EN BANC
[G. R. No. 156982.September 8, 2004]
NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION,petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
JUANITO G. ESPINO, Director IV, NCR, Commission on Audit, and
ERNESTO C. EULALIA, Resident Auditor, National Amnesty
Commission.respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA,J.:
This petition for review[1]seeks to annul the two decisions of
respondent Commission on Audit (COA)[2]dated July 26, 2001[3]and
January 30, 2003,[4]affirming the September 21, 1998 ruling[5]of
the National Government Audit Office (NGAO). The latter in turn
upheld Auditor Ernesto C.Eulaliasorder disallowing the payment
ofhonorariato the representatives of petitionersex officiomembers,
per COA Memorandum No. 97-038.
Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government
agency created on March 25, 1994 by then President Fidel V. Ramos
through Proclamation No. 347.The NAC is tasked toreceive,process
and review amnesty applications. It is composed of seven members: a
Chairperson, three regular members appointed by the President, and
the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local
Government asex officiomembers.[6]It appears that after personally
attending the initial NAC meetings, the threeex officiomembers
turned over said responsibility to their representatives whowere
paidhonorariabeginning December 12, 1994.However, on October 15,
1997, NAC resident auditorEulaliadisallowed on audit the payment
ofhonorariato these representatives amounting toP255,750for the
period December 12, 1994 to June 27, 1997, pursuant to COA
Memorandum No. 97-038. On September 1, 1998, the NGAO upheld the
auditors order and notices of disallowance were subsequently issued
to the following:[7]REPRESENTATIVESAMOUNT
1.CesarAverillaDepartment of National DefenseP2,500.00
2.Ramon Martinez
Department of National Defense73,750.00
3.CielitoMindaro,
Department of Justice18,750.00
4.PuritaDeynataDepartment of Justice62,000.00
5.Alberto Bernardo
Department of the Interior
And Local Government71,250.00
6.StephenVillaflorDepartment of the Interior and
Local Government26,250.00
7.ArtemioAspirasDepartment of
Justice1,250.00P255,750.00Meanwhile, on April 28, 1999, the NAC
passed Administrative Order No. 2 (the new Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Proclamation No. 347), which was approved by then
President Joseph Estrada on October 19, 1999.Section 1, Rule II
thereof provides:
Section 1, CompositionThe NAC shall be composed of seven (7)
members:
a) A Chairperson who shall beappointedby the President;
b) Three (3) Commissioners who shall beappointedby the
President;
c) Three (3) Ex-officio Members
1. Secretary of Justice
2. Secretary of National Defense
3. Secretary of the Interior and Local Government
Theex officiomembers maydesignatetheirrepresentativesto the
Commission. Said Representatives shall beentitled toper
diems,allowances, bonuses and other benefits as may be authorized
by law.(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner invoked Administrative Order No. 2 in assailing
before the COA the rulings of the resident auditor and the NGAO
disallowing payment ofhonorariato theex officiomembers
representatives, to no avail.
Hence, on March 14, 2003, the NAC filed the present petition,
contending that the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in:(1)
implementing COA Memorandum No. 97-038 without the required notice
and publication under Article 2 of the Civil Code;(2) invoking
paragraph 2, Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution to
sustain the disallowance ofhonorariaunder said Memorandum; (3)
applying the Memorandum to the NACex officiomembers representatives
who were all appointive officials with ranks below that of an
Assistant Secretary; (4) interpreting laws and rules outside of its
mandate and declaring Section 1, Rule II of Administrative Order
No. 2 null and void, and (5) disallowing the payment ofhonorariaon
the ground of lack of authority of representatives to attend the
NAC meetings in behalf of theex officiomembers.[8]We hold that the
position of petitioner NAC is against the law and jurisprudence.
The COA is correct that there is no legal basis to grantper
diem,honorariaor any allowance whatsoever to the NACex
officiomembers official representatives.
The Constitution mandates the Commission on Audit to ensure that
the funds and properties of the government are validly, efficiently
and conscientiously used. Thus, Article IX-D of the Constitution
ordains the COA to exercise exclusive and broad auditing powers
over all government entities or trustees, without any
exception:
Section 2.(1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power,
authority and duty toexamine, audit, and settle all accounts
pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses
of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to,
the Government,or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled
corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a)
constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been
granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution;(b) autonomous
state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such
non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or
indirectly, from or through the government, which are required by
law of the granting institution to submit to such audit as a
condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control
system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may
adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as
are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall
keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as
may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting
papers pertaining thereto.
