Phronesis Volume 13 issue 1 1968 [doi 10.2307%2F4181805] Drew A. Hyland -- ῎Ερως, ᾿Επιθυμία, and Φιλία in Plato

, , and in PlatoAuthor(s): Drew A. HylandSource: Phronesis, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1968), pp. 32-46Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4181805 .Accessed: 17/08/2013 19:16

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'Epc,'E7rmOu,ta, and acxa in Plato DREW A. HYLAND

"The encomium proper is preceded by a preliminary dialectical discussion with Agathon, the object of which is to clear the ground of some popular misconcep- tions of the nature of Eros. The notion of Eros, it is shown, is equivalent to that of desire (Ipcoq = s6 &iwLOuIAo5v) ... a quality, not a person."

Bury, R. G. The Symposium of Plato, page XXXVI-XXXVII, in a discussion of Socrates' speech.

"The subject of conversation (in the Lysis) is friendship (qX(a). But behind this word, it is clear, as will be briefly sketched, hides the more powerful Eros... There is hardly any terminological distinction between love and friendship, so that, first, desire is said to wish that of which it is in want, and then that the congenial be the object of 'love, friendship, and desire' (,roil oIxkLou 6 re "Epwq xal h cpLXEa xal t sIouFdm 'ryX&vyL o5av, 221 E)."

Friedlander, Paul, Plato, An Introduction, page 50-51.

It is the purpose of this essay to take some first steps toward dis- pelling the popular conception, exemplified by the two above quotations, that there is little or no difference in Plato's dialogues

between the three important terms "Epwq, eTctE, and ptL?.1 I say "first steps" because the vast number of significant occurrences of these terms in the dialogues makes it impossible to give an ex- haustive treatment in one short paper. Consequently, I propose to do the following: first, I shall elicit the relevant distinctions between these terms, and the basis for the distinctions, by a careful examination of two significant passages, Symposium 200a-201b, and Lysis 221-222. I shall attempt to show therein that although indeed these terms have an important connection with each other, nevertheless there

1 D. N. Levin, "Some Observations Concerning Plato's Lysis", (presented at a meeting of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy, Amherst, Massachusetts, August 17, 1964), notes several different positions taken on the controversy (see especially pages 12-18 including footnotes), and he himself seems to come out in favor of some distinction at least between 'Epcog and yWLX( (pages 15-17) However, since the distinction in question is not the central theme of his essay, he does not offer decisive evidence for his view. I propose to do so in this essay.

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are distinct and significant differences. I shall then consider several relevant passages from other dialogues in which I find the distinctions I draw supported. My claim is not, indeed cannot be, that Plato always consistently distinguishes the terms in question, that he never uses them interchangeably. To do so would necessitate a consideration of every occurrence of one or more of these terms in the dialogues. Besides, there are undoubtedly contexts in which such subtle distinctions are entirely irrelevant to the point being made. In such cases, need we doubt the sincerity or the wisdom of Socrates' words in the Theaetetus that "To use words and phrases in an easy-going way without scrutinizing them too seriously is not, in general, a mark of ill breeding; on the contrary there is something lowbred in being too precise."2 Rather my more cautious claim will be that in at least several important passages where the distinctions would be relevant, Plato maintains them consistently. My suspicion is that this consistency is maintained more broadly; but this cannot be proved in a short paper. Finally, I shall offer a few suggestions as to possible philosophic consequences that would derive from a realization of these differences.

Let me begin with the discussion between Socrates and Agathon at Symposium 200a-201b. Socrates is concerned to show Agathon that 'Epus is always directed, that is, it is always 'Ep; of something and not "in itself," and also that it is always of something which it lacks. I shall be concerned not so much with the establishing of these points as with the careful and distinct use of the terms in question. Let me first arrange the order of the argument, with special emphasis on the interchange of the relevant terms, then comment on the way in which the argument develops. The crucial passage begins at 200a2 when, having established that 'Epco always has an object, Socrates asks Agathon to remember what he thinks the object to be, and then asks, "Does 'Epw; desire that of which it is 'Epco?" (o vEps 'exeLvou 0o5 I=v W p@, Out& t ouTo5 i o5;). This establishes what I shall cal for reference step one, that desire (&VnQua4x) is a possible predicate of 'Epco.3 ' EpG.; desires. "This thing that it desires and loves, does it desire and love it having it or not having it?" (H6orepov gcwv ocaur6 oi5

2 Plato, Theaetetus, 184c. Translation by F. M. Cornford. ' I do not mean to imply by the use of the term "steps" that these are necessarily logical steps, that, say, step four follows logically from step three. I am simply distinguishing the stages in the argument relevant to my paper.

