurchase by the vendor a retro within the
stipulated period. Failure thus of the vendor a retro to perform
said resolutory condition vests upon the vendee by operation of law
absolute title and ownership over the property sold. As title is
already vested in the vendee a retro, his failure to consolidate
his title under Article 1607 of the Civil Code does not impair such
title or ownership for the method prescribed thereunder is merely
for the purpose of registering the 11 consolidated title.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED in that
the petitioners are deemed owners of the property by reason of the
failure of the vendor, Gertrudes Isidro, to repurchase the same
within the period stipulated. However, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 130584, in the name of Alexander M. Cruz, which was
issued without judicial order, is hereby ordered CANCELLED, and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 43100 in the name of Gertrudes
Isidro is ordered REINSTATED, without prejudice to compliance by
petitioners with the provisions of Article 1607 of the Civil
Code.1wphi1.nt SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176858
September 15, 2010
HEIRS OF JUANITA PADILLA, represented by CLAUDIO PADILLA,
Petitioners, vs. DOMINADOR MAGDUA, Respondent.DECISION CARPIO, J.:
The Case Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari
assailing the Orders dated 8 September 2 3 2006 and 13 February
2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, Branch 34,
in Civil Case No. 2001-10-161. The Facts Juanita Padilla (Juanita),
the mother of petitioners, owned a piece of land located in San
Roque, Tanauan, Leyte. After Juanitas death on 23 March 1989,
petitioners, as legal heirs of Juanita, sought to have the land
partitioned. Petitioners sent word to their eldest brother1
6
Ricardo Bahia (Ricardo) regarding their plans for the partition
of the land. In a letter dated 5 June 1998 written by Ricardo
addressed to them, petitioners were surprised to find out that
Ricardo had declared the land for himself, prejudicing their rights
as co-heirs. It was then discovered that Juanita had allegedly
executed a notarized Affidavit of Transfer of Real 4 Property
(Affidavit) in favor of Ricardo on 4 June 1966 making him the sole
owner of the land. The records do not show that the land was
registered under the Torrens system. On 26 October 2001,
petitioners filed an action with the RTC of Tacloban City, Branch
34, for recovery of ownership, possession, partition and damages.
Petitioners sought to declare void the sale of the land by Ricardos
daughters, Josephine Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas, to respondent
Dominador Magdua (Dominador). The sale was made during the lifetime
of Ricardo. Petitioners alleged that Ricardo, through
misrepresentation, had the land transferred in his name without the
consent and knowledge of his co-heirs. Petitioners also stated that
prior to 1966, Ricardo had a house constructed on the land.
However, when Ricardo and his wife Zosima separated, Ricardo left
for Inasuyan, Kawayan, Biliran and the house was leased to third
parties. Petitioners further alleged that the signature of Juanita
in the Affidavit is highly questionable because on 15 May 1978
Juanita executed a written instrument stating that she would be
leaving behind to her children the land which she had inherited
from her parents. Dominador filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction since the assessed value of the land was
within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Tanauan,
Leyte. In an Order dated 20 February 2006, the RTC dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC explained that the assessed
value of the land in the amount of P590.00 was less than 6 the
amount cognizable by the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioners argued
that the action was not merely for recovery of ownership and
possession, partition and damages but also for annulment of deed of
sale. Since actions to annul contracts are actions beyond pecuniary
estimation, the case was well within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Dominador filed another motion to dismiss on the ground of
prescription. In an Order dated 8 September 2006, the RTC
reconsidered its previous stand and took cognizance of the case.
Nonetheless, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration and
dismissed the case on the ground of prescription pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. The RTC ruled that the
case was filed only in 2001 or more than 30 years since the
Affidavit was executed in 1966. The RTC explained that while the
right of an heir to his inheritance is imprescriptible, yet when
one of the co-heirs appropriates the property as his own to the
exclusion of all other heirs, then prescription can set in. The RTC
added that since5
prescription had set in to question the transfer of the land
under the Affidavit, it would seem logical that no action could
also be taken against the deed of sale executed by Ricardos
daughters in favor of Dominador. The dispositive portion of the
order states: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the
Court is reconsidered in so far as the pronouncement of the Court
that it has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action. The
dismissal of the action, however, is maintained not by reason of
lack of jurisdiction but by reason of prescription. SO
ORDERED.7
Petitioners filed another motion for reconsideration which the
RTC denied in an Order dated 13 February 2007 since petitioners
raised no new issue. Hence, this petition. The Issue The main issue
is whether the present action is already barred by prescription.
The Courts Ruling Petitioners submit that the RTC erred in
dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription. Petitioners
insist that the Affidavit executed in 1966 does not conform with
the requirement of sufficient repudiation of co-ownership by
Ricardo against his co-heirs in accordance with Article 494 of the
Civil Code. Petitioners assert that the Affidavit became part of
public records only because it was kept by the Provincial Assessors
office for real property tax declaration purposes. However, such
cannot be contemplated by law as a record or registration affecting
real properties. Petitioners insist that the Affidavit is not an
act of appropriation sufficient to be deemed as constructive notice
to an adverse claim of ownership absent a clear showing that
petitioners, as co-heirs, were notified or had knowledge of the
Affidavit issued by their mother in Ricardos favor. Respondent
Dominador, on the other hand, maintains that Juanita, during her
lifetime, never renounced her signature on the Affidavit or
interposed objections to Ricardos possession of the land, which was
open, absolute and in the concept of an owner. Dominador contends
that the alleged written instrument dated 15 May 1978 executed by
Juanita years before she died was only made known lately and
conveys the possibility of being fabricated. Dominador adds that
the alleged highly questionable signature of Juanita on the
Affidavit was only made an issue after 35 years from the date of
the transfer in 1966 until the filing of the case in 2001. As a
buyer in good faith, Dominador invokes the defense of acquisitive
prescription against petitioners.