(2)The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the
limitations in this Article, todefine the scope of its audit and
examination, establish the techniques and methods requiredtherefor,
and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations,
including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary, inexpensive, extravagant, or unconscionable
expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.Section
3.No lawshall be passedexempting any entityof the Government or its
subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of public
funds,from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.(Emphasis
supplied).
It is in accordance with this constitutional mandate that the
COA issued Memorandum No. 97-038 on September 19, 1997:
COMMISSION ON AUDIT MEMORANDUM NO.97-038
SUBJECT:Implementation of Senate Committee Report No. 509,
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
and Committee on Civil Service and Government Reorganization.
The Commission received a copy of Senate Committee Report No.
509 urging the Commission on Auditto immediately cause the
disallowance of any payment of any form of additional compensation
or remuneration to cabinet secretaries, their deputies and
assistants, or their representatives, in violation of the rule on
multiple positions, and to effect the refund of any and all such
additional compensation given to and received by the officials
concerned, or their representatives, from the time of the finality
of the Supreme Court ruling inCivil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretaryto the present.In the Civil Liberties Union case,
theSupreme Court ruled that Cabinet Secretaries, their deputies and
assistants may not hold any other office or employment. It declared
Executive Order 284 unconstitutional insofar as it allows Cabinet
members, their deputies and assistants to hold other offices in
addition to their primary office and to receive
compensationtherefor.The said decisionbecame final andexecutoryon
August 19, 1991.In view thereof, all unit heads/auditors/team
leaders of the national government agencies and government owned or
controlled corporations which have effected payment of subject
allowances, are directed to implement the recommendation contained
in the subject Senate Committee Report by undertaking the following
audit action:
1.On accounts that have not been audited and settled under
certificate of settlements and balances on record from August 19,
1991 to present to immediately issue the Notices of disallowance
and corresponding certificate of settlements and balances.2.On
accounts that have been audited and settled under certificate of
settlements and balances on record to review and re-open said
accounts, issue the corresponding notices of disallowance, and
certify a new balance thereon.It is understood that the re-opening
of accounts shall be limited to those that were settled within the
prescriptive period of three (3) years prescribed in Section 52 of
P.D. 1445.3.On disallowances previously made on these accounts to
submit a report on the status of the disallowances indicating
whether those have been refunded/settled or have become final
andexecutoryand the latest action taken by the Auditor thereon.
All auditors concerned shall ensure that all documents
evidencing the disallowed payments are kept intact on file in their
respective offices.
Any problem/issue arising from the implementation of this
Memorandum shall be brought promptly to the attention of the
Committee created under COA Officer Order No. 97-698 thru the
Director concerned, for immediate resolution.
An initial report on the implementation of this Memorandum shall
be submitted to the Directors concerned not later than October 31,
1997. Thereafter, a quarterly progress report on the status of
disallowances made shall be submitted, until all the disallowances
shall have been enforced.
The Committee created under COA Office Order No. 97-698, dated
September 10, 1997, shall supervise the implementation of this
Memorandum which shall take effect immediately and shall submit a
consolidated report thereon in response to the recommendation of
the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigation and Committee on Civil Service and Government
Reorganization.[9](Emphasis supplied)
Contrary to petitioners claim, COA Memorandum No.97-038 does not
need, for validity andeffectivity, the publication required by
Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2.Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in theOfficial Gazette, unless it
is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after
such publication.
We clarified this publication requirement
inTaadavs.Tuvera:[10][A]llstatutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
theireffectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a differenteffectivitydate is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive
orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative
powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature
or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a
valid delegation.Interpretative regulations and those merely
internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published.Neither is publication required of the so-called letters
of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the
rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties.(Emphasis supplied.)
COA Memorandum No. 97-038 is merely an internal and
interpretative regulation or letter of instruction which does not
need publication to be effective and valid. It is not an
implementing rule or regulation of a statute but a directive issued
by the COA to its auditors to enforce the self-executing
prohibition imposed by Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution
on the President and his official family, their deputies and
assistants, or their representatives from holding multiple offices
and receiving double compensation.
Six years prior to the issuance of COA Memorandum No. 97-038,
the Court had the occasion to categorically explain this
constitutional prohibition inCivil Liberties Union vs.TheExecutive
Secretary:[11]Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which,
in effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries
and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or
positions in addition to their primary positions, albeit subject to
the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides as follows:
Sec. 13.The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure,
directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate
in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with,
or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government
or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.
xxxxxxxxx[D]oesthe prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or
assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for
appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article
IX-B which, for easy reference is quoted anew, thus:"Unless
otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporation or their subsidiaries."