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s7rLOu)e 'r xaX IpI, elZ' I tnUlIeZ xre X pI , I O- II oV;).4 "Probably

not having," says Agathon. This I shall call step two, that 'Epod both desires and loves, in other words, that love is in a way self- predicative, and that besides this it also desires.

"Consider," says Socrates, "whether, rather than probable, it is not necessary that desire desires what it lacks, or does not desire if it does not lack." (x67nC 8&1, avXL 'lo eLX6toq e M&vcyxz ou'r 0' Z'7rLOLouv OtWVLU.ZV OVi ?VW; '=LV,

'

'MtOU1?LV &&v -? C' ae; i;).5 Here we have step three, which states only (as opposed to step two) that desire desires what it lacks. An important element in step three then, is that it says nothing explicitly about 'Epw;. To this Agathon assents. Socrates next enters upon some examples which both illustrate and expand his point. The object of the examples is this: if someone who is strong wishes to be strong, or if someone who is healthy wishes to be healthy, what he really wishes is to continue to be strong or healthy in the future, something which he at present lacks.6 But in the course of these examples, a new word is introduced to express that element of desire, namely ouXecaOL. It may seem at first that 3ou'caoot and e7rLtieZv are used interchangeably in this passage, but if this were so, Socrates could be accused of ignoring the obvious difference that e7r&LOtLdv is primarily, if not exclusively, a passion, whereas PoUAeaOvL has the more intellectual connotation of "wishing" or "willing." But he does not, I think, ignore this. Thus Socrates says at 200d, "Con- sider, then, whether whenever you say that 'I desire things now present,' you mean anything else than this, that 'I wish to possess the things I now have in the future also."' This suggests that the desire for present possessions in the future somehow loses the passionate force of a present desire (ChLOupdc) so that the more intellectual PoU'Xo,uim is appropriate. Let us call this introduction of Poi'Xo,oa? to refer to desire for future possession step four.

Socrates then switches back to "?p&-v" to draw his conclusion from the examples. "But this is to love that which is not yet ready at hand for one, nor in one's possession, the possession and preservation of these things in future time."7 Step five seems to establish that "Epwg

4 Plato, Symposium, 200a5. 6 Ibid., 200a8. 6 Ibid., 200b8-200e. 7 Ibid., 200d8. "ouxo5v ?o5Yr6 y'&a-lv &xeEvou &p&v, 8 ou'nwco ?tOL[LOV MUrT45 &adv 0o8e 1XCL, 6 ?et t6V 17rCL'X Xp6vov 'rac3rox etvot orCp acO6Lxcvac xodt nop6vro;"

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is also applicable to the possession of present blessings in the future - that locution to which the verb Poi')?eaO is appropriate.

"This man and anyone else who desires," says Socrates, "desires what is not ready at hand nor present to him, and what he does not have, and what he is not himself and what he lacks, such are the kinds of things of which desire and love are."8 Step six thus asserts that both "Ep(o and ZatLOufL are of what one does not have, what one is not himself, and of what one lacks.

Finally Socrates sums up the argument by establishing that vEpw4 is first of something, and second, of something which one at present lacks (&Xo 7L C'=tv 6o "Ep&g np&-ov ,ev 'v mVov, ?7rso ro'Cro&v O )v &oXv gv8eo ncpj ocUs& ;).9 The seventh and final step consists of dropping off the interest in e'tLOUpa and concluding exclusively concerning ÈpwG.

Let us now examine the argument more closely to see what distinctions develop. Step one establishes that 'Epcjg desires, that is, that desiring is a possible predicate of Ep,og. It does not establish that desire is the only predicate of Èpws, nor, certainly, does it even hint that 'Ep&o; and EtLOvCu-. are identical, as Bury would have us believe. Step two increases the dubiousness of Bury's hypothesis when it adds that vEpco& both desires and loves what it lacks. The only way this could be construed as implying that 'Ep&o and eOur[Am are identical would be to interpret the presence of the conjunction here as a rather sophomoric redundancy on Plato's part. If vEpco= VXLOU.dm, then the conjunction of the two is entirely unnecessary. A much more plausible explanation would be that by ascribing both loving and desiring as predicates of 'Ep&g, having just ascribed desiring individually, Plato is indicating to us that there is at least some difference between them. What the difference is has as yet not even been hinted at. We see here only the suggestion that there is a difference.

