Pentagon Papers Part IV C 6 c

8/6/2019 Pentagon Papers Part IV C 6 c

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Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Section 3.3

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IV.C Evolution of the War (26 Vols.)

Direct Action: The Johnson Commitments, 1964-1968

(16 Vols.)

6. U.S. Ground Strategy and Force Deployments: 1965-1967

(3 Vols.)

c. Volume III: Program 6







Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3

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IV. c. 6. (c)

VOLLn,LE IT I

S,ec Det Cant Fr. x - - - - _ l t ~







Declassified per Executi ve O rd er 13 526, Sec tion 3,3

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VOLUME I I I

U. S. G R O U STRATEGY AND FORCE D E P L O Y M E ~ ~ S , 1965- -1967

TABLE OF COI\TTENrS and OUTLINE

V. PROGRAM 6

1. Eme rgency Augmentat ion . • • • . • • . . . . • . . . • . . • . . . . . . • . . . • • . • . . • • • • 1

2 . The Troop Request . . . • • • . • •.....•..••••.•..•.•...•..•....•.••• 12

3. "A to Z" Reassessment . . • . ....•....••.. • ••• . . . . • • . . • • . • • • . • • • 16

4. Drafting 8. Memorandum . . . .• • •• . .• . • . • • . . • • . • • . . . . • . . . . • . • . • . • • 33

5. Recormnendat ion to the Pres ident .... . . . . . ..................... 51

6. The Cli mate of Opini on. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • . . . . . . • . • . . • . . . . . 64

7. The Pres ident Ponders . . . •• . . • . . . • .......•.••..............••• 71

8. The F-.cesident Decides • . . . . . • .... . •• • . . • • ..........•.....•••.• 76

9. The De cision is Announced . . . • . . ....•. • . . . • . • • . • ......•.••.... 78

10 . " I Shall Not Seek, and I \vi l1 Not Accept" .... . . . .............. 80

11 . Epilogue,. ,. . . ,. ,. . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ... . .... . . . ..... . ,. ...... , . . . . . . . 90

FOOTNOTES . . . • . . . . . • . . . • . . • . • . • . • . • . . . . . . . . . • . • . . • . • . . . • . • . • •. 94

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V. PROORAIvI 6

1. Emergency Augmentation

Thus, the year ended with the combat elements of Program 5 eitherclosing in Vietnam or on the i r vlay to Vietnam on an accelerated schedule .The Joint Chiefs of Staff , however, could only promise that , even with

these deployments, the rate of progress in Vietnam would continue to be

slm·l in l ight of the continuing rest r ict ions imposed on the conduct ofmil i ta ry operations .

I n his year-end assessment of the mili tary sitUat ion, however,COMUSHACV had a somewhat more optimist ic outlook . He indicated thatthe Program 5 deployments had "provided us with an increased force

structure and lo gi s t ic s base for offens ive operations" . The past year ,he indicated, ha d been marked by steady free 'iwrld progress, a notice able deterior at ion of the enemy ' s combat effectiveness, and his loss ofcontrol over la rge areas and population .

"During 1967, the enemy los t control of la rge sectors of

t he populat ion . He faces signif icant problems in the areas

of indi genous recrui t ing , moral e , health and resources control .

Voids in VC ranks are being f i l led by regular INA. Se a i l l f i l t ra t i ori through the Market Time area has diminished to near - insign i f ica t ion proportions . Interdiction of the enemy ' s logi s t ics t ra in

i n Laos and N\m by ou r indispensable a ir effor ts has imposedsignif icant dif f icul t ies on him . In many areas the enemy ha s

been driven away from the population centers ; in others he ha s

been compelled to disperse and evade contact, thus null ifying

much of his potent ia l . The year ended with the enemy increasingly

resortin g to desperation tact ics in attempting to achieve mili tary /psychological victory ; and he has experienced only failure inthese attempts . Enemy bases, with spa-ese exception , are nol onger safe havens and he ha s necessari ly become increasinglyr el iant on Cambodian and Laotian sanctuaries . . . "

"The friendly picture gives r ise to optimism for increased

successes in 1968 . In 1967 , our l ogi s t ics base and force

structure permitted us to assume a fully offensive posture . . .A g:eatly improved in t el ligence system fl 'equently enabled us

to concentrate our superior mili tary assets in preempting enemymili tary ini t ia t ives le ad ing us to decisive accomplisrunents inconventiona l engagements . Materiel and t ac t ica l innovat ions

have be en further developed and emp loyed : Long range r c ~ c o nnaissance patrols, aerial reconnaissance sensors, new 0-2A

observat ion ai rcr aft , Rome ploHs,. 47 (Spooky) gunships, ai r mobile operations and t he Mobile RL verine Force (l<RF) , to name

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a few. The MRF has been s ignif icant ly successful in deprivingthe enemy of freedom and in i t i ative in the population and

resources rich Delta ar eas . The helico}'ter ha s establ ishedi t s el f as perhaps the single most important tool in our

arsenal -- and we wil l 1,-Te l come more . To a ir support in both

RVN and ~ N N (Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force ) goes much ofth e credit for ou r accomplishments . II 1./

The enemy ' s TET offensive, >vhich began with the attack on the U.S.

Embassy in Saigon on 31 January 1968, although i t ha d been predicted,took th e U. S . command and th e U.S. public by surprise , and i ts strength,l ength , and in tensi ty prolonged th is shock . As the attacks continued,

th e Secretary of Defense , on 9 February, r equested t he Joint Chiefs of

Staff to furnish pl ans which would provide fo r eme r gency r einforc ementof COMUSMACV .

Aft er extensive backchannel communication with General Westmoreland ,the JCS fo rwarded these plans on 12 February . J/ The Joint Chiefs'

assessment of the current Vi etnam si tuation differed markedly fromCOMUSNACV's year-end assessment submitted only 17 days ear l ier :

"a. The VC/f:.JVA forces have launched large-scale offensiveoperat io ns throughout South Vietnam .

lib. As of 11 February 1968, Headquarters , MACV , r eports thatattacks have taken place on 34 provincial towns , 64 dis t r i c t

towns , and a l l of the autonomous cit ies .

"c. Th e enemy has expressed his intention to continue offensive

operat i ons and to destroy the Government of Vietnam and i t s ArmedForces . .

"d . The f i rs t phase of his offensive has f ai l ed in that hedoes no t have adequate control over any popUlation center toi nsta l l his Revolutionary COTmni t tees 1,-Thich he hoped to forminto a coali t ion ,vi th the NLF .

"e. He ha s los t betvleen 30 and 40 thousand ki l led and captured,

and I,re have seized over seven thousand weapons .

" f.Reports indicate that he ha s committed the bulk of hisVC main fOTce and local fOTce elements dovm to platoon level

throughout the country, with th e exception of six to eightbattal ions in the general area of Saigon .

"g . Thus faT, he has cormnitted only 20 to 25 percent of hisNorth Vietnamese forces . These I·rere employed as gap f i l le rs

1,-There ' VC strength "Tas appa.rently not adequate to carlY out his

i n i t ial t hrust on the ci t ies and towns . Since November , he has

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inc r eased his ~ W A battal ions by about 25 . The bulk ofthese and the bulk of the uncomm i t ted IfifA forces are i n the

I Corps area .

"h . I t i s not clear vJhether the enemy wil l be able t or ecycle his attacks in a second phase . He has indicated his

i ntention to do so during the period from 10 to 15 February .

" i . South Vietnamese forces have suffered nearly tl-TO

t housand ki l led, over seven thousand ,-rounded, and an unknovmnumber of absences . MACV suspects the desertion rate may be

high . The average pre se nt for duty strength of RV1T i nfantry

battalions is 50 percent and Ranger Battal ions, 43 percent .

Fi ve of nine airborne battalions are judged byM ~ C V

to becombat ineffect i ve a t this time . "

Based on this assessment, C j V 1 U S I · ~ C V voiced to t he J oin t Chi efs threemajor concerns :

" a . The abi l i ty of the weakened RVNAF to cope viith additional

sustained enemy offensive operat ions .

"b .

and sea

dictionin that

Logistic support north of Danang, because of vreather

conditions in the Northern I Corps area, en emy inter of Route 1, and the probabil i ty of intensif ied combatarea .

" c . The forces available to him are not adeQuate a t the

moment to permit him to pursue his OIm c81npaign plans and tor esume offensive opera t ions against a i·reakened enemy, consider-

i ng the competing reQuirement s of reacting to enemy ini t ia t ives ,

assist ing in defending Government centers, and reinforc i ng ,.".eakenedRVNAF units when necessary ."

The three plans for . emergency reinforcement examined by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff were :

"a . Plan One, ,·rh ich is based upon prompt deployment of th e

82nd Airborne Division and 6/9 Marine division/,oring team, callup

of some 120,000 Army and Marine Corps Reserves , and appropriate

legis l at iv e action to permit extension of terms of service of

active duty personnel and th e rec all of individual Reservists .

"b . Plan Two, vThich vTOuld deploy as many Marine Corps

bat tal ions as are nOl"" available in cmms, less one bat ta l ionin the Caribbean, the battalion in th e Nediterranean, and the

Guantanamo Defense Force . This plan i-TOuld not be based upon

a callup of Reservists or legis la t ive action .




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" c . Plan Three, which would deploy the 82nd AirborneDi vision but would leave Marine Corps battalions in CONUS .This plan would likevJise envisage no Reserve callup and nol eg i slative action ."

Under Plan One, elements of one brigade of the 82nd Airbor neDivi sion could commence movement within 24 hours and the div i s i on i t se l f36- 48 hours la ter . 6/9ths of a Marine Corps Division/wing team could be

r eady for deployment to Vietnam in one week without \l.t i l iz ing Vietnam

r ep l acement drafts . Dependent upon the avai labi l i ty of ai rcraf t and

the degree of dravrdmm on the current level of Southeast Asia a i r l i f t

support, the deployment could be completed 'I·ri thin three to four weeks .

Under PlanTvro,

elements of twoCONUS

Marine Divisions, consistingof 12 battal ions could be a ir t ransported to Vietnam, although two 'Iveekspreparation '\-TOuld be required . This deployment, hmvever, '\-TOuld deplete

Marine Corps assets except for three battalions -- one afloat i n the

Mediterranean, one af loat in the Caribbean, and one ashore at Guantanamo

Bay, Cuba .

Under Plan Three, as under Plan One, elements of one brigade of the

82nd Airborne Division could commence movement in 24 hours, the division

i t se l f 36- 48 hours l a te r .

All of these plans, hOl·rever, 'Ivould require dra'lvdowns on previously

protected CONUS stocks during procurement lead- time for new production

and would further aggravate the shortage of long procurement lead time

items curr ently short , such as helicopters, tracked combat vehic l es ,and ammunition .

An examination was also made of the feasibi l i ty of an increased

accelerat ion in the deployment of the four infantry battal ions scheduled

to deploy in March-April under Progr am 5. I t was concluded tha t these

units could not be deployed ea::clier " except under the most cr i t ica l

circums tances. "

In examining the capacity to meet the possibi l i ty of 'Ividespread

ci v il disorder in th e United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded

. that , . vheth er or not deployments under any of the plans were directed ,i t appeared that sufficient forces would s t i l l be available for c iv i l

di sorder control .

HOitTeVe r , the Joint Chiefs of Staff cautioned tha t the residu al COlIiUS based active combat-ready ground forces that would resul t from the exten

sion of each of the plans examined 1,vould be :

. " a . Plan One - 6/9 Mar ine Division/Wing Team .

b . Plan '1':70 - One Airborne Division.





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c. Plan Three - One and 3/9 Marine Division/lhng Team ."

Moreover, these forces were at various levels of readiness and a high

percentage of thei r personnel were Vietnam returnees or close to the

end of the obligated active service . The capabil i ty of these uncom-mit ted general purpose forces \,ras further constndned, the Joint Chiefs

pointed out, by shortages of cr i t ica l skil led specia l is ts and shortages

i n mission essent ia l items of equipment and materiel . Thus, the JointChiefs emphasized, ou r posture of readily available combat forces wasseriously strained. Any decision to deploy emergency augmentationforces should be accompanied by the recal l of a t l eas t an equivalent

number, or more prudently, addit ional Reserve component forces and

an extension of terms of service for active duty personnel . Indeed,

the Chiefs, warned,

"I t is no t clear at this time whether the enemy wil l be able

to mount and sustain a second series of major attacks throughout

th e country . I t is equally unclear as to how 'well the Vietnamese

Armed Forces "rould be able to stand up against such a series of

attacks i f they 1,vere to occur. In the face of these uncertainties,a more precise assessment of US}ffiCV's addit ional force requirements,

i f any , must avrai t further developments . The Joint Chiefs ofStaff do no t exclude the possibi l i ty that addit ional develop -ments could make f\.l.rther deplo;yments necessary . II

Based on this assessment of the s i tuat ion , the Joint Chiefs of

Staff concluded and recommended that :

"a. A decision to deploy r einforcements to Vietnfull be

deferre d at th is time.

"b . Measures be taken no',r to prepare the 82nd Airborne

Division and 6/9 Marine Division/Wing team for possible deploy-

ment to Vietnam.

"c. As a matter of prudence, ca l l certain addit ional

Reserve units to active duty now . DeploYlllent of emergency

reinforc ements to Vietnam should not be made 'Ivi thout concomitant

callup of Reserves suff ic ient at l eas t to replace those deployed

and provide for the incre ased sustaining base r equirements of a l l

Services. In addition, bring se lected Reserve force units to

ful l strength and an incre ased s ta te of combat readiness.

"d . Le gis lation be sought now to (1 ) provide authori ty to

cal l individual Reservists to active duty; (2 ) extend past

30 June 1968 the exist ing authori ty to cal l Reserve units to

active duty; and (3) extend terms of service for act i ve duty

personnel.




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" e . Procurement and other supply actions be taken now to

overcome shortages exist ing in certain cr i t ica l items of materieland e ~ u i p m e n t such as munitions, helicopters, and other combat

aircraf t ."

Thus, for perhaps the f i r s t time in the his tory of American involve ment in Vietnam, the Joint Chiefs of Staf f recoffiITlended against deploying

the additional forces r e ~ u e s t e d by the f ield commander, in the absence

of other steps to reconsti tute the strategic reserve . At long las t , theresources ,.;rere beginning to be dra"m too thin, the assets became unavail able, the support base too small .

Notwithstanding the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the

Secretary of Defense almost immediately approved the deployment of one

brigade of the 82ncl Airborne Division and one Marine re gimental landingteam to South Vietnam . A to ta l strength of almost 10,500 was assumedand publicly announced . 'These deployments were directed by the JCS on13 February . Air l i f t of the brigade from the 82nd Airborne Division, a ta strength of approximately four thousand, was to begin on 14 February

and the brigade was to close in-country not la t er than 26 February 1968 . 4/After coordination 1,'Tith CINCSTRIKE and USCONARC, the strength of this

unit was fixed at 3,702 . 5/

The Marine Corps Regiment was to close in SVN not la te r than 26February also. The Regiment (reinforced ) less one bat ta l ion, was to be

deployed by a ir from California at a strength of about 3,600 . One bat ··

tal ion (reinforced) which \-Tas then embarked, "ras to be deployed by surface

at a strength of about 1,600 .

In viel'T of the wide variation of strength assoc ia ted vii th a Marine

Corps Regiment (reinforced) , CINCPAC was directed to advise a l l concerned

of the identi ty, composition and strength of the force selected for

deployment . 1/ CINCPAC nominated the 27th Marine Regiment, which included

5247 Marine and 327 Navy personnel. Additionally, he included the deploy··ment of a logis t ic support element of 389 personnel from Okinm-ra to reduce

the impact on the already heavily committed logis t ic uni ts in I CTZ . Inaddition, CINCPAC took the precautionary step of identifying, for follow

on deployment, a sea- tai l of reinforcing units total l ing 1,400 personnel .This element, scheduled to follm.;r in April 1968, would provide the re giment

th e necessary self-sustaining combat pm.;rer in the event early replacement

wa s not provided. Thus, the to ta l n ~ m b e r of troops deployed or alerted

for the follo'tT-on sea- t a i l numbered 11,065 . 2/

The Joint Chiefs of Staff reacted almost immediately to the national

deci sion to deploy these forces I'Ti thout a concomitant reserve callup .On 13 February 1968 they forwarded to the Secretary of Defense their

r ecommendations for actions'i\fhich should be taken re la t ive to callup of

r eserves , obtaining le gislation and in s t i tu t i ng procurernent actions topr ovide support for these forces and to sustain their deployment . 10/

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A minimum callup of Reserve units to replace deploying forces andto sustain and support them was just i f ied, the Joint Chiefs stated, by

t he follm-Ting si tuat ion:

"a. Army . The 82nd Airborne Division represents the only

re adily deployable Army divis i on in th e CONUS -based activest rategic reserve . The impending reduction of this division by

one-third to meet approved deployments establishes an immediate

r equirement for i t s prompt reconsti tut ion ,.;hich is possible only

by t he callup of Reserve units . In order to replace the forces

deployed from the s tra tegic res erve, to provide support unitsto meet anticipation requir ements in I CTZ and to provide aI-rider rotation bas e of requisite ranks and sk i l l s , i t will be

necessary for the Army to cal l up tvro infantry brigade f orcesof th e Reserve components . This callup ,-Till to ta l approxi mately

32,000 personnel . These t ,w brigades should at tain a combat r eady and deployable status in 12 weeks followin g cal lup .

"b. Marine Corps .

"(1) The Marine Corps cannot sustain addit ional deployments

to Southeast Asia under current personnel policies . Thus, the

f orce authorized for deployment must be replaced with a comparable

Reserve unit as soon as possible. The Reserve force requir ed for

t his purpose wil l consist of one Marine regiment, reinforcingcombat support and combat service support uni ts , and one composite

Marine Air Group Hith one VWA, oneVIv1P,

and two medium helicoptersquadrons (HMM ).

"( 2) The Reserve force ,-Till consist of approximately

12,000 personnel . I t will provide th e capabil i ty to deploy abalanced , sel f -sustai ning air/ground combat force in re l ie f of

the l ight ly structured 27th Marines (Rein ) and permit returnof t he 27th Marine Regiment (Rein ) to the t raining/rotat ion base

i n CONUS/Hmraii . This exchange would commence as soon as the

Reserve unit becomes combat-ready (approximately 60 days af tercallup) and must be completed not la te r than 120 days af ter

d e p l o ~ n e n t of RLT - 27 .

"(3) I t is envisioned that the Reserve forces Hil l be.

redeployed to c o ~ r u s without replacement af ter 13 months in SouthVietn am . HOI-rever, i f this does no t OCC'1.r , i t Hil l be best to

deploy a re l ie f brigade from the 4th Marine Division/wi ng t eam .Alternately, an adequate rotation base in CONUS to sustain the

continued deployment can be created but to do so requires

extensions of terms of service and other personnel policy changes .

11 In addition, i t must be recognized that the anticipated

proportionate increase in pers?nnel losses 'di l l r ~ q u i r e an increasein the end strength of the actlve forces to sustaln these lo sses .







"c. Navy . Support of the newly authori zed deployments vTillr equire the callup of hlO Navy mobile construction bat ta l ions(NMCB ) total l ing 1,700 personnel and 600 individual medical/

dental/chaplain Reservists . These callups "ri l l provide forbringing recal led Marine units up to strength, sustaining the

Navy personnel organic to the deployed RLT, and adding medical

s ta ff ing.required by the in creased level of act ivi ty in Southea.st Asia to forward hospital fac i l i t ies including Guam .

" d . Air Force . The Air Force pl ans to support this approved

deployment operation ,,'li thout recal l of individuals or uni ts .Reserve a i r l i f t augmentation neede d to supplement the deployment

a i r l i f t can be accomplished by Reservists on a voluntary basis ."

I n addition, the Joint Chiefs indicated tha t i t would be both prudent

and aclvisable to reach a readiness leve l tha t could be responsive tofurther COMUS}1ACV force requirements, i f the remainder of the 82nd Airborne

Division and one more RLT Ive;re required . COMUSMACV had already indicated

the potential need for these units at an early date. To r each such areadiness level, the Join t Chiefs indicated that the follmving Reserve

forces "lOuld have to be activated :

"a. Army . Should the additional deployments be made, i t "rouldbe ne cessary for the Army to recal l ( in addition to the h lo brigade

fo rces previously discussed) one infantry division force and onein fantry brigade force of the Army Reserve components , total l ing

58,000men .

Theseforces wil l

be neededto reconsti tute

the

s t ra tegic res erv e and to bro aden t he source of cr t t ica l r anks

and ski l l s to be applied against the increased rota t ion base

requir ements . The Reserve units should be recalled a t this time

to bring them closer to a combat - ready status prior to the probable

deployment of the balance of the 82nd Airborne Division . TheReserve division force should at tain a combat - capable status in15 vre eks after recal l and the brigade force should require 12 vreeks .

lIb. Marine Corps .

(1) The most desirable Reserve callup consists of the

entire 4th Marine Expeditionary Force (IvlEF ) , plus other unitsand selected indivi dual Reserves . This totals about 51,000 .

Mobilization and subsequent deployment of the Reserve forcesshould be accomplished incrementally . 'l'his callup permits the

early and orderly replac ement of the 5th r.larine Division (-)in South Vietn am and the subsequent re(lep loyment of the 5th

Marine Division (-) to CONUS, or, al te rna t ive ly , the 4th Division/

Wing Te am can meet the additional requirements . . . .

"c. Navy. Support of these additional deployments. vrouldr equire the callup of an additional three m,1CB ( total of f ive)

total l in a 4 ,1 50 personnel and a? addit io?al 400 (for a to ta lof 1, 0'00), medical/dental/cnaplaJ.n ReserVlsts . These ca11ups





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would. provide for ll.f 1'MCB in RVN for direct construction support

and an adequate rotation base to ma in t ain these deployment's.The additional medical/dental/chaplain personnel wil l provide

for bringing recal led Marine uni ts up to strength, sustaining

the Navy personnel in the additional deploying RLT, and adding

some medical staffing to forward hospital fac i l i t ies . Recall

of an additional 2,800 personnel would be required to augment

the logist ic operations in Vietnam . The increased requirement

for naval gunfire support for the larger deployments ,.lOuldnecessit ate th e act ivation of two heavy cruisers to f i l l CINCPAC 'sr equirements for additional shore bombardment capability to

maintain hro l arge calibre gun ships on s ta t ion in the SEA

D R A G O = ~ area and off RVN . Additionally, 15 destroyers should

be activated from the mothball f leet to replace 15 Naval Reserve

Training destroyers to be called to active duty . This '\wuldf i l l CINCPAC's requirement for an additional five destroyers

on s ta t ion off Vietnam and provide the rota t ion base to support

them. The recal l of 6,000 Naval Reserve personnel would provide

the additional manpower' and ski l l s base to man these react ivated

ships .

" d . Air Force. The deployment of the remainder of the 82nd

Airborne Division to Southeast Asia ,-rill require the support of

three t ac t i ca l f ighter squadrons, a t ac t ica l reconnaissance

squadron, necessary elements of th e Tactical Air Control System,

on e PRIME BEEF uni t , and one security squadron . In order toprovide support of th e deploynlent and the broadening of the

t raining and rotat ion base and to re ta in a minimum acceptable

number of combat-ready deployable squadrons in the CONUS, theseAir Force organizations wil l have to be replaced by activat ion

of the following Air Reserve Forces: eight t ac t ica l f ighter

squadrons, five tact ical reconnaissance squadrons, one Tact ical

Control Group, t"lQ mili tary a i r l i f t groups, and one t ac t ica l

a i r l i f t ,.ring, total l ing 22 , 497 spaces . Activation of these Air

National Guard/Reserve units include organizations not currentlymanned under COMBAT BEEF standards (100 percent) ."

The Joint Chiefs re i tera ted the i r recommendation tha t leg is la t ion

be sought to : "(1) provide authority to cal l selected individual

Reservists to active duty ; ( 2 ) extend beyond 30 June 1968 the exist ingauthority to cal l Reserve units to active duty ; and (3) extend terms

of service for active duty personnel." The provisions of such legis la t ion would, the Joint Chiefs indicated, i mpact on the Services in the

follo"i ng manner :

(1 ) Extension of terms of Service . P'.covides' an immediate

i rr,pact on readiness worldwide in tha t cr i t ica l sk i l l specia l is ts

in short supply are retained on ad i ve duty . I t is estimated tha t




Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Section 3,3



between 30,000 and 40,000 additional t rained personnel wil l bere t ained in the Army for each month of extension . For example,

during the f i r s t six-month period of extension of terms ofservice, the Army would gain in excess of 500 helicopter pi lo t s ,

of \-'hich there is a cr i t ica l shortage . Other c r i t i c a l sk i l l

shortages \-,ould be similar ly affected.

"( 2) Selective callup of individual Reservists . TheArmy Iwnediate Ready Reserve contains 490,000 personnel, of

which more than 90 percent are in grades of E- 4 and E- 5 . Aselect ive callup of individual Reservists , coupled \-,i th an

extension of terms of service, i-rill alleviate vir tual ly a l l ofthe Army's current cr i t ica l sk i l l shortages .

"b. ' Marine Corps.

(1 ) Involuntary extension of enlistments of a l l

enlisted personnel lvould produce an average of 5,766 enlistedmen per month through June . 11i thin this gain, an average of1,728 experienced NCOs per month would be gained .

"( 2 ) Selective recal l of individual Reservists \-lOuldbe necessary in order to bring mobilized uni ts up, to provide

th e essential rank and ski l ls not contained in the organized

Reserve. Within the Marine Corps Reserve, "out outside of the

organized uni ts , there is an invaluable pool of key personnel :, noncommissioned officers, officers (particularly pi lo ts ) , and

Marines possessing long lead time "hard sk i l l " Mili tary Occupat ion al Special t ies .

"c . Navy . In the deploying ships of the Navy, there i s ashortfall-or-32,500 in officers and the to p six enlisted pay

grades .

(1 ) Involuntary extension of Reserve Officers and

selected r eca l l of Reserves 'Hould fu l f i l l off icer manning

requirements in one to three months .

"( 2) Cancellation of early releases and select ive

involuntary extensions, recal l of Fleet Reserves, deferral of

transfers to Fleet Reserve, and recal l of Ready Reserves would

achieve 100 percent enlisted requirements by rate/ rat ing in

one to three months .

"d . Air Force . I f extension of terms of service were granted

the Air Force could, on a select ive basis , hold approximately

20,000 skil led personnel out of a possible 70,000 tha t Hould

b e discharged over a six-month period. Retaining these cr i t ica l

sl<;:111s ,wuld sustain the force at an acceptable leve l . Should




Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Sec tion 3,3



additional forces be deployed to meet possible future MACV

r equirements, l egislat ion \vould be necessary i n order tha tactive un i ts can be replaced by act ivat i,on of corresponding

Air National Guard units after 30 June 1968 ."

Based on a ll the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recomrnended

t hat :

" a . The follm·Ting Reserve component units be called toactive duty immediately:

(1 ) Two infantry brigade forces .

( 2 ) One Marine regiment, plus the support forces

i ndicated in paragraph 3b(1 ) .

( 3) Tivo II.1J:;fCBs .

"b . The following Reserve component units be brought to ahigh s ta te of readiness for probable ca l l to active duty on

short notice :

(1 ) One infantry division force and one infantrybrigade force, i n addition to the hro brigade forces indicated

above .

( 2) , The remainder of the Lfth Marine Expeditionary Force .

