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G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974

ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner,vs.HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of NegrosOccidental, Branch I, Silay City, respondent.

Adelino H. Ledesma in his own behalf.

Hon. Rafael C. Climaco in his own behalf.

FERNANDO, J .: p

What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent Judge denying a motion filedby petitioner to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio . 1 One of the grounds for such a motionwas his allegation that with his appointment as Election Registrar by the Commission on Elections, hewas not in a position to devote full time to the defense of the two accused. The denial by respondentJudge of such a plea, notwithstanding the conformity of the defendants, was due "its principal effect[being] to delay this case." 2 It was likewise noted that the prosecution had already rested and thatpetitioner was previously counsel de parte , his designation in the former category being precisely toprotect him in his new position without prejudicing the accused. It cannot be plausibly asserted thatsuch failure to allow withdrawal of de oficio counsel could ordinarily be characterized as a graveabuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. There is, however, the overriding concern for the right tocounsel of the accused that must be taken seriously into consideration. In appropriate cases, it shouldtilt the balance. This is not one of them. What is easily discernible was the obvious reluctance ofpetitioner to comply with the responsibilities incumbent on the counsel de oficio . Then, too, even onthe assumption that he continues in his position, his volume of work is likely to be very much less atpresent. There is not now the slightest pretext for him to shirk an obligation a member of the bar, who

expects to remain in good standing, should fulfill. The petition is clearly without merit.

According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed Election Registrarfor the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he commenced todischarge its duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the salaof respondent Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge denysuch motion, but he also appointed him counsel de oficio for the two defendants. Subsequently, onNovember 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio ,premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on thevolume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately thedefense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied said motion. A

motion for reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding. 3

As noted at the outset, the petition must fail.

1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent motion of petitioner to withdraw ascounsel de oficio speaks for itself. It began with a reminder that a crime was allegedly committed onFebruary 17, 1962, with the proceedings having started in the municipal court of Cadiz on July 11,1962. Then respondent Judge spoke of his order of October 16, 1964 which reads thus: "In view ofthe objection of the prosecution to the motion for postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging thatcounsel for the accused cannot continue appearing in this case without the express authority of theCommission on Elections); and since according to the prosecution there are two witnesses who are

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ready to take the stand, after which the government would rest, the motion for postponement isdenied. When counsel for the accused assumed office as Election Registrar on October 13, 1964, heknew since October 2, 1964 that the trial would be resumed today. Nevertheless, in order not toprejudice the civil service status of counsel for the accused, he is hereby designated counsel de oficiofor the accused. The defense obtained postponements on May 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June 14,1963, October 28, 1963, November 27, 1963, February 11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964 July26, 1964, and September 7, 1964." 4 Reference was then made to another order of February 11,1964: "Upon petition of Atty. Adelino H. Ledesma, alleging indisposition, the continuation of the trial ofthis case is hereby transferred to March 9, 1964 at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is reminded thatat its instance, this case has been postponed at least eight (8) times, and that the governmentwitnesses have to come all the way from Manapala." 5 After which, it was noted in such order thatthere was no incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to the accused and to the court and theperformance of his task as an election registrar of the Commission on Elections and that the ends of

justice "would be served by allowing and requiring Mr. Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio ,since the prosecution has already rested its case." 6

2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly mindful of his obligation ascounsel de oficio . He ought to have known that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened withconditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes in the profession, being

appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. For those holding such belief, it may come as asurprise that counsel of repute and of eminence welcome such an opportunity. It makes even moremanifest that law is indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It isunderstandable then why a high degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so designated. A recentstatement of the doctrine is found in People v. Daban : 7 "There is need anew in this disciplinaryproceeding to lay stress on the fundamental postulate that membership in the bar carries with it aresponsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft. Thoseenrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of theState, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of anindigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his servicesare rendered without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary.

This is not, of course, to ignore that other pressing matters do compete for his attention. After all, hehas his practice to attend to. That circumstance possesses a high degree of relevance since a lawyerhas to live; certainly he cannot afford either to neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what isincumbent upon him as counsel de oficio must be fulfilled." 8

So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa , 9 where respondent was de oficio counsel, the opinion penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This Court should exact from itsofficers and subordinates the most scrupulous performance of their official duties, especially whennegligence in the performance of those duties necessarily results in delays in the prosecution ofcriminal cases ...." 10 Justice Sanchez in People v. Estebia 11 reiterated such a view in these words: "Itis true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as such counsel de oficio , he has as

high a duty to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant himself. Because, as in the caseof the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the person assignedto his care. He is to render effective assistance. The accused-defendant expects of him due diligence,not mere perfunctory representation. For, indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justiceis expected to have a bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of self-interest." 12

The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.

3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to the apprehension thatconsidering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the welfare ofthe accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel could in effect be rendered nugatory. Its

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importance was rightfully stressed by Chief Justice Moran in People v. Holgado in these words: "Incriminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heardby counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard bycounsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law,particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he may be convicted not because he isguilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen moreeasily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted bycounsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented thatunder rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have anattorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential thatthe court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonabletime to procure an attorney of hisown." 13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts. 14 The present Constitution is even moreemphatic. For, in addition to reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himselfand counsel," 15 there is this new provision: "Any person under investigation for the commission of anoffense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. Noforce, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be usedagainst him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence." 16

Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an accused.Such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw as counsel deoficio . For he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the task entrusted to him, to putmatters mildly. He did point though to his responsibility as an election registrar. Assuming his goodfaith, no such excuse could be availed now. There is not likely at present, and in the immediatefuture, an exorbitant demand on his time. It may likewise be assumed, considering what has been setforth above, that petitioner would exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel withcompetence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of theprofession in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legalpractitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takesprecedence over the promptings of self-interest.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.

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litigations ensued concerning the position of administrator, to which, in so far as they are pertinent tothe present case, reference will be made later in this decision.

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui,one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960 thethen incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a"convenio" entered into between them and embodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice ofeither the "convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the position.

Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the plaintiff wrote a letter to thedefendant demanding that the office be turned over to him; and on 13 September 1960, the demandnot having been complied with the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case. Romulo Cui later onintervened, claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of thenephews mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio in their deed of donation.

As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications to theposition of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equal circumstances wouldbe preferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be,

applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephewstherein named, "que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta deestos titulos el que pague al estado mayor impuesto o contribucion."

The specific point in dispute is the mealing of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui holds thedegree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a member ofthe Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the otherhand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 (administrativecase No. 141), was reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10 February 1960, about two weeksbefore he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio de Barili .

The Court a quo , in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de abogado,"taken alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer, but that has used in the deed of donation andconsidering the function or purpose of the administrator, it should not be given a strict interpretationbut a liberal one," and therefore means a law degree or diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling isassailed as erroneous both by the defendant and by the intervenor.

We are of the opinion, that whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado" means notmere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after dueadmission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. In Spanish the word "titulo" is defined as"testimonies o instrumento dado para ejercer un empleo, dignidad o profesion" (Diccionario de laLengua Española, Real Academia Espanola, 1947 ed., p. 1224) and the word "abogado," as follows:

"Perito en el derecho positivo que se dedica a defender en juicio, por escrito o de palabra, losderechos o intereses de los litigantes, y tambien a dar dictmen sobre las cuestiones o puntos legalesque se le consultan ( Id ., p.5) A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completionof certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. TheEnglish equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and generalsignification, and has reference to that class of persons who are by license officers of the courts,empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities andliabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.

In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of theSupreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar examinations, taking

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the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being his license topractice the profession. The academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do withadmission to the Bar, except as evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to theexaminations has "successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university,officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this purpose, however, possession of thedegree itself is not indispensable: completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in some otherway. Indeed there are instances, particularly under the former Code of Civil Procedure, wherepersons who had not gone through any formal legal education in college were allowed to take the Barexaminations and to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required possession of "thenecessary qualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that suchpersons do not possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic degree of Bachelorof Laws from some law school or university.

The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing test advisely,and provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator should be a doctor or acivil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be the one who pays thehighest taxes among those otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first of all, because under Act No. 3239 themanagers or trustees of the Hospicio shall "make regulations for the government of said institution(Sec. 3, b); shall "prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids and incapacitated and destitute

persons may be admitted to the institute" (Sec. 3, d); shall see to it that the rules and conditionspromulgated for admission are not in conflict with the provisions of the Act; and shall administerproperties of considerable value — for all of which work, it is to be presumed, a working knowledge ofthe law and a license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset.

Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to theoffice of administrator. But it is argued that although the latter is a member of the Bar he isnevertheless disqualified by virtue of paragraph 3 of the deed of donation, which provides that theadministrator may be removed on the ground, among others, of ineptitude in the discharge of hisoffice or lack of evident sound moral character. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant wasdisbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 for immorality and unprofessional conduct. It is also a fact,

however, that he was reinstated on 10 February 1960, before he assumed the office of administrator.His reinstatement is a recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required forhis admission to the Bar in the first place.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted andapproved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to provetheir case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the sound discretionof the court. The court action will depend, generally speaking, on whether or not it decides thatthe public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will be conserved by the

applicant's participation therein in the capacity of an attorney and counselor at law. Theapplicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the court that he is a person ofgood moral character — a fit and proper person to practice law. The court will take intoconsideration the applicant's character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature andcharacter of the charge for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment,and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement. (5

Am. Jur., Sec. 301, p. 443)

Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to reinstatement,notwithstanding the attorney has received a pardon following his conviction, and therequirements for reinstatement have been held to be the same as for original admission to the

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IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is reversed andset aside, and the complaint as well as the complaint in intervention are dismissed, with costs equallyagainst plaintiff-appellee and intervenor-appellant.

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A temporary Restraining Order was issued ex-parte by this Tribunal on May 22, 1980 enjoiningrespondent Court from acting in Civil Case No. R-18857 below.

L-51928

Edgardo P. Reyes filed, on July 3, 1979, Civil Case No. 33739 before the Court of First Instance ofRizal (Pasig), Branch XXI, against N. V. Verenigde Buinzenfabrieken Excelsior-De Maas and privaterespondent Eustaquio T.C. Acero to annul the sale of Excelsior's shares in the International PipeIndustries Corporation (IPI) to Eustaquio T.C Acero, allegedly on the ground that, prior thereto, thesame shares had already been sold to him (Reyes). Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez entered hisappearance as counsel for Excelsior. This appearance was questioned on the ground that it wasbarred by Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, above-quoted.

Initially, this case (L-51928) was filed as a Supplemental Petition to L-51122 (Eugenio Puyat, et als.Hon. Sixto T.J. de Guzman), but this Court ordered it docketed separately. And since the issueinvolved is on all fours with L-53869, the Court opted to resolve Case No. L-51928 jointly with L-53869 instead of with L-51122 as originally directed.

The novel issue for determination is whether or not members of the Batasang Pambansa, like Attorneys Valentino L. Legaspi and Estanislao A. Fernandez, can appear as counsel before Courts ofFirst Instance.

A comparison of Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution prohibiting any Assemblyman fromappearing as counsel "before any Court inferior to a Court with appellate jurisdiction", and the"similar" provision of Section 17, Article VI, of the 1935 Charter is elucidating. The last sentence ofthe latter provision reads:

... No member of the Commission on Appointments shall appear as counsel before anyCourt inferior to a collegiate Court of appellate jurisdiction.

A significant amendment is the deletion of the term "collegiate". Further, the limitation nowcomprehends all members of the Batasang Pambansa, and is no longer confined to members of theCommissions on Appointments, a body not provided for under the 1973 Constitution.

Under the amendment to Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, ratified in a national plebiscite held on April 7, 1981, Section 11 now reads:

SEC. 11. No member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before anycourt without appellate jurisdiction, ...

The term 'collegiate" remains deleted , and the terminology is now "Court without appellate

jurisdiction."

Although the cases at bar were filed prior to the aforesaid amendment, they should be resolved underthe amended provision. We abide by the proposition that "as a general rule, the provisions of a newConstitution take effect immediately and become operative on pending litigation." 1

Clearly, what is prohibited to a Batasang Pambansa member is "appearance as counsel" "before anyCourt without appellate jurisdiction.

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"Appearance" has been defined as "voluntary submission to a court's jurisdiction". 2 "Counsel" means"an adviser, a person professionally engaged in the trial or management of a cause in court; a legaladvocate managing a case at law; a lawyer appointed or engaged to advise and represent in legalmatters a particular client, public officer, or public body". 3 Ballantine's Law Dictionary says a counselis "counselor, an attorney at law; one or more attorneys representing parties in an action". 4 Thus,"appearance as counsel" is a voluntary submission to a court's jurisdiction by a legal advocate oradvising lawyer professionally engaged to represent and plead the cause of another . This is thecommon, popular connotation of this word which the Constitution must have adopted. In one case, 5 in resolving the question of what constitutes 'appearance as an advocate," the Court held that"advocate" the Court held that "advocate" means one who pleads the cause of another before atribunal or judicial court, a counselor.

