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8/4/2019 Pentagon Papers Index

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

FINAL REPORT OSDVietnam Task Force & Index


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Declassified per Executive O rd er 13526, Section 3.3NND Project Number: NND 63316 , By: NWD Date: 2011

S8c:::Jef /CCS Regr adin g Action II 35 -71O AT E

OF FICE Or: THE SECRETARY OF DEFEt-tSE REGRADING T I O ~ 23 J U ~ 1 e 197 1, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - - ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ - - - - ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - - ~ ~ ~ ~ - - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - - - - - - - -FROM: Top Secret Control Officer , SecDefl Classi f i ed Control Sect i on , Room 3A948 , ThePen t agon , Washington, D. C. 20301TO: 0tate Department, ATTENTION: Document Control/Sec r ' t Off ' W h' t D Cl Y lcer, as l ng on, 20520

DOCUMENT(TYPe, Ollice oi OrigIn, Date, Subj fie :)

CONTROL"nvm aERMemorandum fo r th e Secretary of Defense , SecDefControl#Thru : ASD/ISA and DASD (Pol i cy Planni ng and 1x-0295/69Arms Cont rol) , OASD I Sh ) , From Cha i rman, OSD.Task Force l si Les l i e H. Ge l b, dated 15Januar y 1969 , Subject : Fi nal Report, OSDViet nam Task Force (U) \.,/ 1 Inclosure : : : : : : : : :I NCLOSURE # 1:Document, Subject : OSD Vi et nam TaskForce Outl i ne of St udi es (U), dtd 10 Januar y1969--- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -/i/ii//III/NOTH ING FOLLowsllllll/IIIIII/I/II/

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I CLASSI FICATION REGRADED TOCONFI DENTIAL UNCLASS IFIED !WHEN SEPARATEI'FROM INCLOSURl

REMAINSCO NF IDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

Document was forwarded to both Mr. Bundy and Katzenback , n 1969I f you have any questions concerning this reg ading action e a s e contactSFC William C. Holzer, US Army, Chief Clerk, : e c D e f l C a s s i f i Control Sec ion, Rm3A948 ,The Pentagon. Phone : OX- 76131

I-: ,TATE

JuL 1 b 1871OFFI f OF - - RITY

Th e doeument(s) listed sbave ha s / have be en regraded and seHan should be taken to mark copies i u r n i s h . e d , v ~ of fice. It i s re -quested that you natiiy al l recipients to whom addit.ional di s t ribution wa s furnished.

T. B. EDWARDS , MAJ , USA , Top Secre t Contro l Offic erP r inted 0' type d n am e of of fi c I a l SI QnLJ ture

S O FORM 375-1 I.I A '( 60 G4 4 7 6 3


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FINAL REPORT - OSD Task Force, Vietnam&

INDEX

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEfENSEWASHINGTON; D.C. 20301

15 January 1969MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,THROUGH: Mr. Paul C. Warnke, ASD/ISA .Dr. Morton R. Halperin, DASD/Policy Planning and Arms Control/ISA

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SUBJECT: Final Report, OSD Vietnam Task Force

On June 17, 1967, Secretary Robert S. McNamara directed that a Task Forcebe formed to study the history of United States involvement in Vietnamfrom World Wr I I to the present. Mr. McNamara's guidance was simply todo studies that were "encyclopedic and objective." With six full-timeprofessionals assigned to the Task Force, we vrere to' complete our work inthree months. A year and a half later , and with the involvement of sixtimes six professionals, we are finally done to the tune of thirty-sevenstudies and f if teen collections of documents contained in forty-three volumes.In the beginning, MY. McNamara gave the Task Force fu l l access to OSD fi les ,and the Task Force received access to CIA materials, and some use of StateDepartment cables and memQranda. We had no access to White House f i les.Our guidance p r o h i b i ~ e d personal interviews with any of the prinCipal partici-pants. .

