- 1.APA Newsletters NEWSLETTER ON PHILOSOPHY AND COMPUTERSVolume
11, Number 2 Spring 2012 FROM THE EDITOR, Peter Boltuc
ARTICLESTerrell Ward BynumOn Rethinking the Foundations of
Philosophy in the Information Age Luciano FloridiHyperhistory and
the Philosophy of Information Policies Anthony F. BeaversIs Ethics
Headed for Moral Behavioralism and Should We Care?Alexandre
MonninThe Artifactualization of Reference and Substances on the
Web: Why (HTTP) URIs Do Not (Always) Refer nor Resources Hold by
Themselves Stephen L. Thaler The Creativity Machine Paradigm:
Withstanding the Argument from Consciousness CARTOON Riccardo
ManzottiDo Objects Exist or Take Place? 2012 by The American
Philosophical Association ISSN 2155-9708
2. APA Newsletter onPhilosophy and ComputersPiotr Botu,
EditorSpring 2012 Volume 11, Number 2philosophers of computers but
also for the more traditionalFrom the Editor colleagues interested
in philosophy of language. In the nextpaper Stephen Thaler talks
about creativity machines. Whilesome philosophers may still not be
sure whether and by whatstandards machines can be creative, Thaler
designed, patented,The APA ad hoc committee on philosophy and
computersand prepared for useful applications some such machines
sostarted as largely a group advocating the use of computers andthe
proof seems to be in the pudding, and some of the proof canthe web
among philosophers, and by the APA. While today also be found in
this interesting article. We end with a cartoonphilosophical issues
pertaining to computers are becoming by Richardo Manzotti; this
time it is on an ontological topic. Asmore and more important, we
may have failed in some way always cartoons tend to be overly
persuasive for philosophicalsince problems that have been plaguing
the APAs website fordiscussion; yet, they serve as a good tool for
putting forth theabout the last year have put us all back,
unnecessarily. This alsoauthors ideas.pertains to the Newsletter;
not only did we lose positioning inthe web-search engines but the
Newsletter reverted to just PDFs. I am sure the chair of the
committee would want toThe good news is that archival issues are
successively coming mention the very successful session on machine
consciousnessback. I remember the advice that David Chalmers gave
to the at the Central APA meeting. The session brought together
papersNewsletter upon receiving the Barwise Prize a few years
ago,by Terry Horgan, Robert van Gullick, and Ned Block (who wasto
either become a regular journal or, if we stay open access,unable
to come due to illness), as well as by two members ofto use much
more of blog-style communications. It is my hopethis committee,
David Anderson and myself. The session wasthat one day the latter
option may become more realistic. very well attended, so that some
people had to sit on the flooror in the doorway. I do hope to have
more on this committeesLet me change gears a bit and restart on a
somewhatactivities in the next issue.personal note. My first
philosophy tutor was my mother; amongother things she taught me
that philosophy is the theory of thegeneral theories of all the
sciences. I still like this definition.My first philosophy tutor
also warned me that philosophyshould not become overly preoccupied
with just one theory, Articlesat one stage of its development,
which has been Spencerspredicament. Consistent with this advice,
when I was startingmy own philosophical thinking I was always
puzzled that On Rethinking the Foundations of Philosophyfew
philosophers drew sufficient conclusions from Einsteinsrelativity
theor y, in particular its direct implications for in the
Information Age*Newtonian and Kantian understanding of time and
space.Today it seems that more and more philosophers focus
onTerrell Ward Bynumthe philosophical implications of quantum
physics, and inSouthern Connecticut State Universityparticular the
issue of quantum pairs. Therefore, I was veryinterested in Terry
Bynums paper, when I heard its earlier 1. Introduction: physics and
the information revolutionversion at the 2011 CAP conference in
Aarhus, Denmark. IIt is commonplace today to hear people say that
we are living inam very glad that Terry accepted my invitation so
that histhe Age of Information and that an Information Revolution
isinteresting article is featured in the current issue. Of
course,sweeping across the globe, changing everything from banking
tothe question who is able to avoid excessive reliance on the
warfare, medicine to education, entertainment to government,current
state of science and who falls into the Spencer-trap is and on and
on. But why are these dramatic changes takingalways hard to answer
without a longer historical perspective.place? How is it possible
for information technology (IT) toI am also glad that Luciano
Floridi responds to Terrys paper intransform our world so quickly
and so fundamentally? Scholarsthis issue with an important
historical outlook. More responses in the field of computer ethics
are familiar with James Moorsare expected and encouraged for
submission to the next issue. suggested answer; namely, that IT is
revolutionary because itIn his provocative article Tony Beavers
argues that it mayis logically malleable, making IT one of the most
powerful andbe morally required to build a machine that would
makeflexible technologies ever created. IT is a nearly universal
tool,human beings more moral. I think the paper is an importantMoor
said, that can be adjusted and fine tuned to carry outcontribution
to the recently booming area of robot ethics.almost any task. The
limits of IT, he noted, are basically the limitsAlexandre Monnin
contributes to the set of articles pertaining to of our
imagination. Moors influential analysis of the Informationontology
of the web that started with a paper by Harry Halpin. In Revolution
(including associated concepts like policy vacuums,his tightly
argued work, originally written in French, Alexandreconceptual
muddles, and informationalization) has shown itselfshows why URIs
are philosophically interesting, not only forto be practical and
insightful (see Moor 1998). 3. APA Newsletter, Spring 2012, Volume
11, Number 2 Today, recent developments in physics, especially in
Information is information, not matter or energy. Noquantum theory
and cosmology, suggest an additionalalmost materialism which does
not admit this can survive atmetaphysicalanswer to explain why IT
is so effective in the present day. (p. 132)transforming the world.
During the past two decades, many According to Wiener, therefore,
every physical being can bephysicists have come to believe that the
universe is made viewed as an informational entity. This is true
even of humanof information; that is, that our world is a vast
ocean of beings; and, in 1954, in the second edition of his book
Thequantum bits (qubits) and every object or process in this Human
Use of Human Beings, Wiener noted that the essentialocean of
information (including human beings) can be seen nature of a person
depends, not upon the particular atomsas a constantly changing data
structure comprised of qubits. that happen to comprise ones body at
any given moment, but(See, for example, Lloyd 2006 and Vedral
2010.) If everything inthe world is made of information, and IT
provides knowledgerather upon the informational pattern encoded
within the body:and tools for analyzing and manipulating
information, then weWe are but whirlpools in a river of
ever-flowinghave an impressive explanation of the transformative
power ofwater. We are not stuff that abides, but patterns thatIT
based upon the fundamental nature of the universe!perpetuate
themselves. (p. 96)It is not surprising that important developments
in sciencecan have major philosophical import. Since the time of
ancient The individuality of the body is that of a flame . . . of
aGreece, profound scientific developments have inspired form rather
than a bit of substance. (p. 102)significant rethinking of bedrock
ideas in philosophy. Indeed, In that same book, Wiener presented a
remarkable thoughtscientists working on the cutting edges of their
field often experiment to show that, if one could encode, in a
telegraphengage in thinking that is borderline metaphysical.
