Experimentation Policy In Managing Forest Uses Game Theory Indonesia has many natural resources in its land and its sea. The natural resources are used to fulfill Indonesian’s requirement. It consists of two kinds are renewable natural resource and unrenewable natural resource. One of renewable natural resources is forest. Forest managing involves many stakeholders who have different purpose in the process. Each stakeholder wants to get maximum benefit from the forest, and it has acces to the forest. It is needed to get good managing and good using in order to it can reach its suistainable. In managing process of forest, we usually find some problems, and it can cause conflicts. The conflicts have to be solved, and it is found for the solution. The solution could be a policy which is applied in true condition and is accepted by all stakeholders. The solution will decide managing system and natural resource condition. The indicator of natural resource condition which managed well is from its sustainability. If it is sustain that is meant managing system same as the policy. The policy can be made of government. The effective government policy will considere natural resources in social, economic and enviroment side. One way to make sure the policy is effective and exact, we can use simulation non-computerized tool. That is a Landscape Game. Landscape Game can use to show how should
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Experimentation Policy In Managing Forest Uses Game Theory
Indonesia has many natural resources in its land and its sea. The natural resources
are used to fulfill Indonesian’s requirement. It consists of two kinds are renewable
natural resource and unrenewable natural resource. One of renewable natural resources
is forest.
Forest managing involves many stakeholders who have different purpose in the
process. Each stakeholder wants to get maximum benefit from the forest, and it has
acces to the forest. It is needed to get good managing and good using in order to it can
reach its suistainable. In managing process of forest, we usually find some problems,
and it can cause conflicts.
The conflicts have to be solved, and it is found for the solution. The solution
could be a policy which is applied in true condition and is accepted by all stakeholders.
The solution will decide managing system and natural resource condition. The indicator
of natural resource condition which managed well is from its sustainability. If it is
sustain that is meant managing system same as the policy. The policy can be made of
government. The effective government policy will considere natural resources in social,
economic and enviroment side.
One way to make sure the policy is effective and exact, we can use simulation
non-computerized tool. That is a Landscape Game. Landscape Game can use to show
how should manage forest to get sustainability. Landscape Game is a game which
combain system between Monopoli and Snake Ladder. It gives learning about how to
Notes : Player A = student of Forest Faculty Bogor Agriculture University Player B = student of Forest Faculty Bogor Agriculture University Player C = student of Forest Faculty Bogor Agriculture University Player D = student of Economic and Management Faculty Bogor Agriculture University
In first repetition, four players and bankir are student of Bogor Agriculture
University. As government is a lecture of Forest Faculty Bogor Agriculture University.
The winner in first repetition is player C and he has total of money 451Þ, whereas
player A gets total money which is the lowest 295Þ.
Player C wins the game because he has 4 carbon investments, 1 ecotourism
Total money 126Þ 80Þ 124Þ 25ÞNotes : Pemain A = student of Forest Faculty Bogor Agriculture University
Pemain B = student of Stock Faculty Bogor Agriculture UniversityPemain C = student of Economic and Management Faculty Bogor Agriculture UniversityPemain D = student of Forest Faculty Bogor Agriculture University
The players all in the second repetition are student of Forest Faculty, Stock
Faculty, Economic and Management Faculty Bogor Agriculture University whereas, the
government is a student of Forest Faculty. The second repetition is won by player A
with total money that is 126Þ. Player D gets the lowest of total money is 25Þ.
Player A wins the game because he has good strategy. He has 1 carbon
Total money 223Þ 157Þ 114Þ 270ÞNotes : Player A = delegation of LMDH KPH Bogor
Player B = student of Forest Faculty Bogor Agriculture UniversityPlayer C = non government organiziationactivistPlayer D = delegation of Perhutani Bogor
Players in third repetition are different than two repetitions because they are
stakeholders in actually forest managing. Players consists of student of Forest Faculty
Bogor Agriculture University, non government organiziationactivist, delegation of
Perhutani Bogor, delegation of LMDH KPH Bogor and the government is delegation
from Bogor Forest Department. Player D wins the third repetition and he gets 270 Þ for
total money. In other side, player C looses and gets only 114 Þ for total money.
