PRESENTATION TO LEDGER CONFERENCE MARITIME SECURITY FOR 2010 FIFA SOCCER WORLD CUP

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PRESENTATION TO LEDGER CONFERENCE

MARITIME SECURITY FOR 2010 FIFA SOCCER WORLD CUP

Capt (SA Navy) Nick Snyman2 December 2010

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AIMAIM

To present the SA Navy Operating To present the SA Navy Operating Concept for Underwater Security Concept for Underwater Security

support during 2010 SWC support during 2010 SWC

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Scope

• Area of Operations• Resources• Threats• Concept• Conclusion

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AREA OF OPERATIONSAREA OF OPERATIONS

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Area of Operations Area of Operations

• Harbours and their approachesHarbours and their approaches– Inside the harbour Inside the harbour

• Know the whole harbourKnow the whole harbour• Concentrate on the area from port entrance to identified quays Concentrate on the area from port entrance to identified quays • Sea bottomSea bottom• Structures in the water (jetties, quays and installations)Structures in the water (jetties, quays and installations)

– Outside the harbourOutside the harbour• From fairway buoy to harbour mouthFrom fairway buoy to harbour mouth• Width of approach channel to be determinedWidth of approach channel to be determined• Sea bottom and bathymetrySea bottom and bathymetry• Key installations, buoys and obstructionsKey installations, buoys and obstructions

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Area Of Operations - DefinedArea Of Operations - Defined

• 3 Major ports 3 Major ports – DurbanDurban– Cape TownCape Town– Port ElizabethPort Elizabeth

• Areas of priorityAreas of priority– Port entrance to quays where cruise liners will berth – REDPort entrance to quays where cruise liners will berth – RED– Quays where liners are berthed – REDQuays where liners are berthed – RED– Fairway Bouy to port entrance and port areas where most Fairway Bouy to port entrance and port areas where most

traffic can be expected and which will be vulnerable to traffic can be expected and which will be vulnerable to threats attempting to close the harbour – BLUEthreats attempting to close the harbour – BLUE

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DurbanDurbanDurban: Approximate perimeter and area estimates

Name Perimeter (m) Area (m2)

Red - Inside Harbour 7 850 696 120

Red - Harbour Entrance 3 210 357 470

Blue - Inside Harbour 11 290 1 663 810

Blue - Approach 8 470 3 503 790

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DurbanDurbanDurban: Approximate survey line lengths (m)

Time @ 3 knots survey

Red areas (50 m survey line spacing) 20 850 ≈4 hrs

Blue areas (100 m survey line spacing) 47 100 ≈9 hrs

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Cape TownCape TownTable Bay: Approximate perimeter and area estimates

Name Perimeter (m) Area (m)

West Basin 2 270 327 620

East Basin 5 050 1 454 140

Harbour Entrance and Approach 9 343 3 862 970

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Cape TownCape TownTable Bay: Approximate survey line lengths (m) Time @ 3 knots

survey

Red areas (50 m survey line spacing) 58 270 ≈11 hrs

Blue areas (100 m survey line spacing) 23 970 ≈4.5 hrs

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Port ElizabethPort ElizabethPort Elizabeth: Approximate perimter and area estimates

Name Perimeter (m) Area (m)

Red - Inside Harbour 1 880 199 440

Red - Harbour Entrance 1 790 210 750

Blue - Inside Harbour 5 990 789 020

Blue - Approach 6 960 3 313 330

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Port ElizabethPort ElizabethPort Elizabeth: Approximate survey line lengths (m) Time @ 3

knots survey

Red areas (50 m survey line spacing) 8 320 ≈1.5 hrs

Blue areas (100 m survey line spacing) 33 490 ≈6 hrs

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THREATSTHREATS

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Possible Maritime Threats Possible Maritime Threats

• Military type threatsMilitary type threats– ExplosivesExplosives

• Targeting traffic (on sea bottom, on water surface or in water column)Targeting traffic (on sea bottom, on water surface or in water column)– Deployed from landDeployed from land– Deployed from surface craftDeployed from surface craft– Deployed by underwater vehicle/swimmer Deployed by underwater vehicle/swimmer

• Targeting stationary vessels and structuresTargeting stationary vessels and structures– Deployed by underwater vehicle/swimmerDeployed by underwater vehicle/swimmer

• Criminal actsCriminal acts– Boarding/hostage taking from seaBoarding/hostage taking from sea– TheftTheft

• Protesters/RiotersProtesters/Rioters– Accessing prohibited areasAccessing prohibited areas– VandalismVandalism