Occasionally,message, for example, the entire exquisitely
complexthe scientists and philosophers have been the very
sameinformation pattern of a persons body, and then use thatpeople,
as illustrated by Aristotle, who created physics and encoded
pattern to reconstitute the persons body frombiology and, at the
same time, made related contributionsappropriate atoms at the
receiving end of a message, peopleto metaphysics, logic,
epistemology, and other branches of could travel instantly from
place to place via telegraph. Wienerphilosophy. Or consider
Descartes and Leibniz, both of whomnoted that this idea raises
knotty philosophical questionswere excellent scientists and
world-class mathematicians asregarding not only personal identity,
but also forking fromwell as great philosophers. Sometimes,
thinkers who were one person into two, split personalities,
survival of the selfprimarily scientistsfor example, Copernicus,
Galileo, and after the death of ones body, and a number of others
(WienerNewtoninspired others who were primarily philosophers1950,
Ch. VI; 1954, Ch. V).for example, Hobbes, Locke, and Kant. Later,
revolutionary Decades later, in 1990, physicist John Archibald
Wheelerscientific contributions of Darwin, Einstein, Bohr,
Schrdinger, introduced his famous phrase it from bit in an
influentialand others significantly influenced philosophers like
Spencer, paper (Wheeler 1990), and he thereby gave a major
impetusRussell, Whitehead, Popper, and many more. to an information
revolution in physics. In that paper, WheelerToday, in the early
years of the twenty-first century, declared that all things
physical are information theoretic incosmology and quantum physics
appear likely to alter originthat every physical entity, every it,
derives from bitssignificantly our scientific understanding of the
universe, of that every particle, every field of force, even the
spacetimelife, and of human nature. These developments in physics,
it continuum itself . . . derives its function, its meaning, its
veryseems to me, are sure to lead to important new contributions
existence from bits. He predicted that Tomorrow we will haveto
philosophy. Among contemporary philosophers, Lucianolearned to
understand and express all of physics in the languageFloridiwith
his pioneering efforts in the philosophy of of information
(emphasis in the original).information, informational realism, and
information ethics Since 1990, a number of physicistssome of them
inspired(all his terms)has been leading the way in demonstrating by
Wheelerhave made great strides toward fulfilling histhe importance
of the concept of information in philosophy. it-from-bit
prediction. In 2006, for example, in his book(See, for example, his
book The Philosophy of Information, Programming the Universe, Seth
Lloyd presented impressive2011.) Given the above-mentioned
developments in physics, evidence supporting the view that the
universe is not only ait is not surprising that Floridi was the
first philosopher ever vast ocean of qubits, it is actually a
gigantic quantum computer:(in 2008-2009) to hold the prestigious
post of Gauss Professorat the Gttingen Academy of Sciences in
Germany (previousThe conventional view is that the universe is
nothingGauss Professors had been physicists or mathematicians). but
elementary particles. That is true, but it is equallyFloridis
theory of informational realism, though, focuses true that the
universe is nothing but bitsor rather,primarily upon Platonic
information that is not subject to the nothing but qubits. Mindful
that if it walks like a ducklaws of physics. A materialist
philosopher, perhaps, would beand it quacks like a duck then its a
duck . . . sincemore inclined to focus instead upon qubits, which
are physical the universe registers and processes informationin
nature. Whether one takes Floridis Platonic approach or alike a
quantum computer, and is observationallymaterialistic perspective,
I believe that recent developments in indistinguishable from a
quantum computer, then it isphilosophy and physics with regard to
the central importance ofa quantum computer. (p. 154, emphasis in
the original)information will encourage philosophers to rethink the
bedrockconcepts of their field. More recently, in 2011, three
physicists used axioms from information processing to derive the
mathematical framework2. It from bit of quantum mechanics
(Chiribella et al. 2011). These are onlyIt is my view that a
related materialist information revolution in two of a growing
number of achievements that have begun tophilosophy began in the
mid 1940s when philosopher/scientist fulfill Wheelers it from bit
prediction.Norbert Wiener triumphantly announced to his students
andThe present essay explores some philosophical
implicationscolleagues at MIT that entropy is information. He
realized of Wheelers view that every physical entityevery
particle,that information is physical and, therefore, it obeys the
laws every field of force, even space-timederives its very
existenceof physics. As a result, in 1948 in his book Cybernetics,
Wiener from qubits. But if, as Wheeler has said, qubits are
responsiblemade this important claim about philosophical
materialism: for the very existence of every particle and every
field of force,2 4. Philosophy and Computers then qubits were, in
some sense, prior to every other physicalTo begin a double-slit
experiment, a metal plate withthing that exists. Qubits, therefore,
must have been part of thetwo parallel vertical slits is inserted
between the gun and theBig Bang! As Seth Lloyd has said, The Big
Bang was also a Bitdetection screen. The gun then fires individual
particles orBang (Lloyd 2006, 46). objectsone at a timeat the
double-slit plate. If the particles Unlike traditional bits, such
as those processed in todaysor objects were to act like classical
objects, some of them wouldcomputing devices, qubits have quantum
features, such asgo through the right slit and strike the detection
screen behindgenuine randomness, superposition, and
entanglementthat slit, while others would go through the left slit
and strike thefeatures that Einstein and other scientists
considered spooky detection screen behind that slit. But this is
not what happens.and weird. As explained below, these
scientifically verifiedInstead, surprisingly, a single particle or
object goes through bothquantum phenomena raise important questions
about slits simultaneously, and when a sufficient number of
individualtraditional bedrock philosophical concepts. particles or
objects has been fired, a wave-interference patternis created on
the detection screen from the individual spots3. To be is to be a
quantum data structurewhere the particles or objects landed. In
such an experiment,In most computers today, each bit can only be in
one or the an individual particle or object travels toward the
double-slitother of two specific states, 0 or 1. Such a classical
bit cannot plate as a wave; and then, on the other side of the
double-slitbe both 0 and 1 at the same time. A qubit, on the other
hand, plate, it travels toward the detection screen as two wavescan
simultaneously be 0 and 1, and indeed it can even be in
aninterfering with each other. When the two interfering
wavesinfinite number of different states between 0 and 1. As
Vlatkoarrive at the detection screen, however, a classical particle
orVedral noted, in his book Decoding Reality: the Universe as
object suddenly appears on the screen at a specific locationQuantum
Information (2010), which could not have been known in advance,
even in principle. we are permitted to have a zero and a one at the
sameIn summary, then, in a double-slit experiment, single time
present in one physical system. In fact, we are particles or
objects behave also like waveseven like two permitted to have an
infinite range of states betweenwaves creating an interference
pattern. How is a philosopher zero and onewhich we call a qubit.
(p. 137) to interpret these results? Perhaps we could try to make
senseof this weird behavior by adopting a distinction much likeThis
remarkable feature of qubits is not just a theoretical Aristotles
distinction between the potential and the actual.possibility. It is
real, in the sense that it is governed by the laws When a child is
born, for example, Aristotle would say thatof physics, and it
enables quantum computers to calculate far the child is potentially
a language speaker, but not actually amore efficiently than a
traditional computer using classical bits language speaker. The
potential of the child to speak a language(see below).is, for
Aristotle, something real that is included in the very If every
physical thing in the universe consists of qubitsinnature of the
child. In contrast, a stone or a chunk of wood,keeping with
Wheelers it from bit hypothesisthen onefor example, does not have
the potential ever to become awould expect that any physical entity
could be in many differentlanguage speaker. For Aristotle, the
potential and the actualstates at once, depending on the many
states of the qubits of are both real in the sense that both are
part of the nature of awhich it is composed. Indeed, quantum
physicists have found being; and the potential of a being becomes
actualized throughthat, under the right circumstances, All objects
in the universe interactions with already actualized things in the
environment.are capable of being in all possible states (Vedral
2010, 122).A child, for example, becomes an actual language speaker
byThis means that objects can be in many different places
atinteracting appropriately with people in the community who
areonce, that a particle could be both positive and negative at
theactual language speakers. And, similarly, an unlit candle,
whichsame time, or simultaneously spinning clockwise and counter
potentially has a flame at the top, becomes a candle with
anclockwise around the same axis. It means that living
thingslikeactual flame when it interacts appropriately with some
actualSchrdingers famous cat or a human beingcould be both fire in
the environment.alive and dead at the same time, and at least some
things canIf we adopt a distinction that is very similar to
Aristotles, webe teleported from place to place instantly over long
distancescould say, perhaps, that the waves in a double-slit
experimentfaster than the speed of light without passing through
the spaceconsist of potential paths that the particle or object
could followin between. Finally, it also means that, at the deepest
level ofon its way to the detection screen. Indeed, this is an
interpretationreality, the universe is both digital and analogue at
the sametime. These are not mere speculations, but requirements
ofthat many quantum scientists accept. The potential paths,
then,quantum mechanics, which is the most tested and most strongly
are real entities that travel through space-time together as
aconfirmed scientific theory in history. So, philosophers, it
seems, wave or packet of possibilities between the gun and thewill
have to rethink many fundamental philosophical concepts, screen.
But where is the actual (that is, classical) particle orlike being
and non-being, real and unreal, actual and potential,object while
its packet of possibilities is traveling to the screen?cause and
effect, consistent and contradictory, knowledge and Has the
classical particle or object itself disappeared? Or does
itthinking, and many more (see below).exist as a packet of
possibilities? And how could it be an actualparticle or object when
it is still in the gun, or when it strikes the4. Coming into
existence in the classical universe: screen, but then only be a
wave of possibilities while travelinginformation and decoherence
between the two? Typical philosophical ideas about real andA
familiar double-slit experiment, which is often performed unreal,
cause and effect, potential and actual dont seem to fittoday in
high school physics classes and undergraduatethis case.
Nevertheless, double-slit experiments are regularlylaboratories,
illustrates the ability of different kinds of objects performed in
high school classrooms and undergraduate labsto be in many
different states at once. In such an experiment,around the worldand
always with the same weird results.particles or larger objects are
fired, one at a time, by a particleIndeed, quantum mechanics
requires that every object in thegun toward a screen designed to
detect them. The particles universe, no matter how large, would
behave the same wayor objects in the experiment, can be, for
example, photons, under the right circumstances!or electrons, or
single atoms, or much larger objects, such asIn quantum mechanics,
the possibilities that form thebuckeyballs (composed of sixty
carbon atoms comprised ofwave are said to be superposed upon each
other, and so1,080 subatomic particles), or even larger objects.
together they are called the superpositions of the particle or 3 5.