7
At the outset, only questions of law may be raised in a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
factual findings of the lower courts are final and conclusive and
may not be reviewed on appeal except under any of the following
circumstances: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4)
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of
specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the
finding of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of
evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that,
if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10)
the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the 8 issues of the
case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both
parties. We find that the conclusion of the RTC in dismissing the
case on the ground of prescription based solely on the Affidavit
executed by Juanita in favor of Ricardo, the alleged seller of the
property from whom Dominador asserts his ownership, is speculative.
Thus, a review of the case is necessary. Here, the RTC granted the
motion to dismiss filed by Dominador based on Section 1, Rule 9 of
the Rules of Court which states: Section 1. Defenses and objections
not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion
to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it
appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another
action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that
the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of
limitations, the court shall dismiss the case. (Emphasis supplied)
The RTC explained that prescription had already set in since the
Affidavit was executed on 31 May 1966 and petitioners filed the
present case only on 26 October 2001, a lapse of more than 30
years. No action could be taken against the deed of sale made in
favor of Dominador without assailing the Affidavit, and the action
to question the Affidavit had already prescribed. After a perusal
of the records, we find that the RTC incorrectly relied on the
Affidavit alone in order to dismiss the case without considering
petitioners evidence. The facts show that the land was sold to
Dominador by Ricardos daughters, namely Josephine Bahia and
Virginia Bahia-Abas, during the lifetime of Ricardo. However, the
alleged deed of sale was not presented as evidence and neither was
it shown that Ricardos daughters had any authority from Ricardo to
dispose of the land. No cogent evidence was ever presented that
Ricardo gave his consent to, acquiesced in, or ratified the sale
made by his daughters to Dominador. In its 8 September 2006 Order,
the RTC hastily concluded that Ricardos daughters had legal
personality to sell the property:
On the allegation of the plaintiffs (petitioners) that Josephine
Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas had no legal personality or right to
[sell] the subject property is of no moment in this case. It should
be Ricardo Bahia who has a cause of action against [his] daughters
and not the herein plaintiffs. After all, Ricardo Bahia might have
already consented to or ratified the 9 alleged deed of sale. Also,
aside from the Affidavit, Dominador did not present any proof to
show that Ricardos possession of the land had been open, continuous
and exclusive for more than 30 years in 10 order to establish
extraordinary acquisitive prescription. Dominador merely assumed
that Ricardo had been in possession of the land for 30 years based
on the Affidavit submitted to the RTC. The petitioners, on the
other hand, in their pleading filed with the RTC for recovery of
ownership, possession, partition and damages, alleged that Ricardo
left the land after he separated from his wife sometime after 1966
and moved to another place. The records do not mention, however,
whether Ricardo had any intention to go back to the land or whether
Ricardos family ever lived there. Further, Dominador failed to show
that Ricardo had the land declared in his name for taxation
purposes from 1966 after the Affidavit was executed until 2001 when
the case was filed. Although a tax declaration does not prove
ownership, it is evidence of claim to possession of the land.
Moreover, Ricardo and petitioners are co-heirs or co-owners of the
land. Co-heirs or coowners cannot acquire by acquisitive
prescription the share of the other co-heirs or coowners absent a
clear repudiation of the co-ownership, as expressed in Article 494
of the Civil Code which states: Art. 494. x x x No prescription
shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his coowners or
co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the
co-ownership. Since possession of co-owners is like that of a
trustee, in order that a co-owners possession may be deemed adverse
to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, the following
requisites must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts
of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or
other co-owners, (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have
been made known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, and (3)
that the evidence 11 thereon must be clear and convincing. In the
present case, all three requisites have been met. After Juanitas
death in 1989, petitioners sought for the partition of their
mothers land. The heirs, including Ricardo, were notified about the
plan. Ricardo, through a letter dated 5 June 1998, notified
petitioners, as his co-heirs, that he adjudicated the land solely
for himself. Accordingly, Ricardos interest in the land had now
become adverse to the claim of his co-heirs after repudiating their
claim of 12 entitlement to the land. In Generosa v. Prangan-Valera,
we held that in order that title may prescribe in favor of one of
the co-owners, it must be clearly shown that he had repudiated
8
the claims of the others, and that they were apprised of his
claim of adverse and exclusive ownership, before the prescriptive
period begins to run. However, in the present case, the
prescriptive period began to run only from 5 June 1998, the date
petitioners received notice of Ricardos repudiation of their claims
to the land. Since petitioners filed an action for recovery of
ownership and possession, partition and damages with the RTC on 26
October 2001, only a mere three years had lapsed. This three-year
period falls short of the 10-year or 30-year acquisitive
prescription period required by law in order to be entitled to
claim legal ownership over the land. Thus, Dominador cannot invoke
acquisitive prescription. Further, Dominadors argument that
prescription began to commence in 1966, after the Affidavit was
executed, is erroneous. Dominador merely relied on the Affidavit
submitted to the RTC that Ricardo had been in possession of the
land for more than 30 years. Dominador did not submit any other
corroborative evidence to establish Ricardos alleged possession 13
since 1966. In Heirs of Maningding v. Court of Appeals, we held
that the evidence relative to the possession, as a fact, upon which
the alleged prescription is based, must be clear, complete and
conclusive in order to establish the prescription. Here, Dominador
failed to present any other competent evidence to prove the alleged
extraordinary acquisitive prescription of Ricardo over the land.