(3 ) Three N'MCBs, in addition to the two i ndicated above .Also, de-mothball ivork and long lead time procurement should begin

on t'HO heavy cruisers and 15 destroyers. , Fifteen Naval Reserve

Training destroyers should be placed on active duty and cormnenceimmediate installation of modern communications/electronics

equipment .

11( 4) Eight TPS, five TPS, one TACS, five ARS, one

PRIME BEEF unit , and one securi ty squadron.

"e. Measures be taken immediately to obtain the l egis l a t io nto (1 ) provide authori ty to cal l selected i ndividual Reservists

to active duty ; (2 ) extend beyond 30 June 1968 the exist ing

authority 'to cal l Reserve units to active duty ; and (3 ) extendterms of service for active duty personnel.

li d . A supplemental appropriation be requested to cover the

un-oro rrrammed cost of the approved and probable future deployments ."... 0






TOP SECRET - Sensitive"

I n addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that an updatedasse ssment of U. S. mHi tary posture worldwide pertaining to addi t ·iona lproblems for U. S . military caj:Jabilit i es , to include specific recoIl1.I£lenda t io ns for r equired i mprovement , would be r eported in the near future.

This request \·las overtaken, as \'le shall see, by subsequent require

ments submitted by COMUSH,A.CV .

2. The Troop Request

Although the new Secretary of Defense , Clark Clifford, vTaS formally

sworn into off ice by th e Pre sident on 1 March, his work had begun many days

before .

In order to ascertain the situation in SVN and to determine subsequent

MACV force requirements , General Earle \'lheeler , ChairrJlan of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, had been sent by the President to Saigon on 23 February . JIis r eport

was presented to the Presiden t on 27 Februa.ry 1968 . l l1 On the basis of thisr eport , and the recommendatioris i t contained, the President ordered the i n it i -

ation of a complete and searching reasses sment of the entire U. S . strategyand commitment in South Vietnam . The Secretary of Defense-designate, Mr .Clifford, was directed to conduct this review, aided by other members of the

Cabinet.

In his report , General ' l h e e l e r summarized the si tuation in Vietnam

as follo,vs :

- The enemy failed to achieve his in i t i a l objective buti s continuing his effor t . Although many of his units ,verebadly hurt , the judgment is that he has the wil l and the

capabilHy to continue .

- Enemy los ses have been heavy; he has failed to achieve

his prime objectives of mass uprisings and capture of a l arge

number of the capital ci t ies a nd to uns . Morale in enemy units",hich were badly mauled or where the men ,.,rere oversold th e ideaof a decisive victory a t TET probably has suffered severely.

However, \-lith replacements , his indoctr inat ion system l'lOuldseem capable of m a i n t a i ~ i n g morale a t a generally adequate level .His determination appears to be unshaken .

- The enemy is operat ing "lith relat ive freedom in the

countryside , probably recruiting heavily and no doubt in f i l -

t rating rNA units and personnel . His recovery is l ikely to be

r apid ; his supplies are adequate; and he i s t rying to maintain

th e momentum of his ;;linter - spring offensive .

_ The structure of the GVN held up but i t s effectiveness

has suffered .







- The RVNAF held up against the in i t i a l assault with

gratifying, and in a way, surprising strength and forti tude .HO"ftleVer, ARVN is now in a defensive posture around to"l1nS

and cities and there is concern about how well they will

bear up under sustained pressure .

- The in i t ia l attack nearly succeeded in a dozen places,

and defeat in tho se places vlaS only averted by t he t ime lyreaction of US forc es . In short , i t was a very near thing .

- There is no doubt that th e RD Program has suffered

a severe se t back.

- R v } ~ F was not badly hurt physically - - they should

recover strengthand

equipment rather quickly (equipmen

tin 2 - 3 months - - strength in 3 - 6 months) . Their prob

lems are mor e psychological than physical .

- US forc es have los t none of their pre-TET capabili ty .

- MACV ha s three principal problems . Firs t , logis t ic

support north of Danang is marginal owing to weather, enemyinterdiction and harassment and t he massj.ve dep l oyment of

US forces into the DMZ/Hue area. Opening Route 1 will

alleviate this problem but t akes a SUbstantial troop commitment . Second; the defensive posture of ARVN is permittingthe VC to make r api d inroads in the formerly pacif ied country

side. ARVN,"in i t s 0"ft1l1 "ftlords, i s in a dilemma as i t cannot

afford another enemy thrust into the ci t ies and to"ftmS and yeti f i t r emains in a defensive posture against this contingency ,the countryside goes by default . MACV is forced to devote

much of i t s troop strength to this problem. Third, MACV

has been forced to deploy 50% of a l l US maneuver battalionsinto I Corps, to meet the threat there, ivhile enemy syn

chronizes an attack against Khe Sanh/Hue-Q,uang Tri with an

offensive i n the Highlands and around Saigon \'lhile keeping th epres sure on throughout the remainder of the country, MACV

will be hard pressed to meet adequately a l l threats . Underthe se circumstances, T.tre must be prepared to accept some

r everses . 12/

As to the future, General ~ f u e e l e r saw the enemy pursuing a strategy ofa reinforced offensive in ordel' to enlarge his control throughout thE::

countryside and keep pressure on the government and the a l l ies . The enemy

i s l i kel y, th e Chairman indi cated :

To maintain strong threats in the DMZ . area, a t Khe Sanh,

in the highlands, and a t Saigon, and to attack in force vrhenconditions seem favorable. He is l ikely to try to ga i n

13 TOP S E C R F . ~ - Sensitive






control of the country's northern provinces . He 'Vlill con

t inue efforts to encircle ci t ies and province capitals toisolate and disrupt normal act iv i t ies , and inf i l t ra te them

to cre.ate chaos. He viill seek maximum attr:ition of RVNAFelements . Against US forces, he vlill emphasize attacks by

fire on airf ie lds and instal lat ions, using assaults and 'ambushes selectively . His central objective continues tobe the destruction of the Government of SVN and i t s armedforc es . As a minimum he hopes to sei ze sufficient t e r r i oryand gain control of enough people to support establishmentof the groups and committees he proposes for participationin an NI,F dominated government. W

General Hheeler stated that JflACV believed th e central thrust of U. S .

strategy must be to defeat the enemy offensive . I f this were done vlel l ,the situation overall would be greatly improved over the pre-TET condition .

IVhile accepting the fact that i t s f i r s t prior i ty must be the securi tyof the GVN in Saigon and in provincial capitals , MACV described i ts objec

t ives as:

--Firs t , to counter the enemy offensive and to destroy

or eject the NVA invasion force in the north.

- - Second, to restore securi ty in the ci t ies and towns .

Third, to r estore securi ty in the heavily popu-

l a ted areas of the countryside.

- - Fourth, to regain the in i t ia t ive through offensive

operations . 14/

In discussing how General Hestmoreland vrould accomplish these objec

t ives, General IVheeler indicated th e follol'ling tasks:

(1) Security of Cities and Government . MACV recog

nizes that US forces will be required to reinforce and

support RVNAF in the secLU'ity of ci t ies , towns and govern ment structure . At this time, 10 US battalions are operating

in the environs of Saigon . I t is clear that this task I'rill

absorb a substantial portion of US forces.

(2 ) Security in the Countryside. To a large extent

the VC now cont ro l the countryside. Most of the 54 bat talions formerly providing securi ty for par::ific:ation arenow defending dist r ict or province tOims. M.A.CV es t ima testha t US forces vTill be r equired in a number of places toassis t and encourage the Vietna..rnese Army to lea.ve the ci t ies

and tm ms and reenter the country . This is especial ly true

in the Delta .

14 TOP SECRET - ~ e n s i t i v e



Declassified per Executi ve Ord er 13526, Sec tion 3.3

NND Project Number: NND 633 16. B y: NWD Date: 2011


(3) Defense of the borders, the DMZ and the northern

p r o v ~ ~ MACV considers that i t must meet the enemyt hreat in I Corps Tactical Zone and has already deployed

t here sl ightly over 50% of a l l US maneuver battal ions .US f orces have been thinned out in the highlands, notwith standing an expected enemy offensive i n the ear ly future .

(4 ) Offensive Operations . Coupling the increased

r equirement for the defense of the ci t ies and subsequent

r eentry into the r ural areas, and the heavy requirement

f or defense of the I Corps Zone, MACV does not have adequate

forc es a t this time to resume the offensive in the remainder

of the country, nor does i t have adequate reserves againstth e contingency of simul taneous large - scale enemy offensive

a ct i on throughout the country .

The conclusion 'vas obvious :

Forces currently assigned to MACV, plus the residualPr ogram Five forces yet to be delivered , are inadequatei n numbers and balance to carry out the strategy and toa ccomplish the tasks described above in the proper prior i ty .

HOI-leVer , i t was the extent and magnitude of General Hheeler s request

that stimulated the ini t ia t ion of a thorough review of the direction of

U. S . pol icy in SVN . To contend with, and defeat , the new enemy threat ,MACV indicated a to ta l r equirement of 206,756 spaces over the 525,000

ce i l i ng imposed by Program Five, or a new proposed ceil ing of 731 ,7 56 .

Al l of these forces , which included three Division equivalents , 15 tact icalf ighter squadrons , and augmentation for current Navy programs, were to be

deployed into country by the end of CY 68. These additional forces l;-lere

t o be del ivered in three packages as follows :

(1 ) Immediate Increment , ~ r i o r i t y One : To be deployed

by 1 May 68 . Major elements include one brigade of the 5thMechanized Division with a mix of one infantry, one armored

and one mechanized battal ion ; the Fj.fth Marine Division ( l essRLT-26 ); one armored cavalry regiment ; eight tac t ica l f ightersquadrons ; and a groupment of Na-v,y units to augment on going

programs .

(2 ) I 1 m e d i a Increment, ~ r i o r i t y Two: To be deployed

as soon as-possible but prior to 1 Sep bE. Major el ementsi nclude the rema in der of the 5th Mechanized Division, and four

t ac t ica l f i ght er sq"lJ.adrons. I t is desirable that the ROK

Light Division be deployed 'dithin this time frame .

(3 ) F o l l o w - O ~ Increm.ent: To be deployed by the end of

CY 68. MaJor elements include one infantry division, threetact ica l f ighter squadrons , and units to f\lrther. augment

Navy Pr ograms . }!i/







A fork in the road had been reached . Now the alternatives stood

out in stark real i ty . To accept and meet General ~ f u e e l e r request fortroop s would mean a to ta l U,S. military commitment toSVN -- an Americanizat ion of the "\1a1:' , a callup of reserve forces, vastly increased expenditures .To deny the request for troops, or to attempt to again cut i t to a s i ze vlhichcould be sustained by the thinly stretched active forces, would just as surely

signify that an upper l imit to the U.S. mili tary commitment in SVN had been

reached.

3· "A to Z" Reassessment

These thoughts "l-Tere very much on Secretary Clifford ' s mind during

his f i r s t meeting on 29 February "\'lith the people "\"ho were to conduct the

rea ssessment of U.S. strategy. Present, in addition to Clifford, were McNams,ra,

General Taylor, Nitze , FO"l11er, Katzenbach, Rostm'T, Helms, Bundy , Harnke , andHabib. 17/ Mr. Clifford outlined the task as he had received i t from theP".cesident . He indicated to the group tha t he f e l t that th e real problem tobe addressed "l-7aS not whether we should send 200,000 addit ional troops to Viet

nam. The real questions were : Should we follow the present cour se in SVN ;could i t ever prove successful even i f vastly more than 200,000 troops were

sent? The answers to these questions, the formulation of alternative courses

open to the U. S. , vIaS to be th e in i t i a l focus of the revie,v . To tha t end,

general assignments I'Tere made concernin g papers to be writ ten . These papers

vTere to be prepared for discu.ssion among th e Group on Saturday, March 2 .The geners,l division of labor and outl ine of subj ects assigned was indicated

by Mr . Bundy in a memorandum the subsequent day, as follows :

1 . Hhat 'a l ternative courses of action are available to

the US?

Assignment : Defense - General Taylor - State (Secretary)

2. ~ f u a t alternative courses are open to the enemy?

Assignmen t - Defense and CIA

3. Analysis of implications of Hestmoreland ' s r equest for

additional troops.

Series of papers on the follo",ing.

Military i mpl ications - JCS

Poli t ica l implications - State

(Pol i t ica l implications in their broadestdomestic and internat ional sense to include

internal Vietnamese problem ) .

Budgetary results '- Defense




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3



Economic implications - Tr easury

Congressional implications - Defense

I mplications for public opinion - domestic and

international - State .

4. Negotiation Alterna,tive s

Assignment - State

In addition , Secretary Clifford indicated that certain rnilitary options

were to be examined in this revi ew . These options 'were:

Option I : Add approximately 196 ,000 troops' to the presentto ta l author ized force l evel , i . e . Program 5(5 25,000) plus the six additional battal ionsa lr eady deployed (10,500 ). Re s t r ic t ions cur-r ently impose d on a ir and ground operations inCambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam are relaxed

to permit destruction of the ports , mining oft he watenvays , attack of complete target systems

in NVN and offensive operations against VC / NVAArmy force s in Laos and Cambodia .

Option IA: No change from Option I except that currentr estrict ions on ground and a ir operations inCambodia , Laos, and NVN are maintained .

Option I I : No change to t otal authorized forc e level(525 ,000 plus 10,500 augmentation ) except todeploy 3 fighter squadrons authori zed vTi thinthe cei l ing but no t deployed .

Option III : Add 50,000 troops above those currently authorized .

Option IV: Add 100,000 troops above those currently authorized.

The ,main work in preparing a paper for Secretary Clifford to present

t o the Y.cesident '\'las to be done in the Defense Department by a group of

staff action officers '\wrking intensively under the direction of Mr . LeslieGelb . These sta.ff officers worked as a drafting committee vlhile a group

consisting of Mr. 'Harnke, !vIr . Enthoven, Mr . Halperin and Mr . Steadmanacted as a policy revieitl board . Of the Hork done outside the Pentagon ,only the papers on negotiations and SVN domestic policies prepared by

IVlY . Bundy and Mr . Habib at State and General Taylor ' s paper on alternativestrategies "Tent to the \<lhi te House. The other materials contributed byCIA, State, Treasury, and the Joint Staff were fed into the deliberativeprocess at the Pentagon but vlere no t included as such in the final product .Thus, the dominant voice in the consideration of alternat ives as the r eassess

ment pl'ogres 'sed \'las that of the OSD .

l7 TOP SECRET - Sensitive






These agency views were, hor,.rever, read and assessed by the working

group and, although they Here not furnished to the President, they Here

part of the background of the delj.berative process . I t "\'1Ould be mis l eading, ther efore, to say that they Here not considered or had no influ ence on the decisions taken . In an y case, they provided some sense ofthe ideas and alternatives being considered and debated during these feHfrantic days of la te F e b r u a ~ J - early March , 1968 .

The CIA furnished three papers Hhich were considered in the reassess ment . The f i r s t , dated 26 February 1968, Has prepared for the Director ofCentral In te l l i gence prior to the formation of the Task Group. Entitled"The Outlook in Vietnam , " this paper stated the folloHing conclusion :

We believe that the Cornlllunists "ri l l sustain a high level

of military act ivi ty for a t least the next hro or threemonths . I t is d i f f i c u ~ t to forecast the s i tuation which wil lthen obtain, given th e number of unknoHable factors r,.lhichwil l figure. Our best estimate is as follows :

a . The lea s t l ik ely outcome of the present phase

is that the Cornlll1..mist side Hil l expend i t s resources to such

an extent as to be incapab le thereafter of preventing steady

advances by the US/GVN.

b. Also unlikely, though considerably l ess so, is

the.t the GVN/ ARVN Ivill be so crit i cally weakened tha t i t can

play no further significant part in the military and pol i t ical

prose cution of the struggle.

c . More l ikely than either of th e above is tha t the

pre se nt push "Till be genera lly contained , but with severel os s es to both the GVN and Communist forces, and that aperiod "ri l l set in during "\vhich neither wil l be capable of

registering decisive gains . 521

The second CIA paper, de.ted 29 February, "\Vas entj.tled "CommunistAlternatives in Vietnam . II 1\'10 main military alternatives were identified,

as folJ.O\'lS:

a . maintain widespread mi l i tary pressure in Vietnam

at l east for the next several months ;

b. increase the level of military pressures by oneor more of the folJ.ol·ring measures :

(1 ) cornlllTLcingall of their r eserves from NVN,

tantamount to an al l -out invasion , to gain decisive s u ~ t s as quickly as possible;

(2 ) cornrnitting hT O or three addit ional divisions;






TOP S E C & ~ T - Sensitive

(3) seeking one ma jo r bat t le which promised significantpol i t ica l gains .

(4) expanding current efforts in Laos .

Based on this analysis, Communist intentions were assessed as follows:

The Communists probably in tend to maintain vlidespread mili tary pressures in Vietnam for at least 'the next several months .A special effor t '-'Till be made to harass urban areas and keep

th em under threat . They vlill probably calculate that theUS/GVN vTill be forced to defend the towns and the countrys ide

will be l e ft more vulnerable to Communist domination. At

some time, new Cormnunist attacks vrill probably be launched

to seize and hold certain ci t ies and towns. Where condi-

t i ons appea r favorable they vTill engage US forces, seeking

some significant lo cal success which ,VQuld have a major

poli t ica l return . The to ta l resul t of their campaign, they

hope, wil l be to so strain the resources of the US and the

GVN/ARVN, that the Saigon government wil l lose control ofmuch of the couIltry and th e US \Vill have l i t t l e choice but

to set t le the w'ar on COIfu'nunis t terms.

The third CIA paper, submitted on 1 March 1968, attempted to ans\Verspecif ic questions posed by th e Secretary of Defense in his in i t i a l meeting

with his senior working group on 29 February . Per t inent questions and theCIA assessment are l is ted belOl'T: .

Q. What is the l ikely course of events in South Vietnam

over the next 10 months , assuming no change in U.S. policyor force l evels?

A. In the assUUled c i r c l ~ s t a n c e s a to ta l mili tary victoryby the Allies or the Communists is highly unlikely in the next

10 months . I t is manifest l y impossible for the Commmlists todrive U,S, forces out of the country. I t is equally out of

the question for US / GVN forces to clear South Vietnam of

Comm1l..l1ist forces. I t is possible, hOI'Tever , that th e over-

a l l s i tuat ion in this period ..Till take a decisive turn.

Wethink i t unlikely tha t this

t t ~ n could be in theUS / GVN favor . . . . Vle see no evidence yet tha t the GVN / ARVN

wil l be inspired to seize the in i t ia t ive , go over to the

attack, exploit the Communist V D ~ n e r a b i l i t i e s and quickly

regain th e rural areas . We doubt they have the ,-rill and

capabili ty to make the effort .

Far more likely is an erosion of the ARVN 's morale

and effectiveness. We do not believe tha t the GVN 'will

collapse , or that the ARVN v;i. l l total ly disintegrate . But

19 TOP SEC.RET - Sensitive



Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Sec tion 3.3



t here is a fair ly good chance that Communist presssureswil l result in a serious '\veaken ing of the GVN/ ARVN apparatus

and an end to i t s effective functioning in parts of thecountry . In these circumstances , vir tual ly the entirebur den of the war '\vould f a l lon US forces .

* -(- *In sum , there i s a high r isk that both the ARVN

and GVN I'lill be ser iously weakened in the next months ,and perhaps decisively so . Our best estimate i s that

i n the assumed circumstances the overall si tuat ion 10

months hence '\>Till be no bet ter than a standoff .

Q,. What i s t he l i kely Communist r eact ion t o a changei n US strategy t01.·lard greater control over populationcenters , with or without increased forces?

A. I n general the Communists would vie\-, this moveas a success for their strategy. Their tac t ica l response

i n such circumstances would depend mainly on the natUre

of US enclaves . I f these were fa ir ly l arge and embracedmuch of the outlying countryside, the Com.rnunists vlouldbelieve them to be porous enough to in f i l t ra te and harass,much as they are doing noW'.. I f the defensive perimeters

were fairly solid, however, the Communists would not t ry

to overrun them in frontal assaults . Instead , they

wou l d concentrate for a time on consol idating the countryside and isolat ing the various defended encl aves, inpart icular interdict ing supply l ines and forcing the USto undertake expensive supply movements from ou t ofcountry . A Commurlist-controlled regime with a tI coal i t ion lt

facade vlould be set up in tl l iberatedlt

areas and attempts

a t te r ror is t activity inside the enclaves 'Ivould be under taken . Hanoi vlould hope that a combination of mili tary and

poli t ical presstITe, together W'ith the dim prospect for

achievement of the original US aims in the Vietnam struggl e ,'Ivould eventually pe:csuade the US to extricate i t se l f through

negotiations .

Q, . vmat is the l ikely NVA / VC strategy over the next

10 months i f US forces are increas ed by 50,000, by 100,000 ,or by 200,UOO?

A . He would expect the Cormnuni s ts to continue the ,.;ar .They s t i l l have resources available in North Vietnam and

within South Vietnam to increase the i r troop strength. Their







strong l ogist ical effort and the i r ab i l i ty to organize and

exploi t the people under thei r control in the South enable themt o counter US increases by smaller increases of their own .Over a ten -month period the Communists would probably be ab l et o introduce sufficient n e ~ - l units into the South to offsett he US maneuver battalion increments of the various force

l evels given above .

These CIA assessments, then, painted very bl eak al ternat ives fo rU. S. policymakers . I f U. S. policy and force levels did not change , therewas a high risk that ARVN and the GVN 'iTould be seriously vleakened, perhaps

decisively so . The US would assume the major burden of th e war , and thesituation Hould be no bet ter than a standoff . I f U. S. forces vlere increased

by as much as 100,000, the Communists would probably be ab l e to i nt r oduce

sufficient new units in the South to offset this increase . I f the U. S.

changed i t s strategy toward greater control over population centers , with

or without increased forces, the Communists would adjust thei r strategyso as to preclude the achievement of U. S. aims .

I n his various papers for the Working Group, Assistant Secretary of

State William Btmdy attempted a deliberate approach . He furnished onepaper i-lhich out l ined alternative courses of action ,-lhich he considered

deserved serious consideration . Another paper outlined a checklist

" to serve as a rough guide iD th e pape:cs that need preparation under a

systematic code ." WThe alternative courses l is ted by Mr . Bundy were :

a . Accep·t the ",7heel er / Westmoreland recormnendation aimedat sending roughly 100,000 men by 1 May and another 100 , 000

men by the end of 1968.

b. Change our military strategy, reducing the areas and

p laces we seek to control and concentrating far more heavily

on the protection of populated ar ea s .

c. Adopt option b above in the south, but extend ou r

bombing and other military actions against the North to t ry

t o strangle the war there and put greater pressure on Hanoi

in this area .

d. Accept irmnedia e ly thos e elements of the Tifheeler/\'Testmo reland proposals that could hope to affect th e si.tuation favorably ov er the next four months or so, but do not

go beyond tha t in terms of fo:r;:ce plans and related actions .

e . "Cut and shave" the \<7heele r / lvestmoreland proposals

and thei r action implications, but car ryon basically in

accordance ,-Iith pre sent strategy .

f . "All-out option. " . Announce that we ;-rer6e/ prepared

to hold in Vietnam no matter ",hat developed.







The Department of State also prepared papers on the following

subjects:

a. Introductory Paper on Key Elements in the Situation

b. Probable Soviet, Chinese, \ ~ e s t e r n European Reactions ?:§}

c. Ambassador Thompson's Cable on Soviet Reactions toPos sible U.S. Government Courses of Action 29/

d. European and Other Non-Asian Reactions to Major Force

Increases ]!})

e. Asian Reaction to a Major U.S. Force Increase 31/

f . Options on our Negotiating Posture

These papers vTere presented to the Clifford Group a t the meeting on3 March 1968 . However, as wil l be seen, they were quickly overtaken by

the rapidly moving situation and, with the exception of the paper on nego t ia t ing options, did not figure in the f inal memorandum which Ivas fOTITardedto the President on March.

General MaxvTell Taylor's paper on al ternat ive courses of action is

of greater interest in that i t was furnished both to th e Clifford WorkingGroup and to the ~ f u i te House directly through General Taylor ' s capacity

as Military Advisor to the President. Although i t is not known what weight

was given to this paper, i t was received by the President even prior to the

Memorandum from the Clifford Group, and thereby could have gained some

special vreight in the deliberations of the President .

After a br ief l i s t ing of the U.S. objectives in SVN, General Taylo rconcluded that , since there was no serious consideration being given a t the

moment to adding to or subtracting from ou r present objective, the discussion

should be limited to considerations of alternative strategies and programs

to attain tha t objective. W

General Taylor concluded that , basically, ou r government had only hvo

choices :

a. We ca n t e l l General Westmoreland that he must make dowithhis pres ent forces in Viet-Ham and ask him to report to

us vThat he i s capable of accompl ishing therevTi th . This vTouldbe an invi tation to him to cut back sharply upon the military

objectives he bas defined in his la tes t Combined CampaignPlan (1968). Alternatively, Ivhile making this decision to

provide no further forc es , \'Ie could give new strategicguidance to General Hestmoreland vrhich ,vould assis t him in

establishing the prior i t ies for his efforts necessary tobring his mission viith i.n ca,pabi l i t i e s of the forces al lot ted

him.

22 TOP SF.CRET - Sensitive






b . The other broad alternative is to increase his presentforces by some amount varying from less than his figure of

205,000 and ranging up to the fu l l a m o u n ~ . Also in this case,

we might well consider giving him revised strategic guidance

in the l ight of what we have learned from the Tet offensive

and i t s sequel.

General Tayl or thus indicated that in the reassessment of our strategy,the government would be required to answer the following questions :

(1 ) Do we decide at this time to send any additionalr einforcements to General liTestmoreland?

(2 ) I f the anSvler is affirmative, should we agree tosend a l l or part of th e 205,000 r eques t ed by General

Westmorel and?

(3) Whether th e response is affirmative or negative, should

we send Gener al VTestmoreland nel'l st ra tegic guidance, hoping tol imit further demands on U.S. military manpower?

(4 ) What Strategic Reserve should be retained in the U.S.

i n the foregoing situations?

General Taylor then l i s t ed some of the pol i t ica l considerations of the

military course of action decided upon . He l is ted the following pol i t ica l

act ions as worth considering in connection with an y decision on reinforce-

ment :

(1 ) A renewed offer of negotiation, possibly with a privatecommunication that we 'would suspend the bombing for a fixed period

without making the time l imitation public i f we were assured thatproductive negotiations would s ta r t before the end of the period.

(2 ) A public announcement that we would adjust the bombing

of the North to the level of intens i ty of enemy grou:.n.d 8.ction

in the South.

(3 ) As a prelude to sharply increas ed bon ibing leve ls , possibly

to include the closing of Haiphong, a statement of our intentions

made necessary by th e enemy offensive against the ci t ies andacross the 'frontie:cs.

( Lf ) Announcement of the withdrawal of the San Antonio

m l ) ~ a i n view of the heightened leve l of aggression conducted

by North Viet-Name

( 5) Keep si lent .

23 TOP SECRET - Sensi t ive



Declassified per Executi ve Ord er 13 526, Sec tion 3.3



I n choosing among these al ternat ives , General Taylor argued that th e

present mili tary situation in South Vietnam argued strongly ag a i nst a new

negotiation effor t or an y thought of reducing the bomb ing of the North .He further a r g u ~ d that , in any case , we would appear well - advised to

wi thdraw from the San Antonio formula .