APA Newsletter, Spring 2012, Volume 11, Number 2 object. Some
quantum scientists would say that the particleIf two electrons (or
other quantum entities) are closeor object exists everywhere at
once within the wave. Other together and interact appropriately,
instead of acting like twoscientists would say that no actual
particle or object existsseparate entities, each with its own
superposed possibilities, thewithin the wave, and it is
illegitimate even to ask for its specific two electrons share their
superpositions and begin to act like alocation. In any case, when a
wave of possibilities interactssingle quantum entity. This
phenomenon is called entanglement.appropriately with another
physical entity in its environment by Thus, the spins of two
entangled electrons, both of which aresharing a bit of information
with another physical entity, all the spinning simultaneously
clockwise and counterclockwise,superposed possibilitiesexcept
onesuddenly disappear depend upon each other in such a way that if
one of theand one actualized classical particle or object instantly
appearselectrons is measured or observed, thereby randomly
makingrandomly at a specific location. Quantum physicists call
thisit spin definitely clockwise or definitely counterclockwise,
thephenomenon, in which a wave of possibilities gets convertedother
electrons spin instantly becomes the opposite of theinto an
actualized classical object, decoherence.spin of the first one. The
amazing and puzzling (Einstein said Decoherence, then, is a
remarkable phenomenon! It isspooky) thing is that such entanglement
can continue towhat brings into existence actualized classical
objectslocatedexist even if the electrons are separated by huge
distances. Forat specific places and with specific properties that
can beexample, if one entangled electron is on Earth and the
otherobserved and measured. Decoherence somehow extracts or one is
sent to Mars, they still can be entangled. So if someonecreates
classical objects out of an infinite set of possibilitiesmeasures
the electron on Earth yielding, at random, a definitewithin our
universe; and this extraction process is genuinelyclockwise spin
for the Earth-bound electron, then the otherrandom. As Anton
Zeilinger explains, electronthe one on Marsmust instantly spin
definitely counterclockwise! This instant result occurs no matter
howThe world as it is right now in this very moment doesfar away
the other electron is, and it violates the speed of lightnot
determine uniquely the world in a few years, in a requirement of
relativity theory. That is why Einstein consideredfew minutes, or
even in the next second. The world it to be spooky action at a
distance.is open. We can give only probabilities for
individualevents to happen. And it is not just our ignorance.How is
a philosopher to interpret these phenomena,Many people believe that
this kind of randomness iswhich do not fit well with the usual
philosophical accounts oflimited to the microscopic world, but this
is not true,cause and effect? Apparently, philosophers need to
becomeas the [random] measurement result itself can have
creativeperhaps even daringby questioning old, familiarmacroscopic
consequences. (Zeilinger 2010, 265)foundational concepts that have
formed the metaphysical bedrock of philosophy for centuries. For
example, given theRandom or not, being or existing in our universe
has two growing belief among physicists that the universe is an
oceandifferent varieties: of quantum information, and given Seth
Lloyds view that the 1. One is quantum existence as a wave of
superposeduniverse behaves like a gigantic quantum computer,
perhaps we possibilities, while the other is could interpret
superpositions as entities much like subroutines 2. Classical
existence as a specific object located at a stored within the
quantum computer/universe and waiting to specific place in
space-time with classical propertiesbe run. When the
computer/universe randomly sends a bit of which can be observed and
measured. information to one of its subroutines, that subroutine is
the one that gets run, while the others get erased or taken off
line.In our universe, the quantum realm and the classical realm
This would be the phenomenon called decoherence, whichexist
together and interact with each other. The ultimate source randomly
extracts classical reality from an infinite source ofof physical
being is the constantly expanding ocean of qubits, possibilities
generated by the underlying quantum computer/which establish what
is physically possible by generatingor universe.being?an infinite
set of superposed possibilities. From thisinfinite, always
expanding, set of possibilities, the sharing of Given this
suggested story, the entanglement of twospecific information
(decoherence) generates the everydayquantum entities could be
interpreted as the establishment ofclassical objects of our world
in specific locations withsomething very like a hyperlink
connecting subroutines withinobservable and measurable properties.
Information, then, the cosmic quantum computer. The classical
world, includingcombined with the process of sharing information,
is the all physical objects and processesperhaps even
space-timeultimate source of everything physical in our universe.
It from bit! and gravitycould be a projection or virtual reality
generated by the cosmic quantum computer. The laws of nature of
the5. Additional quantum puzzles for philosophy classical worldsuch
as Einsteins speed of light requirementSimilar philosophical
challenges arise from other quantumwould then be part of the
virtual reality projection; while spookyphenomena, such as
entanglement, spooky action at a action at a distance would be the
result of a hyperlink insidedistance, teleportation, and quantum
computing. Each of these of the cosmic quantum computerthat is,
inside the underlyingphenomena is briefly discussed below along
with some of theocean of qubits which create our classical world
through thephilosophical questions that arise from them.process of
decoherence. In such a situation, there would be noEntanglement and
Spooky Action at a Distance Asneedand no wayto unite relativity and
quantum mechanics,indicated above, a quantum entity can be
indefinite in the because they would exist in different worlds (or
different parts ofsense that its properties can be superposed
possibilities that the same world). This is only one metaphysical
speculation (myhave not yet been actualized. For example, an
electron could own) regarding the ultimate nature of the universe
in our Agebe spinning clockwise and counterclockwise around the
same of Information. Creative philosophers need to come up withaxis
at the same time. When one observes or measures thatmany more
stories until we find one that can be scientificallyelectron (or
when it interacts with another physical entity in confirmed.
Metaphysicians, start your engines!the environment), its
spininstantly and randomlybecomesTeleportation Another quantum
phenomenon that presentsdefinitely clockwise or definitely
counterclockwise. Thisa challenge to traditional philosophy is
called teleportation,happens because of decoherence in which the
electron sharesa process in which the quantum properties of one
objectinformation about itself with the measurer (or something
elseare transferred instantly to another object by means ofin the
environment). entanglement and measurement. Because the transfer
of4 6. Philosophy and Computers properties takes place via
entanglement, it occurs instantly 6. The need to rethink the
foundations of philosophyno matter how far apart the objects might
be in the classicalIn the June 2011 issue of Scientific American,
Vlatko Vedral madeworld, and without the need to travel through
space-time.a convincing case for the view that quantum properties
are notThe object which acquires the quantum properties of
theconfined to tiny subatomic particles (Vedral 2011). Most
people,original is rendered identical to the original, and the
original he noted, including even many physicists, make the
mistakeis destroyed by measurement. (In some cases, some
classicalof dividing the world into two kinds of entity: on the one
hand,information also must be sent to the receiving station, using
atiny particles which are quantum in nature; and on the
othertraditional communication channel, to make adjustments inhand,
larger macro objects, which obey the classical laws ofthe recipient
of the teleported properties and thereby assurephysics, including
relativity.that the recipient is identical to the original.) It is
important tonote that in teleportation it is quantum information
that getsYet this convenient partitioning of the world is a
myth.transferred, not the matter/energy of the original object.
TheFew modern physicists think that classical physics hasrecipient
of the teleported quantum properties contains matter/ equal status
with quantum mechanics; it is but a usefulenergy that is not the
original matter/energy of the donor object,approximation of a world
that is quantum at all scales.but the recipient is otherwise
absolutely identical to the original.(Vedral 2011, 38 and 40) How
should philosophers interpret these results? Is the Vedral went on
to discuss a number of macro objects whichoriginal entity
teleported, or merely an exact copy of it? Ifapparently have
exhibited quantum properties, including,we agree with Norbert
Wiener that all physical objects and for example, (1) entanglement
within a piece of lithiumprocesses are continually changing data
structures, and notfluoride made from trillions of atoms, (2)
entanglement withinthe matter/energy that happens to encode the
data at a given European robins who use it to guide their yearly
migrationsmoment (Bynum 2010), then the teleported entity is
actuallyof 13,000 kilometers between Europe and central Africa,the
original data structure, and not merely a copy. On the other and
(3) entanglement within plants that use it to bring abouthand, if
Wieners view is rejected, what is a better
interpretationphotosynthesis.of quantum teleportation? Given what
has been said above, and given all the importantQuantum Computing
Because qubits can simultaneously be developments in the
information revolution that is happeningin many different states
between 0 and 1, and because of the within physics today, it is
time for philosophers to awaken fromphenomenon of entanglement,
quantum computers are able their metaphysical slumbers and join the
Information Age!to perform numerous computing tasks at the very
same time. *An earlier version of this paper was the 2011 Preston
Covey AddressAs Vlatko Vedral explains, at the IACAP2011 conference
in Aarhus, Denmark.any problem in Nature can be reduced to a search
for Referencesthe correct answer amongst several (or a few
million)Bynum, Terrell Ward. 2011. The historical roots of
information andincorrect answers. . . . [and] unlike a conventional
computer ethics. In The Cambridge Handbook of Information
andcomputer which checks each possibility one at aComputer Ethics,
ed. Luciano Floridi. Cambridge University Press.time, quantum
physics allows us to check multipleChiribella, Giuli; DAriano,
Giacomo; Perinotti, Paolo. July 2011.possibilities simultaneously.
(Vedral 2010, 138, Informational derivation of quantum theory.
Physical Review A. 84.emphasis in the original)Floridi, Luciano.
2011. The Philosophy of Information. Oxford University Press.Once
we have learned to make quantum computers with Lloyd, Seth. 2006.
Programming the Universe: A Quantum Computersignificantly more than
14 qubits of inputwhich is the current Scientist Takes on the
Universe. Alfred A. Knopf.state of the artquantum computing will
provide remarkable Moor, James H. 1998. Reason, relativity and
responsibility in computerefficiency and amazing computing power!
As Seth Lloyd has ethics. Computers and Society
28(1):14-21.explained, Vedral, Vlatko. 2010. Decoding Reality: The
Universe as QuantumA quantum computer given 10 input qubits can
doInformation. Oxford University Press.1,024 things at once. A
quantum computer given 20Vedral, Vlatko. 2011. Living in a quantum
world. Scientific Americanqubits can do 1,048,576 things at once.
One with 300 June:38-43.qubits of input can do more things at once
than thereWheeler, John A. 1990. Information, physics, quantum: the
search forare elementary particles in the universe. (Lloyd 2006,
links. In Complexity, Entropy, and the Physics of Information, ed.
W.138-139) Zurek. Addison-Wesley. Wiener, Norbert. 1948.