Since the property is an unregistered land, Dominador bought the
land at his own risk, being aware as buyer that no title had been
issued over the land. As a consequence, Dominador is not afforded
protection unless he can manifestly prove his legal entitlement to
his claim. With regard to the issue of the jurisdiction of the RTC,
we hold that the RTC did not err in taking cognizance of the case.
Under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691), amending Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, the RTC shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction on
the following actions: Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980",
is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in
civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction. "(1) In all civil actions in which the
subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
"(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed
value of the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for
forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or14
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; x x x On the other hand, Section 3
of RA 7691 expanded the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real
property, or any interest, outside Metro Manila where the assessed
value does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). The
provision states: Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby
amended to read as follows: "Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Civil Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Trial Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxx "(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein where the assessed value of the property or interest
therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not
exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and
costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation
purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the
assessed value of the adjacent lots." In the present case, the
records show that the assessed value of the land was P590.00
according to the Declaration of Property as of 23 March 2000 filed
with the RTC. Based on the value alone, being way belowP20,000.00,
the MTC has jurisdiction over the case. However, petitioners argued
that the action was not merely for recovery of ownership and
possession, partition and damages but also for annulment of deed of
sale. Since annulment of contracts are actions incapable of
pecuniary estimation, the RTC has jurisdiction over the 15 case.
1avvphi1 Petitioners are correct. In Singson v. Isabela
Sawmill,16
we held that:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of
which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted
the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal
action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a
sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or
in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the
claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the
right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought,
this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject
of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial
Courts).
9
When petitioners filed the action with the RTC they sought to
recover ownership and possession of the land by questioning (1) the
due execution and authenticity of the Affidavit executed by Juanita
in favor of Ricardo which caused Ricardo to be the sole owner of
the land to the exclusion of petitioners who also claim to be legal
heirs and entitled to the land, and (2) the validity of the deed of
sale executed between Ricardos daughters and Dominador. Since the
principal action sought here is something other than the recovery
of a sum of money, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation
and thus cognizable by the RTC. Well-entrenched is the rule that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law
and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the party
is entitled to all or some of the claims 17 asserted. In sum, we
find that the Affidavit, as the principal evidence relied upon by
the RTC to dismiss the case on the ground of prescription,
insufficiently established Dominadors rightful claim of ownership
to the land. Thus, we direct the RTC to try the case on the merits
to determine who among the parties are legally entitled to the
land. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE AND SET ASIDE
the Orders dated 8 September 2006 and 13 February 2007 of the
Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 34 in Civil Case No.
2001-10-161. SO ORDERED.
The petition is casts against the following factual
backdrop:cra:nad Following the death of the spouses Maximo Soriano
and Manuela Delatre, their two children, namely, Maria and Felipa,
inherited from them two (2) adjoining parcels of land with an
aggregate area of 9,838 square meters, situated in Licsi, Manaoag,
Pangasinan and covered by Tax Declaration No. 9825 in the name of
Maximo Soriano. One parcel has an area of 5,219 square meters,
while the other, an area of 4,619 square meters. On May 27, 1959,
the sisters Maria and Felipa executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition whereunder the bigger parcel was adjudicated to Maria
while the smaller parcel went to Felipa. The land subject of this
case is the 5,219 square meter parcel representing Maria's share in
the property left by the parents. It was declared in Maria's name
under Tax Declaration No. 17723 (1960) and 17730. Maria was married
to Eleuterio Valera, while her sister Felipa, to Fidel Generosa.
Maria and Eleuterio were childless, while Felipa and Fidel had
three (3) children, namely, Alfonso, Pedro and Florencio, all
surnamed Generosa. Maria died on February 8, 1971, while her sister
Felipa, on June 3, 1960. On October 18, 1984, or long after Maria's
death, her husband Eleuterio married the herein respondent, Pacita
Prangan-Valera. On March 31, 1989, Eleuterio executed an affidavit
adjudicating unto himself as sole heir the property left behind by
his deceased first wife Maria. Consequently, the tax declaration
formerly in the name of Maria was cancelled and replaced by Tax
Declaration No. 4528 in the name of Eleuterio. On October 17, 1990,
Eleuterio died, survived by his second wife, Pacita Prangan-Valera.
On November 5, 1990, the brothers Alfonso, Pedro and Florencio, all
surnamed Generosa (children of Maria's sister Felipa) executed a
document entitled "Deed of Extrajudicial Partition With Sale,"
therein stating that they are the sole heirs of Eleuterio Valera
and as such succeeded to his rights, interest and ownership of the
property left by Eleuterio's first wife, Maria. In the same
document, the brothers Alfonso and Florencio sold their alleged
share in the property to their brother Pedro and the latter's wife,
Vida Rosario Generosa. Pursuant to said document, Pedro and his
wife, Vida, obtained a tax declaration in their own names covering
the entire parcel of what used to be Maria's share in the property
of her parents. Such was the state of things when, on November 25,
1991, in the RTC of Urdaneta City, herein respondent Pacita
Prangan-Valera filed the complaint in this case against the
brothers Pedro, Alfonso and Florencio. Docketed in said court as
Civil Case No. V-5268 and raffled to Branch 47 thereof, the
complaint prayed for the annulment of the aforesaid Deed of
G.R. No. 166521 August 31, 2006 PEDRO GENEROSA, DECEASED, NOW
SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS, VIDA R. GENEROSA, ROBERT R. GENEROSA,
EDMUNDO R. GENEROSA, PEDRO R. GENEROSA, JR., AMALIA R. GENEROSA,
LIZA R. GENEROSA, MELODY R. GENEROSA and FIDEL R. GENEROSA,
Petitioners, v. PACITA PRANGANVALERA, Respondent.DECISION GARCIA,
J.: This recourse, styled as a "Partial Petition for Review on
Certiorari," seeks the modification of 1 the Decision dated
September 29, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA), as reiterated in
its 2 Resolution of December 1, 2004, in CA-G.R. CV No. 79749,
reversing and setting aside an earlier decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, Branch 47, in an
action for annulment of documents, recovery of possession and
damages with application for a writ of preliminary injunction
thereat commenced by the herein respondent Pacita Prangan-Valera
against, among others, Pedro Generosa, now substituted by his widow
Vida R. Generosa and their children.
