Po Valley Battle Analysis

BATTLE ANALYSISDissecting the Axis UnderbellyThe Po Valley Campaign of World War II

John E. Persinger July 18, 2013MILH360 World War II HistoryTurnitin ID # 341607285

With intense fighting raging on both the Eastern and Western fronts during World War II, the campaign to open the Southern front and liberate Italy is easily overlooked and frequently overshadowed. Although overlooked by history, the operations in Italy were crucial to the Allied war effort and consisted of planning and execution of the highest caliber. By ripping open the underbelly of the Axis and delivering a crushing defeat in the Po Valley, the Allies forced the capitulation of Italy and sealed the fate of Germany.In 1945, as winter transitioned into spring, Nazi Germany felt itself being pressed hard by the Anglo-American forces from the west and the Soviets in the east. Yet, to the south, despite nineteen months of difficult fighting up the rugged mountain spine of Italy, the Allied soldiers there found themselves to be still the furthest from the faltering Third Reich.[footnoteRef:1] Launched in April of 1945, the Po Valley campaign sought to break through the German defensive lines in Northern Italy, capture the last remaining bread-basket for Germany, eliminate or destroy the armies in Italy, and seal off the possible retreat of German forces into the Alps.[footnoteRef:2] [1: Thomas A. Popa, "Po Valley 1945." www.history.army.mil/brochures/po/72-33.htm (accessed July 9, 2013).] [2: John B. Cpt Woodruff, History of the 85th Mountain Infantry in Italy: 4 January 1945-31 May 1945, ed. Barbara Imbrie (1945; reprint, 2004), 35.]

The Germans had spent the winter entrenched in their defenses, the Gothic Line, which ran east-west through the peaks of the North Apennines. They had reached this point in their defenses through a calculated and well articulated fighting withdrawal up the Italian peninsula. Orchestrated by the highly talented Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, the countering of the Allied landing in 1943 had led to some of the wars bloodiest contests. The German defense of Italy was hampered by initial indecision as to where to focus the defense. Field Marshal Irwin Rommel advocated for holding only the northern most portion of Italy while Kesselring argued for a defense to be made south of Rome. Hitlers decision to support Kesselring came one month after the Allied landings on the mainland. Kesselring was limited in his options for deploying troops by Hitlers firm belief that the Italians would soon surrender to the Allies and their army would no longer support the Axis effort. The defensive plans were for Kesselring to use mobile forces to hold against Allied landings and then fall back to regroup near Rome until all German forces had evacuated the south. This series of delaying actions fought south of Rome is demonstrated on the overview map below as highlighted by the dashed red lines.[footnoteRef:3] [3: "Department of History", http://www.westpoint.edu/history/SiteAssets/SitePages/World%20War%20II%20Europe/WWIIEurope47.gif (accessed July 5 2013).]

While this delay was being enacted, Rommel was to secure the mountain passes out of Italy and the major ports of the north. The Italian Army was to be disarmed with the evacuated territory being considered hostile and the northern territory being pacified by fascist organizations. Having apparently learned something from the hold to the last orders he issued in Russia, Hitler directed Kesselring to safeguard German troops in Italy by conducting a well-organized withdrawal to central Italy with plans in place for a final assembly in the northern Apennines, south of the Po Valley.[footnoteRef:4] The overall extent of the defensive planning that Kesselring carried out can be best seen in this second map which demonstrates the fallback lines south of Rome and the Gothic line to the far north of Italy.[footnoteRef:5] [4: Ralph S. Mavrogordato, "Chapter 12: Hitler's Decision on the Defense of Italy," in Command Decisions, ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1987), 303-320.] [5: "Italy and Sicily 1943-1945", Directorate of History and Heritage http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/pub/boo-bro/abo-aut/images/cha-05/chap5-13-lg-eng.jpg (accessed July 9 2013).]

