Phronesis Volume 28 Issue 1 1983 [Doi 10.2307%2F4182166] Harold Tarrant -- Middle Platonism and the Seventh Epistle

Middle Platonism and the Seventh EpistleAuthor(s): Harold TarrantSource: Phronesis, Vol. 28, No. 1 (1983), pp. 75-103Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182166 .

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Middle Platonism and the Seventh Epistle

HAROLD TARRANT

There is little excuse for new discussions of the authenticity of the Seventh Epistle unless substantial new evidence or new arguments can be produced. Moreover such evidence must come from outside the Corpus Platonicum, as should be evident from the following considerations:

(i) The interpretation of late Plato can differ so markedly from one scholar to the next that there is no chance of agreement as to the central features of late Platonic theory and attitude, with which the Epistle, if genuine, would have to conform. (ii) There is no shortage of 'inconsistencies' (on the surface at least) within the body of works acknowledged to be genuine; thus apparent inconsistencies between the Epistle and the Dialogues prove little. (iii) There would seem to be a certain community of feeling between ancient Platonists in general, such that, even if the Epistle were entirely compatible with the Dialogues, this would prove no more than that it was composed by a Platonist who understood Plato well. (iv) The Epistles belong to a different genre from the Dialogues, and thus may be expected to show some stylistic differences. (v) There is no agreement as to the existence of any genuine Epistles with which the Seventh may be compared.

For most philosophers and historians of ideas the chief concern is the authenticity or otherwise of the philosophical digression (c.340-345c), which might conceivably have been written and added by a second writer. In this case the difficulties become particularly restrictive, for it is difficult to imagine much evidence outside the Corpus Platonicum which could help one. Naturally if one could confidently reject the Epistle as a whole, then one could reject the digression with similar confidence; but it appears that there is no conclusive evidence leading one either to reject or to accept the main body of the work. I accept neither the view that a work (particularly a letter) has to be attributed to its purported author until it is proved spurious; nor that it should be regarded as spurious until authenticity is demonstrated.1 We must accept that the historian of ancient ideas examines issues on which proof is often impossible; he must often adopt the 'likely story' or suspend judgement. It is pointless to dogmatize about the unknown.

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I quote from a footnote of the late W.K.C. Guthrie:2

Throughout the literature one is baffled by the way in which Dr. A will recognize unmistakably 'the hand of the Master' in passages which to Dr. B are trivial and quite unworthy of P. To carry on the game, I am in this case on the side of Dr. A: no one but P could or would have written like this, and the passage gives us no less than his own attempt to compress into a few pages the essence of his later philosophy.

Regrettably I must agree with Guthrie about the way in which the authenticity-game is played, and I see in his personal contribution towards it a challenge to those who reject the digression to show us some other writer who could have forged it. I intend to take up this challenge later in my paper, and to side with Dr. B, in spite of my full awareness that there are many who have based their judgements upon a far deeper understanding of Plato than I might hope to acquire. Among them I include (Dr. As) K. von Fritz, M. Isnardi Parente, J. Stenzel, and Guthrie himself,3 and (Dr. Bs) L. Edelstein and N. Gulley.4 In particular I have acquired less feeling for Platonic expression than C. Ritter, who was first to athetize the digression while accepting the bulk of the Epistle.5

My sole excuse for writing is new 'evidence', acquired accidentally and pertaining only to the digression; put briefly, my argument is that there was a time when Platonism knew the Epistle but did not know the digression. This will be recognized as an argument ex silentio, but let me state now that it operates at the most conclusive level possible for such arguments. It proves nothing to note that early Middle Platonism, including Plutarch, never makes use of the digression; it proves little to add the observation that the rest of the Epistle was well enough known, and that there was wide use of the Platonic Corpus in general; it does approach to proof when one shows that the digression was not used in spite of its obvious relevance to some pressing issues of early Middle Platonism; but the highest degree of ex silentio proof is reached when one is able to show passages in Plutarch and others where the digression, had it been known, would certainly have been used. I shall attempt to show such passages, and I believe that this will offer substantial reasons for concluding that the digression is a very late addition to the text, made to some influential copy before A.D. 175, perhaps as early as the first century B.C., probably at Alexandria. I hope to be able to show how the philosophy of the digression agrees with the Platonism of its time of composition. This would perhaps explain why the digression is comparatively highly regarded in Europe.6

Standard literature on the Seventh Epistle notes that the first obvious reference to the work appears in Cicero;7 equally it fails to note where the first obvious reference to the digression occurs. This is a serious omission

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now that statistical evidence has suggested to some writers that the digression is by a separate hand.8 I do not claim to be able to offer the first example of an ancient author's use of the digression, but I can perhaps make some significant observations:

(i) Passages used to demonstrate Cicero's knowledge of the Epistle do not demonstrate his knowledge of the digression.

(ii) I have not noticed any obvious allusion to the digression in Philo Judaeus, nor is any parallel with the digression mentioned in Colson's notes to the Loeb text or in Leisegang's index to the Cohn-Wendland edition.9 Both these sources makes it plain that Philo alludes to a wide range of other Platonic works.

(iii) R.M. Jones has collected a large number of parallels between Plato and Plutarch;'0 many parallels with Epistle VII are naturally found in the Life of Dion; parallels with Epistles III (315c), IV (321 b), and XIII (360d) are found at Mor. 36c, 808d, and 467cd/474e/533b. Nowhere is any parallel with Ep. VII 338a-345c3 to be found.

(iv) While there was debate among early Middle Platonists about which classes of things had Ideas, the commonest view (see Didascalicus 9 [p. 163.22-27 Hermann]) excluded at least one class of things for which the digression had postulated Ideas, i.e. manufactured objects (cf. 342d5). It is remarkable that Platonists, like the doxographical tradition," were ready to ignore so explicit a statement of Plato's position on this issue as that of the digression.'2

It is in the second half of the second century A.D. that the digression appears to be playing a greater part. I suspect its influence on Numenius fr. 14 (des Places),'3 and c. 175 the Platonist Celsus did use the 'true account' of the digression (cf. 342a3-4) in an anti-Christian polemic entitled (significantly?) 'True Account'14 There is reason for suspecting that Justin Martyr was alluding to the digression at Dial. 4.1,15 dating from within a decade of A.D. 160. Thereafter references and allusions to the digression are found in many authors.

Let me state now that I am not intending to argue that the digression dates from the period immediately preceding Numenius, Justin, and Celsus. I do not wish to exclude the possibility that it was written in the second quarter of the second century until I see evidence that it was known before that, but it could have been in existence a long time before it came to Platonists' attention. As we shall see shortly, I think it likely that its date of composition was earlier than Plutarch, though not early enough to have become part of the text usually used by Plutarch. The remarkable thing is not that the digression should have remained unknown for a time, but

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rather that it should have found its way into all texts in due course. I have reservations as to whether this could have occurred unless the digression was already present in the influential edition of the works by Thrasyllus in the early first century A.D., or, if not original to the Thrasyllan edition, was incorporated into a prime copy of that edition at an early date. This copy might soon come to have influence in the region where it was located (presumably Alexandria or Rome), but it would probably take considerable time for copies of it to reach other parts. When it did so, the compatibility of the digression with Middle Platonic ideas would have led to its acceptance as genuinely Platonic, and thus it would have ensured its insertion into local texts too.

Let us ask ourselves next where we should have expected references to the digression during the Middle Platonic period. It would seem logical to begin with Cicero, who first shows acquaintance with the main body of the Epistle. There is little evidence of detailed Platonic interpretation in Cicero, but in the A cademica we do encounter a debate on epistemology in which both sides claimed the authority of Plato. The debate emerged from the conflict between Philo of Larissa and Antiochus of Ascalon which had surfaced in 87 B.C., and much of the material probably derives from Antiochus' Sosus, his reply to Philo's Roman books of 88/7 B.C. There are good reasons why the Philonian position should have appealed to the digression if it had been known. It would have offered substantial reasons for continuing to reject all mechanical theories of the acquisition of certain knowledge (342e2-343e 1), giving considerable justification for the traditional Academic uncertainty when it states that difficulties "fill each man, as it were, with all unclarity and perplexity" (343c4-5). But at the same time it would have allowed the Philonians, who ought not to be regarded as genuine sceptics,16 and who sought to teach positively (if esoterically)'7 as much testimony shows,18 justification for (a) stating the obvious concerning everyday matters (see 343c5-8),'9 and (b) believing that some obscure cognition-process is available to the truth-seeker,20 if not from the senses or from Stoic 'cataleptic presentations'.21 Reference to the Platonic Ideas in the digression would not have embarrassed the Philonians, who were aware that Plato's 'truth' belonged to the realm of the mind (Cic. Ac. 2.142, cf. Antiochians at 1.30-32), for the digression is discreetly silent about the nature of the Ideas, and even avoids their usual names: the Idea is simply 'the Fifth' (342a8 etc.). The Philonians would have approved of the digression's denial that the true intellectual could ever write about the most important aspects of his philosophy (34lb-d, 344cd).22 They would also have approved of the digression's emphasis on

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the student's need to find out for himself (34 1c5-e3, cf. Cic. Ac. 2.60). They might also have utilized its criticism of the pupil who prematurely and inaccurately reveals what he has heard from his master (341a8-c4), for Antiochus of Ascalon could plausibly have been included among such persons.

Indeed this digression would have suited Philo so well, that I have had to suggest that it could have been forged to suit his purposes.23 I do not actually believe that it was forged by him or for him, but I strongly suspect that it was forged to support a broadly Philonian position at a later date. There is no surviving evidence that Philo was aware of it, in spite of its relevance to his position, and if it had ever been a key passage for Philo, then it would have become a key passage for Cicero, his pupil.24

Even if Philo did not collect individual passages from the Platonic Corpus to support his fallibilist view of Plato, we must note that other more extreme 'sceptics' did make such a collection to support the 'sceptic' view of Plato. Not only did they make extensive use of the Theaetetus,25 they also extracted arguments for a sceptic view from the Timaeus,26 Phaedo,27 Phaedrus,28 and early aporetic works like the Euthyphro, Charnides, and Lysis.29 Since it seems to have been the Pyrrhonians who made the principal collection of such arguments30 (if not in an attempt to show Plato to be a Pyrrhonist),31 one assumes that final details of the collection do not antedate the first century B.C., the usual date for the activities of Aenesidemus.32 Indeed there are signs that the collection was made by Aenesidemus himself.33 If Aenesidemus (?) had known of the digression I find it difficult to believe that he would not have extracted an argument for non-apprehensibility (&xotrAXri4xa) from it, in particular from its insistence that men are confused by their inability to penetrate beyond the qualities of a thing to the nature of the thing itself (342e-343c).

