-
From: Calum MacLean Sent:
Friday, September 16, 2016 8:02 AM To:
Phillips, Kim (NRCan/RNCan) Cc: Matt Lewin
Subject: RE: Atlantic OHS Regulations
Initiative Stakeholder Consultation
Followup Attachments: Atlantic OHS regs
phase 1 feedback MTL.DOCX
Phillips, Kim (NRCan/RNCan)
Kim,
Please find attached review comments from MTL regarding the
confined space entry and hotwork sections of the draft
OHS policy intent. We’ve tried to bring our experience to the
regulations and understand that you will get a diverse
range of comments from others. If your workgroup would like to
clarify any points which either we have highlighted or
others have brought up that are in conflict with our comments,
please feel free to contact us.
We would also be interested in participating in the review of
the main section of the regulations relating to hotwork in
hazardous areas.
Regards
Calum MacLean
Marine Technical Limits
[email protected]
tel: +44 (0) 1467 424011
cell: +44 (0) 77602 60102
fax: +44 (0) 1224 900 905
From: Phillips, Kim (NRCan/RNCan)
[mailto:[email protected]]�Sent: 12 September 2016 14:49�To:
Phillips, Kim (NRCan/RNCan)�Subject: RE: Atlantic OHS Regulations
Initiative Stakeholder Consultation - Follow-up�
Good morning,
Just a reminder that the deadline for submitting comments on the
Atlantic OHS Regulations policy intent is this Friday,
September 16, 2016.
Please note, there was language missing from Section 217 (Fall
Protection – personnel safety nets). The requirement
should also include the following:
(g) where connected to another personnel safety net, the splice
joints connecting it with the other personnel safety nets
are equal to, or greater in strength than, the strength of the
weakest of the personnel safety nets.
Looking forward to receiving your feedback.
Kim Phillips
Senior Regulatory Officer
Offshore Petroleum Management Division
Natural Resources Canada
1
mailto:mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]
-
Atlantic Canada Energy Office
1801 Hollis Street, Suite 700
Halifax, NS B3J 3C8
cell: (902) 402-0285
[email protected]
From: Phillips, Kim (NRCan/RNCan)�Sent: August 3, 2016 14:51�To:
Phillips, Kim (NRCan/RNCan)�Subject: Atlantic OHS Regulations
Initiative Stakeholder Consultation - Follow-up�
Thank you for attending the stakeholder consultation sessions
held last week in Halifax and St. John’s. Your participation�and
feedback are very much appreciated.�
Please find attached the deck that was presented at the
sessions, as well as the attendance list for the two sessions.
As�noted in the St. John’s session, we have extended the deadline
for written comments to Friday, September 16, 2016.�Written
comments can be sent to me and will be posted as received to the
NRCan website.�
Looking forward to receiving your feedback.
Kim Phillips
Senior Regulatory Officer
Offshore Petroleum Management Division
Natural Resources Canada
Atlantic Canada Energy Office
1801 Hollis Street, Suite 700
Halifax, NS B3J 3C8
cell: (902) 402-0285
[email protected]
2
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]
-
Atlantic Offshore Occupational Health and Safety Initiative –
Phase 1
policy intent review.
Context
Below are the comments and view of Marine Technical Limits,
specialists in the management of
confined space entry inspection and repair projects within the
hull spaces of producing FPSO / FSU
installations. These views are based on 15 years of experience
of executing FPSO hull maintenance
activities in the UK, West Africa and Canada – within differing
regulatory regimes and cultural
requirements. MTL have been closely involved with the structural
integrity management of both
Canadian FPSO’s and in particular the preparation and review of
RQF’s for hotwork repairs during
production. Within the UK offshore sector, MTL manages over 10
hotwork repair projects and 15
confined space inspection projects each year, with an exemplary
safety record.
Having seen how regulations are regarded, quoted and applied
within the Atlantic Offshore area, we
understand the importance that these regulations have and the
need to ensure that the working
within the regulations is clear, unambiguous and targeted at
protecting the health and safety of
workers. Fundamentally the test for every line of the regulation
must be to ensure that these
requirements are met.
Introduction
As our expertise relates primarily to confined space entry and
hotwork, our feedback is limited to
clauses 92 through 138, however, the principles of these
comments may be equally applied to other
sections of the policy intent document where appropriate.
It is fully understood that the policy intent document is
effectively an early draft of what could be
included as content for the ultimately published regulations and
that there is a great deal more work
to do on developing the content following this review exercise
prior to “legalising” the language. The
comments and advice provided below is intended to help progress
this process quickly and to aid the
production of good regulations which will protect worker safety,
whilst enabling essential inspection
and maintenance tasks to be carried out and minimising the need
for RQF’s (deviations and
substitutions.) MTL have seen essential inspection and
maintenance tasks being deferred in many
operating areas due to a view that the work cannot be managed
safely within the regulatory regime
applicable or inappropriate corporate standards. Deferring
essential tasks won’t make anything safer
or provide integrity.
MTL developed the Ageing and Life Extension Guidance for
Floating Offshore Installations as part of
the FPSO Forum at Oil and Gas UK. A key principle that we
learned throughout this process was that
“less is more”. The guidance had more impact by being concise
and making a few points once only
than by repeating the same requirement in many places and losing
the impact through explanations.
This was a very useful approach which we feel would
significantly benefit these regulations; e.g.
make it clear what performance requirements must be met, but
don’t explain in detail how to do it.
