SECOND DIVISIONHUMBERTO C. LIM, JR.,in behalf of PENTA RESORTS CORPORATION/Attorney-in- Fact of LUMOT A. JALANDONI,Complainant,Present:-v e r s u s-CORONA,ATTY. NICANOR V. VILLAROSA, Respondent.Promulgated:Humberto C. Lim Jr.[1]filed a verified complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa on July 7, 2000.[2]On February 19, 2002, respondent moved for the consolidation of the said complaint with the following substantially interrelated cases earlier filed with the First Division of this Court:1.Administrative Case No. 5463: Sandra F. Vaflor v. Atty. Adoniram P. Pamplona and Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa;2.Administrative Case No. 5502: Daniel A. Jalandoni v. Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa.In a resolution dated February 24, 2003, this Court considered Administrative Case No. 5463 closed and terminated.[3]On February 4, 2004, considering the pleadings filed in Administrative Case No. 5502, the Court resolved:(a)to NOTE the notice of the resolution dated September 27, 2003 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dismissing the case against respondent for lack of merit; and(b)to DENY, for lack of merit, the petition filed by complainant praying that the resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dismissing the instant case be reviewed and that proper sanctions be imposed upon respondent.[4]No motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid denial in Administrative Case No. 5502 appears in the records.The Court is now called upon to determine the merits of this remaining case (A.C. No. 5303) against respondent.The complaint read:AS FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION- II -That respondent is a practicing lawyer and a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental Chapter. That sometime on September 19, 1997, Lumot A. Jalandoni, Chairman/President of PRC was sued before RTC, Branch 52 in Civil Case No. 97-9865, RE: Cabiles et al. vs. Lumot Jalandoni, et al.The latter engaged the legal services of herein respondent who formally entered his appearance on October 2, 1997 as counsel for the defendants Lumot A. Jalandoni/Totti Anlap Gargoles. Respondent as a consequence of said Attorney-Client relationship represented Lumot A. Jalandoni et al in the entire proceedings of said case.Utmost trust and confidence was reposed on said counsel, hence delicate and confidential matters involving all the personal circumstances of his client were entrusted to the respondent.The latter was provided with all the necessary information relative to the property in question and likewise on legal matters affecting the corporation (PRC) particularly [involving] problems [which affect] Hotel Alhambra.Said counsel was privy to all transactions and affairs of the corporation/hotel.- III -That it was respondent who exclusively handled the entire proceedings of afore-cited Civil Case No. 97-9865 [and] presented Lumot A. Jalandoni as his witness prior to formally resting his case.However, on April 27, 1999respondent, without due notice prior to a scheduled hearing, surprisingly filed a Motion to withdraw as counsel, one day before its scheduled hearing on April 28, 1999. A careful perusal of said Motion to Withdraw as Counsel will conclusively show that no copy thereof was furnished to Lumot A. Jalandoni, neither does it bear her conformity.No doubt, such notorious act of respondent resulted to (sic) irreparable damage and injury to Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al since the decision of the court RTC, Branch 52 proved adverse to Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. The far reaching effects of the untimely and unauthorized withdrawal by respondent caused irreparable damage and injury to Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al; a highly meritorious case in favor of his client suddenly [suffered] unexpected defeat.- IV -That the grounds alleged by respondent for his withdrawal as counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. was that he is [a] retained counsel of Dennis G. Jalbuena and the Fernando F. Gonzaga, Inc. It was Dennis G. Jalbuena who recommended him to be the counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al.It is worthy to note that from the outset, respondent already knew that Dennis G. Jalbuena is the son-in-law of Lumot A. Jalandoni being married to her eldest daughter, Carmen J. Jalbuena.The other directors/officers of PRC were comprised of the eldest sibling of the remaining children of Lumot A. Jalandoni made in accordance with her wishes, with the exception of Carmen J. Jalbuena, the only daughter registered as one of the incorporators of PRC, obviously, being the author of the registration itself [sic]. Respondent further stated that he cannot refuse to represent Dennis G. Jalbuena in the case filed against the latter before the City Prosecutors Office by PRC/Lumot A. Jalandoni due to an alleged retainership agreement with said Dennis G. Jalbuena. [He] likewise represented Carmen J. Jalbuena and