Philosophy E166: Ethical Theory Spring 2013, Week Ten: Hume on Virtue, Utility and Justice.

Philosophy E166: Ethical Theory

Spring 2013, Week Ten:

Hume on Virtue, Utility and Justice

Perceived Hobbesian Threat

to Ethics

The Christian

Response

Hobbes’s True

PositionLocke’s Position Hume’s Position

Materialism, naturalism

Dualism, supernaturalism

Unorthodox Christianity

Mysterianism, nonreductivism ??

Atheism Voluntarism or intellectualism

Secularism Intellectualism

Psychological egoism

Existence of morality and altruism, with God’s help

Compatibility of egoism and morality

Knowledge of natural law separated from motivation to follow it

Distinguishes object of desire from gratification of desire

Relativism Moral objectivity Distinction between divine justice & human justice, natural law & civil law

Distinction of norms of natural law from uniformity in actions

Determinism Libertarianism Metaphysical compatibilism

Metaphysical compatibilism

Metaphysical compatibilism & Humean causality

Beginnings of Hume’s Naturalistic Account of Morality

• Rawls’ phrase for Hume’s view: “Fideism of nature”

• Hume’s conclusions about reason & passion– Reason cannot be a motive of the will– Reason cannot oppose passion in directing the will

• The moral problem– Moral opinions practical, insofar as motivating action– Moral opinions belief-like, to be argued for or against– For Hume there is nothing like that filling both roles

Hume’s Substantive Views on the Nature of Morality


• Hume’s approach “naturalistic”



• Hume’s view is a “moral sense” view



• Hume’s view is a “moral sense” view – that means that morality is somehow grounded on moral sentiments or moral passions




• So it should be obvious now what the relevance is to our discussion of reason and passion




• So it should be obvious now what the relevance is to our discussion of reason and passion – it’s that just as reason is the slave of the passions, similarly reason is the slave of the moral passions

Reason the Slave of the Passions


• Reason cannot cause us to have passions, except insofar as it might lead us to judgments that cause passions



• But very importantly, it cannot, for Hume, dictate the ends we should follow




• The ends are dictated by the ways we respond through our passions to the world around




• The ends are dictated by the ways we respond through our passions to the world around– and that is the result of our constitutions




• The ends are dictated by the ways we respond through our passions to the world around– and that is the result of our constitutions – we cannot with our reason change our constitution




• The ends are dictated by the ways we respond through our passions to the world around– and that is the result of our constitutions – we cannot with our reason change our constitution– we can and will develop character over time, he says




• The ends are dictated by the ways we respond through our passions to the world around– and that is the result of our constitutions – we cannot with our reason change our constitution– we can and will develop character over time, he says – but not through reason

Morality Consists of “Natural” Virtue and “Artificial” Virtue


• Hume divides “natural” from “artificial” virtue


• Hume divides “natural” from “artificial” virtue• There is something unnatural, given Hume’s

conception of naturalistic psychology, about Hume’s use of the word “natural” here




• After all, Hume embraces “naturalism”




• After all, Hume embraces “naturalism”– What other philosophers explain on the basis of

supernatural Platonic forms, or divine commands, or abstract properties, &c, Hume explains naturalistically




• After all, Hume embraces “naturalism”– What other philosophers explain on the basis of

supernatural Platonic forms, or divine commands, or abstract properties, &c, Hume explains naturalistically

– Hume assumes that all features of the world that exist are parts of the natural world and are to be explained as the result of the machinery of nature




• After all, Hume embraces “naturalism”– What other philosophers explain on the basis of supernatural

Platonic forms, or divine commands, or abstract properties, &c, Hume explains naturalistically

– Hume assumes that all features of the world that exist are parts of the natural world and are to be explained as the result of the machinery of nature

– What then is “artificial”?