Judging from the prescribed criteria, there should be no question that Assemblyman Valentino L.Legaspi, in preparing the Answer for private respondent-spouses in Civil Case No. R-18857 beforethe Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, appears as their counsel. Similarly, AssemblymanEstanislao A. Fernandez appears as counsel for Excelsior in Civil Case No. 33739 of the Court ofFirst Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XXI. They represent and plead the cause of another before aCourt of justice.

The next poser then arises: are the Courts of First Instance, where Assemblyman Legaspi andFernandez, respectively, appear as counsel of record, Courts with appellate jurisdiction?

There are authorities to the effect that the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction is that it revisesand corrects the proceedings in a case already instituted and does not create that cause 6 Or, that itnecessarily implies that the subject-matter has been instated in and acted upon by some other courtwhose judgment or proceedings are to be reviewed. 7 In an early Philippine case, 8 it was held tomean jurisdiction to review the judgment of an inferior court. And, that it calls for and demandsprevious legitimate jurisdiction by a court of origin. 9

By law, Courts of First Instance are Courts of general original jurisdiction. 10 However, under the

same statute, their jurisdiction has been stated to be of two kinds: (a) original and (b) appellate.11

They have appellate jurisdiction over all cases arising in City and Municipal Courts in their respectiveprovinces except over appeals from cases tried by Municipal judges of provincial capatals or CityJudges pursuants to the authority granted under the last paragraph of Section 87 of the Judiciary Act.12

It is rather clear that Courts of First Instance, by virtue of a specific bestowal by the Judiciary Act of1948, as amended, can be Courts with appellate jurisdiction. And, by the deliberate omission of theword "collegiate" in both the original and amended Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution,the obvious intention of the framers is that Courts of First Instance, as appellate Tribunals, no longerfall within the ambit of the previous prohibition. They are single-Judge Courts with appellate

jurisdiction from decisions and orders of City and Municipal Courts.13

Stated otherwise, under theamended proviso, Courts of First Instance are not Courts without appellate jurisdiction.

It is contended, however, that the Courts of First Instance in these two cases took cognizance of thesuits in the exercise of their exclusive original and not appellate jurisdiction, hence, AssemblymenFernandez and Legaspi are still prohibited from appearing before said Courts as counsel. There ismerit to this contention.

It should be borne in mind that Courts of First Instance have dual "personality". Depending on thecase before it, said Courts can be either of appellate or original jurisdiction. The question then to be

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resolved is whether or not Assemblymen can appear as counsel before Courts of First Instance incases originally filed with them.

We are of the considered opinion that, to render effective the Constitutional provision, appearance bylegislators before Courts of First Instance should be limited to cases wherein said Courts exerciseappellate jurisdiction. This is true to the time-honored principle that whatever is necessary to rendereffective any provision of a Constitution, whether the same be a prohibition or a restriction, must bedeemed implied and intended in the provision itself. 14

It bears repeating that under Section 17, Article VI of the 1935 Charter, it was provided that membersof the Commission on Appointments shall not "appear as counsel before any Court inferior to acollegiate Court of appellate jurisdiction." The intent was clear that members of the Commission on

Appointments shall not "appear as counsel before any Court inferior to a collegiate Court of appellate jurisdiction." The intent was clear that members of the Commission on Appointments could notappear before Courts of First Instance. Uppermost in the minds of the framers was "appellate

jurisdiction" more than Court. Under Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, the scope of theprohibition was expanded to embrace all members of the National Assembly who were barred from"appear(ing) as counsel before any Court without appellate jurisdiction." Consistently, the principalcriterion is "appellate jurisdiction." So that, when a legislator appears in an original case filed with a

Court with "appellate jurisdiction."

Appellate practice is all that is permitted because of the admitted predominance of lawyers in thelegislature. 15 Their office has always favored them with the influence and prestige that it carried.Today, as before, it is only "appellate practice" that is allowed with the significant difference that, thistime, the Court need not be a collegial body. This so because with the removal of the legislativepower to review appointments the source of power and influence that members of the National

Assembly could unduly exert in the exercise of the legal profession has been greatly minimized.

This is a situation where the restricted meaning must prevail over the general because the nature ofthe subject matter of the context clearly indicates that the limited sense is intended. 16 In fact, the

original emandement proposed by Antonio V. Raquiza, Delegate of the First District, Ilocos Norte, inResolution No. 345 entitled "Prohibiting Members of the National Assembly to Use Their Office As aMeans of Promoting Sel-Interest" — was to bar a National Assembly member from appearing ascounsel before any Court. In the "Whereas" clauses, that proposal was believed to be an"improvement" over Section 17, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution and the purpose of the proposedamendement was explained as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

2. The Constitutional provision enumerates the kind of court or administrative caseswhere a legislator cannot appear. In our proposal he is absolutely barred because it is

feared that the practice of his profession will interfere with the performance of his dutiesor that because the power of his office might influence the administration of justice.

... (Emphasis supplied) 17

The co-author of Resolution No. 345. Delegate Leocadio E. Ignacio from the lone District of Isabela,and Floor Leader of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, elucidated further on the purpose behind theprohibition when he wrote in his Position Paper that 'The prohibition against appearing as counsel isnecessary because of the under influence which members of Congress enjoy when they practicebefore the Courts and especially before administrative agencies. It is an accepted fat that ourlegislature is composed of a predominance of practicing lawyers, and who are therefor expected to be

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naturally not averse to exerting all influence that they can muster in the pursuit of their profession."Continuing, he said: "The inability to practice as counsel ... should be part of the sacrifices entailed inrunning for the position of lawmaker. 18 The amendement proposed by Delegate Gonzalo O. Catan,Jr. of Negros Oriental even went further: "No member of the National Assembly shall, during his termof office, appear as counsel, directly or indirectly, in any Court or administrative body ..." 19 DelegateEmerito M. Salva from the Second District, Ilocos Norte, substituted his own amendment, thus:

Section 13. No member of the National Assembly shall, during his term of office,practice directly or indirectly any occupation or profession or be allowed to engagedirectly or indirectly in any trade, business, or industry. 20

and explained:

10.2. Explaining the substitute amendment, Delegate Salva said that the assemblymenshould render full-time service to the national. He pointed out that they should be barredfrom the practice of their respective professions since they would reasonably becompensated for devoting their time to the work of the National Assembly. 21

While Section 11, Article VIII, as finally adopted by the Constitutional Convention, did not carry theseveral amendments proposed, they are reflective of the sentiment prevailing at the 1971Constitutional Conventional, and reinforce the condition that appearance as counsel by Assemblymenwas meant to be confined to appellate practice and not unlimited practice before Courts of FirstInstance. That sentiment has been carried over the amendment ratified in the April, 1981 plebiscite.For, there is no substantial difference between "Court inferior to a Court with appellate jurisdiction"(the original 1973 provision) and "Court without appellate jurisdiction' (the amended provision).

The objective of the prohibition, then and now, is clearly to remove any possibility of undue influenceupon the administration of justice, to eliminate the possible use of office for personal gain, to ensureimpartiality in trials and thus preserve the independence of the Judiciary. The possible influence of an

Assemblyman on a signed Judge of the Court of First Instance, though not entirely removed, is

definitely diminished where the latter Court acts in the exercise of its appellate instead of original jurisdiction. The upper hand that a party represented by an Assemblyman by virtue of his officepossesses is more felt and could be more feared in original cases than in appealed cases becausethe decision or resolution appealed from the latter situation has already a presumption not only ofregularity but also of correctness in its favor.

In fine, "appellate practice" is an intended qualification dictated by principles of reason, justice andpublic interest.

The limited application to "appellate practice" is a view-point favored by constitutionalist of eminence,Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his scholarly work "The Constitution of the Philippine, 22 where

he said:

It is to be noted that at present he may appear as counsel in any criminal case, but hecannot do so before any administrative body. Also, while it is only appellate practice thatis allowed a member of the National Assembly, formerly, such a limitation applied solelyto a Senator or Representative who was in the Commission on Appointments, a bodyabolished under the present Constitution. Those differences should be noted (Emphasissupplied) 23

Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando also expounded on the reason behind the Constitutionalprohibition, thus:

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... The need for it was felt by the 1934 Constitutional Convention, a sentiment shared bythe last Constitutional Convention, because of the widespread belief that legislatorsfound it difficult to resist, as perhaps most men, the promptings of self-interest. Clearly,the purpose was and is to stress the fiduciary aspect of the position. There is thusfidelity to the maxim that a public office is a public trust. ... 24

Since the respective Courts of First Instance, before which Assemblymen Legaspi and Fernandezappeared as counsel, were acting in the exercise of original and not appellate jurisdiction, they mustbe held barred from appearing as counsel before said Courts in the two cases involved herein.

WHEREFORE, granting the Writs prayed for, the Order issued on February 27, 1980 by the Court ofFirst Instance of Cebu, Branch II, in Civil Case No. R-18857, is hereby set aside, and AttorneysEstanislao A. Fernandez and Valentino Legaspi hereby declared prohibited from appearing ascounsel before the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XXI, in Civil Case No. 33739, andbefore the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, in Civil Case No. r-18857, respectively. TheRestraining Order issued heretofore in L-53869 is hereby made permanent.

No costs in either case.

SO ORDERED.

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upon the termination of the hearing of the case in the Court of First Instance, and P500 after judgment shall have become final or, should the judgment be appealed, after the appeal shall havebeen submitted for judgment to the appellate court; and that the municipality shall defray allreasonable and necessary expenses for the prosecution of the case in the trial and appellate courtsincluding court and sheriff fees, transportation and subsistence of counsel and witnesses and cost oftranscripts of stenographic notes and other documents (Annex G). On the same date, 28 June 1956,the petitioner filed the necessary complaint in the Court of First Instance of Batangas (civil No. 542,

Annex I). On 9 July 1956 the municipal mayor wrote to the petitioner agreeing to the terms andconditions set forth in his (the petitioner's) letter of 28 June 1956 (Annex H). On 16 July 1956 thedefendant filed its answer to the complaint (Annex J). On 24 July 1956 the petitioner wrote a letter tothe municipal treasurer requesting reimbursement of the sum of P40 paid by him to the Court asdocket fee and payment of the sum of P500 as initial attorney's fee. Attached to the letter were thepertinent supporting papers (Annex K). The municipal treasurer forwarded the petitioner's claim letterand enclosures to the Auditor General through channels for pre-audit. On 24 June 1957 the AuditorGeneral disallowed in audit the petitioner's claim for initial attorney's fees in the sum of P500, basedupon an opinion rendered on 10 May 1957 by the Secretary of Justice who held that the ProvincialFiscal was not disqualified to handle and prosecute in court the case of the municipality of Bauan andthat its municipal council had no authority to engage the services of a special counsel (Annex L), butoffered no objection to the refund to the petitioner of the sum of P40 paid by him to the Court as

docket fee (Annex M). On 15 August 1957 the petitioner received notice of the decision of the AuditorGeneral and on 11 September 1957 he filed with the Auditor General a notice of appeal from hisdecision under section 4, Rule 45, of the Rules of Court Annex N). On 13 September 1957 thepetitioner filed this petition for review in this Court.

The Revised Administrative Code provides:

SEC. 2241. Submission of questions to provincial fiscal . — When the council is desirous ofsecuring a legal opinion upon any question relative to its own powers or the constitution orattributes of the municipal government, it shall frame such question in writing and submit thesame to the provincial fiscal for decision.

SEC. 1682. Duty of fiscal as legal adviser of province and provincial subdivisions . — Theprovincial fiscal shall be the legal adviser of the provincial government and its officers,including district health officers, and of the mayor and council of the various municipalities andmunicipal districts of the province. As such he shall, when so requested, submit his opinion inwriting upon any legal question submitted to him by any such officer or body pertinent to theduties thereof.

SEC. 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in litigation . — The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal districtthereof in any court, except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme

Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal district in question is a party adverse tothe provincial government or to some other municipality or municipal district in the sameprovince. When the interests of a provincial government and of any political division thereof areopposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province.

When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political subdivisionof a province, a special attorney may be employed by its council.