The Allies spent the winter of 1944 in the Apennines facing the Germans in their defensive lines, resting and resupplying after their long, tough fight through the mountains to reach this point. The campaign to strike the soft underbelly of Europe was initiated in 1943 at the urging of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. It was his belief that striking Italy would force it from the war, divert men and materials from the Axis efforts elsewhere, and deny Germany the supplies and goods that came out of Italy; all supporting the invasion of France. Unfortunately, the Allies went ashore in Salerno, which allowed the Germans to contest their advance with a small number of forces, enabling them to prepare defenses lines to the north. Thus, rather than drawing more Germans into the fight, it was the Allies were forced to employ greater resources to take each fortification and hilltop by force. The Allied goal would have been better served had they followed the example of Napoleon in 1796 and invaded Italy near Genoa. From there, like Napoleon, they could have taken Italys largest seaport, Genoa, and struck through the nearby passes into the Po Valley. Striking early on at the Po Valley would have accomplished all of Churchills goals, for the Po contained the bulk of Italian food and industrial production. As it was, the Allies forced their way up the peninsula, taking nineteen months to accomplish what was hoped to take only a few. This was due to the timidity of the Allied advance, the terrain over which the fighting took place, and the gross overestimation of just how stiff a defense the Germans would make over Italy.[footnoteRef:6] [6: Talyor Holbrook, "Po Man's War: Wwii, Napoleon, and the Po River Valley," War College (2012). http://www.armchairgeneral.com/po-mans-war-ww-ii-napoleon-and-the-po-river-valley.htm (accessed July 1, 2013).]

The campaign north ground to a halt in the winter of 1944-1945 due to the harsh conditions in the mountains and the depth of the mud in the lowlands. The snow in the high mountains complicated every move to the point where, in the words of General Clark, all we could do is plan various operations, virtually none of which ever got to the active stage.[footnoteRef:7] While large operations were effectively out of the question, probing and patrolling never ceased. One of the units assigned to the US Fifth Army was the 6th South African Armored Division. The snow was so deep that their tanks stalled during one engagement that lasted for several days and nights. Demonstrating great drive and ingenuity, the South Africans dug in and used their guns as artillery and continued the fight as infantrymen.[footnoteRef:8] As the weather improved, the Allied air force began to strike in earnest at the German controlled railways, highways, and communication lines. Plans were made for a major operation towards the Po Valley to be initiated once the ground would be able to bear the weight of armor without bogging down.[footnoteRef:9] [7: Mark W. Clark and Martin Blumenson, Calculated Risk (New York: Enigma Books, 2007), 322.] [8: Ibid., 327.] [9: Ibid., 337-338.]

The placement of the Gothic Line was based on the advantage of terrain that the Germans had utilized so effectively up to this point in wearing down the Allied forces, and grinding their advance to a mere crawl at times. The Germans capitalized on every geographical advantage at their disposal in building their defenses. For nine months, 15,000 Italians were forced to create the line which included 2,376 machine gun nests, anti-tank ditches, trenches, and gun emplacements.[footnoteRef:10] The natural features of the mountains provided many spurs and ridges upon which observation posts were established. The fortifications were established on the higher of these which afforded the Germans mutually supporting fields of fire and wide angles of observation. The valleys themselves were interrupted by the finger projections of ridges, fences, trees, and hedges, which all served to limit the cross-country mobility of forces, but these also provided excellent cover and concealment behind which to move.[footnoteRef:11] For the Allies, once a breech in the line had been established and they had broken into the valley floor, they would finally be able to utilize the advantages in numbers and mobility.[footnoteRef:12] An excellent representation of the various features of the northern Italian geography is shown on the 3-D rendering of the campaign area.[footnoteRef:13] In this view from the east, the ruggedness of the Apennines stands in stark contrast to the featureless Po Valley, which in turn gives rise to the Alps to the north. The difficulty in maneuvering up the spine of Italy can be easily deduced by simply observing the terrain over which the Allies chose to advance. [10: "Gothic Line and Po Valley Campaign", http://www.goforbroke.org/history/history_historical_campaigns_gothic.asp (accessed July 3 2013).] [11: Popa.] [12: Holbrook.] [13: Hans van der Maarel, The Po Valley and the Alps, Panoramic Rendering, 2008, NOAA and US Department of Commerce, Bolder, CO.]

The advancing Allied forces of the15th Army Group had been under the command of British Field Marshal Sir Harold R.L.G. Alexander with U.S. Lt. General Mark W. Clark commanding the U.S. Fifth Army and Lt. General Oliver Leese leading the British Eighth Army. With a break in the fighting in December to rest, refit, and regroup, changes were made to the command structure. General Clarke assumed command of the 15th Army Group, with Lt. General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr. taking command of Fifth Army and General Sir Richard L. McCreery now commanding the British Eighth.[footnoteRef:14] [14: Popa.]