Hume Acknowledges the Problem and Solves It

• Treatise III.1.2.7: “But in the second place, should it be ask’d, Whether we ought to search for these principles in nature, or whether we must look for them in some other origin? I wou’d reply, that our answer to this question depends upon the definition of the word, Nature, than which there is none more ambiguous and equivocal. If nature be oppos’d to miracles, not only the distinction betwixt vice and virtue is natural, but also every event, which has ever happen’d in the world, excepting those miracles, on which our religion is founded. In saying, then, that the sentiments of vice and virtue are natural in this sense, we make no very extraordinary discovery….”

The Three Meanings of “Nature”

• Treatise III.1.2.8:But nature may also be opposed to rare and unusual; and in this sense of the word, which is the common one, there may often arise disputes concerning what is natural or unnatural; and one may in general affirm, that we are not possess’d of any very precise standard, by which these disputes can be decided…. But nature may also be opposed to artifice, as well as to what is rare and unusual; and in this sense it may be disputed, whether the notions of virtue be natural or not. We readily forget, that the designs, and projects, and views of men are principles as necessary in their operation as heat and cold, moist and dry: But taking them to be free and entirely our own, ’tis usual for us to set them in opposition to the other principles of nature.”

It’s the Third Meaning That’s Important


• Thus Hume is able to distinguish “natural” from “artificial,” where by “artificial” we mean human-made



• The opposite, then, is non-human-made, and that means, for our purposes, made without design, made by blind processes




• Hume has little to say about how “natural virtue” is made




• Hume has little to say about how “natural virtue” is made• In fact, it’s very mysterious for him




• Hume has little to say about how “natural virtue” is made• In fact, it’s very mysterious for him• It’s enough for him that it’s not human-made




• Hume has little to say about how “natural virtue” is made• In fact, it’s very mysterious for him• It’s enough for him that it’s not human-made• Another complication: It will turn out the justice is an

“artificial” virtue




• Hume has little to say about how “natural virtue” is made

• In fact, it’s very mysterious for him

• It’s enough for him that it’s not human-made

• Another complication: It will turn out the justice is an “artificial” virtue

• But even though he’ll suggest that there is a way that it is human-made, it’s still not designed, not in the way the automobile was, not in the way Hobbes & Locke thought

What the “Natural” Virtues Are Like


• The natural virtues are connected to natural instincts, natural dispositions, the natural development of character



• The natural virtues existed in humans before civilization




• Examples are those connected with the so-called “calm desires and tendencies”:




• Examples are those connected with the so-called “calm desires and tendencies”: – “either certain instincts originally implanted in our natures,

such as benevolence and resentment, the love of life, and kindness to children; or the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, considered merely as such” (II.iii.3.8)

The Question: Is Justice Something Else?

•


• Hume’s question about justice, then, is the question of whether it is like these natural dispositions – instinctual, prior to civilization, implanted from the start in our natures – or not

•


• Hume’s question about justice, then, is the question of whether it is like these natural dispositions – instinctual, prior to civilization, implanted from the start in our natures – or not

• If not, Hume’s idea is that it’s “artificial” – human-made

The Argument for “Artificial” Virtue


• The argument, as I see it, has two parts:


• The argument, as I see it, has two parts:• The first part is to argue, as he does at Treatise

III.2.1.10 and following, that justice cannot be directly accounted for on the basis of natural dispositions




• And then he argues that it can be accounted for as the result of human-made conventions




• And then he argues that it can be accounted for as the result of human-made conventions

• Thus, the argument seems to be an inference to the best explanation – the explanation from convention works to explain justice, and it works best

Recall the argument against natural dispositions….

• At Treatise III.2.1.9, he sets out a problem: “I suppose a person to have lent me a sum of money, on condition that it be restored in a few days; and also suppose, that after the expiration of the term agreed on, he demands the sum: I ask, What reason or motive have I to restore the money? It will, perhaps, be said, that my regard to justice, and abhorrence of villainy and knavery, are sufficient reasons for me, if I have the least grain of honesty, or sense of duty and obligation. And this answer, no doubt, is just and satisfactory to man in his civilized state, and when trained up according to a certain discipline and education. But in his rude and more natural condition, if you are pleased to call such a condition natural, this answer would be rejected as perfectly unintelligible and sophistical. For one in that situation would immediately ask you, Wherein consists this honesty and justice, which you find in restoring a loan, and abstaining from the property of others?”