Player D wins the game because he chooses 3 ecotourism investments, and 5
acacia investments. Total asset’s palyer D and cash money’s player D are 106 Þ and 164
Þ. Player C has 2 albizia and ecotourism investments, 3 carbon investments, and 1
biodiesel investments. His total assets is 92 Þ and his cash money is 22 Þ.
2. Government Policy
Strategy is done by players in each repetition which is different. It is depended on
goverment policy that is applied. The policy is depended on managing land use pattern
and competition of players.
Tabel 4 Government PoliciesUlangan Kebijakan Pemerintah
II All investment have tax about 5 – 40%Drinking water is mine of governmentInvestment in settlement area is forbidden except ecoutourism and albiziaForest logging is near drinking water source and river which has tax 40%Biodiesel and albizia investments get incentive from governmentDelimitation of forest logging investments is done by increasing return tax that is 20%Giving incentive for player who has carbon invesment more 3
V Return tax is accounted from actual returnInvestment tax for biodiesel, minning and teak are 40%, 45% and 25%, whereasalbizia and acacia are 30% and 20%Carbon investments tax is free
VI Investment in settlement area does not get permissionPlayer who pass in carbon investment which mine of other player must pay 1 ÞPlayer who is in ecotourism investment which mine of other player must pay 2ÞMinning investment is far from street which is forbiddenTax of investment is various about 10% - 20%
Discussion
1. Player strategy and government policy in Landscape Game
Natural resources is consist of renewable natural resource and unrenewable
natural resource. Forest is included in renewable natural resource and it needs complex
managing. Managing of forest in Indonesia is based on authority princip and useful
princip. It is in Indonesia Constitution of 1945 section 33 subsection 3. “Government is
authority for natural resource including forest and it is used for citizen welfare”
According to Law Number 41 Year 1999 regarding Forestry section 4 subsection
(1) stated that all the forests in the territory of the Republic of Indonesia, including the
natural resources contained within it is controlled by the state. In subsection (2) state in
this case the government can establish and manage the planning, the designation,
provision and use of forests in accordance with its function in providing benefits to the
people and country. It can be stated in the form of government policy.
. Forest management involves many stakeholders who have access to the forest.
Management and utilization of forest resources to consider the balance and
sustainability. Stakeholders consist of businesses in the forestry sector can be a
company or individual, forestry academics, NGOs engaged in environment or forestry,
forest villages and communities around the government as a policymaker.
Landscape Game can be used as a non-computerized simulation of forest
management in the real world. Landscape Game gives an explanation of learning about
the management and landscape conservation, environmental services, the choice of
investment and trade, competition and collaboration and approach to the achievement of
"Nash equilibrium" situation in which every action or choice of optimal player strategy
(Purnomo, 2008). This game can also be used as a model for stakeholders to learn about
the impact of policies that apply to forest resource management activities that occur
trigger competition and the dynamics of land use policies.
A player is an agent that makes decisions in a game (Turocy et al., 2001). Players
can perform a variety of investments in the land where he is. Players can also perform
transactions with other players and the bank. In addition, players can also negotiate with
the government policies that is applied.
Landscape Game requires a strategy to win the game by maximizing profits
without forgetting the ecological and social sustainability. A strategy is not just a list of
alternative actions can be taken by the player, however, describe how the actions of the
player depends on what he observes the other players in game action (Romp 1997).
The strategy replicates performed on each game player is a response to the
measures taken by the government. Conflict and cooperation in the game is a study in
game theory. The concept of game theory can be applied when the actions of the players
depend on each other. So the concept of game theory to formulate, analyze and
understand the scenario of existing strategies (Turocy et al., 2001).