With any job well done comes a promotion or a change to a different area of responsibility. So it was the German command, for just as the campaign for Italy was reaching the actual region of importance. Kesselring, who had orchestrated a superb fighting withdrawal, moved to command Army Group West, being replaced by General Heinrich von Vietinghoff who moved in from the Baltic. General Traugott Herr was advanced from command of the LXXVI Panzer Corps to lead the entire Tenth Army. The Fourteenth Army received General Joachim Lemelsen, commander of the First Army, as its new leader.[footnoteRef:15] [15: "Spring 1945 Offensive in Italy", http://desertwar.net/spring-1945-offensive-in-italy.html (accessed July 1 2013).]

As important as the leaders who developed and issued the order for the operations were the men who executed those orders and big changes were being made there as well. For the Allied soldiers, the break in fighting allowed for a much needed rest, refitting, and reinforcement. The Americans enhanced Fifth Army by increasing its total force from roughly 170,000 soldiers to 270,000 soldiers with another 30,000 assigned to replacement depots.[footnoteRef:16] This powerful force covered a 120-mile front from the Ligurian coast in the west through the Apennines to just southeast of Bologna and was divided into two corps, each containing the equivalent of ten divisions. The deployments placed the US IV Corps to the west under Major General Willis D. Crittenberger and the US II Corps to the east under Major General Geoffrey Keyes. To the right of the Americans was the British Eight Army which had recently lost some combat power as its Canadian compliment was reassigned to France. Despite this loss it still fielded an impressive force of eight divisions from four different nations with an additional Jewish Brigade and four battle groups representing freed Italians. Their line picked up from the Bologna region and extended east to just north of Ravenna on the Adriatic Sea.[footnoteRef:17] [16: "Italian Campaign: Po Valley", http://olive-drab.com/od_history_ww2_ops_battles_1945povalley.php (accessed June 28 2013).] [17: Popa.]

The Allies utilized this time to allow their battle weary troops to rest, restructure, and refresh some of skills and tactics that may have been bastardized over the months of combat or were yet unknown to the incoming fresh troops. In the month prior to the outset of the new campaign, the 10th Mountain Division implemented a system by which soldiers were sent for rest periods of three-five days to Rome, Florence, and Montecatini. This complimented the rotation of battalions through the Montecatini rest camp for four day breaks. In addition to the rests, the battalions were also rotated through Prunetta where the division had established a training center. At the training center skills were improved and honed as well as the training of the newly established regimental level counter-mortar section. These were established to coordinate the counter-fire of the three battalions, increasing accuracy while shortening response time.[footnoteRef:18] Especially given the number of new recruits that had streamed into Fifth Army alone, the opportunity to train them alongside hardened combat troops was an excellent one and likely helped to maintain its fighting ability when compared to what it was in 1944. [18: Woodruff.]

Standing in stark contrast to the growing Allied force were the German defenders. The forces aligned there consisted of twenty-four German divisions and five Italian fascist divisions. These men were mostly all experienced combat veterans and while their units were mostly intact, they were under strength. They were dispersed in a defensive line opposite the Allies. Facing Fifth Army was the Fourteenth Army under von Lemelson while standing opposed Eighth Army was the Tenth Army under Herr. Although well supplied and supported in 1944, the troops were now beginning to suffer from shortages of all types. While the Allies rested and trained, the Germans strengthened their lines in the Apennines. To back-up this defensive line they built another along the Po River itself, which varied in width from 130-150 yards with protective levees. The last line of defense lay in the Alpine foothills and was called the Adige Line. The Adige Line was comprised of dugouts, trenches, and gun emplacements which, if manned properly would be a tough nut to crack.[footnoteRef:19] This is especially true since the resolve of the German soldier had not wavered. Despite the fact that their homeland had been invaded and that the lacked many fighting supplies, they fought with the same tenacity and skill as they had when they arrived. An Italian soldier, who had fought with them and then against them, referred to them as truly great soldiers, many of whom had determined that they would rather die fighting than return to a defeated Germany.[footnoteRef:20] [19: Popa.] [20: Eugenio Corti and Emanuel Arundel, Last Soldiers of the King: Life in Wartime Italy, 1943-1945 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2003), 298-301.]

In looking at the raw numbers, the Allies held the advantage, nearly two-to-one in terms of soldiers alone; 850,000 Allied as compared to 400,000 Axis.[footnoteRef:21] In addition, there were a large number of partisan fighters that were organized into regional groups or bands. These Partisan bands were given specific tasks which were coordinated along with the Allied advance. Their presence was so important to the overall effort that General Clark broadcast a message telling them to conserve their strength and be ready when called, warning them to avoid premature actions. These forces provided intelligence, served as guides, and captured many of the towns and villages in the advance.[footnoteRef:22] [21: C. Peter Chen, "Operation Grapeshot and Operation Roast" www.ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=305 (accessed July 5 2013).] [22: Clark and Blumenson, 339.]