one Vicente Delfin when PRC filed the criminal complaint against them. On April 06, 1999, twenty-one (21) days prior to respondents filing of his Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al., respondent entered his appearance with Bacolod City Prosecutor OIC-Vicente C. Acupan, through a letterexpressly statingthat effective said date he was appearing as counsel for both Dennis G. Jalbuena and Carmen J. Jalbuena and Vicente Delfin in the Estafa case filed by the corporation (PRC) against them. Simply stated, as early as April 6, 1999respondent already appeared for and in behalf of the Sps. Carmen and Dennis Jalbuena/Vicente Delfin while concurrently representing Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. in Civil Case No. 97-9865. However, despite being fully aware that the interest of his client Lumot A. Jalandoni [holding an equivalent of Eighty-two (82%) percent of PRCs shares of stocks] and the interest of PRC are one and the same, notwithstanding the fact that Lumot A. Jalandoni was still his client in Civil Case No. 97-9862, respondent opted to represent opposing clients at the same time.The corporations complaint for estafa (P3,183,5525.00) was filed against the Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena together with UCPB bank manager Vicente Delfin.Succeeding events will show that respondent instead of desisting from further violation of his [lawyers] oath regarding fidelity to his client, with extreme arrogance, blatantly ignored our laws on Legal Ethics, by palpably and despicably defending the Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena in all the cases filed against them by PRC through its duly authorized representatives, before the Public Prosecutors Office, Bacolod City (PP vs. Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena for False Testimony/Perjury, viol. of Art. 183 RPC under BC I.S. No. 2000-2304; viol. of Art. 363, 364, 181 and 183 RPC under BC I.S. 2000-2343, PP vs. Carmen J. Jalbuena for viol. of Art. 315 under BC I.S. 2000-2125 and various other related criminal cases against the Sps. Dennis and Carmen Jalbuena).AS SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION- I -There is no dispute that respondent was able to acquire vast resources of confidential and delicate information on the facts and circumstances of [Civil Case No. 97-9865] when Lumot A. Jalandoni was his client which knowledge and information was acquired by virtue of lawyer-client relationship between respondent and his clients.Using the said classified information which should have been closely guarded respondent did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously conspired and confabulated with the Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena in concocting the despicable and fabricated charges against his former clients denominated as PP vs. Lumot A. Jalandoni, Pamela J. Yulo, Cristina J. Lim and Leica J. Lim for viol. of Art. 172 of Revised Penal Code due to a board resolution executed by the corporation which the Sps. Jalbuena, with the assistance of herein respondent, claimed to have been made without an actual board meeting due to an alleged lack of quorum, [among other things].Were it not for said fiduciary relation between client and lawyer, respondent will not be in a position to furnish his conspirator spouses with confidential information on Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC, operator of Alhambra Hotel.- II -Adding insult to injury, respondent opted to deliberately withhold the entire case file including the marked exhibits of the Cabiles case for more than three (3) months after his untimely unilateral withdrawal therefrom, despite repeated demands from [his] client.On July 26, 1999, capitalizing on his knowledge of the indispensability of said documents particularly the marked exhibits, which deadline to file the formal offer of exhibits was continually impressed upon the new counsel by the court, respondent suddenly interposed an amount of five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos as consideration prior to or simultaneous to the turnover of said documents. [On] July 29, 1999, left with no other alternative owing to the urgency of the situation, PRC issued Check No. 2077686 for P5,000.00 in payment thereof.This was duly received by respondents office on the same date. Such dilatory tactics employed by respondent immensely weakened the case of Lumot A. Jalandoni eventually resulting to (sic) an adverse decision against [her].Further demonstrating before this Honorable Court the notoriety of respondent in representing conflicting interest which extended even beyond the family controversy was his improper appearance in court in Civil Case No. 99-10660, RE: Amy Albert Que vs. Penta Resorts Corp., this time favoring the party opponent of defendant who is even outside the family circle.During the pre-trial hearing conducted on May 5, 1999, while still [holding] exclusive possession of the entire case file of his client in Civil Case No. 97-9865, respondent brazenly