-
Comments by section
92) Confined space definition
“confined space” means an enclosed or partially enclosed space
that
a) is not designed or intended for human occupancy except for
the purpose of performing
work;
b) has restricted means of access and egress, or an internal
configuration, that could make
first aid, evacuation, rescue, or other emergency response
services difficult to p erform; and
c) may become hazardous to any person entering it owing to
d. its design, construction, location or atmosphere;
e. the materials or substances in it; or
f. any other conditions relating to it.
It is understood that this definition is inherited from other
Canadian regulations. Although it appears
to be concise, there are undefined terms which may make it
legally difficult to enforce e.g. what
constitutes a condition relating to a space which may make it
hazardous to personnel? An
alternative more general phrasing may achieve the same effect
e.g.
A confined space is a place which is substantially enclosed
(though not always entirely), and where
serious injury can occur from hazardous substances or conditions
within the space or nearby (e.g.
lack of oxygen)
93) Assessment of confined spaces
When assessing whether a space is or may become hazardous to a
person entering it, a
person must not take into account the protection afforded to a
person through the use of
personal protective equipment or additional ventilation.
This clause seems more like guidance than a regulatory
requirement. It would be better to include in
an approved code of practice or interpretation note.
94) and 95) Confined Space Management Program
94) Employer must develop, establish, implement and maintain a
confined space
management program in accordance with this section.
95) The confined space management program must be integrated as
part of the broader
OHS management system and OHS program.
It is not at all clear what the content of the management
program should be, what it’s aims should
be and what the minimum requirements are. How would a regulator
be able to determine whether a
document presented by an employer meets the requirements of
these clauses? We suggest that
these clauses are removed from the regulations. A responsible
offshore installation operator would
develop his own confined space entry management procedures
without a need for a regulation.
-
These should be checked against the requirements of all
applicable regulations to ensure that the
minimum requirements are satisfied by the CSE procedures.
96) – 98) Identification of Confined Spaces
96) An employer shall ensure a competent person evaluates the
workplace to identify andrecord any confined spaces that exist.97)
Employer must identify all confined spaces by means of visible
identifier that:
a) identifies it as a confined space;b) indicates access is
restricted to a uthorized personnel only; and, c) warning that a
danger exists.
98) Employer must re-evaluate the workplace for confined spaced
every three years or as a
result of changes in the workplace that may have created new
confined spaces, or
eliminated ones, and record any changes from the last
evaluation.
There are a number of different employer companies on board any
offshore installation. Although
the intention of this clause is clearly that the installation
operator is responsible for identifying the
confined spaces, rigid compliance could result in multiple
companies each maintaining confined
space registers and posting their own signs. The wording of this
clause should clearly put the
responsibility on the installation operator.
Within UK regulations, there is some recognition that some
spaces may not always be defined as
confined spaces. Refer to
http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/indg258.pdf
99) – 102) Hazard assessment
99) Where it is likely that a person will enter a confined
space, the employer shall appoint a
competent person to:a) carry out an assessment of:
a. the hazards that may exist due to the design, construction,
location, use
or contents of the confined space;
b. the hazards that may develop while work is done inside the
confined
space;
b) specify the tests that are necessary to d etermine whether
the person would be
likely to be exposed to a ny of the hazards identified pursuant
to subsection (a).
100) The competent person referred to in section 99 shall, in a
signed and dated report to
the employer, record the findings of the assessment carried out
pursuant to subsection
99(a).
101) Upon request, the employer shall make a copy of any report
made pursuant to section
99 available to:
a) the work place committee or the health and safety
representative; and,
b) any employee who i s required to e nter the confined
space.
102) The employer shall ensure that the assessment is reviewed
as often as necessary to
ensure that the assessment referred to in subsection 99(a)
remains current.
Whilst this section appears to be stringent, it is not likely to
achieve the intended
objectives/behaviours. To comply with the requirements as
written, an “expert” could be appointed
http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/indg258.pdf
-
to create a suite of hazard assessments for tasks which might be
carried out in confined spaces –
years before these are required or used, or the tasks to be
carried out are properly defined. The
danger is that once these hazard assessments have been recorded
and reported, the operational
management on board the installation will not feel any ownership
for the content or feel
empowered to change, amend or question any of the content.
As a regulatory requirement it is much more important to clearly
state that:
• For each program of entry into a confined space, a hazard
assessment must be carried out by suitably competent and
experienced persons with a detailed knowledge of the space, the
work/activities to be carried out within the space and the
hazards which are present.
• The hazard assessment shall identify all hazards which may be
present, assess the risk and determine what precautions must be put
it in place.
• The hazard assessment shall be reviewed and understood by all
persons involved in the work.
• The hazard assessment must also consider risks outside the
confined space i.e. simultaneous operations such as breaking
hydrocarbon containment, offloading, startup/shutdown, non-
routine operations, etc. which could affect the ability to
respond to a CSE emergency or
create an increased risk of entrapment within the confined
space.
103) Procedures
(1) Where a confined space exists in the workplace, the employer
shall, in consultation with
the health and safety committee or health and safety
representative, establish written work
procedures that are to be followed by a person entering, exiting
or occupying a confined
space.
(2) Written work procedures must specify:
a) The required controls specific to the known hazards or the
task to be performed;
b) The standard protective equipment that is to b e used by
every person who is
entering a confined space;
c) Retrieval equipment to b e worn by every person entering a
confined space,
including the type of full body harness to be worn, where
practicable;
d) Additional rescue equipment, including a yoke and adequate
means to extract an
unconscious person;
e) The processes for preventing entanglement of life-lines and
other equipment
where one or more employees are entering the confined space;
f) Equipment to be used for atmospheric testing, including
calibration requirements;
and,
g) All training requirements for entrants, attendants and
rescuers.