Answers He Thinks Won’t Work


• He says that in humans’ “rude and more natural condition” it won’t do to answer the answer that we have reason to restore the loan based on justice



• And he rejects as motives:



• And he rejects as motives: – private interest (par. 10),



• And he rejects as motives: – private interest (par. 10), – regard for public interest (par. 11),



• And he rejects as motives: – private interest (par. 10), – regard for public interest (par. 11), – love of mankind (par. 12),



• And he rejects as motives: – private interest (par. 10), – regard for public interest (par. 11), – love of mankind (par. 12), – private benevolent or “a regard to the interests of

the party concerned” (par. 13)

Hume’s Answer: Artificial Convention

• At par. 11, he introduces what he takes the answer to be:

– “public interest is not naturally attached to the observation of the rules of justice; but is only connected with it, after an artificial convention for the establishment of these rules, as shall be shewn more at large hereafter” (my emphasis)

How is this supposed to work?


• Well, we have the need for conventions of justice


• Well, we have the need for conventions of justice• At III.2.2.7, he argues that we enjoy three sorts of goods:



– 1. the internal satisfaction of our mind




“We are perfectly secure” in these.




“We are perfectly secure” in these.– 2. the external advantages of our body





Others can deprive us of these but cannot get an advantage from it.






– 3. enjoyment of possessions from industry and good fortune







These alone can be taken by violence for the advantage of others. Their possession is unstable.








And they are scarce, not just for taking.








And they are scarce, not just for taking.

• The instability addressed by putting external possessions on the same footing as advantages of mind and body

Hume’s Solution

• Solution (at Treatise III.2.2.9):

“This can be done after no other manner, than by a convention entered into by all the members of the society to bestow stability on the possession of those external goods, and leave every one in the peaceable enjoyment of what he may acquire by his fortune and industry.”

Hume’s Solution (cont.)

• “By this means, every one knows what he may safely possess; and the passions are restrained in their partial and contradictory motions. Nor is such a restraint contrary to these passions; for if so, it could never be entered into, nor maintained; but it is only contrary to their heedless and impetuous movement. Instead of departing from our own interest, or from that of our nearest friends, by abstaining from the possessions of others, we cannot better consult both these interests, than by such a convention; because it is by that means we maintain society, which is so necessary to their well-being and subsistence, as well as to our own.”

Not Promise-Like

• “This convention is not of the nature of a promise: For even promises themselves, as we shall see afterwards, arise from human conventions. It is only a general sense of common interest; which sense all the members of the society express to one another, and which induces them to regulate their conduct by certain rules. I observe, that it will be for my interest to leave another in the possession of his goods, provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me. He is sensible of a like interest in the regulation of his conduct.”

Hume’s examples

• How are these supposed to be examples of convention?

Hume’s examples

• How are these supposed to be examples of convention?– 1. Men in a boat: “Two men, who pull the oars of a

boat, do it by an agreement or convention, though they have never given promises to each other.

Hume’s examples

• How are these supposed to be examples of convention?– 1. Men in a boat: “Two men, who pull the oars of a

boat, do it by an agreement or convention, though they have never given promises to each other.

– 2. Language: “In like manner are languages gradually established by human conventions without any promise.”

Hume’s examples

• How are these supposed to be examples of convention?– 1. Men in a boat: “Two men, who pull the oars of a boat,

do it by an agreement or convention, though they have never given promises to each other.

– 2. Language: “In like manner are languages gradually established by human conventions without any promise.”

– 3. Money: “In like manner do gold and silver become the common measures of exchange, and are esteemed sufficient payment for what is of a hundred times their value.”

Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma and Coordination Games

• Hume stresses the importance of “repeated experience”:• “Nor is the rule concerning the stability of possession the

less deriv’d from human conventions, that it arises gradually, and acquires force by a slow progression, and by our repeated experience of the inconveniences of transgressing it. On the contrary, this experience assures us still more, that the sense of interest has become common to all our fellows, and gives us a confidence of the future regularity of their conduct: And ’tis only on the expectation of this, that our moderation and abstinence are founded.”