Under the foregoing provisions of law, the Provincial Fiscal is the legal adviser of the mayor andcounsel of the various municipalities of a province and it is his duty to represent the municipality inany court except when he is disqualified by law. When he is disqualified to represent the municipality,

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the municipal council may engage the services of a special attorney. The Provincial Fiscal isdisqualified to represent in court the municipality if and when original jurisdiction of the case involvingthe municipality is vested in the Supreme Court; when the municipality is a party adverse to theprovincial government or to some other municipality in the same province; 1 and when in the caseinvolving the municipality, he, or his wife, or child, is pecuniarily involved as heir, legatee, creditor orotherwise. 2 The fact that the Provincial Fiscal in the case at bar was of the opinion that Republic ActNo. 1383 was valid and constitutional, and, therefore, would not be in a position to prosecute the caseof the municipality with earnestness and vigor, could not justify the act of the municipal council inengaging the services of a special counsel. Bias or prejudice and animosity or hostility on the part ofa fiscal not based on any of the conditions enumerated in the law and the Rules of Court do notconstitute a legal and valid excuse for inhibition or disqualification. 3 And unlike a practising lawyerwho has the right to decline employment, 4 a fiscal cannot refuse the performance of his functions ongrounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office, where he swore, among others,"that he will well and faithfully discharge to the best of his ability the duties of the office or positionupon which he is about to enter. . . ." 5 Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney, themunicipal council should have requested the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscalin place of the provincial fiscal who had declined to handle and prosecute its case in court, pursuantto section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code. The petitioner claims that the municipal councilcould not do this because the Secretary of Justice, who has executive supervision over the

Government Corporate Counsel, who represented the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authorityin the case filed against it by the municipality of Bauan (civil No. 542, Annex J) and direct supervisionand control over the Provincial Fiscal, would be placed in an awkward and absurd position of havingcontrol of both sides of the controversy. The petitioner's contention is untenable. Section 83 of theRevised Administrative Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 94, series of 1947 and furtheramended by Executive Order No. 392, series of 1950, 46 Off. Gaz., 5913, 5917, provides that theSecretary of Justice shall have executive supervision over the Government Corporate Counsel andsupervision and control over Provincial Fiscals. In Mondano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil., 143; 51 Off. Gaz.,2884, 2888, this Court distinguished supervision from control as follows:

. . . In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer

to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them theformer may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or setaside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitutethe judgment of the former for that of the latter. . . .

The fact that the Secretary of Justice had, on several occasions, upheld the validity andconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 1383 does not exempt the municipal council of Bauan fromrequesting the Secretary of Justice to detail a provincial fiscal to prosecute its case.

The services of the petitioner having been engaged by the municipal council and mayor without

authority of law, the Auditor General was correct in disallowing in audit the petitioner's claim forpayment of attorney's fees. The decision under review is affirmed, without pronouncement as tocosts.

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G.R. No. L-42992 August 8, 1935

FELIPE SALCEDO, petitioner-appellant,vs.FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ, respondent-appellee.In re contempt proceedings against Attorney VICENTE J. FRANCISCO.

Vicente J. Francisco in his own behalf.

DIAZ, J .:

In a motion filed in this case, which is pending resolution because the second motion forreconsideration of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, who represents the herein petitioner, has not beenacted upon to date, for the reason that the question whether or not the decision which has alreadybeen promulgated should be reconsidered by virtue of the first assignment of error relied upon in saidpetitioner's brief, has not yet been determined, for which purpose the case was set for hearing on

August 5, 1935, said attorney inserted a paragraph the translation of which reads as follows:

We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this court,denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage tothe rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at thepolls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within outpower in order that this error may be corrected by the very court which has committed it,because we should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality ofTiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicialoutrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and because it is our utmost desireto safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of each and every member thereof in theeyes of the public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisionslike these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily considerunjust, increase the proselytes of " sakdalism " and make the public lose confidence in theadministration of justice.

When the court's attention was called to said paragraph, it required Attorney Vicente J. Francisco toshow cause, if any, why he should not be found guilty of contempt, giving him a period of ten days forthat purpose. In this answer attorney Vicente J. Francisco, far from regretting having employed thephrases contained in said paragraph in his motion, reiterated them several times contending that theydid not constitute contempt because, according to him it is not contempt to tell the truth.

The phrases:

. . . and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery ofthe popular will expressed at the polls . . . .

. . . because we should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipalityof Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the

judicial outrage . . . .

and ... we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which the affected partyand his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of

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enough to induce the granting of a rehearing on the merits. It is hardly necessary to add that thataction was taken entirely uninfluenced by the peroration of the motion here judicially penalized.

Following microscopic examination in the majority opinion of the paragraph, attention is directed towords which prophesy the loss of public confidence in the courts and the growth of Sakdalism . If,however, the passage flowing from the pen of Mr. Francisco be set side by side with passages writtenby the late Mr. Justice Johnson in the case of Garchitorena vs. Crescini and Imperial ( [1918, 39 Phil.,258), little difference in phraseology will be noted. One came from a lawyer and is condemned; theother came from a judge and is accepted.

The main burden of the charge is that threats against this court were made by the respondent. Admittedly a lawyer should maintain a respectful attitude towards the courts. Any attempt on the partof a lawyer to influence the action of the court by intimidation will justify not alone punishment forcontempt but also disbarment. But does anyone believe that the action taken in this case has beenobtained by coercion or could be obtained by such methods? Judges are of sterner stuff than weakplants which bend with every wind. 1avvphil.ñet

The lawyer possesses the privilege of standing up for his rights even in the face of a hostile court. Heowes entire devotion to the interests of his client. His zeal when a case is lost, which he thinks should

have been won, may induce intemperate outbursts. Courts will do well charitably to overlookprofessional improprieties of the moment induced by chagrin at losing a case.

So that it may not be assumed that the position taken by me is isolated or peculiar, permit me to offera few corroborative authorities.

Mr. Chief Justice Sharswood of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was the pioneer authority in thesubject of professional ethics. Speaking for the court in one case, he said: "No class of the communityought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity,impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. ... To say that an attorney can only act orspeak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and

livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is aposition too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system." ( Ex parte Steinman [1880], 40 Am. Rep., 637.)

Mr. Justice Brewer was first a member of the Supreme Court of Kansas and subsequently waselevated to the Supreme Court of the United States. In the former capacity, in sustaining a contemptof court, he nevertheless observed: "We remark again, that a judge will generally and wisely passunnoticed any mere hasty and unguarded expression of passion, or at least pass it with simply areproof. It is so that, in every case where a judge decides for one party, he decides against another;and ofttimes both parties are beforehand equally confident and sanguine. The disappointment,therefore, is great, and it is not in human nature that there should be other than bitter feeling, which

often reaches to the judge as the cause of the supposed wrong. A judge, therefore, ought to bepatient, and tolerate everything which appears but the momentary outbreak of disappointment. Asecond thought will generally make a party ashamed of such outbreak, and the dignity of the court willsuffer none by passing it in silence." ( In re Pryor [1877], 26 Am. Rep., 747.)

The late Mr. Justice Holmes of the Supreme Court of the United States was until recently the leaderof progressive thought in American jurisprudence. In a dissenting opinion in a famous case, he said:"When it considered how contrary if is to our practice and ways of thinking for the same person to beaccuser and sole judge in a matter which, if he be sensitive, may involve strong personal feeling, Ishould expect the power to be limited by the necessities of the case 'to insure order and decorum intheir presence'. ... I confess that I cannot find in all this or in the evidence in the case anything that

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would have affected a mind of reasonable fortitude, and still less can I find there anything thatobstructed the administration of justice in any sense that I possibly can give to those words." (ToledoNewspaper Co. vs . United States [1917], 247 U.S., 402.)

In 1922 Attorney Feliciano Gomez was charged with having said in effect that the Supreme Court haddecided the election protest in favor of Cailles because Governor-General Wood, out of friendship forCailles, had invited members of the court to Malacañang previous to formulating the decision, andthere, following a secret conference, had offered them a banquet. The proceedings for contemptinitiated against the respondent by the Attorney-General were halted by the court. In he opinion it wassaid: "We doubt very much if any one would think for a moment that memory of the Supreme Court ofthe Philippine Islands would sell their birthright of judicial integrity for a social courtesy and the favorof the Chief Executive. ... We feel also, that litigants and lawyers should not be held to too strict anaccount for words said in the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the bigway is for the court to condone even contemptuous language." ( In re Gomez [1922], 43 Phil., 376.)

To punish for direct contempt of the Supreme Court is a jurisdiction to be exercised with scrupulouscare. The members of the court sit as prosecutors and as judges. Human sensitiveness to anattorney's unjust aspersions on judicial character may induce too drastic action. It may result in thelong run in making of lawyers weak exponents of their clients' causes. Respect for the courts can

better be obtained by following a calm and impartial course from the bench than by an attempt tocompel respect for the judiciary by chastising a lawyer for a too vigorous or injudicious exposition ofhis side of a case. The Philippines needs lawyers of independent thought and courageous bearing,

jealous of the interests of their clients and unafraid of any court, high or low, and the courts will dowell tolerantly to overlook occasional intemperate language soon to be regretted by the lawyer whichaffects in no way the outcome of a case.

Mr. Francisco assures us that it has not been his intention to be recreant to the respect andconsideration which he has always shown the highest tribunal in the Philippines, and that thelanguage of the last paragraph of his motion of June 19 was not meant to offend the dignity of thecourt. I do not think that the language found in Mr. Francisco's motion constitutes contempt of court,

but conceding that it did require explanation, I would accept his disavowal of wrong intent at its facevalue. I would not mark the record of a member of the bar of long and honorable standing with thisblemish. With due deference to the opinion of the majority, I must strongly dissent therefrom.

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[A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997]

SOPHIA ALAWI, com pla inant , vs . ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a DistrictCourt, Marawi City, r e sponden t .

D E C I S I O N

NARVASA, C.J .:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa &Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is theincumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. They wereclassmates, and used to be friends.

It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa& Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National HomeMortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to thePresident of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:

" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to terminate theContract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as represented by your Sales

Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City,on the grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonestyand abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said contract void ab initio . Saidsales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made saidcontract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests."

He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the "groundswhich could evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse ofconfidence by the unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agreefor the mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I categorically state on record that Iam terminating the contract **. I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before said onerousand manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent,hence the need to annul the controversial contract."

Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayande Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually went through the post, bore no stamps.Instead at the right hand corner above the description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage — PD 26," had been typed.

On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President,Credit & Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at SalcedoVillage, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and askingfor cancellation of his housing loan in connection therewith, which was payable from salarydeductions at the rate of P 4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he said:

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" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the'manipulated contract' entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., asrepresented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulentlymanipulated said contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without my authorityand against my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attendingcircumstances, that my consent was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, andabuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between me and the swindlingsales agent who concealed the real facts from me."

And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the anomalousactuations of Sophia Alawi.

Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15,1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on thecancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account thereof.He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoñez, Head of the Fiscal Management &Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from hissalary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which he wasallegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent."

The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stopdeductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996," and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co."for the buy-back of ** (Alauya's) mortgage, and ** the refund of ** (his) payments."

On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with thisCourt a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to which she appended a copy of the letter, andof the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage — PD 26."[1] In thatcomplaint, she accused Alauya of:

1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest

ignorance and evident bad faith;"

2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"

3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and

4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar mayproperly use.

She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger, manipulator, etc." without"even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his

imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance andevident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular and completelytransparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the service, or be appropriatelydisciplined (sic) ** "

The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably with establishedusage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, thenotice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk ofCourt.[2]

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Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"[3] in which he questioned the authority of Atty.Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere

Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, theCourt Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the resultof a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complainthad no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of court andex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a scion of a Royal Family **."[4]

In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequioustones,[5] Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he mightcomment thereon.[6] He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within theconfines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying hissignature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions ofP 4,333.10 from his salary.

And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was hewho had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untoldfinancial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from hissalary.[7] He declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa &

Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege,saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with themailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage — PD 26," were typewritten on the envelopeby some other person, an averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV(subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J);[8]and as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given forpostage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurredinadvertently and because of an honest mistake.[9]

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with"Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the

title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or the Maranaoterm "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not considerhimself a lawyer.

He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man undulyprejudiced and injured."[10] He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, aclassmate and friend.[11] He was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that shewould show the completed document to him later for correction, but she had since avoided him;despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where the property -- subject of hissupposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. -- is situated;[12] He says Alawi somehowgot his GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not do

so until after several months. He also claims that in connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment,clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw.[13]

Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal ofthe complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations," andcomplainant Alawi having come to the Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulenthousing loan being apparent and demonstrable.

It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 -- all

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of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not usethe title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."

The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report andrecommendation.[14]

The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelouscharges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith,"resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and established reputation." In thoseletters, Alauya had written inter alia that:

1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit,fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"

2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial to **(his) rights and interests;"

3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit,fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and

4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., andunlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without ** (his) authority and against ** (his) will,"and "concealed the real facts **."

Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense ofhis rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who hadsuffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering,"considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[15]

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter alia

enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in thepublic service.[16] Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees ** at alltimes respect the rights of others, and ** refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, goodcustoms, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest."[17] More than once has thisCourt emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agencyinvolved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should becircumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times becharacterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect ofthe public for the judiciary."[18]

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy, or

respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed -- however sincerely -- to bedeceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate. insulting or virulent language. Alauya isevidently convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that heexercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in amanner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or otherwisestated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."[19]Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, ordownright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject toa standard of conduct more stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law,he may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwiseimproper.[20] As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person and the

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rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence,restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps bemitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been grievouslywronged.

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare thatpersons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may onlypractice law before Shari'a courts.[21] While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and onewho has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense thatthey give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of"attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law andsuccessfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippinesand remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice lawin this jurisdiction.