We rule in the negative.
xxxxxxxxxBut what is indeed significant is the fact thatalthough
Section 7, Article IX-B already contains a blanket prohibition
against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the
government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials,
the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate
another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting
the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment
during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution
itself.xxxxxxxxxThus, while all other appointive officials in the
civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the
government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by
the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly
authorized by the Constitution itself.In other words, Section 7,
Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to
all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while
Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable
only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants.This being the case, the qualifying
phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" in Section
13, Article VII cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions
provided under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. .
. .xxxxxxxxxThe prohibition against holding dual or multiple
offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the
Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts
occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without
additional compensation in anex-officiocapacity as provided by law
and asrequiredby the primary functions of said officials' office.
The reason is that these posts do no comprise "any other office"
within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are
properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said
officials.xxxxxxxxx[T]he prohibition under Section 13, Article VII
is not to be interpreted as covering positions held without
additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law
and as required by the primary functions of the concerned
official's office. The term ex-officio means "from office; by
virtue of office."It refers to an "authority derived from official
character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual
character, but rather annexed to the official position." Ex-officio
likewise denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a
consequence of office, and without any other appointment or
authority than that conferred by the office." An ex-officio member
of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a
certain office, and without further warrant or appointment. To
illustrate, by express provision of law, the Secretary of
Transportation and Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of the
Board of the Philippine Ports Authority, and the Light Rail Transit
Authority.
xxxxxxxxxTheex-officioposition being actually and in legal
contemplation part of the principal office, it follows thatthe
official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation
for his services in the said position.The reason is that these
services arealready paid for and covered by the compensation
attached to his principal office.xxxxxxxxxxxx[E]x-officio posts
held by the executive official concerned without additional
compensation as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of his office do not fall under the definition of "any
other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition...(Emphasissupplied).
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution, such as theCivil Liberties Uniondoctrine, form part
of our legal system.[12]Supreme Court decisions assume the same
authority as valid statutes.[13]The Courts interpretation of the
law is part of that law as of the date of enactment because its
interpretation merely establishes the contemporary legislative
intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect.[14]COA
Memorandum No. 97-038 does not, in any manner or on its own, rule
against or affect the right of any individual, except those
provided for under the Constitution. Hence, publication of said
Memorandum is not required for it to be valid, effective and
enforceable.
InCivil Liberties Union, we elucidated onthe two constitutional
prohibitions against holding multiple positions in the government
and receiving double compensation: (1) the blanket prohibition of
paragraph 2, Section 7, Article IX-B on all government employees
against holding multiple government offices, unless otherwise
allowed by law or the primary functions of their positions, and (2)
the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII on the
President and his official family from holding any other office,
profession, business or financial interest, whether government or
private, unless allowed by the Constitution.
The NACex officiomembers representatives who were all appointive
officials with ranks below Assistant Secretary are covered by the
two constitutional prohibitions.
First, the NACex officiomembers representatives are not exempt
from the general prohibition because there is no law or
administrative order creating a new office or position and
authorizing additional compensationtherefor.
Sections 54 and 56 of the Administrative Code of 1987 reiterate
the constitutional prohibition against multiple positions in the
government and receiving additional or double compensation:
SEC. 54.Limitation on Appointment.(1) No elective official shall
be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any
public office or position during his tenure.
xxxxxxxxx(3) Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any
other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
xxxxxxxxxSEC. 56.Additional or Double Compensation.--No elective
or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional
or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law nor
accept without the consent of the President, any present,
emolument, office, or title of any kind form any foreign state.
Pensions and gratuities shall not be considered as additional,
double or indirect compensation.
RA 6758, the Salary Standardization Law, also bars the receipt
of such additional emolument.
The representatives in fact assumed their responsibilities not
by virtue of a new appointment but by mere designation from theex
officiomembers who were themselves also designated as such.
There is a considerable difference between an appointment and
designation. An appointment is the selection by the proper
authority of an individual who is to exercise the powers and
functions of a given office; a designation merely connotes an
imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person
already in the public service by virtue of an earlier
appointment.[15]Designation does not entail payment of additional
benefits or grant upon the person so designated the right to claim
the salary attached to the position. Without an appointment, a
designation does not entitle the officer to receive the salary of
the position.The legal basis of an employees right to claim the
salary attached thereto is a duly issued and approved appointment
to the position,[16]and not a mere designation.
Second, theex officiomembers representatives are also covered by
the strict constitutional prohibition imposed on the President and
his official family.