What is the content of the convention in question?

• What is the convention in question? –


• What is the convention in question? – – “abstinence from the possession of others”(III.2.2.11)



• What follows? –



• What follows? – – “After this convention, concerning abstinence from the

possessions of others, is entered into, and every one has acquired a stability in his possessions, there immediately arise the ideas of justice and injustice; as also those of property, right, and obligation. The latter are altogether unintelligible without first understanding the former.”

The Moral Sense View


• Let’s return now to Hume’s “moral sense” view of ethics



• I’m not going to discuss the moral sense view in detail




• But I do want to discuss two paragraphs in Book III.1 of the Treatise where he sets it out –




• But I do want to discuss two paragraphs in Book III.1 of the Treatise where he sets it out – – namely the last two paragraphs of III.1.1 –

paragraphs 26 and 27

III.1.1, Paragraph 26


• “Nor does this reasoning only prove, that morality consists not in any relations, that are the objects of science; but if examin'd, will prove with equal certainty, that it consists not in any matter of fact, which can be discover'd by the understanding….”


• “Nor does this reasoning only prove, that morality consists not in any relations, that are the objects of science; but if examin'd, will prove with equal certainty, that it consists not in any matter of fact, which can be discover'd by the understanding….”

• Hume is not saying here that ethics – the moral sense – cannot be the subject of science.

What Hume Means

What Hume Means

• In fact, he thinks, as I said last week in setting out Rawls’s ideas about Hume’s view as being a “fideism of nature,” that the study of ethics is a part of the study – a scientific study – of human nature

What Hume Means


• I take it that what Hume means here in par. 26 is that the assertions of ethics

What Hume Means


• I take it that what Hume means here in par. 26 is that the assertions of ethics – assertions of the sort “You should not …” and “Your action was virtuous”

What Hume Means


• I take it that what Hume means here in par. 26 is that the assertions of ethics – assertions of the sort “You should not …” and “Your action was virtuous” – are not derivable from science and are not, in fact, matters of fact

Is cannot be derived from Ought

• It is often said that it is in the next paragraph that Hume argues that statements of morality – ought-statements – cannot be derived from is-statements – i.e., descriptive statements.

Is cannot be derived from Ought

• It is often said that it is in the next paragraph that Hume argues that statements of morality – ought-statements – cannot be derived from is-statements – i.e., descriptive statements.

• But he already asserts that here, in paragraph 26.

Disapprobation “in you … not in the object”

• Hume goes on: “This is the second part of our argument [which he has made in this section against rational intuitionism of the sort due to Samuel Clarke – which Rawls reviews]; and if it can be made evident, we may conclude, that morality is not an object of reason. But can there be any difficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not matters of fact, whose existence we can infer by reason? Take any action allow'd to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but `tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object….”

Hume’s Claim

Hume’s Claim

• By “moral” Hume means the quality in the action by virtue of which we call it “vicious”

Hume’s Claim

• By “moral” Hume means the quality in the action by virtue of which we call it “vicious”

• Hume’s claim is that the relevant quality lies within us, the labeler of the action, and not in the action itself

Moral Pronouncements Are Said by Hume to Be About You

• Hume goes on: “So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it. Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compar'd to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind: And this discovery in morals, like that other in physics, is to be regarded as a considerable advancement of the speculative sciences; tho', like that too, it has little or no influence on practice.”

Supposedly Like Color


• This seems to me to be a little sloppy on Hume’s part.



• What he seems to say here is something like this: When we call an apple “red,” we don’t mean to refer to a property in the apple but rather to a property in us.




• For if our brains were wired differently or if our eyes were constructed differently, we would see blue perhaps instead of red.




• For if our brains were wired differently or if our eyes were constructed differently, we would see blue perhaps instead of red.

• Thus, the quality is in us, not in the object.

Clearly False

Clearly False

• What he seems to say is clearly false.