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Civil Defence Support at Sea Civil Defence Support at Sea (SAN providing assistance)(SAN providing assistance)

• Search and rescue at seaSearch and rescue at sea• Containment of spills/dangerous substances in Containment of spills/dangerous substances in

ports/at seaports/at sea• Force protection (terrorist attack alongside or at Force protection (terrorist attack alongside or at

sea)sea)

04/21/23

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Possible Underwater Possible Underwater ThreatsThreats

• No threat is expected from conventional No threat is expected from conventional mine warfare in terms of numbers or mine warfare in terms of numbers or extentextent

• If a threat exists it is likely to be non-If a threat exists it is likely to be non-conventionalconventional

• Generic underwater threatsGeneric underwater threats– Divers/swimmers (scuba, snorkel)Divers/swimmers (scuba, snorkel)– Vehicles (diver scooter, AUV)Vehicles (diver scooter, AUV)– Mine like explosives (similar to limpet Mine like explosives (similar to limpet

mines or sea mines)mines or sea mines)– Sabotage devices (recognisable or Sabotage devices (recognisable or

disguised)disguised)

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RESOURCESRESOURCES

2020

Frigates

Maritime Reaction Squadron teamsonboardConducted surveillance and securitypatrols by boat and helicopter

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SAS DRAKENSBERG (Supply Vessel)

Had Maritime Reaction teamson board. Conducted securitypatrols

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Maritime Patrol Aircraft

Assisted frigates to establish Surface Picture

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SAS PROTEA (Survey Vessel)

SAS PROTEA served as HQ for underwater securityusing divers, work boats and Mine Countermeasures vessels to execute survey and otherunderwater security tasks

Shallow Water RouteSurvey system was developed and deployed

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EQUIPMENTEQUIPMENT

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SA NAVY SHALLOW WATER ROUTE SURVEY SYSTEM

(SWRSS)

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DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM (2)

• EQUIPMENT BREAKDOWN (Wet)– Reson SeaBat 7125 (400 khz) Bathy

Multibeam Echosounder (MBES)– Reson SeaBat 7128 (200 khz) Forward

Looking Sonar (MBES)– Edgetech 300 khz / 900 khz Dual

Frequency Side Scan Sonar (SSS)• USBL with 1m accuracy

– Edgetech 2 khz / 12 khz Sub Bottom Profiler (SBP)

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SSS System

7125 MBES

SBP System

7128 Forward Looking Sonar

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SMB Interior

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Operational RequirementsOperational Requirements

Prevention Mitigation ReactionForce ProtectionIntelligenceAccess ControlSurface PictureSurface PatrolAir PictureSurveillanceDiver Detection

Route SurveySonar SearchDiver SearchIEDDUSDDUEODCrowd ControlNon-lethal weaponsNegotiators

Sonar SearchDiver SearchIEDDUSDDUEODSearch & RescuePolicing ActionsMedical EvacuationClean-up Operations

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Capabilities RequiredCapabilities Required

• Control of traffic in and around ports (people and Control of traffic in and around ports (people and vehicles)vehicles)– Detection of persons, boats, ships etc. – surveillanceDetection of persons, boats, ships etc. – surveillance

• Detection of underwater traffic – sonar surveillanceDetection of underwater traffic – sonar surveillance• Detection of above water traffic – radar, IR, visualDetection of above water traffic – radar, IR, visual

– Identification of detected trafficIdentification of detected traffic• PermitsPermits• DatabaseDatabase

– Enforcement of authorityEnforcement of authority• Armed patrol of ports and approachesArmed patrol of ports and approaches

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Capabilities RequiredCapabilities Required

• Be able to counter static threatsBe able to counter static threats– Detect mines, sabotage devices etc. on sea bottom and Detect mines, sabotage devices etc. on sea bottom and

against hulls and quays where liners are berthedagainst hulls and quays where liners are berthed– Identify, classify and neutralise detected devicesIdentify, classify and neutralise detected devices

• Be able to counter mobile threatsBe able to counter mobile threats– Detect mobile underwater threatsDetect mobile underwater threats– Track and intercept underwater threatsTrack and intercept underwater threats– Neutralise underwater threats Neutralise underwater threats

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Summary

• Principles for underwater surveillance and above water surveillance are the same

• Longer processes for underwater surveying– Slower speed– Long time to analyse data

• Identification and recognition problems exist in both environments

• Identification more difficult in underwater environment

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QUESTIONS?