Strategy taken by the players on the three replications varies greatly depending on
the pattern of the game, the competition among the players and the government policies
issued. There are several common strategies undertaken by the players on the three
replications. Players who win the game choose a low-cost investments but give high
yields such as logging, acacia, oilpalm and albizia. This strategy looks at the third
replications of the game. Courage to invest is also seen in the first and second repetition.
Another investment strategy used to win the Landscape Game is to choose investments
that apply the fee system for the past investments such as ecotourism or carbon. This
strategy can be used to note that the policy issued by the government contributed to the
choice of strategy. This strategy is used by players to win the game in the first test,
second, and third.
Meanwhile, the strategy is used to win the last game that is the player to choose
Landscape investments that earn incentives from the government. The strategy is chosen
by the players because of government policies that will provide incentives to certain
investments. This strategy is carried out by the players on every test except repeat the
third game. Players who had caused the defeat did not dare to invest and take risks in
debt to the banks when capital began to thin. This happens on the first repetition, second
and third. Besides losing players due to the selection of investment with low cost and
the amount of investment only slightly. It is located on the second and third repetition.
Another strategy that led to losing the player is throwing the dice that falls on an
existing cell investment. This leads to lost opportunities to invest player. This incident
was the first and third repetition. Decision to invest in the wrong time can also result in
a player losing. For example, an investment which takes two cycles (teak) to obtain new
results when the game has been invested through one cycle. This occurred in secon
repitition.
Strategy is chosen by the player which is also influenced by the type of policies
adopted by the government. In the Landscape Game, there are three types of
government policy that is Eco-Facism, Enviromentalism and Eco-populism. Each game
has a different government in policy making for several reasons such as patterns
influenced the game, the competition among the players and the strategy are chosen by
the player.
Type of government policy on the first and third test have in common is
Enviromentalism wing leaning government Eco-Facism. This type of government to
preserve the forest resources in order to sustain the economy. Investment and gift tax
assessment are done so that the government has increased revenue from the
management of forest resources. Mastery of the drinking water source by government
restrictions and high taxes for investments in logging and banning the opening of the
mine away from the street is an act to preserve forest resources.
The flow of government policy Enviromentalism leaning Eco-populism can be
seen in the second repetition. Type of government policy on the repetition preserves the
forest resources in order to sustain the economy but also think about people's interests.
Type Enviromentalism visible policy of the government policy in determining the tax
imposed higher taxes to close the road investment and tourism investment restrictions.
Eco-populism policy type is seen in government policy in providing incentives for
investment in land mosaics and higher taxes to invest close to residential areas.
Government to test the game first and the third has a different flow of the Eco-
leaning populism Enviromentalism and Eco-populism. The first replication the type of
game on Eco-populism visible policy of banning investment in a residential area by
reason of the existence of disturbing public investment. Tax assessment for all types of
investments included in Enviromentalism policy. The second repetition game types of
government policies Eco-wing populism because the government uses taxes for the
welfare of the people and the settlement of investment prohibited by reason of a society
of social control in forest management.
2. The First Repetition
In second repetition the game, four players and a banker are students of the
Faculty of Forestry and Faculty of Economics, Management, Bogor Agricultural
University with a lecturer from the Faculty of Forestry, Bogor Agricultural University
who acted as the government. Player C can win the game because it is very brave to
invest. This is indicated by always investing in the cell where the player C to stop.
Investment choices made by the player C as carbon, eco-tourism, logging, oilpalm and
albizia. The investment cost is not too expensive but the results will be obtained after
one big round. This is consistent with the basic assumption of game theory in Romp
(1997), namely rationality. Rationality assumes that each player will maximize its
profits in the current situation by making rational decisions. Government policy that sets
all investments are taxed 10% except for logging, 15% for mining, 20% for ecotourism
and biodiessel is not taxed also influence the investment choices the player C.
Logging and mining taxes are high because of the environmental impact of the
management. Impact of mining activities that change the physical form of land resulting
in considerable environmental degradation such as loss of topsoil due to soil excavation
process, erosion, water pollution and soil by chemicals used during the mining process
and waste grounds. Pulp waste or tailings are usually referred to scour stone is usually
collected through piled or dumped into rivers that lead into shallow rivers and flooding.