Clearly False

• What he seems to say is clearly false. • It’s not arbitrary, of course, that we call the apple red

instead of yellow or green.

Clearly False


instead of yellow or green. • It is part of the explanation of our calling it red instead of

yellow or green – and of our applying the concept red to it instead of the concept yellow or the concept green – that our eyes and our brains are constructed a certain way.

Clearly False


instead of yellow or green. • It is part of the explanation of our calling it red instead of

yellow or green – and of our applying the concept red to it instead of the concept yellow or the concept green – that our eyes and our brains are constructed a certain way.

• But it also figures into the explanation that the apple is constructed a certain – namely, in that way necessary to be seen as red and not yellow or green.

Clearly False

• What he seems to say is clearly false.

• It’s not arbitrary, of course, that we call the apple red instead of yellow or green.

• It is part of the explanation of our calling it red instead of yellow or green – and of our applying the concept red to it instead of the concept yellow or the concept green – that our eyes and our brains are constructed a certain way.

• But it also figures into the explanation that the apple is constructed a certain – namely, in that way necessary to be seen as red and not yellow or green.

• Thus, what is really going on is a two-step process.

Locke’s Idea

Locke’s Idea

• John Locke’s way of putting it is useful:

Locke’s Idea


• Secondary qualities such as colors are powers that objects have to cause certain sensations in us by virtue of the invisible primary qualities (such as, we might say, reflective powers, for example) of the objects

Locke’s Idea


• Secondary qualities such as colors are powers that objects have to cause certain sensations in us by virtue of the invisible primary qualities (such as, we might say, reflective powers, for example) of the objects

• This is probably what Hume should have said

Analogy to Moral Qualities


• But what concerns us here is Hume’s analogy between secondary qualities like color and moral qualities.


• But what concerns us here is Hume’s analogy between secondary qualities like color and moral qualities.

• When we use moral terms like “vicious” and “virtuous,” we are using terms that project qualities onto objects based on distinctions that we find in ourselves, just as when we use perceptual terms like “red” and “blue” we are as well.

What This Means: Connection to Is-Ought


• We cannot fully discover the nature of the application of color terms scientifically by inspection of objects alone



• So similarly we cannot fully discover the nature of the application of moral terms by inspection of actions alone



• So similarly we cannot fully discover the nature of the application of moral terms by inspection of actions alone– As Hume says, discovering that there is this limit to

scientific investigation is to be “regarded as a considerable advancement of the speculative sciences”



• So similarly we cannot fully discover the nature of the application of moral terms by inspection of actions alone– As Hume says, discovering that there is this limit to

scientific investigation is to be “regarded as a considerable advancement of the speculative sciences”

• It’s in this context that we must consider the is-ought argument in paragraph 27

The First Half of Paragraph 27

• Treatise III.1.1.27: “I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence.”

The 2nd Half of Paragraph 27

• “… For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, `tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention wou'd subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv'd by reason.”

Rawls’ Take on Paragraph 27

• Rawls who discusses this paragraph in Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy is probably correct:


• Rawls who discusses this paragraph in Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy is probably correct: – this paragraph does not add very much to the

previous paragraph (26)


• Rawls who discusses this paragraph in Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy is probably correct: – this paragraph does not add very much to the

previous paragraph (26)

• Rawls asserts that it merely constitutes a summary of the case that Hume has been making against his rationalist opponents who try to ground morality entirely in reason

Two Interpretations of Hume


• I will follow Rawls in suggesting that Hume is not arguing that his rationalist opponents are confused –


• I will follow Rawls in suggesting that Hume is not arguing that his rationalist opponents are confused – that they don’t understand the logic or the meanings of words like “is” and “ought”



• Rather, Hume’s point is that given the correct view of morality – the secondary qualities view of moral qualities provided by Hume in par. 26 – then it is completely obvious that we could not derive the one from the other



• Rather, Hume’s point is that given the correct view of morality – the secondary qualities view of moral qualities provided by Hume in par. 26 – then it is completely obvious that we could not derive the one from the other

• And that it would be an obvious error to slip from the one into the other

Searle’s Famous “How to Derive ‘Ought’ from ‘Is’”