Again, inCivil Liberties Union,we held that cabinet secretaries,
including their deputies and assistants, who hold positions inex
officiocapacities, are proscribed from receiving additional
compensation because their services are already paid for and
covered by the compensation attached to their principal offices.
Thus, in the attendance of the NAC meetings, theex officiomembers
were not entitled to, and were in fact prohibited from, collecting
extra compensation, whether it was calledper diem,
honorarium,allowance or some other euphemism. Such additional
compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.
Furthermore, inde la Cruz vs. COA[17]andBitoniovs. COA,[18]we
upheldCOAsdisallowance of the payment ofhonorariaandper diemsto the
officers concerned who sat asex officiomembers or alternates. The
agent, alternate or representative cannot have a better right than
his principal, theex officiomember. The laws, rules, prohibitions
or restrictions that cover theex officiomember apply with equal
force to his representative. In short, since theex officiomember is
prohibited from receiving additional compensation for a position
held in anex officiocapacity, so is his representative likewise
restricted.
The Court also finds that the re-opening of the NAC accounts
within three years after its settlement is withinCOAsjurisdiction
under Section 52 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, promulgated on
June 11, 1978:
SECTION 52.Opening and revision of settled accounts.(1) At any
time before the expiration of three years after the settlement of
any account by an auditor, the Commission maymotupropioreview and
revise the account or settlement andcertifya new balance.
More importantly, the Government is neverestoppedby the mistake
or error on the part of its agents.[19]Erroneous application and
enforcement of the law by public officers do not preclude
subsequent corrective application of the statute.
In declaring Section 1, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 2s.
1999 null and void, the COA ruled that:
Petitioner further contends that with the new IRR issued by the
NAC authorizing the ex-officio members to designate representatives
to attend commission meetings and entitling them to receive per
diems, honoraria and other allowances, there is now no legal
impediment since it was approved by the President. This Commission
begs to disagree. Said provision in the new IRR is null and void
for having been promulgated in excess of its rule-making authority.
Proclamation No. 347, the presidential issuance creating the NAC,
makes no mention that representatives of ex-officio members can
take the place of said ex-officio members during its meetings and
can receive per diems and allowances. This being the case, the NAC,
in the exercise of its quasi-legislative powers, cannot add, expand
or enlarge the provisions of the issuance it seeks to implement
without committing an ultraviresact.[20]We find that, on its face,
Section 1, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 2 is valid, as it
merely provides that:
The ex officio members may designate their representatives to
the Commission. Said Representatives shall be entitled to per
diems, allowances, bonuses and other benefits as may be authorized
by law. (Emphasis supplied).
The problem lies not in the administrative order but how the NAC
and the COA interpreted it.
First, the administrative order itself acknowledges that payment
of allowances to the representatives must be authorized by the law,
that is, the Constitution, statutes and judicial decisions.
However, as already discussed, the payment of such allowances is
not allowed, prohibited even.
Second, the administrative order merely allows theex
officiomembers to designate their representatives to NAC meetings
but not to decide for them while attending such meetings. Section 4
of the administrative order categorically states:
Decisions of the NAC shall be arrived at by a majority vote in a
meeting where there is a quorum consisting of at least four
members.
Thus, although the administrative order does not preclude the
representatives from attending the NAC meetings, they may do so
only as guests or witnesses to the proceedings. They cannot
substitute for theex officiomembers for purposes of determining
quorum, participating in deliberations and making decisions.
Lastly, we disagree withNACsposition that the representatives
arede factoofficers and as such are entitled to allowances,
pursuant to our pronouncement inCivil Liberties Union:
where there is nodejureofficer, ade factoofficer, who in good
faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the
duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of
the office, and may in appropriate action recover the salary, fees
and other compensation attached to the office.
Ade factoofficer derives his appointment from one having
colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive
office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. (He is) one who
is in possession of an office and is discharging its duties under
color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an
appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent
be not a mere volunteer.[21]The representatives cannot be
consideredde factoofficers because they were not appointed but were
merely designated to act as such. Furthermore, they are not
entitled to something their own principals are prohibited from
receiving. Neither can they claim good faith, given the express
prohibition of the Constitution and the finality of our decision
inCivil Liberties Unionprior to their receipt of such
allowances.
WHEREFOREthe petition is herebyDISMISSEDfor lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011ESTRELLITA
JULIANO-LLAVE,Petitioner,vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI
ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and ADIB AHMAD A. TAMANO,Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
DEL CASTILLO,J.:A new law ought to affect the future, not what
is past. Hence, in the case of subsequent marriage laws, no vested
rights shall be impaired that pertain to the protection of the
legitimate union of a married couple.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the
Decision1dated August 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution2dated September
13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner Estrellita
Juliano-Llaves (Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano
(Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.