When we come to the anonymous Commentary on the Theaetetus, recently redated by myself to the second half of the first century B.C.,34 the apparent lack of influence of the digression becomes more noticeable; for even within the surviving pages the author gives a reasonably clear picture of his approach to Platonic epistemology. For him the Meno and the Theaetetus are the key epistemological works. The fallibilism of Philo of Larissa is still in evidence,35 as is a mild esotericism.36 The Platonic method of teaching is now clearly regarded as a process of soliciting from within an internal revelation, not the passing on of doctrines from teacher to pupil.37

Positive Platonic thinking is much more in evidence than in anything which survives of Philo of Larissa (as it needs to be in a Platonic commentary), and the Ideas play a background role. The digression of the

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Seventh Epistle, often known as the 'epistemological digression', could thus easily have been utilized by the author. A more detailed comparison will follow shortly.

There is room for disagreement as to whether Philo Judaeus, had he known the digression, would have made use of it; indeed it is unclear whether he even knew the Epistles at all.38 If he did not, then it is fairly clear that they were not then known as a source for Platonic doctrine, as Philo seems to have studied the rest of the Corpus Platonicum extensively.39 If he did know them, he could surely have used the digression to good effect. He himself places emphasis in several passages on the difficulties of attaining real knowledge,40 but seeks to justify confidence in his own teachings through belief in a revelation from above.41 This agrees well enough with the digression. But does it agree with the esotericism of the digression? The revelation is not such as cannot be expressed in words; indeed it was revealed by Moses. Yes, but Moses revealed it in riddles so that it required allegorical interpretation. On the whole the esotericism of the digression might have appealed to Philo rather than disconcerting him. And in view of his interest in the Platonic revelation as seen in the myth of the Phaedrus,42 it may seem surprising that he ignores the revelation- process described in the digression (343e-344c).

We have seen that early Middle Platonism in general did not heed the digression when deciding to reject Ideas of manufactured objects as seen at Didascalicus 9 (p. 163. 22-27 Hermann). The Didascalicus itself naturally follows the usual view, and seems unaware of any explicit statement of Plato's which could contradict that view. If the author were offering his own philosophy it would be less surprising that Plato's direct statement of his own position at 342d5 has been ignored; but the work is supposedly a compendium of Plato's own doctrines, and intends only to unearth the beliefs upon which the Dialogues are founded, not to present an original Platonist system. That the author does not know the digression is both a possible and a natural conclusion. The Index Platonicus of P. Louis offers over 15 columns of Platonic Parallels,43 drawn from all genuine Dialogues other than Hippias Ma, and Mi., Menexenus, Apology, and Crito, as well as from Theages, Axiochus, Definitions, On Virtue, and Sisyphus. Naturally one cannot expect much mention of the Epistles in a work on Plato's doctrines, but one might expect some reference to the digression of Epistle VII seeing that it gives a clear and concise statement of doctrine.

Louis' note 499 (to Didasc. 34.2) points to a possible parallel with Ep. VII 326ab in conjunction with Republic 473cd, but only note 481 purports to offer a parallel with the digression (340d). Louis says of the word ilXE-

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xpwa[?vov at Didasc. 33 (p. 187.13-14 Hermann) "expression emprunt6e A la Lettre VII, 340d", but it is the word alone and not the context that might be thought to be evidence of borrowing. Plato's "tinged superficially with opinions" and the expression in Didasc. 33 "tinged superficially, as it were, by virtue" hardly require to be related historically. In Middle Platonist times the verb 'rTLXp.wvvvIL was common enough, being found in Lucian,44 Plutarch (Mor. 395e, cf. 382c), Rufus Medicus (Anat. 30), Pollux (VII, 129), and Plotinus (4.5.7, 5.6.4). I do not know of any other use of the word before the time of Plutarch, except at Ep. VII 340d - if even that precedes Plutarch. There is certainly no use of it in such authors as Polybius, Philodemus, and Philo Judaeus. Thus its appearance in both the digression and the Didascalicus is more likely to spring from the proximity of their dates of composition than from a conscious borrowing on the part of the author of the latter.

It thus remains possible that the author of the Didascalicus did not know the digression even though he knew nearly all the Corpus Platonicum. The non-appearance of material from the digression is noteworthy not only in the section on Ideas, but also in the comparatively detailed sections on theory of knowledge (chapter 4) and on assimilation to God (chapter 28); for 344a brought out the connection between becoming virtuous, becoming wise, and becoming like the object of wisdom - connexions which Didasc. 28 (p. 182. 2-7 Hermann) insists on, and which had been foreshadowed in its principal source for the doctrine, Theaetetus 1 76a-c.

The importance of the Didascalicus lies in its adherence to the teachings of contemporary school-Platonism, without any real effort to be original. It uses those passages of Plato which would normally have been used, perhaps with some additions but with very few subtractions. Well-known passages of Plato could not suddenly fall into oblivion, and were almost certain to surface in such a work as this. The digression failed to surface here; therefore it was not well-known at the time.45

Our most important evidence for contemporary ignorance of the digression is found in Plutarch, a man whose knowledge of the Epistles in general cannot be disputed, and who accepted their authenticity without qualms.46 He alone, of genuine Middle Platonists, has left us a considerable body of writings in whose pages numerous Platonic allusions occur. He has left us the Life of Dion, in which he sometimes makes appeal to the words of the Seventh Epistle.47 Naturally Plutarch's great interest in Plato, and in the interactions between Plato and other men of importance, has led him to introduce much material on Plato that most historians of the period or biographers of Dion would not have found relevant.48 But Jones was

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unable to point to any parallels between the Life and that part of the Epistle between 338a and 345c (see n. 10). The Bud6 text sees parallels with material between 338c and 339c in Dion 18.3-7, but points to no obvious borrowing between 339c and 345c.49 It does admittedly refer to 341b-e ('par exemple') in relation to Dion 14.3 (To GLW?I(4LCVOV &ya0ov CTELv), but that section does not make the identification between the object(s) of Plato's esoteric philosophy and the Good, and Plutarch had no need to learn of Plato's reluctance to speak in detail about the Good from the Epistle. He could surely recall Aristoxenus' report of the connexion between the Good and the 'unwritten doctrines' (Harm. 2.30-31, Meibom), and he had sufficient evidence of Plato's reluctance to discuss the matter in Rep. 506b8-el. Indeed I imagine that Plato's reluctance to reveal the full details of his system was notorious in Plutarch's time, and one of the chief connexions which Plutarch made between Platonic and New Academic practice.50

One must therefore ask why it is that Plutarch failed to mention Plato's experience of teaching Dionysius and of the latter's ill-judged publication of Plato's doctrine, as described in the digression. I cannot accept the answer that it was not relevant to Dion's life, for Plutarch obviously found the part played by Plato of considerable significance to the critical relations between Dion and Dionysius; or at very least he thought that they tho- roughly deserved a digression. Plutarch could have made capital out of Dionysius' inability or unwillingness to grasp the true meaning of Platonic philosophy. The fact that he does not do so is most readily explained by his ignorance of c.340-345c3. His failure to take account of the digression in two significant discussions on epistemology in the Moralia adds to our suspicions.51

It is not, however, anything to do with Plutarch's epistemology which leads me to the conclusion that the Moralia too show him to have been ignorant of the digression. It is rather two passages, one from the De E apud Delphos and the other from the De Defectu Oraculorum, where Plutarch indulges in lengthy discussions about five-fold elements in Plato's thought. Besides such obvious passages as the Megista Gene episode of the Sophist (254d ff) and the Classification of Goods in the Philebus (66a-c), he brings in the ontological classification of Philebus 23c ff (which is not even obviously five-fold), the five regular solids of the Timaeus (53c-55c), and the suggestion in the same work that if there were not one world there might be five (55d2).52 Plutarch has omitted by far the most striking five-fold classification of the Platonic Corpus - the classification of the 'things to do with knowledge' in the digression (342a7 fl). This

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classification actually has its five-fold nature highlighted by the use of the term 'the fifth' for the Platonic Idea throughout, and could have been used in the De E with far more effect than passages actually used (particularly Phil. 23c ff). Its omission there is striking. In the De Defectu its omission is less striking, owing to the fact that the discussion evolves from the question of how many worlds there are; but even there the Megista Gene have crept in (428c) as has the sum of Plato's four elements + soul (422f-423a).

In view of the importance of the De E it would be well to list some of the five-fold classifications which were introduced by Plutarch in propria per- sona in support of a numerical interpretation of the puzzling Delphic E. I confine myself to the material which follows the introduction of Plato at 389f: (a) 389f, the Timaeus and the possibility of 5 worlds (b) 389f-390a, Aristotle's fifth element or 'fifth substance' (c) 390a, the five regular solids of the Timaeus (d) 390b, the five senses (sometimes assigned to 5 elements) (e) 390c, Homer's division of the world into 5 (f) 390c-e, point-line-plane-solid-soul (g) 390e, God-demon-hero-man-beast (h) 390f, Aristotle's five-fold psychology, with Platonist emendations (i) 391 b, Megista Gene (j) 391bc, Phil. 23cff (k) 391cd, Phil. 66aff

In so varied a list, designed purely to illustrate that five is a specially potent number, and with its strong Platonist colouring, there is no doubt that the classification of Ep. VII 342a7 ff would have had a place if Plutarch had thought of it. How significant, then, is the fact that he did not think of it?

If the praise of the number five in the De E had been an isolated phenomenon, then I should have been willing to accept that Plutarch could have forgotten a seemingly important piece of evidence. But the passage from the De Genio confirms to us that its sister-passage was no mere ad hoc assemblage of passages demonstrating the potency of five. The material had at some stage been assembled with considerable care and interest, probably before Plutarch's time. Plutarch came to take an interest in such investigations as a result of his curiosity concerning the Delphic E, as is shown by the mention of the E in the De Genio also (426f). Similarly there is no doubt that Plutarch was fascinated by the notion of five Platonic worlds somehow corresponding to the five regular solids, a topic which had been discussed with some ingenuity by Theodorus of Soli before him

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(427a ff).53 Thus any evidence for the potency of the number five in Plato's works would have been carefully noted and committed to memory by a reader like Plutarch. He has collected so much trifling material on the number five (e.g. De E 387e-388e, 389c-f, De Defectu 429d-430a) that he could scarcely have judged the passage from the digression (342a7 ff) as anything less than critical.

