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1 PRESENTATION TO LEDGER CONFERENCE MARITIME SECURITY FOR 2010 FIFA SOCCER WORLD CUP Capt (SA Navy) Nick Snyman 2 December 2010
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PRESENTATION TO LEDGER CONFERENCE MARITIME SECURITY FOR 2010 FIFA SOCCER WORLD CUP

Jan 17, 2016

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PRESENTATION TO LEDGER CONFERENCE MARITIME SECURITY FOR 2010 FIFA SOCCER WORLD CUP. Capt (SA Navy) Nick Snyman 2 December 2010. AIM. To present the SA Navy Operating Concept for Underwater Security support during 2010 SWC. Scope. Area of Operations Resources Threats Concept Conclusion. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

  • PRESENTATION TO LEDGER CONFERENCE

    MARITIME SECURITY FOR 2010 FIFA SOCCER WORLD CUP Capt (SA Navy) Nick Snyman2 December 2010

  • AIMTo present the SA Navy Operating Concept for Underwater Security support during 2010 SWC

  • ScopeArea of OperationsResourcesThreatsConceptConclusion

  • AREA OF OPERATIONS

  • *

  • ***RESTRICTED

  • Area of Operations Harbours and their approachesInside the harbour Know the whole harbourConcentrate on the area from port entrance to identified quays Sea bottomStructures in the water (jetties, quays and installations)Outside the harbourFrom fairway buoy to harbour mouthWidth of approach channel to be determinedSea bottom and bathymetryKey installations, buoys and obstructions

  • Area Of Operations - Defined

    3 Major ports DurbanCape TownPort Elizabeth

    Areas of priorityPort entrance to quays where cruise liners will berth REDQuays where liners are berthed REDFairway Bouy to port entrance and port areas where most traffic can be expected and which will be vulnerable to threats attempting to close the harbour BLUE

  • Durban

  • Durban

  • Cape Town

  • Cape Town

  • Port Elizabeth

  • Port Elizabeth

  • THREATS

  • Possible Maritime Threats

    Military type threatsExplosivesTargeting traffic (on sea bottom, on water surface or in water column)Deployed from landDeployed from surface craftDeployed by underwater vehicle/swimmer Targeting stationary vessels and structuresDeployed by underwater vehicle/swimmerCriminal actsBoarding/hostage taking from seaTheftProtesters/RiotersAccessing prohibited areasVandalism

  • Civil Defence Support at Sea (SAN providing assistance)Search and rescue at seaContainment of spills/dangerous substances in ports/at seaForce protection (terrorist attack alongside or at sea)*

  • Possible Underwater ThreatsNo threat is expected from conventional mine warfare in terms of numbers or extentIf a threat exists it is likely to be non-conventionalGeneric underwater threatsDivers/swimmers (scuba, snorkel)Vehicles (diver scooter, AUV)Mine like explosives (similar to limpet mines or sea mines)Sabotage devices (recognisable or disguised)

  • RESOURCES

  • *FrigatesMaritime Reaction Squadron teamsonboardConducted surveillance and securitypatrols by boat and helicopter

  • *SAS DRAKENSBERG (Supply Vessel)Had Maritime Reaction teamson board. Conducted securitypatrols

  • *Maritime Patrol AircraftAssisted frigates to establish Surface Picture

  • *SAS PROTEA (Survey Vessel)SAS PROTEA served as HQ for underwater securityusing divers, work boats and Mine Countermeasures vessels to execute survey and otherunderwater security tasks

    Shallow Water RouteSurvey system was developed and deployed

  • *RESTRICTED*

  • EQUIPMENT

  • SA NAVY SHALLOW WATER ROUTE SURVEY SYSTEM(SWRSS)*RESTRICTED*

  • DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM (2)EQUIPMENT BREAKDOWN (Wet)Reson SeaBat 7125 (400 khz) Bathy Multibeam Echosounder (MBES)Reson SeaBat 7128 (200 khz) Forward Looking Sonar (MBES)Edgetech 300 khz / 900 khz Dual Frequency Side Scan Sonar (SSS)USBL with 1m accuracy Edgetech 2 khz / 12 khz Sub Bottom Profiler (SBP)*RESTRICTED*

  • *RESTRICTED*

  • Operational Requirements

    PreventionMitigationReactionForce ProtectionIntelligenceAccess ControlSurface PictureSurface PatrolAir PictureSurveillanceDiver DetectionRoute SurveySonar SearchDiver SearchIEDDUSDDUEODCrowd ControlNon-lethal weaponsNegotiatorsSonar SearchDiver SearchIEDDUSDDUEODSearch & RescuePolicing ActionsMedical EvacuationClean-up Operations

  • Capabilities RequiredControl of traffic in and around ports (people and vehicles)Detection of persons, boats, ships etc. surveillanceDetection of underwater traffic sonar surveillanceDetection of above water traffic radar, IR, visualIdentification of detected trafficPermitsDatabaseEnforcement of authorityArmed patrol of ports and approaches

  • Capabilities RequiredBe able to counter static threatsDetect mines, sabotage devices etc. on sea bottom and against hulls and quays where liners are berthedIdentify, classify and neutralise detected devicesBe able to counter mobile threatsDetect mobile underwater threatsTrack and intercept underwater threatsNeutralise underwater threats

  • *

  • SummaryPrinciples for underwater surveillance and above water surveillance are the sameLonger processes for underwater surveyingSlower speedLong time to analyse dataIdentification and recognition problems exist in both environmentsIdentification more difficult in underwater environment

  • QUESTIONS?

    It was evident from SHIELD 1 in PE that the SAN can not view itself separately from the entire 2010 effort. This means that the forces deployed during that time will be required to form part of the entire support capability and may expected to participate in activities that can be viewed as collateral support. This has a bearing on the prime function as manpower can not be ensured for reactionary tasks in some instances (bottom of divers that had to dive for collateral purposes).****

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