Popular Presidents Can Affect Congressional Attention, for a Little While John Lovett, Shaun Bevan, and Frank R. Baumgartner Does the president have the ability to set the congressional agenda? Agenda setting is a prerequisite for influence, so this is an important element in understanding presidential–legislative relations. We focus on the State of the Union address and show that popular presidents can, indeed, cause Congress to shift attention to those topics most emphasized. The impact is tempered by divided government and time, however. No matter the state of divided government, however, popular presidents can direct congres- sional attention, at least for a little while. Unpopular presidents, by contrast, are irrelevant. KEY WORDS: agenda setting, presidential–congressional relations, presidential approval, divided government Presidential Popularity and Congressional Attention When a popular president announces a major policy initiative in the State of the Union (SoU) address at the beginning of a new congressional session, committee chairs follow suit. Popular presidents set the congressional agenda because their use of the bully pulpit can be expected to mobilize voters. Further, since the SoU is an important event within the annual cycle of work within the executive branch, con- gressional leaders know that those federal agencies favored by mentions in the SoU will likely follow up with new initiatives, pushing for congressional action. Com- mittee chairs have a choice: Get on board or move away. They move away from presidential initiatives when the president is of the other party, when the president is unpopular, and as the SoU fades into memory as the months of the calendar click by. Presidential influence on the congressional agenda can be great if the president is popular and this popularity effect can be so strong as to affect members of the rival party. But even the most popular president can expect the impact of a single speech to fade over time. The power of the most public of presidential speechmaking occasions is great, but conditional and fleeting. In this paper we show that presidential power to set the congressional agenda is conditional on presidential approval, shared party control of the White House and the houses of Congress, and timing. We test our argument by modeling the effect of mentions of particular issue areas in the SoU on the number of congressional hear- 22 0190-292X V C 2014 Policy Studies Organization Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc., 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ. The Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2015
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Popular Presidents Can Affect Congressional Attention,for a Little While
John Lovett, Shaun Bevan, and Frank R. Baumgartner
Does the president have the ability to set the congressional agenda? Agenda setting is a prerequisite forinfluence, so this is an important element in understanding presidential–legislative relations. We focuson the State of the Union address and show that popular presidents can, indeed, cause Congress to shiftattention to those topics most emphasized. The impact is tempered by divided government and time,however. No matter the state of divided government, however, popular presidents can direct congres-sional attention, at least for a little while. Unpopular presidents, by contrast, are irrelevant.
Hypothesis 1: The effect of the SoU on congressional attention is stronger duringunified government than under divided government.
Leaders are only effective as long as they have support. In politics, support is
directly tied to public approval, suggesting that popular presidents are also the most
effective leaders (Brace & Hinckley, 1992; Kernell, 1997). While the effects of popu-
larity on policy are debatable (e.g., Canes-Wrone & De Marchi, 2002), popularity
adds to the agenda-setting power of the president (Light, 1999).
Hypothesis 2: The effect of the SoU on congressional attention is higher for presi-dents with higher approval ratings than for presidents with lower approval ratings.
Timing also plays an important role in the SoU. While a tool for expressing the
president’s agenda for the next year, events, debates, and public opinion can quickly
and sometimes dramatically change the course of politics (Stimson, 1989; Wood &
Peake, 1998). Presidents recognize this fact and often choose to pursue many imme-
diate policy goals in order to take advantage of the agenda-setting power of the SoU.
Due to the drop-off in the signal of the SoU over time and the president’s own
penchant for pursuing many short-run goals, the effect of the SoU is therefore
strongest the closer it is to its reading.
Lovett et al.: Presidents Can Affect Congressional Attention 728 Policy Studies Journal, 43:1
Hypothesis 3: The effect of the SoU on congressional attention is strongest imme-diately following its reading.
Finally, we also argue that the body of Congress that the president is influencing
will have an effect on the attention of Congress. The House, with agenda control
embedded within the majority leadership, should act directly in line with its lead-
ership. In the Senate, we should see more muted effects: While the majority members
will want to follow the president’s lead, the power of all 100 members of the Senate
to be independent of agenda control should make results in the body less cohesive
than the House.
Hypothesis 4: The effect of the SoU on congressional attention should be greater inthe House than in the Senate.
Data and Methods
The data we use to test H1–H4 are drawn from the Policy Agendas Project (PAP)
(www.policyagendas.org), supplemented by Gallup presidential approval data com-
piled by James Stimson. Our analysis covers the period 1953–2005 and uses 19
different major topic codes that encompass the full range of activities of the U.S.
federal government. With consistent topic codes for all the databases included in the
PAP, it is a simple matter to see if increases in presidential attention correlate with
subsequent increases in congressional attention, measured in this case by hearings.
We accomplish this by employing a time series cross-sectional design,1 with each
year as the time value and each major topic treated as an individual panel for a total
N of 1,007 (54 − 1 years (T) × 19 major topics (n)) observations.
Congressional Attention
We focus on congressional hearings as our measure of congressional attention,
in line with previous scholarship (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). Hearings may or may
not be followed by legislation but are an important indicator of attention and that is
our focus. Edwards and Barrett (2000) follow Edwards et al. (1997) in using legisla-
tive hearings to measure if a bill was on what Mayhew (1991) calls the “ ‘much talked
about’ stage.” As congressional hearings may or may not be held on a matter of
interest to the committee leadership, it is a good indicator of what is being discussed.