That my arguments for Plutarch's ignorance of the digression are somewhat unusual I do not question. For this reason I suspect that they will not hastily be accepted. But when the issue has been carefully considered for some time, and with due consideration for Plutarch's philosophical leanings, his personal interests, and his objectives in writing, I suspect that others too will recognize that it is most unlikely that Plutarch knew the digression at the time of writing the Life of Dion, De E apud Delphos, and De Defectu Oraculorum. His ignorance of the digression would confirm what one already had cause to suspect: that the digression was little known in the early Middle Platonist period. If that suspicion is correct, then it is highly probable that the digression was forged during that period.

The Plutarchian treatises De E and De Defectu are again of great importance in revealing a motive for such a forgery. There was great interest in any possible significance of the number five for Plato. We do not have to confine our attention to Plutarch here, for that interest is confirmed rather earlier in Seneca's Ep. 65.7-10, where Plato is depicted as adding a fifth cause to Aristotle's four: the paradigmatic cause. Here then is a passage, however different from the epistemological classification of the digression (342a7 ff), which also makes the Idea a 'fifth'. The other letter of Seneca in which he discusses Plato's metaphysics in detail (58.16-24), though dividing the real into six Platonic senses, might also be connected with the interest in Plato's use of five-fold division, for the first use given is the generic use, and this is followed by five specific uses in hierarchical order; thus the underlying metaphysic seems to be five-fold rather than six-fold.

Elsewhere in Middle Platonism one may find lists of five names applied to God,54 or indications of an underlying five-fold metaphysic.55 But overt signs of an interest in Plato's use of five-fold classification is dying after Plutarch. If we concentrate on the first century A.D., however, it would seem that the evidence is clearer, in particular in the Platonizing Pytha- gorean Moderatus. E.R. Dodds long ago drew attention to a five-fold ontology in Moderatus,56 and was able to link this with considerable plausibility to early interpretation of the five57 positive hypotheses of Plato's Parmenides.58 Moderatus seems to have assumed that these five

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hypotheses presented five esoteric pictures of Pythagorico-Platonic ontology, depicting (a) a supreme One above Being,59 (b) a second One identified with the really real and the intelligible, (c) the realm of the soul, which partook of the One and the Ideas, (d) the sensible world, which reflected the Ideas, and (e) matter, which was not-real and deprived of all form.

It seems to me that a five-fold metaphysic of God, Intelligibles, Soul/ Mathematicals, Sensible bodies, and Matter is also in evidence in Plu- tarch's treatment of the Posidonian interpretation of the Platonic World- Soul at Mor. 1023bc. I hesitate to trace the metaphysic back to Posidonius, but am more confident that it was to be found in Eudorus, the likely source of most of Plutarch's material on earlier interpretations.60 Let us note that Eudorus was also the first thinker we know of to have taken an interest in seeing esoteric Pythagorizing teachings behind the positive hypotheses of the Parmenides,61 and that he is the first we know of to have made use of the five-fold classification of Goods at Phil. 66a-c.62 There is, I suggest, a plausible case for seeing early Middle-Platonic interest in an esoteric significance of the number five and of five-fold division in Plato as having originated with Eudorus; perhaps Theodorus' interest in the five worlds of the Timaeus had anticipated him,63 but I know of no way of dating Theodorus relative to Eudorus. And I have doubts as to whether his interests went far beyond the five worlds and five regular solids of the Timaeus.

Now one might anticipate the objection that if some early Middle Platonist had attached great significance to the number five and to five- fold classification in Plato, then we might have expected to hear rather more about this; we might have expected to see evidence of some good reason leading to such an attitude. If he thought he had discovered some underlying key to the interpretation of later Plato, why was this good news not immediately spread abroad? The answer is surely obvious. Any Platonist, thinking he had discovered something esoteric in Plato, something meant to be confined to the school, might feel that he had an obligation to confine his discoveries to within his school. It might also have been to his advantage, in respect of both income and prestige, if he could encourage outside belief to expect exciting revelations within his school. One might expect reflections of the inner doctrines in such a Platonist's exoteric work, together with propaganda explaining the secrecy proper to the core of Platonic doctrine.

That such secrecy surrounded the early Middle Platonic schools is little less than certain. When one considers the case of Eudorus of Alexandria

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one is able to observe that there is a strange lack of significant doctrine attributed to him in our sources. There is plenty of material relating to his explanations of the doctrines of others,64 some of it giving us important clues as to his own doctrines.65 But we have nothing to inform us directly of Eudorus' own metaphysical system; nor have we any Eudoran explanations of the core of Plato's metaphysical system. Hence Eudorus remains "to us a rather shadowy figure".66 No doubt Eudorus, though he could never be described as a 'sceptic',67 adhered to the traditional Academic practice of concealing his own opinion on important philosophical questions.68 Eudorus probably determined the tone of much subsequent Platonism, such as the attitude of reluctance to commit too much to exoteric writing found in [Plutarch] De Fato.69 It is noteworthy that Eudorus seems to have seen a stable underlying core of doctrine in Plato, which revealed itself in many modes of expression; thus he surely sought for a deeper (esoteric?) significance behind Plato's words.70 Diogenes Laertius, perhaps following Thrasyllan material at 3.63,71 records the belief that Plato employed a range of different terms in order make his system unintelligible to the layman. Similar remarks are made about Plato's obscure and riddling manner of referring to his doctrines in Plutarch's De Defectu, not long before the introduction of the 5-worlds material (420f), and in Numenius, fr. 24.57-64 des Places. The anonymous Commentary on the Theaetetus sees doctrine in Plato, but asserts that it is not revealed in his 'inquiries' (59.12-21).

From this we may gather that the century or so of Platonic scholarship before Plutarch's day tended to see Plato as reluctant to give full expression to his most important beliefs. This view of Plato seems to have been accompanied by the reluctance of Platonic teachers to have their own account of Plato's core-doctrines published outside their 'schools'. Thus while various extant Middle Platonic texts suggest that there had been some central five-fold metaphysical doctrine, none (with the possible ex- ception of the fragment of Moderatus) do more than offer an insubstantial reflection of that metaphysic. The digression's five-fold epistemological classification may itself offer a carefully contrived reflection of this esoteric metaphysical doctrine in a setting where 'Plato' explains his reluctance to write openly of his key doctrines, and explains also the pitfalls of learning such doctrines at second hand.72 In accordance with the contemporary belief that Plato varied terminology to confuse the layman (D.L. 3.63) the Platonic Idea is always referred to simply as 'the Fifth', also highlighting the special significance of the number.

It is not easy to discover any more about the context in which the

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digression was composed (assuming it to be spurious), for the author clearly felt that his own doctrines should not be widely known. Moreover he clearly wanted the sentiments expressed in the digression to be read as the products of Plato's own hand, and he would thus have been reluctant to use vocabulary or ideas which could not have come from Plato himself. Furthermore he must have known Plato well, seeing that he felt he had insights into the core-doctrines of Platonic metaphysics. There would be few, if any, indications of the later date of the writer, and there would be nothing which did not originate from a thoughtful Platonist mind. There are a few relevant observations to be made about the forger's date and philosophical orientation, but one cannot expect them to be conclusive.

We may begin by noting that the author is interested in Plato's Pytha- gorean connexions. As Edelstein has noted with regard to the episode on the testing of pupils (340bl-341a7),73 "for a moment, one may think that the forger . . . believes in the closeness of the Platonic and Pythagorean schools, and ascribes to the master a method similar to the well-known method of testing the novice which the Pythagoreans applied."74 But it is rather the idea of a test itself than the actual content of it which reminds one of the Pythagoreans. Since the digression's test is said to have been particularly suitable for tyrants who already have an inaccurate idea of one's teachings (340b5-6), it is just possible that the passage had been composed by a Platonist with some experience of teaching such persons: of Academics only Nestor of Tarsus springs to mind as a possible candidate,75 but Thrasyllus himself was astrologer at Tiberius' court76 and should perhaps be associated with the Pythagorean wing of Platonism, while Arius Didymus' Platonic interests qualify him for consideration; but officially this friend of Augustus was a Stoic,77 and the author of the digression was anything but that. Only Thrasyllus strikes one as a possible forger, and he certainly had the opportunity to interpolate material into his own edition of Plato.

We are not really in a position to judge how far the digression's deep- rooted scepticism of mechanical explanations of knowledge would fit Thrasyllus. The lack of clarity and of value attributed to knowledge (EiTt-

oi-irr ) at 343bc and d8-el, which must be held to pertain also to correct opinion and intellection (vovs) on the authority of 342c (thus arousing my suspicions of spuriousness),78 indicates the author's recognition of the validity of New Academic activity; it shows some sympathy for the One- Academy thesis propounded in Philo of Larissa's Roman Books.79 It is only the author's belief in some non-mechanical revelation (341cd, 344ab) that lifts him above scepticism proper. This attitude towards knowledge

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reminds one of certain passages in Philo of Alexandria, Thrasyllus' contemporary.80 Both may have inherited similar attitudes from the Academic Eudorus of Alexandria.81

There are two significant ways in which I believe that Eudoran influence has crept into the digression: it makes great use of the 'categories' of iToLov

TL and -r (or ov, far more than one would have expected from the miserable Platonic precedent (Meno 86el, 87b3); and it seems to relate the revelation-process to the doctrine of assimilation to God, in so far as one has to be like the object revealed (344a2-4).82 Eudorus seems to have done considerable work on the categories after the awakening of interest in the Aristotelian treatise in the mid-first century B.C.,83 and it was probably he who popularized the assimilation-doctrine so that it became the standard Middle Platonic goal of life.84 In short, I believe the principal influence behind the digression was Eudorus of Alexandria, but this is insufficient reason for also believing that he wrote it. The forger is more likely to have been Thrasyllus, acting under the influence of Eudorus' interpretation of Plato.