10
Extrajudicial Partition With Sale executed by the defendant
brothers and the recovery of possession and ownership of the
property in dispute, plus damages, attorney's fees and litigation
expenses. In gist, the complaint alleged that the brothers Alfonso,
Pedro, and Florencio were never legitimate heirs of the plaintiff's
deceased husband, Eleuterio Valera, nor are they related to the
latter; that when her husband's first wife Maria died in 1971,
Eleuterio continued in possession of the subject property even
after he married her (plaintiff) in 1984; that when Eleuterio died
in 1990, she continued in possession of the same property until her
possession thereof was interrupted when the defendant brothers
surreptitiously took possession of the property in 1991, after
arrogating unto themselves the very same property on the basis of a
falsified Deed of Extrajudicial Partition With Sale wherein said
defendants made it appear that they are the sole heirs of her
husband, Eleuterio Valera; that on account of the misrepresentation
committed by the three, she filed against them a criminal complaint
for falsification of public document, docketed as Criminal Case No.
D-11039; that the brothers Alfonso and Florencio were convicted in
said case and subsequently applied for probation while their
brother Pedro was dropped from the case on account of his death
during the pendency thereof. In their Answer, the defendant
brothers basically sought refuge on their claim of prescription,
alleging that they have been in possession of the disputed property
for more than thirty (30) years. During the pendency of the suit,
defendant Pedro Generosa died and was accordingly substituted by
his widow, Vida Generosa, and their children, to wit: Robert,
Edmundo, Pedro, Jr., Amalia, Liza, Melody and Fidel, all surnamed
Generosa, the petitioners herein. In a decision dated February 7,
2003, the RTC found for the plaintiff, now respondent Pacita
Prangan-Valera. It annulled the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition
With Sale executed by the three brothers and awarded the entire
property subject of the suit to the respondent, with damages,
attorney's fees and litigation expenses. More specifically, the
decision dispositively reads:cra:nad WHEREFORE, premises
considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:cra:nad 1. The
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition with sale dated 5 November 1990
(Exh. "C") is hereby ANNULLED and declared NULL and VOID; 2. Tax
Declaration No. 5428 in the names of Pedro Generosa and Vida
Rosario (Exh. "E") is hereby CANCELLED and ANNULLED; 3. Tax
Declaration No. 4528 (Exh. "C") in the name of Eleuterio Valera is
hereby ordered to be reinstated. The Municipal assessor of Manaoag,
Pangasinan is ordered to reinstate the3
same in the name of Eleuterio Valera. Likewise, the Provincial
Assessor of the Province of Pangasinan is directed and ordered to
reinstate the same in the name of Eleuterio Valera; 4. Defendants
Alfonso Generosa, Florencio Generosa, Vida Generosa and the heirs
of deceased Pedro Generosa, namely: Beda Generosa, Robert Generosa,
Edmundo Generosa, Pedro Generosa, Jr., Amalia Generosa, Liza
Generosa, Melody Generosa and Fidel Generosa, are directed to
deliver, reconvey the possession and ownership of that property
located in Licsi, Manaoag, Pangasinan containing an area of 5,319
square meters, more or less, bounded on North by Maximo Soriano;
East by Road; South by Pedro Rous and Crispin Buessa; West by
Mariano Soriano, declared under Tax Decl. No. 4528 and assessed at
P1,900.00 to the plaintiff; 5. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff
the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees, P5,000.00 as expenses of
litigation and the additional sum of P30,000.00 for and as moral
damages. Costs against the defendants. SO ORDERED. From the
aforementioned decision of the trial court, the defendants, now
petitioners, went on appeal to the CA whereat their appellate
recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 79749. As stated at the
threshold hereof, the CA, in its decision of September 29, 2004,
reversed and set aside that of the trial court, thus:cra:nad
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby
GRANTED and the appeal decision in Civil Case No. U-5268 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby entered declaring
that the legal heirs of Maria Soriano Valera are her surviving
spouse, the late Eleuterio Valera (succeeded by his widow, herein
plaintiffappellee), who is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the
subject property; and her brothers (sic), Alfonso, Pedro (deceased)
and Florencio, or their children, herein appellants, who are
entitled to the other half of the property. No pronouncement as to
costs. SO ORDERED. In decreeing the division of the subject
property between the petitioners and the respondent in equal
shares, the CA ruled that the conviction of the brothers Alfonso
and Florencio in the criminal case for falsification of public
document filed against them and their brother Pedro at the instance
of the respondent "is a concern of the authorities" . and "will not
result in the nullification of their rights as co-owners [of the
respondent] where such act does not fall under any of the legal
grounds for disqualification to succeed as heirs under Articles
1027 and 10324
11
of the Civil Code." To the CA, the rightful heirs of Maria
Soriano-Valera to whom the property involved in the case originally
belonged are, on the one hand, the petitioners herein, in
representation of Maria's nephews, and on the other hand, her
deceased husband Eleuterio Valera, represented by his second wife,
the herein respondent Pacita Prangan-Valera, which two (2) sets of
heirs are entitled to each of the property left by Maria. In time,
the petitioners moved for a reconsideration claiming that to them
alone belong the entire property left by Maria. With their motion
having been denied by the CA in its Resolution 5 of December 1,
2004, the petitioners are now with this Court via the present
recourse on their lone submission that THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONERS ARE THE OWNERS OF THE
PROPERTY WITH RESPECT TO THE ONE-HALF (1/2) AWARDED TO RESPONDENT
BY ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION HAVING BEEN IN POSSESSION THEREOF FOR
MORE THAN TWENTY (20) YEARS. No similar recourse was taken by the
respondent. We DENY. The evidence on record belies the petitioners'
pretension of possession for more than twenty (20) years. As found
by the trial court and borne by the evidence: xxx xxx xxx "It was
only in 1991, after the death of [respondent's] husband that the
said defendants [i.e., the brothers Alfonso, Pedro and Florencio]
on the basis of the falsified deed of extra-judicial partition with
sale took possession of the property. The claim that they were in
possession of the property for more than thirty (30) years appears
unsupported. In fact, their own evidence (EXHIBITS "5" and "6")
belies their claims of prescription and possession of the property.