The wording of this clause suggests that a confined space entry
work procedure will be developed
which will be applied to all confined spaces on the
installation. Whilst there are some generic
requirements which will apply to every confined space (e.g. gas
testing and the need for
communication), trying to encompass everything is likely to lead
to some spaces requiring deviations
from the general requirements. For example, procedures for entry
into FPSO engine room void
spaces and small double bottom spaces is completely different
from those required for double
bottom ballast tanks (very large and complex spaces.)
-
This clause appears to be the home for defining the minimum
requirements of the installation
operator’s confined space entry management procedure. It should
require that:
• Entry to confined spaces should be avoided where possible (e.g
by doing the work from outside the confined space)
• If it is not possible to avoid entry to the confined space, a
risk assessment must be carried out taking full considerations of
the condition of the space, the tasks to be carried out, the
skills of the personnel involved and any simultaneous operations
on the installation which
could affect the work, the safety of personnel involved, the
access/egress from the
workspace to the safe refuge or the ability to respond to an
emergency in the confined
space.
• The space should be isolated from sources of hydrocarbon and
hazardoussubstances/vapours and any residual liquids removed prior
to entry where possible.
• Confined spaces should be ventilated using fresh air from a
non-hazardous area • Emergency response plans must be prepared
specific to each confined space being entered.
These must consider communications, actions on alarms and rescue
procedures.
• The safety of rescuers must be addressed in the development of
any emergency rescue plans.
• Atmospheric testing is carried out by suitably trained persons
using calibrated equipment. • Frequency of atmospheric testing and
re-validation • Minimum equipment requirements (e.g. personal gas
detectors, lighting, communication,
escape sets.)
Note that with respect to the stated requirements in 103
(2):
c) only twice within MTL’s 15 years of working in FPSO tanks has
it been appropriate for tank
entry personnel to wear retrieval equipment / life lines. The
focus should be on making the
atmosphere safe and properly illuminating the space so that
accidents do not occur. It is important
that work can be carried out efficiently within confined spaces
to minimise the exposure to the
identified hazards. Similarly we always prepare a specific
rescue plan for each space and once the
tank has been made safe for entry, ventilated and illuminated,
we carry out a rescue exercise to
prove that the rescue/recovery plan will work and that all the
personnel involved know what they
are doing.
d) We have never used a yoke on any project and have never
considered recovering a
casualty, unconscious or otherwise from a hull tank by any means
other than in a stretcher. A “sked”
stretcher or similar is far suitable for handling through
structural openings and is likely to result in
less additional injury to the casualty. The point which the
regulations should make is that the rescue
plan must specify the required equipment and this must be
checked as being available on site and in
serviceable condition before confined space entry commences.
e) this is a very specific consideration for situations where
lifelines are being used or line-fed
breathing apparatus. It should be specified in any risk
assessment where these are necessary rather
than as generic procedures. The requirements will clearly be
very different for entry into a process
vessel (one or two people in a small space) compared with a team
of 6 people cleaning a slops tank
25m deep with lots of ladders and platforms.
-
104) Lifeline / Full Body Harness
Notwithstanding Section 103, the use of a lifeline and/or full
body harness is not required
where an obstruction or other condition makes its use unsafe
but, in that case, an employer
shall implement procedures to ensure the safety, and safe
removal, of the employee.
The implication in this statement is that a lifeline and/or
harness provides both a recovery method
and some other safety benefits which are not explicitly stated
but need to be considered if a lifeline
and/or harness would not be safe. We assume that these safety
benefits could be communication
and potentially fall restraint. Although it is useful that the
grounds for not using lifelines/harnesses
are included in the regulations, the message that this wording
gives to workers is that the work
planning is less safe if it doesn’t require lifelines and
harnesses. Overall it would be more useful if the
regulations simply stated that emergency response and recovery
plans must be put in place which
are appropriate to the configuration and arrangements of that
particular confined space and the
work being carried out. These may include the use of lifelines
and/or harnesses or other suitably
rated equipment.
105) Re-evaluation of CSE procedure
Employer must re-evaluate the procedure every three years or
upon any structural or
equipment modifications, or change in purpose, and record any
changes from the last
evaluation.
Agree with the principle of routinely reviewing the suitability
of the CSE procedures. It may also be
appropriate to force this to happen following any significant
organisational changes on the
installation to ensure that the roles of key personnel are
updated as necessary.
106) Emergency response plans
In consultation with the workplace committee or health and
safety representative, the
employer shall develop written emergency procedures to be
followed in the event of an
emergency in or near the confined space, on all of the
following:
a) a plan for responding to emergencies and preventing or
mitigating any illness orinjury as a result of potential hazards
that might be encountered;b) the methods for communication ,
including:
i. between entrants and those outside the confined (attendants
and
rescuers);
ii. signaling evacuation;
c) a plan to r escue an employee following an accident or
emergency in the confined
space;
d) identification of the necessary resources to i mplement a
plan under subsection
106 (a) & (b) effectively, including a determination of
whether more than one
person is required to b e present outside a confined space
during its occupancy by
any person;
e) provision to ensure immediate evacuation of the confined
space when an alarm is
activated or there is any significant, unexpected and
potentially hazardous change in
the concentration, level or percentage referred to in section
112;
-
f) means by which a written emergency procedure would be
initiated;g) communicating with other employees in the vicinity and
other personnel, as
appropriate;
h) The protective equipment and emergency equipment to be used
and/or worn by a person who takes part in the rescue of a person
from the confined space or in responding to o ther emergency
situations in the confined space; and, i) Regular conduct of
emergency response drills and exercises.