Since I have suggested elsewhere that the Commentary on the Theaetetus is a work of Eudorus,85 a brief comparison between this work and the digression seems warranted. The extant part of the commentary has only just got as far as the first attempted definition of knowledge (151e) and Plato's early discussions of it, and it must be remembered that the discovery of more of the commentary could alter our impressions of it considerably. Nevertheless I have considerable doubts as to whether its author could have been responsible for the digression. Even in the introduction it is plain that accuracy plays a significant part in the production of knowledge, for it is necessary that the judging faculty,86 or criterion 'by which', must be accurate; accuracy does not belong to knowledge (in the ordinary sense) in the digression (343bc). Also required by the commentator for knowledge of P is awareness of why P (col.3); the digression would not appear to make such a requirement, and seems to think in terms of knowing 'things' rather than propositions. The commentator acquires his ideas of knowing why P from the Meno,87 whose recollection theory is also used;88 though it could be argued that the Meno operates beneath the surface in the digression,89 that would not appear to be a major source of the writer, who ignores the Meno's important distinction between knowledge and true opinion (342c). Ultimately the digression shows little interest in ordinary knowledge, and is concerned only with knowledge of 'the Fifth', in which a flash of revelatory light (34 1cd, 344b7) plays a far greater part than the preparatory processes; the commentator does not separate off any special kind of knowledge, does

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not seek for a comparable revelation, and does not even make any obvious use of the Ideas in the extant pages. The commentator produces a Platonism with a late-Hellenistic character; he still thinks in terms of mechanical cognitive processes. The author of the digression produces a new Platonic mysticism of an early imperial character. In spite of similarities of interest (scepticism concerning purely physical cognition theory,90 the rikpV1a L,91 and o'RoiwaLs92), the two authors could not be identified.

Thus, since I identify the author of the commentary with Eudorus, I should not be tempted to hold Eudorus responsible for the digression. The forger was more extreme perhaps. Whether or not he is sufficiently extreme to be identified with the author of Ep. II 312d3-3 14c7 I am not sure. The matter has to be considered, since both philosophical digressions first appear in the same period in a similar group of authors.93 This suggests that at the time when the edition with the digression of the Seventh Epistle was becoming available widely, the passage which I regard as a parallel philosophical digression in the Second Epistle was coming to be known. Could this have belonged to the same edition? Could it have been the work of the same editor?

The similarities between the two passages are certainly most striking. The fear of the written word which is evident at 34 1bc and 344cd is likewise present in the Second Epistle at 312de and 314bc, where it is accompanied by an almost paranoid fear of the letter's falling into the wrong hands. But we cannot state that the Second Epistle was written by a man with stronger views on the question of writing. The obvious reason for the exaggerated precautions of the philosophical digression here is that this letter is discussing what the author thought to be the supreme metaphysical doctrines of Plato at 3 12e-3 1 3a; the digression of the Seventh Epistle discusses no more elevated level than that of the Ideas. Even so the principle of speaking through riddles (II 312d7-8) does occur in the other digression in so far as the forger avoids the usual terms for Ideas and substitutes 'the Fifth'.

The more exalted status of matters discussed in II 312e3 13a also explains the greater contempt found here for the 'rotov as opposed to the Tr than at VII 342e-343c. When we are searching for the supreme being, as at 31 3a, it is 'the cause of all evils' to wonder about what kind it is; when we search for 'the Fifth' as at 342e, information which indicates quality is merely a hindrance to the determination of the substance.

It is perhaps unnecessary to state that both these philosophical digressions show great interest in the relationship between Platonist teacher and his pupils, particularly if that pupil happens to be a 'tyrant'. It

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seems, however, that Dionysius is less despised in the Second, though it should be added that in both cases (313a-c, 341b, 344d-345b) Dionysius is seen to have a tendency to think he knows everything already: a hint perhaps that some actual relationship between a Platonist and a monarch had inspired both digressions.

My final point of comparison would require a separate article to esta- blish fully. I have no doubt that 312e is referring to the discussion of the One in the five positive hypotheses of Plato's Parmenides. Everything, that is the whole discussion, is concerned with the supreme King, i.e. the One. The second (i.e. hypothesis, 142b-155e) is about the second level of entities (i.e. intelligible Ideas),94 while the third (hypothesis, 155e-157b) is about the third level of entities (psychicals or mathematicals).95 Thus far interpretation of the hypotheses would be similar to that of Moderatus.96 The number of hypotheses which assume the unity or existence of the One is five, and I strongly suspect that Middle Platonic curiosity concerning the relevance of the number five for Plato had its origins in the belief that there were five metaphysical levels pictured in these five positive hypotheses of the Parmenides. The digression of Epistle VII provides an example of early interest in 'fives' in Plato, while the digression of Epistle II is concerned with the passage which is the source of that interest.97

A small linguistic point which could be thought to suggest identical authorship is the tendency to favour asyndeton when commencing statements of (or allusions to) critical doctrine. We find this at 31 2e 1 and 31 3a3, and again at 342a7, b4, and 343a5. Unfortunately these digressions do not present enough material for stylometry to tell us much, and we are unlikely to find many striking features given that Platonic style is consciously imitated. It would be ludicrous to expect such passages as this to include any material which could prove them to be from the same hand. I am here concerned only to show that they could be from the same hand.98

Although all conclusions which this paper makes are tentative, and may need to be revised in the light of new discoveries, one ought perhaps to assume, on the basis of evidence presented, that the digression of the Seventh Epistle is an early Middle Platonic addition: possibly by Thra- syllus. If we are prepared to date the digression to the late first century B.C. or early first century A.D. then it might explain some minor confusion concerning the nature of the Ideas in the digression. Edelstein denied that there was a truly transcendent theory of Ideas here, and held that they were seen as belonging within the soul.99 This cannot be right,10? for the position of knowledge within the soul is said to distinguish it from the 'Fifth' as well as from name, definition, and sensible image (342c5-dl). In fact it seems

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clear that the 'Fifth' belongs neither in the soul, nor in the voice, nor in physical bodies. Where then? If our date is correct then we could certainly expect the Ideas to be located in the divine mind.101 Can such a theory be detected in the digression?

My answer is that the accompaniments to such a theory are to be found there. Edelstein's attempt to put the 'Fifth' within the soul is partially justified, and partially only, by the fact that the knowledge of the 'Fifth' is obviously an internal experience; we do not 'look away' (&'LToi3X&rrrnv)102 to the Idea, but turn a certain amount of worldly information around in our heads until wisdom (pp0vqaLs) and intelligence (voi3s) shine forth (344b7); they shine like a self-nourishing fire within the soul, sparked off by some fire elsewhere (34Ic7-d2), like knowledge of divine origin in Numenius.103 The 'Fifth' is rather that original external fire and does not enter within the mind; the fire within the mind is a different thing, the 'knowledge of the Fifth' (342e2, cf. 343e2), or 'wisdom and intelligence' (344b7). 'Intel- ligence', though the highest kind of knowledge, does not seem to grasp the 'Fifth'; it merely comes close to it in kinship and in likeness (342d2) as one fire is akin to another. It is an internal likeness of the external 'Fifth', created in us by our diligence, our intellectual powers, and our own likeness to the 'Fifths' in respect of virtue (343e-344b). Thus the 'Fifth' is not an object of cognition in the normal sense; we approach it only by recreating our own Fifth-substitute within us; the process is one of likening ourselves to the (hitherto unknown) 'Fifth'.

To the best of my knowledge Platonism knew no doctrine of 'jloFo;ats

7EIIrTr, only of OpiwL0UOLS 04s. Though found in Plato,10 that doctrine assumes greater importance in early Middle Platonist times.105 But assimilation to God had always involved assimilation to the virtues (Tht. 176bc, esp. b2), and it is clear that these are the important 'Fifths' in which the author of the digression is interested (344ab, a8-bl). If assimilation to these 'Fifths' is assimilation to God, then it is clear that the 'Fifths' somehow belong to God; though the virtues could perhaps have belonged to him as being his particular good qualities, it is clear that many of the 'Fifths' could only belong to him as thoughts within his mind: the Idea of Fox, for example, or of Walk (see 342d7-8).

Let us now ask ourselves briefly what was the epistemology of those who placed the Ideas in the mind of God. How is it that man's mind could be expected to reach up to the Ideas, when those Ideas were confined to the mind of a divinity? Does he peer into the divine mind? But we cannot even peer into each other's minds. We might perhaps be able to work out what our neighbour thinks if we have some basic information available to us

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about the premises from which he begins, and if we, like him, think rationally. We can recreate his thoughts within ourselves, as long as we think like he does. We have access to his mind only by making our minds work in the same way. I assume therefore that knowledge of the Ideas in early Middle Platonist times was just such a case of recreating the likeness of the Ideas within our own minds; there may perhaps have been some memory-trace within the divine part of us which could recognize when that likeness had been recreated, but such a memory-trace could scarcely con- stitute active knowledge of the Idea.06 God's thoughts remained his own; but we shared in the same construction as that of the divine mind,107 and we could restore that construction to our own minds, and recreate the same mathematical patterns'08 and the same virtues within it. Hence our minds will contemplate the same Ideas within themselves as God's mind con- templates within itself.