The Allied force was also comprised of a multitude of specialty units. These included engineer units who cleared the minefields, cleared obstacles, reestablished bridges or brought up pontoon bridges, and breached fortifications. The 10th Mountain Division for example, was trained specifically for mountain warfare. Their expertise was invaluable as maneuvering in difficult terrain was the core of their existence. One of their basic skills was skiing, which enabled them to maintain patrols even in the lasting snow, as the patrols were conducted on skis.[footnoteRef:23] The Signal Corps was quite active in ensuring that communications were maintained and the actions were documented on film and in writing. The 10th Mountain Division alone laid 70 miles of field wire during the period of 7-12 April 1945. The efforts of the Signal Corps helped to negate the limitations imposed by the terrain on the coordination of the upcoming assault.[footnoteRef:24] [23: Jr. Walther H. Persinger, "Dad and World War Two," in Persinger Family History (Enumclaw).] [24: Woodruff.]

The advantages held by the Allies over the Germans were not limited to the ground. Having been spread thin across all the German fronts, the Luftwaffe was simply unable to counter Allied efforts in the air. One description sums this up best in stating that German soldiers were hammered without truce by the frightfully powerful air force.[footnoteRef:25] This air power was all encompassing and was comprised of bombers, fighter-bombers, and close supporting fighters. With free range of the air, and the altitude at which the fighting took place, the soldiers often witnessed fighters such as the Hurricane, Spitfire, and P-47 flying through the valleys below them to provide close in ground support.[footnoteRef:26] General Clark would also employ the use of LTVs or Buffalo Amphibious Boats and DUKW or ducks to ensure that the coastal waters, lagoons, and the Po River were an avenue of attack to be capitalized on rather than an obstacle.[footnoteRef:27] While the Allies enjoyed the abundance of technology and modern means of transportation, the Germans were reduced to using whatever they had available to move supplies which by 1945 included wagons, hand carts, horses, and cows; and typically at night to avoid air patrols.[footnoteRef:28] [25: Corti and Arundel, 299.] [26: Walther H. Persinger.] [27: Jr. Ernest F. Fisher, "Cassino to the Alps," in The US Army in World War II (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1977).] [28: Woodruff, 33-36.]

As the time for the impending assault neared, the experienced leaders on both sides took steps that they felt would swing the advantage in their favor. General Clark released a statement to his force highlighting their experience to this point and that the successful end to their campaign was nearly at hand. He encouraged them to deal a decisive blow to their enemy by taking advantage of all the available resources they had brought to bear.[footnoteRef:29] While Clark encouraged, the German command took action to counter the assault they knew was coming. General Herr recommend the use of a false front maneuver which had been employed in WWI. This tactic calls for the withdrawal of troops under the cover of an artillery barrage, just prior to the enemy assault, so that the attack strikes nothing and becomes unbalance. Vietinghoff approved the plan and despite denial from German OKW, he implemented a smaller version in an attempt to strengthen the line near the Santerno and thinned his line at Senio. Unfortunately, while this was being implemented, his shifting troops were caught in the intense bombing that precluded the assault.[footnoteRef:30] [29: 15th Army Group, by Mark W. Clark, April 1945, Letter to 15th Army, To the Soldiers of the 15th Army Group.] [30: Ernest F. Fisher.]

The assault to break the Gothic Line and take the Po Valley was called Operation Grapeshot and was preceded by a diversionary attack known as Operation Roast. On April 1, 1945 the commando raid on Port Garibaldi was initiated with the intent to draw attention from the main attack which was to follow in one week. On the 9th of April, following a bombardment by 825 bombers and a multitude of fighter-bombers, the same one which struck the Germans as they sought to realign, three divisions of Eight Army secured Santerno River crossings and two divisions began their advance on Argenta. Operation Impact Plain, a push to expand the territory gained through Operation Roast, commenced on the 10th of April, and was designed to draw German forces from the center to the flanks. To counter this threat, the Germans shifted two divisions and stymied the advance on Argenta.[footnoteRef:31] [31: Chen.]

With the Germans reacting to the threat to the east, Clark unleashed Truscott and his Fifth Army on the 14th of April. Under cover of 2,000 heavy bombers, and 2,000 artillery pieces the US IV Corps attacked the western end of the line while the US II Corps drove toward Bologna.[footnoteRef:32] Despite stiff resistance, the German defenders were unable to counter the movement against them. In a combined thrust of the 10th Mountain and 1st Armored Divisions to strive for a breakthrough and avoid more of the heavy hill fighting, Pvt Thomas Hatfield of A company, 85th Mountain Regiment became the first American to enter the Po Valley. This breakthrough happened on the morning of 20 April and was 8 kilometers west of Bologna.[footnoteRef:33] [32: Ibid.] [33: Woodruff.]