In addition, the tailings can also pollute the river that would disrupt the ecosystem of the
river (Malelak 2009).
When the player is less interested in investing logging because of high taxes and
lower government logging tax to 10%. The government hopes that with the passing of
the tax can motivate players to invest so that logging of forest resources can be utilized
to the fullest. Although logging gives a great damage to the environment but the
government argues that the forest should be utilized for the welfare of the people.
According to Elias (2008) of timber and non timber would be beneficial if they can be
issued and sold to consumers or used as raw material in processing plants.
Player C is the most of income earned from investments albizia which amounts 4
and the result per invesment is 74 Þ. Government policies that allow investment in
residential albizia and incentives for players who invest the trigger player C for
investing. This is consistent with the basic assumption of game theory in Romp (1997),
namely interdependence. Government policy is encouraging land management that is
participatory. Residential land is a mosaic of forest areas, agricultural land, the
ownership of land is defined on the basis of high population density and natural forest
management often can not compete with agriculture (Chomitzs et al., 2007). Providing
incentives for investment albizia and biodiessel. Jatropha is a tax exemption for
government measures to encourage land use and management of participatory mosaic.
According to the regulations of the Minister of Forestry No. POI/Menhut-II/2004 on the
Empowerment of Local Communities in the Context of Social Forestry section 2
describes the empowerment of local communities in and around forests is to increase
the capacity and independence of the community in a forest with the aim to improve the
welfare of local communities and the realization of sustainable forest management.
. A total of money players get the lowest in second repetition because of the
investment made slightly when compared to other players. A few players of reason to
invest because player A does not dare to spend money runs out, and eventually led to
his capital he should owe to the bank. Type of investment chosen by player A is actually
a low-cost investment with high returns such as acacia, logging, oil and ecotourism. But
because their numbers are small and often through ecotourism A player other players
who have to pay a fee to owners of investment led to the player A has the lowest total
money after the game ends.
Type of investment chosen by player A is actually a low-cost investment with
high returns such as acacia, logging, oil and ecotourism. But because their numbers are
small and often through ecotourism A player other players who have to pay a fee to
owners of investment led to the player A has the lowest total money after the game
ends.
When a player D stops at cell 52 which is a source of water and want to invest the
government does not approve it. Source of water is a public good and all the people are
very dependent on the water so as to avoid the privatization of water resources by the
players, the government issued a policy that the water source controlled by the
government and every player who stopped in the cell 52 must pay 2Þ to the government
that is obligated to pay for the use of water resources. This is in accordance with the
Article 33, section 3 of the 1945 "Earth and water and natural resources contained
within it are under the state and utilized for the welfare of the people". So the only water
resource management by the government, as a consequence of state responsibility to the
people. Availability of water which tends to decrease with increasing water needs of
water resource management requires attention to the preservation of the social,
environmental and economic (Riyanto 2008). Obligations for players who quit in the
cell 52 to pay 2Þ to the government in line with Law no. 7 of 2004 on Water Resources
Article 26, subsection (7) "utilization of water resources carried out by emphasizing the
social function to achieve justice by paying attention to the principles of water use and
water resource management services by involving the community". In addition, the
government also issued a tax policy logging near water sources and flow of water to
40%. This is not to protect the water sources so that water quality is awake and able to
meet people's needs for water. According Chomitzs et al. (2007) state in this case the
government needs to decide who has the right to manage resources and how big a role
the government to regulate these rights in order to protect the public interest.
Efforts to achieve ecological sustainability by looking from the issuance of
government policy on logging restrictions by increasing the logging tax to 20% from
10% for players who have an investment logging> 2 and the provision of incentives to
players who have a carbon investment> 3. In addition to thinking about the welfare of
the people, the government also seeks to achieve ecological sustainability. Some theory
and evidence suggests that deforestation can cause changes in weather patterns locally
and globally, flood, smoke pollution, and reduce the availability and quality of water.