I cannot hope to make my point more forcibly without embarking upon a complete examination of early Middle Platonist epistemology. In due course I hope to be able to do this. At present let it suffice to say that my current theory regarding the knowledge of Ideas in early Middle Platonism is identical with the theory which I would attribute to the author of the epistemological digression of the Seventh Epistle. I regard this as important confirmation of my belief that the digression is an early Middle Platonic document.'09

University of Sydney

NOTES

L. Edelstein, Plato's Seventh Letter (Leiden, 1966), p. 2, seems almost to adopt such an attitude: "Recognizing that in any case the burden of proof lies with those who consider the letter genuine,..." 2 History of Greek Philosophy V (Cambridge. 1978), p. 402 n.l. 3 In addition to Guthrie (op.cit. pp. 402-417), see K. von Fritz, Platon in Sizilien unddas Problem der Philosophenherrschaft (Berlin, 1968) and 'Die philosophische Stelle im siebenten platonischen Brief und die Frage der esoterischen Philosophie Platons', Phronesis 11 (1966), 117-153; M. Isnardi Parente, Filosofia e politica nelle lettere di Platone (Napoli, 1970) and La Parola del Passato 10 (1955), 241-273; J. Stenzel. 'Ober den Aufbau der Erkenntnis im VII. platonischen Brief, Kleine Schriften (Darmstadt, 1957), pp. 85-106. 4 L. Edelstein (op.cit., n.l. above); N. Gulley, Entretiens Hardt 18 (Geneva, 1972), 105-143. 5 C. Ritter, Platons Gesetze (Leipzig, 1896), Anhang: 'Brief VII und Vlll', pp. 367-378. The view that the digression is not an integral part of the letter has continued to be taken

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seriously, and besides Morton and Winspear (below, n.9) one may mention W. Brocker, 'Der philosophische Exkurs in Platons siebenten Brief, Hermes 91 (1963), 416ff. He would see only 342al-344cl as an addition, while Ritter concentrates on 341a-345c4 (pp. 372-3), while regarding 340b ff with some suspicion (p. 373). Morton and Winspear see 341b-345d as the product of a separate hand, while I should athetize all of 340bl-345c4. 6 Europe, and the Tilbingen school in particular (on whose views see K. Gaiser, 'Plato's enigmatic Lecture "On the Good"', Phronesis 25 (1980), 5-37), tends to be the home of the view that Plato adopted an esoteric metaphysical system much of which emerged more openly in later times, and hence that Plato can be, and indeed should be, understood in terms which the Anti-esoterics would regard as peculiar to later Platonism. The Seventh Epistle is often seen as offering support for the Esoteric view (i) by suggesting that important doctrine must not be transmitted in writing (see Gaiser, pp. 15-16 with n. 33), (ii) by continued use of Ideas, intuitively grasped, and (iii) by presenting some systematic doctrine, at least, which is not found in the Dialogues. If the digression is a Middle Platonic document, however, (ii) and (iii) are to be expected, while (i) is a useful device for allowing later Platonists the freedom to search for a deeper revelation beneath the Dialogues than any which openly emerges within them. I do not believe that the argument for the digression's authenticity at p. 18 of Gaiser's article works against my theory of so late a date for its interpolation.

TD. 5.100, Fin. 2.92. 8 See A. Q. Morton and A. D. Winspear, It's Greek to the Computer (Montreal, 1971), pp. 80-83. 9 Loeb text, ed. F. H. Colson et al., vol. x (1962), indices by J. W. Earp, and Philonis Alexandrini, Opera quae Supersunt ed. L. Cohn and P. Wendland, vol. VII (Berlin, 1926), indices by J. Leisegang. 10 The Platonism of Plutarch (Univ. of Chicago diss., 1916) now published with intro. by L. Taran (New York, 1980), pp. 109ff, particularly 119. '1 Arius Didymus (Diels Dox. p. 447.1-2, 16) and Aetius 1.10.1 (p. 308bl9) appear to imply that there are Ideas of natural entities only; Aetius' treatment of Platonic Ideas (1.3.21, 1.10.1-3) shows no awareness of the digression and its 'fifth', while the concept of Ideas as thoughts of God barely accords with the notion of Ideas of artefacts, particularly if these thoughts are seen as blueprints for the universe as at Hippolytus Philos. 19.2 (p. 567 Diels). 12 I assume that where references to Ideas of artefacts occur in Platonic Dialogues (the best known examples being Rep. 597b ff and Crat. 389a fl) they need not have been seen as committing Plato to such Ideas, particularly at a time when Plato was believed to speak in deliberately obscure terms in such works (below, p. 86), and to shun direct expression of doctrine for the most part. Where Plato employed concepts during an argument they could not immediately be assigned the status of doctrine. For that reason individual Platonists might claim the right to decide for themselves. Dialogues are subject to interpretation, but much of the digression had either to be accepted or denied. 13 See fr. 14.11-12 (des Places = 23 Leemans): olov &v'COLS kE0t4PqOvT0 &q' irTpoV Xvxvov Xuxvov qxps ExovTa, and compare Ep. 341c7-d 1: olov &irso -rVp6S 'IMavMroS Friqav q4ZS. Both passages are treating the acquisition of knowledge, in particular knowledge of divine origin. Numenius suggests that the revelation-process leaves the same IEts or ov(ia in the receiver as in the giver; he is thinking chiefly of God-given knowledge here, so that the revelation-process must be accompanied by assimilation to God (cf. Ep. 343e-344a).

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14 Origen, Contra Celsum 4.3ff, trans. H. Chadwick (Cambridge, 1953), pp. 320-3, shows that Celsus supported his view with quotations and paraphrase of material between 341 d and 344b. In his introduction (xxi) Chadwick notes that R. Bader, Der A lethes Logos des Kelsos (Stuttgart-Berlin, 1940), pp. 2-3, connects the title with Ep. 342a3-4. Middle- Platonist times, it seems, had an appetite for 'true accounts' from time gone by. 15 J.C.M. van Winden, in his edition of the Dialogue with Trypho (Leiden, 1971), draws attention to a parallel here with Ep. 341cd as well as with Phd. 65e-66a and Rep. 509b. There is an ovi,re Oqr6V in the text which might possibly be inspired by 341c5, and an

cxiqvvns (cf. c7); more significantly, we read TOXis evi 'rrvxvuta i-;uxlXts lyytIPvovov L&& T6 auyyrvis, which is reminiscent of 343e-344a (especially e3 Ecv Trfux6nT, a2 avyyevi, cf. a6). 16 See Harold Tarrant, 'Agreement and the Self-Evident in Philo of Larissa', Dionysius 5 (1981), 66-97. 17 See Ac. 2.60, and the doctrine of concealment at De Or. 1.84; also Ac. fr. 35 = Aug. c.A cad. 3.43. 18 See Philo's programme for moral philosophy in Stob. Ecl. 2.39.20 ff (Wachsmuth), and Aenesidemus' allegations of dogmatism within the Academy (of Philo), Phot. Bibl. cod. 212 p. 170a14-38 (Bekker); also Cic. De Or. 1.84-93 (with Tarrant, Classicum 8 (1982), 7-1 1), Ac. 2.7-9, 35. I should add also Aetius' reports of 'Academic' doctrines, pp. 396b5-7, 17-19, 398b24, 403b8- 1 I (Diels, Dox.). l9 According to the Philonians even Carneades was willing to abandon his scepticism on matters not debated by the philosophers (Aug. c.Acad. 2.11, cf. Num. fr.27.57-59 des Places = Eus. P.E. 14.738d); Philonians themselves were willing to appeal to general agreement and to the self-evident character of certain truths (see Tarrant, loc.cit. above [n.161, and Numenius fr. 28 des Places = 8 Leemans = Eus. P.E. 14.739b). 20 Philonians regarded themselves as truth-seekers (zetetics?), as may be seen from Cic. Ac. 1.46 (de omnibus quaeritur), 2.7 (studium exquirendi and summa cura studioque conquirimus), 2.9 (exquirere); also fr. 33 (rerum inquisitorem). Zetesis also appears to be an ideal of anon. In Tht., who sees Tht. itself as a zetesis (2.43, 3.20 etc.) and would argue that a dogmatist school did not extend the range of its zetesis sufficiently (e.g. Stoics, 11.25); anon. regards the Socratic method of examining people through question and answer as zetesis (58.23ff), and sees its cathartic function as important (2.9-11, 58.33-36, cf. Philo Lar. in Stob. Ecl. 2.39.20ff (Wachsmuth). The zetetic process in anon. has a mild New Academic character, in so far as it is free from affirmation and denial (59.12-17); but it is considerably more positive in purpose than Pyrrhonist zetesis (D.L. 9.70, S.E. PH. 1.7) and perhaps more akin to the zetesis of Plato's 'zetetic' dialogues (D.L. 3.49ff). I assume that the less natural use of the term to characterize Pyrrhonists (who are scarcely truth-seekers) is secondary to an earlier and more natural use of the term (as with the term 'sceptic', see n. 67 below). 21 Philonians maintained the Academic attack on the senses, but with an emphasis on their lack of accuracy rather than their 'unhealthiness' (Aetius, Dox. p. 396b 17-19, cf. Cic. Ac. 2.79ff with the fragments of Ac.Post. II). They maintained their attack on the cognitive presentation as defined by the Stoics, but did not reject the notion of some cognitive act if more modestly defined (though not as a 'criterion of knowledge'), S.E. PH. 1.235 (on which see my comments in Dionysius 5 (1981), pp. 84-92, and LCM. 7.2 (1982), 21-2). 22 Because their views on philosophical issues (if they had any) were not to be communicated to the public, Cic. De Or. 1.84, Ac. 2.60, fr. 35, Numenius fr. 27.57-59 and 70-72 des Places. It may be that their reasons for silence were not identical with those of

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[Platol, but it was certainly open to them to believe (with Gaiser, loc. cit. [above, n. 6] n. 33) that [Plato] thought his doctrine able to be expressed in words (written or otherwise), but not able to be directly expressed in any manner consistent with a Platonist's edu- cational objectives. In any case it is the Academic practice itself, rather than any underlying theory, which Cicero was anxious to defend. And Numenius at least (fr. 24.57-64 des Places) sees a link between Plato's reluctance to express his doctrine clearly and New Academic 'heresy'. 23 Dionysius 5 (1981), p. 70 with n. 16. 24 Cicero had several teachers who exerted an influence upon him, including also the dogmatist-Academic Antiochus of Ascalon, and the Stoics Diodotus and Posidonius (ND. 1.6), but he remained true to Philo's Academicism as is clear from the same passage as well as from Ac. 2.7-9; for he could legitimatelyfavour any philosophical position and still be true to his Academicism just as long as he maintained a critical attitude to such a position. Note that when he asserts that he finds some Antiochian arguments very persuasive (Att. 13.19.5) he concedes nothing; for in using the Academic term 'IOctv6v he is reaffirming his adherence to New Academic criteria of judgement. 25 See anon. In Thi. 54.38-43, anon. Prol. in Plat. Phil. 10 (p.205,17-21, 206. 11-13 Hermann). 26 See D.L. 9.72; the relevant passage is Tim. 40d. 27 See anon. Prol! in Plat. Phil. 10 (p. 205. 27-35 Hermann); Plato is said to reject our senses, but also to reject our intellect because it is thrown into confusion by the senses; thus he rejects both possible sources of information. See also Olymp. In Phd. 8.17 (p. 15.1-12 Norvin) for evidence of 'ephectic' use of Phd. 28 See S.E. PH. 2.22, Phr. 230a: 'Socrates' does not know whether he is a man or not. 29 See anon. Prol. in Plat. Phil. 10 (p. 205.12-17 Hermann). 30 Anon. ProL in Plat. Phil. 10-11 is countering arguments which were designed to show that Plato belonged among the 'Ephectics and Academics' (p. 205.4 Hermann), but more especially that he was ephectic (see also p. 205.11, 207.9 and 12). 'Ephectic' was the standard late Neoplatonic term for a Pyrrhonist sceptic (see the introductions of the various Categories-commentaries), and is so used at anon. Prol. 7 (p. 202.22-27), where 'Ephectics' are distinguished from Academics. Since the arguments were certainly not devised to show that Plato was a sceptic of the Pyrrhonist rather than the New Academic variety, it is clear that anon. attaches importance to the term 'Ephectic' because he has in mind Pyrrhonist champions of the sceptic view of Plato. The arguments are such that they must come from a source concerned with the discovery of arguments rather than one devoted to the historical truth: their object is not to secure belief, but to counter-balance the arguments of those who saw Plato as a dogmatist. See also also n. 32 below. 31 I assume that the orthodox Pyrrhonist view held that Pyrrho was foreshadowed by earlier thinkers, but that he had out-stripped them all in the rigour of his 'scepticism' (cf. S.E. PH. 1.7); Plato was held to have been one of these (D.L. 9.72), though there was perhaps dissension among Pyrrhonists concerning the degree to which he could be said to have embraced 'scepticism' (S.E. PH. 1.222 with Heintz's emendation: see my article 'The Date of Anon. In Theaetetum', CQ. forthcoming, n. 66). In anon. Prol. there is no doubt that Plato is depicted as an Academic rather than a Pyrrhonist in the Pyrrhonist arguments, for he makes hesitant statements rather than completely suspending judgement, and he appears to sanction the non-apprehensibility doctrine in the stronger Academic fashion (but Tarrant, loc. cit., does note that the passage paints Plato as rather extreme in his Academicism: there is no conflict here, as I hope to show elsewhere).