It was only in 1971, after the death of MARIA, former wife of
ELEUTERIO, that defendants were entitled to successional rights
over the property in question in conjunction with ELEUTERIO as
surviving spouse. xxx xxx xxx It appearing that the property under
litigation was transferred in the names of the defendant spouses
[Pedro Generosa and Vida Generosa] in 1991 and the action for
annulment of document and reconveyance of ownership and recovery of
possession was filed in 1993, the action has not yet prescribed."
(Words in brackets supplied.) In any event, and as correctly
pointed out by the CA, acquisitive prescription, as laches, is
based on the doctrine equity. It cannot be invoked to defeat
justice or to perpetuate an
injustice. Equity, which has been aptly described as "justice
outside legality," should be applied only in the absence of, and
never against, statutory law. Aequetas nunguam 6 7 contravenit
legis. The positive mandate of Article 494 of the Civil Code
conferring imprescriptibility to actions of a co-owner or co-heir
against his co-owners or co-heirs should preempt and prevail over
all abstract arguments based only on equity. Certainly, laches
cannot be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible
legal right, and the herein respondent can validly vindicate her
inheritance despite the lapse of time. To reiterate, the herein
parties are co-owners of the property subject of the controversy.
Surely, in order that title may prescribe in favor of one of the
co-owners, it must be clearly shown that he has repudiated the
claims of the others, and that they were apprised of his 8 claim of
adverse and exclusive ownership, before the prescriptive period
begins to run. The evidence relative to the possession, as a fact,
upon which the alleged prescription is based, must be clear,
complete and conclusive in order to establish said prescription
without shadow 9 of doubt. This is not the case here. To stress,
the petitioners' claim that they were in possession of the property
for more than thirty (30) years appears unsupported. In fact, their
own evidence belied their claim of prescription and possession of
the property. As found by the trial court, it was only in 1991,
after the death of the respondent's husband Eleuterio that the
petitioners on the basis of the falsified deed of extrajudicial
partition with sale took possession of the property. As it is, the
petitioners could neither invoke acquisitive prescription because
their mode of acquisition was illegal and void. Ordinary
acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good
faith and with just title of the time fixed by law. It may also be
added that the possession of co-owners is like that of a trustee.
In order that his possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui
que trust or the other co-owners, the following requisites must
concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation
amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owners,
(2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to
the cestui que trust or other co-owners, and (3) that the evidence
thereon must be clear and convincing. Even granting, arguendo, that
the falsified deed of extrajudicial partition with sale could be
taken as a positive act of repudiation of the co-ownership existing
between the respondent and the petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest, there is clearly no showing that
prescription has set in, given the fact the property under
litigation was transferred in the names of the petitioners in 1991
and the action for annulment of documents, reconveyance of
ownership and recovery of possession was filed by the respondent in
1991. The action has not yet prescribed. Article 1456 of the Civil
Code provides that if a property is acquired through mistake or
fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a
trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom
the property comes. This provision, in conjunction with Article
1144, gives the respondent a prescriptive period of ten years, for
an obligation under an implied trust is one created by law.
Accordingly, an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based
on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten
12
years, the point of reference being the date of the registration
of the deed of sale or the date of the issuance of the certificate
of title over the property. All told, the Court rules and so hold
that the CA correctly adjudicated the disputed parcel of land in
such a way that one-half (1/2) thereof shall pertain to the
respondent as successor of Eleuterio Valera, while the other
one-half (1/2) to the petitioners, in accordance with Article 10
1001 of the Civil Code. cra WHEREFORE, petition is DENIED. The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto. Cost against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised
private respondent of their intention to partition the subject
property and terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent refused
to partition the property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc
instituted an action for partition before the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-44038 and
raffled to Branch 78. On October 3, 2002, the trial court ordered
the partition of the subject property in the following manner:
Perla G. Patricio, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6; and Marcelino
G. Dario III, 1/6. The trial court also ordered the sale of the
property by public auction wherein all parties concerned may put up
their bids. In case of failure, the subject property should be 4
distributed accordingly in the aforestated manner. Private
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by
the trial court on 5 August 11, 2003, hence he appealed before the
Court of Appeals, which denied the same on October 19, 2005.
However, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by private
respondent on December 9, 2005, the appellate court partially
reconsidered the October 19, 2005 Decision. In the now assailed
Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint for
partition filed by petitioner and Marcelino Marc for lack of merit.