positioned himself beside Atty. Adoniram P. Pamplona, counsel of plaintiff [in] a suit against his client Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC, coaching said counsel on matters [he was privy to] as counsel of said client.Facts mentioned by said counsel of the plaintiff starting from the last par. of page 25 until and including the entire first par. of page 26 were the exact words dictated by respondent. The entire incident was personally witnessed by herein complainant [who was] only an arms length away from them during the hearing. However, the particular portion showing the said irregular acts of respondent was deliberately excluded by the court stenographer from the transcript, despite her detailed recollection and affirmation thereof to herein complainant. This prompted the new counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC to complain to the court why Atty. Nicanor Villarosa was coaching Atty. Pamplona in such proceedings. Said corrections were only effected after repeated demands to reflect the actual events which [transpired] on said pre-trial.[5](emphasis ours)In an addendum to the July 4, 2000 complaint, Lim also pointed to certain acts of respondent which allegedly violated the Rules of Court perpetration of falsehood and abuse of his influence as former public prosecutor. These supposedly affected the status of the cases that Lim filed against the clients of respondent.[6]In a motion to dismiss dated October 30, 2000, respondent claimed that the complainant violated Circular No. 48-2000 because, in his verification, Lim stated:3. That [he] prepared this instant complaint for disbarment against Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa, read its contents, the same are alltrue and correct to [his] own personal knowledge and belief.[7](emphasis ours)Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that:SEC. 4.Verification.Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit. (5a)A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.A pleading required to be verified which contains verification based on information and belief or upon knowledge, information and belief, or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. (As amended, A.M. 00-2-10, May 1, 2000.) (emphasis ours)While the Rules provide that an unsigned pleading produces no legal effect,[8]the court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it appears that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay.[9]We find that Lim was not shown to have deliberately filed the pleading in violation of the Rules.In his comment dated December 1, 2000, respondent, reiterating his ground for the dismissal of the complaint, added:[that] complainant Humberto C. Lim, Jr. has not only violated the Rule on Civil Procedure but he was/isNOTduly authorize[d] by the Penta Resorts Corp. (PRC) nor [by] Lumot A. Jalandoni to file this complaint against [him].Neither [was Lim] a proper party to file this complaint.This fact is an additional ground to have his case dismissed because Humberto C. Lim Jr. exceeded whatever authority was granted to him as embodied in a resolution and the Special Power of Attorney allegedly granted to him by the complainants.[10]To bolster his assertion that the complaint against him was unfounded, respondent presented the following version in his defense:FACTS OF THE CASEThat Mrs. Jalandoni has two sons-in-law, namely Dennis G. Jalbuena married to her daughter, Carmen J. Jalbuena, and Humberto C. Lim Jr., the herein complainant married to her daughter, Cristina J. Lim.That Mrs. Lumot Jalandoni organized a corporation namely the Penta Resorts Corporation (PRC) where she owned almost ninety seven percent (97%). In other words, in reality, Penta Resorts Corporation is a single proprietorship belonging to Mrs. Jalandoni.That the only property of the corporation is as above-stated, the Alhambra Hotel, constructed solely through the effort of the spouses Jalbuena on that parcel of land now claimed by the Cabiles family.That sometime on the year 1997 the case above-cited (Civil Case No. 97-9865) was filed before the court against the sisters.That [he], beingRETAINEDcounsel of the spouses Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena wasRECOMMENDEDby the spouses to the sisters to answer the complaint filed against themII.That as counsel to the sisters, [he] filed a Motion for Extension Of Time To File Answer and ultimately, [he] filed an Answer With Counter-Claim And Prayer For Issuance Of Writ Of Preliminary Injunction.That reading the Answer it is clear that the defense of the sisters totally rest onpublicdocuments (the various titles issued to the land in question because of the series [of changes] in ownership) and the sisters and their parents actual occupation and possession thereof.xxx xxx xxxMr. Lim[s] accusation against [him] in the light of the above-facts is the best evidence of Humberto C. Lim, Jr.s penchant for exaggeration and distortion of the truth.Since the defense of the sisters to retain ownership of the land in question