Cybernetics: or Control and Communication in For philosophy, such
remarkable computer power has the Animal and the Machine. MIT
Press.major implications for concepts such as knowledge, thinking,
Wiener, Norbert. 1950, 1954. The Human Use of Human Beings:and
intelligenceand, by extension, artificial intelligence. Cybernetics
and Society. Houghton Mifflin, First Edition; DoubledayImagine an
artificially intelligent robot whose brain includes a Anchor Books,
Second Edition Revised.quantum computer with 300 qubits. The brain
of such a robot Zeilinger, Anton. 2010. Dance of the Photons: From
Einstein tocould do more things simultaneously than all the
elementaryTeleportation. Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.particles in
the universe! Compare that to the problem-solvingabilities of a
typical human brain. Or consider the case of so-called human idiot
savantswho can solve tremendouslychallenging math problems in their
heads instantly, or Hyperhistor y and the Philosophy ofremember
every waking moment in their lives, or remember,Information
Policiesvia a photographic memory, every word on every pagethey
have ever read. Perhaps such savants have quantum Luciano Floridi
University of Hertfordshire and University of Oxford*entanglements
in their brains which function like quantumcomputers. Perhaps
consciousness itself is an entanglementphenomenon. The implications
for epistemology and the1. Prefacephilosophy of mind are
staggering! I am hugely indebted to Terry Bynums work. Not merely
for5 7. APA Newsletter, Spring 2012, Volume 11, Number 2 his kind
and generous acknowledgement of my efforts tocapabilities are the
necessary condition for the maintenanceestablish a philosophy of
information but, way more seriously and any further development of
societal welfare, personaland significantly, because of his
ground-breaking work, which well-being, as well as intellectual
flourishing. The nature ofopened new research paths to philosophers
of my generation, conflicts provides a sad test for the reliability
of this tripartiteespecially, but not only, in computer ethics.
interpretation of human evolution. Only a society that lives I
suppose the best way to honor his work is probably
byhyperhistorically can be vitally threatened informationally,
bytrying to contribute to it. In this short article, I shall
attempta cyber attack. Only those who live by the digit may die by
theto do so by taking seriously two important points made in
digit.Bynums article. One is his question: How is it possible forTo
summarize, human evolution may be visualized as ainformation
technology (IT) to transform our world so quickly three-stage
rocket: in prehistory, there are no ICTs; in history,and so
fundamentally? The other is his exhortation: we need there are
ICTs, they record and transmit data, but humanto bring philosophy
into the Information Age []. We need tosocieties depend mainly on
other kinds of technologiesrethink the bedrock foundations of
philosophy that were laidconcerning primary resources and energy;
in hyperhistory,down hundreds of years ago by philosophers like
Hobbes, there are ICTs, they record, transmit, and, above all,
processLocke, Hume, and Kant. Central philosophical concepts
shoulddata, and human societies become vitally dependent on thembe
re-examined []. I shall accept Bynums exhortation. Andand on
information as a fundamental resource.I shall try to contribute an
answer to his question by calling the If all this is even
approximately correct, the emergencereaders attention to the need
to reconsider our philosophy from its historical age represents one
of the most significantof politics, our philosophy of law, and our
philosophy of steps taken by humanity for a very long time. It
certainly openseconomics, in short, to the need of developing a
philosophy ofup a vast horizon of opportunities, all essentially
driven by theinformation policies for our time. The space is of
course limited,recording, transmitting, and processing powers of
ICTs. Fromso I hope the reader will forgive me for some
simplifications synthetic biochemistry to neuroscience, from the
Internetand sweeping remarks that will deserve much more carefulof
things to unmanned planetary explorations, from greenanalysis in a
different context.technologies to new medical treatments, from
social media2. Hyperhistory to digital games, our activities of
discovery, invention, design,control, education, work,
socialization, entertainment, and soMore people are alive today
than ever before in the evolution offorth would be not only
unfeasible but unthinkable in a purelyhumanity. And more of us live
longer and better today than ever mechanical, historical
context.before. To a large measure, we owe this to our
technologies,at least insofar as we develop and use them
intelligently, It follows that we are witnessing the outlining of
apeacefully, and sustainably.macroscopic scenario in which an
exponential growth ofnew inventions, applications, and solutions in
ICTs are quicklySometimes, we may forget how much we owe to
flakesdetaching future generations from ours. Of course, this is
notand wheels, to sparks and ploughs, to engines and satellites. to
say that there is no continuity, both backward and forward.We are
reminded of such deep technological debt when we Backward, because
it is often the case that the deeper adivide human life into
prehistory and history. That significant transformation is, the
longer and more widely rooted itsthreshold is there to acknowledge
that it was the invention and causes are. It is only because many
different forces have beendevelopment of information and
communication technologies building the pressure for a very long
time that radical changes(ICTs) that made all the difference
between who we were may happen all of a sudden, perhaps
unexpectedly. It is notand who we are. It is only when the lessons
learnt by pastthe last snowflake that breaks the branch of the
tree. In ourgenerations began to evolve in a Lamarckian rather than
a case, it is certainly history that begets hyperhistory. There
isDarwinian way that humanity entered into history. no ASCII
without the alphabet. Forward, because it is mostHistory has lasted
six thousand years, since it began withplausible that historical
societies will survive for a long time inthe invention of writing
in the fourth millennium BC. Duringthe future, not unlike the
Amazonian tribes mentioned above.this relatively short time, ICTs
have provided the recording andDespite globalization, human
societies do not parade uniformlytransmitting infrastructure that
made the escalation of other forward, in synchronic
steps.technologies possible. ICTs became mature in the few
centuriesbetween Guttenberg and Turing. Today, we are experiencing
3. The philosophy of information policiesa radical transformation
in our ICTs that could prove equally Given the unprecedented
novelties that the dawn ofsignificant, for we have started drawing
a new thresholdhyperhistory is causing, it is not surprising that
many of ourbetween history and a new age, which may be aptly
calledfundamental philosophical views, so entrenched in
history,hyperhistory. Let me explain. may need to be upgraded, if
not entirely replaced. Perhaps notPrehistory and history work like
adverbs: they tell usyet in academia, think tanks, research
centers, or R&D offices,how people live, not when or where.
From this perspective,but clearly in the streets and online, there
is an atmosphere ofhuman societies currently stretch across three
ages, as waysconfused expectancy, of exciting, sometimes nave,
bottom-upof living. According to reports about an unspecified
number changes in our views about (i) the world, (ii) ourselves,
(iii) ourof uncontacted tribes in the Amazonian region, there are
stillinteractions with the world, and (iv) among ourselves.some
societies that live prehistorically, without ICTs or at least These
four focus points are not the result of researchwithout recorded
documents. If one day such tribes disappear, programs, or the
impact of successful grant applications. Muchthe end of the first
chapter of our evolutionary book will have more realistically and
powerfully, but also more confusedly andbeen written. The greatest
majority of people today still livetentatively, the changes in our
Weltanschauung are the result ofhistorically, in societies that
rely on ICTs to record and transmit our daily adjustments,
intellectually and behaviorally, to a realitydata of all kinds. In
such historical societies, ICTs have not yetthat is fluidly
changing in front of our eyes and under our feet,overtaken other
technologies, especially energy-related ones, exponentially,
relentlessly. We are finding our new balance byin terms of their
vital importance. Then there are some peopleshaping and adapting to
hyperhistorical conditions that havearound the world who are
already living hyperhistorically, in not yet sedimented into a
mature age, in which novelties aresocieties or environments where
ICTs and their data processingno longer disruptive but finally
stable patterns of more of 6 8. Philosophy and Computers
approximately the same (think, for example, of the car or the
Referencesbook industry, and the stability they have
provided).Floridi, L. 2003. On the intrinsic value of information
objects and the It is for this reason that the following
terminology is infosphere. Ethics and Information Technology
4(4):287-304.probably inadequate to capture the intellectual
novelty that Floridi, L. 2008. Artificial intelligences new
frontier: artificial companionswe are facing. As Bynum rightly
stressed, our very conceptualand the fourth revolution.
Metaphilosophy 39(4/5):651-55.vocabulary and our ways of making
sense of the world (ourFloridi, L. 2010. Information - a Very Short
Introduction. Oxford, Oxfordsemanticising processes and practices)
need to be reconsidered University Press.and redesigned in order to
provide us with a better grasp of our Floridi, L. 2011. The
Philosophy of Information. Oxford, Oxford Universityhyperhistorical
age, and hence a better chance to shape andPress.deal with it. With
this proviso in mind, it seems clear that a new Floridi, L.
Forthcoming. Information Ethics. Oxford, Oxford
Universityphilosophy of history, which tries to makes sense of our
age asPress.the end of history and the beginning of hyperhistory,
invites thedevelopment of (see the four points above) (i) a new
philosophyof nature, (ii) a new philosophical anthropology, (iii) a
syntheticIs Ethics Headed for Moral Behaviorism
ande-nvironmentalism as a bridge between us and the world,
andShould We Care?(iv) a new philosophy of politics among us. In
other contexts, I have argued that such an invitationAnthony F.