It held that the family home should continue despite the death of
one or both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary
thereof. The heirs could not partition the property unless the
court found compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate
court also held that the minor son of private respondent, who is a
grandson of spouses Marcelino V. Dario and Perla G. Patricio, was a
minor beneficiary of 6 the family home. Hence, the instant petition
on the following issues: I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY
ERRED IN REVERSING ITS EARLIER DECISION OF OCTOBER 19, 2005 WHICH
AFFIRMED IN TOTO THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED 03 OCTOBER
2002 GRANTING THE PARTITION AND SALE BY PUBLIC AUCTION OF THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY. II. COROLLARILY, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
PATENTLY ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLE 159 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 154
OF THE FAMILY CODE ON FAMILY HOME INSTEAD OF ARTICLE 494 IN
RELATION TO ARTICLES 495 7 AND 498 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE ON
CO-OWNERSHIP. The sole issue is whether partition of the family
home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse to accede to such
partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in
the said home.3
G.R. No. 170829
November 20, 2006
PERLA G. PATRICIO, Petitioner, vs. MARCELINO G. DARIO III and
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Second Division,
Respondents.DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: This petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul
and 1 set aside the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
December 9, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80680, which dismissed the
complaint for partition filed by petitioner for being contrary to
law and evidence. On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died
intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G.
Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private
respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left was
a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building
built thereon situated at 91 Oxford corner Ermin Garcia Streets in
Cubao, Quezon City, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. RT-30731 (175992) of the Quezon City Registry of Deeds,
covering an area of seven hundred fifty five (755) square 2 meters,
more or less. On August 10, 1987, petitioner, Marcelino Marc and
private respondent, extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino
V. Dario. Accordingly, TCT No. RT-30731 (175992) was cancelled and
TCT No. R-213963 was issued in the names of petitioner, private
respondent and Marcelino Marc.
13
Private respondent claims that the subject property which is the
family home duly constituted by spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario
cannot be partitioned while a minor beneficiary is still living
therein namely, his 12-year-old son, who is the grandson of the
decedent. He argues that as long as the minor is living in the
family home, the same continues as such until the beneficiary
becomes of age. Private respondent insists that even after the
expiration of ten years from the date of death of Marcelino on July
5, 1987, i.e., even after July 1997, the subject property continues
to be considered as the family home considering that his minor son,
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, who is a beneficiary of the said
family home, still resides in the premises. On the other hand,
petitioner alleges that the subject property remained as a family
home of the surviving heirs of the late Marcelino V. Dario only up
to July 5, 1997, which was the 10th year from the date of death of
the decedent. Petitioner argues that the brothers Marcelino Marc
and private respondent Marcelino III were already of age at the
time of the death of their 8 father, hence there is no more minor
beneficiary to speak of. The family home is a sacred symbol of
family love and is the repository of cherished 9 memories that last
during ones lifetime. It is the dwelling house where husband and
wife, or 10 by an unmarried head of a family, reside, including the
land on which it is situated. It is 11 constituted jointly by the
husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family. The
family home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied as a
family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as
any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home
continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment 12 except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of
the value allowed by law. The law explicitly provides that
occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by "any
of its beneficiaries" must be actual. That which is "actual" is
something real, or actually existing, as opposed to something
merely possible, or to something which is presumptive or
constructive. Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the owner
of the house specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by
the "beneficiaries" enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code,
which may include the in-laws where the family home is constituted
jointly by the husband and wife. But the law definitely excludes
maids and 13 overseers. They are not the beneficiaries contemplated
by the Code. Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the
beneficiaries of a family home: (1) The husband and wife, or an
unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their
parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the
relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the
family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal
support. To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites
must concur: (1) they must be among the relationships enumerated in
Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and
(3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the
family.
Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code provides that the
family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses
or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or
for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot
partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons
therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the
property or constituted the family home. Article 159 of the Family
Code applies in situations where death occurs to persons who
constituted the family home.1wphi1 Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino comments
on the effect of death of one or both spouses or the unmarried head
of a family on the continuing existence of the family home: Upon
the death of the spouses or the unmarried family head who
constituted the family home, or of the spouse who consented to the
constitution of his or her separate property as family home, the
property will remain as family home for ten years or for as long as
there is a minor beneficiary living in it. If there is no more
beneficiary left at the time of death, we believe the family home
will be dissolved or cease, because there is no more reason for its
existence. If there are beneficiaries who survive living in the
family home, it will continue for ten years, unless at the
expiration of the ten years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in
which case the family home continues until that beneficiary becomes
of age. After these periods lapse, the property may be partitioned
by the heirs. May the heirs who are beneficiaries of the family
home keep it intact by not partitioning the property after the
period provided by this article? We believe that although the heirs
will continue in ownership by 14 not partitioning the property, it
will cease to be a family home. (Emphasis supplied) Prof. Ernesto
L. Pineda further explains the import of Art. 159 in this manner:
The family home shall continue to exist despite the death of one or
both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family. Thereafter,
the length of its continued existence is dependent upon whether
there is still a minor-beneficiary residing therein. For as long as
there is one beneficiary even if the head of the family or both
spouses are already dead, the family home will continue to exist
(Arts. 153, 159). If there is no minor-beneficiary, it will subsist
until 10 years and within this period, the heirs cannot partition
the same except when there are compelling reasons which will
justify the partition. This rule applies 15 regardless of whoever
owns the property or who constituted the family home. (Emphasis
supplied) The rule in Article 159 of the Family Code may thus be
expressed in this wise: If there are beneficiaries who survive and
are living in the family home, it will continue for 10 years,
unless at the expiration of 10 years, there is still a minor
beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until that
beneficiary becomes of age.