is based onPUBLICdocuments,what delicate and confidential matters involving personal circumstances of the sisters allegedly entrusted to [him], is Mr. Humberto C. Lim, Jr. talking about in paragraphs I and II of his Complaint? What [privity] to all transactions and affairs of the corporation/hotel is he referring to?Whatever transactions the corporation may have been involved in or [may be getting involved into], is totally immaterial and irrelevant to the defense of the sisters.There was nothing personal [about the] circumstances of the sisters nor transactions of the corporation [which were] discussed. The documents being offered as evidence, [he] reiterate[s] for emphasis, arepublic; the presumption is that the whole world knows about them.That [he] [also] vehemently den[ies] another distorted allegation of Mr. Lim that [he] represented Mrs. Jalandoni [in] theentireproceedings of [the] case.[Lim] himself attested that [he] [filed] [his] Motion to Withdraw As Counsel, datedApril 26, 1999, before the trial court, sometime on April 27, 1999.How then could [he] have represented Mrs. Jalandoni for [the]entireproceedings of the case?Further, Mr. Limintentionallyhid from this Honorable Court the important fact that [his] Motion to Withdraw wasAPPROVEDby the trial court because of thepossibilityof a conflict of interest.xxx xxx xxx.[11]Respondent discredited Lims claim that he deliberately withheld the records of the cited civil case.He insisted that it took him just a few days, not three months, to turn over the records of the case to Lim.[12]While he admitted an oversight in addressing the notice of the motion to withdraw as counsel to Mrs. Totti Anlap Gargoles instead of Mrs. Jalandoni at Hotel Alhambra, he maintained that it was the height of hypocrisy to allege that Mrs. Jalandoni was not aware of his motion to withdraw[13]since Mrs. Gargoles is Mrs. Jalandonis sister and Hotel Alhambra is owned by PRC which, in turn, actually belongs to Mrs. Jalandoni. Respondent also argued that no prejudice was suffered by Mrs. Jalandoni because she was already represented by Atty. Lorenzo S. Alminaza from the first hearing date.[14]In fact, respondent contended, it was he who was not notified of the substitution of counsels.[15]As to the bill ofP5,000, respondent stated:That Mr. Lim begrudge[s] [him] for billing Mrs. Jalandoni Five Thousand (Php5,000.00) Pesos. Mr. Humberto C. Lim Jr. convenientlyforgetsthat the net worth of the property together with its improvements, under litigation in that Cabiles, et al. vs. Gargoles et al. case, is a minimum ofTHIRTY MILLION (Php30,000,000.00) PESOSthen, and more so now.[He] cannot find any law which prohibits a counsel from billing a client for services in proportion to the services he rendered.[16]In view of these developments, respondent was adamant that:the only real question to be answered in this complaint iswhy Mr. Lim so consistently [determined] to immerse the Jalandoni family [in] a series of criminal and civil suits and to block all attempts to reconcile the family by prolonging litigations, complaints and filing of new ones in spite of the RESOLUTION of the corporation and the UNDERTAKING of the members.[17]On June 18, 2001, the Court resolved to refer the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation.Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro made the following report and recommendation:After going over the [pieces of evidence] submitted by the parties[,] the undersigned noted that from the onset, PRC had a case wherein respondent was its counsel.Later on, complainant had a case against spouses Jalbuena where the parties were related to each other and the latter spouses were represented by the respondent as their retained counsel; after respondent had allegedly withdrawn as counsel for the complainant in Civil Case No. 97-9865.Being the husband of one of the complainants which respondent himself averred in his answer, it is incumbent upon Humberto Lim Jr. to represent his wife as one of the representatives of PRC and Alhambra Hotel in the administrative complaint to protect not only her interest but that of the [familys].From the facts obtaining, it is evident that complainant had a lawyer-client relationship with the respondent before the latter [was] retained as counsel by the Spouses Jalbuena when the latter were sued by complainants representative.We cannot disregard the fact that on this situation for some reason or another there existed some confidentiality and trust between complainants and respondent to ensure the successful defense of their cases.Respondent for having appeared as counsel for the Spouses Jalbuena when charged by respondents former client Jalandoni of PRC and Alhambra Hotel, represented conflicting interests in violation of the Canon of Professional Responsibility.As such therefore, the Undersigned has no alternative but to respectfully recommend the suspension of the respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months from receipt hereof.RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.Pasig City, June 20, 2002.