The implication is that a generic emergency response plan will
be created which sits on the shelf
waiting to be referenced when work is planned within a
particular space. In our experience, it is best
practice to create the rescue plan whilst planning the work such
that you can take appropriate
consideration of the skills of the CSE work party, the equipment
available, the nature of the space,
any temporary physical/operational constraints (e.g. blocked
access to preferred rescue hatch),
duration of the CSE work. For example, if the work is being
carried out by rope access technicians in
a hull tank, a rope access rescue plan may be more
efficient/suitable.
In our experience, the frequency of emergency response drills
and exercises is never stipulated in
regulations which leads to a wide variation between operators.
On one installation in West Africa, a
rescue exercise had never been carried out by the crew in 3
years and when they did execute the
exercise it was found that the rescue stretcher wouldn’t fit
through the tank opening and the winch
couldn’t reach the tank bottom. It is clear that the regulatory
requirement should be that the
emergency plans which have been put in place must be appropriate
for the space/tasks, all required
equipment must be readily available and maintained in
serviceable condition and the personnel with
responsibilities under the emergency plan must understand the
plan and be ready to respond as
required. Clearly recording that an exercise has been carried
out would be a good way to
demonstrate compliance.
107) and 108) Training
107) An employee shall not work in a confined space unless he or
she has completed a
confined space training program that includes, at minimum, the
following components:
a) This section of the regulations;
b) Definition of confined spaces with identification of confined
spaces and their
hazards;
c) Hazard assessment;
d) Confined space work permit systems and standard
procedures;
e) Familiarization with the operation of gas monitoring
equipment;
f) Atmospheric t esting;
g) Methods to safely ventilate and/or purge confined spaces;
h) Isolation requirements for substances, energy and
equipment;
i) Duties of supervisors and entrants;
j) Confined space safety watch responsibilities;
k) Entrant tracking;
l) Overview of rescue and emergency response (including rescue
plan);
m) Emergency Escape Breathing Devices;
n) Identification and use of appropriate confined space PPE and
rescue equipment;
o) Hot work and other hazardous activities.
108) Training program must be renewed, at minimum, every three
years
-
The range of requirements in clause 107) seems too much for
basic confined space entry training for
an entrant (worker). They would not normally be expected to
understand the principles of isolation
or control of hotwork if it wasn’t relevant to the work that
they are actually doing. The danger of
being too onerous with the basic training is that employers feel
that they must send all CSE
personnel on an “approved course” every 3 years or less. That
approved course is likely to cover
generic hazards, rescue scenarios and equipment rather than the
specific information necessary for
the work they will be engaged in. In our experience, the basic
CSE training can be provided through
an internal course in 1 – 2 hours, and can be provided offshore
if necessary for refreshers or short
notice works.
109) Pre-entry training
Prior to entry, the employer shall provide every employee who is
likely to enter a confined
space with instruction and training in
a) the procedures established for confined space entry and for
emergencies;
b) control measures and PPE to be utilized while in a confined
space and during an
emergency; and
c) the specific hazard(s) that have been identified as
potentially existing within the
confined space they are about to e nter.
Referring to this as “training and instruction” is misleading.
There is an overlap with the permitry
requirements and hazard assessment in that every person involved
in the work should understand
the risks identified and the control measures put in place to
prevent them occurring. This pre-entry
briefing should ensure that all personnel clearly understand the
communications procedures, how to
raise an alarm, what to do if they hear an alarm and how to use
all of the specific equipment they
have been provided with (gas detector, radio, escape set,
etc.)
110) Emergency response personnel training
Any person tasked with emergency response and rescue from a
confined space shall be
trained in:
a) Applicable emergency response training;
b) Emergency response procedures;
c) Meet or exceed the requirements under Sections 107 and
109;
d) Advanced level of first aid training; and
e) In addition, an employee who is required to enter a confined
space shall be
provided training in the specific hazard(s) that have been
identified as potentially
existing within the confined space they are about to enter.
Similar to 107) these requirements could be interpreted as
requiring an external “approved” course
in confined space entry. It is not clear what would be
considered satisfactory to satisfy a) or b). The
mandatory requirement for anybody assigned CSE ER roles to have
advanced first aid training is not
justified. If a confined space presents a life threatening
atmosphere or condition, the ER personnel
will not have any opportunity to administer first aid but will
need to focus on evacuating the casualty
as quickly as possible to a safe location. If the casualty
requires rescue for any other reason and the
condition of the confined space is not hazardous, then
sufficient opportunity exists for the
installation medic to attend the casualty before recovery.
-
The importance of challenging this requirement is that for the
later life of FPSO’s it is foreseeable
that there could be inspection/repair teams in multiple hull
tanks for extended periods in order to
execute all the necessary integrity work. To provide sufficient
emergency response cover, rope
access inspectors working within the tanks can be considered to
have Emergency Response
responsibilities and therefore it could be interpreted to be a
mandatory requirement to send them
on a 5 day advanced first aid course.