14
It may be deduced from the view of Dr. Tolentino that as a
general rule, the family home may be preserved for a minimum of 10
years following the death of the spouses or the unmarried family
head who constituted the family home, or of the spouse who
consented to the constitution of his or her separate property as
family home. After 10 years and a minor beneficiary still lives
therein, the family home shall be preserved only until that minor
beneficiary reaches the age of majority. The intention of the law
is to safeguard and protect the interests of the minor beneficiary
until he reaches legal age and would now be capable of supporting
himself. However, three requisites must concur before a minor
beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the
relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they
live in the family home, and (3) they are dependent for legal
support upon the head of the family. Thus, the issue for resolution
now is whether Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor son of
private respondent, can be considered as a beneficiary under
Article 154 of the Family Code. As to the first requisite, the
beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or
an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their
parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the
relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. The term "descendants"
contemplates all descendants of the person or persons who
constituted the family home without distinction; hence, it must
necessarily include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of
the spouses who constitute a family home. Ubi lex non distinguit
nec nos distinguire debemos. Where the law does not distinguish, we
should not distinguish. Thus, private respondents minor son, who is
also the grandchild of deceased Marcelino V. Dario satisfies the
first requisite. As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries
must be actually living in the family home to avail of the benefits
derived from Art. 159. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, also known as
Ino, the son of private respondent and grandson of the decedent
Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the family home since 1994,
or within 10 years from the death of the decedent, hence, he
satisfies the second requisite. However, as to the third requisite,
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his
paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of
supporting him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IVs parents, especially his father,
herein private respondent who is the head of his immediate family.
The law first imposes the obligation of legal support upon the
shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only in their
default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents. Marcelino
Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from his
grandmother, but from his father.1wphi1 Thus, despite residing in
the family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario,
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered as beneficiary
contemplated under Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third
requisite of being dependent on his grandmother for legal support.
It is his father whom he is dependent on legal support, and who
must now establish his own family home separate and distinct from
that of his parents, being of legal age.
Legal support, also known as family support, is that which is
provided by law, comprising everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education 16
and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family. Legal support has the following characteristics: (1) It is
personal, based on family ties which bind the obligor and the
obligee; (2) It is intransmissible; (3) It cannot be renounced; (4)
It cannot be compromised; (5) 17 It is free from attachment or
execution; (6) It is reciprocal; (7) It is variable in amount.
Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren cannot demand
support directly from their grandparents if they have parents
(ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of supporting them.
This is so because we have to follow the order of support under
Art. 18 199. We agree with this view. The reasons behind Art. 199
as explained by Pineda and Tolentino: the closer the relationship
of the relatives, the stronger the tie that binds them. Thus, the
obligation to support under Art. 199 which outlines the order of
liability for support is imposed first upon the shoulders of the
closer relatives and only in their default is the obligation moved
to the next nearer relatives and so on. There is no showing that
private respondent is without means to support his son; neither is
there any evidence to prove that petitioner, as the paternal
grandmother, was willing to voluntarily provide for her grandsons
legal support. On the contrary, herein petitioner filed for the
partition of the property which shows an intention to dissolve the
family home, since there is no more reason for its existence after
the 10-year period ended in 1997. With this finding, there is no
legal impediment to partition the subject property. The law does
not encourage co-ownerships among individuals as oftentimes it
results in inequitable situations such as in the instant case.
Co-owners should be afforded every available opportunity to divide
their co-owned property to prevent these situations from arising.
As we ruled in Santos v. Santos, no co-owner ought to be compelled
to stay in a coownership indefinitely, and may insist on partition
on the common property at any time. An action to demand partition
is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches. Each co-owner 20
may demand at any time the partition of the common property. Since
the parties were unable to agree on a partition, the court a quo
should have ordered a partition by commissioners pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. Not more than three
competent and disinterested persons should be appointed as
commissioners to make the partition, commanding them to set off to
the plaintiff and to each party in interest such part and
proportion of the property as the court shall direct. When it is
made to appear to the commissioners that the real estate, or a
portion thereof, cannot be divided without great prejudice to the
interest of the parties, the court may order it19
15
assigned to one of the parties willing to take the same,
provided he pays to the other parties such sum or sums of money as
the commissioners deem equitable, unless one of the parties
interested ask that the property be sold instead of being so
assigned, in which case the court shall order the commissioners to
sell the real estate at public sale, and the commissioners 21 shall
sell the same accordingly. The partition of the subject property
should be made in accordance with the rule embodied in 22 Art. 996
of the Civil Code. Under the law of intestate succession, if the
widow and legitimate children survive, the widow has the same share
as that of each of the children. However, since only one-half of
the conjugal property which is owned by the decedent is to be
allocated to the legal and compulsory heirs (the other half to be
given exclusively to the surviving spouse as her conjugal share of
the property), the widow will have the same share as each of her
two surviving children. Hence, the respective shares of the subject
property, based on the law on intestate succession are: (1) Perla
Generosa Dario, 4/6; (2) Marcelino Marc G. Dario II, 1/6 and (3)
Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6. In Vda. de Daffon v. Court of Appeals,
we held that an action for partition is at once an action for
declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a
determinate portion of the properties involved. If the court after
trial should find the existence of coownership among the parties,
the court may and should order the partition of the properties in
24 the same action. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80680 dated
December 9, 2005, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED
to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, who is
directed to conduct a PARTITION BY COMMISSIONERS and effect the
actual physical partition of the subject property, as well as the
improvements that lie therein, in the following manner: Perla G.