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32 It is now usually believed that Lucius Tubero, dedicatee of Aenesidemus' Pyrrhonian Logoi (Photius 169b33) was Cicero's friend L. Aelius Tubero (cf. Lig. 2 1). Aristocles (Eus. P.E. 14. 763d) says that Aenesidemus' activities were ExOs xa; 'rrp6n1v only to emphasize that they are a product of the Roman age and have no respectable Greek pedigree. The words are a taunt, and were certainly not meant to be taken literally. 33 See Tarrant, loc.cit. (n. 31 above), including nn. 77-78. 34 See Tarrant, loc.cit. (n. 31 above),passim, also Dionysius 5 (1981), p. 68 n. 9. 35 Note the apparent approval of Pyrrho's rejection of all Hellenistic-style criteria at 61.15-46 and the interest shown in Pyrrhonist relativity-theory in col. 63 (chiefly with regard to sensation). Note too the apparent reluctance to agree that the senses are either accurate or to be highly valued (3.7-12) and the One-Academy thesis at 54.43-55.7. 36 One assumes that the One-Academy doctrine of 54.43-55.7 entails belief in an esoteric 'dogmatism' in the Second if not the Third Academy (cf. S.E. PH. 1.234); 54.23-30 and 59.12-34 see Plato as partly esoteric in his methods. (N.B. I suspect the editor's restoration of 59.28: - 'Ear(Lv OTE] would be better than kar[LV owl, for it is sometimes useful to 'conceal' or 'by-pass' the truth, never useful to obliterate it.) 37 46.43-54.30: considerable attention is paid to the process of 'Socratic midwifery'. 38 The Loeb notes refer only to Ep. VIII 355b in conexion with Quod Omn. Prob. 3, but there is no evidence of Philo's having known the passage. The Cohn-Wendland edition sees a parallel with (but again hardly a borrowing from) Ep. VII 326b. 39 Leisegang's index, under Plato, lists over 3 columns of Platonic citations, allusions, or parallels, drawn from Tim., Phr., Laws, Rep., Tht., Crat., Gor., Symp., Meno, Phd., Phil., Prot., Ap., Menex., Sph., Ion. A xiochus, and Eryxias (approximate order of importance in Philo). 40 e.g. Ebr. 166-205, Jos. 125-147, Fug. 135-6, 188-193, 206, Spec. 1.333-343, Prov. fr. l, Opif. 72, Her. 247. 41 e.g. Sac. 12-13, but the notion of a divine revelation, of a higher kind than human 'knowledge', is fundamental throughout Philo's writings. 42 See R.M. Jones, 'Posidonius and the Flight of the Mind', CP. 21 (1926), 97-113, particularly 101-7. 43 Albinus, Epitome, ed. P. Louis (Paris, 1945). 44 Dom. 8, Im. 16, Iup. Tr. 8. 45 But since John Whittaker demonstrated that there are no good grounds for attributing the Didascalicus to Albinus (Phoenix 28 (1974), 320ff and 450ff) one cannot insist that it belongs to the mid-second century A.D. Often the date of its source material is more relevant. Stylometry can at least reveal parts of the work where the sentence-length drops well below the 24-25 words per sentence-unit which characterize the less original (?) parts fairly consistently. These are chapters 1 (surely the author's own introduction); 9.3 (p. 163. 28 Hermann) to II (where new material on Ideas and God, as well as a digression on qualities, has presumably been introduced); about the last half of 14 (time and the planets); 18-22 (probably a pr6cis of the source); 24-25 (extra material on the soul); 26 (on fate: like 24-25 not foreshadowed in the division of philosophy in chapter 3); 28 (up-to- date material on assimilation to God); 30-33 (original, or source modified?); and 35-36 (a digression on the Sophist, and the author's conclusion). Average sentence length in these parts are as follows: I - 17.83, 9b - 11.64,10 - 13.70, 11- 12,88, 14b - 20.13, 18 - 22.56,19 - 20.76, 20-22 - 15.21, 24- 17.22, 25 - c.15.49-17.91, 26 - 15.94, 28 - 17.05, 30 - 17,90, 31 -

16.13, 32 - 15.68, 33 - 19.21, 35-36 - 17.00. I suspect that the author's own natural sentence length was around 17 words on average, dropping a little when presenting arguments (as

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a 9b-l I and 24-25). There remain chapters 2-9.2, 12-17 (except part of 14), 23 (Timaeus- based like 12-22, and no doubt from the same source), 27, 29, and 34 (politics). It should be noted that 12 is known to stem from Arius Didymus (Diels, Dox. p. 447) or from some closely related source. Minor discrepancies between 9b- 11 and parts with longer average sentence-length convince me that the work is not homogeneous. If I am broadly correct, then the passage which speaks against Ideas of artefacts (163.22-27 Hermann) falls only just within the unoriginal material: so close to new material that the author would have excised it if it had been out of date. It is interesting that the passage which I regard as the best candidate for dependence upon the digression of Ep. VII falls in chapter 1, which I presume to be original: xai r rp6o 8tx0ol0)VT)V r ITE VUXFVOXL -X cov.ITpOoEL, .,poVaL 8

avTCJ xai EVr6&ELav xvi iLV't[uv. Compare 344a. This may be an argument in favour of the final work's having stemmed from the late second century A.D. 46 cf. G.R. Morrow, Studies in the Platonic Epistles (Urbana. 1935) p. 26: 'for Plutarch was obviously as convinced that they were the writings of Plato as he was convinced of their value as historical sources'. 47 e.g. 4.5 ('S ax'Trs y&ypatE HX&?Wv), 11.3 (as cpnoIV avr6s). 18.9 (oVi7w pv bi qrqatv 6 HX&rwv), and several less striking instances. 48 The comparison with Nepos and Diodorus is instructive, cf. Gulley (lOc. cit. n. 4 above) p. 108: 'only Plutarch pays any substantial attention to the part played by Plato. And only Plutarch refers to the Epistles' 49 Bude text, ed. R. Flaceli0re and E. Chambry (Paris, 1978). 50 Note that Plutarch appears to have defended Philo of Larissa's One-Academy thesis in a lost treatise (Lamprias Cat. no. 63). His works appear to show a loyalty to Arcesilaus and Carneades as well as to Plato. On the early Middle Platonic view of Plato as one who concealed his doctrine see below, p. 86. 11 Quaest. Plat. I (999c-1000e) and fragments 215-7. 52 It would appear from the De Defectu that Plutarch inherits from Theodorus of Soli his interest in the possibility that there are five worlds rather than one. There is, of course, nothing in the Timaeus to suggest that Plato had some special affection for the notion of five worlds, and explanation must be sought elsewhere for Theodorus' interest in the question. It is possible that he had been stimulated by Old Academic texts, for a quaint interest in five physical bodies in five regions of the universe with five corresponding types of divinity appears in the Epinomis (984b2ff) just as there are five types of matter in Speusippus (see below, n. 63). 53 See also my discussion of Theodorus in relation to Speusippus and the Platonic Parmenides, Phronesis 19 (1974), 130-145. Theodorus' date is unfortunately not known, but his interest in mathematical aspects of Plato's Timaeus is also attested at De A n. Proc. 1022cd and 1027d. My inclination is to place him after Crantor and Clearchus of Soli (whose views he seems to be replying to at 1022d), yet before Eudorus, who appears to be the source of much of the historical material on the interpretation of the psychogony (see 1013b, 1019e, 1020c with H. Cherniss' note b, Loeb ed. p. 300). 54 Twice at Didascalicus 10 (p. 164. 27-30 Hermann); Aetius 1.7.31 (p. 304a1-2, b23-24 Diels); Maximus Tyrius Or. 29.7g (cf. 4.9d 'Who is helmsman, who general, who law- giver, who yeWpY6s [cf. Numen. fr. 13 des Places], who householder?'). It may also be relevant that both the physical chapters of Didasc. (14-15) and Aetius 1.7.31 appear to attribute five orders of divinity to Plato: Father-Creator, sphere of fixed stars (Didasc.) or intelligible (Aetius), astrals, element-powers, and earth (Didasc.) or all-embracing cosmos (Aetius). The lists are very different from the five kinds of God which are