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law," because in hisregion, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to locallegislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of"counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.

Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the record contains noevidence adequately establishing the accusation.

WHEREFORE , respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessivelyintemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and forusurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct inthe future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

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A.M. No. 1053 September 7, 1979

SANTA PANGAN, complainantvs.ATTY. DIONISIO RAMOS, respondent,

R E S O L U T I O N

ANTONIO, J .:

This has reference to the motion of complainant, Santa Pangan, to cite respondent Dionisio Ramosfor contempt. It appears from the record that on September 7, 1978 and March 13, 1979, the hearingsin this administrative case were postponed on the basis of respondent's motions for postponement.These motions were predicated on respondent's allegations that on said dates he had a case set forhearing before Branch VII, Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled People v. Marieta M. Isip(Criminal Case No. 35906). Upon verification, the attorney of record of the accused in said case isone "Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos, 306 Dona Salud Bldg., Dasmarinas Manila." Respondent admits thathe used the name of "Pedro D.D. Ramos" before said court in connection with Criminal Case No.35906, but avers that he had a right to do so because in his Birth Certificate (Annex "A"), his name is"Pedro Dionisio Ramos", and -his parents are Pedro Ramos and Carmen Dayaw, and that the D.D. in"Pedro D.D. Ramos" is but an abbreviation of "Dionisio Dayaw his other given name and maternalsurname.

This explanation of respondent is untenable. The name appearing in the "Roll of Attorneys" is"Dionisio D. Ramos". The attorney's roll or register is the official record containing the names andsignatures of those who are authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a nameother than the one inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys in his practice of law.

The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he will do no falsehood". As an officer inthe temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of "truthfulness, candor and frankness".1 Indeed, candor and frankness should characterize the conduct of the lawyer at every stage. Thishas to be so because the court has the right to rely upon him in ascertaining the truth. In representinghimself to the court as "Pedro D.D. Ramos" instead of "Dionisio D. Ramos", respondent has violatedhis solemn oath.

The duty of an attorney to the courts to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided tohim, such means as are consistent with truth and honor cannot be overempahisized. Theseinjunctions circumscribe the general duty of entire devotion of the attorney to the client. As stated in acase, his I nigh vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case, and toaid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions. He violates Ms oath of office ,when heresorts to deception or permits his client to do so." 2

In using the name of' Pedro D.D. Ramos" before the courts instead of the name by which he wasauthorized to practice law - Dionisio D. Ramos - respondent in effect resorted to deception. Thedemonstrated lack of candor in dealing with the courts. The circumstance that this is his firstaberration in this regard precludes Us from imposing a more severe penalty.

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G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959

PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,vs.CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office, respondent.

Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent.

MONTEMAYOR, J .:

This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction againstCeledonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.

On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patentattorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and

jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular, members of thePhilippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training arequalified to take the said examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has beenholding similar examinations.

It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the barexaminations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is ingood standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and thatconsequently, the cat of the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in goodstanding to take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to theirbeing allowed to practice before said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation andprosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.

In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution ofpatent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application ofscientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, theprosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also engineers and otherpersons with sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as givenby the Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-

judicial body from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish to handlecases before the Patent Office which, as stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more of anapplication of scientific and technical knowledge than the mere application of provisions of law; . . .that the action taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise knownas the Patent Law of the Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordancewith which the United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as thatprescribed by respondent. . . .

Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America authorizesthe Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who practice before theUnited States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent Law,Republic Act No. 165.

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Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been holdingtests or examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to practice beforethe Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the Director of Patents to doso, specially as regards members of the bar, has been questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue.

And we have given it careful thought and consideration.

The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to thepractice of law in the Philippines 1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing maypractice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in thePhilippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not appearance before the patent Officeand the preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in thepractice of law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court ; it embraces thepreparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, themanagement of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients , and all action taken for them inmatters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation servicescontemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,

enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conductingproceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held toconstitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the workdone involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts andconditions . (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied).

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside ofany court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing,the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution oflegal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs.

Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are

always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree oflegal skill , a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficultand complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear anintimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far asconcerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part which involvesadvice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the publicthat these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequatelearning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trustobligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quotedin Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc . (R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis

ours).

In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, therepresentation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applicationsfor patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the firstplace, although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application oftechnical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered inaccordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulationspromulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the PatentOffice involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as theexistence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. For

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instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention shall not be patentable if it iscontrary to public order or morals, or to public health or welfare. Section 9 says that an invention shallnot be considered new or patentable if it was known or used by others in the Philippines before theinvention thereof by the inventor named in any printed publication in the Philippines or any foreigncountry more than one year before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public useor on sale in the Philippines for more than one year before the application for the patent therefor.Section 10 provides that the right to patent belongs to the true and actual inventor, his heirs, legalrepresentatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to connection of any mistake in a patent. Section28 enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although any person may apply for suchcancellation, under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of apatent. Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition for cancellation. Section 31 and 32 providefor a notice of hearing of the petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in casethe said cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the expiration of three yearsfrom the day the patent was granted, any person patent on several grounds, such as, if the patentedinvention is not being worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for thepatented article in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article inthe Philippines is not being met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason of thepatentee's refusal to grant a license on reasonable terms or by reason of the condition attached byhim to the license, purchase or use of the patented article or working of the patented process or

machine of production, the establishment of a new trade or industry in the Philippines is prevented; orif the patent or invention relates to food or medicine or is necessary to public health or public safety.

All these things involve the applications of laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They call forlegal knowledge, training and experience for which a member of the bar has been prepared.

In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and decisions ofthe Patent Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the veryPatent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that:

. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a proceeding tocancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any party to any other proceeding in the

Office may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director.

In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent Officeand the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical andscientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicialbody, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.

Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts ofthe Head of the Patent Office.

. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and

extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the duty ofthe Commissioner to give authenticated copies to any person, on payment of the legal fees.(40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).

. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the grantingand delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the patent is new and whether itis the proper subject of a patent; and his action in awarding or refusing a patent is a judicialfunction . In passing on an application the commissioner should decide not only questions oflaw, but also questions of fact , as whether there has been a prior public use or sale of thearticle invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).

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The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable tohold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed topractice before the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of course, theDirector of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may require that members of the barpractising before him enlist the assistance of technical men and scientist in the preparation of papersand documents, such as, the drawing or technical description of an invention or machine sought to bepatented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an application for the registration of a parcel of land onbehalf of his clients, is required to submit a plan and technical description of said land, prepared by alicensed surveyor.

But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons desiringto practice or to do business before him to submit an examination, even if they are already membersof the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the UnitedStates Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an examinationsimilar to that which he (respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to thefollowing provisions of said Rules of Practice:

Registration of attorneys and agents . — A register of an attorneys and a register agents arekept in the Patent Office on which are entered the names of all persons recognized as entitled

to represent applicants before the Patent Office in the preparation and prosecution ofapplicants for patent. Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions of these rules shallonly entitle the person registered to practice before the Patent Office.

(a) Attorney at law . — Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before anyUnited States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States whofulfills the requirements and complied with the provisions of these rules may be admitted topractice before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the register of attorneys.

x x x x x x x x x

(c) Requirement for registration . — No person will be admitted to practice and register unlesshe shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by theCommissioner and furnish all requested information and material; and shall establish to thesatisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good repute andpossessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary to enable him torender applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise competent to advise and assisthim in the presentation and prosecution of their application before the Patent Office. In orderthat the Commissioner may determine whether a person seeking to have his name placedupon either of the registers has the qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good moralcharacter and repute, and of sufficient basic training in scientific and technical matters must besubmitted and an examination which is held from time to time must be taken and passed. The

taking of an examination may be waived in the case of any person who has served for threeyears in the examining corps of the Patent Office.

Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office inPatent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as follows:

The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce mayprescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other

persons representing applicants or other parties before his office, and may require of suchpersons, agents, or attorneys , before being recognized as representatives of applicants orother persons, that they shall show they are of good moral character and in good repute, are

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possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or other persons valuable service, and are likewise to competent to advise and assist applicants orother persons in the presentation or prosecution of their applications or other business beforethe Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and opportunity for a hearing,suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case from further practice before hisoffice any person, agent or attorney shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of grossmisconduct, or who refuses to comply with the said rules and regulations, or who shall, withintent to defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or prospectiveapplicant, or other person having immediate or prospective applicant, or other person havingimmediate or prospective business before the office, by word, circular, letter, or by advertising.The reasons for any such suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded. The action of theCommissioner may be reviewed upon the petition of the person so refused recognition or sosuspended by the district court of the United States for the District of Columbia under suchconditions and upon such proceedings as the said court may by its rules determine. (Emphasissupplied)

Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to theprovisions of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulationsrequiring that persons desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass an examination. We

reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:

SEC. 78. Rules and regulations . — The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary ofJustice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for theconduct of all business in the Patent Office.

The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the UnitedStates Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of thoseallowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissionerof Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the necessary qualifications andcompetence to render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which

showing may take the form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law,Section 78, is silent on this important point. Our attention has not been called to any expressprovision of our Patent Law, giving such authority to determine the qualifications of persons allowedto practice before the Patent Office.

Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe formsand make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious andefficient administration of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect the laws relating tomatters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariffand Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject tothe approval of the Department Head, makes all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the

provisions of said code. Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No.466 as amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Collector ofInternal Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement ofthe provisions of the code. We understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not onlyfor the Bureau of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, togovern the transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said bureaus.

Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law giving thenecessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it beforethey are allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there would be no reason why otherbureaus specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area

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are more or less complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc.,assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and theclassification of goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards theBureau of Customs, may not also require that any lawyer practising before them or otherwisetransacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.

In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by thisTribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office,for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination ofthe scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation ofevidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial orquasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to theSupreme Court.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is herebyprohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and passthe same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office. No costs.

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[A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000]

LESLIE UI, com pla inant , vs . ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, r e sponden t .

D E C I S I O N

DE LEON, JR., J .:

Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedlycarrying on an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.

The relevant facts are:

On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes Churchin Quezon City[1] and as a result of their marital union, they had four (4) children, namely, Leilani,Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December 1987, however, complainantfound out that her husband, Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. IrisBonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime in 1986, and that they had been living together atNo. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduateof the College of Law of the University of the Philippines was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982.

Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant then visitedrespondent at her office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal wife ofCarlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she has a child with Carlos Ui and alleged,however, that everything was over between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant believed therepresentations of respondent and thought things would turn out well from then on and that the illicitrelationship between her husband and respondent would come to an end.

However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband andrespondent continued, and that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her husband, CarlosUi, had a second child. Complainant then met again with respondent sometime in March 1989 andpleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicitrelationship persisted and complainant even came to know later on that respondent had beenemployed by her husband in his company.

A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August 11, 1989 bythe complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar Discipline ofthe Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the ground of immorality, moreparticularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainant’s husband, Carlos Ui. In her

Answer,[2] respondent averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all alongto be a bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese woman in

Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged. She stated that during one of their tripsabroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in1985[3]. Upon their return to Manila, respondent did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued tolive with his children in their Greenhills residence because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let thechildren gradually to know and accept the fact of his second marriage before they would livetogether.[4]

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In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only returnoccasionally to the Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties. During one of her tripsto Manila sometime in June 1988, respondent was surprised when she was confronted by a womanwho insisted that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her discovery of thetrue civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988 andreturned only in March 1989 with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after shereported to work with the law firm[5] she was connected with, the woman who represented herself tobe the wife of Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding to know if Carlos Ui has beencommunicating with her.

It is respondent’s contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they weremarried abroad and that after June 1988 when respondent discovered Carl os Ui’s true civil status,she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her in Alabang,and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was respondent wholived in Alabang in a house which belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the saidhouse was built exclusively from her parents’ funds.[6] By way of counterclaim, respondent soughtmoral damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against complainant forhaving filed the present allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case against respondent.

In her Reply[7] dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent knew perfectlywell that Carlos Ui was married to complainant and had children with her even at the start of herrelationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went abroad was to give birth to her two(2) children with Carlos Ui.

During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also charged herhusband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of the ProvincialFiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was dismissed for insufficiency ofevidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged. The resolution dismissing the criminalcomplaint against respondent reads:

Complainant’s evidence had prima facie established the existence of the "illicitrelationship" between the respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant inDecember 1987. The same evidence however show that respondent Carlos Ui was stillliving with complainant up to the latter part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989.

It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of respondentsstarted and was discovered by complainant sometime in 1987 when she andrespondent Carlos were still living at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, SanJuan, MetroManila and they, admittedly, continued to live together at their conjugalhome up to early (sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when respondent Carlos left the same.

From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the relationship, illicitas complainant puts it, had been prima facie established by complainant’s evidence,this same evidence had failed to even prima facie establish the "fact of respondent’scohabitation in the concept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala

Alabang house, proof of which is necessary and indispensable to at least createprobable cause for the offense charged. The statement alone of complainant, worse, astatement only of a conclusion respecting the fact of cohabitation does not make thecomplainant’s evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. vs. Casipong and Mongoy, 20Phil. 178).