Thus , he concl uded , there seemed to be at l east three pr ogr am

packages worth serious consideration. The y were :

Package A

a. No i ncrease of General Westmore l and ' s forces in South Vi et - Nam .

b. New s tra tegic guidance .

c. Build -up of Strategic Reserve .

d. No negotiation ini t ia t ive .

e. Wi thdral·lal of San Antonio formul a .

f . Pressure on GVN to do bet ter .

Pac kage B

a . Par t ial acceptance of General Westmoreland ' s r ecommendation .

b. New s t ra t .egic guidance .

c. Build- up of Strategic Reserve ;

d . No negotiation i ni t iat ive .

e . Wi thdrm'lal of San Antonio formula .

f . Pressure on GVN to do bet ter .

Package C

a . Approval of General Westmoreland ' s ful l request .

b .

c.

d .

e .

f .

I i '

Nevl stl?ategic guidance.

Build-up of Strategic Reserve .

No negotiation i nit ia t ive.

Withdrm'lal of San Antonio formul a and announcemen t of

i ntention to close Haiphong.

Pres sure on GVN to do bet ter .

Major effor t to ral ly the homefront.

24 TOP SECRET - Sensitiye




NND Project Number : NND 63316 . By : NWD Date: 2011


The working group within ISA had access to a l l of these documents .In addition, and at the request of the working group , other papers were

prepared within the Department of Defense by th e Assistant Secretary

(Systems Analysis) and the Assistant Secretary (Public Affairs).

In i t ia l ly , Systems Analysis undertook a capabili ty study in order

to ' determ.irie i f the "tJfACV requirement could indeed be met. They concluded

that , with the exception of Army aviation units, the MACV manpower requestcould be f i l led essential ly as desired. This could even be done, the

analysis concluded , without changing the one-year tour policy, without

dra"l>Ting dO"l>m on Europe, and without widespread second tours with less than

24 months i n CONUS. This assumed a reserve recal l , added funds, and the

required strength increases.

Our maximum capabil i ty "\>Iould be to provide 6 maneuver

battalions in May , 9 more in June, 9 in July and as many as

6 more in August - - faster than the MACV request. These

units would have the necessary ar t i l le ry , transportationand engineer support . Added tac t ica l a ir ' units could deploy

on a matching schedule.

The only significant shortfal l would be in Army Aviation.

Even "\>lith a reserve recal l , pre sent deployment schedules cannot

be significantly accelerated. Production l imitat ions are such

that at leas t one year would be required to increase the out

pu t of UH-l/ AF-l helicopters. Thus, i t would be mid-1969

before any added aviation units could deploy and mid-1971

before th e to ta l MACV requirement could be met .

This SA paper also considered several other deployment options , as

follows : cut 50,000 from present authorization; no increase in current

authorization ; increase by 50,000; increase by 100,000 ; increase by 200,000.

The Qnits required under a l l these options, i t was concluded, could deploy

to Vietnam in a matter of months . The 50 ,000 man package could arrive inMay and June; the 100,000 man package by August; and t he fu l l 200,000 (with

minor exceptions) by December. The principal exceptions under a l l options

would continue to be Army aviation units . A surmnary of the various options

considered is sholm below:

Optional DeE loymen t s

A B C D ECut Current Add Add Add

50 ,000 Plan 50 ,000 100,000 200,000

Total U.S. persmmel 485,000 535,000 585,000 635,000 631 ,000

U.S. Maneuver Bns 103 112 118 124 133

Arti l lery Bns 68 72 77 83 92

Tac Air Sqds 1 ~ 4 45 51 56 60

Annual. Cost $23 Bil.. $25' Bi l . $28 Bil. . $30 B il . $35 Bil.

Reserve Recall 65,000 200,000 250,000 ]2}

25 TOP SECRET .- Sensitive






Other papers prepared by Systems Analys i s during this period were

furnished to the ISA working group upon the i r request . I ndeed , the subj ectmatter and thrust of these papers indicated fair ly ea r ly t he bias of the

people preparing them as well as the direction in vlhich th e reassessment ofU.S. strate gy was ' mov i ng , a t least within the working group in ISA.

Papers were also furnished concern in g pacification, costs and probable

results of a l t er nat ive U.S. strategies in South Vi etnam , the status ofRVNAF, problaas of inflat ion, and data for analysis of strateg ies. Thema in thrust of most of these papers was that II more of th e same ll in South

Vietnam wou l d no t achieve decisive r esul t s and , i ndeed, wou ld not be sat is-

factory. The paper on pacification indi cated that :

Hamlet Evaluation System (RES ) r eports for CY 1967 indicate

that pacification progressed slowly during the f i r s t half of1967, and los t ground in the second half . Most (60%) of the

1967 gain r es ul t s from accounting type changes to th e RESsystem, not from pacification progress ; hamlet addit io ns and

deletions, and revised population estimates accounted forhalf of the January-June increase and a l l of the June - Decemberincrease . In the area. tha t really count s --VC-D-E hamlets

r ls ln g to A- B-C r atings --we actually suffered a net loss of10,100 people betw'een June and December 1967 . 36/

Based on General vlheeler ' s statement in his report to the Presi,dent ,that "to a l arge extent the VC nOH control the countryside,1I the paper concluded tha t li the enemy ' s current offensive appears to have k i l l ed the progra.rn

onc e and for801

1.11

' 37/In ana.lyzing the status of RVNAF, the Systems Analysis paper concluded:

Highes t priori ty must be given to getting RVNAF moving . Int he short rW1 r e- equipping the Vietnamese and helping them

r egain t heir combat power insures tha t vle can prevent unnecessary

l os s should the enemy attack the ci t ies or put pressure therei-lhile hi t t ing Khe Sanh. Further , present US force commitmentsmean tha t only a recuperated RVNAF wil l permit re lease of US

units for other missions and accomplish an y objectives inpacification. Finally:, res toration of security i n the ci t ies

i n conjunct ion ,·lith the National Police is a major new miss ionf or RVNAF which requires forces .

V\1hat can i-le do? There are many indications that the man pOl'ler situation is i-TOrSe than r eported. Every effor t must bemade to determine hO'd many deserters there are and to approach

them . Rounding up trained manpovrer delinquent in returningfrom Te t l'7ill help . US advisors ca n pressure the JGS to up grade selected Rl"/ PF into ARVN in addition to measures a l r eady

in i t ia t ed by RVNA.F.

26 TOP SECRET - ,Sensitive



Declassified per Executi ve Ord er 13526, Sec tion 3,3

NND Projec t Number: NND 633 16 . By: NWD Date: 2011


COMUSMACV must identif 'y I-leak RVNAF units . I I I Corps

need special study and preparation of revised contingency

plans . Pr i ori ty on remanning, re - equipping and retr:ai ning

must be given to the RVNAF el i te units (VNMC ) which cons t i tute the general reserve . COMUSMACV must plan for th e

use of th i s reserve and earmarked US units to defect VC

at t ack of weak RVNAF units during the interim period .

RVNAF modernization should take precedence over equip ping a l l US forces except those deploying to the combatzone . The remaining 82,000 M16 r i f l es must be delivered

ASAP . It i s also i n the US interest to equip the RF/ PFwit h M16s befor p. equi pping the US t r a i ni ng base , wh ich i sa lr eady programmed .

Last l y , COMUSMACV must make decisions about wh8.tmissions RVN.I\F need not accomplish no-I'! . RVNAF is stretched

t oo thin given i t s past and expected missions . I t alone

cannot protect the ci t ies and hold the countryside where

i t i s s t i l l deployed. Decision i s needed to permit th e

build-up of weak units and bet ter integrated us e of US

and RVNAF against whatever enemy scenario develops .

The paper enti t led ttAlternate Strategies" painted a bleak picture ofAmerican failure in Vietnam:

We los t ou r offensive stance because we never achieved

the moment1JIfl 'essential for military victory . Search andDestroy operations can ' t build this kind of momentum and

t he RVNl\.F vIas not pushed hard enough. We became mesmerized

by statistic:s of known doubtful validi ty choosing to place

ou r fai th only in the ones that showed progress . We j udged

the enemy ' s intentions rather than his capabili t ies because

we trusted captured documents to o much. We 'were not aler t

t o the peri ls of time lag and spoofing . In short , ou r set backs 'Here due to wishful thinking compounded by a massive

intel l igence coll ection and/ or evaluation failure .

Indeed , in examining U. S. objectives in SVN, the picture of fa i l ure Ivas

manifest :

Since the original commitment of large US forces in 1965 ,ou r stated objectives have been to :

(1) Make i t as diff icul t and costly as possib l e for

NVN to continue effective support of the VC and cause NVN to

cease i t s dh'ection of th e VC insurgency .

(While 1'78 have raised the price to NVN of aggression and

27






support of the VC, i t shOTtTS no l ac k of capabili ty or I'Tillto match each nel'T US escalat ion . Our strategy O I ~ "att r i ion"

has not worked . Adding 206,000 more US lnen to a force of525,000, gaining only 27 additional n:anetlve r battal ions and

270 tactica l f i ghte rs a t an added cost tc the US of $10 bi l -

l ion per year raises the q,ucstion of ,'Tho is making i t costly

from whom .)

(2 ) Extend GVN dom in io n , direction and control over

SVN.

(This objective can only be achieved by the GVN through

i t s pol i t ica l and economic processes and vTith the indispensablesupport of an effective RVNAF . The T ~ T offensive demons t ratednot only that the US he,d not provided an effective shield , i ta l so demonstrated that the GVN and RVNAF had not made real

progress in pacification - - the essent ia l f i r s t step a l ong theroad of extending G V 1 ~ d o m i n i o ~ direction and control. )

(3) Defeat the VC and NVA forces in SVN and forcethe ir I'Tithdl'a'lva1. (The TET offensive proves ,\qe 'Here furtherfrom this goal than \"e thought. Hol'l much further remains

to be seen .)

(4 ) Deter the Chinese Communists f r om direct in tervention in SEA . (This I"e have done successfully so far;hOl'Tever, greatly increased U. S. forces may become counter productive. )

We know that despite a massive influx of 500 ,0 00 US tro ops,1.2 millio n tons of bomb s a year, 400,000 attack sort ies per year,200,000 enemy KIA in three years, 20,000 US KIA, e tc . , our contro lof th e countryside and the defense of the 'lU'ban areas is no\"essential ly at pre-August 1965 levels. We have achieved stale-

mate at a high comm i tment . A nei-T strategy must be sought . 39/

Several alternative strategies vJere brief ly discussed and a l l but oneI'Tere Cluickly dismissed as being unlike ly to bring success :

(1) No change but increase t h e ~ o u ~ . This strategy alternat ive is implici t in the recoll1.rnenda

t i ons ofMACV

andCJCS

. . . . In brief , the]Ylfi.CV

andCJCS

recommendat ions are f8r addit ional forces to regai:. th is ground los t since

January, 1968. Nothing is said as to I'lhether s t il l more US

f orces "li l l be reCluired to finish the job. Another payment onan open-ended c o n ~ i t m e n t is req,ues ted.






• • •• •• . . . . . . . ~ . :- ... • • - ',. - •


(2 ) Widen the v-Iar.

Adoption of th is alternative would re':;J.uire more forcesthan are now being considered and i t runs further risks ofinvolving Chir.a and the USSR. The course of events already

set in motion could lead to adoption of this alternative;increasing US forces in SVN would undoubtedly incre3.se \thepossibili t ies of i t . And the option is open fe!r North \Korea or other aggressive countries to t.est our will elsewhere.

(3) opt Out of the Har.

The price ofquitt ing

now

wouldinclude

theunder

ffilnlng of our other commitments world-wide, bit ter dissensionat home, and a probable resurgence of active Chinese-USSRt er r i tor ia l aggrandizements.

Before TET we could have done th is with less risk than

now.

(4) Resuscitate GVN and RVNAF.

This option is to return to the concept of a GVN

war with US assistance instead of the present situation ofa US war with dubious GVN assistance.

Adoption of this alternative requires:

(a) A solid commitment to a US force ceiling.

;i

__ ~ - - - - - - - - - - ~ T h i s ( ! c ) m m i t m e n t must be communicated to the highest levelsof GVN/RVNAF and our own military leaders.

-----

(b) A ,skil l ful conditioning of US and world

opinion to the limited US commitment to the South Vietnamesewar and to our right of withdrawal i f GVN/RVNAF determina

t ion or performance wavers.

(c) A statement that the US objective in SVN is

to develop th e GVN capability to defeat the VC and NVA

forces in SVN and force their withdrawal.

The remalnlng Systems Analysis paper cited stat ist ics to show that ,in the past, the North Vietnamese had been able to match the U.S. buildup

in SVNw.lib their own buildup. Also stat ist ics were used to project thecost to th e U.S. in c a s u a l ~ i e s resulting from various deployment options

and 'various strategies on the ground. These projections showed that ashi f t to a population control strategy which was unchallenged by the enemywould stabilize casualty rates, as some units would be underemployed.





NND Projec t Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date : 20 11


"

The paper prepared py the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public

Affairs ) was enti t led tlpossible Pu.blic Reaction to Various Alternatives ."Five alternative options 'were examined :

1. I ncreased mobilization and deployment . This includes

sending General Westmoreland 50,000 to 200,000 more troops

and th e addit ional moves this would require at home - - call ingr eserves, extending enlistments , extra expenditures, biggertax bi l l , etc .

2. Increased mobilization/ deployment plus expanded bombingof North Vietnam.

3. Increased mobilization/deployment plus' a bombing pause .

4. Denial of the Westmoreland requests and continuation ofthe war "as is" - - as i t 'vas being fought prior to the Tet

offensive and Khe Sanh .

5. Denial of the ~ f e s t m o r e l a n d requests and a change inwar-fighting policy with greater concentration on defending

populated areas and less on search-and-destroy in unpopulated

areas . This ,vould include an announced program to begin

troop vTithdra"\'ral a t a fix ed date. 42 /

The Assistant Secretary, :Mr . Goulding, emphasized that a l l optlons

vlere being examined from a public rea.ction standpoint only . He also

emphasized tha t no' action would unite the count ry . The question to be

attacked 'l<7aS Hhj.ch option wil l most coalesce supporters and most isolatethe opposition .

I n analyzing the various options above, :Mr . Goulding divided the

public into hawks, doves, and middle-of-the-roaders. Under Option 1,he argued, increased mobilization and deployment moves , 'l<7ithout other

neY] 8.ctions :

.• . l d l l make the doves unhappy because we become moreand more enmeshed in the ITar . They vlill make the haiVks

unhappy because 'l<Te s t i l l wil l be withholding ou r mil i tarystrength , part icularly in the North. And the middle - of the - roaders vTho ba::;ical ly support the President ou t of

conviction 'o r patriotism wil l be unhappy becs.use they wil lsee the ante going up in so many I-lays anci s t i l l . 'l<lill not

be given a victory date, a progress report they can believe

or an argument they can accept that a l l of th is is in the

nationa l in terest . (Furth er , they vTill read in the dissent

colmnrls and' editor ials that 18 months from nOl'T , when theNOl'th Vietnamese have added 30 ,000 more troops, Tile vlill be

r ight back 'l<There \'7e started. )







Thu s , publi c reaction to this option would be extremely negative, and

vrould become increasingly so as the deployment numbers , th e f inancialcos ts , and the l i f e -d i srupting actions increase .

The next two options, Mr . Goulding indicated, should be considered

together since, from a public affai rs standpoint, the decision to deploy

addit iona l troops of any significant mmiber must be accompanied by some"new " move . The tvro options discussed were deployment plus expanded

bombing of the North, and increased mobili zation plus a bomb i ng pause.

The f i r s t course,Goulding concluded,would e l ic i t more support i nthe country than does the present course .

This course would clearly bring aboard more havlks and

furth er isolate the doves . I t would also make the war much

easier to accept by the middle - of-the - roaders. I t would

help unite the country. Some fence s i t ters , hOVlever , \'lOuldbe added to those who already vie\v the Vlar as an unforgiveable

sin. I think the campus and " l iberal ll reac t ion vlOuld sur pass anything \ve have seen.

The other option envisioned continuing to f ight as we are i n the

south , strengthening General Westmoreland vI i h part or a l l of his request,and coupling these moves \·Ti th a visible "peace

llcampaign based upon a

cessation of the bOrribing in the North . This course, Goulding concluded :

. . . vould alienate those who take the hardest l ine .We would be add ing much to our cost, both by th e extra

deployment and the military price paid for the pause ,without receiving any immedj.ate or concrete resul ts . I fthe Communists took advantage of the bombing hal t , the

hawks and many of the military vlould react strongly . . . .The doves, of course, would enthusiastically endorse the

pa use and would i mmediately begin pleading and praying

tha t i t be continued long enough to explore every possible

and conceiv8.ble corridor . . . •Addit ional ly , the doves would

deplor e the extra deployments . They would complain tha.t

t he pause VJaS not unlimited or unconditional. They vTouldargue that the deployments plus the fai lure to be lIuncon dit ional" detracted from the effor t . Thi s two -pronged

approach - - strengthen but seek negotiation -- would give

new confidence to the middle-of-the-roaders . They wouldapplaud the govern.ro.ent for doing II something" different ,for seeking a 'Ivay mJ.t of the cluagmire . rhey would be

more patient than th e hawks to give the pause a chance ,and l ~ s s disturbed than the doves a t the mobilization .Fo r them, i t could be a \'lay out _- and even a "c ould be "is bet ter than the frustration they now feeL .• . The deploy/pause OptiOE 'l'lould be more favorably received by the nation

than the deploy/ escalate North, since i t vlould, in the public

mind, offer more hope of a:'n eventual solution to the ·war .

31 TOP SECRE'f' - Sensi tj . ve




NND Project Number: NND 63316. By : NWD Date : 2011


The fourth option, denial of" the vlestmoreland request and continue

th e "lar lIas is , I would please no one, according to Mr. Goulding . Theha'-Tks (and the mili tary) l'lOuld pro tes t vehement ly . They would b"e lesssat isf ied, and the doves v70uld be no more sat isf ied by this failure totake new in i t i a t ives tOvrard peace. HOI-lever,!v',r . Goulding concluded,

since fewer people would be affected by this course than by Option One,and therefore i t would be preferable to that Option.

Th e advantages of Option Five - denial of General Hestmoreland t srequests and a change in strategy in South Vietnam - - from a public affai rsstandpoint were ovenrhelming, the paper concluded .

. . . . The pain of addit ional deployments, Reserve cal lups ,i ncreased draft cal ls , increased casualties, extended tourswould be e liminate d. The hazards of bombing escalat ion

would be el iminated . The dangers of a bomb'ing pause wouldbe eliminated . The frustration of more - and-more -and -moreinto the endl es s p it vrould be eliminated . I'mat the people

want most of a l l is some sign that 'de are making progress ,that there is , some"l-rhere , an end . Vlhile this does not

necessarily sho\-7 progress, i t does sho,-r change . I t does

show the search for new approaches . . . . lt would prevent the

middle-of-the -roaders from joining the doves . Hhile the

doves vrant a pause, I "I·rould think they would prefer thisto deployment-mob i l iza t ion plus pause . vThile the ha"\-Tks

want to escalate in the North, most of them (not al l ) also

want an end to increased ground strength in the South .I believe that "I·re '-Tould be successf'Lll in gett ing members

of Congress to make speeches in support of this .

In summary, then, and s t r ic t ly from a public reaction staJ:}dpoint ,Mr . Goulding noted the options as folloi'7S :

Acceptable : Only #5 -- Denial of requests and achange in policy in the South.

Most acceptable of th e othe rs : #3 -- Deploy and

pause.

Next most acceptable : #2 -- Deploy and e A ~ a n d Air

Har North.

Next most acceptable: ff1+ - - Deny vTestmoreland and

continue as is .

Most objectiona"ble : #1 -- Deploy and continue as i s ,

north and s u t . ~ } / .

32 TOP SFCRET - Sensitive






4. Drafting a Jv:emorandum

There is , of course, no way of knowing hOH much conside'ration

and 'Yreight were given to each of these papers by th e small group of action

officers in the Pentagon Ivho were, in the la s t analysis, charged with

digestin g a l l of these factors, considerations, and vie'ds and actuallydraf t ing the reassessment of U.S. strategy r equired by th e President of

his new Secretary of Defense . The predilections of these drafters, per haps Ivere hinted a t by the subj ect matter of the backup papers prepared a t

the i r specif ic reques t and sillillnarized above.

By 29 February, this group had produced an in i t i a l draf t of a memorandum for the President Vlhi ch examined the s i tuat ion in SVN "in light of U.S.

pol i t ica l objectives and General westmoreland ' s r equest for addit ional

troops , as stated in General Wheeler's report."

This draft was sl ightly revised by senior officers in ISA and apparently

was discussed within the Defense E s t a b l i s r ~ e n t on 1 March . 45/

This paper began with an assessment of the current situation in South

Viet Nam and a discussion of the prospects over the next 10 months. Quoting

General \Vheeler ' s report , the draf t memorandum indicated tha t the most i mpor tant VC goal in the Hinter-spring offensive was the takeover of the country

side. In many parts of the country, i t 'YTaS stated, they may have already

succeeded in achieving this goal .

The ' main event ' thus is s t i l l to come, not in a one-night

offensive but in a week-b y 1;.1eek expulsion of GVN presence and

influence from the rural areas, showing up on the pe.cificationmaps as a ' re d t ide ' flol,ring up to the edges of the province

and dis t r ic t towns, and over some of them. L16/

Although ARVN he ld up vTell under in i t i a l assaults , the ISA memorandlIDl

concluded that they Vlould not soon move out of their defensive posture

around the ci ie sand to',ms . They would, in the future, challenge the VC

offensively much less than before.

In the neH, more dangerous environment to come about inth e n t r y s i d e ~ and as currently led, motivated, and influenced a t the top, ARVN is even less l i kely than before tobuckle dOim to the crucial offensive jo b of chasing dis t r ic t

companies and (with U.S. help) provincial battalions . In tha tenvirorlD.ent, informers \-rill clam uJl, or be ki l led; the VC wil l

get more information and cooperation, the GVN les s ; off icialsand police ,vill be much l ess, willing to act on in formation or

VC suspects and act ivi t ies .

The memorandum Has even more pessimistic concerning the future direction

and abi l i t ies of the South Vietnamese Govermnent, and read nore into the TET

offensive than had been noted there by other observers.

33 TOP SBCPcET - Sens i t i ve






I t is unlikely that the GVN 'l-lill r ise to the challenge.

I t vlill no t move toward a Govern.rnent of National Union.

Current arrests of oppos i t ion is t s further i solate and dis credit i t , and possibly foreshadOlv the emasculation of the

Assembly and the undoing of a l l promising pol i t ica l develop

ments of th e past year . Furthermore, i t is possible thatthe recent offensive 'Ivas fac i l i ta ted by a nevlly fr iendlyor apathetic urban environment , and a broad 10lv- levelcooperat ive organization that had not existed on the samescale before. I f , in fact , the attacks ref lect ne,v VC

opportunities and capabil i ty in the ci t ies , then the impact

of the attacks themselves, the overall mili tary response,

and the ineffect ive GVN pol i t ica l response may s t i l l furtheri mprove the VC cause in the c i t ies , as well a s in the country side . Even i f the poli t ical makeup of the GVN should change

for the bet ter , it may ,.,ell be tha t VC penetration in theci t ie s has no'\V gone or '\ViI I soon go to o far for rea l noncommunist pol i t ica l mobilization to develop . 48/

Based upon this bleak assessment of the future of the Government and

Army of South Vietnam, the ISA draf t memorandruu undertook to exmninea l te rnat ive military strategies . THO such strategies '\Vere to be compared,

the current one and an al te rna t ive which emphasized population securi ty .(Actually, only one "las analyzed in detai l . ) The two strategies ,.,ere to be

compared a t current force levels and '\Vith added increments of 50,000,

150 ,0 00 and 200 ,000 .

In analyzing our current strategy, the memorandum undertook a revie'\V

of how ou r strategy in Vietnam evolved . At the time U. S. forces ,,,ere f i r s tcOlmnitted in South VietnaJ..l in early 1965, the draft Presidential memorandumindicated , the pol i t ica l s i tua t ion '\Vas a desperate one . There '\Vas w ~ i n e n t danger of a North Vietnamese-controlled seizure of pO'iTer in SVN and the

Lrnposition of a communis t regime by force. Thus, the immediate objective

of the U. S. 'Ivas a military one- - to arrest th i s trend and to deny to the

~ v A / V C the seizure of pol i t ica l control by force.

Once U. S. forces were committed in increasingly large numbers, ho'\Vever,the military and poli t ical situation began to improve significantly . Byth e end of 1966, ou r in i t ia l military objective had been achieved -·- no longer

'\Vas i t 'possible for NVN to impose i t s 'will upon SVN by force . By this time,

hOvlever, our military ob j ec t ives had been expanded a t the expense of our

poli t ical objectives.

In the absence of pol i t ica l directives l imit ing the goals to be

at ta ined by U.S . military force , ou r objectives became:

a. To make it as diff icul t and cost ly as possible for

NVN to continue effect ive support of the VC and to cause NVU

to ce ase direction of the in surg ency .






b. To defeat the VC and NVA forces in SVN and force thewithdra,val of NVN forces . . . .

c. To extend GVN control over a l l of SVN.

Inde ed , in asking for increased forces, General 'IVheeler and General

westmoreland described their current tasks as follows:

a. Security of Cities and Government.

b. SectITity in the Countryside.

c. Defense of the Borders, the DMZ, and the Northern

Province.

d. Offensive Operations.

Th e question to be answered, then, suggested the memorandum, was whatwe could hope to accomplish with these increased force levels in pursuit ofour current strategy . The answer was not encouraging.

With current force levels we cannot continue to pursue a l l

of the obj ect iyes l i sted by General \ITheeler. Can vie do so with

increased forces?

MACV does no t c learly specify hoW he would use the addi t ional forces he requests, except to indicate that they

would provide him wi th a theater reserve and an offensivecapabi l i ty . Even with the 200,000 addit ional troops r equested

by MACV, we will not be in a po s i t ion to drive the enemy from

SVN or to destroy his forc es . MACV 's description of his key

problems makes clear that the addit ional forces would be used

to open Route 1, north of Danang; support ARVN units, particular ly in the Delta; and to maintain a reserve e,gainst enemyoffensives . With l esser increases of 50,000 or 100,000,

MACV would be in an even less favorable posit ion to go on the

offensive. Moreover, even before the TET offensive theenemy was ini t ia t ing about two-thirds of the clashes and

could, in response to our buildup, adopt a casualty l imiting

posture.

The more l ikely enemy r esponse , however, i s that ,vithwhich he has responded to previous increases i n our force

levels, viz. , a matching increase on his part . Hanoi has

maintained a constant rat io of one maneuver battal ion to1.5 U.S. maneuver battalions from his reserve in NVN of

from 45-70 maneuver battalions (c omprising 40 , 000 -60,000

men in 5-8 division s ).

35 TOP SECRET - Sensit ive






Even i f the enemystands and

fightsas he did before

TET, the results ca n only be disappointing in terms ofat t r i t ing his capabil i ty .

Over t he past year the United States has been kil l ingbeh7een 70 and 100 VC/rWA per month per U.S. combat bat tal ion i n theater . The return per comba t battal ion deployed

has been fal l ing off , but even assuming that additionaldeployments will double the number of combat bat tal ions,and assuming that the k ill - rat ios will rema in constant , we

could expect enemy deaths, a t best, on th e order of magnitude of 20,000 per month, but the in f i l t r a t ion system fromNorth Viet Nam e,lone could supply 13, 00 0 -16 , 00 0 per month,

r egardless of our bombing pattern, les,ving the remainder - -4,000 - - to be recruit ed in South Viet Nam - - a demonstrablymanageable undertaking for th e VC .