Now out in the open terrain of the Po Valley, the campaign had become a race to the Po River and the Alps beyond. Truscott, an old cavalry officer and tank commander, was the perfect man for this type of fighting. With his forces pouring out of the hills he mounted a high-speed advance to cut-off and destroy the remaining enemy units. He directed II Corps isolate Bologna and then link with the Eighth Army to encircle all Axis forces south of the Po. The 92nd Division was to advance on Genoa along the western coast while the 1st Armored and 10th Mountain were to continue their drive north to the Po River, followed by the 6th African Armored and 85 Infantry Divisions as they left the Apennines.[footnoteRef:34] So quickly were the units advancing that the wounded from both sides were shuttled to the rear by using POWs as stretcher bearers as the number of wounded increased and the distance over which they needed to transport became greater.[footnoteRef:35] The maneuver to link up the II Corps with the Eighth Army trapped 100,000 German soldiers south of the Po River.[footnoteRef:36] [34: Popa.] [35: Woodruff, 45.] [36: Popa.]

The entire Fifth Army had reached the Po by the 24th and the Eighth Army was closing on it fast as well to the east. Truscott ordered the immediate crossing of the Po with the goal of driving towards Verona to block the escape route to Brenner Pass. This would allow his forces to defeat the Adige Line before the German troops, who were still struggling to cross the valley, could take up positions. Faced with the bulk of their forces captured or trapped behind the Allied onslaught, the loss of both of their fall-back lines, and the retreat routes in to the Alps captured, the Germans were beaten. On the 28th, with no hope of continuing the fight, the Germans sought a cease-fire which was followed by a formal surrender on the 2nd of May. On the 4th of May, elements of the 349th Infantry moving through Brenner Pass made contact with patrolling elements of the 103rd Division of the Seventh Army in Austria, thereby linking the European and Mediterranean fronts. [footnoteRef:37] Germany was now surrounded, cut-off from the supplies and resources it needed, and being pressed on all fronts. [37: "Italian Campaign: Po Valley".]

This was welcome news on the American home front, where despite good news from the eastern and western advances of the Allies, they had not had much to celebrate in Italy for nearly two years. Emphatically, on the 21st the headlines proclaimed the arrival of Allied tanks in the Po Valley.[footnoteRef:38] The triumphant advance across the Po was headlined daily until the 26th when they celebrated taking of Verona and the capturing of two generals and 50,000 prisoners.[footnoteRef:39] This public heralding marked the end of combat for the Fifth Army which had been engaged in continuous fighting for over twenty months; the longest of all US field armies in WWII. The campaign for Italy had cost the Allies 312,000 casualties with 31, 886 dead while the Germans suffered an estimated 400,000 dead.[footnoteRef:40] [38: "Yanks Break into Po Valley," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, April 21 1945.] [39: "Allies Crush Nazis in Drive for Verona: Two Generals Included among Thousands of Prisoners Taken," Pittsburg Post-Gazette, April 26 1945.] [40: "Italian Campaign: Po Valley".]

The Po Valley campaign was an amazing finish to the long and brutal campaign in Italy. The Allies capitalized on their overwhelming superiority in both air and ground forces which were capably led and managed by their leaders. Through this they defeated an enemy which was well entrenched but worn out by years on campaign. Suffering from shortages of almost all war supplies and hampered by poor leadership at the political level, the Germans really didnt have a chance. Once the defensive lines were broken and the fighting was taking place on the open valley floor, the battle was over. The battle which had taken 19 months to reach ended the Italian campaign in less than one month.The drive through France from Normandy and the Soviet push from the east often overshadow the fighting that took place in Italy. Despite this neglect of credit, the soldiers who participated in the fighting there experienced some of the toughest combat in the harshest conditions. By tearing through the underbelly of Europe, the Allies deprived the Germans of the men they could have used elsewhere, the supplies which could have supported their existence, and the possibility of falling back to a mountain stronghold, sealing the fate of Germany.

Dedicated to:W.H. Persinger, Sr. (2nd from right), MedicB Company, 2nd Battalion,85th Regiment10th Mountain Division5th ArmyPicture taken just prior to Po Valley Campaign

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