[18]The IBP Board of Governors (Board), however, reversed the recommendation of the investigating commissioner and resolved to dismiss the case on August 3, 2002.[19]Lumot A. Jalandoni filed a motion for reconsideration (MR) on October 18, 2002 but the Board denied the MR since it no longer had jurisdiction to considerand resolve a matter already endorsed to this Court.[20]Before delving into the core issues of this case, we need to address some preliminary matters.Respondent argues that the alleged resolution of PRC and the special power of attorney given by Lumot A. Jalandoni to Humberto did not contemplate the filing of an administrative complaint.[21]Citing the Rules of Court, respondent said that:[s]uch complaints are personal in nature and therefore, the filing of the same, cannot bedelegatedby the alleged aggrieved party to any third person unless expressly authorized by law.We must note, however, the following:SECTION 1.How instituted.Proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Courtmotu propio,or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint ofany person.The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits or persons havingpersonal knowledgeof the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents a may substantiate said facts.The IBP Board of Governors may,motu propioor upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, orat the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against any erring attorneys.[22](emphasis ours)Complaints against members of the Bar are pursued to preserve the integrity of the legal profession, not for private vendetta.Thus, whoever has such personal knowledge of facts constituting a cause of action against erring lawyers may file a verified complaint with the Court or the IBP.[23]Corollary to the public interest in these proceedings is the following rule:SEC. 11.Defects.No defect in a complaint, notice, answer, or in the proceeding or the Investigators Report shall be considered as substantial unless the Board of Governors, upon considering the whole record,finds that such defect has resulted or may result in a miscarriage of justice, in which event the Board shall take such remedial action as the circumstances may warrant, including invalidation of the entire proceedings.[24](emphasis ours)Respondent failed to substantiate his allegation that Lims complaint was defective in form and substance, and that entertaining it would result in a miscarriage of justice.For the same reason, we will no longer put in issue the filing at the onset of a motion to dismiss by respondent instead of an answer or comment.[25]The core issues before us now are:1.whether there existed a conflict of interest in the cases represented and handled by respondent, and2.whether respondent properly withdrew his services as counsel of record in Civil Case No. 97-9865.CONFLICT OF INTERESTPetitioners alleged that as an offshoot of representing conflicting interests, breach of attorney-client confidentiality and deliberate withholding of records were committed by respondent. To effectively unravel the alleged conflict of interest, we must look into the cases involved.InCivil Case No. 97-9865, respondent represented Lumot A. Jalandoni and Totti Anlap Gargoles.This was a case for the recovery of possession of property involving Hotel Alhambra, a hotel owned by PRC.InBC I.S. No. 99-2192,Lim v. Vicente Delfin, Spouses Dennis and Carmen Jalbuena, respondent was counsel for Delfin and the spouses Jalbuena. In this case, plaintiff Cristina Lim sued the spouses Jalbuena and Delfin on the basis of two checks issued by PRC for the construction of Hotel Alhambra.[26]The corporate records allegedly reflected that the contractor, AAQ Sales and Construction (AAQSC), was already paid in full yet Amy Albert Que of AAQSC still filed a collection case against PRC for an unpaid balance.[27]In her complaint-affidavit, Cristina averred:11. That it was respondent Carmen J. Jalbuena, who took advantage of [her] signatures in blank in DBP Check Nos. 0865590 and 0865591, and who filled up the spaces of the payee, date and amount without the knowledge and consent of any officer of the corporation and [herself], after which she caused the delivery of the same checks to her husband Dennis Jalbuena, who encashed without [their] knowledge and consent, and received the proceeds of the same checks (as evidenced by his signature in receipt of payment on the dorsal side of the said checks) with the indispensable participation and cooperation of respondent Vicente B. Delfin, the Asst. Vice President and Branch Head of UCPB.[28]Notably, in his comment, respondent stated:There was a possibility of conflict of interest because by this time, or one monthbefore[he] filed [his] Motion to Withdraw, Mrs. Jalandoni /Penta Resorts Corporation, Mr. Lim, through hiswife,Cristina J. Lim, byanother counsel, Atty. Lorenzo S. Alminaza, filed a criminal complaint against the spouses Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena on March 26, 1999 under BC-I.S. Case No. 99-2192.