The current s t r a t e g ~ thus ca n promise no early end tothe conflict , no r any success in a t t r i t ing th e enemy or

eroding Hanoi ' s Hil l to fight. Moreover , i t 'would entai l

substantial costs in South Viet Nem, in the United States ,and in th e res t of the world. 50/

These substantial costs, the paper i ndicated , 1i70uld indeed precludet he attainrnent of U.S. objectives. In South Vietnam,

• . . the presence of more than 700,000 u.S. mili tary can

mean nothing but the to ta l Americanization of the vJar .There is no sign that ARVN effectiveness \Vill increase ,and there wil l be no pressure from th e U. S. or the GVN for

ARVN to shape up i f th e U. S. appears "7illing to increase

i t s forc e l evels as necessary to maintain a stalemate inthe country.

The effect on th e GVN 'Iwl.:11d be even more unfortunate .The Sai gon leadersh ip shows no signs of a willingness - - letalone an abi l i ty - - to a t t rac t the necessary loyalty or sup~ o r t of th e people . I t is true that the GVN did no t total ly

~ o l l a p s e dlIT i ng TET, but there is not yet anything l ike an

urgent sense of nat io na l unity and purpose. A la rge i n f l l ~ of additional U.S. forces will intensify the bel ief of the

ru l ing e l i te that the U. S. v7ill continue to fight i t s wari"hile i t enge,ges in be,ckroom pol i t ics and permits wide spread corruption. Tne proposed actions will also generate

i ncreased in f lation , thereby reducing th e effectiveness oft he GVN and makj,ng corio uptiui.1. harder to control. Reformof th e GVN \·,ill come only ,,,hen and if ' they come to believethat our continued presence i n South Viet Nam depends onwhat th e GVN does . Certainly, a U.S. cornnitment to a sub

stant ial trooD increase before the GVN commits i t se l f tor eform'and action can only be counterproductive. Hhatever







our success on the bat t l efield, our chances of leaving behind

an effective functioning national government '\-lhen we a t l as twi t h d r a will be sharply diminished .

In the United States, the effects would be equally unfo r tunate .

We ,\-lill have to mobili ze reserves, increase ou r budget

by bi l l ions, and se e U.S . casualt ies cl imb to 1,300 -1, 400per month . Our balance of payments will be worsened con

s iderably, and we wi l l need a larger tax i ncrease-- just if iedas a war tax, or wage and price controls . . . .

I t 1ilill be di f ficu l t to convince cr i t ics that we are no t

s imply destroying South Viet Nam in order to " save" i t and

tha t we genuinel y vlant peace ta lks. This grmving disaffectionaccompanied, as i t certainly will be, by i ncreased defiance

of the draft and growing unrest i n t he c i t ie s because of the

be l ie f tha t we are neglecting domestic problems , runs grea,t

r i sks of provoking a domestic cris is of u..l'lpr ecedent ed pro

port ions . 51/

Thus, i f ou r current strategy, even '\'lith increased troops , could not

promise an early end to the conflict , what alternatives I'Jere availableto the United States? No U. S. ground strategy and no level of U.S. forces,

alone, could by t hemselves accomplish our objective in South Viet Nam ,the draft memorandum stated .

We can ob.tain our objective only i f the GVN be gins tot ake the steps necessary to gain th e confidence of the people

and to provide effective l eadership for the diverse groups

in t he population . ARVN must also be turned i nto an effectivef i ghting forc e . I f '\-le fa i l in these objective s , a mil i taryvic tory over the NVN/VC main forces, follOived by a U.S . Vl i th

drmval, ,vould O I l ~ y pave the ,\-lay for an NLF takeover .

Our military presence in South Viet Nam should be designed

t o roy th e t ime during vlhich ARVN and the GVN ca n develop effect iv e capabi l i ty . I n order to do this , we must deny th e enemya,ccess to the populated areas of the country and prevent him,

from achieving his objective s of controll ing the population and

destroying the GVN .

The memorandum concluded that MACV shoul d b e told that his mission

wa s t o provide security to populated areas and to deny th e enemy access tothe population; that he should not attempt to at t r i te the enemy or todrive him out of the country . MACV should be asked to recommend an appro priate stl'ategy and to determine his force r equirements to carry ou t this

objective ,vith the minimum possible casualt ies .

37 TOP SECRET - SeIlsitive






However , in the next section of the Presidential draft memorandum,

t he Working Group re l ieved MACV of this responsibi l i ty by sketching onepossible strategy (obviously th e preferred one ) which should be able tobe pursued "without substantially increasing ou r l evel of forces i n South

Vie t Nam , thus avoiding the adverse domestic and fo r eign c o n s e ~ u e n c e s sket ched above ." 52/

The st rategy outl ined in the memoran dum ~ v a s designed to atta i n th ei ni t i ative al ong the "demographic frontier ." I t consisted of the f ol lowi ng :

Those forces currently in or near th e heavily populated

a reas along the coast should remain in place . Those forces

currently bordering on the demographi c frontier* should cont i nue to operate from those positions , not on l ong search -anddestroy missions , but in support of the frontier . Eight to10 battal ions from the DMZ areas would be redeployed and be come

s t rategic research in I Corps ; six battalions from the inter iorof I I Corps would be redeployed to Dien Binh province as ast rategic reserve for defense of provincial capitals in thehighlands . As securi ty is restored in the previously neglected

populated areas of coastal Viet Nam , addit ional U. S. battalionswould move forward to the demographic frontier . . . .

Based j ust beyond the populated areas, the forces on the

demographic frontiers would conduct spoiling raids , l ong-r ange reconnaissance patrols and, when appropriate targetsare located, search-and-destroy operations i nto the enemy ' szone of movement in the unpopulated areas betvleen the demo

graph ic and the pol i t ica l frontiers . They woul d be availab l eas a u i c k reaction force to support RVNAF when i t was attacked

wi thin the populated areas . Where RVNAF patrolling i n thepopulated areas is i n a d e ~ u a t e U,S. forces would be in a posi

t i on to assis t . 53/

The advantages of the "demographic strategy of population securi ty"

~ . . , e r e l is ted as follows :

1 . I t would become possible to keep the VC / NVA offbal ance in thei r present zone of movement. This area is

nOvT l argely available to them for maneuver and massine;, nomore than a day ' s march from any of the major ci t ies porth

of Saigon.

2 . I t would lengthen enemy LOC ' s from their sanctu a r i es in Laos and Cambodia. Base areas and LOC ' s within

SVN "Tould be the subj ect of attack and disruption , without

extending th e war to neighboring countries .

* This frontier rlUlS along th e eastern foothil ls of the Annrunite chain,

fro la Quang-Tri Province to P?an Thiei in Binh Thuan, cuts across SVN

along th e northern ede;e of t he Delta from Phuc Tuy to the Cambodic'.ilBorder in Tay Ninh . Garrisons v 7 0 u ~ d be established 8. S a t Bong Son

and An Khe.TOP SECRET - Sensitive---.-



dum.




3. RVN.IV' , knowing the avai labi l i ty of support from

U.S. r eaction forces , would perform more aggressively .

l ~ . This would permit the patrolling and securing of

populated areas to be accomplished primar i ly by Vietnamese

forces.

5. U.S. forc es would keep act ive i n what i s now theenemy's zone of movement , no longer presenting s ta t ic posi t ions against ,vhich the ener:w can mass and attack . This ,plus his increased logis t ical problems, ,vould reduce U. S.casualties while increasing his . In effect , we would force

h im to come to us, f ight on ter rain of our choosing .

6. The increased patrolling of the populated areas by

RVNAF combined Hith U. S. actions in the zone of movement

would make it harder for the enemy to mass against and

attack targets Hithin the populated areas . This would

reduce civil ian casual t i es and refugee generation .

7. Garrisoning U.S, forces closer to RVNAF Hould fac i l i -

ta te joint operations a t the maneuver level (b at t a l ion ,

company), again increasing RVNAF aggressiveness .

8 . 1Vith RVNAF thus supported by U. S. forces, i t ca n be

expected to r emain in uniform and engage in operat ions as

long as i t is paid and fed.

No disadvantages of this strategy \"Tere noted. or l is ted in the memoran-

Details of this strategy, by Corps area, vTere examined in an appendix .In I Corps, our present precarious posit ion could be rel ieved.

Were MACV to be provided guidance to forego posit iondefense in areas remote from population centers and concent r ate upon mob i le offensive opera tions in and contiguous

to the coasta l plain, one division eCluivalent - eight to10 U.S. maneuver battalions - could eventually be relieved

from operations in , or related to defense of Khe Sanh.

Undoubtedly, however , t he s e eight to 10 battalions would

be required to restore tact ical f lex ib i l i ty to and insure

logis t ical sufficiency for the forcespresently

disposedinthe Quang-'rri -Hue -Danang area . MA.CV present ly is planning

operat io ns in the Aeschau L S i ~ 7 Valley after April 1968;the new guidance ,,,ould preclude these. .

Guidance to MACV in II Corps

It •• • should counsel continued economy of force and s h o u ~ d specifically exclude determined defense of a l l but province

39 TOP SEC RET - Sensitive



Declassified per Executi ve O rd er 13 526, Section 3.3


TOP SECREr - Sensitive

.capitals in the highlands. Permission to wi thdraiv from

Special Forces camps (e . g., Dak To), and other exposedpositions remote from the coastal plain should be included .Under this guids"nce, six U. S. battalions could be with drawn from border defense operations in the highlands foruse as a mobile reserve or for operations on the coastal plain .

I n I I I Corps, no redepl oyment from present positions , wi th U. S.f or ce s concentrated in the immediate environs of Saigon were envisaged .

The guidance to MACV should be to concentrate on offensive

operations in and around the densely populated portions ofI I I CTZ . MACV should maintain a mobile strike force fordefense of remote province capitals, ' but he should otherwise

f orego l ong range or regional search-and -destroy operations .Withdrawals from Special Forces camps should be authorized .

Fourth Corps - the Mekong Delta region - i s the onl y region of SVN in'which the burden of the I'Tar was s t i l l borne, chiefly by RVNAF . U. S.strategy should avoid Americanizing the confl ict there . I nstead, ou r

efforts should be aimed a t catalyzing increased R v ] ~ F efforts there .

Gui dance provided to MACV should be geared to galvanizing

RVNAF by a strategy of :

i. Defending province capitals , major towns, principal

communication centers, and comrJe rcial ly important routes.

2. Extending GVN control into the countryside, consis t ent with RVw\F capability to defend RD teams and other

public administration there .

3. Stimulating RVNAF operations by providing U. S, f orces

on an occasional basis for combined operations againstpart icula r ly promising ta rgets , or in conjunction with key

defensive operations . U. S. forces in the Delta for th iseffort should drmv on the existing Dong Tam and Saigon bases .

4. Providing l imited assistance to RVN.A.F vlith sophisti cated engineer equipment and reconnaissance apparatus IThere

such would improve their abi l i ty to perform the missions

sketched above.

5. Bringing serious pressure to bear on RVN leaders inSaigon and within IV CTZ to mount active, sustained, offensive

operations consistent with the foregoing miss ions. Considera

t ion should be given to:

Providing addit ional RVW\F bat talions to IV CTZ ona temporary basis from I I I CTZ--conceptually, battalions or

regiments from th e 5th or 18th AEVN ~ i v i s i o Hould be deployedto IV CTZ, minus dependents, for perlods of one month or more

of active operat ions . 55 /

40 TOP SECRBT c n s i t ~






In another appendix, the memorandum analyzed the effects of th is

strategy on those inter ior provinces outside the II demographic frontier ."I t would be desirable to maintain all in ter ior Province capitals, th eappendix conclu1ed, because " the pol i t i ca l consequences of i<lithdra,qal fromwhole Provinces would be to recreate the atmosphere of 1954 or 1965, andwhile the situation may be that grim , we should a t l east str ive to makeit appear otherwise .

fl 56/

The Province capitals would be garr i soned id h ARVN units of th e 22ndand 23 rd Divisions and, in i t ia l ly , some American units . These units i i o ' J ~ d have as thei r mission the holding of the Province to\m for a minimum offo ur days, giving time for th e arr ival of a re l ief st r ike force.

Having secured the Province capitals , however , th is strategy envisaged

evacuating other ins ta l lations in the in ter ior Provinces,

. . • such as the frontier series running from Bu Dop toDak To and the inter ior but vulnerable points as Vo Dat

and Vinh Thanh . h o u ~ h these points ar e not held by

al l ied main force units , they do t i e dOHn other assets ,

such as Specia l Forces, CIDG , PF, and RF. Furthermore ,their combined existence represents a potential strain forthe l imited r eaction abi l i ty currently available since iqe

must respond, as 'He did a t Dak To, v7hen the enemy massed

for an attack . I f a presence i s required in some of these areas,i t should be in the form of a mobile striking uni t , and no t agarrison.

Based upon this fl analysis " of our current strateg:y- and a strategy ofprotecting the demographic frontier , the draf t memorandum recommended thefo l lo,qing actions to th e President:

1. Approve a NSAIvI, stat ing that ou r poli t ical objective

i s a peace which Hill l eave th e people of South Viet Nam

fre e to fashion their ovm lloli t i ca l inst i tut ions • . . . The NSAlVl

should state that the primary role of U. S. military force s is

to provide securi ty in th e populated areas of South Viet Nam

rather than to destroy th e VC / NVA or drive them out of th e

country . We shoul d plan on ma in taining th e posture necessary

to accomplish this objective for a considerable period .

2. Approve th ei w ~ e d i a t e

dispatch of an additional10, 500 military personnel to Sciuth Viet Nam .

3. Approve an accelerated and expanded program of

i ncreased f ire pO'lqer and mobil i ty for ARVN and other ele

ments of th e GVN Armed Forces .

4. Send General Taylor to Saigon to expla in th e NSAM

to HA.CV and the GVN, and to reques t General \'Testmoreland todevelop a strategy and force requirements to i mplement themilitary objectives stated in the NSAlI1 .






TOP SECRET - Sensitive..

5 . Dispatch one or two high-level civil ians to Saigon

1,Tith General Taylor to warn the GVN that i t must broaden

their base of pol i t ica l support, end i t s internal bickering,purge corrupt officers and off icials , and move to develop

efficient administration and effective forces. They should

also begin a discussion of negotiations while informing th eGVN of th e increased support to be provided for ARVN.

6 . Deliver a Presidential address to the American public,explaining OtIT new strategy in l ight of the enemy ' s new

tact ics . 57/

I n short , then, this in i t i a l reassessment of our strategy in SVN

i ndicated to th e President that no ground strategy and no level of addi t ional U.S. forces alone could achieve an early end to the war. That

could be done only i f the GVN took the steps necessary to provide effec t ive military and poli t ical leadership to i t s population. In order tospeed up this process, the U.S. should J_imit i t s objectives in SVJl.T andadopt a strategy of population securi ty. This would give the GVN time toorganize and develop democratic ins t i tut ions , and would give R \ ~ F time togrow in effectiveness while our forces provided a protective screen for

the populated areas at minimu.rn cost in resources and casualties .

This paper was discussed 'ivi thin the mili tary community a t a meeting

in the Secretary of Defense ' s office on 1 March. General Wheeler, the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "\"las appalled a t the apparent repudi ation of American military policy in South Viet Nam contained in the ISADraft Memorandum. He detected tlvO "fa ta l fla\<Ts" in the population securi ty

strategy .

1 . The proposed strategy would mean increased fighting in or close

t o population centers and, bence, ·would resul t in increased civi l ian casualt ies .

2 . By adopting a posture of s ta t ic defense, we would allolv the enemyan increased capabil i ty of massing near population centers, especial ly north

of Saigon.

In addition, General Vlheeler was equally appalled a t the statement in

the ISA Draft P-.cesidential Memorandu."U to the e f I ~ e c t that "MACV does not

clearly specify how he would use th e addit ional forces he requests, except

to indicate tha t they would provide him with a theater reserve and an

offensive capabil i ty. " IvlJ\.CV had indeed clearly and specifically indicated

to CINCPAC on 27 February, concurrent v?ith General Wheeler ' s original memorandum to the President, the location s and missions of the requested add-on

units . These had been t rausmitted through the Joint Staff to each of the

Services, ,..,ho indeed vlere engaged in studying and staffing these proposals . ]§)Apparently, this information had not specifically been furnished to the

Office of the Secretary of Defense.







The debate '\'lithin the Defense Establishment continued into the following day . In a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, dated 2 March,Assistant Secretary of Defense Warnke gave his answer to General Wheeler ' s"two fatal fla,vs " of the population control strategy.

1 . Increasing Fighting in the Cit ies . General ~ f u e e l e r i s concerned tha t the proposed strategy wil l mean increased

fighting in or clo se to population cent ers and, hence, wil lr esult in increased civil ian casualties. This argument over l ooks, I believe, the fact that th e enemy demonstrated during

the TET offens ive hi s willingness and abil i ty to attackpopulated centers re gardle ss of ou r strategy . He is demonstrat ing that capability again r i ght now in the Quang Tri -Hue

area and may soon do so in th e Delta. I f th e enemy continuest o choose to fight in the c i t ies , we wil l have no choice

but to engage him in those areas at the cost of civi l iancasualties . The proposed strategy may actually reduce civi l iancasualt ies i f we can succeed in attacking enemy concentrations

before he ca n attack the c i t ies . Moreover, in attacking the

ci t i es , the enemy vlill face American as ,'Tell as ARVN forces

engaged in offensive patrolling operations around the cit ies .

This ' should resul t in fe,-rer casualties than have come from the

l iberation of cit ies in the post -TET period. By freeingforces now engaged along the DMZ and in light ly populated high lands for active offensive operations near population centers ,we should make th e enemy effort against cit ies less effective.

2. Enemy Ability to Mass Near Popu l ation Centers . General

IVheeler's concern that under the proposed strategy the enemywi l l be more capable of massing near population centers north

of Saigon is diff icul t to understand . In fact , prior to TET,because we were operating primarily along the coast, along the

DMZ, and in th e highl ands , we vlere permitting the enemy tomass along the demographic frontier as he did prior to th e TET

offensive. In fact , one of the advantages . of the nevT strategyi s that we wil l be able to keep the enemy off-balcmce in this

area. General Wheeler may believe we advocate a posture of

s ta t ic defense. This is not true. In the strategy sketched inth e paper , one of the primary missions of U.S. forces would be

to operate in this area, remain highly mobile and carry out

attacks against suspected enemy base camps. 711




Declassified per Executi ve O rd er 13 526, Section 3.3



General Wheeler fought back with arguments contained i n two documents . The f i r s t was a backchannel message from C O M U S ~ ~ C V dated

2 March, which answered specific questions concerning the planned use

of additional forces. These questions had been asked by General Wheeler

i n a backchannel message the previous day. The f i r s t question concerned

the military lI and other I objectives additional forces 'I'lere designed t oa dvance . General Hestmoreland was ambitious , indeed, and stated thatt hese ob j ectives ~ v e r e to :

(1 ) Defeat and evict from SVN the new NVA units nowpresent in Western Quang Tri and Central Thua Trien provinces ,t o i nclude the Ashau Valley and base areas 131 and 114 .

(2 ) Maintain positive governmental and mili tary controlover Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces , part icularl y the

populous areas of the coastal lowlands and the DMZ area . Beprepared to bl ock or in terdict the inf i l t ra t ion / invasion r outes

f rom ~ N N through Laos.

(3) Destroy VC / NVA main force units and base areas i n ther emainder of I Corps and in the northeastern coastal and north western Laos border areas of I I Corps .

(4) Reduce the II calculated r iskll

currently entai l ed in our

e conomy of force posture in I I and I I I Corps by providing thea dded f l e x i b ~ l i t y and II punch ll of an armored cavalry regiment .

(5 ) Conduct aggressive and continuing offensive campaigns

throughout the coastal areas of II Corps and into t radi t ionalenemy base areas and sanctuaries in I I I Corps along theCambodian border ; especial ly in war zones II CII and IIDII . Restore

t he offensive combat and pacification momentum l ost in I I I Corps

as a resul t of the enemy ' s TET offensive and the requirement

t o t ransfer the l Olst Airborne Division ( - ) to I Corps to stem the

NVA incursion into Quang Tri .

(6) Be prepared for contingency operations i f required .

The second ques t ion a.sked by General Wheeler I'Tas :

Questj:on B: What specific dangers are their dispatch to

SVN designed to avoi d , and \'That specific goals would the

i ncremen t of force aim to achieve -

In the next 6 months?

Over the next year?







In his ans,ver , General ~ T e s t m o r e l a n d was equally optimist ic

•.• additive forces would serve to fores ta l l the danger

of local defeats due to the tac t ica l degeneration or temporary

disorganization of some ARVN units in th e event of another

general enemy offensive coupled with a massive invasion across

the DMZ . The need to be prepared to support or reinforceARVN units tha t are surprised by the nature and intensity ofVC/NVA attacks became manifest during the enemy ' s TET drive

and must be recognized in US troop requirement and deployment

plans for t he foreseeable futm'e . By providing a tHO division

mobile II syring force " which could be positioned and employed as

required , the need to dral-Tdo"\VD

on forces directly engaged inte r r i to r ia l securi ty ta sks probably "\vould be reduced . Thust he danger of los ing popular confidence in and support for

GVN/US capab i l i t i e s , policies and aspirations as a resul t oftemporary mj.li tary or psychological setbacks would al so be

diminished.

(2) Provision of th e immediately required additiona lforc es also would make i t possible to apply continuous pre ssure

to some degree in a l l corps areas and thus reduce the danger

of allo,ving the enemy the opportunity to so l ic i t support fromthe population and to reorganize, r e f i t and recoup so that he

could soon f ield rejuvenated units , despite heavy losses suffered

during the TET offensive . This is part icularly i mpo rta,nt in

vi ew of th e enemy capabil i ty to move additiona l divisions southt hrough the panhandle or DMZ without any clear intell igenceindicators of such action . (This mat te r i s of part icular concern

to me ) these forces wil l also make i t po ss ible to re tain thatdegree of f lexibi l i ty and rapid responsiveness necessary tocope ,vith an apparent ne,·r enemy tact ic of searching for thinspots i n our force structure or deployment in order to laD-Dchhis concent:cated mass attacks.

(3) I n the next six months the presence of th e armored

cavalry regiment in I I or I I I Corps i<lould reel.uce the degree of

calculated r i sk i nherent in the economy of force posture inthose areas, provide added t er r i to r ia l sec1ITity and further the

goal of pr:oviding added combat f le xib i l i ty . Addition of anotherMarine i m e n t and i t s division headqUFl.r ters in I Corps vTouldt hicken troop density i n cr i t ica l I CTZ, add to combat f lexi -bi l i ty and improve command and control capabi l i t ie s in that cr i t i ca l

area .

(4) Over the neA't year the incr ement of forc e "\·:ould make

i t possible to :

. 45 TOP SECRET - Sensitive



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 303


TOP S E C R ~ T - Sensitive

, 0

A. Move progressively from north to south with a continuing

series of hard hit t ing offensive c ~ n p a i g n s to invade base areas,interdict and disrupt inf i l tra t ion routes, and e l iminate or

evict VC / NVA forces from SVN.

B. At the same time, th e highly mobile exploitation force

(hlO divisions ) "I{ould be available to counter enemy aggression

or to exploit opportunities ror tact ical success n ~ v h e inSVN without reducing the min imal essent ial force necessary toguarantee maintenance of securi ty in th ose areas where success

fu l military campaigns have already been "I·Taged.

C. Addition of th e ne", division in I I I Corps during this

t ime frame °would re - establ ish the capab i l i ty for conducting

constant operat ions in and around IvaI' zones "e" and "D" and makepossible the constant us e of a division size force in the

IV CTZ \'Thich capabil i ty °was removed vrith t ransfer of the 101st

Airborne Division (-) to I Corps . In addit ion, combat operationsconducted by this division would provide added security for

LOC and th e v i ta l seat of government and economic center of

Saigon.

D. With the to ta l additive combat force s requested i t wil lbe possible to deal with the invader from the north, and to face

with a greater degree of confidence the potent ia l tank, rocket and

t ac t ica l a ir th r eat as vrell as the ever present po ss ibil i ty thathe may reinforce vTith addit ional elements of his home army. 60/

The second document available to General i'lheele r was an analysis of

the military implications in South Vietnam of the deployment of various

increments of U. S. force s . This analysis vms done by the Short RangeBranch, Plans and Policy Directorate, Joint Staff. I t was an informal

s te,f f document which had not been addressed by th e Joint Chiefs ofStaff or any of the military services separately . § / The fiveoptions addressed were those indicated by the Secretary of Defense inhis meeting of 29 February (see pages 7-8). This paper docurnented the

larg e enemy buildup in South Vietnam :

1 . The enemy, since November, has increased his forcesin South Viet Nam by at least 41 maneuver battal ions, some armored

elements , a la rge number of rockets, and addit ional ar t i l lery .There are indicat io ns he i s preparing f or the use of limited a ir

support, including logis t ica l a ir drops and bombing missions.

The Joint Staff paper took exception to COMUSM.A.CV I S stated f i r s t

prior i ty of insuring "the securi ty of the GVN in Saigon and in the

provincia l cap i t a l s . "

46 TOP SECRET - Sens it ive






The basic strategy which must be follo,,;ed by MACV in an yci rcumstances is to defeat the current enemy offensive both

i n Horthe::--n I Corps Tactical Zone where i t is the most formidable ,in the Highlands I'There i t is highly dangerous, and throughout

South Vietnam in defense of th e government and the ci t ie s and

tOlms .•••Allied forces are not conducting offensive operations

of an y great magnitude or frequency and therefore they are not

wresting contro l of t he countryside from the enemy •.••

I f th e enemy offensive ca n be broken with sustained heavy

casualt ie s, then, and only then, wil l the ci t ies be secure and

the countryside reentered. Even "Tith the largest forcecontemplated (Option 1) i t wil l not be possible to perform

ad equately a l l of the tasks unless the current enemy offensivei s decisively defeated. This, therefore, is the f i r s t and most

important task upon which a ll else depends ••••

I f the forces now in Vietnam or the forces under an y of the

options prove to be inadequate to break the enemy offensive, or i f ,

conversely , the enemy sustained offensive breaks the Vietnamese

armed forces (even short of destroying th e GVN), then our objectives

in South Vietnam and the tasks associated with them "Jill be un-

obtainable . Specif ically, we vlOuld be unable to re gain the

in i i a t i ve, that i s , we lo7Ould not be able to conduct offensive

operations at the scope and pace required ei ther to prevent furtherenemy buildup or to r eenter the countryside. This would force US

and allied forces into a defensive posture arOlmd the major

population centers ••••

Therefore , immediate action to break the enemy ' s current

offensive is not only the f i r s t but the decisive requirement .

In specifically addressing each of the options, the Joint Staf f reach-

ed the following conclusions:







OPTIONSIAdd approximately 196,000

to the present MACV Pro

gram 5 authorized level(525,000) plus 6 addi

t i onal bns already de ployed (10,500). Relax ation of restrictions on

operations in Cambodia /

Laos/IITVN.

TOTAL - 133 maneuver bns

I- A

Same additive forces as

Option I -No relaxation of res t r ic -

t ions on operations .

II

No change to present

M.A.CV Program 5 author

ized level (525,000)

plus 6 addit ional bns

already deployed (10,500 ).