The most important thing that ER personnel must understand is
how to operate the rescue
equipment, load a casualty into the stretcher provided for the
job, the specific details of the rescue
plan (route, etc.) and to be aware of the configuration of the
confined space being entered
(openings, ladders, levels).
111) Attendant training
Any attendant must be trained to perform the assigned duties
effectively, including training
in their role in the emergency response procedures.
It isn’t clear why the attendant training is specified
separately in this way. In our experience, it is
most effective if the attendant has the same confined space
entry basic training and understanding
of the specific hazards and controls as the CSE entrants. This
knowledge ensures that the attendant
fully understands their role in ensuring the safety of those
inside the confined space.
112) – 117) Confined space atmosphere
112) The atmosphere within the confined space must meet the
following:
a) An employee’s exposure to harmful substances is maintained at
acceptable levels
in accordance with the TLVs established by ACGIH;
b) The level of oxygen in the confined space is not less than
19.5% and not more
than 22.5%; and
c) The concentration of flammable substances is maintained below
10% of the lower
explosive limit (LEL) of that substance or substances, except
where hotwork is
conducted in accordance with 129(a).
The requirements of clauses 112-117 are typical of historic
thinking in confined space safety but do
not reflect the or encourage the employer to understand the
risks presented and to minimise the
risk that personnel are exposed to. For example, clause 112 b)
and c) would permit an employer to
commit employees into a confined space with oxygen level at
19.5% and LEL at 10% without any
specific requirement to be wearing breathing apparatus. This
situation may lead to loss of life.
The critical components of confined space entry atmospheric
control are as outlined in the
presentation material which MTL have forwarded separately to
this submission. Essentially, it is
important to be clear that the confined space must be isolated
and drained of hydrocarbons in order
to remove any sources of gas; provided with forced ventilation
of fresh air from a non-hazardous
area and the atmosphere in the space then tested whilst the
ventilation is switched off. Entry may
be permitted when the gas test readings taken from all available
openings indicate 20.9% oxygen
-
and 21% detected.) Normally high readings indicate
that the gas detector needs to be calibrated as pure oxygen
sources are very rare. Atmospheric tests
with oxygen level < 20.9% indicate the presence of a
significant volume of something other than air
in the atmosphere. As an example, if the oxygen level is
measured at 19.9%, this tells us that 5% of
the normal volume of oxygen has been displaced and hence 5% of
the atmosphere by volume is not
air. It only requires 1 – 2% by volume of some volatile organic
compounds to achieve their lower
explosive limit.
The < 1% LEL test limit before permitting entry is consistent
with industry guidance such as ISGOTT
although the basis of this is not clearly explained anywhere.
From our experience, even with very
significant levels of forced ventilation, it is difficult to
attain a reading of
-
Any review of historic confined space fatalities will show that
in nearly all cases the space was not
being ventilated at all (e.g. ship’s chain lockers) or that the
ventilation provided was not effective. In
the hierarchy of controls, isolation and ventilation will
eliminate the atmospheric hazard in most
cases, whilst gas detection can only be considered as an
administrative control (relying on
equipment, calibration and training.)
Clause 112) a) makes reference to exposure to hazardous
substances – these requirements are no
different for personnel working anywhere on the installation.
Why is this specifically included under
confined space entry? Limiting exposure to harmful substances
should consider not only their
presence but also the exposure pattern, engineering controls in
place and finally respiratory
protective equipment. Placing this as the first requirement for
atmospheric control is misleading in
terms of its specific importance to confined space
management.
Tests
113) The employer shall appoint a qualified person to carry out
appropriate tests to verify
the requirements in Section 112 can be achieved throughout the
period of time that the
person will be in the confined space.
Clause 113) appears to put the responsibility on the qualified
gas tester to conclude from his/her
measurements alone that the space will remain safe for the
duration of entry. As stated earlier, the
gas test is only indicating that the isolations are sound, to
ensure that the atmosphere will remain
safe requires assurance that any forced ventilation will not
introduce a harmful atmosphere. In our
work, we draw air from a non-hazardous area and pass all
ventilation supplies through in-line gas
detection with automatic dampers and alarms.
114) Atmospheric testing should be conducted, and results
recorded,
a) Before entry into a confined space;
b) After an interruption in the work procedures;
c) At appropriate intervals; and
d) Shall not exceed 12 hours being testing.
Clause 114) - Agree with requirements. More specifically the
recorded results should be displayed at
the CSE entry point. It is much more important for them to be
available for scrutiny by people about
to enter the space than it is to carefully store them in an
office!
Missing from clauses 113 and 114 is any reference to the
principle that if confined space entry
should be avoided wherever this is practicable. Applying this
principle to gas testing, it would be
useful for the regulations to explicitly encourage the employer
to conduct gas tests from outwith the
confined space.
115) The employer shall ensure the confined space is
continuously monitored and that the
atmosphere remains at all times in compliance within Section
112.
Clause 115) – Continuous monitoring of the atmosphere is
normally satisfied by each work party
within the confined space carrying a personal gas monitor. Is
this the intent or is the intent that the
ventilation supply should be monitored or that the attendant
monitors a gas detector sampling with
confined space whilst people are inside?
116) The employer shall ensure that tests referred to in Section
113 are performed on
adjacent areas that may be affected by, or may affect, the work
performed in the confined
space.
-
117) Tests shall be performed by a qualified person who has been
adequately educated and
trained in:
a) The proper use of testing and monitoring equipment;
b) Limitations of the equipment;
c) Properties of the potential contaminants to be tested;
and
d) Any other relevant information specific to the task at
hand.