Dario, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6 and Marcelino G. Dario
III, 1/6. The trial court is DIRECTED to appoint not more than
three (3) competent and disinterested persons, who should determine
the technical metes and bounds of the property and the proper share
appertaining to each heir, including the improvements, in
accordance with Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. When it is made to
the commissioners that the real estate, or a portion thereof,
cannot be divided without great prejudice to the interest of the
parties, the court a quo may order it assigned to one of the
parties willing to take the same, provided he pays to the other
parties such sum or sums of money as the commissioners deem
equitable, unless one of the parties interested ask that the
property be sold instead of being so assigned, in which case the
court shall order the commissioners to sell the real estate at
public sale, and the commissioners shall sell the same accordingly,
and thereafter distribute the proceeds of the sale appertaining to
the just share of each heir. No pronouncement as to costs. SO
ORDERED.23
G.R. No. 188802
February 14, 2011
REVELINA LIMSON, Petitioner, vs. WACK WACK CONDOMINIUM
CORPORATION, Respondent.DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: On January 22,
1996, Revelina Limson (Revelina) purchased from Conchita Benitez an
apartment unit (Unit 703) at Wack Wack Apartments, Wack Wack Road,
Mandaluyong City. Upon moving in, Revelina noticed defects in the
electrical main panel located inside the unit, drawing her to
report them, by letter of February 22, 1996, to the Wack Wack
Condominium Corporation (respondent), a non-stock corporation
organized for the purpose of holding title to and managing the
common areas of Wack Wack Apartments Racquel Gonzalez, who sits as
Member of respondents Board of Directors, replied by letter of
February 23, 1996 that under Section 3 of the House Rules and
Regulations, it is the duty of the unit owner to maintain the
electrical and plumbing systems at his/her expense. By still
another letter dated February 28, 1996, Revelina informed
respondent that the "switch board is such that No. 12 wire is
protected by 30 ampere fuse" and that five appliances refrigerator,
freezer, iron, dryer and washing machine are connected to only one
fuse. Revelina later sought professional assistance from a private
electrical consultant, Romago, Incorporated. It was concluded that
the wirings in Unit 703 are unsafe, hazardous and did not comply
with the Philippine Electrical Code. On Revelinas request, the City
Building Office conducted an inspection of Unit 703 following which
a Report dated January 21, 1997 was accomplished with the following
findings and recommendations: Findings: 1. The load center consists
of 100 A 2 pst main switch and fusible cut out Blocks with 16
circuits. The fusible cut out block enclosure is not provided with
cover, exposing electrical live part that makes it hazardous,
unsafe and will be difficult to maintain because a portion was
blocked by a shelf. 2. The jumper cable from main safety switch to
fusible cut-out blocks used 2 #10 wire (Capt. 60 amp) per phase.
This is undersized and would overheat.1
16
3. The fusible current protective devise where all 30 Amp., sp.,
240 v FOR 2 #12 TW (20 AMP. Capacity wire) this does not comply
with the provision of the Philippine Electrical Code that
stipulates rating of the protective devise shall be the same as the
conductor ampacity especially on a multi outlet circuit. 4. Power
supply for water heaters was tapped to small appliance for
convenience outlet circuit. Recommendation: 1. Replacement of
fusible load center with panel board and circuit breaker components
to correct the problem as enumerated on items 2, 3, 4 of our
findings. 2. Replace the embedded circular loom with conduit on
moulding. 3. Check all grounded circuit for water heater lad. 4.
Provide separate circuit for water heater lad. 5. Submit As Built
Electrical Plan signed and sealed by a Professional Electrical
Engineer together with the previous approved Electrical Plan.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied) The Report was sent by then
Mayor Benjamin Abalos, Sr. to respondent by letter dated January
31, 1997. On February 3, 1997, respondent, through Architect
Eugenio Gonzalez, wrote Revelina to demand that repairs in line
with the above-stated recommendation of the City Building Office be
undertaken within ten (10) days. Before the deadline, respondents
Board of Directors convened on February 7, 1997 and resolved to
impose a daily fine of P1,000.00 on Revelina and her husband
Benjamin, to commence on February 14, 1997, should the latter fail
to comply. Revelina and her husband refused to undertake the
repairs and to pay the fine. They claimed that the electrical main
panel forms part of the common areas, citing Section 6 of Republic
2 Act No. 4726 , "An Act to Define Condominium, Establish
Requirements for its Creation and Government of its Incidents," the
pertinent provision of which reads: Sec. 6. Unless otherwise
expressly provided in the enabling or master deed or the
declaration of restrictions, the incidents of a condominium grant
are as follows: a.) x x x The following are not part of the unit:
bearing walls, columns, floors, roofs, foundations, and other
common structural elements of the buildings; lobbies, stairways,
hallways and other areas of common use, elevator equipment and
shafts, central heating, central refrigeration and central air
conditioning equipment, reservoir, tanks, pumps and other
central services and facilities, pipes, ducts, flues, chutes,
conduits wires and other utility installations, wherever located,
except the outlets thereof when located within the unit. (emphasis
and underscoring supplied) They argued that an electrical main
panel is in the nature of a utility installation. Meanwhile,
Revelina and her husband purchased an oversized whirlpool. In the
process of installation, the 7th floor utility room which is
adjacent to Unit 703 was damaged. Revelina claimed that an
agreement had been reached under which respondent would take charge
of the repair of the utility room and would bill her for the cost
incurred therefor but respondent failed to do so. Yet the Board of
Directors assessed her and her husband a fine of P1,000.00 per day
until the utility room is repaired. Respondent thereupon filed a
complaint for specific performance and damages against Revelina and
Benjamin before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) upon
the following causes of action: 1. To compel the defendants
(Spouses Limson) to undertake the necessary repairs of the
defective and hazardous condition of the electrical wiring of their
Unit 703 in accordance with the report and recommendation of the
Office of the Building Official of Mandaluyong City; 2. To seek
payment of liquidated damages from the defendants in accordance
with the Resolution of the