Note that our focus on the percent of all hearings means that we do not count an
issue as high on the congressional agenda merely because a single hearing was
scheduled; with 19 major topics, and over a thousand hearings per year on average,
we are looking for fluctuations up or down in levels of attention. Another advantage
to the use of congressional hearings as an indicator of attention is that they cover the
full range of congressional activities. The dependent variable is the percentage
change in the number of hearings on a given topic as compared to the previous year.
The use of a proportional change variable in our model is for theoretical reasons. The
simple count of hearings increases over time during the period of our study. It also
follows a zigzag pattern due to the two-year cycle of congressional work. We use a
John Lovett is a PhD candidate in political science at University of North Carolina-
Chapel Hill.
Shaun Bevan is a postdoctoral research fellow at Mannheimer Zentrum für
Europäische Sozialforschung (MZES), Universität Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany.
Frank R. Baumgartner is the Richard J. Richardson Distinguished Professor of
Political Science at University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill.
Notes
1. In our analyses, we use a time series cross-sectional model with panel corrected standard errors. This
model is appropriate for analysis here as we are not concerned with variation between topics (e.g., the
differences between the proportion of hearings on agriculture and trade) but rather the general trend
in cases. Postestimation tests of our analyses both in the paper and the appendix did not reveal any
concerns over serial autocorrelation.
2. Breitung panel unit-root tests showed our dependent variable to be stationary across all panels with
lamda values of −11.57***, −8.77***, and −7.32*** for the three months, May–December, and full-year
models, respectively, in the House; and −7.69***, −8.39***, and −5.07*** for the three months, May–
December, and full-year models, respectively, in the Senate, comfortably (p < 0.000 percent) rejecting
the null hypothesis that at least one panel contains a unit root.
3. Two years, 1953 and 1961, contain two SoUs, one from the outgoing and one from the incoming
president. In these years, we have included the outgoing president’s SoU alone to match the historical
norm. Until 1989, the norm was for outgoing presidents to offer a speech either orally or in a written
form with no SoU from incoming presidents (except in 1953 and 1961). Since 1989, incoming presi-
dents have offered an SoU-type speech after they first take office with no speech offered by outgoing
presidents. Officially, the address offered by an incoming president is not called an SoU as that
responsibility technically belongs to the president who held office during the past year. However, the
speech offered by incoming presidents both fulfills the same purpose and is commonly referred to as
an SoU.
4. Other specifications were also considered including both a change and proportional change variable.
However, these models lead to considerable missing data problems because many topics have no
mentions in any given year, rendering missing any proportional change calculation for the following
year. Models using change measures did, however, produce the same general inferences as what we
present here. We also ran models using a lagged proportional SoU, but there were no differences
between models with or without the lagged SoU variable. The results for the lagged proportional SoU
model are presented in Online Appendix S1.
5. Indeed, in our statistical findings, replacing the percent attention variable in the SoU with a percent-
change variable, we have null results. But we have no reason to think that congressional leaders would
be calculating these percent-change values; our theory strongly suggests they are responding to levels
of attention in the current period alone.
6. Alternative divided-government measures were also tested. The first was coded 1 if the House of
Representations was of a different party than the president. The second was coded 1 when one house
of Congress was of a different party than the president, 2 when both were, and 0 otherwise. These
models were poorer fitting but did not alter this paper’s inferences. Given our concern about party
effects on scheduling hearings, the separate treatment of each chamber makes more theoretical sense.
7. A measure of presidential approval for the period following each SoU was also tested and led to the
same inferences as the results presented here.
8. To test for the potential that the use of a single survey house may bias the estimates of the marginal
effects, we also ran the model with a smoothed average yearly approval measure. This measure was
created from data compiled by James Stimson over the years 1953 and 2005 and contains data from
over 20 polling sources (though the series is only Gallup polling between 1953 and 1980 due to the
lack of polling by other houses in this period). The data were smoothed using James Stimson’s
WCalc5 application in order to account for potential outliers and variations between houses. The
Lovett et al.: Presidents Can Affect Congressional Attention 1940 Policy Studies Journal, 43:1
results do not change when using the smoothed measure versus the average monthly Gallup
opinion polling. See Stimson (1989) for more information on smoothing of public opinion
polling and http://www.unc.edu/∼jstimson/Software_files/Wcalc5.pdf for more information on
WCalc5.
9. As these alternative analyses further indicate the SoU is most effective in the first two months and
continues to decline in the six-month, yearly, and end of the year models. The slightly lower effect in
the one-month model compared with the two- and three-month models is no doubt due to hearings
scheduled prior to the reading of the SoU lending further support to its effect on congressional
attention.
10. The exclusion of either the congressional first-year dummy or the lagged hearings variable does not
alter any of the main inferences in the models. The exception is that excluding lagged hearings led to
a negative effect for the lagged New York Times variable, which we believe likely picks up some of the
effects of excluded lagged hearings variable.
11. While it is possible to compile and recode MIP data to match PAP major topic codes for a shorter than
yearly time frame, this produces several issues. In particular, many major topics receive little to no
attention through the MIP question even on the yearly level, and this issue is only compounded with
shorter time intervals given our time series cross-sectional setup.
12. A contemporaneous version of this variable was also tested and led to the same inferences. New YorkTimes data come from the PAP and are coded according to the same topic categories.
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Supporting Information
Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this
article at the publisher’s web-site:
Appendix S1. Tests using lagged State of the Union (SoU) measure.