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On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly incredible forher to have knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her Answer had she known that the samewas altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling reason for her to make it appearthat her marriage to Carlos Ui took place either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains thatrespondent and Carlos Ui got married before complainant confronted respondent and informed thelatter of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent stated that it was CarlosUi who testified and admitted that he was the person responsible for changing the date of themarriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present evidence to rebut thetestimony of Carlos Ui on this matter.

Respondent posits that complainant’s evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent with a child,pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light colored carwith Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and portion of the house and ground, and anotherpicture of the same car bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the garage,[19]does not prove that she acted in an immoral manner. They have no evidentiary value according toher. The pictures were taken by a photographer from a private security agency and who was notpresented during the hearings. Further, the respondent presented the Resolution of the ProvincialFiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui againstrespondent for lack of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged [20] and the

dismissal of the appeal by the Department of Justice [21] to bolster her argument that she was notguilty of any immoral or illegal act because of her relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondentclaims that she entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in good faith and that her conduct cannot beconsidered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in lovewith Carlos Ui whom she believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil status,she parted ways with him.

In the Memorandum [22] filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for thedisbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent committed immorality by havingintimate relations with a married man which resulted in the birth of two (2) children. Complainanttestified that respondent’s mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, personally knew complainant and her

husband since the late 1970s because they were clients of the bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was theBranch Manager.[23] It was thus highly improbable that respondent, who was living with her parentsas of 1986, would not have been informed by her own mother that Carlos Ui was a married man.Complainant likewise averred that respondent committed disrespect towards the Commission forsubmitting a photocopy of a document containing an intercalated date.

In her Reply to Complainant’s Memorandum [24], respondent stated that complainant miserably failedto show sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the allegationsof complainant, there is no showing that respondent had knowledge of the fact of marriage of CarlosUi to complainant. The allegation that her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married man does not provethat such information was made known to respondent.

Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its Report andRecommendation, finding that:

In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by Carlos Ui, thelatter represented himself to be single. The Commission does not find said claim toodifficult to believe in the light of contemporary human experience.

Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents himself to besingle, separated, or without any firm commitment to another woman. The reasontherefor is not hard to fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single men.

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The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true civil status ofCarlos Ui, she left for the United States (in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts withhim. When she returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her brother,

Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each other becauseof the children whom he was allowed to visit. At no time did they live together.

Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the part ofrespondent that can be considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensibleto a high degree. To be sure, she was more of a victim that (sic) anything else andshould deserve compassion rather than condemnation. Without cavil, this sad episodedestroyed her chance of having a normal and happy family life, a dream cherished byevery single girl.

x..........................x..........................x"

Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice ofResolution dated December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, theReport and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitledcase, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding therecommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws andrules, the complaint for Gross Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack ofmerit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully attaching to her

Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning that a repetition of thesame will merit a more severe penalty."

We agree with the findings aforequoted.

The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the

legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subjectto the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. Therequisites for admission to the practice of law are:

a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;

b. a resident thereof;

c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;

d. a person of good moral character ;

e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filedor pending in court;

f. possess the required educational qualifications; and

g. pass the bar examinations.[25] (Italics supplied)

Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicantmust possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral character must be

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continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the lossthereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. It has been held -

If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continuedpossession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in thelegal profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases tohave good moral character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).

A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his convictionof a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity inaddition to professional probity.

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grosslyimmoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render alawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that whatappears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoralconduct that warrants disbarment.

Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, orshameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good andrespectable members of the community." (7 C.J.S. 959).[26]

In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui, she knewand believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and as a result ofsuch marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status ofCarlos Ui, she left him.

Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are not only farfrom simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitionersshould be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be

before. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with ahigher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with greater caution.The facts of this case lead us to believe that perhaps respondent would not have found herself insuch a compromising situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding outmore about Carlos Ui’s personal background prior to her intimate involvement with him.

Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondent’s suspicion thatsomething was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions. Forinstance, respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with a woman from Amoy,China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and thiswoman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with

respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply incomprehensible consideringrespondent’s allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her .

All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent inmanaging her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothedas it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. Forimmorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion ofgood and respectable members of the community.[27] Moreover, for such conduct to warrantdisciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as toconstitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.[28]

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We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain fromadulterous relationships x x x but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public bycreating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards."[29] Respondent’s act of immediatelydistancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moralindifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard ofthe legal profession. Complainant’s bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, theburden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only ifshe establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.[30] This, herein complainantmiserably failed to do.

On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer, we findimprobable to believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy of theMarriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as significant as a marriageceremony, any normal bride would verily recall the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult tofathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the year when she gotmarried. Simply stated, it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable.

Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to herpleading, especially so when she has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances contained

therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated date, the defense of good faith ofrespondent on that point cannot stand.

It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. Thelegal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard theintegrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions asofficers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.

WHEREFORE , the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for allegedimmorality, is hereby DISMISSED .

However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of herMarriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that amore severe sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the same or similar offense in thefuture.

SO ORDERED.

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In disregard of the abovementioned order, the complainant attempted to take possession of thelandholdings by placing thereon her own tenants. Predictably, the Aglinao brothers, to protect theirrights, countered by filing against a the complainant two petitions with the Court of Agrarian relationsin Iloilo (hereinafter referred to as the agrarian court), docketed therein as C.A.R. cases 1254 and1255 (hereinafter referred to as the C.A.R. cases). They alleged in their respective petitions that theyhave been tenants of Enrique Soriano, Sr. since 1960 on a parcel of riceland located in barrioMalapoc, Balasan Iloilo, held by the complainant as administratrix of the intestate estate of thedeceased Joaquina Ganzon; and that they had started to plow their leaseholds consisting of twohectares each at the start of the agricultural year 1962-63 when "on March 7, 1962, the respondent[complainant herein] ordered one Bonifacio Margarejo to harrow the plowed land without theknowledge and consent" of the petitioners. Consequently, they prayed for the issuance of aninterlocutory order enjoining the complainant and her representatives from interfering with theirpeaceful cultivation of the lands in question pending determination of the merits of their petitions.However, consideration of the petitioners' prayer for the issuance of an interlocutory order ofinjunction pendente lite was considerably delayed not only by reason of several postponementsgranted at the behest of the complainant but also because of the assurance made by her throughcounsel in open court at the hearing of June 16, 1962, that neither she nor any of her men woulddisturb or interfere with the petitioner's possession of their leaseholds until their petitions shall havebeen finally resolved.

But on June 18, 1962, barely two days after the abovementioned hearing, the complainant's menagain entered the land in question and planted rice thereon. This unauthorized entry prompted the

Aglinao brothers, through their counsel, the herein respondent Atty. Vicente Aragona, Jr. (hereinafterreferred to as the respondent), to file on June 20, 1962 an "Urgent Motion for Issuance ofInterlocutory Order." There being no objection by the complainant against the said motion, and findingthe same meritorious, the agrarian court issued on June 21, 1962 the interlocutory order prayed for,directing "the respondent, her agent, or any person acting for and in her behalf to refrain frommolesting or in any way interfering with the work of the petitioners in their respective landholdings."

On June 24, 1962, upon the agrarian court's direction, the PC detachment stationed in Sara, Iloilo,

served copies of the order on the complainant's men, Bonifacio Margarejo and Carlos Fuentes, andrestored the Aglinao brothers to the possession of their landholdings. On the same day, Margarejoand Fuentes informed their landlord, the complainant, about the said order. lawphi1.ñet

For several months thereafter nothing of significance happened in the C.A.R. cases until the palayplanted on the land in question became ripe and ready for harvest.

Then on October 2, 1962 Enrique Soriano, Sr. showed to the respondent in Iloilo City a telegram 2

which reads as follows:

BALASAN OCT 2 62

GILDA ACOLADO

ILOILO AMERICAN SCHOOL MARIA CLARA AVENUE ILOILO CITY

TELL DADDY COMMUNICATE ARAGONA IMMEDIATELY ALBERT HARVESTTODAY....

MAMANG

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The sender of the telegram was Mrs. Isabel Soriano, wife of Enrique, the addressee Gilda Acolado,their daughter.

After reading the telegram, the respondent asked Soriano whether his wife (Mrs. Soriano) wascoming to Iloilo City; when informed that she was arriving, he decided to wait for her. Mrs. Sorianoarrived from Balasan in the afternoon of that same day, October 2, 1962. She went to see therespondent, and informed the latter that it was she who had sent the telegram upon request of the

Aglinao brothers; that she was personally present when one Albert, a tenant of the complainant,accompanied by many armed men, went to the land in question and harvested the palay thereon overthe protests of the Aglinao brothers; that upon inquiring why the said Albert and his armedcompanions harvested the palay, she was told that they were acting upon orders of the complainant;and that instead of filing a complaint with the chief of police as she originally planned, she decidedinstead to see the respondent without delay.

Possessed of the above information, the respondent promptly prepared and filed with the agrariancourt, on October 3, 1962, a verified "Urgent Motion to Declare Respondent in Contempt of Court"(hereinafter referred to as motion for contempt), praying that the complainant and "her armed goons"be declared in, and punished for, contempt of court for violating the interlocutory order of June 21,1962. This motion for contempt elicited, on the very same day it was filed, an instant reply from the

complainant who moved to strike it out from the, records claiming that the allegations therein libeledher, and that it was the respondent who should be punished for contempt for deliberately misleadingthe agrarian court. Moreover, not content with this reply and countermotion for contempt thecomplainant also lodged on October 4, 1962 a criminal complaint for libel against the respondent withthe City Fiscal of Iloilo, based on the same allegedly libelous allegations made against her by therespondent in the latter's motion for contempt filed in the C.A.R. cases. However, after preliminarilyinvestigating the said complaint, the assistant city fiscal to whom it was assigned dismissed the sameon the ground that the allegations of the motion for contempt were privileged communications. Thecomplainant did not appeal from the, said dismissal to the city fiscal; neither did she elevate the samefor review to the Department of Justice.

Meanwhile, no action was taken by the agrarian court in the C.A.R. cases on the motion forcontempt filed by the respondent against the complainant, as well as on the latter's countermotion,also for contempt, against the formal instead, by order dated October 24, 1963, the agrarian courtdismissed C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255, including the complainant's counterclaims therein, for lack ofinterest to prosecute on the part of the petitioners, the Aglinao brothers. As a matter of course, thedismissal of the main cases carried with it the dismissed of all incidents therein, including the motionfor contempt and counter-motion for contempt. Again, the complainant did not ask for reconsiderationof the order of dismissal, nor did she appeal therefrom. She filed instead the present administrativecomplaint against the respondent.

The only issue raised in the present disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent, Atty. Vicente

E. Aragona, Jr., should be disciplined or disbarred for having prepared and filed under oath the"Urgent Motion to Declare Respondent in Contempt of Court" in C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255-Iloilo,which allegedly contains false and libelous imputations injurious to the honor of the complainant.

For easy reference, the motion for contempt is hereunder reproduced in toto .

COMES NOW the undersigned, in behalf of the petitioners in each of the above-entitledcases, and to this Honorable Court respectfully states that:

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1. Upon urgent and verified motion of the undersigned dated June 20, 1962, this HonorableCourt issued an interlocutory order dated June 21, 1962, the dispositive part of which is asfollows:

WHEREFORE, finding the motion meritorious, an interlocutory order is hereby issuedordering the respondent, her agent, or any person acting for and in her behalf, to refrainfrom molesting or in any way interfering with the work of the petitioners in theirrespective landholdings, situated at Barrio Malapoc Balasan Iloilo, with an area of 2hectares for each of them, in these two cases, pending the bearing of these cases onthe merits.

The Commanding Officer of the Constabulary Detachment of the 56th PC Companystationed at Sara, Iloilo, or his duly authorized representative, is hereby ordered toimplement this order and to report to this Court his proceedings in this particular within aweek from the date of his implementation of this order.

SO ORDERED.Iloilo City, June 21, 1962.

(SGD.) JUAN C. TERUEL

Commissioner

2. Pursuant to the above-quoted order, the Commanding Officer of the 56th PC Companystationed at Sara, Iloilo, ordered the respondent and her men not to enter the landholdings inquestion and to refrain from molesting or in any way interfering with the work of petitioners intheir respective landholdings; the report of said Commanding Officer is now on file with therecords of the above-entitled cases;

3. On this date, the undersigned was just surprised when he received a telegram from thepetitioners, through Mrs. Isabel Soriano, copy of which is thereto attached as Annex "A" andmade part hereof, informing the undersigned that respondent, thru a certain Albert, with the aid

of armed goons, harvested the palay of the petitioners yesterday despite the vehementopposition of the petitioners not to enter their landholdings;

4. The said acts of respondents and her men in harvesting the palay of the petitioners,knowing fully well the existence and implementation of the interlocutory order of this Courtdated June 21, 1962, is a gross and open defiance and disobedience of said order and achallenge to the legal processes and authority of this Court in the peaceful administration of

justice;

5. This rebellious and seditious conduct of the respondent and her men against the authority ofthis Court constitutes wanton resistance and contumacious contempt of court;

6. Unless the respondent and her armed goons are declared in contempt of Court and dulypunished, the lawful orders, processes and authority of this Court would be a mockery andrendered useless by the stubborn resistance and defiance of the respondent.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court thatrespondent and her armed goons be declared and punished for contempt of Court until suchtime that she turns over the produce of the landholdings in question which she harvestedillegally and until such time that she fully complies with the interlocutory order of this Court.