[29]Similarly, inBC I.S. Nos. 00-1370, 2000-2304, 2000-2343, 00-2125, 00-2230, 00-880, respondent positioned himself against PRCs interests.And, inCivil Case No. 99-10660, a collection case against PRC, Atty. Alminaza of PRC was alarmed by the appearance of respondent at the table in court for AAQSCs counsel.[30]Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) highlights the need forcandor, fairness and loyalty in all the dealings of lawyers with their clients. Rule 15.03 of the CPR aptly provides:Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.It is only upon strict compliance with the condition of full disclosure of facts that a lawyer may appear against his client; otherwise, his representation of conflicting interests is reprehensible.[31]Conflict of interest may be determined in this manner:There is representation of conflicting interestsif the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matterin which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.[32](emphasis ours)The rule on conflict of interests covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided but alsothose in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.[33]Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof, and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquire in the previous employment.The first part of the rule refers to cases in which the opposing parties are present clients eitherin the same action or in a totally unrelated case; the second part pertains to those in which the adverse party against whom the attorney appears is his former clientin a matter which is related, directly or indirectly,to the present controversy.[34](emphasis ours)The rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or in totally unrelated cases.The cases here directly or indirectly involved the parties connection to PRC, even if neither PRC nor Lumot A. Jalandoni was specifically named as party-litigant in some of the cases mentioned.An attorney owes to his client undivided allegiance.After being retained and receiving the confidences of the client, he cannot, without the free and intelligent consent of his client, act both for his client and for one whose interest is adverse to, or conflicting with that of his client in the same general matter.The prohibition stands even if the adverse interest is very slight; neither is it material that the intention and motive of the attorney may have been honest.[35](emphasis ours)The representation by a lawyer of conflicting interests, in the absence of the written consent of all parties concerned after a full disclosure of the facts, constitutes professional misconduct which subjects the lawyer to disciplinary action.[36]Even respondents alleged effort to settle the existing controversy among the family members[37]was improper because the written consent of all concerned was still required.[38]A lawyer who acts as such in settling a dispute cannot represent any of the parties to it.[39]WITHDRAWAL AS COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASE NO. 97-9865The next bone of contention was the propriety of respondents withdrawal as counsel for Lumot A. Jalandoni in Civil Case No. 97-9865 to fulfill an alleged retainership agreement with the spouses Jalbuena in a suit by PRC, through Cristina Lim, against the Jalbuenas and Delfin (BC I.S. No. 99-2192).In his December 1, 2000 comment, respondent stated that it was he who was not notified of the hiring of Atty. Alminaza as the new counsel in that case and that he withdrew from the case with the knowledge of Lumot A. Jalandoni and with leave of court.The rule on termination of attorney-client relations may be summarized as follows:The relation of attorney and client may be terminated by the client, by the lawyer or by the court, or by reason of circumstances beyond the control of the client or the lawyer.The termination of the attorney-client relationship entails certain duties on the part of the client and his lawyer.[40]Accordingly, it has been held that the right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is considerably restricted.Canon 22 of the CPR reads:Canon 22 A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances.An attorney may only retire from a case either by written consent of his client or by permission of the court after due notice and hearing, in which event the attorney should see to it that the name of the new lawyer is recorded in the case.[41]A lawyer who desires to retire from an action without the written consent of his client must file a petition for withdrawal in court.[42]He must serve a copy of his petition upon his client and the adverse party at least three days before the date set for hearing, otherwise the court may treat the application as a mere scrap of paper.[43]Respondent made no such move. He admitted that he withdrew as counsel on April 26, 1999, which withdrawal was supposedly approved by the court on April 28, 1999. The conformity of Mrs. Jalandoni was only presumed by Atty. Villarosa because of the appearance of Atty. Alminaza in court, supposedly in his place.