Direct economic benefits from forest conservation such as pollination and pest control
may be very large but visible in the mosaic of land, there is no physical or economic
calculations are clear about it (Chomitzs et al., 2007).
Based on the policies made by government policies including the type of
government into a stream of skewed Eviromentalism Eco-Facism. Enviromentalism
became clear in setting tax policy on the utilization of the resources that will be used for
public welfare. Natural resource conservation policy can be seen from the water source
is controlled by the government, tax and logging around the source of water flow by
40% and limiting the amount of investment logging. Eco-Facism embodied in natural
resources to protect the investment restrictions and high taxes.
3. The Second Repetition
In second repetition players are from the Faculty of Forestry, Faculty of Animal
Science and Faculty of Economics and Management. Government is a student at the
Faculty of Forestry, Bogor Agricultural University. The player who wins the game is
player A. Player A is in early round games and he invest albizia and ecotourism.
Ecotourism investment in second repetition are charged a fee for 15Þ. Therefore, player
A invests ecotourism because of the money gained from tourism levy large and small
investment cost of 10Þ. A player's strategy choice is choosing to invest ecotourism is
also supported by government policy that sets a 10% tourism tax.
Ecotourism is taxed because of charges that are determined according to the
consensus player of 15Þ also. Utilization of forest concessions in the form of nature
tourism should be conducted with not a lot of damage potential and its beauty in order
to obtain the maximum benefit and sustainable (Riyanto 2008). Based on the Decree of
the Minister of Forestry No. 441/Kpts-II/1990, contributions of business on the business
activities in the nature conservation area is 6% of the turnover of the relevant financial
year.
Government policy is set at 30% albizia tax on the grounds where the investment
is located near the settlement of the well-being must be considered. In the mosaic of
land, agriculture and forests are located close together, the challenge is to ensure that
land managers already take into account the benefits of forest maintenance for people
living in the vicinity (Chomitzs et al., 2007).
A player also has a carbon investment because of government tax relief for
investment in carbon. Government investment liberate carbon from the tax because they
support government policies in the development of land management practices that are
environmentally friendly. According to the FAO in the FWI (2001) land cover changes
produce more carbon than saving it, thus giving a big contribution to the warming
global. Based on studies conducted by the Faculty of Forestry, Bogor Agricultural
University (1999) in FWI (2001) concluded that the economic theory of biodiversity
and carbon storage currently far exceeds the revenue earned from timber production.
When the money starts running low A players he decided to take on debt to the
bank of 100Þ and successfully restore it. A player willing to take risks in order to
continue to invest in the next round. The money from loans used to invest in logging
and mining that gives great results, namely the 50 Þ and 75 Þ. The Government set a
high tax for logging and mining which is 20% and 45% for both the investment
detrimental impact on the environment. This is in accordance with the opinion Chomitz
et al. (2007) which states that the impact of forest loss causes floods, smoke pollution
and declining water availability and quality.
Player D actually has a number of investment more than player A. In the initial
round of player D with the cost of investing teak 60 Þ and give the results after 2 cycles.
In addition to investing teak, player D is also investing logging and oil palm. Because
capital is less then the player D to the bank to borrow money at 100 Þ. Player D in the
next round of investment through ecotourism's a lot of other players. So he must pay a
fee for each ecotourism 15 Þ passed. On lap-8 player D back into debts to the bank at
100 Þ. Players D does not get a true return true because the game ends before reaching
the two cycles. But if the identity of up to 2 cycles of D player will get a result at 150 Þ.
Although the total value of the assets but as a player D has an unpaid debt, the total
money in the end only the 25 Þ game.
On second repetition of this long debate between the players and the government.
In the early determination of the tax, the government did not explain that the tax was
calculated from the results after reinvestment. Players who objected to the way the
calculation of trying to negotiate for reduced taxes, however, insisted the government
would not reduce the amount of tax. Finally, it was agreed that the tax is not reduced
but, calculated from the gross proceeds. This is a reflection of real life, government
regulations often not socialized before applied so often overlapping forest resource
management rights with other interests.