Petitioners pray for such other relief and remedies just and equitable under the premises.

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Iloilo City, October 3, 1962.

E. I. Soriano Jr. and V. E. AragonaCounsel for the PetitionersLopez Bros. Bldg., Iznart StreetIloilo City

By:

(sgd.) VICENTE E. ARAGONA JR.

The complainant's testimony is to the effect that (1) on October 2, 1962 she was not in Balasan butin Iloilo City where she testified at the trial of C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255 after which she left for herhome which is situated also in Iloilo City; (2) the distance between Balasan and Iloilo City is 135kilometers, and to reach Balasan from Iloilo City one has to travel four hours by car or six hours bybus; (3) although she knows that the person Albert, mentioned in the motion, is Alberto Boneta, ahelper of Carlos Fuentes, one of the tenants she had placed on the lands involved in the C.A.R.cases she never met or saw Boneta or Fuentes from the time she was informed of the interlocutoryorder dated June 21, 1962 in the aforesaid cases, until October 2, 1962 when the said Alberto Bonetaand several armed men allegedly harvested the crops on the lands in question; (4) she did not orderBoneta to harvest the said crops; and (5) she never visited the aforesaid lands in 1962. Heruncontradicted testimony lends credence to her claim that she did not order Alberto Boneta toharvest, with the aid of armed men, the crops on the Aglinao brothers' landholdings.

Nonetheless, this Court is loath to uphold the view that the preparation and the filing of thequestioned motion for contempt, furnish sufficient basis for disciplinary action against the respondent.

In People vs. Aquino 3 this Court laid down the decisional authority that

[S]tatement made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged — that is,

privileged regardless of defamatory tenor and of the presence of malice — if the same arerelevant, pertinent or material to the cause in hand or subject of the inquiry. And that, in view ofthis, the person who makes them — such as a judge, lawyer , or witness — does not therebyincur the risk of being found liable thereon in a criminal prosecution or an action for therecovery of damages. (emphasis supplied)

Since there is no doubt that the allegations made by the respondent in the questioned motion forcontempt are statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding — i.e., in C.A.R. cases 1254and 1255 — besides being relevant, pertinent or material to the subject-matter of the said cases, theyare absolutely privileged, thereby precluding any liability on the part of the respondent.

To be sure, the charges levelled by the respondent against the complainant in the questionedpleading lack sufficient factual basis. But even this circumstance will not strengthen the complainant'sposition. "The privilege is not affected by factual or legal inaccuracies in the utterances made in thecourse of judicial proceedings." 4 In fact, "Even when the statements are found to be false, if there isprobable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle ofprivilege may still cover the mistake of the individual .... The privilege is not defeated by the mere factthat the communication is made in intemperate terms .... A privileged communication should not besubjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessivescrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communications. Theultimate test is that of bona fides ." 5

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Indeed, the actuations of the respondent were motivated by the legitimate desire to serve theinterests of his clients. For, contrary to the complainant's claim, the respondent did not rely merely onMrs. Soriano's telegram (exh. 5) when he prepared the motion for contempt. According to hisunrebutted testimony, when Mr. Soriano brought to him the said telegram on October 2, 1962, heasked the former whether his wife, the sender of the telegram, was coming to Iloilo City, and, wheninformed that she was arriving, he waited for her. True enough Mrs. Soriano saw the respondent inthe afternoon of that same day and informed him that she was personally present when one Albert, atenant of the complainant, accompanied by several armed men, went to the landholdings of the

Aglinao brothers and, against the objections of the latter, harvested the palay crop thereon, and thatupon her inquiry, she was informed that they were acting upon orders of the complainant.

Considering that the foregoing information which impelled the respondent to file the questionedmotion for contempt, was obtained by him first-hand from someone who claimed to have actuallywitnessed the incident in question, coupled with the complainants own admission that the Albertreferred to by Mrs. Soriano was indeed a helper of Carlos Fuentes, one of the tenants whom she hadillegally placed once on the landholdings of the Aglinao brothers, it was not unseemly for therespondent to assume that Albert did act at the behest of the complainant. After all, the complainanthad, in the past, committed the same forcible act of entering the said landholdings on June 18, 1963,only two days after she had assured the agrarian court that she would not disturb or interfere with the

Aglinao brothers' possession, pending final resolution of the petitions filed by them against her. Intruth it is precisely such forcible entry into the said lands that precipitated the issuance of the veryinterlocutory order dated June 21, 1962 which the respondent accused her of disobeying in hismotion for contempt. Unquestionably, the aforenarrated circumstances provided the respondent aprobable cause for belief in the truthfulness of the allegations which he couched in rather intemperatelanguage in his motion for contempt. He had merely acted in righteous indignation over the wrongsupposedly done to his aggrieved clients — believing as he did in the truth of his charges — withoutdeliberate intention whatsoever to malign and villify the complainant.

The doctrine of privileged communication is not an idle and empty principle. It has been distilledfrom wisdom and experience. "The privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those

engaged in the public service and in the enactment and administration of law, as for the promotion ofthe public welfare, the purpose being that members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors,lawyers , and witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective functions withoutincurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages." 6 Lawyers, mostespecially, should be allowed a great latitude of pertinent comment in the furtherance of the causesthey uphold, and for felicity of their clients they may be pardoned some infelicities of language. 7

The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the individual attorney himself, as tosafeguard the administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from the misconduct ofofficers of the court, and to remove from the profession of law persons whose disregard for their oathof office have proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the

bar. 8

Thus, the power to disbar attorneys ought always to be exercised with great caution, and only inclear cases of misconduct which seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as anofficer of the court and member of the bar. 9

In this case, there is no evidence whatsoever tending to prove unfitness of the respondent tocontinue in the practice of law and remain an officer of the court.

ACCORDINGLY, the administrative complaint against the respondent is hereby dismissed.

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A.C. No. 492 September 5, 1967

OLEGARIA BLANZA and MARIA PASION, complainants,vs.ATTY. AGUSTIN ARCANGEL, respondent.

BENGZON, J.P., J .:

Complainants Olegaria Blanza and Maria Pasion ask this Court to take disciplinary action againstrespondent Atty. Agustin Arcangel for professional non-feasance. They complain that way back in

April, 1955, respondent volunteered to help them in their respective pension claims in connection withthe deaths of their husbands, both P.C. soldiers, and for this purpose, they handed over to him thepertinent documents and also affixed their signatures on blank papers. But subsequently, theynoticed that since then, respondent had lost interest in the progress of their claims and when theyfinally asked for the return of their papers six years later, respondent refused to surrender them.

Respondent answered these accusations before Fiscal Raña to whom this case was referred by theSolicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. He admitted having received thedocuments from complainants but explainer that it was for photostating purposes only. His failure toimmediately return them, he said, was due to complainants' refusal to hand him the money to pay forthe photostating costs which prevented him from withdrawing said documents from the photostatservice. Anyway, he had already advanced the expenses himself and turned over, on December 13,1961, the documents, their respective photostats and the photostat service receipt to the fiscal.

Finding respondent's explanation satisfactory and considering that he charged complainants nothingfor his services, Fiscal Raña recommended the former's exoneration, or at most, that he bereprimanded only. The Solicitor General, however, feels that respondent deserves at least a severereprimand considering (1) his failure to attend to complainants' pension claims for six years; (2) hisfailure to immediately return the documents despite repeated demands upon him, and (3) his failureto return to complainant Pasion, allegedly, all of her documents.

At the hearing of the case before this Court on October 21, 1963, only respondent, thru counsel,appeared. In lieu of oral arguments, therefore, respondent submitted his memorandum, annexingtherewith an affidavit executed by Olegaria Blanza asking for the dismissal of the administrativecase. 1

Respondent first submits that he was not obliged to follow up complainants' pension claims sincethere was no agreement for his compensation as their counsel. Respondent, however, overlooks thefact that he volunteered his professional services and thus was not legally entitled to recover fees. 2 But having established the attorney-client relationship voluntarily, he was bound to attend tocomplainants' claims with all due diligence.

Nevertheless, We find the evidence adduced insufficient to warrant the taking of disciplinary actionagainst respondent attorney. There is no clear preponderance of evidence substantiating theaccusations against him. 3

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Respondent's explanation for the delay in filing the claims and in returning the documents has notbeen controverted by complainants. On the contrary, they admitted 4 that respondent asked them toshoulder the photostating expenses but they did not give him any money therefor. Moreover, thedocuments and their photostats were actually returned by respondent during the fiscal's investigationwith him paying for the photostating costs himself. And the condition of the photostats themselves — they appear to have been in existence for quite some time 5 — supports respondent's allegation thatthey remained in possession of the photostat service for the failure of the owners (respondents and/orcomplainants), to withdraw the same upon payment of the corresponding costs. Hence, complainantsthemselves are partly to blame for the delay in filing their respective claims. 1awphîl.nèt

As for the alleged failure of respondent to return all her documents to complainant Pasion, the formerdenies this. Fiscal Raña made no findings on the matter. The affidavit of Mrs. Blanza pardoningrespondent cannot prejudice complainant Pasion because res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet .Still, there is equiponderance of evidence which must necessarily redound to respondent's benefit.Complainant Pasion had another opportunity to substantiate her charges in the hearing set forOctober 21, 1963 but she let it go. Neither she nor her counsel of record appeared.

But while We are constrained to dismiss the charges against respondent for being legally insufficient,yet We cannot but counsel against his actuations as a member of the bar. A lawyer has a more

dynamic and positive role in the community than merely complying with the minimal technicalities ofthe statute. As a man of law, he is necessarily a leader of the community, looked up to as a modelcitizen. His conduct must, perforce, be par excellence, especially so when, as in this case, hevolunteers his professional services. Respondent here has not lived up to that ideal standard. It wasunnecessary to have complainants wait, and hope, for six long years on their pension claims. Upontheir refusal to co-operate, respondent should have forthwith terminated their professional relationshipinstead of keeping them hanging indefinitely. And altho We voted that he not be reprimanded, in alegal sense, let this be a reminder to Atty. Arcangel of what the high standards of his chosenprofession require of him.

Accordingly, the case against respondent is dismissed. So ordered.

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[A.C. No. 6492. November 18, 2004]

MELANIO L. ZORETA, com pla inant , vs . ATTY. HEHERSON ALNOR G. SIMPLICIANO,r e sponden t .

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:

This is a complaint for disbarment filed against Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano for allegedlynotarizing several documents during the year 2002 after his commission as notary public had expired.

Complainant Melanio L. Zoreta alleged that on 02 August 2001, he filed before Branch 4 of theRegional Trial Court of Antipolo City, a complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages againstSecurity Pacific Assurance Corporation (SPAC) dated 22 June 2001 due to the latter’s failure tohonor SPAC’s Commercial Vehicle Policy No. 94286, where respondent Atty. Heherson Alnor G.Simpliciano was the latter ’s counsel. In said cases, respondent who was not a duly commissionedNotary Public in 2002 per Certifications [1] issued by the Clerk of Court of Quezon City Mercedes S.Gatmaytan, performed acts of notarization, as evidenced by the following documents, viz :

1. Verification [2] executed by Aurora C. Galvez, President of defendant SPAC,subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on February 18,2002 as alleged notary public, in Quezon City and attached to defendants’ Very UrgentMotion (1) To Lift the Order of Default; and (2) To defer Plaintiff’s Presentation ofEvidence Ex-Parte dated February 18, 2002;

2. Affidavits of Meri t[3] signed by Aurora Galvez attached to the pleading mentioned inpar. 1 hereof, likewise notarized by Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano as alleged―Notary Public‖ in Quezon City, on February 18, 2002;

3. The Affidavit of Service [4] signed by a certain Renee L. Ramos, a Legal Assistant inSimpliciano and Capela Law Office, and subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Heherson

Alnor G. Simpliciano on February 19, 2002 as alleged ―Notary Public‖ in Quezon City. Said Affidavit of Service was attached to the pleading mentioned in Par. 1 hereof;

4. The Affidavit of Service [5] of one Nestor Abayon, another Legal Assistant ofSimpliciano and Capela Law Office, subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Heherson

Alnor G. Simpliciano on 01 April 2002 at Quezon City, as ―Notary Public.‖ This Affidavitof Service was attached to defendants’ Motion (1) For Reconsideration of the Orderdated 05 March 2002; and (2) To allow defendants to Present Defensive Evidencedated 27 March 2002.