[A client] may discharge his attorney at any time with or without cause and thereafter employ another lawyer who may then enter his appearance.Thus, it has been held that a client is free to change his counsel in a pending case and thereafter retain another lawyer to represent him.That manner of changing a lawyer does not need the consent of the lawyer to be dismissed. Nor does it require approval of the court.[44]The appearance of Atty. Alminaza in fact was not even to substitute for respondent but to act as additional counsel.[45]Mrs. Jalandonis conformity to having an additional lawyer did not necessarily mean conformity to respondents desire to withdraw as counsel. Respondents speculations on the professional relationship of Atty. Alminaza and Mrs. Jalandoni find no support in the records of this case.Respondent should not have presumed that his motion to withdraw as counsel[46]would be granted by the court. Yet, he stopped appearing as Mrs. Jalandonis counsel beginning April 28, 1999, the first hearing date.No order from the court was shown to have actually granted his motion for withdrawal. Only an order dated June 4, 1999 had a semblance of granting his motion:When this case was called for hearing Atty. Lorenzo Alminaza appeared for the defendantsconsidering that Atty. Nicanor Villarosa has already withdrawn his appearance in this case which the Court considered it to be approvedas it bears the conformity of the defendants.[47](emphasis ours)That Mrs. Jalandoni continued with Atty. Alminazas professional engagement on her behalf despite respondents withdrawal did not absolve the latter of the consequences of his unprofessional conduct, specially in view of the conflicting interests already discussed. Respondent himself stated that his withdrawal from Civil Case No. 97-9865 was due to the possibility of a conflict of interest.[48]Be that as it may, the records do not support the claim that respondent improperly collectedP5,000 from petitioner.Undoubtedly, respondent provided professional services to Lumot A. Jalandoni.Furthermore, there is no evidence that the documents belonging to Mrs. Jalandoni were deliberately withheld. The right of an attorney to retain possession of a clients documents, money or other property which may have lawfully come into his possession in his professional capacity, until his lawful fees and disbursements have been fully paid, is well-established.[49]Finally, we express our utter dismay with Lims apparent use of his wifes community tax certificate number in his complaint for disbarment against respondent.[50]This is not, however, the forum to discuss this lapse.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa is hereby foundGUILTYof violating Canon 15 and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and isSUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for one (1) year, effective upon receipt of this decision, with aSTERN WARNINGthat a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.Let a copy of this resolution be entered into the records of respondent and furnished to the Office of the Clerk of Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the Philippines, for their information and guidance.
A.C. No. 6160 March 30, 2006 NESTOR PEREZ ,Complainant, vs. ATTY. DANILO DE LA TORRE,In a letter-complaint1dated July 30, 2003 addressed to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., complainant Nestor Perez charged respondent Atty. Danilo de la Torre with misconduct or conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for representing conflicting interests.Perez alleged that he is the barangay captain of Binanuaanan, Calabanga, Camarines Sur; that in December 2001, several suspects for murder and kidnapping for ransom, among them Sonny Boy Ilo and Diego Avila, were apprehended and jailed by the police authorities; that respondent went to the municipal building of Calabanga where Ilo and Avila were being detained and made representations that he could secure their freedom if they sign the prepared extrajudicial confessions; that unknown to the two accused, respondent was representing the heirs of the murder victim; that on the strength of the extrajudicial confessions, cases were filed against them, including herein complainant who was implicated in the extrajudicial confessions as the mastermind in the criminal activities for which they were being charged.Respondent denied the accusations against him. He explained that while being detained at the Calabanga Municipal Police Jail, Avila sought his assistance in drafting an extrajudicial confession regarding his involvement in the crimes of kidnapping for ransom, murder and robbery. He advised Avila to inform his parents about his decision to make an extrajudicial confession, apprised him of his constitutional rights and of the possibility that he might be utilized as a state-witness.Respondent claimed that when Ilo sought his assistance in executing his extrajudicial confession, he