Factual Antecedents
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married
Estrellita twice initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on
May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City3and, subsequently, under a civil
ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on
June 2, 1993.4In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamanos civil
status was indicated as divorced.
Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the
whole world as Sen. Tamanos wife, and upon his death, his
widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A.
Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their
own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamanos legitimate
children with Zorayda,5filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon
City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita
and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint6alleged, inter
alia, that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil
rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married
Estrellita in 1993. The complaint likewise averred that:
11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda, having
been celebrated under the New Civil Code, is therefore governed by
this law. Based on Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, the
subsequent marriage entered into by deceased Mamintal with
Defendant Llave is void ab initio because he contracted the same
while his prior marriage to Complainant Zorayda was still
subsisting, and his status being declared as "divorced" has no
factual or legal basis, because the deceased never divorced
Complainant Zorayda in his lifetime, and he could not have validly
done so because divorce is not allowed under the New Civil
Code;
11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have divorced
Complainant Zorayda by invoking the provision of P.D. 1083,
otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, for the simple
reason that the marriage of the deceased with Complainant Zorayda
was never deemed, legally and factually, to have been one
contracted under Muslim law as provided under Art. 186 (2) of P.D.
1083, since they (deceased and Complainant Zorayda) did not
register their mutual desire to be thus covered by this
law;7Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994.
She then asked from the court for an extension of 30 days to file
her answer to be counted from January 4, 1995,8and again, another
15 days9or until February 18, 1995, both of which the court
granted.10Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita
filed a Motion to Dismiss11on February 20, 1995 where she declared
that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims who were married
under the Muslim rites, as had been averred in the latters
disbarment complaint against Sen. Tamano.12Estrellita argued that
the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because
under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code), questions and
issues involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the
exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts.
The trial court denied Estrellitas motion and asserted its
jurisdiction over the case for declaration of nullity.13Thus,
Estrellita filed in November 1995 acertioraripetition with this
Court questioning the denial of her Motion to Dismiss. On December
15, 1995, we referred the petition to the CA14which was docketed
thereat as CA-G.R. SP No. 39656.
During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC continued
to try the case since there can be no default in cases of
declaration of nullity of marriage even if the respondent failed to
file an answer. Estrellita was allowed to participate in the trial
while her opposing parties presented their evidence. When it was
Estrellitas turn to adduce evidence, the hearings set for such
purpose15were postponed mostly at her instance until the trial
court, on March 22, 1996, suspended the proceedings16in view of the
CAs temporary restraining order issued on February 29, 1996,
enjoining it from hearing the case.17Eventually, however, the CA
resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita in its Decision dated
September 30, 1996.18Estrellita then elevated the appellate courts
judgment to this Court by way of a petition for review on
certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 126603.19Subsequent to the
promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC ordered Estrellita to
present her evidence on June 26, 1997.20As Estrellita was
indisposed on that day, the hearing was reset to July 9, 1997.21The
day before this scheduled hearing, Estrellita again asked for a
postponement.22Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their
case, Zorayda and Adib moved to submit the case for
decision,23reasoning that Estrellita had long been delaying the
case. Estrellita opposed, on the ground that she has not yet filed
her answer as she still awaits the outcome of G.R. No. 126603.24On
June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of Quezon
City,25stating as one of the reasons that as sharia courts are not
vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction in cases of
marriages celebrated under both the Civil Code and PD 1083, the
RTC, as a court of general jurisdiction, is not precluded from
assuming jurisdiction over such cases. In our Resolution dated
August 24, 1998,26we denied Estrellitas motion for
reconsideration27with finality.
A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998, the
RTC rendered the aforementioned judgment declaring Estrellitas
marriage with Sen. Tamano as void ab initio.28Ruling of the
Regional Trial Court
The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and
Zorayda were never severed, declared Sen. Tamanos subsequent
marriage to Estrellita as voidab initiofor being bigamous under
Article 35 of the Family Code of the Philippines and under Article
83 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.29The court said:
A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately shows
that the second marriage of the late Senator with [Estrellita] was
entered into during the subsistence of his first marriage with
[Zorayda]. This renders the subsequent marriage void from the very
beginning. The fact that the late Senator declared his civil status
as "divorced" will not in any way affect the void character of the
second marriage because, in this jurisdiction, divorce obtained by
the Filipino spouse is not an acceptable method of terminating the
effects of a previous marriage, especially, where the subsequent
marriage was solemnized under the Civil Code or Family
Code.30Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In her appeal,31Estrellita argued that she was denied her right
to be heard as
the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the
finality of the Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 126603.