118) Equipment used in testing and monitoring shall be
calibrated, maintained and used
according to the manufacturer’s instructions, and shall be bump
tested, at minimum, every
12 hour shift.
119) Precautions Prior to Entrance
119) The employer shall ensure:
a) the opening for entry and exit is sufficient to allow safe
passage of a person
wearing personal protective equipment;
b) mechanical equipment in the confined space is
i. disconnected from its power source, and
ii. locked out and tagged;
c) pipes and other supply lines whose contents are likely to
create a hazard are
blanked off, or otherwise locked out or controlled to ensure
that no contents are
inadvertently discharged into the confined space;
d) measures have been taken to ensure that, where appropriate,
the confined space
is continuously ventilated;
e) liquid in which a person may drown or a free-flowing solid in
which a person may
become entrapped has been removed from the confined space;
f) adequate explosion-proof illumination is provided where
appropriate;
g) a source containing a hazardous substance leading to the
confined space is safely
and completely disconnected or blanked;
h) Adequate barriers are erected to prohibit unauthorized
entry;
i) PPE and emergency equipment identified in section 103(2)(b)
are provided as
close as reasonably practicable to the entrance to the confined
space.
Many of these points have been addressed in earlier comments. It
is sufficient within the regulations
to state that the CSE risk assessment shall consider these
hazards and the permitry system must
ensure that all identified control measures are put in place
prior to work commencing.
The MTL pre-entry check list incorporates:
-
Figure 2- Pre-Entry Checklist
119) g) is open to interpretation in terms of whether this means
sources of hydrocarbon oil and gas
or sources of “hazardous substances” such as Benzene. If the
intent is that all sources of
hydrocarbons are completely disconnected and blanked prior to
entry then this is a significant and
costly change in the regulations for cargo tank inspections on
FPSO’s and tankers with cargo
headers. With these cargo pipework arrangements, the positive
isolation (blanking) can only be
achieved within the confined space itself, and this is safely
carried out under multiple levels of valve
isolation.
120) Entry without a safe atmosphere
120) Where atmospheric gas testing under section 113 indicates
presence of a harmful or
explosive substance and it is not feasible to provide a safe
atmosphere using engineering
and administrative controls, an employer shall ensure that:
a) An employee entering the confined space is provided with and
wears respiratory and
personal protective equipment appropriate to t he hazards likely
to be encountered;
b) Where a flammable or explosive gas or liquid is present all
sources of ignition is
eliminated; and
c) Conditions are monitored to e nsure protection afforded by
controls remains adequate.
121) The employer shall provide
a) appropriate respiratory protective equipment to a person who
enters a confined space
where the concentration of chemical substance or a mixture of
chemical substances in a
confined space is hazardous to the health and safety of an
employee; and
b) Positive pressure respiratory protective equipment to a
person who enters a confined
space where the concentration of oxygen is less than 19.5%.
This clause is not strong enough in discouraging entry into
confined spaces under breathing
apparatus. The level of safety provided to individuals will
always be less than if the atmosphere was
safe. If an incident occurs within the confined space,
communications will be more difficult and
emergency response actions will also need to be carried out
using breathing apparatus. Effective use
of and correct function of the breathing apparatus are the only
barriers to prevent harm, and these
should be considered as PPE.
-
Within UK legislation, it is the duty of the employer to make
all efforts to ensure that a safe
atmosphere can be achieved without PPE. The only situations
where it remains acceptable are for
emergency response or in order to carry out actions which will
make the atmosphere safe i.e. put in
place isolations or install equipment to remove the source of
the hazard.
122) – 124) Respiratory protective equipment
122) The employer shall ensure that the respiratory protective
equipment referred to in
section 121 is in accordance with the most recent version of CSA
Z94.4 Standard and for
escape from IDLH atmospheres the SCBA or Escape SCBA shall have
a rated Service time in
excess of the anticipated time needed to escape.
123) Additionally, the respiratory protective equipment must
be:
a) a Pressure-Demand SCBA with an audible alarm that sounds when
the air supply
has diminished to 20% the capacity of the unit; or
b) a Multifunctional SCBA/Airline Respirator with auxiliary
self-contained air supply,
with a minimum rated service time of 15 minutes and the escape
route shall be
planned such that the time needed to esc ape does not exceed the
rated service
time of the auxiliary air supply.
The combination of RPE specifications and SCBA service time
within clause 122 is misleading in that
it may lead regulation users to believe that it is permissible
to use escape SCBA as respiratory
protection. The equipment described in 123) a) is suitable only
for escape whilst the equipment in
123) b) would be suitable for escape and to satisfy the
requirements of 121) a) and b).
125) Electrical shock
125) Where there is a hazard of electrical shock in a confined
space, and employer shall
ensure that electrical equipment taken into the confined space
is:
a) Battery operated;
b) Double insulated;
c) Bonded to ground and not exceeding 30 v and 100 volt-amps;
or
d) Equipped with a ground fault, circuit interrupter of the
Class A type that complies
with the most recent version of CSA standard CSA C22.1, Canadian
Electrical Code
Part 1 – Safety Standard for Electrical Installations, and that
its tested before each
use.
There controls described are appropriate for all electrical
equipment in the workplace, not just
within a confined space. These requirements don’t really fit
within this section of the OHS
regulations. It would be more appropriate to stipulate the
explosion protection requirements for
lighting and any equipment which would need to be operated
within a confined space in an
emergency scenario. Similarly it would be appropriate to
stipulate that all entrants are equipped
with an explosion proof flashlight.