Beaversamounts to a request for a new philosophy of information The
University of Evansvillethat can work at 360 degrees on our
hyperhistorical conditionThe righteous are responsible for evil
before anyone else is.(Floridi 2011). I have sought to develop a
philosophy of natureThey are responsible because they have not been
righteous enoughin terms of a philosophy of the infosphere (Floridi
2003), andto make their justice spread and abolish injustice: it is
the fiascoa philosophical anthropology in terms of a fourth
revolution inof the best which leaves the coast clear for the
worst.our self-understandingafter the Copernican, the Darwinian,and
Freudian onesthat re-interprets humans as informational Levinas
(1976/1990, 186), paraphrasing the prophet Ezekielorganisms living
and interacting with other informational agents A Provocationin the
infosphere (Floridi 2008; 2010). Finally, I have suggestedI start
with a premise that may appear at first as a moralthat an expansion
of environmental ethics to all environments imperative: if it is
within our power to build a machine thatincluding those that are
artificial, digital, or syntheticshould be can make human beings
more moral, both individually andbased on an information ethics for
the whole infosphere (Floridi collectively, then we have a prima
facie moral obligation toforthcoming). What I have not done but I
believe to be overlybuild it. Objections to this claim are, of
course, tenable, thoughdue is to outline a philosophy of
information policies consistentthey may assume particular
conceptions of ethics that havewith such initial steps, one that
can reconsider our philosophical historically carried great
credibility, but whose credibility weviews of economics, law, and
politics in the proper context of might have new reason to doubt.
Some of these objections arethe hyperhistorical condition and the
information society. apparent if we substitute the word nation with
machine and4. Conclusionclaim that if it is within our power to
build a nation that can make human beings more moral, then we have
a prima facieSix thousand years ago, a generation of humans
witnessed the obligation to build it. While this claim, too, may at
first seeminvention of writing and the emergence of the State. This
is not intuitively correct, it could prove objectionable if the
most directaccidental. Prehistoric societies are both ICT-less and
stateless. way to build such a state requires totalitarianism or,
minimally,The State is a typical historical phenomenon. It emerges
whenan overly-coercive state that punishes moral (and not
merelyhuman groups stop living in small communities a hand-to-
legal) wrongdoers. We thus find ourselves at the nexus ofmouth
existence and begin to live a mouth-to-hand one, inseveral
inter-related issues, including not only how to determinewhich
large communities become political societies, with in a precise way
what is morally correct, but also the role thatdivision of labor
and specialized roles, organized under somefreedom plays in moral
culpability. If a total nation-state holdsform of government, which
manages resources through theindividuals at gun point and demands
that they act morallycontrol of ICTs. From taxes to legislation,
from the administrationunder pain of death, their actions are no
more deserving ofof justice to military force, from census to
social infrastructure,reward than they would be deserving of
punishment if at gunthe State is the ultimate information agent and
so history is thepoint they were made to act immorally.age of the
State. Indeed, it is a common ethical assumption, in the WestAlmost
halfway between the beginning of history and now, at least, that
someone can be morally praised or blamed (thatPlato was still
trying to make sense of both radical changes:is, culpable) only for
actions that are in their power to do orthe encoding of memories
through written symbols and the refrain from doing. Thus, a good
character in virtue ethics issymbiotic interactions between
individual and polis-State. Inonly worthy of respect because it is
in the power of individualsfifty years, our grandchildren may look
at us as the last of the to sculpt their own characters, and in
Kantian ethics, moralhistorical, State-run generations, not so
differently from the way praise and blame can only be attributed to
creatures that arewe look at the Amazonian tribes, as the last of
the prehistorical, free. Such an assumption, however, itself
becomes problematicstateless societies. It may take a long while
before we shallif we rearrange our initial premise a bit and
suggest that if it iscome to understand in full such
transformations, but it is timein our power to design human beings
genetically to be moral,to start working on it. Bynums invitation
to bring philosophythen we have a prima facie obligation to do so.
In this case,into the Information Age is most welcome. humans might
still choose the right course of action with the* Research Chair in
Philosophy of Information, and UNESCO Chair in same feeling of
freedom that we do, but only because theyInformation and Computer
Ethics, University of Hertfordshire; Faculty of are engineered to
do so. That some among us would object toPhilosophy and Department
of Computer Science, University of Oxford. such a course of action
is readily apparent in the fact that manyAddress for
correspondence: Department of Philosophy, University offind Huxleys
Brave New World a piece of dystopian, and notHertfordshire, de
Havilland Campus, Hatfield, Hertfordshire AL10 9AB,utopian,
fiction. Furthermore, the theological among us mightUK;
l.floridi@herts.ac.ukworry that if it is morally imperative to
engineer moral human7 9. APA Newsletter, Spring 2012, Volume 11,
Number 2 beings, then God must have made a tragic mistake in the
firstImplicit in this observation is the notion that ought
impliesplace by making us the way he did. implementability.
Admittedly, this claim looks counter-intuitiveNew possibilities
from research in computational at first blush, but it is a logical
extension of the Kantian notionmachinery and bio-engineering are
raising a daring question: that ought implies can properly situated
by the possibility ofAre we not morally required to engineer a
moral world, whether moral machinery. Can in this context means
that one mustby deference to moral machines, social engineering, or
takinghave the ability to x, before we can claim that one ought
tocontrol over our biology? When we consider the great lengths x.
This, in turn, implies that the behavioral recommendationswe go to
in training a child by nurturing guilt and a sense of of any moral
theory must fall within the power of an agentshame (scolding, for
instance), fighting, even killing, in (so to perform, or, in other
words, that the theory itself must becalled) moral wars, punishing
and rewarding wrongdoers able to be implemented, whether in wetware
or hardware.accordingly, sanctioning acceptable conduct in our
institutionsConsequently, computational ethics sets a criterion
forthrough mechanisms of law, etc., such a question does
notevaluating the tenability of moral theories. If it can be
shownseem misplaced. It is as if we want to create a moral world,
that a particular theory cannot be physically implemented,but in
the most difficult, unproductive, and possibly even whether for
logical or empirical reasons, we are justifiedimmoral way possible.
History itself bears testimony to ourin claiming that that theory
insofar as it is a moral theory isfailure: witness the fact that
the U.S. is quickly approaching untenable.involvement in the
longest war in its history contrasted against Initially, this might
sound well and good if it werent for thethe fact that most
Americans are barely aware that we arefact that such a criterion
poses serious problems for Kantianfighting at all and seem to have
lost any interest in seeing itdeontology and classical
utilitarianism, because they both runcome to an end. Furthermore,
even if this war were to end, into moral variants of the frame
problem and are therefore notwe collectively characterize war in
general as inevitable, which implementable. (For further discussion
on Kant, see Beaversmeans also that we have accepted it as
unavoidable. Arriving 2009.) Without rehearsing the full arguments
here, a quickat this point is simply to have given up on the
matter. But, to be sketch might be sufficient to get the point
across.fair to ethics, this fatalism (or indifference) must itself
be seenKants universalization formula of the categorical
imperativeas a serious moral transgressionone that is only
apparently,says Act as if the maxim of your action were to become
throughbut not actually, banalif there is in fact something we can
doyour will a universal law of nature (1785/1994, 30), where ato
fix the situation. Should we, at this point in history, start
tomaxim is defined as the subjective principle of acting. It is
thethink seriously about putting an end to our moral indecency?
rule that I employ as a subject when acting individually, and
itMight Huxleys Brave New World or some variant thereof beis moral
if and only if I can at the same time permit any agentutopian after
all? What should the world look like morally, givenin the same
situation to employ the same maxim. The problemthat technology is
slowly giving us the power to shape it as wehere is that the
possibility of universalization depends on thewish, and would it be
worth the cost if developing a moral world scope I set for the
maxim. If the subject is defined as a classmeant abandoning several
cherished assumptions about ethics? of one (i.e., anyone exactly
like me in exactly my particularThe goal of ethics is to make
itself obsolete, hopefully,situation), any maxim will universalize,
and thus every actionthough, by fulfillment in moral community and
not by justcould be morally permissible. To avoid this conclusion
onedefining it out of existence. Yet, current trends in
technologymust find a non-arbitrary way to establish the legitimate
scopeand, more broadly, in society seem to be leaning toward theof
a maxim that should be taken into account. The prospectslatter.
Ethics, traditionally conceived, is under attack on severalfor
doing so objectively seem poor without simultaneouslyfronts. Yet,
given its historical failure, we must wonder whetherbegging the
question.it is worth saving. Im beginning to think not. The goal of
the Similarly, Mill runs into problems with the principle ofrest of
this essay is to say why. utility where actions are right in
proportion as they tend toHonestly, Is Honesty a Virtue? promote
happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverseTemperance,
courage, wisdom, and justice made it into Platosof happiness
(1861/1979, 7). As is commonly known, Mill doeslist of virtues in
the Republic, but, ironically, the author of the cave not mean the
promotion of my happiness and the reduction ofallegory did not
include honesty. Yet, as his text clearly shows,my private pains.
He means those of the (global?) communitythis was no oversight,
since honesty is necessary for avoiding as a whole. Because the
success of an action hangs on futureself-deception and is thus
necessary for the named virtues asstates that are wholly unknown to
the agent, the principle ofwell. Self-deception is quite hard to
avoid, even in matters ofutility is computationally intractable.