She claimed that the RTC should have required her to file her
answer after the denial of her motion to dismiss. She maintained
that Sen. Tamano is capacitated to marry her as his marriage and
subsequent divorce with Zorayda is governed by the Muslim Code.
Lastly, she highlighted Zoraydas lack of legal standing to question
the validity of her marriage to the deceased.
In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17,
2004,32the CA held that Estrellita can no longer be allowed to file
her answer as she was given ample opportunity to be heard but
simply ignored it by asking for numerous postponements. She never
filed her answer despite the lapse of around 60 days, a period
longer than what was prescribed by the rules. It also ruled that
Estrellita cannot rely on her pending petition forcertiorariwith
the higher courts since, as an independent and original action, it
does not interrupt the proceedings in the trial court.
As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that
Estrellitas marriage to Sen. Tamano is void ab initio for being
bigamous, reasoning that the marriage of Zorayda and Sen. Tamano is
governed by the Civil Code, which does not provide for an absolute
divorce. It noted that their first nuptial celebration was under
civil rites, while the subsequent Muslim celebration was only
ceremonial. Zorayda then, according to the CA, had the legal
standing to file the action as she is Sen. Tamanos wife and, hence,
the injured party in the senators subsequent bigamous marriage with
Estrellita.
In its September 13, 2005 Resolution,33the CA denied Estrellitas
Motion for Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
where it debunked the additional errors she raised. The CA noted
that the allegation of lack of the public prosecutors report on the
existence of collusion in violation of both Rule 9, Section 3(e) of
the Rules of Court34and Article 48 of the Family Code35will not
invalidate the trial courts judgment as the proceedings between the
parties had been adversarial, negating the existence of collusion.
Assuming that the issues have not been joined before the RTC, the
same is attributable to Estrellitas refusal to file an answer.
Lastly, the CA disregarded Estrellitas allegation that the trial
court erroneously rendered its judgment way prior to our remand to
the RTC of the records of the case ratiocinating that G.R. No.
126603 pertains to the issue on the denial of the Motion to
Dismiss, and not to the issue of the validity of Estrellitas
marriage to Sen. Tamano.
The Parties Respective Arguments
Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo, Estrellita now
argues that the CA erred in upholding the RTC judgment as the
latter was prematurely issued, depriving her of the opportunity to
file an answer and to present her evidence to dispute the
allegations against the validity of her marriage. She claims that
Judge Macias v. Macias36laid down the rule that the filing of a
motion to dismiss instead of an answer suspends the period to file
an answer and, consequently, the trial court is obliged to suspend
proceedings while her motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction has not yet been resolved with finality. She maintains
that she merely participated in the RTC hearings because of the
trial courts assurance that the proceedings will be without
prejudice to whatever action the High Court will take on her
petition questioning the RTCs jurisdiction and yet, the RTC
violated this commitment as it rendered an adverse judgment on
August 18, 1998, months before the records of G.R. No. 126603 were
remanded to the CA on November 11, 1998.37She also questions the
lack of a report of the public prosecutor anent a finding of
whether there was collusion, this being a prerequisite before
further proceeding could be held when a party has failed to file an
answer in a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage
with the late senator is valid as the latter was already divorced
under the Muslim Code at the time he married her. She asserts that
such law automatically applies to the marriage of Zorayda and the
deceased without need of registering their consent to be covered by
it, as both parties are Muslims whose marriage was solemnized under
Muslim law. She pointed out that Sen. Tamano married all his wives
under Muslim rites, as attested to by the affidavits of the
siblings of the deceased.38Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda
and Adib have no legal standing to file suit because only the
husband or the wife can file a complaint for the declaration of
nullity of marriage under Supreme Court Resolution A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC.39Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol
Gen) defends the CAs reasoning and stresses that Estrellita was
never deprived of her right to be heard; and, that filing an
original action for certiorari does not stay the proceedings of the
main action before the RTC.
As regards the alleged lack of report of the public prosecutor
if there is collusion, the Sol Gen says that this is no longer
essential considering the vigorous opposition of Estrellita in the
suit that obviously shows the lack of collusion. The Sol Gen also
supports private respondents legal standing to challenge the
validity of Estrellitas purported marriage with Sen. Tamano,
reasoning that any proper interested party may attack directly or
collaterally a void marriage, and Zorayda and Adib have such right
to file the action as they are the ones prejudiced by the marital
union.
Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any
comment.