126) Entrance Into a Confined Space
126) The employer shall ensure that one or more attendants
are:
a) assigned the employees who a re entering the confined
space;
b) stationed outside and near
-
i. The entrance to the confined space; or
ii. Where there is more than one entrance to the confined space,
the one
that best allows the attendant to perform his or her duties;
iii. And shall ensure effective record keeping of persons in and
out of the
confined space
c) in continuous communication with the employee using an
appropriate means of
communication provided with a device for summoning an adequate
rescue
response.
Clauses 126) a) and b) are appropriate. Clause 126) c) should
recognise that there may be more than
one entrant within the confined space. We normally consider that
each work party should have a
radio when working in large confined spaces where direct
communication is not possible. In these
situations we also stipulate that there is a back-up
communications system (air horn).
127) An attendant shall not enter a confined space and shall
a) Not be assigned any additional duties beyond the d uties
outlined in (b) through
(d);
b) Monitor the safety of the employee in the confined space;
c) Provide assistance to p ersons inside the confined space;
d) Summon an adequate response where one is required.
In addition to the requirements in 126 and 127, it is important
to stipulate that the attendant must
not leave the confined space entry point until all entrants have
safely exited the confined space and
barriers / notices to prohibit entry have been placed. The only
circumstances where the attendant
may leave personnel unmonitored within the confined space is
where the attendant’s personal
safety is endangered. Typically, confined space regulations do
not recognise this situation as it is
inherently assumed that the attendant is safe and confined space
entrants are always in greater
danger. For FPSO tank entry works, explosions or fire incidents
on the upper deck will directly
endanger a tank entry attendant whilst the personnel within the
hull tanks may be in risk of
entrapment but not direct danger unless the event escalates.
129) – 131) Hot Work
The inclusion of general hotwork requirements within the
confined space section of the OHS
regulations is confusing without reference to any other sections
of the regulations covering hotwork.
Essentially there is little difference between how hotwork
should be managed in a confined space
and within any other location on an offshore installation. The
golden rules are:
• Hotwork can only be performed in a location which is
non-hazardous or which has been temporarily designated as
non-hazardous through enhanced controls such as ventilation,
gas
barriers, gas testing and continuous monitoring.
• All flammable materials must be removed from the area affected
by the hotwork and suitable spark / spatter barriers put in place
as necessary.
• Any potential sources of flammable or explosive gases directly
affecting the worksite or any ventilation system supplying the
worksite must be blanked.
• All hotwork activities must be specifically risk assessed with
full consideration given to both explosion (ignition of a flammable
atmosphere) and fire (heat in contact with combustable
materials).
-
• A fire watch, equipped with suitable fire extinguishing
equipment must monitor the area during hotwork activities and for a
cool down period prior to leaving any hotwork site
unattended.
• Where a habitat is used to create a gas barrier around a
hotwork site, fire watches must be positioned both within and
outwith the habitat.
129) An employer shall ensure that an employee does not perform
hot work in a confined space
unless all of the following conditions are satisfied:
a) In the case of an explosive or flammable gas vapour, the
atmospheric concentration is less
than 5% of the lower explosive limit, as determined by a
combustible gas instrument,
b) The atmosphere in the confined space does not contain, and is
not likely to c ontain while
an employee is inside, an oxygen content greater than 22.5%,
c) The atmosphere is continuously monitored,
d) The entry permit includes adequate provisions for hot work
and corresponding control
measures, and
e) An adequate alarm system and exit procedures are provided to
ensure that employees
have adequate warning and are able to exit the confined space
safely where either or both
of the following occur, in the case of an explosive or flammable
gas or vapour
i. The atmospheric c oncentrations exceeds 5% of its lower
explosive limit, or ii. The oxygen content of the atmosphere exceed
22.5% by volume. f) all potential sources of flammable and
explosive gases are identified and blocked off/locked out, g) a
qualified person patrols the area surrounding the confined space
and maintain a fire-
protection watch in that area until all fire hazard has
passed,h) fire extinguishers specified as emergency equipment are
provided in the area referred to in (d) above.
130) Hotwork shall not be performed in a confined space
where:
a) Concentrations of flammable or explosive substances exceed 5%
of the LEL;
b) Oxygen concentrations are in excess of 22.5%; or
c) Where flammable liquids are present.
Referring back to the comments provided in section 112) it is
MTL’s opinion that the atmospheric
requirements for confined space entry and for hotwork in
confined spaces are the same (20.9%
Oxygen and
-
• The ventilation air supply to the confined space must be drawn
from a non-hazardous area and incorporate gas detection.
• Electrical welding and cutting processes should be used in
preference to gas welding and cutting which would involve the
introduction of flammable gas supplies or oxygen supplies
into the confined space.
• Welding gas, propane, acetylene or oxygen pressurised
cylinders must not be placed within a confined space.
• Flammable gas and oxygen hoses must be continuous lengths
containing no joints or repairs. Hoses must be tested for leaks
prior to being fed into the confined space and depressurised
and withdrawn from the confined space immediately after each
use.
• The attendant must be provided with the ability to isolate all
hotwork supplies and flammable gas hoses in the event of an
emergency.
• The noise created by hotwork activities must be considered in
managing communications between entrants and the CSE attendant.
• Adequate fume management arrangements will be necessary to
protect workers from exposure to hazardous substances and to
prevent loss of visibility within the confined space.