5. The Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping [6] signed this time by acertain Celso N. Sarto, as affiant, ―notarized‖ on 16 August 2002 by Atty. Heherson

Alnor G. Simpliciano. This Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping wasattached to defendant’s Motion For Extens ion of Time To File Petition Under Rule 65before the Court of Appeals;

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/nov2004/ac_6492.htm#_ftn1












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6. The Affidavit of Service [7] signed by a certain Joseph B. Aganan, another Legal Assistant in Simpliciano and Capela Law Office subscribed and sworn to before Atty.Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano as ―Notary Public‖ on 16 August 2002. This Affidavit ofService signed by Aganan was also attached to that Motion For Extension of Time ToFile Petition under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals;

7. Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping [8] executed by one Celso N.Sarto, alleged Executive Vice President and Claims Manager of defendant SPAC and―notarized‖ by Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on 19 August 2002, attached to thePetition for Certiorari and Prohibition, etc., filed before the Court of Appeals; and

8. Affidavit of Service [9] signed by a certain Joseph B. Aganan, Legal Assistant ofSimpliciano and Capela Law Office, subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Heherson

Alnor G. Simpliciano on 19 August 2002, as alleged ‖Notary Public‖ for Quezon Citywith notarized commission to expire by December 31, 2002.

On 23 April 2003, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) of Pasig required respondent Atty.Simpliciano to submit his answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order .[10]

On 26 May 2003, counsel of respondent filed an ex-parte motio n[11] for extension of time to fileanswer.

On 30 June 2003, petitioner filed a motion [12] to resolve the complaint after the extension requestedby respondent ended on 30 May 2003, and almost a month had lapsed from 30 May 2003, with nocomment or pleading filed by respondent.

On 17 July 2003, Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro issued an order ,[13] giving respondent a lastchance to file his answer, otherwise the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution. Respondentfailed to do so.

Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro submitted her report and recommendation [14] dated 12 February2004, pertinent portions of which read:

A careful examination and evaluation of the evidence submitted by the petitioner showed thatrespondent notarized up to Document No. 590, Page 118, Book No. II, Series of 2002 and hiscommission expires December 31, 2002 which referred to the Affidavit of Service signed andexecuted by Joseph B. Aganan Legal Assistant of Simpliciano and Capela Law Office subscribed andsworn to before Notary Public Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano whose commission expires December31, 2002.

All the other documents aforementioned were entered in Boo k II of respondent’s alleged notarial book

which reflected that his commission expires on December 31, 2002 as notary public.

However, the Clerk of Court of Quezon City in her certification dated October 4, 2002 stated that asper records on file with their office respondent was not duly commissioned notary public for and inQuezon City for the year 2002.

Another certification issued by the Clerk of Court of RTC Quezon City dated April 15, 2003 showedthat as per records on file with their office respondent was commissioned notary public for and inQuezon City from January 14, 2000 to December 31, 2001 and for the year 2002 and 2003 he did notapply for notarial commission for Quezon City.

















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It is evident from the foregoing that when respondent notarized the aforementioned documents, hewas not commissioned as notary public, which was in violation of the Notarial Law; for havingnotarized the 590 documents after the expiration of his commission as notary public without havingrenewed said commission amounting to gross misconduct as a member of the legal profession.

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing the Undersigned respectfully recommends the revocation ofrespondent’s commission as notary public permanently if he is commissioned as such at present andhis suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months from receipt hereof furnishingthe IBP Chapter where he is a registered member a copy hereof for implementation should thisrecommendation be approved by the Honorable members of the Board of Governors .[15]

Per Resolution No. XVI-2004-236 dated 16 April 2004, the Board of Governors modified the reportand recommendation of Commissioner Navarro of suspension of three (3) months to a suspension ofsix (6) months .[16]

We concur in the finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent Atty. Simpliciano did nothave a commission as notary public in 2002 when he notarized the assailed documents as evidencedby the two (2) certifications issued by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon Citydated 04 October 2002 .[17] Records also show, and as confirmed by IBP Commissioner Navarro,

that as of 02 August 2002, respondent had already notarized a total of 590 documents .[18] Theevidence presented by complainant conclusively establishes the misconduct imputed to respondent.

The eight (8) notarized documents for the year 2002 submitted by complainant, consisting ofaffidavits of merit, certifications and verifications against non-forum shopping, and affidavits ofservice, were used and presented in the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 74, in CivilCase No. 01-6240, and in responde nt’s petition for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals.

Against the evidence presented by complainant, respondent did not even attempt to present anyevidence. His counsel filed an ex-parte motion for extension to file answer, which was granted, butno answer was forthcoming. Still, Hearing Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro gave respondent a last

chance to file his answer; which was again unheeded. Thus, respondent was unable to rebutcomplainant’s evidence that he was not so commissioned for the year in question. His lack of interestand indifference in presenting his defense to the charge and the evidence against him can only meanhe has no strong and valid defense to offer. Conclusively, respondent Atty. Simpliciano is not a dulycommissioned Notary Public for and in Quezon City for the year 2002.

At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed bythe State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications requiredby law for the conferment of such privilege .[19] Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened withconditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only during good behavior and canonly be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after

opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or right,an attorney’s right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend him, based onconduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of anattorney. It must be understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring him as an attorney is toremove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with theduties and responsibilities belonging to an office of attorney, and thus to protect the public and thosecharged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish an attorney .[20] Elaborating on this,we said in Maligsa v. Cabanting [21] that ―[t]he bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiencyas well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfullyperforming his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a member ofthe legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence







http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/may1997/ac_4539.htm












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and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession. ‖[22]Towards this end, an attorney may be disbarred, or suspended for any violation of his oath or of hisduties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule138 of the Rules of Court, all of these being broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of alawyer in his professional or private capacity .[23]

Apropos to the case at bar, it has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty,meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those whoare qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarilyrequires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon thepublic, the courts, and the administrative offices in general. It must be underscored that thenotarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document making thatdocument admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity. A notarial document is by lawentitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmostcare the basic requirements in the performance of their duties .[24]

The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a merecasual formality. The Court has characterized a lawyer’s act of notar izing documents without therequisite commission therefore as ―reprehensible, constituting as it does not only malpractice but also

x x x the crime of falsification of public documents. ‖[25] For such reprehensible conduct, the Courthas sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the practice of law, revocation of the notarialcommission and disqualification from acting as such, and even disbarment .[26]

In the case of Nunga v. Viray ,[27] the Court had occasion to state that where the notarization of adocument is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization orcommission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing anotarial without such com mission is a violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, morespecifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when heis not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, wh ich the lawyer’soath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1

of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: ―A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.‖

By such misconduct as a notary public, the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7 of the same Code, whichdirects every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.

On different occasions, this Court had disbarred or suspended lawyers for notarizing documents withan expired commission:

1. In Flores v. Lozada ,[28] the court disbarred a lawyer who notarized six documents such asthe extrajudicial partition of an estate, deed of sale with right of repurchase, and four (4)

deeds of absolute sale - all involving unregistered lands, after his commission as NotaryPublic expired;

2. In Joson v. Baltazar ,[29] the court suspended the lawyer for three (3) months since onlyone (1) instance of unauthorized notarization of a deed of sale was involved.

3. In Nunga v. Viray ,[30] the court suspended the lawyer for three (3) years when henotarized an absolute deed of sale of the buyer minor, who was his son and, at the sametime, he was a stockholder and legal counsel of the vendor bank, and when he entered inhis notarial registry an annotation of the cancellation of the loan in favor of a certain bank,at a time when he was not commissioned as a Notary Public. What aggravated





















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respondent’s unlawful notarization was the fact that the transaction involved was in favor ofhis son, who was then only eighteen years old and, therefore, a minor.

4. In Buensuceso v. Barrera ,[31] the lawyer was suspended for one (1) year when henotarized five (5) documents such as a complaint for ejectment, affidavit, supplementalaffidavit, a deed of sale and a contract to sell, after his commission as Notary Publicexpired.

Needless to state, respondent cannot escape from disciplinary action in his capacity as a notarypublic and as a member of the Philippine Bar. However, the penalty recommended by the Board ofGovernors of the IBP must be increased. Respondent must be barred from being commissioned as anotary public permanently and suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.

WHEREFORE , this Court hereby adopts the findings of Investigating Commissioner Lydia A.Navarro, which the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted andapproved, but hereby MODIFIES the penalty recommended by the Board of Governors. As modified,respondent ATTY. HEHERSON ALNOR G. SIMPLICIANO is hereby BARRED PERMANENTLY frombeing commissioned as Notary Public. He is furthermore SUSPENDED from the practice of law fortwo (2) years, effective upon receipt of a copy of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Court Administrator aswell as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and recorded in thepersonal files of respondent himself.

SO ORDERED.



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A-1 FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.,Complainant,

- versus -

ATTY. LAARNI N. VALERIO,

Respondent.

A.C. No. 8390

[Formerly CBD 06-1641]

Present:

CORONA, C.J. ,

CARPIO,

CARPIO-MORALES,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION,

PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR.,

PEREZ, and

MENDOZA, JJ .

Promulgated:

July 2, 2010

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

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Canon 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of theland and promote respect for law and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral ordeceitful conduct.

In the instant case, there is no denial of the existence of the loan obligation despite

respondent’s failure to cooperate before any proceedings in relation to the complaint. Prior to thefiling of the complaint against her, Atty. Valer io’s act of making partial payments of the loan and

interest suffices as proof that indeed there is an obligation to pay on her part. Respondent’s mother,

Mrs. Valerio, likewise, acknowledged her daughter’s obligation.

The Court, likewise, finds unmeri torious Mrs. Valerio’s justification that her daughter, Atty.

Valerio, is suffering from a health condition, i.e. schizophrenia , which has prevented her from properly

answering the complaint against her. Indeed, we cannot take the ―medical certificate‖ on its face,

considering Mrs. Valerio’s failure to prove the contents of the certificate or present the physician whoissued it.

Atty. Valerio’s conduct in the course of the IBP and court proceedings is also a matter of

serious concern. She failed to answer the complaint against her. Despite due notice, she failed to

attend the disciplinary hearings set by the IBP. She also ignored the proceedings before the court as

she likewise failed to both answer the complaint against her and appear during her arraignment,

despite orders and notices from the court. Clearly, this conduct runs counter to the precepts of the

Code of Professional Responsibility and violates the lawyer’s oath which imposes upon every

member of the Bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. Atty. Valerio has failed to live up to

the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In Ngayan v. Tugade, [11] we ruled that ―[a lawyer’s] failure to answer the complaint against

him and his failure to appear at the investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful

orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule

138 of the Rules of Court.

We come to the penalty imposable in this case.

In Lao v. Medel ,[12] we held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of

worthless checks constitute gross misconduct for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-year

suspension from the practice of law. The same sanction was imposed on the respondent-lawyer in

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Rangwani v. Dino, [13] having found guilty of gross misconduct for issuing bad checks in payment of a

piece of property, the title to which was only entrusted to him by the complainant.

However, in this case, we deem it reasonable to affirm the sanction imposed by the IBP-CBD,

i.e ., Atty. Valerio was ordered suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years,[14] because,

aside from issuing worthless checks and failing to pay her debts, she has also shown wanton

disregard of the IBP’s and Court Orders in the course of the proceedings.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-647 dated December 11, 2008 of the IBP, which

found respondent Atty. Laarni N. Valerio guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the Code of

Professional Responsibility, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION . She is hereby SUSPENDED for

two (2) years from the practice of law, effective upon the receipt of this Decision. She is warned that a

repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to

the personal record of Atty. Valerio as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and

the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and

guidance.

This Decision shall be immediately executory.

SO ORDERED .

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BAR MATTER No. 1222 September 23, 2003

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your inform at ion , is a resolu t ion of th e Cour t En Banc d ated September 23, 2003.

"Bar Matter No. 1222.- Re: 2003 Bar Examinations.- Acting on the report and recommendation by theChairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee concerning the examination conducted on themorning of September 21, 2003 on the subject of Mercantile Law, the Court Resolved to:

(a) NULLIFY the examination on this subject, in view of the Court's findings which affect theintegrity of the examination in Mercantile Law; and

(b) HOLD another examination in Mercantile Law on Saturday October 4, 2003, eight o'clock inthe evening (being the earliest available time and date) at the same venue (De La SalleUniversity, Taft Avenue, Manila.)

This resolution is without prejudice to any further action the Court may take on the matter."

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO Clerk of Court

Jose C. Vitug (x) Associate Justice andChairman, 2003 Bar ExaminationsSupreme Court

Atty. Ma. Cristina B. Layusa (x)Deputy Clerk of Courtand Bar ConfidantOffice of the Bar ConfidantSupreme Court

Ms. Carmelita I Quebegco (x)Executive Vice President

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RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS B.M. No. 1222

x ---------------------------------------- x

ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN,

Petitioner, Present:

Puno, C .J .,

Quisumbing,

Ynares-Santiago,

Carpio,

Austria-Martinez,

Corona,

Carpio Morales,

Tinga,

Chico-Nazario,

Velasco, Jr.,

Nachura,

Leonardo-De Castro,

Brion,

Peralta, and

Bersamin, JJ .