TOTAL - 112 maneuver bn s

I I I

Add 50,000 US troops to the

approximately 535,000 in

Option I I .

TO'J'A.L - 118 maneuver bns

IV

Add 100,000 to the ap

proximately 535,000 in

Option I I .

TOTAL - 124 maneuver bns

CONCLUSIONS(TO Defeat the VC/NVA in SVN)

This Option would :a. Assuming no additional deployments

break enemy offensive and permit

early and sustained operations

agains t the enemy .b. Permit simultaneous operations

agains t enemy main force, base

areas, and border sanctuaries .c. Permit resumption of program to

develop effectiveness of RVNAF.

d. Permit greater employment of a ir as sets in conducting an expanded a i r

campaign against NVN, Laos , Cambodia .

Essentially the same as ~ p t i o n I except:

a . The rate of conducting operations

wouid be reduced by higher military risk.b. Th e enemy viould enj oy sanctuary

across the Cambodian/ Laotian/ NVN borders .c. The rebuilding of the RVNAF would be

a t a slower pace.

US objectives in SVN cannot be achieved

as al l ied forces must remain in defensive

posture.

At present levels , al l ied force s can

expect incr easingly grave threats totheir security 'v i h high casualty rates.

This opti on could probably secure theci t ie s but would be insufficient tocounter the current enemy offensive or

to restore security in the countryside .

The resul t s of this Option are essential lythe same as Option I , except :a. The ra te of progress 'l-Tould be sl01der.b. The enemy vTould retain the in i t ia t ive

in the border areas.







The paper, then, concluded that the larger forces of Option I andIA w o u ~ d Itgreatly reduce risks to' Free World farces in SVN and ~ ' i l l ac

compl ish U.S. cbjectives more rapidly than tbe forces a f the atheraptions," and recammended that iIP.mediate .actian be taken to provide the

forces af Option I .

Read anather way, hOI·rever, the Joint Staff analysis could be taken

to' indicate that the United States c o u ~ d successfully pursue a strategyaf "population security" by adapting Optian I I I , adding 50,000 traapsto' the current level in SVN.

At the 2 March meeting of the senior members a f the Secretary of

Defense's Working Group conducting the reassessment , nO' consensus was

re B,ched an a new U. S. stra egy. Apparently, Mr vJarnke and Mr. Gaulding"Tere given the task of drafting a ne;v memorandum far the P"..resident which

would be less contraversial than the in i t ia l ISA dacument.

The draft memorandum far the P"..resident, dated 3 March 1968, which

was prepared by these two individuals,differed markedly in tane fram the

in i t i a l memorandum presented to' the Cliffard Graup an 2 March . Gane wasany discussion of grand strategy. This memorandum recommended simply:

1. Meeting General Westmareland's request by deploying as

clase to' May 1 as pract ical 20,000 additianal traaps (appraximately

1/2 of which "Tauld be cambat).

2. Approval of a Reserve call-up and an increased end

strength adequate to meet the balance af the request and tore store a strategic reserve in the United States, adequate far

possible cantingencies.

3. Reservatian af the decisian to deplay the balance of

General Westmareland ' s new request. While "Te would be in aposition to make these additianal deployments, the futuredecision to do So' viauld be cantingent upan:

a. Cantinuaus reexamination af the desirabil i ty of

further deplayments on a vleek-by-week basis as the si tuat ian

develops;

b. Im:pravedpalitical perfarmance by the GVN andincrea sed cantributian in effective mili tary actian by the

ARVN;

c. The results af a study in depth, to' be ini t iated immediately, af a passible neYl s t rategic guidance far the conduct

af US military a p e r a t i ~ : m s in Sauth Vietnam.







nvo appendices to this paper addressed the basis for these recommendations and the context in which additional troop commitments to Vietnam

should be examined .

In explaining the basis for the r e c o w ~ e n d a t i o n to deploy 20,000

tro ops, th e memorandum indicated that the f i r s t increment of forces re que sted by General 'l<lestmoreland should be provided as an emergency

measure to mee t the prospect of cont inued abnormal levels of enemyact ivi ty . "This '\-lould , by May 1st , furnish him with an additional 20,000

t r oops , 10,500 of whom would be for combat purposes . Because of the

possibi l i ty that the North Vietnamese leaders may decide to l aunch al arger scale invasion by main forc e units, vle should put ourselves in aposition to provide the other 185,000 ground , sea , and a ir forces i nvolved in General Hestmoreland ' s request." 63 / ,

Ad dit ional forces, ho\vever , should not be dispatched unt i l the

situation in Vietnam developed.

A continuing and intensive revievl should focus not only onfuture enemy activity but also on the demonstrated abil i ty of the

GVN and the ARVN to pull themselves together , to get back intobusiness , and to demonstrate significant improvements both intheir abi l i ty to ''lin popular support and the i r willingness tof i ght 8.ggressively f or their own security . Unless these qual i t iesare evidenced, there can be no real hope for the accomplishment

of our poli ica.l aims.

Finally, we believe that the str iking change in the enemy ' stact ics , the wil l i ngness to commit at least two additional divisions

t o the fighting in the South over the past few Ive eks , the obvious

and not vlholly anticipated strength of the Viet Cong infrastructure,ther e can be no prospect of a quick mil i t ary solution to theaggression in South Vietnam. Under these circumstances , we should

give intensive study to the developme nt of a neVl st ra tegic guidance

t o General Hestmoreland . This guidance should make clear the

fact that he cannot be expected either to destroy the enemy forces

or to rout t hem complete ly from South Vietnam. The kind off...merican commitment that would be required to achieve these

military ob j ectives cannot even be estimated . There is no reasonto believe tha t i t could be done by an additiona l 200 , 000 American

troops or double or t r iple

that quantity. . . •

The exact nature of the strategic guidance which should be

adopted cannot nOI" be predicted. I t should be the subj ect of adeta i led inter-agency ,study over the next several Vleeks . During

the progress of the study , discussions of the appropriate strategicguida.nce and i t s nature and implications for t he extent of our

military commitment in South Vietnam should be undertaken with both

General Hestrnol'eland and Ambassadol' Bun..'k:er . 64 / '

50 TOP SECRET - Sens i t ive






In pl acing these addit ional troop comwitments in a larger context ,an addit ional appendix concluded :

No matter "That the result in South Vietnam i t s e l f , we will

have failed in our purposes i f :

a . The war in Vietnam spreads to the point where i t is

a major conflict leading to direct mil i tary confrontation

wi th the USSR and/ or China;

b. The war in Vietnam spreads to the point ,,,here we

are so committed in resources that our other ",orld -wide

commitments - - especially NATO - - are no longer credible ;

c. The att i tudes of the American people towards "moreVietnams " are such that our other commitment s are brought

i nto question as a matter of US wil l ;

d . Other count ries no longer ,vish the US commi tment

for fear of the consequences to themselves as a ba t t le f ie ldbetween the East and the West .

Under these circumstances, we rec ommend that under the leadership of the State Department, with the assistance of the Office oft he Secretary of Defense, the JCS, and the Treasury, a review of

our Vietnamese policy in the context of our globa,l poli t ico-mil i tary

strategy be undertaken with a due date of May 15 . 65 /

Thus , the net resul t of th is period of frantic preparation, consul

t ation , writing, and reass essi ng was similar to a l l previous requests

f or reinforc ement in Vietnam. The l i tany '\Vas familiar : H'Ive "ri l l furnishwhat vre can presently furnish without disrupting the normal poli t ical and

economic l i fe of the nation, while I'le study the si tuat ion as i t develops ."

No star t l ing reassessment of strategy ,,7as indicated, although for the

f i r s t time i t was recognized that such a reassessment WD..S needed, that al imit to U.S. involvement in SVN had to be determined, and that any

number of U So troops could not achieve our ' objectives without · signj_ficant

improvement in the a,bili ty of the GVN to "rin popula r support and to

f ight aggressively for their O'lm security.

5. R e c o n ~ e ~ ~ ~ to the President

This draf t memorandum was discussed again within the Defense

Department on 3 March, and several changes '\'Tere made . The 4 March draftmemorandum for t he Pr esident was appg,rently approved by the Secrete,ryof Defense and fon7arded to the President. The paper llhich Has fcrwarded

to the President bore a great :cesemblance to the 3 March draf t , 9..1thoughthe Systems Analy sis influence on the 4 March paper yTaS evidenced by i t sgreater detai l , especially concerning actions to be required of the GVN.





NND Project Number: NND 63316 . By : NWD Date: 2011


The memorandum recapitulated General l-lestmoreland s r e C l u e s ~ forpersonnel and indicated that General Wheeler believed that we should

meet this reCluest, and should act to increa s e and improve our st ra tegicreserve in the United States. To achieve both these goals, the paperstated, s ta f f examination indicated that the follolving actions would be

r eCluired :

a . A call-up of reserve units and individuals total ingapproximately 262,000 (194,000 in units, 68,000 as individuals ).

b . Increased draft cal ls .

c. Extension of terms of service . These actions vlould produce

a to ta l increase in end strength in the Armed Forces of approximately 511,000 by June 30 , 1969. (The s ta ff exrunina t ion referredto above included spaces t o add 31,500 troops in South Korea and

a US naval proposal to a dd t wo crui sers and fif teen destroyers tothe naval forces in Southeast Asia. I f these proposals aredisapproved in thei r ent i rety , th e figures above wil l be ~ e c r e a s e d t o approximately 242,000 and 454,000 respectively.

The Secretary of Defense then recommended :

1. An i mmediate decision to deploy to Vietnam an estimated

to ta l of 22,000 addit ional personne l (approximate ly 60% of 'vhich

would be combat ). An i mmediate decision to deploy the three

t ac t ica l f ight er sCluadrons deferred from Program 5 (about 1,000men) . This vlould be over and above the four batta·l ions (about 3700men ) a lr eady planned for deployment in April which in th emselveswould bring us slightly above the 525,000 authorized level . . . .

2 . Either through Ambassador Bunker or through an earlyvi s i t by Secretary Clifford, a highly forceful g.pproach to the GVN

(Thieu and Ky) to get certain key o w ~ i t m e n t s for improvement,

t ied to our mm increased effort and to increased US support for

the ARliN . . . •

3. Early approval of a Reserve ca l l-up and an increased endstrength adeCluate to meet the balance of the Westmoreland reCluestand to restore a strategic reserve in the United States, adeCluatefor possible contingencies world-lvide . . . .

4. Reservation of the decision to meet the Westmoreland request

in ful l . ~ { h i l e \'7e v70uld be putting ours elves in a posit ion to mak ethe se additional deployments, the future dec is ion to do so vlould

be contingent upon:







a . Reexamination on a week-bY-Iveek basis of the desir abi l i ty of further deployments as the si tuation develops ;

b. Improved pol i t ica l performance by the GVN andi ncreased contribution in effective mil i t ary action by the

ARVN ;

c. The re sults of a study in depth, to be ini t ia ted

immediately, of possible ne"l<T pol i t ica l and st rategic guidance

f or the conduct of US operations in South Vietnam, and of ou r

Vietnamese policy in the context of our world-,'T ide pol i t icomilitary strategy . .• .

5.No

new

peace ini t ia t ive on Vietnam

. Re-statement of ou r termsf or peace and certain limited diplomatic aCtions to dramat ize Laosand to focus attention on th e to ta l threa t to Southeast Asia . . . .

6. A general decision on bombing policy, not excluding future

change, but adequate to 'form a basis for discussion with the Congress

on this key aspect . Here your advisers are divided :

a . General Wheeler and others would advocate a substantialextension of ta rgets and authori ty in and near Hanoi and Haiphong,

mining of Haiphong, and naval gunfire up to a Chinese Buffer

Zone ;

b. Others would advocate a seasonal step-up through the

spring, but without these added elements . 66 /

In proposing this course of action, the Secretary of Defense indicated

t hat he r ecognized that there "l<7ere many negative factors and certaindiff icul t ies . Nevertheless, he indicated the bel ief that this course ofaction, a t lea s t in i ts essential outl ine, 1'78.S urgently required to mee tth e i mmediate situation in Vietnam , as ,vell as ,vider possible contingencies

there and elsewhere .

Ei gh t tabs to the draft memorandwn elaborated upon the reasoningwhich led to the recommendations contained therein . TAB A reviewed the

just i f icat ion for immediately sending additiona l forces to Vietnam.The s i tu.ation in SVN I'la s ana ly zed as follows :

Hanoi has made a basic change in i t s strategy and scale of

operations . Perhaps because they thoughT, they were lo sing as the

war and pacif ication,vere go ing , Hanoi is pressing hard for

decisive r es ul ts over th e next feiv months . They are committinga high proportion of their assets, although i t appears l ikely thatthey ,vou ld retain both the capabil i ty and , '!ill to keep up the

pres sure next yea.r i f this effort does not succeed . Th ere is hopethat , i f this year 1 s effor t could be th,·rarted, Hanoi and Viet Cong

morale would be sufficiently affeoted to open up possibi l i t ies ofpeace, 'b ut this cannot be assessed as l i kely .

53 TOP S E C R ~ T - Sensjtive






Within South Vietnam, there are key variables that could

move the si tuat ion sharply, one ';lay or the other, in th e

coming months. Specifically:

a. The degree to v7hich Hanoi and the VC are

able to keep pressing, and how effect ively they arecountered in the mi l i tary sphere.

b. The degree to which the VC are able to extend

their control in the countryside and recoup the i r lo sses -or ,'Thether conversely the South Vietnamese can take the

in i t iat ive and either neutralize such recoupment or set inmotion a new favorable trend.

c. The degree to which the GVN improves i t s per-

formance and gal vanizes potential ly greater popular supportthan i t can nOVT have.

Thus, there was created an urgent need, both practical and psycho-

logical, to send such forces as could be effect ive within the next four

or five months .

The follovTing additional forces ·of about 22,000 men could

be deployed by June 15 in accordance vli th the schedule set

forth below:

Six Tactical Fighter Squadrons

2 Squadrons by

3 Squadrons by1 Squadron by

- 3,000 men- 1 April- 1

May- 1 June

4th Marine Expeditionary Force (minus ) - 18,100 menby - 15 June

Naval Mobile Construction Battalionby 1 May

700 men

In addition, i t was re i t erated that an urgent effor t vTaS required to

.i mprove and modernize the equipmen t of the SVN Armed Force s.

Tab B elaborated on what s h o u ~ d be done to increase th e effectivenessof Vietnamese efforts in conjunction with the U.S. t r oop i ncrease .possible GVN r eact ions v7ere foreseen to the ceployment of additional U. S.forces. The reaffirmation of the U.S. comm itment would be welcomed, ,wuld

add to the feelin g of confidence, and might s t if fen the GVN!s vTill a t atime !I ,'Then the tasks i t faces are rather monumental. !I On th e other hand,

t here 'vas all'lays the danger tha t the Vietnamese ,wuld be tempted to relaxbehind the refuge of American pOI'rer, and th e sense of arlxiety and urgency

which had resulted f r om th e TET offensive could suffer. The memorandumindicated , hOlvever, that the GYT'J had th e capacity to take tho se civil and

mili tary actions ,-rhich "iould materia l ly improve the poli t ical and security







,. '

c l imate of South Vietnam, a s well as the image of the GVN i n the United

States . This involved, the memorandum i ndicated , a readiness for the

U.S . to make specif ic demands upon the GVN in order to get i t to take awide range of decisions and actions. Among those things considered essent ia land feasible, the following act i ons were l isted :

1 . Mobilization - The Vietnamese Armed Forces should be

increased to the maximum . As a f i r s t step, present plans toincree.se Vietnamese forces by 65,000 men should be amended toprovide for an additiona l 30,000 men under arms by the end of1968 . The draft of 18 and 19 year olds should proceed as

presently scheduled. This should be consistent with the abil i ty

to t ra in and supply the forces, but avoid QDdercutting the

ne ed for key civi l ians in other governmental functions by

diversion of skil led personnel .

2. Th e Thieu- I\y Relationship and Unity of Leadership -The fai lure of Thieu and Ky to cooperate fully and apply

their individual talents to the needs of the si tuat ion has

continued to plague the effective management of the Vietnamese

effort . In turn th is has had ramifications down the l ine inboth the military and civi l ian cha in of ~ ~ a n I t ha s alsocomplicated the chances of rallying the various elements int he society , as the rivalry translates i t s e l f into interference,d th attempts at forming a national anti-communist front.

Thieu and Ky and their follol'lers, as ,veIl as other

e lements in the society not assoc ia t ed direct ly with them,must be brough t to real ize that 'I,'1e are no l onger prepared toput up vlith anything but the maximum effor t on the i r par t .A c lear and precise role for Ky should be defined . Thieu

and Ky must bring their follovTers into l ine . The government

should be prepared to engage the services of people with

admin i s t rative and executive talent vTho are no,'1 not part icipat ingin the common task. Our expectations in this regard have tobe m.ade crystal clear to each and every Vietnam.ese l eade r inand out of Government. 'V-lithout th i s fundamental change inthe att i tude and dedication of the leadership, the necessary

refo rms and the neces sary inspiration of t he Vietnamese people

will not be forthcoming quickly or sufficient ly .

3. Getting the Govermnent Back into t he Countrys ide -\Ire must ,,15 n the race to the countryside, go on the offensive,

r e-establish security in the rural areas , and restore the

g o v e r n ~ e n t presence in the villages. The ARVN and other

security forc es must deploy aggressively , the RD cadre must

r eturn to · th eir t a.sks , and governmental service s reac h out

from the province capital s .







I n th e f inal analysis rural security, the sine qua non

of popular identif icat ionvIi

th the GVN, must be provided bythe Vietnamese themselves . The two keys here are (1 ) thecal ibre and role of the 44 province chiefs (and the i r sup

porting staf fs) and (2 ) a properly offensive sense of mission

on the part of ARVN units - and their commanders - assigned

to rural securi ty support missions . In every area (v i l lage ,dis t r ic t , province, DTZ and co rps ) th e RVNAF unit cOfimandersrespon s ible for security in that area m ~ s t be graded ( i . e.promoted , commended or sacked) primarily on the i r abil i ty

to find, fix and eradicate the VC Force indigenous to thatarea. They must also be graded (with commensurate effecton their careers) vIi th respect to th e behavior of theirtroops vis-a-vis th e poptuace in that area.

4. Drive on th e Viet Cong Infrastructure - In our con

cern over the behavior of ou r a l l ies , 'Ive mus t not neglect our

enemies and the present opportunity to compound and exacerbatecommunist problems. Operation Phoenix which is targettedage,inst th e Viet Cong must be pur sued more vigorously in clos erl iaison with th e US. Vietnamese armed forces should be devoted

to anti- infrastructure act ivi t ies on a prior i ty basis . TheTet offensive surfaced a good dea l of the infrastructure and

the opportunity to damage i t ha s never been bet ter . This

would force the VC on the defensive and head off th e estab l i s hment of local VC arunin is t ra t ive organizations and VC

attempts to se t up provisional governmental committees.

5. US-A RVN Command Relations hiEs - While we accept theMission ' s reluctance to create a joint command, we believethat alternative arrangemen ts which give th e US a greaterrole in ARVN employment are necessary. This can be done at

the Corps level and below. I t vTould involve US part icipationin th e planning and control of ARVN operations. I t might

even ca l l for th e prior approval by US advisors of ARVN

operational plans -- th is now exists in certain cases

depending upon individual advisor relationships. We

should request MACV to study th e matter an d come up with

a specif ic plan to meet th e r equirement .

6. Government Reform and Anti-Corruption Campai gn -

The beginning steps a t administrative reform 'Iilhich PresidentThieu has c,rmounced must be accelerated . This should be

directly associated with a nevT deal on corruption, which must

be dealt HUh by re l ie f of a specified l i s t of corrupt off i-

cials nO'\'7 and th e pronise of severe action in th e future.

A capab le Inspectorate should be established. IncompetentARVN officers must be r emoved , beginning 'I'Tith a specificl i s t tha,t should be made available by MAC V. Incompetentprovince chiefs 'Ivho have plagued our efforts in the past

must be removed . The r emoval of incompetent commande rs

'l'OP SECRET - Sensit ive






and off icials i s now more feasible in the l igh t of p e r ~ fo rmance during the Tet offensive. We should not hesitateto make our desires known and back them up by refus in g to

provide sUfport for t he incompetent . For key o w ~ a n d e r swe should r e ~ u i r e the r ight of prior approval on a secretand discreet basis . The precise tools of l everage to be

applied in this r egard should be l e f t to the US Mission,but could include w i t ~ h o d i n g advice and ass i stance a t

10C8,1 l evels in extreme cases.

7. The Prime Minister - We should so l i c i t ArnbassadorBunker s vieivs on the desirabi lity of replacing the Prime

Minister. I f he is to be r eplaced vre should agree on hissuccessor beforehand , in consultat ion with Thieu an d Ky .

8. The United Front - A nat ional is t sp i r i t of coopera t ion and unity came to the fore in the ilnmediate vlake ofthe Tet offensive. I t is being manifested incomple tely inat tempts to organize gro1,J.ps in support of the national task.Despite th e personal mis givings of old antagonists there ha s

bee n some success . This is now threatened by personal r ival -r ie s , and most significantly by differences beti'leen Thieu and

Ky. We need to find a fo rmula for joint efforts . AmbassadorBunker suggests that the optimum r esu lt ,'lould be a II super fro nt ll

of the anti-communist groups . Although not directly t ied toth e government , such a fro nt could serve to ra l ly the people

broadly and emotionally against t he Viet Cong o To succeed i tmust be backed by the leadership of the government - both

Thieu and Ky - but not appear to compete i'l i th the Nationa lAssembl y . I t should encompass a l l elements in the so ciety ,but no t be the vehicle for anyone power group .

9. Economic Measures - There ,viII be increased in f lationin Vietnam this year, and additional US troops ,'Till make i tmore severe . steps need to be taken nO,'l to counter th eth reat of inflat ion, i f ;"Ie are not to be faced \ ' l ith a severe

cri sis next f a l l and ·Hinter . The GVN needs to move on taxincreases, and U.S. and GVN expenditures for non-essentialprograms in Vietnam shotud be restrained . On the other hand,

;"Iage increases for c iv i l and military personnel in the GVN

a re needed i f in f la t ion is not to vTeaken their i'Till and support .

Additi0nally, ,-Ie must demand 0-1" the G-VN some measure of

action on thei r part to compensate for the effect of addi

t i onal US troops on the US balance of payments . This ca n

be done by having the GVN provide to the US at no cost the

addit ional piaster costs incurred by our troop increase. VoTe

should also insis t that GVN res erves be reduced to $250 mil lion from the present maximum re serve level of $300 mi l l ionand that a significant portion of the reS'2rve be invested inmedium ,and long term US securities '. The detai ls of these







economic measures cannot be discussed in this paper, but

a comprehensive economic package should be prepared and

presented to the GVN - to include what the US is prepared

t o do in t he way of increased financing of commercia l imports .

10 . Resource Allocation - Non - essent ia l use of resources

should be elimina,ted. P'.cesent government programs toe l iminate n evI luxury construction must be t ightened and con

t inued . Bars and night clubs should remain closed . Austerity

should be fostered. 68/

The Appendix recommended that a high-level mission, probably headed

by the Secretary of Defense, should go to Saigon to emphasize to the GVN

that 1tTe consider improved GVN performance essential ; that any further U. S.support must be matched by GVN actions; and that the above recownendations

1tTould be used as a checkl i s t for judging Vietnamese performance . In addi t ion, this Appendix emphasized that VTe should do what ,vas necessary toimprove the capabil i ty of RVNAF . Although no detai ls were given, the statement was made that : 1T0n the basis of current planning estimates, this

would involve addit ional expenditure of about $475 mill ion over a period

of 18 months .1T

Tab C of the Memorandum for the President consisted of a br ie f just i f-

icat ion for increasing the strategic reserve. The basic argument was thatwe w o u ~ d then be prepared to provide the additional ground, se a , and a ir

forces involved in General ~ ' J e s t r e l a n d I s request i f the mili tary s i ua ion

required . In addition, the paper indicated:

I f these addit ional forces are not deployed to Vietnam,

our action in thus reconsti tuting the st ra tegic reserve Hould

nevertheless be ful ly vTarranted. Our strategic reserve ha s

been appreciably depleted because of Vietnam demands. At

present , the active division forces in the Continental United

States, HaHaii and Okinm'<a, and including the Marine unitsin the Caribbean and Mediterranean, consist of 4-2/3 Armydivisions and 1-1/3 Marine divisions. This compares withthe 9 Army divisions and 3 Marine divisions in ou r st ra tegicreserve on 30 June 1965. A call-up of 245,000, 1tTith nodeploymen ts to South Vietnam in excess of the 20-30,000

now recowmended, would yield a strategic reserve of 7 Army

divi sions and 2 Marine divisions . The unsettle d situationsin many pa'rts of the vTorld make this build-up a prudent

action entirely apart from possible Vietnam contingencies. §2/

Relegated to Tab D of the Memorandum for the President was 1tThat had

begun as the major task of the Working Group--the necessi ty for in-depth

study of Vietnam. policy and st ra tegic guidance .

General \,vestmoreland s request, th is Appendix pointed out, doe s no t

purport to provide any real ly sat isfactory ans,ver to the problem in Vietnam.

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There can be no assurance tha t this very sUbstantial

additional deployment would leav e us a year from today inany more favorable military posit ion . A ll tha t can be saidi s that t te additional troops would enahle us to k i l l moreof the enemy and would provide more securi ty i f the enemy does

not offset them by lesser reinforcements of his own . There

i s no indication that they would bring about a quick solutioni n Vietnam and, i n the absence of bet ter performance by th e

GVN and the ARVN, the increased destruction and increased

Americanization of the war could, in fact , be counter productive . 70/

There "Tere many other reasons for conducting a study of ou r Vietnamese

p'olicy in the context of th e U. S. i-lOrIdwide poli i ca l /mi l i tary strategy .

No matter what the resul t in Vietnam i t se l f , we wil l have failed in ou rpurpose, the memorandum stated, i f :

a . The war in Vietnam spreads to the point "\-There i t isa major conflict leading to direct military confrontation

,vi th the USSR and/or China;

b . The "lar in Vietnam spreads to the point where weare so comm i t ted in resources that ou r other "\-70rld -wide

commitments - - especially NATO -- are no longer credible;

c. The att i tudes of th e American people to 'wards "moreVietnams " are such that our other commitment s are brought

into question as a matter of US wil l ;

d . Other countries no lo nger wi sh the US commitment for

fear of the consequences to themselves as a bat t lef ie ld between

the East and the II/est . 71/

In addit ion, any intensive review should focus on the abil i ty of theGVN and the ARVN to demonstrate significant improvement , both in the i r

Q,bility to win popular support and their will ingness to fight aggressively

for their O"Tn securi ty.

Finally, the memorandum stated:

. . . he striking change in the enemy !s tact ics , his

will ingness to commi t a t least two addit ional divisionsto the f iGhting in the South over the pq,st few weeksand the obvious and not "\-7holly anticipated strength of

the Viet Cong infrastructure , shows that there can be

no prospect of a quick mil i tary solution to the aggression

in South Vie tnam . Und er these circumstances , we should give

intensive study to the development of ne"\-7 strategic guidance

to General l'lestmorel and . This study may show that he should

not be expected either to destroy the enemy forces or to

rout them comuletely from South Vietnam . The kind of Amer ic8,ncommitment that might be r equired to achieve the se mili tary







objectives cannot even be estimated. There is no reason

to believe tha t it could be done by an addit ional 200,000

American troops or double or t r iple tha t quantity •. • •

The exact nature of the strategic guidance \-Thich shou..ldbe adopted cannot now be predicted. I t should be the subject

of a detailed interagency study over the next several weeks .During the progress of the study, discussions of the appro priate strategic guidance and i t s nature and implicationsfor the ext ent of ou r military cowmitment in South Vietnamshould be undertaken with both General Westmoreland and

Ambassador Bunker. 15/

Thus , the tlA to Z reassessment tlof U. S. strategy requested by the

President vlaS rele gated by th e Working Group to a future date .