• Wherever possible all equipment used to support hotwork
activities shall be non-flammable, flame retardant.
Please note that a pressurised habitat is not an essential
requirement for hotwork in a confined
spaces. Within a hazardous area, a pressurised habitat is a
means of creating the gas barrier
necessary to temporarily re-classify a location as
non-hazardous. It is often much more effective
to consider the boundaries of the confined space (structural
steel) as the gas barrier and
considering the over-ventilation of the confined space (net flow
of air from confined space
outwards through any openings) to be an adequate barrier to
prevent the ingress of any external
gases or smoke.
131) Cleaning for hotwork
131) Where flammable liquids are present, the employee must
ensure all flammable liquids are
removed and the area cleaned and inspected to ensure no residue
exists, prior to permitting any
hotwork to be performed in the confined space.
The responsibility for acceptable levels of cleaning would
reside with the permit issuing authority
(employer) rather than the employee (e.g. welder).
Clause 131 does not insist that the entire confined space is
cleaned so that no residue remains but
states that the “area” must be cleaned. The extent of the
defined area is open to wide interpretation
ranging from the area 1m around the hotwork site to the entire
confined space. The position we
promote at MTL is that cleaning is necessary wherever sparks and
spatter could come into contact
with residues. This is usually 2m above the hotwork site, and 3m
horizontally around the site
projecting downward until meeting continuous structure.
Prevention on fire must not rely on
cleaning alone, therefore spark and spatter containment measures
should also be applied using fire
blanket or steel barriers.
132) – 137) Entry Permit
-
132) An employer shall ensure that no person enters a confined
space until the employer
has fulfilled the requirements of this section and a competent
person has provided a written
work permit
Does a work permit need to be written or will a permit produced
by a computer system be
sufficient? The language should be changed to “authorised work
permit.”
133) The written work permit must, at minimum, identify:
a) Date and time if when the tests referenced in section 113
were performed, and their
results;
b) The type of work that:
i. Can be performed in the confined space; and
ii. Is explicitly banned in the confined space.
c) Any engineering and administrative control measures
identified as necessary;
d) Specific PPE that must be worn by every employee entering the
confined space;
e) The means by which the work is to b e performed;
f) The expiry date and time of the permit;
g) Names of all employees entering the confined space; and
h) The method to be followed by an employee entering into,
exiting from, or occupying a
confined space.
There is nothing in these requirements which states that the
work permit needs to be supported by
a confined space risk/hazard assessment and validation that all
control measures have been put in
place.
Specifically including the names of the personnel permitted to
enter the space on the permit is
cumbersome without bringing any real safety value. Then names of
all entrants will be provided
under the requirements of 134) c) It would be more important to
state a limit of how many people
are permitted within the confined space.
It is unclear what is intended by 133) h) and why this is a
specific requirement of the permit whilst
there is no mention of the requirement for ventilation,
continuous gas testing or any reference to
the communications protocols or emergency response plans
applicable to the confined space entry.
134) The written permit must include:
a) the signature of the competent person(s) completing the work
permit, and
b) The signature of qualified person(s) completing the tests
identified in Section 113;
c) the signatures of all persons entering the confined space,
verifying that they have
read and understood the permit.
It is commonplace that a separate gas testing sheet is attached
to the permit in order to record all
measurements, equipment used, time of test and the name of the
gas tester. This should support
the authorisation of the permit, be updated throughout the shift
as necessary and maintained with
the permit at the confined space entry point for examination by
the attendant and entrants.
135) No permit issued shall be valid for longer than 12 hours
after the time the tests
required under section 113 were performed.
136) An employer shall post a copy of the valid permit required
at the entrance to the
confined space for the duration of the confined space
occupancy.
-
In our view this requirement should be expanded to refer to a
“permit package” containing the valid
permit, gas testing measurements, risk assessment, alarm guide
and emergency response
procedures.
137) The employer shall retain the permit for 12 months
following the date of entrance.
Is this a specific requirement only for confined space entry
permits or for all permits? It isn’t clear
how this will enhance or ensure the safety of personnel entering
confined spaces.
138) Confined space closure
138) No person shall close off a confined space until a
qualified person has verified that no
person is inside it, and verify that all locks and isolations
are removed, as required.
The intent of this clause is not clear. If it is intended to say
that “no person shall close off a confined
space PERMIT until …”, it would be unclear what is meant by
“closing off a permit”. The comments
provided against clause 126) are sufficient to ensure that no
person remains in a confined space
when unattended and that all entrants are accounted for.
If clause 138) is intended to state that the confined space
entry point/access hatch will not be
closed until the stated requirements are met then this is
physically problematic. Most confined
spaces are blanked and positively isolated from outwith the
confined space. The sequence for
returning to service in these cases is to close and seal all
hatches then commence de-isolation
activities. For cargo tanks with bottom lines and some designs
of ballast tanks, it is only possible to
remove the blanking flanges/spades from within the confined
space, therefore the entry hatches
must remain open and a valid entry permit issued to cover
de-isolation activities.
From an employee safety perspective, the hazards associated with
closing up a confined space have
already been covered by earlier clauses: personnel must not
enter a confined space without a permit
and all entrants must be accounted for.
Further information / Contacts If the workgroup requires any
further information on the above comments or opinions on any
other
comments received by NRCAN during the draft policy review,
please contact either Calum MacLean
or Matthew Lewin at Marine Technical Limits Ltd. Contact details
are available at www.technical-
limits.com
http:limits.comwww.technical
MTL1MTL