Promulgated:

April 24, 2009

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

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Thereafter, petitioner focused on his studies, taking up Bachelor of Arts inPolitical Science and eventually pursuing Bachelor of Laws. In his second year in lawschool, he was elected as the President of the Student Council of the Institute of Law ofthe Far Eastern University (FEU). Here, he spearheaded various activities including theconduct of seminars for law students as well as the holding of bar operations for barexaminees.

Despite his many extra-curricular activities as a youth and student leader,petitioner still managed to excel in his studies. Thus, he was conferred an AcademicExcellence Award upon his graduation in Bachelor of Laws.

Upon admission to the bar in April 1999, petitioner immediately enteredgovernment service as a Legal Officer assigned at the Sangguniang Bayan of Taguig.Simultaneously, he also rendered free legal services to less fortunate residents ofTaguig City who were then in need of legal assistance.

In March 2000, petitioner was hired as one of the Associate Lawyers at theBalgos and Perez Law Offices. It was during his stay with this firm when his craft as alawyer was polished and developed. Despite having entered private practice, hecontinued to render free legal services to his fellow Taguigeños.

Then in February 2004, by a sudden twist of fate, petitioner’s flourishing careerwas cut short as he was stripped of his license to practice law for his allegedinvolvement in the leakage in the 2003 Bar Examinations.

Devastated, petitioner then practically locked himself inside his house to avoidthe rather unavoidable consequences of his disbarment.

On March 2004, however, petitioner was given a new lease in life when he wastaken as a consultant by the City Government of Taguig. Later, he was designated as amember of the Secretariat of the People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB). For the nextfive (5) years, petitioner concentrated mainly on rendering public service.

Petitioner humbly acknowledged the damaging impact of his act whichunfortunately, compromised the integrity of the bar examinations. As could be bornefrom the records of the investigation, he cooperated fully in the investigation conductedand took personal responsibility for his actions. Also, he has offered his sincerestapologies to Atty. Balgos, to the Court as well as to all the 2003 bar examinees for the

unforeseen and unintended effects of his actions.Petitioner averred that he has since learned from his mistakes and has taken the

said humbling experience to make him a better person.

Meanwhile, as part of his Petition, petitioner submitted the following testimonialsand endorsements of various individuals and entities all attesting to his good moralcharacter:

1) Resolution No. 101, Series of 2007, ―Resolution Expressing FullSupport to Danilo G. De Guzman in his Application for Judicial Clemency,

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Endorsing his Competence and Fitness to be Reinstated as a Member ofthe Philippine Bar and for Other Purposes‖ dated 4 June 2007 of theSangguniang Panlungsod, City of Taguig;

2) ―Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ngSoutheast People’s Village Homeowners Association, Inc. (SEPHVOA)

kay Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ngKapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang KakayahanUpang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado‖ dated 1June 2007 of the Southeast People’s Village Homeowners Association,Inc. (SEPHVOA), Ibayo-Tipas, City of Taguig;

3) ―Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ngSamahang Residente ng Mauling Creek, Inc. (SAREMAC) kay G. DaniloG. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at

ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibaliksa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado‖ dated 1 June 2007 ofthe Samahang Residente ng Mauling Creek, Inc. (SAREMAC), LowerBicutan, City of Taguig;

4) ―Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglal ayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ngSamahan ng mga Maralita (PULONG KENDI) Neighborhood Association,Inc. (SAMANA) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang PetisyongMagawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa

Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ngIsang Abogado‖ dated 1 June 2007 of the Samahan ng mga Maralita(PULONG KENDI) Neighborhood Association, Inc. (SAMANA), Sta. Ana,City of Taguig;

5) ―An Open Letter Attesting Personally to the Competence andFitness of Danilo G. De Guzman as to Warrant the Grant of JudicialClemency and his Reinstatement as Member of the Philippine Bar‖ dated 8 June 2007 of Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino, Laogan, Trespeses andLlantino Law Offices;

6) ―Testimonial to the Moral and Spiritual Competence of Danilo G. DeGuzman to be Truly Deserving of Judicial Clemency and Compassion‖dated 5 July 2007 of Rev. Fr. Paul G. Balagtas, Parish Priest,

Archdiocesan Shrine of St. Anne;

7) ―Testimonial Letter‖ dated 18 February 2008 of Atty. Loreto C. Ata,President, Far Eastern University Law Alumni Association (FEULAA), FarEastern University (FEU);

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8) ―Isang Bukas na Liham n a Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ngSamahang Bisig Kamay sa Kaunlaran, Inc. (SABISKA) kay G. Danilo G.De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at angBoluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik saKanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado‖ dated 8 July 2008 of theSamahang Bisig Kamay sa Kaunlaran, Inc. (SABISKA);

9) Board Resolution No. 02, Series of 2008, ―A ResolutionRecognizing the Contrib utions of Danilo G. De Guzman to the People’sLaw Enforcement Board (PLEB) – Taguig City, Attesting to his UtmostDedication and Commitment to the Call of Civic and Social Duty and forOther Purposes‖ dated 11 July 2008 of the People’s Law EnforcementBoard (PLEB);

10) ―A Personal Appeal for the Grant of Judicial Forgiveness andCompassion in Favor of Danilo G. De Guzman‖ dated 14 July 2008 of

Atty. Edwin R. Sandoval, Professor, College of Law, San SebastianCollege – Recoletos;

11) ―An Open Letter Personally Attesting to the Moral competence andFitness of Danilo G. De Guzman‖ dated 5 September 2008 of Mr. Nixon F.Faderog, Deputy Grand [Kn]ight, Knights of Columbus and President,General Parent-Teacher Association, Taguig National High School, LowerBicutan, Taguig City;

12) ―Testimonial Letter‖ dated 5 September 2008 of Atty. Primitivo C.Cruz, President, Taguig Lawyers League, Inc., Tuktukan, Taguig City;

13) ―Testimonial Letter‖ dated 21 October 2008 of Judge Hilario L. Laqui,Presiding Judge, Regional Trail Court (RTC), Branch 218, Quezon City;and

14) ―Testimonial Letter‖ dated 28 October 2008 of Justice Oscar M.Herrera, former Justice, Court of Appeals and former Dean, Institute ofLaw, Far Eastern University (FEU).

Citing the case of In Re: Carlos S. Basa , petitioner pleaded that he be afforded

the same kindness and compassion in order that, like Atty. Basa, his promising futuremay not be perpetually foreclosed. In the said case, the Court had the occasion to say:

Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars ofCalifornia and the Philippine Islands. Recently, he was charged in the Court ofFirst Instance of the City of Manila with the crime of abduction with consent, wasfound guilty in a decision rendered by the Honorable M.V. De Rosario, Judge ofFirst Instance, and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two years,eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional. On appeal, this decision

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was affirmed in a judgment handed down by the second division of the SupremeCourt.

x x x x

When come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which should betaken by the court, we do so regretfully and reluctantly. On the one hand, theviolation of the criminal law by the respondent attorney cannot be lightly passedover. On the other hand, we are willing to strain the limits of our compassion tothe uttermost in order that so promising a career may not be utterly ruined.

Petitioner promised to commit himself to be more circumspect in his actions andsolemnly pledged to exert all efforts to atone for his misdeeds.

There may be a reasonable ground to consider the herein Petition.

In the case of Re: Petition of Al Argosino to Take the Lawyer’s Oath (BarMatter 712), which may be applied in the instant case, the Court said:

After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys andpractice the legal profession with the following admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer’s oath, the Court recognizesthat Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the variouscertifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civicduties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts, to atone

for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of thedoubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash,temerarious and uncalculating.

x x x x

Meanwhile, in the case of Rodolfo M. Bernardo vs. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia(Administrative Case No. 2984) , the Court [in] deciding whether or not to reinstate

Atty. Mejia to the practice of law stated:

The Court will take into consideration the applicant’s character and

standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s forwhich he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment and the timethat has elapsed in between the disbarment and the application forreinstatement.

Petitioner was barely thirty (30) years old and had only been in the practice oflaw for five (5) years when he was disbarred from the practice of law. It is of no doubtthat petitioner had a promising future ahead of him where it not for the decision of theCourt stripping off his license.

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Petitioner is also of good moral repute, not only before but likewise, after hisdisbarment, as attested to overwhelmingly by his constituents, colleagues as well aspeople of known probity in the community and society.

Way before the petitioner was even admitted to the bar, he had alreadymanifested his intense desire to render public service as evidenced by his activeinvolvement and participation in several social and civic projects and activities.Likewise, even during and after his disbarment, which could be perceived by some as adebilitating circumstance, petitioner still managed to continue extending his assistanceto others in whatever means possible. This only proves petitioner’s strength of characterand positive moral fiber.

However, still, it is of no question that petitioner’s act in copying the examinat ionquestions from Atty. Balgos’ computer without the latter’s knowledge and consent, andwhich questions later turned out to be the bar examinations questions in Mercantile Lawin the 2003 Bar Examinations, is not at all commendable. While we do believe thatpetitioner sincerely did not intend to cause the damage that his action ensued, still, hemust be sanctioned for unduly compromising the integrity of the bar examinations aswell as of this Court.

We are convinced, however, that petitioner has since reformed and has sincerelyreflected on his transgressions. Thus, in view of the circumstances and likewise forhumanitarian considerations, the penalty of disbarment may now be commuted tosuspension. Considering the fact, however, that petitioner had already been disbarredfor more than five (5) years, the same may be considered as proper service of saidcommuted penalty and thus, may now be allowed to resume practice of law.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended thatthe instant Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated 10 November 2008 ofpetitioner DANILO G. DE GUZMAN be GRANTED. Petitioner’s disbarment is nowcommuted to suspension, which suspension is considered as served in view of thepetitioner’s five (5) year disbarment. Hence, petitioner may now be allowed to resumepractice of law.

The recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant is well-taken in part. We deem

petitioner worthy of clemency to the extent of commuting his penalty to seven (7) years suspension

from the practice of law, inclusive of the five (5) years he has already served his disbarment.

Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders. [2] While

the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show

compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose. [3]

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In cases where we have deigned to lift or commute the supreme penalty of disbarment

imposed on the lawyer, we have taken into account the remorse of the disbarred lawyer [4] and the

conduct of his public life during his years outside of the bar. [5] For example, in Valencia v. Antiniw

we held:

However, the record shows that the long period of respondent's disbarment gavehim the chance to purge himself of his misconduct, to show his remorse andrepentance, and to demonstrate his willingness and capacity to live up once again to theexacting standards of conduct demanded of every member of the bar and officer of thecourt. During respondent's disbarment for more than fifteen (15) years to date for hisprofessional infraction, he has been persistent in reiterating his apologies and pleas forreinstatement to the practice of law and unrelenting in his efforts to show that he hasregained his worthiness to practice law, by his civic and humanitarian activities andunblemished record as an elected public servant, as attested to by numerous civic andprofessional organizations, government institutions, public officials and members of the

judiciary. [6]

And in Bernardo v. Atty. Mejia , [7] we noted:

Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejia’s disbarment, it also cannotclose its eyes to the fact that Mejia is already of advanced years. While the age of thepetitioner and the length of time during which he has endured the ignominy ofdisbarment are not the sole measure in allowing a petition for reinstatement, the Courttakes cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992, no othertransgression has been attributed to him, and he has shown remorse. Obviously, he

has learned his lesson from this experience, and his punishment has lasted longenough. x x x

Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated the remorse expected of him considering the gravity of

his transgressions. Even more to his favor, petitioner has redirected focus since his disbarment

towards public service, particularly with the People’s Law Enforcement Board. The attestations

submitted by his peers in the community and other esteemed members of the legal profession, such

as retired Court of Appeals Associate Justice Oscar Herrera, Judge Hilario Laqui, Professor Edwin

Sandoval and Atty. Lorenzo Ata, and the ecclesiastical community such as Rev. Fr. Paul Balagtas

testify to his positive impact on society at large since the unfortunate events of 2003.

Petitioner’s subsequent track record in public service affords the Court some hope that if he

were to reacquire membership in the Philippine bar, his achievements as a lawyer would redound to

the general good and more than mitigate the stain on his record. Compassion to the petitioner is

warranted. Nonetheless, we wish to impart to him the following stern warning:

8/10/2019 PALE Set 1


―Of all classe s and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws.He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and overridethe laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bands of society, arguesrecreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinateand dangerous elements of the body politic.‖ [8]

WHEREFORE , in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion is

hereby GRANTED IN PART . The disbarment of DANILO G. DE GUZMAN from the practice of law is

hereby COMMUTED to SEVEN (7) YEARS SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW

reckoned from February 4, 2004.

SO ORDERED.

PALE Set 1

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