Step three is characterized by the fact that it tells us nothing directly about Èpco. It does, however, tell us something about enu&Aoc.10 It tells us that desire desires, that it is self-predicative in

S Ibid., 200el. xxl o5roq &pm xal &XXoq niq 6 &kntOu(13v 'ro5 ph &'rotLou xxl SroV 0v? 7rpOvrO; xoc 6 * lXCL XMt 8 IAj a-LV XT6q xma o5 kvgt4 &aCrt, roLat r',r-m ta'rlv &v J &rLOuJAC -C xOd 6 Ip@ &FTEV; 9 Ibid., 200e8. 10 Liddell and Scott, under "&1=0u[&" say that "'r IntOu?.ov ... equals &tOU[Eda." Although this may at times be debatable, it serves the point here; step three is about kMOu)imd, not 'Epw,.

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the same way as 'Epcoc. 'Epo~ and sLOu&4o thus have this much in common: they both desire. 'Epco, however loves (4p5) as well, i.e., it too is self-predicative. One possible distinction between 'Epco and 6t0u,LOa now begins to emerge: they both desire, but only "Epc? has been said to love. It may be that an0u[u(m can only desire, whereas 'Epcog can both desire and love. Nor ought we to be surprised that such a difference arises. After all, VmOu,ul0 is characterized by Plato in the Phaedrus as but the lowest faculty of the soul, as an unruly monster which must be constrained, sometimes violently constrained, by the higher faculties in order to prevent it from gaining complete mastery over the soul,1" whereas 'Epco is portrayed in the same dialogue as divine madness, the source of inspiration to "divine philosophy.112 There must, then, be some other element in 'Epco& in addition to its capacity to desire, which gives it the divine status which ehr&[da lacks. Looking forward to the "ascent passage" of the Symposium, the charioteer image of the Phaedrus, and even the cave analogy of the Republic, we could well suspect that it will be some element of rationality which will accomplish this enhancement of 'Epco. When we think of the brute desire (EtLOu[da) of which 'Epco is capable, modified by a more rational element, our thought ought to turn to the possibilities offered by y6ac as a source of insight. Perhaps qtXEm is also involved in 'Epo in a way which distinguishes 'Epw from e.mOuiEa. To explore this possibility, we must turn to certain important passages in Plato's dialogue on (pLkax, the Lysis.

The Lysis is a dialogue whose ostensible concern is the nature of a friend (pLX6;) or more broadly, of friendship (pLXcx).'8 It might be pointed out that the very fact that Plato wrote one dialogue on friendship (ypXoc) and two on 'Epco indicates that he at least makes a distinction between these two terms, even if his commentators do not. What concerns us here, however, are certain illuminating statements on the possible relationship between 'Epw4, 9c0LX, and C7nLO04dc. Near the end of the dialogue, Socrates is pointing out that cXLai need not be of what is absolutely evil or absolutely good, but possibly of something neither evil nor good. He says at one point, "Is it possible for one desiring and loving not to befriend (p6elv) that which he desires and loves?" (otov re oi9v earLv i7Ou&oUvr x' x C?L &pAv'a orouTOU

"I Plato, Phaedrus, 246ff. 12 Ibid., 244-246. 18 See D. N. Levin, op. cit. (n. 1), pages 9-10 for a discussion of this.

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0o eOtU.tL Xm,L cP p T (pLXBEZV;).14 To which Lysis replies, "It seems to me not." This sentence is most instructive, for it directly mentions and relates the three terms in question. It suggests that it is impossible for one desiring and loving (7rtLOouivat. xocL ipxv-dr) not to befriend (FI? t9Xev) its object. That is, if one both desires and loves (erLOUie xal kp-), he must also befriend (pLXd) as well. Now, we would hardly want to say that if one simply desired, he would also befriend. 'ETLOu- tLCx, as the lower passion, would hardly deserve such a close association with the more rational yLX(c. The question as to whether one who loves (4p) also befriends (pXct) is more difficult, but probably contains the crux of our problem. I offer the following suggestion: it begins to look as though qLX6 must be more closely associated with 'Epw; than with C'mOulA. A hierarchy begins to emerge, with &rLOu- .daC at the bottom and (pLXL at the top, and these two terms mediated,

