Presentation by Jackie Kerr: Internet Penetration and Political Protest:The Global and Regional Politics of Internet Use and Regulation

Internet Penetration and Political Protest:The Global and Regional Politics of

Internet Use and Regulation

Jaclyn A. [email protected]

Center for New Media and Society, NES

September 18, 2013

Research Questions:

Why has growing Internet use coincided with the development of powerful protest movements in some states but not in others?

What explains why some countries have tightly restricted Internet use while others have let it freely develop?

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Civic Engagement & Political Protest

“Arab Spring” 2010-2011

“Liberation Technologies”?

Russian Blogosphere MapBerkman Center, 2011

Map of Election ViolationsGOLOS, March 4, 2012

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ICTs in Civic & Political Engagement

Variety of Affordances & Mechanisms

• Groups & Association

• Media & Public Discourse

• IT & Social Entrepreneurship

• Activism & Protest Mobilization

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Example:

Video Sharing / Bypass State Media

Zhanaozen, Kazakhstan, December 16, 2011

Example:

Protest Movement Mobilization

“НЕсогласные Казахстана” – Almaty, Kazakhstan, 20127

But Context Matters…

8Aktau, August 2012

Political Context Matters

•Regime type

•Internet regulation

•Relationship of online & offline freedoms

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Political Context MattersPolitical Context Matters

Internet used differently in different settings!

State Internet Regulation

“The Net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it.”

– Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) co-founder John Gilmore, 1993

“[T]here are now a wide variety of technical and nontechnical means at [governments’] disposal to shape and limit the online flow of information.”

– Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski, 2010

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State Internet Regulation

Uzbekistan Site Blocking11

State Internet Regulation

Qatar Site Blocking12

Restrictive Internet & ICT Policies

“First Generation”

• Site Blocking

• Keyword Filtering

• Manual Content Censorship

• Complete Cellular or Internet Network Shutdowns

• Network Traffic Slowdowns

• “Walled Garden” Intranets

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“Next Generation”

• Restrictive Legal Measures

• Informal Take-Down Requests

• Regulation of Private Companies

• Just-In-Time Blocking / DDoS Attacks

• Patriotic Hacking / Trolling / Blogging

• Targeted Surveillance

• Physical / Legal Attacks

“Digital Dictator’s Dilemma”

Why have Internet and information technology policy choices differed so markedly across authoritarian and hybrid regimes?

What factors have influenced state decisions to adopt more- or less- restrictive approaches, and how durable are these choices once taken?

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Internet Policy as Norm Adoption

1.State Characteristics

2.Interdependencies (International / Regional)

3.Global Context & Trends

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State Characteristics

• “Offline” Regime Type (Policy-Linkage)

• Internet Penetration

• Protest Levels (Perceived Stability Risk)

• Perceived Restriction Legitimacy

• Economic Costs / Benefits

• Technical Restriction Capacity

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International & Regional Interdependencies

•International Pressure

•Regime Vulnerability

•Restrictive Neighbors & Peers

Global Trends & Context

• Growing Global ICT Penetration

• Changes in Global Internet Infrastructure

• “Arab Spring” as Exogenous Shock

• Global Norm Trends / Legal Contestation

State Characteristics & Policy Choice

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GCC Region

Asymmetry

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International & Regional Factors

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GCC

FSU

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Internet Regulation: Findings

Why Russia matters…

Policy-linkage alone doesn’t explain

Penetration rate alone doesn’t explain

Domestic instability

Regional clusters

Policy divergence?

Future for Hybrid Regimes???

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Internet Blacklist Law, November 1, 201229

Why Russia Matters…

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Asymmetry

Example:

“Protect Kok-Jailau”

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Example:

Air Pollution “Zombie Parade” Flash Mobs

32Ust-Kamenogorsk, August 2012

Example:

“За Свободный Интернет ”

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Global Internet Future?

Future of the Internet and activism?

“Internet Freedom” Promotion

Growing Restrictions

Role of Companies

Increasing State Control

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Questions?“We couldn’t have a blogger like Navalny…”

35Moscow, March 2012