Type of government policies including the flow Enviromentalism Eco-leaning
populism. Government policies that environmentalism looks great and the tax
assessment is calculated from the net but, finally calculated from the gross proceeds.
Determination albizia high taxes because of its proximity to the settlement led to
government policies biased toward the type of Eco-populism.
4. The Third Repetition
Players at third repetition is different the previous two replicates for the
stakeholders in forest management in the real world. Players consisted of students of the
Faculty of Forestry, Bogor Agricultural University, Bogor Perhutani KPH, KPH Bogor
LMDH community, NGOs, while the government is representative of the Department of
Plantation and Forestry Bogor
Player D wins the game because it has a lot of investment acacia and ecotourism.
Player D prefer investing acacia than other investments because they thought that the
demand for wood is high and good quality wood is acacia. In addition, a large acacia
provides a cost benefit must be paid a small investment. Investment in land of mosaic
has great results when compared with the core forest and forest edge. This is due to
investment in the mosaic of land devoted to production. Government policy is set at
10% acacia taxes also affect the selection of investment by player D. The tax is used to
finance the government budget in carrying out their duties, the construction of public
facilities and infrastructure.
A reason players choose ecotourism investment because of low investment cost,
using the forest without having to change its physical form and generate a lot of money.
Government policy on the provision of a player who quit on ecotourism investments are
charged a fee by the other players also support the 2Þ player A invests ecotourism. This
is done by the government to provide motivation for players to want to invest in
ecotourism because players tend to choose investments that generate carbon levy every
player who passes by. Genesis is a portrait of real world events that the entrepreneurs
are reluctant to invest in tourism because of the complicated licensing and infrastructure
costs are large (Riyanto 2008).
Player C get a total cash investment as low as a result many choose low as
biodiesel, carbon and eco-tourism. Investment is only giving a yield of 2th-8th so it
does not really affect the amount of money earned by the player C. Although the results
of low carbon investment, player C still choose the investment because of government
policies that determine the amount of levy 1th for other players who belong to the
carbon investment over other players. 1Þ magnitude as the amount of tax levy not more
than 10%. This is in accordance with the Decree of the Minister of Forestry Number
441/Kpts-II/1990 which states that the contribution of business on the business of
business activities in the nature conservation area which is 6% of the turnover of the
relevant financial year. Determination of the policy also aims to encourage the players
to invest without having to change the physical form of the forest.
Another policy adopted by the government is banning investments in residential
areas and mining investment away by road. The prohibition in residential areas aim to
protect society and prevent land disputes. According to Chomitz et al. (2007) challenges
beyond the agricultural frontier is to recognize and maintain the certainty of the rights of
indigenous people that they already have for a long time and keep the conflict from the
seizure of property rights when those limits are set. Mining investments have much by
way of the high investment cost of having to open the forest area and create
infrastructure that can cause harm to the environment. Coordination in regional
development interventions by government such as the construction of the road network
is intended to minimize the gap between the goals of environmental and human
livelihoods (Chomitz et al., 2007).
Type of government policy, including Environmentalism flow skew Eco-Facism.
Government policies skewed Eco-Facism environmentalism can be seen from the
determination of the tax, the tax on gifts and the prohibition of mining investment away
from roads.
Conclusion
Landscape in the form of non computerized tools can effectively present their
game dynamics of forest resource management in real life.
Strategies is needed to win the game that is to choose low-cost investment but
have high yield such as logging, acacia, oilpalm, and albizia. In addition, players
courage to take risks and take advantage of every opportunity to invest as well be one
strategy to win the game. Type of investment chosen will affect the productivity and
sustainability of the land.
Type of effective government policy for the management of forest resources is a
leaning Enviromentalism Eco-Facism that the end condition is more sustainable
landscape at the end of the game
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