Tab E remained intact from the original 29 February draf t memorandum.P".cepared by the State Department , i t discussed negotiating options and

possible diplomatic action s in connection with a buildup of U. S. forces.

Concerning ou r negotiating posture, three broad options were l is ted :

1 . Stand pat on th e San Antonio formula an d on our basic

posit ion to"\.;ard the te rms of a negotiated settlement - - the

Geneva Accords plus free choice in th e South, rejecting acoalit ion or any special pos i t ion for the NLF .

2 . Take some nel" in i t iative , ei ther privately or publicly ,that might iDvolve a change in our position on the San Antonio

formula and/ or a change in ou r posit ion on the elements of aset t lemen t .

3. No change in our posit ion for the present , but pitchingou r course of action toward a strong move for ne got iations \-Then

and i f we have countered Hanoi ' s offensive - - i . e . , in a matter

of four months or so perhap s . 111The crucial question , th e paper indicated, was r ea l ly to exam ine

what vIe could conce ivably do by way of a nevl ini t ia t ive under Option 2 •.After examining the s i tua t i on , however, the conclusion was reached tha t :

. . •any change in ou r pos it ion on the terms of a peaceful

settlement would be extremely un,'lise at th e pres ent time . He

may well vii sh to vlOrk on opening 1.l.p channel s to the NLF , butthis mus t be done in the utmost secrecy and in fu l l consulta-

t ion "I·lith the GVN. He do not knoi'l \-lhat the possibi l i t ies

may be in this direction, but any public stress on this avenue

would f ee d the f ires of a VC propaganda l ine that has already

had signif icant di s turbing effect in South V i e t n ~







As to our conditions f'or stopping the bombing and

entering into talks, we continue to believe tha t the San

Antonio formula is "rock bottom ." The South Vietnamese

are i n fact talking about much st iff 'er · ~ o n d t i o n s such

as stopping the inf i l tra t ion entirely. Any move by us tomodify th e San Antonio fo rmula dOIVllward ",ould be extremely

dis turbing in South Vietnam, an d ",ould have no signif ' icanto e t t i n g gains in US public opinion or in key third countries . . . .

This being said , we believe tha t i t would strengthen ou r

over -a ll posture, and involve no signif'icant r i sk s i n Vietnam,

i f vle "Tere to rei terate our basic position on our terms ofsettlement in South Vietnam . A systematic restatement of' ou r

po sit ion on the Geneva Accords and free choi ce in the South

could be a vita l part of' sell ing our vlhole course of' actionto the public, to Congress , and the world . Although vTe have

stated a l l th e e lements a t different times, we have not pulledth em together for a long time and ,'le could get a considerable,

impression of f'reshness , even novelty , and certainly r easonable -

ness by ident if 'ying more precisely the elements of' the GenevaAccords ; ou r position on free choice , and perhaps adding

something on external guarantees, which have always been ageneralized part of ou r posit ion and that of the South Viet-

namese. .

Further diplomat ic actions, th e Appendix indicated , would be designed

to dramatize the Communist th reats to Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia. Among

the actions suggested were th e follo"ling:

Firs t , that the re statement of' ou r position on South Viet

nam include sUbstantial emphasis on restoration of' th e Lcl.OS

Accords of' 1962 and on th e p r e s e l ~ a t i o n of' the neutral i ty and

t er r i to r ia l integrity of' Cambodia under the 1954 Ac cords .

I ndeed , "Te could go s t i l l further and take the occasion

to ta lk in terms of an over-all settlement f'or Southeast Asia

that would spec i f ica l ly provide that each nation Ivas free toas sume vThatever neutral or other international po s ture i twished to take . We could expl ici t ly state that vIe vTere prepared to accept a Southeast Asia that was "neutral" in the

sense of not adhering to any power bloc or forming a part

of any alliance directed a t others .

He could sa y a favorable ,"lOrd about ree;ional arrange

ments in Southeast Asia consistent with the concept , and

could indicate our willingness to join with other out s ide

nations to consider Ivhat kind of general assurcmces of su pport could be given to such a Southeast Asia . . . .

Second, there are strong diplomatic steps that could be







taken to dramatize the si tuation in Laos. We could encourageSouvanna to take the case to the UN where Laos and Souvannahave strong appeal . Concurrently, but We believe less effect ive in practice, Souvanna could press the Brit ish and Soviets

to take action or even to reconvene th e Geneva Conference of 1962 .

Third, we could attempt similar action for Cambodia. This

Jnight be-through th e Australians, to get Sihanouk to take hiscase also to the UN. Even i f he made some accusations against

us in the process, he 1wuld be l ikely a t the present time tohighlight his internal Chinese-backed threat , and the net resul tcould be useful.

A further possibi l i ty wou l d be to seek to enl is t India moredeeply in the Cambodian si tuation . This i s vlorth trying, but

the Indians are a weak reed for action or for effective diplomatic dramatization .

Fourth, we could consider getting the Thai to dramatize

their-8ituation more than they have done. This takes carefulthought, since they do no t ,·!ish to alarm the i r o"m people. 12.1

Other possibili t ies discussed were th e enlist ing an d engaging of other

Asian nations in tte search far peace in Vietnam a.nd the Soviet Union in an

~ f f o r t to find peace in Southeast Asia.

In Tab F appeared a discussion of military action against North Viet

nam. This tab contained two contrary views concerning th e bombing campaignagainst NVN, and is discussed in detai l in another Task Force paper . 'J'hisis the f i r s t place that an y writ ten discussion of the bombing campaignagainst the North appears in any of the papers of the Horking Group. I t is

in t eresting to note, in th e l i ght of subsequent development s , that neither

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor the Secreta:ry of Defense mademention of a part ial or complete bombing suspension of the North a t thistime. Th ey differed only on the extent to which the bomb ing campaign

against North Viet Nam should be intensified. 1§/

Tabs G and H, the f inal Tabs, considered the public affairs problems

in dealing vIi th increased U. S. troop comm i tme nts to SVN and to the calling

up of reserve forces. In dealing vli th p u b l ~ c o p i n ~ o n a ~ d wi Congress,

th ese Appendices concluded that from a publJ.c affalrs vlevrpolnt:

Beyond th e basic points of establishing that th e ,var is in

the national interest , tha t there is a plan to end i t sat is factori ly and that "le can identifY the resources needed to

carry out that plan, 'de must prove:

1. That General \ ~ e s t m o r e l a n d n e e d s th e addit ional troops

being sent him .

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NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011


... .

2. That he does no t need further addit ional troops a t

th i s time .

3. ThR.t the Strategic Reserve does need reconstitutiona t this time .

4. That the possible need of General Westmoreland forpossible future reinforcement is sufficient l y important

to merit th e callup .

5. That there i s not a bottoml ess pi t .

6. Tha t the nation s t i ll has the resources f or the ghetto

f i ght . ] ]}

Thus , the memorandum forwarded to the Presldent by the Secretary ofDefense in re sponse to the P-..cesidential reQuest for an If A to Z r eassessment lf

of ou r Vietnam policy again r epresented a compromise . In this case, i t,'las a compromise brought about by differences bet'\<Teen the Assistant Secre

tary of Defense for International Security Affairs and his s ta f f , and theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a.nd his officers . Ini t ial ly , I SA ha d

prepared a draft Presidential memorandum "i'Thich had indeed r eassessed U.S.

st rategy in SVN, found i t faulty, and recommended a nel'l strategy of protectingthe Itdemographic frontier" '\<Tith bas ically th e U.S . forces presently in country . The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff found Itfatal f l aVors II int his strategy, could not accept the implied crit icism of pa s t strategy inthe I SA proposal, di d not think that th e Defense Department civil ians should

be involved in issuing specific guidance to th e military f ield commande r ,

and supported this f ie l d o w ~ a n d e r in his reQues t for the forces requiredto allo,'l him to Itr egain the ini t ia t ive .

1t The compromise reached, of course ,'\<Tas tha t a decision on ne"i'l strategic guidance should be deferred pendi ng acomplete pol i t ica l/ mili tary reassessment of th e U.S. strategy and objectives 'in Vietnam in the context of our '\<TorId'\dde corr.uni t ment s .

The recormnendation for addit ional forces Has a lso a compromise an d

'\<Tas based , as had past decisions of this nature, on ",hat c o u ~ d be done by

the forc es in-being 'I-rithout disrupting the nation . HOI'lever , there 'I·rere addit ional reasons adduced for not meet ing a l l of C O M U S ~ ~ C V r eQuirements forforces. The situation in SVN "TaS not c lear . The abil i ty of the Governmentand of the Army of South Vietnam to survive and to improve ,'Tere in seriousquestion . The abi l i ty of the U.S . to at tain i t s obj ect ives in SVN by mil i -tary forc e of vrhatever size vTaS no t clear . Weighing heavily upon the minds

of the senior off icials '\<Tho prepared and approved the 4 March memorandum to

the President Has , indeed , '\<That differ ence in the '\'lar , what progress tOvTard,victory such a buildup as reque sted by l.w._CV 'I'lOuld make . These l eaders vrere,

f inally, prepared to go a long i'lay do,m the road in meeting COMUS.MACV S

reques t . They r e c o w ~ e n d e d to the President tha t the f i r s t increment of

this request be met . They also recommended a par t ia l mobilization so as

to be p;epared to meet addit ional reQuirement s if ' and ''lhen i t "TaS demonstrated that these forces "'lere neces sary and vrould make a strategic difference .

63 TOP SECRET _ Sen s i t ive






More importantly , hCNlever, these off ic ials f inal ly carne to the realizat iontha t no military strategy could be successful unless a South V i e t n ~ m e s e pol i t ical and mi l i tary ~ n t i t y was capable of "rirming the support of i t speople . Thus, fo r the f i r s t time , U. S. efforts "Tere to be made contingent

upon specif ic re form measures undertaken by the GVN, and U. S . leverage wasto be used to el i c it these reforms. South Vietnam was to be put on noticethat the l i mi t of U.S . patience and commitmen t had been approached.

Concerning negotiations and the bombing of th e North , the Memorandumfor the F-.cesident was convent ionaL No changes i n Gur negotiating positionwere recom.mended and no r eally ne,'T dipl omatic ini t ia t ives Vlere suggested .Concerning the bombing of the North , the only issue indicated concerned

the degree of intensification. There vlas no ment ion made of a par t ia l reduc

t io n or cessation.

Thus , faced with a fork in th e road of our Vi etnam policy, th e WorkingGroup failed to seize the opportunity to change directions . Indeed , they

seemed to r ecommend that we continue rather haltingly down th e same r oad ,meanwh i le consulting t he map more frequently and in greater detai l to insure

tha t we were s t i l l on the right road.

6. The m a t ~ of Opinion

Thi s memorandum was presented to the Pr esident on Monday evening,

4 March , and at his request, the recommendations were pa ssed to General

Westmore land for his comments . These comments were received by the Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and passed to th e Secretary of Defense on

8 March 1968 . General Westmoreland welcomed the addit ional airpower 'which"would greatly enhance the tact ical a ir support ava ile,ble to groll_l1d units ."

The chairman indicated, however, that there had been no change in General

westmoreland's requirements as originally proposed and, indeed , addit ional

combat service-support forces had been requested.

General Westmoreland states that although i m.'lled iateauthori zat ion for deployment of 22,000 addit ional personnel

would provide much needed combat and combat support force s ,th e combat service support forces now in Vietnam are i nsuffi -

cient to support our present force structure . This is especi al ly cr i t ical in view of the recent deployment of th e 3rd

Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division and RLT 27 to the I Corps

tact ic8,

1 zone ,vithout the appropriate sl ice of combat support .He emphas ize s the absolute i e ~ e n t to provide the support

forces identified with th e increased deployments prior to or

a t the same time th e t ac t ica l forces are deployed . I n th is

r egard, General Westmoreland has this date fOYivarded hisspecif ic strength e c o L ~ e n d a t i o n s for the imnlediate essent ialcombat service support forces to provide adequate support for

combat units in I CTZ , including the 3rd Brigade of the 82dAirborne Division , RLT 27 and Army units Hhich have be en

red ep l oyed to Northern I C'orps tact ical zone . This r equest






TOP SECRE'f - Sensit i ve

ha s no t 'yet been validated by CINCPAC, but i s currently underconsideration here by the Joint Staf f in anticipation of earlyaction by Jl.drrLi,ral Sharp ' s headquarters .

Finally, General Westmoreland recogn izes that the forces

which were contained in the Committee's recommendations were

apparently based upon the capabili t ies of th e Services toproduce troops for deployment . He states that there has been

no change i n his appraisal of th e si tuation since my v i s i t toVietnam and thus there has been no change in his requirements

as original ly proposed . 'J!})

From th e 4th of March unti l th e f inal President ia l decision was annoQDced

to th e country, th e Ivritten record becomes sp arse. The debate \'lithin theAdministration was argued and carried fori-lard on a personal basis by the

officials involved, primarily, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary

of State .

The decision, hOI-lever, had been placed squarely on the shoulders oft he President . The recomrnendations of the 4 March memorandum had le f t hima profound pol i t ical /mi l i tary dilemma . 'The memorandum had recommended "a

l i t t le b it more of th e same" to s tabi l ize th e mili tary si tuation, plus al evel of mobilization in order to be prepared to meet any further deter ior i ation in th e ground situation. Any nevr st rategic gui dance , an y new direction

in policy, hovlever, vlere to be le f t to a subsequent study .

But many pol i t ica l events in the f i r s t fevl weeks of March 1968 gave

strong indica t ions that the country was becoming increasingly divided over

and disenchanted with th e current Vietnam strategy, and would no lo ngerset t le for "more of the same" with no indication of an eventual end to theconflict . That the Pr esident was aware of these external pol i t ica l pres

sures and that they influenced his decision is evident .

Focus to th i s pol i t ica l debate and sense of dissat isfaction i-laS given

by a star t l ingly accurate account , published in The New Y o r ~ Times on10 March , of General Hestmoreland ' s reques t and of the strategic r eassess ment 'which ..las being conducted wi thin the executive branch of the government .I t also indicated th e grolving doubt and unease in the nation concerning this

policy revi el'l .

Written by Neil Sheehan and Hedrick Smith , the ,ar t ic le stated :

General Hilliam C. Ife stmoreland has asked for 206,000

Illore American troops for Vietnam, but the request has touched

off a divisive internal debate within high levels of th e

Johnson Administration.

A number of sub-Cabinet civi l ian off icials in th e Defense

DepG,rtment , supported by some senior officis,ls in the StateDepartment, have argued aga.inst General vlestmorela.nd ' s plea

~ I . ' O P SECRET - Sensitive






f or a 40 per cent increase in his rorces ' to rega in the

ini t ia t ive ' from the en emy .

. • . . Many of the civil ian off ic ials are arguing thatthere should be no increase beyond the movement of troops

now under way. . . .

The contention of these high ranking off ic ials is thatan American increase vrill bring a matching increase by

North Vietnam, thereby raising the leve l of violence vl i th out giving the al l ies the upper hand .

Senior Pentagon civi l i ans have put fOT\<Tard a viri tencounter -proposal to President Johnson, calling for a

shi f t in American strategy to a concept of clos e - indefense of populated areas with more l imited offensive

thrusts than at present . Much of th e military hierarchyis reported to oppose this approach . . . .

The President has no t yet decided on the question ofsubstantial increases in American forces in Vietnam . . . .

Nonetheless, the scope and depth of the interna l debate

vrithin the Government ref lect the vrrenching Ql1certainty

and doubt in this capital about every facet of the war l e f t

by the enemy ' s dramatic wave of attacks at Tet, the Asian

NevT Year holiday, six vreeks ago. More than ever this has

le f t a sense of weariness and irr:i . tation over the war.

Of f icials themselves comment in private about wide

spread and deep changes in at t i tudes, a sense that a water

shed has been reached and tha t i t s meaning is just nowbe ginning to be understood . . . .

But at every l evel of Gover:nment there is a sense thatthe conflict , i f expanded further, can no longer be called' a l imi ted v18,r. ' Officials acknovTledge that any furtherAmerican involvement carrie s serious implications for the

civi l ian l i fe of the nation--not only th e call-up of mili tary reserves and enactment or a tax increase "out problems

vlith t he budget, the economy and the balance of payments .

In Congress, uneasy and divided, as the Senate debate

on Thursday shOi"ed , there is a r ising deman d that Capito l Hil lbe con sulted· before any cr i t i ca l ne\<[ step is taken . Evensupporters of Administration policy, such e,s Senator Richard

B. Russel l , Dem:Jcrat of Georgia, I·rho is chair'man of the

Senate Armed Services Committee, are openly cr i t i ca l of'American combat strategy. M.r . Russell has suggeste d that the







United States ha s los t the batt lef ield ini t iat ive not only throughthe enemy ' s bold tac t ics but by what he calls i t s o,m defensive,

gradualist ~ s y c h o l o g y . •.•

General westmoreland's r e ~ u e s t for another 206,000 troops,beyond the present authorized 525,000-man level to be reached by

next fal l , vTaS brought from Saigon l as t month by Gen. Earle G.

vfueeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff . . . .

General Wheeler presented the u e s t to President Johnson at

the vfuite House on Feb. 28 , when he delivered a report on his three day survey of the war si tuat ion in South Vietnam. The r e ~ u e s t vTaSalso forwarded to the President by the Joint Chiefs as a body

' ,vith ou r approval' • . . .

Military leaders also contend that only a massive infusion oftroops wil l restore the a l l i e d in i t ia t ive . They say i t would alsopermit the all ied forces to resume the pacification of the country s i de and the "rar of at t r i t ion against the Vietcong that they contend

was being successfully waged before the Tet offensive.

The main l ines of the case against General Westmoreland's

r e ~ u e s t are contained in a position paper prepared over the l as t

weekend by senior civil ian off ic ia ls in the Defense Department ,i ncluding assistant secretaries. Most of these officials Here

brought into the Government by former Secretary of Defense Robert S .

McNamara .

The argument goes l ike this :

Since the United States military build-up began in 1965, Hanoiha s gradually increased i t s forces in South Vietnam and maintained

a reasonab le ratio to the fighting strength of the American Force s .There is every rea son to believe, these officials contend, thatHanoi is able and ·willing to continue to do so i f more American

troops are sent to Vietnam Hithin the next year .

The reinforcements that General Westmoreland wants Hould thus

not restore the in i t iat ive. They would simply ra i se the level ofviolence. The United States would spend bill ions more on the "Tar

effort and "lould suffer appreciably higher casualties .

North Vietnam would likewise endure substantially greater l osses .But the experience of the Te t offensive shOWS, according to thisl ine of rea soning , that American Mili tary commanders have gravely

underestimated the capacity of the enemy to absorb such punishment

and to be s t i l l able to launch bold offensive operations .

' So there ,vould just be a lo t more ki l l ing, ' one analyst said .







The White House is also reported to have received an analysisf r om the Central Intel l igence Agency that support this view ofNorth Vietnam ' s manpower resources and i t s wil l to res i s t .

'Essential ly, ' said one off ic ia l , 'we are f i ghting Vietnam's

b i r th rate . '

The Defense Department ' s paper ,vas verbally endorsed by Deputy

Secretary of Defense Paul T. Nitze and fO l'i'Tarded by him to Clark

M Cl i f ford , the new Defense Secretary, for transmittal to the

Pr esident on Monday.

Mr. Clifford was impressed with the caliber of the analysis ,in formants said, but i t is no t known whether he endorsed the

documen t personally .

The thru s t of the argument in the Pentagon paper is reportedto have gained the sympathetic support of a number of senior StateDepartment off icials , including Under Secretary Ni cholas deB.Kat zenbach , William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary for East Asian

and Pacif ic Affairs, and others clo se to Vietnam policy.

'i can t e l l you tha t a l l of us in th i s building are against atroop increase, ' one State Department off ic ia l said. HOI-leVer ,Secretary Rusk ' s posit ion on the matter was unknown.

Th e defense position paper concludes by proposing a change in

American strategy in South Vietnam. This would enta i l withdrawingfrom exposed positions l ike Khesanh in the sparsely populated

f rontier regions and concentrat ing on a mobile defense of the

ci t ies and populated areas nearer t he sea.

But sOll'\e military off ic ials contend this i s not a rea l i s t i c

option .

' Each t mm I-Till become a Khesa[l_h , ' they asser t , and civi l ian

casual t ie s wil l soar .

Although most civi l ian off ic ials declined to us e the t erm' enclave ' to describe their proposed strategy, some conceded that

i tdoes

amountto

amodification

ofthe theory advanced by Lieut.

Gen. James '1 . Gavin, ret ired . He has fo:c months urged that the

al l ies pull back t o defensive positions around ci t ies and other

i mportant enclaves al ong th e coast .

The Pentagon document suggests that on the pol i t ica l side the

United State s encouraged the Saigon regime to broaden i t s e l f by

including non-Communi s t opposit ione lements such as the follo,tTers of

th e militant Buddhist leader Tri Quang. A broader base ,-Tould he lp

the regime este.blish a bet t er relat ionship with i t s population and

make i t s army more effective, th e paper asserts .







In their discussion of the American predicament in Vietnam,

some civ i l ian officials go significantly further and suggest

tha t th e Administration should concede that 'you c a n ~ o t completely

defeat the enemy . ' The United States, they say, should instead'buy time' 'with i t s present forces while the non-Communist South

Vietnamese can strengthen themselves to the point where they'believe in thei r abi l i ty to survive against the Communistsafter some sort of internal compromise. '

Off ic ials are vague about the ingredients of this compromise ,but they acknovlledge tha t i t would probably involve negotiations

between th e Vietcong and the non-CommQD i s ts in the South.

Although i t clearly entai ls abandonment of the military

solution that is i mpl i c i t in current Aillainis t rat ion policy, theyargue tha t such a compromise would not violate an y public

American comm itment to South Vietnam.

While avoiding any decision so far , President Johnson has

gained time by putting u ~ e on General Westmoreland to obtain

maximum use of the troops he nOH has . The President has instructedthe general to just i fy in detai l his reques t for reinforcements.

Mr. Johnson has also se t in motion extensive s ta f f studies ofth e fu l l poli t ical , economic and military r ami fic a t ions of giving

General Westmoreland more t roops. Included among these may be an

exwaination of th e possibi l i ty of acquiring addit ional forces

from Washington's all ies in South Vietnam --Austral ia, South Korea,Thailand and the Philippines. .

The thrus t of the President's concern, however, has been with

th e consequences of troop increases . There is no indica t ion at this

time that Mr. Johnson and his closest advisers , Mr . Rusk, Mr .Clif for d and Mr . Rostovl are seriously interested in extending thewar to Cambodia and Laos or in changing to a s tra,tegy of close-in

defense of populated areas.

They reject 8, pol i t ica l compromise \<lith the Vietcong a t th ispoint. Some senior civil ian off icials , in fact , believe Mr .Johnson is ' s t i l l intensely commit ted to a military solut ion. '

These officials consider General vJestmoreland' s request foran additional 206,000 men 'unreal i s t ic , ' ho,\vever, and do not believe

the P-..cesident viill grant i t . 79/




Declassified per Execut ive Order 13526, Section 3.3



Even prior to this art ic le , there had been a great deal of speculation

in the press concerning the need for addit ional troops in SVN, and thegeneral conclus i on seemed to be that some additions vTould be required.Members of Con gress had already demanded that Congress be consul ted

before any decision was made to increase troop strength in Vietnam

s ignif icantly . A number of prominent senators had i nterrupted debate

on c iv i l r j.ghts on 7 Mar ch to make this demand because of "d is turb inginformation that a P"residential Decision was i mm inent." 80 /

The Sheehan ar t i cle appeared one day before Secretary of State DeanRusk appeared to tes t i fy before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee .His 2- day grilling indicated a considerable growth i n open dissentwithin the Committee concerning U. S. policy in South Vietnam. Rusk evencame under crit icism from one of th e few Administration supporters on

th e Comm i t tee , Senator Karl E. Mundt (R-SD), who warne d him, "You areas aVTare as we are that the shif t of opinion in this country is inthe vTrong direction" - meaning ar.'lay from support of U.S . policy in Vietnam. " Something more convincing," said Mundt, "has to come from the

Adminis t ra t ion as to vThat this i s a l l about ' to match ' th e sacrifices_we are making . II Rusk sidestepped a l l attempts by Senators Fulbright,

Gore, and other questioners to pin him down on a possible increase i ntroops or other element of future Vietnam strategy . I t would "not be

r ight for me to speculate about numbers of possibi l i t ies ," said Rusk,''vThile th e P"resident is consul t ing his advisors ." 81 /

Later , on 12 March , both friends and foes of the President ' s policy

i n Vietnam served notice that the present course must be r eassessed

before more troops were sent to Vietnam.

"Senator Fulbright (D-Ar k) , Foreign Relations Committee chairman,warned against an escalation that could l ea d to 'a ll -out war , ' and

insisted dtITing a te l evised hearing with Dean Rusk , Secretary of State,that Congress be consulted before crucial new dec i s i ons are made ."

But Sena.tor Russell (D-Ga ), Armed Services Committee chairman, took

a different tack, contending that a ir and sea power should be used toth e fu l lest extent before ground-force levels are increased .

" If we are not willin g to take this calculated r isk, " Russell told

a Veterans of Foreign Wars dinner, "we should not s t i l l be increasing

the half-mill ion men in Vietnam who are exposed to danger dai ly from

weapons tha t might have been kept from th e hands of our enemies ." 82/

These cormnents from tvTO pOlver f ul cormni t tee chairmen demonstrated

th e cross -currents of opinion sr.-Tirl ing around the President as he cont emplated General \'Jestmoreland ' s request and the r ecommendations of his

advisors .







Adding fuel to this controversy was the unexpected triumph in theNelv Hampshire Pr e sidential Primary on 12 March of the Democ ra t ic lIpeace

ll

candidate, Senator Eugene McCarthy . This tri.umph was wide l y heralded

a s a r epudiation by the voters of the present Administration and i ts

Vietnam policies, and i t encouraged another cr i t ic of these policies,Senator Robert Kennedy, to announce on 16 March his intent ion to seek

the Democratic Presidential nomination.