Without some specificationepistemology and especially in ethics. In
this spirit, Dennett of the scope, it is impossible to know whether
any particularsays of the frame problem that it is not merely an
annoying action promotes or impedes happiness across the
whole.technical embarrassment in robotics, but on the contrary,The
worst atrocities might, over time, turn out to maximizethat it is a
new, deep epistemological problemaccessiblehappiness, while the
kindest gestures to some could lead toin principle but unnoticed by
generations of philosophers tragic consequences for others.brought
to light by the novel methods of AI, and still far
fromUtilitarianism might be salvageable by modifying it intobeing
solved (1984, 130). More recently, he remarked that AIsome
computationally tractable form . . . maybe. It is too soonmakes
philosophy honest (2006). In a similar vein after citing to say,
but I have my doubts about Kant, pace Powers, who hasthis last
quote from Dennett, Anderson and Anderson observemade a worthy
attempt to save him by treating the categoricalthat ethics must be
made computable in order to make it clear imperative in its various
forms as heuristics for behaviorexactly how agents ought to behave
in ethical dilemmas (2007, rather than strict rules (2006). This
approach, I worry, leads16). In this light, it is common among
machine ethicists to thinkto problems of its own, such as losing
the objective criterionthat research in computational ethics
extends beyond buildingfor determining precisely when a behavior is
moral which themoral machinery because it helps us better
understand ethics categorical imperative was meant to provide. (If
the categoricalin the case of human beings. This is because of what
we must imperative is a heuristic, what is the algorithm for which
itknow about ethics in general to build machines that
operateprovides the short cut?) But I have deeper worries about
Kantwithin normative parameters. Unclear intuitions are unworkable
that I have presented elsewhere (2009 & 2011b) and that
arewhere engineering specifications are required. appropriate to
repeat here.8 10. Philosophy and Computers For reasons that should
be clear from the above, ought things on their own. Internet
routers and the switches on thecannot imply must. That is, if it is
impossible for me to refrain U.S. power grid do so to help with
load balancing, the automaticfrom an action, then the notion of
ought does not apply. (Thisbraking system on my car does, and even
my dishwasher andis why angels and animals are not moral agents in
Kantsdryer do, since neither stop until they sense that the job
ismoral architecture.) Said in other words, ought implies might
done. Such machines interact with environmental cues thatnot.
However, if so, then we are heading for an uncomfortable may in
certain circumstances lead to dire consequences. Moresituation that
I have identified as the paradox of automated pressingly, advances
in auto-generative programming allowmoral agency or P-AMA (2011b).
In brief, it starts with a fewmachines to write their own code,
often producing innovativedefinitions, followed by a question and
then an argument. The and unpredictable results. To set such
machines free on thedefinitions are intended to avoid starting with
question-beggingworld without building in moral constraints would
simply bebiases. Thus, irresponsible on the part of their
designers, but to anticipateevery contingency is not possible
either. So these constraints{def MA} any agent that does the right
thing morally,themselves have to autonomously decide things as
well. Inhowever determined. short, they must be able to evaluate
situations and use someIn stating the definition in this way, we do
not imply any moralprocedure to act in morally acceptable
ways.evaluation or theory of moral behavior. We do so in order to
The issue is pulled into greater focus when we addressclear room
for the question just intimated. Having defined an MAthe question
of who is to blame when such machines fail. Ifneutrally, we can now
distinguish between responsible moral they are autonomous and left
to their own devices, blamingagents (RMAs) and artificial moral
agents (AMAs). In turn, thetheir creators would seem to be cruel
and no more justifiednotion of an RMA is intentionally morally
loaded to fit traditional than blaming parents for the moral
failures of their children orassumptions about what it means for an
agent to be worthy ofGod, for that matter, for the failures of the
free creatures thatmoral praise or blame for its actions.he
unleashes on the world. We could, of course, argue that thecreators
of such machines should not make them autonomous{def RMA} an MA
that is fully responsible andin the first place, but this is
tantamount to arguing that parentsaccountable for its
actions.should not have children or that God should not have made
hisIt can decide things for itself and so may do or refrain from
doing creatures autonomous either.something using its own
discretion. Because it is the cause of The real issue with the
paradox here points, I believe, to aits own behavior it can be
morally culpable. Finally, to return problem with our traditional
notion of moral responsibility. To beto a more neutral definition:
consistent, if we cannot morally want machines to be RMAs as{def
AMA} a manufactured MA that may or may not opposed to
non-responsible MAs, we cannot want humans to bebe an RMA.either.
Moral responsibility in this light appears to be a solutionof last
resort for fallen creatures. Since I am not theisticallyRegardless
of the technical possibilities of current research inclined, I have
no stake in either exonerating or indicting God,in artificial moral
agency and whether we are disposed to but the matter does speak to
the point that responsibility andthink that an RMA can be the only
genuine kind of MA, we canaccountability, when they carry the
weight of moral praise andnow ask the important question, should an
AMA be an RMA,blame that we attach to them, are necessarily
correlated withassuming it possible for us to make one so. If we
cling to thethe notion that we, humans, are morally broken. If we
can repairnotion of responsibility assumed thus far, the answer
would the situation, we ought to; seriously . . . we physicians
ought toseem to be no.heal ourselves . . . if we can. Given that
the need to make a machine an MA in the first Non-Responsible Moral
Agents . . . Really?place stems from the fact that such machines
are autonomous,that is, they are self-guided, rather than act by
remote control, The notion of a non-responsible moral agent is not
coherent ifwe run into a paradox, P-AMA, which says: we assume
conventional conceptions of responsibility or seeit as a necessary
part of the moral enterprise. But it seems that 1) If we are to
build autonomous machines, we havethe definition of moral
responsibility is being reduced to causal a prima facie moral
obligation to make them RMAs,responsibility by challenges on
several fronts. This is to say that is, agents that are responsible
and able to be held that x is responsible for y means only that x
is the precipitating responsible for their actions. cause of y.
This shift of focus in matters of morals is visible in 2) For an
RMA to be responsible and able to be held the conflation between
ethics and codes of conduct that we responsible for its actions, it
must be capable of bothsee in several of our institutions, in the
notion that immoral succeeding and failing in its moral
obligations. behavior results from neurological deficit embraced by
several 3) An AMA that is also an RMA must therefore be
designedneuroscientists (and sometimes by our courts), and in the
to be capable of both succeeding and failing in itsadvent of moral
machinery. The bottom line, it seems, is not the moral obligations.
need to have agents to blame, but the need to have immoralbehavior
cease. In other words, the social problem of ethics is 4) It would
be a moral failure to unleash upon the worldto create (or
encourage) agents, whether human or otherwise, machines that are
capable of failing in their moralto behave morally. The coercion of
moral behavior, whether by obligations. the promise of rewards or
punishments, is but one means to 5) Therefore, we have a moral
obligation to build AMAsthis end (and one, we must admit, that is
sometimes effective that are not also RMAs.and sometimes not).P-AMA
might be escapable as a paradox by simply denying In 2011a, 2011b,
and 2011c, I advanced what I calledpremise 1, but doing so might
not be as easy as it first appears, the sufficiency argument. It is
intimated here already. Themostly because of the technical aspects
involved with argument maintains that the kind of moral interiority
necessaryautonomy as it applies to machinery. A full discussion of
the for an agent to be an RMA is a sufficient though not
necessarypoint exceeds the scope of this paper, but the problem
cancondition for being an MA. Therefore, moral interiority is
notquickly be summarized by noting that as the world becomes
essential for moral agency. One corollary of the argument
isincreasingly automated, machines are being left to decide that
there are other (and perhaps more effective) ways to be an 9 11.
APA Newsletter, Spring 2012, Volume 11, Number 2 MA that do not
require the internal psychological componentsnot to be able to
distinguish between persons and things, Iinvolved in conscience,
guilt, shame, etc. Advancing this have come to appreciate what is
going on at a deeper level: byposition seriously is really to do
nothing other than pinpointbroadening our moral regard to include
non-human, indeed,the direction that ethics is already heading: the
general focus non-living, things, we also broaden the concept of
harm toof our moral regard is no longer the salvation of the
individualthat of damage (Floridi 2002). This view squares well
withsoul, but individual behavior, properly contextualized, insofar
asthe no-fault ethics mentioned above insofar as harm invitesit has
a moral impact on our social situation. To have come
thiscompensation whereas damage invites repair. In traditionalfar,
however, is already to have wreaked havoc on the historicalviews,
if we harm a person, justice demands compensation,foundations of
ethics, (again) at least in the West.but harming a painting only
makes sense by extension of To make this clear, in 2011c, I invited
the reader to consider metaphor. We cannot pay recompense to a
painting for its painthe headline First Robot Awarded Congressional
Medal ofand suffering. We can, however, see to its repair. This
shift ofHonor for Incredible Acts of Courage on the Battlefield. I
thenfocus from harm to damage invites us to fix problems
ratherasked, What must we assume in the background for such athan
place blame. It is in this spirit that moral behaviorism
startsheadline to make sense without profaning a nations highest to
make sense.award of valor? Minimally, fortitude and discipline,
intention to Setting aside the motives, drives, and desires of
moralact while undergoing the experience of fear, some notion of
agents to focus on the damage that they do and the repairssacrifice
with regard to ones own life, and so forth, for what that they (or
others) can make gets us to what really mattersis courage without
these things? That a robot might simulatein ethics. Once again, the
point of ethics is not grounded in thethem is surely not enough to
warrant the attribution of virtue, need to have agents to blame,
but in the need to make immoralunless we change the meaning of some
terms. At the timebehavior cease. The whys and what fors are beside
theof that writing, I was worried that we, as a species (meaning
point, though, for those who wish to preserve them, they may
doirrespective of the concerns of professional ethicists), were so
with limited concession, as I shall demonstrate momentarily.in the
midst of an inevitable entry into a post-ethical age. In a Indeed,
I regard the possibility of their preservation as one ofsense, I
still think we are, but it might be better to put this inthe
benefits of moral behaviorism.Nietzschean terms and say that we are
tacitly in the processGetting Practical about Moral Philosophyof
revaluing value. The ethical landscape is transforming at itsvery
roots as we are forced by new technological possibilitiesIn their
book Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right fromWrong, Wallach and
Allen call attention to a problem thatand life in a highly
connected world to recognize a plurality ofmorally demands a change
of perspective from traditional ethicslifestyle choices, religious
(and non-religious!) commitments,to something more along the lines
of the above. This demandand political ideologies. Whether this
leads to relativism isis forced by new possibilities regarding
emerging technologies,besides the point; the problem we must face
is whether wethough in some sense it might always have been in the
waiting.can find a way to work together to solve some very
pressingThey write:problems that the species is just beginning to
confront withoutdestroying ourselves in the process. This change of
moral focus Companies developing AI are concerned that theyfrom the
individual soul to the common good now seems to me may be open to
lawsuits even when their systemsto be a positive step in the right
direction, even if it amounts to a enhance human safety. Peter
Norvig of Google offersno-fault ethics. Indeed, this is what I mean
by non-responsible the example of cars driven by advanced
technologymoral agency; pointing fingers gets us nowhere when there
israther than humans. Imagine that half the cars on U.S.serious
work to be done.highways are driven by (ro)bots, and the death toll
Fortunately, information ethics (IE), as advanced by
Floridi,decreases from roughly forty-two thousand a year tostarts
in the right direction with a macro-ethics that mightthirty-one
thousand a year. Will the companies sellingbest be described as an
eco-informational environmentalism. those cars be rewarded? Or will
they be confrontedFloridis views are spread across several papers
and will soonwith ten thousand lawsuits for deaths blamed on thebe
released as a book, Information Ethics, the second volume(ro)bot
drivers? (207)of a quadrilogy on the philosophy of information,
which willGiven our current ethical and legal climate, companies
arecomprise part of an intricate system of philosophical overhaul.