IssuesThe issues that must be resolved are the following:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial courts judgment,
even though the latter was rendered prematurely because: a) the
judgment was rendered without waiting for the Supreme Courts final
resolution of her certiorari petition, i.e., G.R. No. 126603; b)
she has not yet filed her answer and thus was denied due process;
and c) the public prosecutor did not even conduct an investigation
whether there was collusion;
2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen.
Tamano was bigamous; and
3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have
Estrellitas marriage declared void ab initio.
Our RulingEstrellitas refusal to file an answer eventually led
to the loss of her right to answer; and her pending petition for
certiorari/review on certiorari questioning the denial of the
motion to dismiss before the higher courts does not at all suspend
the trial proceedings of the principal suit before the RTC of
Quezon City.
Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of
her right to due process. She was never declared in default, and
she even actively participated in the trial to defend her
interest.
Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias40to justify the
suspension of the period to file an answer and of the proceedings
in the trial court until her petition forcertiorariquestioning the
validity of the denial of her Motion to Dismiss has been decided by
this Court. In said case, we affirmed the following reasoning of
the CA which, apparently, is Estrellitas basis for her argument, to
wit:
However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a Motion to
Dismiss, instead of filing an Answer to the complaint. The filing
of said motion suspended the period for her to file her Answer to
the complaint. Until said motion is resolved by the Respondent
Court with finality, it behooved the Respondent Court to suspend
the hearings of the case on the merits. The Respondent Court, on
April 19, 2001, issued its Order denying the Motion to Dismiss of
the Petitioner. Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure [now Section 4],the Petitioner had the balance of the
period provided for in Rule 11 of the said Rulesbut in no case less
than five (5) days computed from service on her of the aforesaid
Order of the Respondent Court within which to file her Answer to
the complaint: x x x41(Emphasis supplied.)
Estrellita obviously misappreciatedMacias. All we pronounced
therein is that the trial court is mandated to suspend trial until
it finally resolves the motion to dismiss that is filed before it.
Nothing in the above excerpt states that the trial court should
suspend its proceedings should the issue of the propriety or
impropriety of the motion to dismiss be raised before the appellate
courts. InMacias,the trial court failed to observe due process in
the course of the proceeding of the case because after it denied
the wifes motion to dismiss, it immediately proceeded to allow the
husband to present evidence ex parte and resolved the case with
undue haste even when, under the rules of procedure, the wife still
had time to file an answer. In the instant case, Estrellita had no
time left for filing an answer, as she filed the motion to dismiss
beyond the extended period earlier granted by the trial court after
she filed motions for extension of time to file an answer.
Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its
judgment, as it should have waited first for the resolution of her
Motion to Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently, before this
Court. However, in upholding the RTC, the CA correctly ruled that
the pendency of a petition for certiorari does not suspend the
proceedings before the trial court. "An application for certiorari
is an independent action which is not part or a continuation of the
trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained
of."42Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is explicit in stating that
"[t]he petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal
case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued against the public respondent from
further proceeding in the case."43In fact, the trial court
respected the CAs temporary restraining order and only after the CA
rendered judgment did the RTC again require Estrellita to present
her evidence.
Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of Rule
45, we never issued any order precluding the trial court from
proceeding with the principal action. With her numerous requests
for postponements, Estrellita remained obstinate in refusing to
file an answer or to present her evidence when it was her turn to
do so, insisting that the trial court should wait first for our
decision in G.R. No. 126603. Her failure to file an answer and her
refusal to present her evidence were attributable only to herself
and she should not be allowed to benefit from her own dilatory
tactics to the prejudice of the other party. Sans her answer, the
trial court correctly proceeded with the trial and rendered its
Decision after it deemed Estrellita to have waived her right to
present her side of the story. Neither should the lower court wait
for the decision in G.R. No. 126603 to become final and executory,
nor should it wait for its records to be remanded back to it
because G.R. No. 126603 involves strictly the propriety of the
Motion to Dismiss and not the issue of validity of marriage.
The Public Prosecutor issued a report as
to the non-existence of collusion.
Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section
3(e) of the Rules of Court, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC)44also requries the participation of the public
prosecutor in cases involving void marriages. It specifically
mandates the prosecutor to submit his investigation report to
determine whether there is collusion between the parties:
Sec. 9.Investigation report of public prosecutor.(1) Within one
month after receipt of the court order mentioned in paragraph (3)
of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to
the court stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve
copies thereof on the parties and their respective counsels, if
any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he
shall state the basis thereof in his report. The parties shall file
their respective comments on the finding of collusion within ten
days from receipt of a copy of the report. The court shall set the
report for hearing and if convinced that the parties are in
collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists,
the court shall set the case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of
the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.