7. The President Ponders

At a meeting a t the ~ f u i t e House on 13 March, t he Presidentdecided to deploy 30,000 troops to South Vietnam in addition to the 10,500

emergency augmentation already made . This would substantially meet

Genera l Westmoreland ' s in i t ia l package request . Army forces wouldreplace those Marine Corps forces requested, as the Marine Corps could

not sustain the requested deployments . Also an additional Army brigade(7,363 personnel) would be deployed to replace Marine RLT 27 , and i t s

associated support . RLT 27 sould begin to return to CONUS on 15 July.Th e forces to be depl oyed Ivere as follows :

A. US ARlVIY

In f Bde (3 In f Bns )Mech Bde (1 Inf Bn , 1 In f

Bn (Mech), 1 Tk Bn )AVD Co, Sep BdeArmd Cav SqdnMP BnCbt Svc sptCbt and Cbt Svc Spt

SUB-TOTAL

B. 7th AF

4 TFS

FAC/TACPAir l i f t

Support

SUB-TOTAL

C. USN

NSA Da Nang Support

SUB-TOTAL

D. TOTAL M.A.CV

71

4,500

5,041

2381,030

9553,3169,120

24,200

2,164191

741

9294, 025

1,775

1,775

30 , 000

Deployment Date

15-30 June

12 July

15 July15-30 June

15-30 June

15-30 June

15-30 June

15-30 June

5 April1 June

1 June

1 June

1 June







There would be h lO reserve callups to meet and sustain these deploy ments, one in March and one in May . The callup in March would support

the 30 , 000 deployment . The one in May wOlUd reconsti tute the strategicreserve a t seven active divisions. Other ground rules decided upon were :(1 ) those Reservists to be called in May would not now be notified; (2)

there would be no extensions of terms of service for personnel presentlyon active duty; (3 ) no individuals would be recalled, only units . 83/

This decision was formalized by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in amemorandQm to the Chainnan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 14 March 1968 .Mr . IUtze asked the chairman to inform General Hestmoreland of these pro -posals, and to ask him vThether he considered the substi tutions sat isfactory . 84/

On 14 March, the Secretary of the Army fOYl'larded to the Secretary of

Defense his recommendations concerning these Program Six deployments, and

the Reserve callup necessary to sustain them and to reconsti tute thestrategic reserve. Secretary Resor pointed out, however, that an addi t ional 13,500 men would have to be added to the figure of 30,000 to be

deployed. ftIf the 3d Brigade of the 82nd Airborne is to be l e f t in-country

permanently and i f the Army is to replace the RLT with 'an infantry brigade

on a permanent bas i s then lilli t s \-li th TO&E strength of 13,500 mus t be

included in the March 15 cal l -up and deployed . . . . In addit ion, the ~ A C V ceil ing wi l l have to be increased from 565,000 to 578,500, unless MACV can

provide trade-off spaces for a l l or part of this add-on .ft 85/

The strength of units to be called up in March would be 45,000 , as

follo\-ls:

a. Units to provide for the additional deployments - 31,563.

b. Units to provide the sustaining troops for 82d Airborne

and RLT 27 replacement - 13,437.

The May 15 cal1up ,-,ould comprise the fo11ovling:

1 division plus 1 lSI1 brigadePost, camp and stat ion comple -

ment to open 1 additional stat ionTotal '

32 ,000

4,000

5,000

41,000

This 'would reconsti tute the STRliF a t the following levels :

Divisioll

lSI

SSI

66

1-1/3 §§}







In addition, the Secretary indicated that the Chief of Staff of the

Army recownended :

• . . that one division, i t s lSI and the stat ion comple ment, a to ta l of 37,000 TOE strength, be alerted 15 Marchand called up 15 April instead of 15 May in order to provide

an ear l ier capabi l i ty to react to the unpredicted, a stronger

STRAF in l i ght of growing uncertainties in Southeast and

Northeast Asia and to assure an earl i e r i mprovement of the

sustaining base to support the increased deployments and toavoid drawdown on Europe. 87/

The approval of an addit ional 13,500 deployment to support the emer gency augmentation was apparently approved very CJ.uickly .

In a memorandum for the record on 16 March, the la tes t tentative plan

for Vietnam Deployment s and r eserve call-ups ldere l i s t ed as follo,'1s by the

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Syst ems Analysis) :

1. e p l o y m ~ . . . : ? ! .

Program #5Emergency Augmentation

Support for 10,500Add i t ional D e p l o ~

Total

525,00010,50013,50030,000

579,000

2. The Marchreserve cal l ,

tobe announced around

20 Marchwil l be :

Support deployment

Support personnel for the 10,500Total

36,62113,43750,05B

The March cal l wil l ''1aive the 30 day s notice, so troops

wil l report around t1arch 27 .

3. Around a ,'leek or 10 days la ter , tlafte r a study tl there vJill

be a second cal l of 48,393 . . . . These reservists will be given

30 days, therefore reporting around 1 May . §!}/

St i l l , the 'President vIas troubled. In public he continued to indicatefirmness and r esolutene s s , but press leaks and continued public crit icism

cont inued to compound his problem . On March 17, th e Ne"l-J York Times, again

ama zingly accurate, forecast that the President ,vould approve dispatch

of an additional 35,000 to 50,000 men to Vietnam over th e next six months . . §2jOn March 18, nearly one-third of th e House of Representatives, a to ta l

of 139 membe rs , - 98 Republica.ns and 41 Democrats - joined in sponsoring aresolution call ing for an i rrnnecUate Con gres siona l review of the United

state s pol icy in Southeast A s i ~ . 90/

73 TOP SECRE'I' - Sensi t ive






On that same day, 18 March, Mr. Johnson ans';'lered these cr i t ics , as

he charged in a speech before the National Farmers ' Union Convention in

Minneapolis, that Hanoi is seeking lito win in Hashington \,rha t i t cannotwin in Hue or Khe SarLh. Your President 'Helcomes suggestions from commissions, from congressmen, from private individuals or groups,1I he

continued, lIor anyone who has a plan or program which can stand inspection

and open a hope of reaching ou r goal of peace in the world . 1I

At this time, the President sought the advice of a group of his friends

and confidants outside of government. These men came to ~ T a s h i n g t o n on18 March a t the request of the President to receive briefings on the la test

developmen ts in the \'lar and to advise the President on the hard decision

he faced. Present "lere : former Undersecretary of State George Ball;Arthur Dean, a Republican Nel" York lawyer who was a Korean War negotiatorduring the Eisenhmver Administration ; Dean Acheson, former President

Truman's Secretary of State : Gen . Matthew B. Ridge",ay, the ret ired com mander of United Nations troops in Korea; Gen. Maxvrell Taylor, former

Chairman of th e Joint Chiefs of Staff; Cyrus Vance, former Deputy Defense

Secretary and a key troubleshooter for the Johnson Administration; McGeorgeBundy, Ford Foundation President who had been special assistant for National

Security Affairs to ~ I T . Johnson and former President Kennedy; former Treasury

S e c r e t a ~ J C. Douglas Dillon and Gen. Omar Bradley .

The only published account of this consultation, which is considered

rel iable, "las \ 'lritten by Stuart H. Loory and appeared in the Los Angeles

Times late in May . According to this report , the group met over dinner

with Secretary of State Dean Rusk; Defense Secretary Clark M. Clifford;Ambassador Ttl . Averell Harriman; Walt W. RostO'\v, the F-.cesident ' s special

assistant for National securi ty affairs ; General Earle G. I'meeler, Chairman

of th e Joint Chiefs of Staff; Richard Helms, Director of the CentralIntel l igence Agency; Paul Nitze, Deputy Defense Secretary; Nicholas

Katzenbach, Under Secretary of State; and William P. Bundy, AssistantSecretary of State for East Asian and Pacif ic Affairs .

The outsiders questioned the government officials ca,reful l yon the ",ar, the pacification program and th e condition of the

South Vietnamese government af ter the Te t offensive . They in -cluded in their deliberations th e effect of the war on the

United States.

After dinner the government off ic ials le f t and th e group

received three br ief ings .

Fhilip C. Habib, a deputy to William Bundy and nO'\"1 a member .of the American negotiating team in Paris, delivered an unusually

frank briefing on the conditions in Vietnam after the Te t offensive .He covered such matters as corruption in South Vietnam and the

grm'ling r ef\lgee problem.







Habib, according to rel iable sources, told the group thatthe Saigon government '\Vas generally weaker than had been realizedas a result of the Te t offensive. He related the si tuation, somesaid, with greater frankness than the group had previously heard .

In addition to Habib, Maj . Gen. William E. DePuy, specialassistant to the Joint Chiefs for counterinsurgency and specialact ivi t i es, briefed th e group on the military si tuation, and

George Carver, a CIA analyst, gave his agency ' s estimates of con

di ions in the vrar zone .

The brief ings by DePuy and Carver reflected what many understood

as a dispute over enemy strength bet\veen the Defense Department

and the CIA which has been previously reported. Discrepancies inthe figures resQlted from the fact that DePuy ' s estimates of enemystrength covered only identifiable mil i tary uni ts , while Carver ' sincluded a l l known mi l i tary, paramilitary and parttime enemy strength

available .

The morning of March 19, th e advisory group assembled in th e

White House to discuss vThat they had heard the previous evening

and arrived at their verdict. I t was a s t r iking turnabout in

att i tude for a l l but Ball .

After their meeting, the group me t the President for lu..nch.I t was a social af fa i r . No business vTas t ransacted. The meal 'finished, the advisers delivered their verdict to the President .

Their deliberations produced this verdict for th e chief

executive:

Continued ' escalation of the wa.r--intensified bombing of North

Vietnam and increased American troop strength in the South--would

do no good. Forget about seeking a bat t lef ield so l ution to the

problem and instead intensify efforts to seek a pol i t ica l solution

a t th e negotiating table.

He vTas reportedly greatly surprised at their conclusions .When he asked them vrhere they had obtained the facts on which the

conclusions vTere based, th e group told him of th e brief ings by

Habib, DePuy and Carver .

Mr . Johnson knew that the three men 11ad also briefed his

governmental advisers, but he had not received the srune picture of

the war as RostO\'T presented the reports to him .

As a result of the discrepancy, the President ordered his Oi-Tn

d ir ect briefings. At least Habib and DePuy- -and almost certainly

Carver--had evening sessions 'Ivith the President.






TOP SECRET - Sensit ive

Habib Ivas reportedly as frank with the President as he had

been ,'lith the advisory group . The President asked tough questions.'Habib stuck to his guns, ' one source r eported .

Whatever impact this group 's recommendations and the direct briefings

he received had on the President was no t immediately apparent in any

decision which affected the deployment of forces. Even as the President

announced, on 22 March , that General Will iam C. Westmoreland would be

recalle d from Vietnam to become the Army Chief of Staff , 93/ the Defense

Department continued to plan for the deployment of 43,500-additional

troops. In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense on 23 March 1968 ,the Assistant Secretary (Systems Analysis) forwarded his Program #6Summary Table based on 579,000 men in South Vietnam, 54,000 over theapproved ~ r o g r a m #5 cei l ing . This 54,000 was made up of the 10,500

emergency reinforcement package, the 13,500 support forces for i t , andthe 30,000 additiona l package . The Assistant Secretary added, that uponnotific ation of approval and desire to announce the new plan, the tables

would be published. 94/

HO'tTever, these part icular table s "Tere not to be published. ThePresident sought further advice as he wrest l ed with the problem which

had plagued his Administration. On March 26, General Creighton Abrams,Deputy COMUSMACV, arrived suddenly and without prior announcement, and

vlas closeted I,dth the Fresident and his senior off ic ia ls . These

conferences were conducted in the utmost secrecy amid press speculation

that Abrams I"ould be named to succeed General Westmoreland . Further

press speculation .was that the conferences dealt primarily vTi thexpansion c.md modernization of the South Vietnamese armed forces andthat this tended to buttress earl i er predictions that any increase inAmerican forces in South Vietnam ",ould be modest . 95/

8. The President Decides

Apparently the Presidential decision on deployment of additionalU. S. forces to Vietnam vias made on 28 March and concurred in by General

Abrams . In an undated memorandum (probably written on 27 or 28 March)for the Chief of Staff , U.S. Army, the Deputy Chief of Staff forMilitary Operations, Lt General Lemley, indicated that the Joint Staff

had informed him of:

• • . . tentative decisions arising from the recent conference

betiqeen the' President, the Chairman , and General Abrams, aswell as telecons between the Chairman and General Westmorel and .It is believed that a Pr e sidential decision may be made by

Friday (29 March ) morning .




Declassified per Exec ut ive Order 13526, Section 3.3

NND Project Num ber: NND 633 16. By : NWD Date: 2011


New cei l ing i n RVN : 549, 500a. Pr ogram 5: 525,000 .b. Emergency deployment of 82d Abn , 27th RLT : 11 , 000 .*

13 , 500 . *. Support and sustain emergency deployment :d. Tota l : 549,500 .

*Incl udes estimated 1 , 444 Ai r Force and Navy .

1s t Bde , 5th Inf Div (He ch ) ,'Till replace 27th RLT .Reser ve call -up of approximately 62, 000 .a. Ar my 53, 957

(13,301 Support of 3/82d Abn Div &1 /5t h Inf Div )(40,656 - Reconstitute STRAF )

b. Navy 1, 45 3c. Ai r Force 6 , 590

d. To ta l 62 , 000 96/

A Jo i nt Staff paper enti t l ed IlHACV Troop Lis t of Program 6 Add - on ,1I

dated 28 Ma,rch , summarized service capability to sat isfy Il HACV ' S 28 March1968 request for U. S. forces

llas follows :

T\vo Bri gade Increment

USARV - I nf Bde , Sep

- Mech Bde , Sep

- Armored Cav Sqdn- 2 TFS (F-100 ) (469 ea )Brigade Increment

(Combat Forces )STRENGTH CONUS AVAIL DATE-X-

4, 639 I n- Country as 3d Bde / 82d

4, 882

1,049994

11 ,564

Di vJul 68

Aug 68Jun/ Ju l 68th AF

Tota lSupport Increment (Combat Support and Combat Service Support Forces )

USARV - 2 FA Bn (155mm )- Engr Bn (Cbt )- Other Support Units

NAVFORV -

7th AF

I I I MAF -Total Support Increment

'I'OTAL DEPLOY1vIENT

STRENGTH

1,132812169

2, 7522,2191,411

9001,775

895707496

13 , 268

C O ~ u S AVAIL DATE*Aug! Sep 68Aug 68J un/ Jul 68Aug 68Sep 68Oct 68Unk...l1o,m/ May 69J un 68

Jun/ Jul 68UnknovmApr/ Sep 68

24, 832 (Excess over 24, 500 can be

t aken from existing credit /deoit account )

* CONUS availabil i ty date based on decision t o call up reserve elements . 97/







9. The Decision is Announced

On Sunda.y, 31 March , i t 'I'7as announced that the President would

address the nation that evening concerning the vTar in Vietnam. Thenight before, Saturday, 30 March , a cable was dispatched to the U.S.

Ambassadors in Australia, NevT Zealand, Thailand, Laos, the Philippines,and South Korea. This cable, slugged "Literally Eyes Only forAmbassador or Charge", instructed the addressees to se e their

respective heads of government and inform them of the following major

elements of the President's planned policy annOtLDCement on Sunday~ ~ : ~ ,

a. Major stress on i mportance of GVN and ARVN increased

effect iveness, with our equipment and other support as f i r s tpriority in our own actions.

b. 13,500 support forces to be called up at once in order

to round out the 10,500 combat units sent in February.

c. Replenishment of strategic ' reserve by call ing up

48,500 addit ional r eserves, stat ing that these ,",ould be

designed to strategic reserve.

d. Related tax increases and budget cuts already largelyneeded for non-Vietnam reasons.

3. In addition, af te r similar consultat ion and concurrence,

President proposes to announce that bombing will berest r ic ted to targets most direct ly engaged in the bat t le-

field area and that this meant that there I'Tould be nobombing north of 20th paral le l . Announcement 'I'tlould leave

open how Hanoi might respond, and 'I'70uld be open-ended as totime . H O ' ~ ' T e v e r , i t vlould indicate that Hanoi !s response

could be helpful in determining I'lhether vTe v7ere just i f ied inassumption that Hanoi 'I'70uld not take advantage i f vle

stopping (sic) bombing altogether. Thus, it vlOuld tothis extent foreshadow possibi l i ty of fu l l bombing stoppage

a t a l a te r point.

This cable offered the Ambassadors some a d d i t i o ~ a l rationale for this

ne'l'T policy for their discretionary use in conversations with theirrespect iV ·3 heads of goverrr_Tllent. This r3.tiona le represents the only

available statement by the Administration of some of i t s underlying

reasons and purposes for and expectations from this policy decision.

a. You should cal l attent ion to force increases that would

be announced a t the Saille time and vlould make clear our continued

resolve . Also our top priority to re-equipping ARVN forces.







b. You should make clear that Hanoi is most l ikely todenounce the project and thus free our hand af ter a short period .Nonethelesf', vre might wish to continue t:he l imita t ion even af te r

a formal denunciation, in order to reinforce i t s sinceri ty and

put the monkey firmly on Hanoi ' s back for whatever follol'ls . Ofcourse, any ma,j or military change could compel full-scalere sumption at an y time.

c. With or without denunciation, Hanoi might well feell imited in conducting any major offensives a t l east in the northern

areas . I f they did so, this could ease the pressure where i t is

most potentially serious . I f they did not, then this vlould give

us a clear f ield for whatever actions were then r e ~ u i r e d .

d. In view of weather l imitations , bombing north of the 20th

paral lel vlill in an y event be l imited at least for the next four

we ek s or so -- which we tentat ively envisage as a maximum t es t -

in g period i n any event . Hence, we are not giving up anything

real ly serious in this time frame. Moreover, a ir power now used

north of 20th can probably be used in Laos (where no policy change

planned ) and in SVN.

e . Insofa r as our announcement foreshadows any possibi l i tyof a complete bombing stoppage , in the event Hanoi real ly exercises

reciproca l res traints , vole regard this as unlikely. But in any

ca se , the period of demonstrated res traint would probably have tocontinue for q. period of several ,'leeks, and we would have time to

appraise the situation and to consul t carefully with them beforewe undertook any such action.

Thu s, in reassuring our al l ies of our IIcontinued reSOlve!!, th e cable

clearly indicated that no t very much was expected of this change i n policy .I t could possibly reinforce our sinceri ty and II put the monkey on Hanoi's

back for vlhatever follovlS . II I t was not expected that Hanoi would reactpositively although they might IIfeel l imited in conducting any major

offensives at least in the northern areasll

, admittedly a highly dubious

l ikelihood ..

What, then, was the purpose of this change in policy? I f i t ';vas no t

expected that Hanoi ,'lould re spond pos:Ltively, or that any other major

mil i ary benefi ts would accrue, \'lhat then vlas expected? The anSvler tothese ~ u e s t i o n s ~ of . course, could only be speculation at the time )a l t h o ~ . g h ma:ny of the answers vTere to be contained in the President ' s

speech on 31 March .







,, '

10 . I Shall Not Seel<;:, .and I Will Not Accept. . .

The Presiden t ' s speech to the nation on 31 March began with asummary of his efforts to achieve peace in Vietnam over th e years . 2J}

Good evening, my fellovl Americans .

Tonight I vrant to speak to you of peace in Vietnam and

Southeast Asia.

No other ~ u e s t i o n so preoccupies ou r people . No other

dream so absorb s the 250 million human beings vrho l ive in thatpart of th e world . No other goal motivates American policy in

Southeas t Asia.

For years, representat ives of our goverI1JUent and others

have travelled the ,vorld -- seeking to find a basis for peace

talks .

Since l as t September, they have carried the offer that Imade public at San Antonio .

That offer was this :

That the United States would stop i ts bombardment of North

Vietnam when that would lead promptly to productive discussions

and that v7e would assume that North Vietnam v70uld not take

military advantage of our res t ra int .

Hanoi denoun ced th is offer, both privately and publicly .Even '-7hile the search for peace was going on , North Vietnam rush-

ed their preparations for a sa.vage assault on the people, th e

government , and th e al l ies of South Vietnam.

This attack during th e TET holidays, the Pr esident indico..ted, failed

to achieve i t s principal objectives :

I t did not collapse the elected goverpJUent of South Vietnam

or shatter i t s army -- as th e Communists had hoped .

I t did not produce a ' general upri s ing ' among the people

of the ci t ie s as they had predicted .

The Commu . 1ists v7ere unable to maintain control of any of

th e more than 30 c i t ies tha t they attacked. And they took very

heavy casualt ies.







But they did compel the South Vietnamese and the i r all iesto move certain forces from the countryside, into the c i t ies .

They caused vridespread disruption and suffering. Their

attacks, and the bat t les that followed, made refugees ofhalf a million human beings .

The Co@nunists may renew their attack any day .

They are, i t appears, t rying to make 1968 the year of

decision in South Vietnam - - th e year that brings, i f not f inalvictory or defeat, at least a turning point in the struggle .

Thi s much is clear:

I f they do mount another rouIld of heavy attacks, they ,\-Tillnot succeed in destroying the fighting pOvTer of South Vietnam

and i t s al l ies .

But t ragically, this is also clear:' many men - - on both

sides of the struggle - - ,\-Till be lo s t . A nation tha t has

already suffered 20 years of IV'arfare "dill suffer once again.

Armies on both sides vJill take nelV' casualties. And the war wil l

go on.

There is no need for this to be so .

In dramat ica l ly announcing the par t ia l suspension of the bombing ofNorth Vietnam as a nel'! in i t iat iv e designed to l ea d to peace ta lks ,P'..cesident Johnson did not voice an y of the doubts of the State Department

cable of the previous night tha.t this i n i t iat iv e ""as not expected tobe frui t ful . Ind eed , the central theme of this port ion of the speech

'\-las tha t our uni lateral action '\-las designed to le a.d to early talks .The President even designated the United States repres entatives for

such ta lks.

There is no need to delay the talks that could bring an endto th i s lo ng ' and this bloody war .

Tonight, I renei'l the offer I made las t August - - to stop

th e bombardment of North Vietnam. \qe ask tha t talks begin

promptly, tha t they be serious talks on the substance of peace .ltle assume that during those talks Hanoi wil l not take

advantage of our r est raint .

We are prepared to move immediately tOl-lard peace through

negotiations .







So, tonight, in the hope that th is action wil l lead toearly talks, I am taking the f i r s t step to de-escalate theconfl ict . ' T e are reducing - - substantially reducing -- thepresent level of hosti l i t ies .

And vre are doing so unilatera. l ly, and at once .

Tonight, I have ordered our a i r c r a I ~ and ou r naval vesselsto make no attacks on North Vietnam , except in the area northof the DeMilitarized Zone "l'There the continuing enemy build-updirect ly threatens all ied fOTlvard posit ions and where themovement s of thei r troops and supplies are clearly related tothat threat .

The area in "l'Thich "l'Te are stopping ou r attacks includesalmost 90 percent of North Viet nam ' s population, and most ofi t s terr i tory. Thus there wil l be no attacks around th eprincipa l populated area$, or in the food-producing areas ofNorth Vi etnam .

Even this very l imited bombing of the North could come toan early end -- i f our r est raint is mD.tched by restraint inHanoi. But I cannot in good conscience stop a l l bombing so

long as to do so YTould i mmediately and direct ly endanger thel ives of ou r men and ou r all ies . Whether a comp le te bombinghal t becomes possible in the future wil l be determined by

events.

Our purpose in this action is to bring about a reduction inth e level of violence that now exists .

I t is to save th e l ives of brave men -- and to save the l ivesof innocent vlomen and children. I t is to permit the contendingforces to move closer to a pol i t ica l settlement .

And tonight, I ca l l upon the United Kingdom and I ca l l uponth e Soviet Union -- as co-chairmen of the Geneva Conferences, and

as permanent members of th e United Nations Security Counc i l --to do a l l they can to move from the unilateral act of de

escalation that I have jus t announced to"\'lard genuine pe a.ce in

Southeast Asia.

Now, as in the past , the United States is ready to send

i t s repr esentatives to an y for um , a t any time, to discuss themeans of bringing this ugly war to an end .







I a.."'Il designating one of our most distj.nguished Ameri-

cans , Ambassador Averell Harriman, as my personal repre-sentative for such ta lks. In addit ion, I have asked

Ambassador Lle'Nellyn Thompson, who returned from M o s c o ~ ' T for consultation , to be available to join AmbassadorHarriman a t Geneva or an y other suitable place - - justas soon as Hanoi agrees to a conference.

I cal l upon President Ho Chi Minh to respond posi-t i vely, and favorably, to this ne ..7 step toward peace.

I f peace did not come through negotiat ions, h , e v e r th e President

indicated that our common re so lve was unshakable and our common strengthinvincible. As evidence of th is , he l is ted the achievements of the South

Vietnamese nation.

Tonight , we and the other al l ied nations are con

t r ibut ing 600 ,000 fighting men to ass is t 700,000 South

Vietnamese troops in defending their l i t t l e country .

Our presence there has always rested on this basic

bel ief : the main burden of preserving their freedom

must be carried out by them -- by th e South Vietnamese

th emse lves .

vie and ou r al l ies can only help to provide a shield -

behind which the people of South Vietnam can survive and

can grovT and develop. On their efforts - - on the i r

determinations and resourcefulness - - th e outcome vTill

ul t imately depend.

That small, beleaguered nation has suffered terr ible

punishment for more than twenty years.

I pay t r ibute once again tonight to the great coura.geand endurance of i ts people. South Vietnam supports armedforc es tonight of almost 700,000 men - - and I cal l your

attention to th e fact that that is the equivalent of morethan 10 million in ou r OHn population. I ts people maintain

the ir firm determination to be free of domination by the

North.

There ha s been substantial progress, I think, in

building a durable government during these l as t three

veal's. The South Vietnam of 1965 CO'J.ld not have survived

th e enemy ' s Te t offensive of 1968. The elected govern-

ment of South Vietnam survived that attack - - and is

rapidly repairing th e devastation that i t vTrought.









levels of government .

We applaud th is evidence of determination on th e partof South Vietnam. Our f i r s t prior i ty wilJ. be to support

their effort .

We shall accelerate the re-eg.uipment of South Vietnam ' sarmed forces -- in order to meet th e enemy ' s i ncreased f ire-

pm'ler . This ~ " T i l l enable them progressively to undertake

a larger share of combat operations against the Communistsinvaders.

The token increase in U.S. troop deployments to South Vietnam which

presaged for the f i r s t time a l imit to ou r commitment and pointed to achange in ground strategy, an issue which had caused such great specula t ion in th e press and controversy in Congress and within the Administration,

received short mention in th e speech. I t se emed almost a footnote to th edramatic statements ''lhich had preceded i t .

On many occasions I have told the American people thatwe ~ ' l O u l d send to Vietnam those forces that are required toaccomplish our mission there . So, with that as our guide ,we have previously authorized a force level of approximately

525,000.

Some weeks ago -- to help meet th e enemy ' s offensive

we sent to Vietnam about 11,000 additional Marine and

airborne troops . They ·Here deployed by a ir in 48 hours, on

e.n emergency basis . But the ar t i l le ry , tank, aircraf t , andother units that e r e needed to work with and support theseinfantry troops in comb at could no t accompany them on thatshort notice.

In order that these forces may reach maximum combateffectiveness, the Joint Chiefs of Ste,ff have recommended tome that we should prepared to send -:-- during the next five

months -- support troops to ta l l ing approximately 13,500 TIlen .

A portion of these men I<Till be made available from ou r

active force s . The balance 'di l l come from Reserve Componentunits which ,.Till be called up for service .

The po"':'tion of the President ' s speech detailed the cost ofthe Vietnam Har and made a plea for Con gressional action to reduce th e

defici by passing the surtax vThich had been requested almost a year

before .

In sunun.a ry, the President re i t erated the UoS, objectives in South

Vietnam, and gave his appra i sa l of ~ ' T h a t th e U.S. in pursuit of those

ob j ect ives, hoped to accompl ish in Southeast Asia.

TOP SECRET Sensitive






I cannot promise that the ini t ia t ive that I have announced

tonight vIill be cDmpletely successf'ul in achieving peace anymore than th e 30 others that vIe have undertaken and agreed toin recent years.

But i t is our fervent hope that North Vietnam , af ter

years of fighting that has le f t th e issue unresolved, willnmv cease i t s efforts to achieve a mili tary victory and wil ljoin "Tith us in moving toward the peace table.