right to be concerned that their technologies to improve ourThus, a
detailed treatment is not possible here. To paint the world may
shift the burden of responsibility from others topicture in broad
strokes though, Floridi advocates following thethemselves. Yet,
from a patient-centered point of view, thislead of environmental
ethics by shifting our focus from the agent demonstrates precisely
what is wrong with approaching ethicsin a moral situation to the
patient. This move is in direct contrastfrom a traditional,
agent-oriented perspective, since it shouldto virtue ethics, which
focuses its attention on the character of be clear that if we can
save ten thousand lives by employingthe subject, but it is also in
contrast to utilitarianism, deontology autonomous vehicles we ought
to do so, regardless of whereand contractarianism, which, though
relational, tend to treatthis places responsibility and
accountability. Some forgivenessthe relata, i.e., the individual
agent and the individual patient, as here is in order. In cases
such as this, the traditional, fault-secondary importance (1999,
41), by putting their focus on the oriented perspective gets in the
way of doing the right thing. Asaction itself. Additionally, they
(including virtue ethics here) aremore technologies with possible
positive ethical consequencesalso anthropocentric in the sense that
they view ethics primarily emerge, this problem will inevitably
become a greater concernas a matter of managing relations between
human beings. Thiswe will have to address.contrasts strongly with
Land Ethics, where the environmentThere is room to be concerned as
well about what happensitself can become a patient worthy of our
moral regard becauseto individual responsibility and accountability
if we fail to deferit is intrinsically valuable and not just
valuable for us. Followingappropriately to certain machines. In
2011b, I put forth a thoughtthis lead, Floridi advocates an
object-oriented and ontocentricexperiment involving MorMach, an all
knowing moral machine,theory (1999, 43) that extends our moral
concern to anythingthe ultimate oracle in all matters concerning
ethics, in orderthat exists. to illustrate the emerging possibility
that we might one day While I must confess that, on first
encountering this view,transcend our faulty neural wiring and
hormone control systemsmy moral sensibilities were offended by a
theory that seems by deference to a machine that is better at
ethics than we are. 10 12. Philosophy and Computers If such a
machine were to exist, would not ethics itself requireDennett, D.
1984. Cognitive wheels: the frame problem of AI. In Minds,our
deference, even in cases where our conscience, an affective
Machines and Evolution, ed. Hookway, C., 129-151. Cambridge,
UK:component of our frail biology after all, might disagree?
Suppose Cambridge University Press.MorMach were widely employed
across every sector of society,Dennett, D. 2006, May. Computers as
prostheses for the imagination.including, for instance, the medical
profession. Where should The International Computers and Philosophy
Conference. Laval, France.we place the blame if a physician were to
follow his conscience Floridi, L. 1999. Information ethics: on the
philosophical foundation ofagainst the advice of MorMach and end up
engaged in an action computer ethics. Ethics and Information
Technology 1:37-56.with serious negative consequences? On a
traditional approach Floridi, L. 2002. On the intrinsic value of
objects and the infosphere.to ethics, it would seem that fault in
this case would fall to theEthics and Information Technology
4:287-304.physician who should have let the AMA do the moral work
for Kant, I. 1785/1994. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals,
ed. andhim. Speculating about the future is dangerous business, but
Itrans. Ellington, J. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company.suspect that if MorMach were a reality, the courts would
inevitably Levinas, E. 1976/1990. Damages due to fire. In Nine
Talmudic Readingsagree. In this light, we may wonder whether one
day moral by Emmanuel Levinas, ed. Aronowicz, A., 178-197.
Bloomington, IN:failures will be indistinguishable from other kinds
of failures,Indiana University Press.like, for instance, not
prescribing a medication according to the Mill, J. S. 1861/1979.
Utilitarianism. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishingadvice of
established medical practice or failing to follow anCompany.owners
manual regarding warnings when using various tools. Powers, T.
2006. Prospects for a Kantian machine. IEEE IntelligentPractically
speaking, these examples suggest that Systems
1541-1672:46-51.ethics requires us to acknowledge human limitations
whenWallach, W. and Allen, C. 2009. Moral Machines: Teaching Robots
Rightconfronting moral matters. Being able to be morally
successful, from Wrong. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.and
therefore worthy of praise, only because it is possible forus to be
immoral, is not, as Kant thought, a sign of the dignity ofthe human
being, but the sign of an ethics that assumes human The
Artifactualization of Reference andbeings to be broken from the
start. In this light, we should take Substances on the Web: Why
(HTTP) URIscare to see that ethics becomes
behavior-oriented.Finally, to deliver on the promise made in the
last paragraphDo Not (Always) Refer nor Resources Holdof the
previous section, the sufficiency argument allows us by
Themselvesto approach moral behaviorism without entirely
dismissingthe several motivations that come from inherited
ethicalAlexandre Monninand religious tradition. To remind the
reader, the sufficiencyUniversit Paris 1 Panthon-Sorbonne (PhiCo,
EXeCo),argument maintains that the kind of moral interiority
necessaryInstitut de Recherche et dInnovation (IRI) du Centrefor an
agent to be an RMA is a sufficient though not necessaryPompidou,
INRIA (Wimmics), CNAM (DICEN)condition for being an MA. Therefore,
moral interiority is notwe now have to pay our way in order to
subsist1essential for moral agency. It is not essential, but this
is not tosay that it is not helpful, particularly for beings
constituted like(B. Latour)us. Of course, what is true for
sufficient conditions in generalIntroductionis also true for this
one. This is to say that there may be (andFrom an architectural
point of view, the Web can be conceivedare, I believe) a number of
sufficient conditions that will leadas an information space full of
URIsWeb identifiers. Contraryone to being an MA; several existing
moral beliefs and systemsto popular belief it is not a traditional
hypertext linkingare, no doubt, among them. All are fine and
acceptable, asdocuments or pages to one another. Indeed, to
accountlong as the necessary condition for being an MA is met,
andfor all the situations encountered on the Web (Web services,this
is, straightforwardly, moral behavior. Used in this way,dynamic
pages, applications, feeds, content negotiation, etc.),the
sufficiency argument permits a plurality of paths to morala more
encompassing theory was needed. According to theobjectives based on
a singular necessary condition. Perhapslatter (the REST style of
architecture), Web identifiers have tothis pluralism of motivation
can get us all on the same pagebe treated as derefereceable proper
namesURIs (Uniformregarding moral behavior without having to reach
agreementresource Identifiers), instead of the more well-known
URLsabout incidentals that often clutter ethical debate. Perhaps
this(Uniform Resource Locators).is what we need in a quickly
globalizing moral community.URIs are especially interesting for
philosophers. LikeReferencesproper names, a concept central both to
the philosophy ofAnderson, M., and Anderson, S. 2007. Machine
ethics: creating an ethicallanguage and metaphysics, they seem to
refer to an object. Ifintelligent agent. AI Magazine
28(4):15-26.the architecture of the Web retains some of their
characteristics,Beavers, A. 2009, March. Between angels and
animals: the question then philosophers are no longer facing a
terra incognita butof robot ethics, or is Kantian moral agency
desirable? Association forrather a familiar landscape. Unlike
proper names, however,Practical and Professional Ethics, Eighteenth
Annual Meeting, Cincinnati,URIs also give access to Web contents.