as it were, by 'Epwg, which contains elements of both. The criterion of this hierarchy clearly is involved with the degree of rationality implicit in the terms. 'E=Oufao, the lower passion, contains virtually no rationality. In fact, it is a constant hindrance to reason, as we learn in the Phaedrus.'L 'Ep&s, as we learn from Diotima's revelation, contains a considerable element of reason or deliberative ability. It acts as the mediator between gods and men.16 In its mythical pre- sentation as the son of Poros and Penia, it is described as "... plotting after beautiful things and good things, being manly and energetic and impetuous, a clever hunter, always weaving plots, desirous of thoughtfulness, inventive, a philosopher throughout its life.. ".17 Moreover, in the famous "ascent passage",'8 we leam that as the degree of reason in 'Epcs increases, whereby one turns his attention to increasingly higher objects of love, 'Ep&q becomes transformed, in its highest manifestation, into p)LX, indeed the cpLXEm for aocptx,

1 Plato, Lysis, 221b. I have adopted "to befriend" for "qlXtlv", because it seemed the most plausible way to maintain the connection between qLxelv and TOA (friendship). However, it is in fact an inadequate translation, because it fails to bring out the subtlety of the distinction between (pOXcv, and &p&.v in this sentence. The point is that 9LxCLv has less 17:LO[uLEa in it than does &p&v. But "to befriend" is too weak. Both Ip&cv and 9LXclv should really be translated "to love" with the former understood to be somewhat stronger than the latter. 15 Plato, Phaedrus, 247b, and elsewhere. 16 Plato, Symposium, 202e. 17 Ibid., 203b-204, not to mention that in this description 'Epcq is the veritable image of Socrates. Is Ibid., 210-212b.

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or philosophy. 00kXa, then, is 'Epcos modified by an increased degree of rationality. At the risk of being capricious we could say that the highest pursuit of man is not "erosophy" but "philosophy" because by the time man reaches his highest condition, the erotic drive which started him on his way has been modified, but not sublimated, by an increased rationality, so that it becomes a pXtoc for wisdom. In fact, it is precisely this increased degree of rationality which has enabled man to settle his erotic drive on its most proper and highest object, wisdom itself. To hold such a view is not, of course, to maintain that there is no relation whatsoever between these terms. That even the two extremes, pL?E and e.LOUVd4x, are somewhat related is shown by a statement which Socrates makes shortly after the last quotation from the Lysis, at 221d. "Desire is the cause of friendship, and that which desires is a friend to that which it desires, at the time when it desires." (4 F tOuliEm 'rn ?tLcx, aoclx(a, xal 'o Z7rL0uLoiUv rp[LXov Z'oTv 'O6'Z o6 C7tlOu4LC xal' 6o'-e 6 7LOt i .u...).19 Thus the desiring (so ZmLOt)ou)v) becomes a friend to that which it desires in order to possess it. This illustrates that the two terms are related but different. Again, that Z'nu&.da is the cause of friendship also indicates that at least the extremes, cpL?,L and etLOuj.do are different, unless we wanted to hold the unlikely view that tLEot is a causa sui. This is reiterated in another way a few sentences later when Socrates argues that although we desire what we lack, nonetheless, "Love and friendship and desire, as it seems happens to be of what belongs to it." (soiu o'Lxetou , c gOtX?V, 0 T 9p O xaL Yn TqLX( XOCl 4) C7MOUpLLOCL TUyXxVEL o?ia).20 The fact that all three terms are mentioned again indicates that they are different, yet the content of the statement itself suggests another important similarity. Although all three are of what they do not have, their objects nonetheless are what belong to them, what is proper to them.21

Let us now return to the order of argument in the Symposium. Step four contains the introduction of Po&'sXaeOt to apply to the desire for present possessions in the future. It is important to see that PoUAXaOt has at least this much in common with spav and &C70utOZV; it too is

19 Plato, Lysis, 221d3. 30 Ibid., 221e3. 31 Let us remind ourselves again that to construe the ascription of the same predicate to these terms as an indication of their identity would be a wholly unsatisfactory procedure.