(Philosophical Review 73 (1964), pp. 43-58)

Searle’s Example of How to Derive Ought from Is

Searle’s Argument that (3) Follows from (2)


to Ethics

The Christian

Response

Hobbes’s True





Mysterianism, nonreductivism ??














to Ethics

The Christian

Response

Hobbes’s True





Mysterianism, nonreductivism

Distinction between reason & passion, fact & value














to Ethics

The Christian

Response

Hobbes’s True








Secularism Intellectualism??












to Ethics

The Christian

Response

Hobbes’s True








Secularism Intellectualism Fideism of nature; vice & virtue not miracles












to Ethics

The Christian

Response

Hobbes’s True
















??




Relativism vs. the Judicious Spectator


• Hume’s account of sympathy is intended to address the threat of relativism



• Rawls’s distinction between two uses of the term “sympathy”



• Rawls’s distinction between two uses of the term “sympathy”– The ordinary one: where one has sympathy



• Rawls’s distinction between two uses of the term “sympathy”– The ordinary one: where one has sympathy – Hume’s notion of what Rawls calls (perhaps

awkwardly) “imparted feeling” (or perhaps “contagious feeling”) and Hume calls “sympathy”



• Rawls’s distinction between two uses of the term “sympathy”– The ordinary one: where one has sympathy – Hume’s notion of what Rawls calls (perhaps awkwardly)

“imparted feeling” (or perhaps “contagious feeling”) and Hume calls “sympathy”

• The fact that they are not the same is shown by Rawls’ humiliation example: the fact that we sympathize with someone who is humiliated does not mean that we ourselves feel humiliated

Variability Objection


• A natural objection to the view that moral distinctions and judgments are based on sympathy is based on the variability of sympathy



• Moral distinctions, it is objected, cannot vary the way that sympathy does




• Hume replies by invoking “the judicious spectator” and what he calls “the common point of view”




• Hume replies by invoking “the judicious spectator” and what he calls “the common point of view”

• The parallel to the correction of observational judgments

The Judicious Spectator

• Hume (III.1.1.16, T581): “In order, therefore, to prevent those continual contradictions, and arrive at a more stable judgment of things, we fix on some steady and general points of view; and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation. In like manner, external beauty is determin'd merely by pleasure; and `tis evident, a beautiful countenance cannot give so much pleasure, when seen at the distance of twenty paces, as when it is brought nearer us. We say not, however, that it appears to us less beautiful: Because we know what effect it will have in such a position, and by that reflection we correct its momentary appearance.”

The Common Point of View

• Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, §9, ¶6: • “When a man denominates another his enemy, his rival,

his antagonist, his adversary, he is understood to speak the language of self-love, and to express sentiments, peculiar to himself, and arising from his particular circumstances and situation. But when he bestows on any man the epithets of vicious or odious or depraved, he then speaks another language, and expresses sentiments in which, he expects, all his audience are to concur with him. He must here, therefore, depart from his private and particular situation, and must chuse a point of view, common to him with others: He must move some universal principle of the human frame, and touch a string, to which all mankind have an accord and symphony.

The Common Point of View (cont.)

• “If he mean, therefore, to express, that this man possesses qualities, whose tendency is pernicious to society, he has chosen this common point of view, and has touched the principle of humanity, in which every man, in some degree, concurs. While the human heart is compounded of the same elements as at present, it will never be wholly indifferent to public good, nor entirely unaffected with the tendency of characters and manners. And though this affection of humanity may not generally be esteemed so strong as vanity or ambition, yet, being common to all men, it can alone be the foundation of morals, or of any general system of blame or praise. One man's ambition is not another's ambition; nor will the same event or object satisfy both: But the humanity of one man is the humanity of every one; and the same object touches this passion in all human creatures.”


to Ethics

The Christian

Response

Hobbes’s True
















The judicious spectator & the common point of view – the analogy to observation




Philosophy E166: Ethical Theory Spring 2013, Week Ten: Hume on Virtue, Utility and Justice.

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