As such, they betokenOhio.an important change, from a symbolical
dimension, whereBeavers, A. 2010. Editorial to Robot ethics and
human ethics. Specialproper names are bestowed certain functions
and used to solveissue of Ethics and Information Technology
12(3):207-208.philosophical conundrums regarding identity, to a
technologicalBeavers, A. 2011a, July. Is ethics computable, or what
other than canone, to quote the late German media theorist
Friedrich Kittler,does ought imply? Presidential Address at the
Annual InternationalAssociation for Computing and Philosophy
Conference, Aarhuswhere they earn new functionalities and act as
the pillar of aUniversity, Aarhus, Denmark.world-wide information
system.2Beavers, A. 2011b, October. Could and should the ought
disappear from This shift is what we call artifactualization,3 the
becoming-ethics? International Symposium on Digital Ethics, Loyola
University, artifact of philosophical concepts. Our first goal in
this paper is toChicago, Illinois.show that reference, the frail
symbolic relation between a signBeavers, A. 2011c. Moral machines
and the threat of ethical nihilism. and its referent, is turned
into something entirely different onIn Robot Ethics: The Ethical
and Social Implications of Robotics, ed. the Web, the space between
referent and reference, the relationLin, P Bekey, G., and Abney,
K., 333-344. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ., itself, being adjusted so
as to warrant that reference doesnt fail. 11 13. APA Newsletter,
Spring 2012, Volume 11, Number 2 Our second goal is to deal in the
same movement with theindex.html, to your computer. That file is
copiedcorrelate of URIs, resources. About ten years after the birth
ofinto your computers memory and viewed by yourthe Web, it was
understood/decided, after careful analysis, thatbrowser. The
version you view disappears from yourits architecture was a
resource-oriented one. A very paradoxicalcomputers memory when you
no longer view it, ormove inasmuch as resources are not accessible
per se. But if cached, when your cache is cleaned. You may alsoa
most important one since it provided the URIs a means tochoose to
save my web page to your hard drive inidentify anything at all.
Things on the Web, outside of the Web,which case you will have a
copy of my index.html file.chairs, people, rates, square circles,
etc. The introduction of My index.html file remains, throughout the
browsingresources can be seen as a potent way to reopen the
ontological and afterward, intact and fixed.6question afresh.While
the default view of the Web is conform to the paragraphYet, it must
also be understood that while resource can quoted, a more general
theory was needed to account for casesbe anything, they also share
very specific characteristicsnot covered in this picture:which have
not been properly identified. Drawing from Kittler The dynamic Web
which is also, incidentally,once again, we could say that the
concept of an object for becoming the default Web (services,7
constantlyphilosophers from Goclenius, Lohardus, and Suarez to Kant
toBretano, Twardowki, and Meinong, belonged to the symbolicchanging
pages like newspapers homepages, blogs,realm while the very notion
of a resource belongs to the etc.)technical realm as well, born as
it was out of an effort to restore Content negotiation (abbreviated
as conneg). Aconsistency to a technical project.feature of the HTTP
protocol accounting for the factAs the Web is spreading and
becoming more ubiquitous that users may specify the form of the
information theyday after day, we witness an interesting change
wherebyget access to according to such criteria as
languages,objects are becoming resources. From an online
documentaccessibility, formats, etc. This means that it is notto a
person or an RDFID-enhanced product or device, they possible to
generalize on the basis of a single case thatare everywhereor
everyware, to borrow designer Adam of retrieving a single HTML page
on a server. After all,Greenfields portmanteau word. what gets sent
to a browser may take many differentInterestingly, on the surface
resources share many aspects forms. It may even be generated on the
fly and thuswith what used to be the dominant ontological
conception ofnowhere to be found on a server before a
requestobjects for centuries: substance. However, unlike
substances,is even sent. In which cases, what is identified by athe
category of resource is no longer a natural one. The functionURI
can simply no longer be a single (HTML) file.of substances was to
explain how things like people, organisms, URIs without addressable
content (temporarily oror artifacts persisted over time. Without
such an ontologicalnot).8background, the issue remains open. We
will see that on the The lack of a file versioning system9 (WebDAV
could beWeb, resource persistence has a cost which has to be
assumed used as a counter-example but it never really scaled).by a
publisher and depends on protocols and standards. Overall, Further
examination of the intricate history of Web identifiersthis will
lead to a completely different ontological framework. is needed to
understand why the nave picture of how the WebOne that is gaining
more and more traction insofar as the works is no longer tenable.
Before the creation of the W3C,network expands.the Webs
implementation and principles were not thoroughlyI. From Web pages
to resourcesdistinguished. The Web existed in the guise of
programminglibraries, software, and the likes, but no agreed upon
standardsIt has been said that the new digital continent opened
newdefined the very principles to which these libraries had to
stick.perspective for ontology. Not since the first work of fiction
wasThis led to many a conceptual difficulty when the first
Webproduced have philosophers been confronted with such anstandards
were devised around 1994-1995.impressive and so totally unexplored
new realm of ontologicalinquiry as is presented by cyberspace, says
David Koepsell in The latter had to do both with the nature of the
objectsthe opening pages of his book, The Ontology of Cyberspace.
In available on the Web and their identifiers. At first, the
notiona similar vein, Luciano Floridi prefers to speak of a process
ofof a document (or page) seemed to prevail. The
obviousre-ontologization4 but the idea is roughly the
same.conclusion was that Web identifiers had to be addresses
(URLsfor Uniform Resource Locators) allowing for document retrieval
The issue is that on specific questions such as Whatin a
hypertextual environment. Pages evolving over time (evenexactly is
a Web page? philosophersexcept for a fewin the so-called web
1.0forums being a good example of theexceptions worth mentioning
like Harry Halpinhavent takenlatter), the identification of stable
entities as exemplified throughinto account the work of Web
architects. Thus, up until now, alibrary identifiers like ISBNs for
books or ISSNs for journals, waslot more has been done to
understand the fundamentals of thetransferred to URNs (for Uniform
Resource Names)properWeb inside standardization bodies like the
W3C.5 Koepsell, fornames referring to objects not available on the
Web. The onlyinstance, in the already quoted book, explains the
retrieval ofproblem of these identifiers is that the Webs main
feature is toa Web page the following way:provide information about
a range of entities, whatever statusWeb pages are just another form
of software. Again, (inside or outside of the Web) they have. URNs
no longerthey consist of data in the form of bits which reside
giving access to anything, their value became disputable. Theon
some storage medium. Just as with my wordcontradiction regarding
addressing, on the other hand, becameprocessor, my web page resides
in a specific placeflagrant in one official document, RFC10
173611:and occupies a certain space on a hard drvie [sic]
inLocators may apply to resources that are not alwaysAmherst, New
York. When you point your browseror not ever network accessible.
Examples of the latterto http://wings.buffalo.edu/~koepsell, you
are sendinginclude human beings and physical objects that havea
message across the Internet which instructs myno electronic
instantiation.web pages host computer (a Unix machine at
theuniversity of Buffalo) to send a copy of the contents ofThis is
no mere contradiction, rather the renegotiation, in mediamy
personal directory, specifically, a HTML file called res, of the
most fundamental features of a technical project. It is 12 14.
Philosophy and Computers precisely this non-sense that was
corrected three years later, in terms, is the intentional act of
picking up something, and1998, when the notion of a resource first
appeared (elsewhere by doing so, aiming at an object. It has a
content (the objectthan in acronyms such as URIs, URLs, URNs, or
URCs).identified) and a form (the action of identifying something).
TheMerely as a correlate of URIs, the latter being established
asdistinction at stake is reminiscent of the hul/morph
distinctionthe new Web identifier after having been sundered in
URNs in Husserls Ideen. Unfortunately, the Husserlian vocabulary
isand URLs. URIs are peculiar inasmuch as they add a technicaltied
to a somewhat mentalistic approach to the mind that is notdimension
to identification, namely, access.12 They have theentirely suitable
to explain a socio-technical system like the Webstatus of
dereferenceable proper names for this reason; being,(something
outside of the scope of Husserls phenomenologicalin other words,
proper names that identify a resource and giveinvestigation up
until his later books, particularly the Krisis andaccess to its
representations.the Origin of geometry).Why resources instead of
Web pages, a concept everyoneAnother way of putting things would be
to conceive of ais acquainted with? Simply said, because what is
aimed at hereresource as a rule for identification. It presents the
advantageis a stable entity whose representation can neverthelessof
allowing for different ways of identifying an object. In thevary
over time or at a given moment (with conneg). Theexample above, the
rule can be of a Russellian nature (thehomepage of the newspaper
The Guardian I access at time t current King of France is
relatively similar to the homepageis different from the same
homepage I access at t. Likewise, of the Guardian yielding
differentincluding the possibilityaccessing it from a mobile phone
or a textual browser will yieldof noresults over time) or a
Kripkean one (the Moon15)different results. These various
representations are subject to among infinite possibilities. Anyone
is entitled to choosingsynchronic and diachronic modifications.13
Albeit not the any rule. When the standards explain that a resource
canleast identical to one another, they must be somehow faithful be
anything, this is precisely what they mean: this choice isto a
given resource (The Guardian homepage, not accessiblecompletely
free. Were led back to Roy Fieldings definition,per se). Such a
notion is especially important with regards to theundoubtedly the
most precise ever given. The Web Architecturalfact that it allows
reference not only to documents (page) butstyle REST (for
Representational State Transfer) he authored16also services,
physical objects, etc. Overall, it is of paramount indeed defines a
r