And there may come a time vThen South Vietnam -- onboth sides -- are able to ,qork out a "ray to se t t le their

own differences by free poli t ical choice rather than by

war.

As Hanoi considers i t s course, i t should be in no doubt

of our intentions. I t must not miscalculate the pressures

within ou r democracy in th is election year.

We have no intention of 'widening th is VTar.

But the United States >'Till never accept a fake solutionto this long and arduous struggle and cal l i t peace .

No one can foretel l the precise terms of an eventual

settlement.

Our objective in South Vietnam has never been th eannihilation of th e enemy. I t has been to bring about arecognition in Hanoi that i t s objective -- taking over the

South by force -- could not be achieved.

We think that peace can be based on the Geneva Accords

of 1954 -- under poli t ical conditions that permit th e South

Vietnamese _ . a l l th e South Vietnamese -- to chart their

course free of any outside domination or interference, fromus or from anyone else.

So tonight I reaffirm th e pledge that we made a t Manila -that VTe are prepared to withdraw our forces from South Vietnam as the other side vTithdra,vs i t s forces to the North, stops

th e jnf i l t ra t ion, and the level of violence thus subsides.

Our goal of peace and self-determination in Vietnam

is directly related to the future of a l l of Southeast Asia







where much ha s happened to inspire confidence during the past10 years. Ive have done a l l that we kne,v hOlY to do to contribute and to help build that confidence . . . .

Over time, a wider, f r ame,vork of peace and security inSoutheast Asia Inay become possible. The ne,v cooperation ofth e nations in the area could be a fOQndation-stone. Cer

tainly friendship with the nations of such a Southeast Asia

i s what t he United States seeks -- and that is a l l that the

United States seeks.

One day, my fellow cit izens, there 1-rill be peace in South

east Asia.

I t 1-Till come because the people of Southeast Asia want

i t -- those 1-Those arm..i..es are a t war tonight, and those 'vho,though threatened, have thus far been spared .

Peace will come because Asians were 'villing to 1-lork fori t -- and to sacrif ice for i t -- and to die by tbe thousands

for i t .

But le t i t never be forgotten: peace wil l come alsobecause America, sent her sons to help secure i t .

I t ha s not been easy -- far from i t . During th e pastfour and a half years, i t has been my fate and my r esponsi

bi l i y to be comrnander-in-chief. I have l ived -- daily andnightly -- 1-lith the cost of this 1-Tar. I knovT th e pain tha t

i t has inf l icted. I know perhaps bet ter than anyone themisgivings tha t i t has aroused.

Throughout this entire, long period, I have been sus

tain ed by a single principle:

that ,vhat we are dOing nOH, in Vietnam, i s v i ta l

not only to th e securi ty of Southeast Asia, but i t is

vi ta l to the securi ty of every American.

Surely "Te have t reat ies which we must re spect .

Surely we have comm itments tha t we are going to keep.ResoJutions of the Congress t es t i fy to the need toresis t aggression in the world and in S o ~ t h e a s t Asia .

But the heart of ou r involvement in South Vietnam

und er three P".cesidents, three separate Administrat ionshas ahlay s been America I s o,m securi ty .

87 TOP SECRET - Sensit ive






And the la:rger purpose of Our involvement ha s alwaysbeen to help the nations of Southeast Asia become inde pendent ane'. stand alone, self-sustaining as members of agreat iVorld communitsy.

- - At peace , 'lith th emselves, and a t peace with a l l

others.

With such an Asia, OUT country - - and the "lorld - wil l be far more secure than i t is tonight .

I believe that a peaceful Asia is far nearer tor eal i ty, because of what America has done in Vietnam .I bel i eve that the m.en "Tho endure th e dangers of bat t le

- - f i ghting there for us tonight - - are helping theent i re ,varld avo id far greater conflict s , far vIider wars ,far more destruction, than this one .

I pray that i t vIill not be rejected by the l eaders

of North Vietnam. I pray that they will accept i t as ameans by 'Hhich the sacrif ice s of their o,m people may be

ended. And I a sk your help and your support , my fellow

citizens, for this effort to reach across the bat t lef ie ld

toward an early peace.

Fina,lly, the President addressed himself in a highly personal mannerto the issue that had seemed uppermost in his mind throughout the preceding

month of deliberation, re assessment and reappraisal of our Vietnam policy - t he is sue of domestic unity .

Yet, I believe t hat ,,,e must ahTays be mindful of this onething , "lhatever the t r ia ls and th e tes ts ahead . The ultimate

strength of our cOlm try and ou r cause will l ie not in povlerful

weapons or inf inite resources or boundless vTealth , but wil ll ie in the unity of ou r people.

This, I bel.ieve very deeply.

Througbout my entire public career I have followed thepersona l p"liJ.osophy that I am a man, an American , a public

servant and a member of my Party, in that order always and only .

For 37 years in the service of our nat ion, f i rs t as aCongressman , as a Senator and as Vice President a,nd nO'rl as

your President , I have put the unity of the people f i r s t .I have put i t ahead of an y dev is ive part isanship.







.-'

And in these times as in times b e ~ o r e , i t is true thata house divided against s e l ~ by the sp i r i t ~ a c t i o n , o ~ party, re gion , religion, race, is a house that can-

not stand .

There is division in the American house nO"l-T. Th ere

i s devisiveness among us a,ll tonight. And holding the t rus t

t hat i s mine, as Pr esident a l l the people, I cannot dis regard the per i l to the progress the American people and

t he hope and th e prospect peace ~ o r a l l people s .

So, I would ask a l l Americans, whatever their personal

in terests or concern, to guard against devisiveness and a l li t s ugly consequences .

F i ~ t y - t months and ten days ago, in a moment tragedy

and trauma , the duties this o ~ ~ i c e ~ e l l upon me . I asked

t he n ~ o r your help and God ' s, that we might continue America

on i t s course, binding up our "l-lounds, healing ou r history,moving ~ o r ' . ' T a r d in new unity, to clear the Ameri can agenda and

t o keep the American commitment ~ o r a l l our people.

United vIe have kept that commitment. United "l-Ie have

enlarged that commitment .

Through a l l time to come, I think Amer ica ,viII be astronger nation, a more jus t society, and a l and of grea,ter

opportuni y and ~ u l ~ i l l m e n t because vlhat we have a l l donetogether in these years unparalleled achievement.

Our relvard wil l come in the l i ~ e ~ r e e d o m , peace, and

hope that our childre n vIill en j oy through ages ahead.

\<]hat i'le won \'Then a l l our people united just must not

nOV1 be l ost in suspicion , dis trust , s e l ~ i s h n e s s , and poli t icsruaong any ou r people .

Having eloquently stated th e need ~ o r unity in a nation divided, the

Pre sident then made the dr.amatic arulOuncement which shocked and e l e c t r i ~ i e d the nation and th e world, an announcement intended to restore unity to the

divided nation:

B e l i e v i ~ g this as I do , I have ~ o n c l u i e d that I should not

permit the Presidency to become involved i n the partisandivisions that are developing in this pol i t ica l year .

With America ' s sons in the ~ i e l d s far away, with America ' s~ t u r e LLDder challenge r ight here a t home , wi th our hopes




Declassified per Execut ive Order 13526, Section 3.3



and the world ' s hopes f'or peace in the balance every day ,I do not believe that I should devote an hour or a day

of' my t ime to any personal partisan causes or to any dutiesother t han th e awesome duties of' this of'f i ce -- the Presi-dency of your country.

Accordingly , I shall not seek , and I will not acc ept , thenomination of'my Party f'or another term a s your President.

But l et men everyWhere know, however, that a strong , aconfident , and a vigilant America stands ready tonight toseek an honorable peace -- and stand ready tonight to defend

an honored cause -- whatever the price, whatever the burden,

whatever the sacrif ices that duty may require .

Thank you for l is te ning .

Goo d night and God bless a l l of you.

On April 4, 1968 , th e Deputy Secretary of Defense , in a memorandumfor t he Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chairman of theJoint Chief's of Staff' established Southeast Asia Deployment Program #6 .This program added 24,500 per som1el to th e approved Program #5 , and placed

a new ceil ing of 549,500 on U.S . f'orces in South Vietnam. 100/ None of'the some 200,000 t r oops requested by General Westmore l and on 27 February

were to be deployed.

Late in the afternoon of April 3, 1968, the vlhi te House releas ed the

f'oll olYing statement by President Johnson:

To day the GoverQment of' North Vietnam made a statement

which included th e follovling paragraph, and I quote :

ItHovrever , for i ts par t , th e Governm.ent of the Demo-crat i c Republic of Vietnam declares i ts readiness toappoint i ts representatives to contact the United States

r epresentative vTi th a vi ew to determining ,vith the

AIDerican side the unconditional cessation of th e United

States bombing raids and a l l other a.cts of' Ivar against

t he Democratic Republ ic of Vietnam so that talks mays tar t . '1

Last Sunday night I expres sed the position of' the

Uni te d states I'Tith r espect to peace in Vi etnam and South

east Asia as f'0110v7s :

ItNOvl , as in the past , the United states is ready tosend i t s representatives to any forum, a t any time, todiscu ss the means of bringing this vrar to an end . It







Accordingly , we vTill establish contact with the repre

sentatives of North Vietnam. Consultations with theGovernment of South Vietnam and ou r other a l l ies are nowt aking place . 101/

The f i r s t step on vThat would undoubtedly be a lo ng and tortuous road

to peace apparently had been taken . In one dramatic action , President

Johnson had for a time removed the is sue of Vietnam from domestic pol i t ica l

contention . In an unexpectedly prompt and re sponsive reply to his in i t i -

ative, Hanoi had moved the struggle for South Vietnam into a new path .

As has been indicat ed , little had been expected to resul t from the

par t i a l bombing hal t and the l imitation upon U.S . troop commitments toSouth Viet nam . Why , then, were these steps taken?

In March of 1968 , the President and his principal advisers were a gain

confronted ,vith a dilemma vThich they had faced before , but which they had

postponed resolving . Although seldom specifically stated, the choi ce had

alvlays been ei ther to increase U. S. forc es in South Vietnam as necessary

to achieve military victory or to l imit the U,S, commitment in order to

prevent the defeat of our South Vietnamese all ies while they put the i r

pol i t ica l -military house in order . In the past, th e choice had no t been

so clear-cut. Progress toward mil i t ary victory had been promised with

small i n c l ~ e a s e s in forc e levels I'Thich did not require la rge r eserve call-

ups or ec onomic dislocations. Military victory would then assure a viable

South Vietnamese pol i t ica l body capable of protecting and gaining the

support of i t s people .

In March of 1968 , the choice had become clear-cut . The price formil i tary victory ha d increased vastly , and there vTas no assurD-nce thati t would not grovl again in the future. There were also strong indi ca

t ions tha t l arge and grow·ing elements of the American public had begun

to believe the cost had already reached unacceptable leve.ls a.nd vlouldstrongly protest a la rge increase in t hat cost.

The pol i t ica l real i ty vlhich faced President Johnson ·was that "moreof the sa.rne" in South Vietnam, vTith an increased commitment of American

l ives and money and i t s consequent impact on the country , accompanied by

no guarantee of military victory in th e near future, ha d become unaccept able to these elements of th e American public. The optimist ic military

reports of progress in the war no longer rang true af te r the shock of

the TET offensive .

Thus, th e y.cesident ' s decision to seek a new strategy and a nevT road

to peace vTas based upon tl"70 major considerations :

(1 ) TheSecretary of

Westmoreland

convictions of his principal civi l ian advisers , part icularlyDefense Clifford , tha t the troops requested by General

vlould not make a military victory any more l ikely ; and







(2 ) A deeply-felt conviction of th e need to res tore unity to the

American nat ion.

For a policy from which so l i t t l e was expected, a great deal \-Tas

in i t i a ted . The North Vietnamese and the Americans sa t dOiffi a t th e

conference table in Paris to begin to t ravel the long road to peace; the

issue of Vietnam largely ",as removed from American pol i t i ca l discord;

a l imi t to the cOrrLrnitment of U. S . forces i'las estab l ished; an d the South

Vietnamese ",ere put on notice tha t , Ili th our he lp , they would be expected

to do more in the i r own defense .

The "A to Z" reassessment of U. S. strategy in South Vietnam in the

wake of the TET offensive did not resul t in the announcement of a nevI

ground strategy for South V i e t n ~ r n . But in placing General westmoreland ' s

request for forces squarely in the context of the achievement of U.S.

pol i t ica l-mil i ta ry object ives in South Vietnam, ' the l imited pol i t i ca lnature of those objectives was for the f i r s t time affirmed . A nel'] ground

strategy, based on trere l imited object ives and upon the ceil ing on U. S.

t roops became a corollary for the nei'l U. S. commander .

American forces i n i t i a l l y vTere deployed to Vietnam in order to prevent

the South Vietnamese from lo sing the war, to insure tha t aggression from

the north would not succeed . Having deployed enough troops to insure t ha t

NVN aggression ",ould not succeed, i t had been almost a ref lex act ion to

s ta r t planning on hOH much it "It/ould take to "win" the war . Lip service

was given to the need for developing South Vietnamese pol i t i ca l ins t i tu

t ions , but no one a t high l evels seemed to quest ion the assumption that

U.S. pol i t i ca l objectives in South Vietnam could be at tained through mil i

tary victory .

However , it Ivas quickly apparent that there was an embarrassing lack

of knowledge as to hoI'; much it i',1Ould take to wi n the war . This stemmed

from uncertainty in hlo areas : (1 ) hOlv much e f fo r t the North Vietnamese

Ivere I'Tilling to expend in terms of men and mater ie l ; and (2) how effect ive

the South Vi etna..rnese armed forces "\-lould be in establ ishing securi ty in the

countrysi de . As the l-lar progressed, it appeared t ha t our estimates of the

former were too low and of the l a t t e r too high. Ho,oJever, committed to amili tary victory and having l i t t l e information as to vThat was needed mil i

t a r i ly, the civ i l ian decision makers seemed will ing to accept the f ie ld

commander I s estimate of 'what "lvas needed . Steady progress ,'las promised

and was apparently being accomplished, although the commitment of forces

steadily increased.

The TET offensive shol'led that th is progress in many ways ha d been

i l lu sory . The possib i l i ty of mil i tary vic tory had seemingly become remote

' andthe cost had become too high both in pol i t i ca l an d economic terms .

Only then vTere our ult imate object ives brought out an d re-examined. Only

then ,'las it realized that a clear-cut mil i t a : r ~ . f vic tory "I,ms probably not

possible or necessary, an d t ha t the road to peace would be a t l eas t a·s







dependent upon South Vietnamese pol i t ica l development as i t would be on

American arms. This rea l iza t ion , then, made i t possible to l imit theAmerican military commitment to South Vietnam to achieve the objectives

for which this force had originally been deployed. American forces 'wouldremain in South Vietnam to prevent defeat of the Government by C o ~ n u n i s t forces and to provide a shield behind "rhich that Government could ral ly ,

become effective, and win the support of i t s people.







FOOTNOTES

l. COMUSMACIl 6 1 ' t ~ 2 " 260755 Jan 68, Subject : "Annua l Assessment."

2. "U.S. Aides Predict All-Out Red Drive as Prelude to Talks," by

George R. Packard, Philadelph ia BLuletin, 11 Jan 68, p. 1.

3. JC stvI 91-68, 12 Feb 68, Subject: "Emergency Reinforcement of COlYIUSMACV . "

4 . JCS Msg 9926, 130218z Feb 68, Subject: "Deployment of Brigade Task

Force of 82nd Airborne Division to SVN (S) 0"

5. Ibid .

6. JCS Msg 9929, 130341Z Fe b 68, Subject: "Deployment of Marine Corps

Regiment (Reinforced ) to SVN (S) ."

7 • Ib id .

8. c nrCPAC Msg to JCS/CINCSTRIKE, 150125Z Fe b 68, Subject: "Deployment

of Marine RegilJlen t (U)" JCS in 12316.

9·

10.

ll.

12.

13·

14 .

15 ·

16.

17·

DJSM 259-68, Memorandum fo r the Secretary of Defense, Subject:

"Marine .Deployments to Vietnam (U),," date d 6 Mar 68.

JC SM 95-68, 13 Feb 68, Subject : "Emergency Reinforcement of COMUSMACV(C)."

Report of Chairman, JCS on Situat ion in Vietnam and MACV Force

Requirement s , 27 Feb 1968 (TS).

Ib id . , pp . 1-2 .

Ib id . , p. 12.

Ibido, pp . 12-13·

Ib id . , p. 130

Ib id . , p. 14.

Hand,{r i t t en notes by Morton Halperin from conversation withPaul vvarnke, 29 Feb 1968 (TS-EYES ONLY).

18. Memorandum from William Bundy to General Taylor and Mr . Warnke ,

29 Feb 1968 (TS-NODIS).







19. Halper in notes, Op e ci t .

20. Office of National Estimates, Central In te l l igence Agency,MemorandUlll f oX' th e Director, Subject: The Qutlook in Vietnam ,dated 26 Feb 1968 (s).

21. Central In te l l igence Agency, Memorandum, Subject: CommunistAlternatives in Vietnam , dated 29 Feb 1968 (s )

22.

23·

Ibid. , p. 1

Central Intelligence Agency, M e m o r a n d u ~ Subject : Questions Concerning

the Situation in Vietnam, dated 1 March 1968 (S).

24. W. P. Bundy, Draf t Memorandum for th e Group, Subject: AlternativeCourses·of Action , dated 29 Feb 1968 (TS ).

25·

26.

27·

28.

29·

30.

31.

320

Department of State , Memorandum for the Group , Subject : Checkl is t of

Factors Affecting Alternative Courses of Action , dated 29 Feb 1968 ,j.ni t ial ed by Nicholas deB . Katzenbach (TS-NODIS ) .

W. P. Bundy, Dra f t Memorandulll for the Group, OPe c i t . , 29 Feb 68.

W. P. Bundy, Draf t Memorandum for the Group , Sub ject : Introductory

Paper on Key Elements in th e Situat ion, dated 29 Feb 1968 (TS).

Department of State , "Poss ib le Soviet Responses to Various US Actions

in I ndochina -- Vietnam , Laos and Cambodia ;" "Probable Chinese

Responses to Certain US Courses of Action in Indochina- -Vietnam ,Laos and CSJubodia ;" "Probable Western European Reaction to Various

US Course s of Action in I ndochina - - Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia ," un

dated papers (TS).

Cable , MOSCOVT 2983, 011515Z March 1968, TS-LITERALLY EYES ONLY forUnder Secretary from Ambassador .

W. P. Bundy, r a f t Memorandum, Subj ect : European an d Other Non Asian Reactions to a Major US Force Increas e , dated 1 Mar 1968 (TS) .

W P . Bl1ndy , Dra f t MemorandQm, Subject : Asian Reaction to a Ma jor

U.S. Force Increase , dated 1 Mar 68 (TS) .

';1. P. Dundy, Firs t Draft , Subject :posture, dated 29 Feb 68 (TS ) .

95

Option, on Our Negotiating

TOP SECRET -,Sensit ive






33 . Undated M e m o r a n d u ~ Subject : Viet-Nam Alternatives , signed M.D.T.,

General Taylor took, as the U.S. objective , the statement of~ r e s .

Johnson in his speech a t Johns Hopkins University in Apr i l 1965:

!lOur objective is the independence of South Viet -Nam and i t s freedom

f r om attack . He "Tant nothing for ourselves , only that the people

of South Viet-Nam be allowed to guide their cOlmtry in their own

34.

!lway.

OASD/ SA , Draft Memorandum, Subject:

Alternatives , undated (S).

35 . Ib id .

D e p l o ~ ~ n t s - A Discussion of

36 . OASD/SA , Draft Memorandum, Subject: Pacification Slovldo"m, undated (C)

37· Ibid. , p . 2

38 . OASD / SA , Draft Memorandum, Subject : The Status of RVNAF, undated (TS) .

39· OASD/SA, Draft M e m o r a n d u ~ Subject :29 Feb 1968, pp . 1-2 (TS ) .

Alternative Strategies , dated

40. Ibid . , pp . 2-4.

41- OASD/SA, Draft Memorandum, Subject :undated (TS) .

Data for Analysis of Strategies,

42. Phi l G. Goulding, Draf t Memorandum , Subject : Possible Public Reaction

to Various Alternatives , undate d (TS ) .

43 . Ibid . , p . 5

44. Memorandurn for the President, Subject : Alternative Strategies i nSVN, 1st Draft , 29 Feb 1968 (TS-SENS )

45 . Ibid . , 3rd Draf t , 1 Mar 1968 (TS -SENS )

46. Ibid. , p . 3

47 . ~ . , pp 5-6.

48 . ~ pp. 6-7.

49· I b i ~ . , pp . 8-10.

50 . Ibid. , Annex I I , Alternative Courses of Military Action, pp. 8-100




5 l. Ib id . ,

52. ~ . , 53· Ib id . ,

54. i b i9:' ,

55· Ib id . ,

56. ~ ~ 9 : " 57. ~ . ,




pp. 12-13·

Annex :rr:I, Population Securi ty , p . 15·

p . 16.

pp. 16-17.

Appendix , Strategy by Corps Tact ical Zone, pp . A-3 -

Appendix , Effects of Strategy on In te r ior Provinces ,

p . 2.

A- 8 .

pp. A- l

58. Brig . Gen . Harris W. Holli.s , Director of Operations , ODCSOPS , DA;Memorandum fo r LTG Lem l ey , Subject : CHTCPAC Force ReCluirem,,;nts ,dated 27 Feb 1963 (S); Lt Col Spil le r , ODCSOPS, DA, Supplemental

Information , Subject : MACV ReCluirem::;nts and Major Grol..Uld Forces

Deployment by Option) 1 Mar 1958 (S) .

59. Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA, Memorandum fo r the Secretary

of Defense , Subject : Genera l Wheeler ' s View of the TI·ro Fa ta l

- A-3·

Flaws in the Popu l a t ion Control Strategy, dated 2 Mar . 1968 T S - S ~ T S60. MAC 02951, 020947Z , from General W e s t m o r e l ~ n d to General Wheeler ,

(TS-LTIi.lDIS,EYES ONLY) 0

61. Organization of the Jo in t Chiefs of Staff , Plans an d Policy Directorate ,Short Range Branch, J -5 , Subject : Analysis of COMUSiYlL\.CV Force

ReCluirements and Alterrn t ives , dated 1 :Mar 1968 (TS-SENS ) .

62. Memorandum. fo r the Pres iden t ) 3 Mar Draft (Goulding -\varnke ) ( TS-SENS ) .

63. Ibido, p. 8 .

64 • . l b id . ) pp. 8-10.

65.

66.

Ib id . ) pp. 5-6.

Draft Memorandum fo r the President , 4· Mar 1968 ( TS-SENS) J pp. 1-2.

Ib id . ) Tab A, The Jus t i f ica t ion fo r I lIllll.ediate Addit ional Forces

i-n South Vietnam, pp . 1-2.

97 TOP SECRET - Sensit ive- - - : - - - . --- ---



68 .

70.

7 l.

72.

73·

74.

75·

76.

77 ·

79·

80.

8 l.

82.



"


Ibid. , Tab B, Increasing the Effectiveness of Vietnamese Effortsin-Conjunction "'ith a U.S. Troop In crease , pp. 1-7.

Ibido, Tab C, Just i f i cation f or Increasing th e Strategic Reserve,

w.1- 2 .

Ibid. , Tab D, Necessity for In-Depth Study of Vietnam Policy and

s tra tegic Guidan ce , po 1.

Ib id . , pp. 1-2 •

I b i ~ . , pp . 2-3·

Ibid. , Tab E, Negotia t ing Posture Options , and Possible Diplomat icActions, p. 1.

~ . , pp . 4-6.

~ . , pp. 8-10.

~ . , Tab F, Military Action Against North Vietnamo

Ibid., Tab G, Difficult ie s and Negative Factors in the Course of~ o n ; Tab H, Problems We Can Anticipate in U.S. Public Opinion, p. 4.

CH-3098-68, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject:

C O ~ m S M A C V Force Requirements, dated 8 Y ~ r 68 (TS-SENS ) .

Neil Sheehan and Hedrick Smith, "Westmoreland Requests 206,000 MoreMen, Stirr ing Debate in AdmLDistrat ion, New York Times, 10 Mar 1968,

pp. l , l l .

Joseph R L. Sterne, "War Crit ics Denounce Any Troop Rises,t'

Balt:LnJre Sun, March 8, 1968, po 1; John W. Finney, "Cri t ic ism ofWar Widens in Senate on Build-Up Issue ," Nevl York Ti me s , 8 Mar 68 , p. l .

J oseph R.L . Sterne , "For Different Aims, Russell , Fulbright AskViet Restudy," Ba l timore Sun, 13 March 1968, p. 1.

Ibid.

830 Hand,·rritten notes by Alain Enthoven from meeting with Secretary

, Clifford ,:tvIr . Warnke , Mr. Resor, General lfueeler , 13 :tvlar . 1968. (s)




84.

86 .

88.

90 .

92 .

930

950

97 .




Deputy Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for C h a i r i l l ~ n of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, Subject : Southeast Asia Deployments , dated .14 V18.r 1968. (TS )

Secretary of the Army, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense,

14 Mar 1968 (s) .

Ibid.

Chief of Staff , USA, Memorandum for the Secretary of th e Army ,Subject : Ca ll-Up of Reserves and Program 6 Dep l oyment , dated

14 Mar 1968 .

Al ain Enthoven, Memorandum for the Record, 16 Mar 1968 .

Robert H. Phelps, IIMore U. S. Troops Going to Vietnam," New York Times,

17 ~ B r . 1968 , p . 1.

Joh..n vi . Finney , IIThird of House Wants Review of War Policy,"

Ne"T York Times , 19 Mar . 1968, po 32.

Muriel Dubbin , IjWar Foes Censured by Johnson, I. Baltimore Sun ,

19 Mar . 1968 , p. 10

Stuart H. Loory,

Charl es W. Corddry, ''IoJestmoreland Attains No. 1 Goal , II Baltimore Slm ,

23 Mar . 1968, pp . 1, 25 .

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis ) , Memorandum forSecretary of Defense, Subject: P r o g ~ #6 Sunmary Table (Tentative )(U), dated 23 Mar . 1963, (TS ) .

Mvrray Mardes , "General Abrams , LBJ Confer on Vietnam , II Washington

Post , 27 JVlar . 1968, p. 1; Neil Sheehan, "Gen. Abrams in Capitol,Sees

Presid ent and Aides, " NevT York Times, March 27, 1968, p. 2 .

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Memorandumfor Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, Subject : M ~ C V Requirements, undated, (S ).

Joint Staff, Pacific Division, J -3 , Subject : t ~ C V Troop List , Program6 Add-OD, dat ,}d 28 March 1968 . Corrected 5 Apri l 1968 .

98.- Department of State Message 139431, 30 March 1968 (TS-NODIS LITERALLY

EYES ONLY, FOR AM.EASSADOR· OR CHARGE ).

99 . Remarks of the President to the Nation, March 31 , 1968 .

99 TO P SECRET - Sensitive





. TOP SECRET - Sensitive

100 . Deputy Secretary of Defense , Memorandum for Secretar ies of th eMilitary Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ,Assistant f'2cretar ies of Defense, Subject: Southeast Asia

Deployment Program #6(u), dated 4 April 1968(s) .

101. White House Pre ss Release, 3 April 1968 .

Pentagon Papers Part IV C 6 c

Documents