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always of that which it lacks.22 But 3Ou'XeAoct has the sense of deliberation or reasoning for what one wishes, which sense &rntOuV.C lacks. That is, the difference between the simple present desire (C'tMOUpit) and the assessment that the object is also desirable in the future (for which Poi'XeaOa is employed) is that the latter requires some element of deliberation as to the value (or at least desirability) of the object. At Republic 438 aff., a passage we shall consider later, Socrates satisfies Glaucon that an &ItLOuji( like thirst, makes no value judgment as to its object; it desires not good drink, but simply drink. Poueaott, on the other hand, suggests the deliberative or rational element whereby we assess the object of our desire as worth having in the future. Socrates' examples in the present passage are instructive in this regard. His examples of things which we wish for (3ouX6,eOoc) in the future are strength, health, and wealth.23 Evidence for my view that these things require some deliberation before one seeks them (and are not simply objects of erLu&.do) is that these are precisely the three examples which Glaucon uses at Republic 357c to convince Socrates of a "third class" of goods which require activities painful and unpleasant in themselves (exercise, being healed, working) but which are tolerated and considered good because of their good consequences.

As step five indicates, this reasoned desire for present possessions in the future qualifies as `Epw4. "This is to love that which is not present to one, and which he does not have..." ('Ouxo5v roi5t6 y'ea'sV ~xexsou 9pV, 8 O57rcW JroL[Lov Oc-rx -IarV oi & ZXeL...),24 This too suggests that the introduction of the deliberation involved in Po'X?rOoct lifts the status of the merely passionate &97c&4do to the level of "Ep&g. Again we can argue that central to the distinction between es;tu41(a and 'Epcs is the presence of rationality in 'Epw;.

Thus, concludes Socrates in step six, both desire and love are of what one does not have, of what one is not, and of what one lacks. This is consistent, because as we have seen, both "Epco and e&irLQt desire, and one desires what one lacks. This conclusion, then, concerns only the fundamental similarity between "Epto and Our?LEa Socrates does not state explicitly the difference between these terms. That remains the enterprise of the reader.

In the summary of his discussion with Agathon, Socrates ceases 22 Plato, Symposium, 200b. 23 Ibid., 200d. '4 Ibid., 200d8.

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mentioning both 'Ep; and krOupia and concludes exclusively concerning "Epw. This is because the stated topic of conversation is 'Epcoc not C'Ovudca. We have learned about &7rLOutLm too in this discussion, as well as about cpOEm, but the explicit purpose in the context of the Symposium has been to determine certain things about "Epco;. We have learned that "Epoj is always directed towards an object, and that its object is always something that it lacks.

In the context of these remarks about the nature of 'Epwq in the Symposium, we have seen the necessity of making a more complex distinction between three related but different terms: C7LOu['to, 'Epo;, and cptXM. Let me try to sum up in a coherent fashion the distinctions which have so far emerged. 'EmtOu[da we know to be the lowest faculty of the soul, the brute desire to possess what one lacks. 'Epco; also desires, but unlike mLOutita, which only desires, 'Epwo both desires and loves. The difference between 'Epo and ?tLOu,u(a, then must lie in this "and loves." I have suggested that the qualitative difference between 'Epco& and 'r=Ouda( lies in the presence of rationality in 'Epwg. In its purest form, the modification of the desire for possession by rationality or contemplation is y&X6. The aspect of "Epws and ctoc is thus a rational or contemplative aspect which is usually accompanied by desire.

I propose now to cite several passages both in the Symposium and in other dialogues, in which the thesis that there is a distinction between L7tOUi.to, "Ep&g and ytEa, and that the distinction hinges on the presence and degree of reason in each, is borne out. At the same time I shall begin to suggest certain philosophic consequences which follow therefrom.

To take the "ascent passage" of the Symposium first; in that passage we are presented with the erotic ascent of a lover and potential philosopher from the love of one beautiful body, through the love of all physical beauty, through the love of increasingly higher objects, to the love of the beauty of knowledge, and finally to the love of Beauty itself. This ascent is endlessly rich with philosophic possibilities, but we must confine ourselves here to an examination of what it can tell us about the distinction between 'Epco;, mOu,i(m and ypLX(m. The first thing to notice is the first step: "It is necessary" says Diotima, "for one rightly pursuing this business to begin when he is young by pursuing beautiful bodies, and first if he is rightly led by his leader, he will love one body and in it he will beget beautiful speeches."25 25 Ibid., 210a4.