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associated with the five elements at Epinomis 984b2ff, whose obvious influence on the author of Didasc. (see L. Taran, Academica: Plato, Philip of Opus, and the Pseudo- Platonic Epinomis (Philadelphia, 1975), pp. 161-4) was probably not direct; other unknown influences were at work too. 55 Ideas are related to God, the Ideas themselves, us (qua souls?), the sensible world, and matter at Didasc. 9 (p. 162.12-16 Hermann). I draw attention to what I believe to be a related five-fold metaphysical pattern in Numenius (fragments 13, 16, 18, and 22 des Places = 22, 25, 27, and T25 Leemans) in Antichthon 13 (1979), pp. 26-28. In the Prologus of Albinus (6, p. 150.15ff Hermann) and the Introductio of Theon Smyrnaeus, both from the second century A.D., are related theories of a five-fold Platonic education-process. Theon's account likens this process to progress in a mystery-religion (p. 14.18ff Hiller), but barely a trace of religious language is found in Albinus, the initial cathartic stage being seen in relation to medicine rather than religion. Indeed the chief point of contact is the number of stages, a number which receives more emphasis in Theon, who also emphasizes the number of five mathematical sciences (used at the cathartic stage), relating them to the five-fold purification (?) of Empedocles B 143 (p. 15.9ff). A common influence seems to have determined both the number of stages and the cathartic nature of the first stage in both authors, and it must be Theon who is most indebted to it: for (a) he is inclined to excerpt the works of others, and (b) the passage has not been reworked sufficiently to adapt it well to the context, while only the first stage is really relevant to his mathematical subject. Since Thrasyllus is an important influence on Theon (see p. 47.18ff, 85.8ff, 87.8, 93.8, and 205.5 at the conclusion: cf. J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (London, 1977), pp. 397-8), and is well-known to, but not very influential upon, Albinus (p. 149.12-17), he may well be Theon's source and a passing influence on Albinus. Note that Theon (like Albinus' Prologus) was concerned with the Thrasyllan subject of the order of the Dialogues (see al-Nadim, Fihrist, trans. B. Dodge (New York, 1970), pp. 592-4 = pp. 245-6 Fliigel), and is committed to the notion of tetralogies. Material in Plutarch's De Iside on Horus as five (374ab) which relates to De E 387e and De Defectu 429d-f suggests that there may be some five-fold underlying metaphysic relating to Osiris, Osiris' efflux, Typhon, Isis, and Horus in the platonizing account of 37 la ff, but the issue is complex. 56 'The Parmenides of Plato and the Origins of the Neoplatonic One', CQ. 22 (1928), pp. 129-142; cf. J.M. Rist, 'The Neoplatonic One and Plato's Parmenides', TA PA. 93 (1962), 389-401. $7 I am aware that many modern scholars of Plato prefer to divide the positive hypotheses into four (with 155e4-157b5 being regarded, with Cornford, Plato and Par- menides (London, 1939), p. 194, as a corollary of hypothesis 2), counter-balancing the four negative ones. But unless the words "ETL 8i To Tpirov X)ywgv (155e4) are themselves an early Middle Platonic addition to the text it seems that Plato would have counted five, and there seems to be a little evidence that Speusippus did so too (see Tarrant, loc.cit. (n. 53 above), 138ff). Frankly I do not see how Moderatus' interpretation could have evolved without the existence of some tradition (written rather than oral) of five separate hypotheses. 58 The evidence for Moderatus' views is to be found in a report, via Porphyry, at Simpl. In Phys. p. 230.34ff (Diels). It may be possible to claim that Porphyry is responsible for adulterating the passage with Neoplatonic elements, thus reading an interpretation of the Parmenides into Moderatus; but I would join Dillon (op. cit. [n. 55 above] p. 349) in resisting such a suggestion, not least because I see Neoplatonism, and Porphyry's

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Neoplatonism in particular, as having evolved from Middle Platonism and Neopytha- goreanism, particularly in respect of Platonic interpretation. 59 The notion of a One beyond being goes back at least as far as Speusippus (fr. 34e Lang = 57 Isnardi Parente = F43 Taran; cf. Proclus, In Parm. ed. R. Klibansky and L. Labowsky (London, 1953), pp. 38-40 = fr. 62 I-P = F48 T, and Iamb. De Comm. Math. Sc. 4 p. 17.7-8 Festa). Taran's attempt to detach this doctrine from Speusippus, claiming that the words W"UTE - 6E V Tvt LvaL To 'Ev OVXT6 (Arist. Met. 1092a 14-15) are only Aristotle's opinion of where Speusippus' system ought to lead, and do not at all reflect Speusippus' own view, is based upon the application of his private school-masterly rules for Greek consecutive clauses. How this could be a clause of intended result without it being the intention of Speusippus I fail to understand; certainly Aristotle cannot have intended such a result. Moreover Aristotle simply has not been granted the premises for establishing such consequences for Speusippus' system. Pace Taran (Speusippus of Athens (Leiden, 1981), 104-5 and 338-9), Aristotle's grammar establishes only that he is not reporting a clause of actual result (indicative construction) used by Speusippus; but there is no reason why Speusippus should have preferred the indicative construction to the infinitive construction in the first place; the latter is appropriate whenever one would wish to express the natural result, the result that tends to follow (Goodwin, Greek Grammar 1450). TarAn also tries to show that other Aristotelian testimony proves that the Speusippean One was an entity in the normal sense of the word; the testimony is forced into yielding information on matters which Aristotle did not intend to comment upon, let alone try to report accurately. I hope to say more on this topic in a review for Classical Philology. It is difficult to interpret the passage in Proclus, but it is clear enough that Neoplatonists associated Speusippus (i) with the Parmenides (cf. fr. 61 I-P = F49b T = Porphyry (?) In Parm. fr. I) and (ii) with a One beyond being. The lamblichan passage may perhaps be a reworking of Speusippean doctrine rather than Speusippus' own words (Taran p. 107; Isnardi Parente in Athenaeum 53 (1975), 88-1 10), but the Speusippean element can hardly have been derived from Aristotle pace Taran. It is inconceivable that the period of great Pythagorico-Platonic interest in the mathematical passages of Plato's works which prec- eded the studies of Plutarch and Theon Smyrnaeus would have failed to have recourse to such of the works of Speusippus on mathematics as had survived. Rist (loc. cit. [above. n. 561 p. 390) oversimplifies when claiming that the system of Speusippus was a dualism, without a single universal cause, and thus without significant influence on 'Neo-Pytha- goreanism' (the word is not yet well understood). Had he looked more closely at Aristotle, Rist might have been persuaded that Speusippus too had distinguished between One (henadic) and One (monadic), cf. pp. 395-7 on Proclus, Theon, and Eudorus; for Taran notes that Aristotle sometimes 'substitutes' monad for Speusippus' One, but not for Platonist Ones in general (p. 36). For Monad seems to signify the One (one?) in a purely arithmetical role as joint-principle with multiplicity (Met. 1092a29, Top. 108b29), whereas the One is sometimes seen as something more fundamental, a starting-point for all classes of substance (Met. 1028b21-24 = fr.33a L, 40 I-P, F29a T), each of which has only one truly separate principle (ibid., cf. De Comm.Math.Sc. p. 16.20-22, 17.5, 17.13-19), this being the material principle. When the One is considered as an element of the class of number, and only then, it appears in the guise of the monad (cf. De Comm. Math. Sc. p. 17.14-15: 's iv &pLOIO6S pv&&Ba xoTr TO'EV, O'v'rs artyLyv kv ypouLRois. . .). Consequently when Aristotle discusses the notion of a primary One in Speusippus, prior to other ones (Met. 1083a24-27 = fr.42 L, 76 I-P, F34 T), he cannot refer to a 'monad' prior to monads, even though his argument from analogy with the dyad and triad would have been greatly

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strengthened by that term. The One has been hypostatized by Speusippus in a way which principles peculiar to a single class were not; for the One was a general principle of 6vica (De Comm.Math.Sc. p. 15.9), which is precisely why the One, but never (explicitly) any principle peculiar to a class, cannot be an iov itself. 60 On his use of Eudorus see n. 53 above; also Dillon (op.cit. [n.55 above] p. 116). But if Plutarch uses Eudorus as a basic source, why'does he not give Eudorus' interpretation of 35ab? His attitude to Xenocrates and Crantor (1013b) is compatible with his having been among oiL 'Trpi HOLt8WVLOV (1023b). These must have found attractive elements in Old Academic theories: the epistemological considerations in Crantor, Xenocrates' use of One and Many. Eudorus, I think, associated the latter with Same and Different rather than with Indivisible and Divisible. My suspicion stems from my regarding 1024d (1v Se To 0rTEpov. . .) and sequel as once more Eudoran; for P. Thevenaz, L'A me du Monde, Le Devenir, et la Mati&re chez Plutarque (Paris, 1938), p. 82, noted that Plutarch seems here to derive Rest and Motion from Same and Other (1025a), whereas he had already criticized Xenocrates (1013d) for such an assumption. Note too that the dual nature of cognition, which is here thought to depend upon Same and Other, is earlier, in Plutarch's own criticism of Posidonius (1023d-4b), said to depend upon Indivisible and Divisible. Finally let us note that Plutarch now defines Same and Other as 'Idea of things in the same state' and 'Idea of things in a different state' (1025c), but that such definitions are reminiscent of the Posidonian definition of soul as 'Idea of the all-extended . . .' (1023b, after Speusippus' description of the Platonic World-Soul, fr. 40 L = 96-97 I-P - 54 T: TarAn's commentary is recommended); this seems to use a sense of'Idea' which Plutarch himself criticizes at 1023c. [lt is difficult to see how soul could be composed of Ideas in the normal Platonic sense, just as it could not be an Idea in such a sense.] 61 See Dodds, loc.cit. (above, n. 56); Rist. loc.cit. p. 397, sees the evidence in a different light, and therefore regards Moderatus as the first to make substantial use of the Par- menides; Eudorus, he claims, 394-8, was dependent rather upon the Philebus (I 5ab). But this is a passage which features prominently in Proclus' commentary on the Parmenides (p. 779.22 etc.). Rist has been ably answered by John Whittaker, 'E'rixetva vov xaL ovao;as, Vig. Christ. 23 (1969), 91-104, particularly p. 98 n. 10. It should not be forgotten that Thrasyllus' having coupled Phil. with Parm. early in the third tetralogy guarantees that a close connexion was seen between the two works in his day. It is likely that Parm. was thought to investigate the first principle qua One, while Phil. examined it qua Good. The Philebus' liberal sprinkling of material on One, Many, Limited, and Unlimited would also have ensured that the two dialogues would be seen in close relation. 62 See Stob. Ecl. 2.55.13-21 (Wachsmuth): I presume that Arius is here continuing to employ Eudoran material (see CQ forthcoming, n. 136). Early use of the Philebus in the interpretation of Plato's mathematical metaphysics has been postulated by Rist (n. 61, above) and linked by him with Eudorus. Certainly one can say that Theon of Smyrna, Intr. p. 21.14-16, gives evidence of early interest in the dialogue. He can scarcely be original at this point, for earlier in the chapter (p. 18.3ff, 19.7ff, and 19.22ff) his words are almost identical with those of Moderatus (Stob. Ecl. 1.1.8-9); the likeliest common source is Thrasyllus. 63 See above, n. 53. 64 Of Plato in Plutarch's De Animae Procreatione and in his famous emendation to the text of Arist. Met. 988a 10-1 I (Alex.Aphr. ad loc.); of Socrates, Plato, Pythagoras, and Aristotle in the 'problems' following his division of ethics (Stob. Ecl. 2.45.7ff); of the Pythagoreans in Simpl. In Phys. p. 181.10ff (Diels); of Aristotle (criticism rather than