- The result ioras not so much a documentary history, as a history based solelyon documents -- checked and rechecked with ant-l ike diligence. Pieces ofpaper, formidable and suggestive by e m s e l v e s ~ could have meant much or nothing .Perhaps this document was never sent anywhere, and perhaps that one, thoughcommented upon, was irrelevant. Without the memories of people to t e l l us,we were certain to make mistakes. Yet, using those memories might have beenmisleading as ioTell. This approach to research was bound to lead to distortions,and distortions we are sure abound in these studies.To bring the documents to l i fe , to f i l l in gaps, and just to see what the"outside world" was thinking, we turned to newspapers, periodicals, and books.We never used these sources to supplant the classified documents, but only tosupplement them. And because these documents , sometimes ioTTitten by very clevermen who knew so much and .desired to say only a part and sometimes ioTTitten veryopenly but alsQ contradictorily, are not immediately self-revealing or selfexplanatory, we t r ied both to have a number of researchers look at them andto quote passages l iberal ly. Moreover, when we fe l t we could be challengedwith taking something out of context, we included the whole paper in theDocumentary Record section of the Task Force studies (Parts V and VI. A and B) . Again seeking to fend off inevitable mistakes in interpretation and context,what seemed to us key documents were reviewed and included in several overlapping in substance, but separate, studies.

Ifr.' ..,. ~ 'L .. " " l t V .. ..i .. '_". 4 J .a.--Io4

UNCLASSIfIED 'WHEN SEPARATED FROME N C L O S U R E ~


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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3NND Project Number: NND 63316 , By: NWD Date: 2011

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The people who worked on the Task Force were superb--uniforrnly bright andinterested} although not always versed in the art of research. We had asense of doing something important and of t ~ e need to do i t right. Of course,we a l l had our prejudices and axes to grind and these shine through clearlya t times, but we tried} we think} to suppress or compensate for them.These outstanding people came from everywhere--the military services} State}OSD} and the "think tanks." Some came for a month} for three months} forsix months, and most were unable} given the unhappiness of their superiors}to finish the studies they began. Almost a ll the studies had several authors,each heir dutifully trying to pick up the threads of his predecessor. In a l l ,we had thir ty-six professionals working on these studies, with an average offour months per man.The quality, style and interest of the studies varies considerably. Thepapers in Parts I , II} III} and IV.A} concerning the years 1945 to 1961 tendto be generally non-startling--although there are many interesting t idb i ts .Because many of the documents in this period were lost or not kept (exceptfor the Geneva Conference era) we had to rely more on outside resources.From 1961 onwards (Parts IV.B and C and VI.C)} the records were bountiful,especially on the f i r s t Kennedy year in office} the Diem coup} and on the' subjects of the deployment of ground forces} the decisions surrounding thebombing campaign against North Vietnam} US-GVN relations, and attempts atnegotiating a settlement of the conflict .Almost a l l the studies contain both a Summary and Analysis and a Chronology.The chronologies highlight each important event or action in the monographby means of date} description} and documentary source. The Summary andAnalysis sections, which I wrote, attempt to capture the main themes andfacts of the monographs --and to make some judgments and speculations whichmayor may not appear in the text i tse lf . The monographs themselves stick,by and large} to the documents and do not tend to be analytical.

":-.Writing hist017} especially where i t blends into current events, especiallywhere that current event is Vietnam} is a treacherous exercise. We couldno t go into the minds of the decision-makers, we were not present at thedeCisions, and we often could not t e l l whether something happened becausesomeone decided i t , decided against i t , or most l ikely because i t unfoldedfrom the situation. History, to me, has been expressed by a passage fromHerman Melville's Moby Dick where he writes: "This is a world of chance,free will , and necessity -- alL interweavingly working together as one;chance by turn rules either and has the l as t featuring blow a t events."Our studies have t r ied to reflect this thought; inevitably in the organizing. and writing process, they appear to assign more and less to men and freewil l than was the case.

~ \ i ..Encl - Outline of Studies LESLIE H. GELBChairman, OSD Task Force

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OSD VIETNAM TASK FORCE

OUTLINE OF S':ru1)IES

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INDEX (1 Vo 1 )I . Vietnam and the U.S., 1940-1950 (1 Vol.)