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We see here that although Plato begins the erotic ascent to philosophy on a much more concrete level than many philosophers would be willing to grant, he has still not begun at the most concrete level. For Plato has Diotima begin this ascent at what is already a fairly advanced stage of development; the young person in question has already discerned the beauty of the physical body, and picked out that quality as worthy of love. The higher level of this first step is also indicated by the manner of generation which results; the lover will generate not human children, or even sexual gratification, but "beautiful speeches" (?o6you xocXoi)) in the soul of the beloved. A prior stage of development, then, would have been an undiscerning or indiscri- minate desire for the possession of the physical body, a desire whose generative issue would have been sexual gratification, or at best (if the affair were heterosexual) human children. But what else would that desire be but &7rLOuutO ? This ascent is an ascent of "Ep&o, and therefore does not begin with the absolutely lowest level, which would be &7rOu,(ac. A complete ascent would necessitate a beginning with pure i'mOultm, or desire for the possession of a physical body, that is, for sexual intercourse. Plato has given us that beginning in an earlier ascent just prior to the present one, which was stated in terms of the desire (ZhrOudoc) for generation.26 There, the ascent began with the

lOUpd for procreation, which was characteristic even of beasts, and ascended to such higher procreations as the works of Homer and Hesiod, and the laws of Solon and Lycurgos. If we were now to juxta- pose these two ascents, we would see that the first ascent constituted the absolute beginning, whereas the beginning of the second ascent, the one now in question, already represents a certain stage of development. And what precisely is that stage? It is the stage of discriminating or reasoning capacity which our earlier analysis suggested differentiates 'Epoc from Cr&LOdcu.

It is also worth noting that the highest stage of the earlier ascent (of desire for procreation), laws and politics (exemplified by Solon and Lycurgus) ,27 is but a middle level in the more famous ascent of the love of beauty.28 Whatever the deeper reasons for this, it reveals that m7rOu[Aoc and 'Ep&4 overlap, but 'Ep(o has higher manifestations than does 'LmOu[da, in particular the two highest steps on the philosophic ascent, love of knowledge (popOL,a6E) and love of Beauty 26 Ibid., 207-210. 27 Ibid., 209d. 28 Ibid., 210c.

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Itself (ypXoaopc). This was indicated in our analysis by the fact that 'Ep&o and C'=Ouda both desire - this is where they overlap - yet the reasoning ability of which "Epwg is capable makes it higher.

A look at the transitions in the erotic ascent to Beauty Itself again shows the involvement of reason and "Epcoq. For the redirection of one's "Ep&o from one step to another, for instance from the love of one beautiful body to the love of all physical beauty, is accomplish- ed when one realizes (VVonamV rO)29 that the beauty of all physical things is related. Thus the ascent of "Epcog, the redirection of one's 'Epwg on increasingly worthy objects, is possible because of the increased presence of reason in "Ep&o.

In the last two steps of the ascent, the love of all knowledge, and the love of Beauty Itself, one's "Ep&; has become so imbued with reason that it is more properly called (cpLoc, indeed, the pL?Wa for aop6x. For in the next to the last step, the love of the beauty of all knowledge (ZhUaTn[), the aspirant is partaking "in unencumbered philosophy" (v pXoaoptoc aOp06v),30 and of course, in the last step, the glimpse of Beauty Itself, one is at the level of philosophy too. This also supports the results of our earlier analysis; the difference between "Ep&g and cpcao is one of degree. And the degree in question is the degree of reason which is present in one's "Ep&g. Thus the ''ascent passage" is entirely consistent with the results of our earlier analysis, both in regard to the order of the hierarchy (efLQu[dc-'Epwq- ypaLXL) and in regard to the principle of differentiation: the presence and degree of reason.

My thesis also finds ample support in Plato's other great dialogue on 'Ep&o, the Phaedrus. To take the "negative way" first; in the speech of Lysias, and more importantly, in the first speech of Socrates for which he must later offer a recantation, "Ep(o4 is indeed identified with ehnNu,i.. He "defines" "Epcog in this speech as "irrational desire" (' &veu Xoyou ebtLOtdo)31 which, far from inspiring one to philosophy as the Symposium suggests, rather prevents both the lover and his beloved from pursuing "divine philosophy."32 It is clear throughout these first two speeches that "Epc is interpreted, and censured, as irrational and harmful sexual lust, or ehr&tLta. This is why both speeches advocate that one avoid relationships with lovers. Yet Socrates 29 Ibid., 210b. 20 Ibid., 210d6. al Plato, Phaedrus, 238b7. 32 Ibid., 239b.

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insists that he make a recantation for this speech because it was a "sin against 'Epw,"33 the sort of thing one would expect to hear from sailors who had never experienced any higher love.34 Clearly then, this interpretation of "Epwg is to be rejected.