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interpretation) in sundry parts of Simpl. In Categ.; reports of the physics of Posidonius and Diodorus (possibly of others too) in Achilles Inir. adAratum. 65 I think particularly of those reports mentioned in n.64 which concerned Plato and/or Pythagoras. 66 Dillon, op.cil. (above, n.55), p. 115. 67 Eudorus is habitually regarded as a 'dogmatist', and this view arises from modern use of the simplistic sceptic-dogmatist dichotomy. While dogma was then a term for 'doctrine', not all who had doctrines could be called 'dogmatic' today, nor was dogma inconsistent with a New Academic position. 'Sceptic' still did not mean anything like what we mean by the term, as may be seen in certain passages of Philo of Alexandria (e.g. Ebr. 202), cf. K. Janacek, Listy Filologicke 102 (1979), 65-68; but Janacek pays too little attention to traces of the emergent new meaning at Fug. 209 and Congr. 52, and does not appear to know QG. 3.33 where that new meaning is already the school-name of the Pyrrhonists. The fact is that though Eudorus was not a 'sceptic', this cannot be used to prove that he was not following New Academic traditions, for neither Philo of Larissa nor Charmadas were 'sceptics' (see Tarrant, loc.cit. n. 16 and loc.cit. n. 18 above). I attribute a similar position to Eudorus in CQ 1983. 68 Cic. De Oratore 1.84, ND. 1.1 1, Ac. 2.60. 69 568c, 574f; I can offer no opinion here as to the identity of the author. 70 He appears to have been responsible for the view that Plato was of many voices, not of many opinions: Stob. Ec. 2.49.25-50.1 (with Heeren's suppl.), also 55.6. On its Eudoran origin see H. Dorrie, Platonica Minora (Munchen, 1971), pp. 159-160. I like to compare anon. In Thi. 59.12-21, where it is said that Plato's meaning is not stated in his 'inquiries', but that it nevertheless reveals itself imperceptibly to those acquainted with his methods. 71 One cannot be certain of his source here; Thrasyllus had been followed from the middle of 56 to the middle of 61, perhaps via Favorinus, who is mentioned as a source at the end of 62. All of 63-64 would appear to come from a single source. 72 If I am correct, the forger has been inspired by the reference to others who were iTopoxovaUtT0v Twvi:v 9p4LEOTOL TrV xa/r qptXoaoqiav at 338d3, so that he develops this theme at 340b6-7 and 341a8-b5 using similar terminology ('rrap&xovaRa, -napaxoA). That such terminology should be used three times within three Stephanus pages, but nowhere else until the first century B.C., gives an unexpectedly technical ring to the language of 'Plato'. 73 op.cil. (above, n.l.), p. 73. 74 The reader is referred to Zeller, Ph.Gr. I i6 p. 400. 75 But see J. Glucker, Antiochus and the late Academy (GOttingen, 1978), pp. 122-3. 76 Suet. Tib. 14, 62; Tac. Ann. 6.20 ff; Dio 55.11.1-3, 57.15.7, 58.27.1: presuming that Tiberius' Thrasyllus is not a different person from the Platonic scholar as has been thought by some (e.g. Grote, Furneaux). Such a view, however, is called into question by a scholiast on Juv. 6.576, who clearly identifies the Platonist with the court astrologer, and there seems no reason to challenge the accuracy of his information. Note that Thrasyllus exercised some influence over Tiberius (Suet. Tib. 62), but that he reportedly was lucky enough to survive murderous intentions on the part of Tiberius (ibid. 14, Dio 55.11.2). Thus it may be said that his relationship with Tiberius was stormy enough to rival that of Plato with Dionysius. 77 Or so it appears in the Epit. Diog., on which see Glucker, op. cit. (above, n. 75), pp. 349-350. 78 It seems to me that it is quite contrary to the spirit of the Dialogues to speak of taLur11L

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and vovs as belonging to a q)poas. . . srrpvxvia ipavXs (343de), and that such words were not uninfluenced by Academic 'scepticism'. 79 Cic. Ac. 1. 13. 80 e.g. Prov. fr. i; see CQ 1983. 81 It is currently fashionable to suppose the influence of Eudorus on Philo, e.g. W. Theiler, 'Philo von Alexandria und der Beginn des kaiserzeitlichen Platonismus', Parusia, Festschrift fur J. Hirschberger (Frankfurt, 1965), 199ff. 82 Although our forger is here speaking (in theory) of the knowledge of Ideas in general, it is clear that he thinks particularly of the knowledge of true virtue, beauty, and goodness: paradigms which one might expect to discern in the God to which one likens oneself (cf. Tht. 176c). 83 1 assume that there is substance in the stories of Strabo ( 13.54) and Plutarch (Sulla 26) concerning the rediscovery of the treatises in 86 B.C., and their subsequent acquisition by Andronicus. 84 Stob. Ec. 2.49.8 (Wachsmuth); the doctrine reappears in Albinus Prol. 5-6 (pp. 150-1 Hermann), Didasc. 28 (p. 181.16ff Hermann), Apul. De Plat. 23 (p. 126.4ff Thomas), and D.L. 3.78 (along with doxographic material in Clement Strom. 2.131.2ff and Theodoretus). 85 'The Date of Anon. In Theaetetum, CQ (forthcoming). 86 Anon. first refers to a criterion 'through which we judge like a tool' (2.23-26), and that 'by which' (26-27) should perhaps be regarded as different from this; for, to judge from Tht. 184d, it should be the mind as opposed to the senses: moreover 3.7-12 suggest that anon. does not allow accuracy to the senses, as he does to the criterion 'by which'. 87 See 3.2 1-25 (cf. 15.16-23); Meno 98a. 88 47.45ff, up to and including 56.26-31. The Meno's mathematical episode is also mentioned at 28. 43ff. 89 The revelation-process is not, I think, incompatible with the theory of recollection, and knowing-the-ldea becomes knowing-the-cause if one chooses to regard the Ideas as causes. However it is not necessary to read such theories into the digression. On the 'categories' Tnoi6V TL and ov or T; (342eff) and their possible relation to Meno 86e-87b see above, p. 88. 90 anon. Cols. 3. 61, 63 etc. 91 anon. 4.31-5.3, 9.30ff; Ep. 343e-344a. 92 anon. 7.14-20, cf. 58.39ff; Ep. 343e-344a. 93 Celsus in Origen c.Celsum 6.18 (p. 331 Chadwick), Justin Apol. 1.60.7, Clement Strom. 5.103.1 et al.; Dillon op.cit. (above, n.55) p. 367 thinks that Numenius may have known the passage, and notes its use by Apuleius (p. 313). 94 Or World-of-Ideas as a single entity with H.J. Kramer, Der Ursprung der Geistme- taphysik (Amsterdam, 1967), p. 221 n76; much depends upon whether the m?pi of 312e3 and 4 should be read with the preceding singulars (understanding IaaLXea perhaps) or with the plurals which follow (as I prefer). 95 Or the ensouled Cosmos with Kramer; again the question raised in n.94 above applies. 96 See above, n.58. 97 My theory is that Speusippus first wrote of Plato's interest in seeing five metaphysical levels in the Parmenides, and perhaps of a wider significance of that number to the Plato whom he knew. The early commentators on the mathematical aspects of Plato who flourished up to Theon's time made use of Speusippus in their interpretations, and tried to recreate the vision which lay beneath the Parmenides. The digression of Ep. 11 is in my

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view part of this later search for the vision behind the Parmenides, and I find it most interesting that John Glucker (op.cit. [above, n.75], pp. 40-47) has recently tried to relate it to this work in particular. His explanation of the 'young and beautiful Socrates' of 314c is very attractive, but only if he does not persist in his attempt to see the statement that there exists no Platonic writing as a statement without qualification (p. 43). The passage surely means that there is no Platonic writing about the supreme principles of mathematical metaphysics, but that what is now being talked about (Parmenides) is the product of a youthful Socrates. [The fact that 'Parmenides' questions 'Aristotle' in the second part of the work need not, I think, bother us.] 98 1 do not see Glucker's alleged differences between the two digressions (see previous note). 99 op.cit. (above, n.l.), pp. 95-99. 100 See TarAn, op.cit. (above n.54), p. 153 n. 660. 101 As in the doxographical tradition (Aetius etc., see above, n. 12), in Seneca Ep. 65.7-10, in Nicomachus of Gerasa, Introductio 4 (p. 9.Hoche), and in the Didascalicus (9, p. 163.13 etc. Hermann). 102 Typical Platonic terminology, e.g. Euthphr. 6e5. 103 fr. 14 des Places, see above, n. 13. 104 Tht. 176b, Rep. 613ab, Tim. 90a-d. 105 See n.84 for references. 106 e.g. anon. In Thi. 46.43-49, Cic. Fin. 5.59: sine doctrina notitias parvas. 107 The assimilation-process recognized by Middle Platonists was generally seen as involving a God within the heavens, akin to the intellect of the Platonic World-Soul, see Didasc. 28 (p. 181.36-37 Hermann), Eudorus in Stob. Ecl. 2.49.8ff.(Wachsmuth), and perhaps Albinus, Prol. 5 (p.150.8-12 Hermann with Tim. 90a-d). 108 The Ideas are often numbers in the mind of God (e.g. Seneca and Nicomachus, locis cit., [above, n.101]), and the process often involves attuning oneself to the harmonies of the heavens as at Tim. 90a-d. 109 My thanks to the editor for some welcome and constructive comments.

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Phronesis Volume 28 Issue 1 1983 [Doi 10.2307%2F4182166] Harold Tarrant -- Middle Platonism and the Seventh Epistle

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