Records show that the trial court immediately directed the
public prosecutor to submit the required report,45which we find to
have been sufficiently complied with by Assistant City Prosecutor
Edgardo T. Paragua in his Manifestation dated March 30,
1995,46wherein he attested that there could be no collusion between
the parties and no fabrication of evidence because Estrellita is
not the spouse of any of the private respondents.
Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at
bar. Even assuming that there is a lack of report of collusion or a
lack of participation by the public prosecutor, just as we held in
Tuason v. Court of Appeals,47the lack of participation of a fiscal
does not invalidate the proceedings in the trial court:
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of
marriage and legal separation proceedings is to determine whether
collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the
evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's vehement
opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that
collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by
the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of
the parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the
non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of
collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the
validity of the proceedings in the trial court.48The Civil Code
governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their
marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamanos subsequent
marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was
celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites.49The
only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims
and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the
provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given
time.50Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is
not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No.
39451which was not availed of during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamanos prior marriage
to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083,52the
law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot
benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that
the law applies to "marriage and divorce wherein both parties are
Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the
marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code
in any part of the Philippines." But we already ruled in G.R. No.
126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation
where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim
rites."53Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4,
1977, and this law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code
which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen.
Tamano and Zorayda. The former explicitly provided for the
prospective application of its provisions unless otherwise
provided:
Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. Acts executed prior
to the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by the laws in
force at the time of their execution, and nothing herein except as
otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their validity or
legality or operate to extinguish any right acquired or liability
incurred thereby.
It has been held that:
The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that
all laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is
clearly, plainly and unequivocably expressed or necessarily
implied; accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved against
the retroactive operation of laws. Article 186 aforecited
enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to have its
provisions applied prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force
and effect of a pre-existing body of law, specifically, the Civil
Code in respect of civil acts that took place before the Muslim
Codes enactment.54An instance of retroactive application of the
Muslim Code is Article 186(2) which states:
A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity
of this Code in accordance with non-Muslim law shall be considered
as one contracted under Muslim law provided the spouses register
their mutual desire to this effect.
Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for
the marriage to be considered as one contracted under the Muslim
law, the registration of mutual consent between Zorayda and Sen.
Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose
marriage was celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Besides,
as we have already settled, the Civil Code governs their personal
status since this was in effect at the time of the celebration of
their marriage. In view of Sen. Tamanos prior marriage which
subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent
marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.
Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal
personalities to file the declaration of nullity of marriage. A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the husband or the wife the
filing of a petition for nullity is prospective in application and
does not shut out the prior spouse from filing suit if the ground
is a bigamous subsequent marriage.
Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the
Philippines,55Estrellita relies on A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took
effect on March 15, 2003 claiming that under Section 2(a)56thereof,
only the husband or the wife, to the exclusion of others, may file
a petition for declaration of absolute nullity, therefore only she
and Sen. Tamano may directly attack the validity of their own
marriage.
Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void
marriage can file a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. However, this interpretation does not apply if the reason
behind the petition is bigamy.
In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses
may file the petition to the exclusion of compulsory or intestate
heirs, we said:
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages
and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal
Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the
following manner,viz:
(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for
annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory
or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2;
Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for
annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of
the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the
petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights
prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only
question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death
of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the
concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its
dissolution.57Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section
2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the "aggrieved or injured
spouse." If Estrellitas interpretation is employed, the prior
spouse is unjustly precluded from filing an action. Surely, this is
not what the Rule contemplated.
The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he
or she had only discovered during the connubial period that the
marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had
already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit
from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they
would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such
circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal
remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the
prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to
the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder
of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior
marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.
Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son
from impugning the subsequent marriage.1wphi1But in the case at
bar, both Zorayda and Adib have legal personalities to file an
action for nullity. Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution governs
marriages celebrated under the Family Code, such is prospective in
application and does not apply to cases already commenced before
March 15, 2003.58Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of
nullity of Estrellitas marriage in November 1994. While the Family
Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void marriage, in which no
marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of rights, any
interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally
without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime
of the parties to the marriage.59Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does
not apply, Adib, as one of the children of the deceased who has
property rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be the real
party in interest in the suit he and his mother had filed since
both of them stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit.60Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a
couple, they should be interpreted in a way that would preserve
their respective rights which include striking down bigamous
marriages. We thus find the CA Decision correctly rendered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 17, 2004
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762, as well
as its subsequent Resolution issued on September 13, 2005, are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.