The more positive statement of the nature and function of the soul's 'Epwq in Socrates' second speech offers even stronger support for my thesis. There the famous charioteer image is presented; the soul is likened to a team of horses and a charioteer. The black, ugly, unmanageable horse, it is usually agreed, represents desire, or entOu[LEo. The handsome white horse, more obedient to the orders of the charioteer, represents spirit (Ouli6q). The distinction between 'Epw; and kn&Ou[Aa. is clear from the outset; ?shOur.ta, represented by the black horse, is the lowest and most unruly faculty of the soul, a constant danger to its higher functions. 'Epcoq, however, is divine madness which pervades the whole soul. Indeed, one crucial difference between 'Epw~ and inOuti?M is the relation of each to the charioteer, reason. 'En&sL'o.c, the black horse, resists and disobeys the charioteer whenever possible.35 'Ep&o, on the contrary, finds its fulfillment (in philosophy) only when the charioteer is in proper command. Per- vading the whole soul, "Epwq contains in its nature desire, spirit, and reason. But its fulfillment requires that the reason which is part of its nature exhibit its presence and control over its ?tnLOU[.da 36 This should be sufficient to show that it is only when reason is sufficiently present and active in 'Ep&q that 'Epw; can achieve its highest manifestation, in philosophy. Remembering that at this highest manifestation, "Epcos is indeed a cpLXEa, we can see that this passage alsois consistent with the distinction, however slight, between "Epwq and

tEoc, a distinction of which Plato indicates he is aware at Phaedrus 255e, where the young beloved mistakes his feelings of "Ep&g for cpLXt. Thus all the distinctions which we found present in the Sym- posium are also present in the Phaedrus; 'Epco, kbrOupdo, and cpLtX are all differentiated, and the principle of differentiation is the presence and degree of reason.

I wish now to turn briefly to the Republic where support is also present for my view. It will be remembered that one stage in my

88 Ibid., 242e4. 84 Ibid., 243c5. 85 Ibid., 253e, 254a, 254c, el. al. Il This is a constant theme throughout the speech. See especially the remark of of Socrates at 256a8.

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argument from the Symposium concerned the introduction of the term "PoueafxL" which was to be distinguished from ?UL#OuLCZV and which pointed the way to 4p&v.37 The distinction between ?7rVrLOUZV and poUAeaOaL is indicated in the Republic at 437b-c, where Socrates is establishing the tripartite division of the soul. He wants to show that desire (e7tOu[L(a) is one of these parts, and in so doing says, "What then, said I, of thirst and hunger and the desires generally, and again (my italics) willing and wishing..." (-r[ ou'v; jv 8'y6')c aLt4v xalJ~ 7t?lVmV XMt 6X,( e'7r& OUtL'M XOcdt x5 'r T O XeLv xaL 'rs po,a...) My point here is that by distinguishing the desires (k e'7vOu[Eoc;) from wishing ('r6 PouieaOoc), indeed emphasizing the distinction by the use of "and again" (xot oa5), we see that that distinction is held consistently in this dialogue too.38 Again, this by way of support for the difference between 'Epw and ehr&u,uL, Socrates at 438a is satis- fying Glaucon that desire, qua desire, is only of its object, with no further qualifications. He warns Glaucon, "'Let no one then,' said I, 'disconcert us when off our guard with the objection that everybody desires not drink but good drink (4g oC8clg 7noTro5 &ntLOu"Zt &X X p ro'roo3) and not food but good food because all men desire good (7r6iv'T? yip &pa -r&v &yaxO&v ln&rOto5atv) and so if thirst is desire it would be of good drink or of good whatsoever it is; and so similarly of other desires."' "8

Since hrrLu.Ltca is not to be understood as discriminating between objects as to their goodness, it must surely be differentiated from 'Epus which in the Symposium is defined as "of the eternal possession of the good."40

Finally, to point to one of the so-called "earlier dialogues," the Charmides offers appropriate support for some of the distinctions I have drawn.4" At Charmides 167e, Socrates is concerned to call into question the possibility that wisdom should have no subject matter of its own, but rather be "the science of sciences." To repudiate this,

87 Above, pp. 38-39. 38 On the other hand, see Republic 439a9, where Socrates uses Po6Xvrau as virtually synonymous with kn&Outet, where the subtle distinction between them is not important. 39 Translation is that of Paul Shorey. See also 439a-b. 40 Plato, Symposium, 206a. Notice that at Symposium 205a, Diotima, by way of correcting Aristophanes, asserts that people will even cut off a part of themselves if they think it will bring them good. 41 I wish to thank David Gallop for pointing out these passages to me. The interpretation of them presented here is of course my own responsibility.