A. u.S. Policy, 1940-50B. The Character and Power of th e Viet MinhC. Ho Chi Minh: Asian Tito7I I . U.S. Involvement in th e Franco-Viet Minh War, 1950-1954 (1 V 0 1 . )

A. U.S., France and Vietnamese NationalismB. Toward a Negotiated SettlementI I I . The Geneva Accords (1 V o l . )

A. U.S. Military Planning and Diplomatic ManeuverB. Role and Obligations of State of VietnamC. Viet Minh Position and Sino-Soviet StrategyD. The Intent of the Geneva Accordsrv . Evolution of the War (26; Vols.)

A. U.S. MAP for Diem: The Eisenhower Commitments, 1954-1960 (5 Vols.)1. NA'ID and SEATO: A Comparison j2. Aid for France in Indochina, 1 9 5 0 - 5 43. U.S. and France's Withdrawal from "Vietnam, 1954-56"/4 U S. Training of Vietnamese National Army, 1954-59 . / .5 Origins of the Insurgency - /

B., Counterinsurgency: The Kennedy Commitments, 1961-1963 (5 Vols.)1 . The Kennedy Commitments and Programs, 1961/2. Strategic Hamlet Program, 1961-63 "/3. The Advisory Build-up, 1961-67 /4. Phased Withdrawal of U.S. Forces in Vietnam, 1962-64--"5. The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, May-Nov. 1963

C. Direct Action: The Johnson Commitments, 1964-1968 (16 Vols.)1 . U S. Programs in South Vietnam, November 1963-April 1965: /

NSAM 273 -- NSAM 288 -- Honolulu. 2. Military Pressures Against." NVN (3 Vols.)a. February - June 1964b. July - October 1964 ./c. November - December 1964 V /.J . ROLLllfG THUNDER Program Begins: January - June 1965


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Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Section 3.3NND Project Number: NND 633 16 . By: NWD Date: 2011

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4. Marine Combat Units Go to DaNang, March 1965 /5. Phase I in the Build-Up of U.S. Forces: March - July 1965 /6. u.s. Ground Strategy and Force Deployments: 1965 - 1967 (3 Vols.)a . Volun:e I : Phase I I , Program 3, Program 4 . /b. Volume I I : Program 5 / 'c. Volume I I I : Program 6 ../7. Air War in the North: 1965 - 1968 (2 Vols)

a . Volume I ./b. Volun:e 11 ./8. Re-emphasis on Pacificat ion: 1965-1967 ./9. U.S.-GVN Relat ions (2 Vols.)a. Volume 1: December 1963 : June 1965 ../b . Volume 2: July ' 1965 - December 1967 /10. Stat i s t ica l Survey of the War, North and South: 1965 - 1967 ' /

V. Jus t i f ica t ion of t he War (1 1 Vols.)A. Public Statements (2 Vols.)

Volume I : A--The Truman Administra t ion }B--The Eisenhower Administration /.C--The Kennedy Administration

Volume I I : D--The Johnson AdministrationB. Internal Docun:ents (9 Vol s . )

l .2.

3

The Roosevelt Administra t ionThe Truman Administra t ion: (2 Vols.)a . Volun:e I : 1945-1949b. Volume I I : 1950-1952The Eisenhower Administration: (4 Vols.)a . Volume I : 1953 . . /

.. ..b. Volume I I : 1954-Geneva vi'c. Volume I I I : Geneva Accords 15 March 1956 ./d. Volume IV: 1956 French Withdrawal - 1960 /'4. The Kennedy Administration (2 Vola.)Book IBook I IVI . Set tlement of the Confl ict (6 Vols.)

A. Negotiat ions, 1965-67: The Public RecordB. Negotiations, 1965-67: Announced Position Statements . , /C. Histor ies of Contacts (4 Vola.)

1 . 1965-19662. Polish Track3.4. Moscow-London Track1967-1968'" LESLIE H. GELBChairman, OSD Task Force


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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 .3NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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