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he cites several parallel cases where, he suspects, the implausibility wil be obvious. Three of these examples are especially relevant to the present problem, for they again indicate a consistent maintenance of the relevant distinctions on Plato's part. Socrates says at 167e, "Could there be any desire (7rt0upAm) which is not the desire of any pleasure, but of itself and of all other desires? Certainly not. Or can you imagine a wish (Po0X7atq) which wishes (Ao6XrcxL) for no good, but only for itself and all other wishes? I should answer no. Or would you say that there is a love (fpcom) which is not the love of beauty, but of itself and of other loves? I should not."'2

We notice first that the three terms are distinguished, supporting the thesis of this paper. But the way in which they are distinguished, namely, according to their objects, is also significant. The object of

&vutAa is pleasure. This differentiates it from 'Epcos both in this dialogue and in Socrates' speech in the Symposiun. Significantly enough, the object of "Epcos is the Charmides is beauty (sor xocX6v) whereas that of Pou'-aL is the good (ro6 &yaO6v). In the Symposium both Agathon and the young Socrates begin with the view that 'Epco;' object is the beautiful but are corrected by Diotima, who shows that 'Ept' true object is the good." Perhaps we could say that this transition was prefigured by the transition which I treated earlier" from ?7mOlutoA to 'Epco;, where these two terms were mediated, as it were, by ,Bou')CGaO, whose object, we learn now in the Charmides, is the good. If so, we see again the remarkable consistency with which Plato used these important terms.

Still further, we see again that one consequence of the different objects of Oupidcx and Pou'i)Xa (pleasure and the good) is that PoUA-mLq requires, over and above the simple desire for the object, the deliberative ability wherewith to assess that its object is good, once again supporting the distinction drawn earlier between these two terms.46

Such is the evidence I wish to put forward for the hierarchical distinction between brLOu,da, 'Epus, and cpara based on the degree and presence of reason. Some of the consequences of this view for the

4I Translation is that of Jowett. 48 Plato, Symposium, 205-206a. 44 Above, pp. 38-39. "6 That the object of 'Epws also involves this deliberative ability is supported by a general consideration of Socrates's speech in the Symposium, but especially by the correction mentioned above, that 'Epcw most proper object is really the good.

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Symposium, and in particular for the important "ascent passage", I have already noted. I would like to conclude by suggesting a far more pervasive consequence. If Plato is indeed suggesting, as I maintain, that reason is not merely occasionally interrelated with, but indeed part of the very nature of "Epcoq, as opposed to desire, then he forces us to reconsider the notion, popular in his day as it is today, that love is necessarily and unambiguously in the realm of the irrational. By extension he forces us to reconsider such clear- cut distinctions in Greek thought as Nietzsche popularized between the Dionysian and the Apollonian. Finally by lifting 'Ep&o from the realm of "irrational feeling," Plato avoids the rather bizarre consequence that philosophy, which is after all a species of love, would, while standing as the champion of rationality, have its base in the utterly, exclusively, irrational. As Nietzsche himself said in Thus Spoke Zarathustra: "True, we love life, not because we are used to living but because we are used to loving. There is always some madness in love. But there is always some reason in madness."46

46 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, translated by Walter Kaufmann in The Portable Nietzsche, Viking Press, New York, page 153.

Trinty College, Hartford, Connecticut.

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Article Contentsp. 32p. 33p. 34p. 35p. 36p. 37p. 38p. 39p. 40p. 41p. 42p. 43p. 44p. 45p. 46

Issue Table of ContentsPhronesis, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1968), pp. 1-90Front MatterPlatons 'Ungeschriebenen Lehren': der Vortrag 'ber das Gute' [pp. 1-31], , and in Plato [pp. 32-46]ber den Erkenntnisbegriff in Platons "Theaitet" [pp. 47-67]The Role of Medical and Biological Analogies in Aristotle's Ethics [pp. 68-83]Individual and Collective Virtues in the "Republic" [pp. 84-87]A Note on "De Anima" 412b19-20 [pp. 88-89]Back Matter

Phronesis Volume 13 issue 1 1968 [doi 10.2307%2F4181805] Drew A. Hyland -- ῎Ερως, ᾿Επιθυμία, and Φιλία in Plato

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