conferred with Ilo in the presence of his parents; and only after he was convinced that Ilo was not under undue compulsion did he assist the accused in executing the extrajudicial confession.The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.2On August 16, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner submitted his report with the following recommendation:WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Danilo de la Torre be suspended for one (1) year from the practice of the legal profession for violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.The Board of Governors of the IBP modified the recommendation by increasing the period of suspension to two years.In finding the respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests, the Investigating Commissioner opined that:In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in his complaint. The complainant was able to prove by substantial evidence his charge against Atty. de la Tor[r]e. The respondent admitted that his services as a lawyer were retained by both Avila and Ilo. Perez was able to show that at the time that Atty. de la Torre was representing the said two accused, he was also representing the interest of the victims family. This was declared by the victims daughter, Vicky de Chavez, who testified before Branch 63 of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur that her family retained the services of Atty. Danilo de la Torre to prosecute the case against her fathers killers. She even admitted that she was present when Atty. de la Torre met with and advised Avila and Ilo on one occasion. This is proof that the respondent consciously offered his services to Avila and Ilo despite the fact that he was already representing the family of the two accuseds victim. It may not even be improbable that respondent purposely offered to help the accused in order to further his other clients interest. The respondent failed to deny these facts or offer competent evidence to refute the said facts despite the ample opportunity given him.Under Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Respondent is therefore duty bound to refrain from representing two parties having conflicting interests in a controversy. By doing precisely the foregoing, and without any proof that he secured the written consent of both parties after explaining to them the existing conflict of interest, respondent should be sanctioned.We agree with the findings of the IBP except for the recommended penalty.There is conflict of interests when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.3There is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.4The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is founded on principles of public policy and good taste. In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the clients case, including the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of impropriety and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.5To negate any culpability, respondent explained that he did not offer his legal services to accused Avila and Ilo but it was the two accused who sought his assistance in executing their extrajudicial confessions. Nonetheless, he acceded to their request to act as counsel after apprising them of their constitutional rights and after being convinced that the accused were under no compulsion to give their confession.The excuse proferred by the respondent does not exonerate him from the clear violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits a lawyer from representing conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.As found by the IBP, at the time respondent was representing Avila and Ilo, two of the accused in the murder of the victim Resurreccion Barrios, he was representing the family of the murder victim. Clearly, his representation of opposing clients in the murder case invites suspicion of double-dealing and infidelity to his clients.What is unsettling is that respondent assisted in the execution by the two accused of their confessions whereby they admitted their participation in various serious criminal offenses knowing fully well that he was retained previously by the heirs of one of the victims. Respondent, who presumably knows the intricacies of the law, should have exercised his better judgment before conceding to accuseds choice of counsel. It did not cross his mind to inhibit himself from acting as their counsel and instead, he even assisted them in executing the extrajudicial confession.Considering that this is respondents first infraction, disbarment as sought by the complaint is deemed to be too severe. Under the present circumstances, we find that a suspension from the practice of law for three years is warranted.WHEREFORE, Atty. Danilo de la Torre is found GUILTY of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests. He is SUSPENDED for THREE YEARS from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP, as well as on the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance.LETICIA GONZALES VS ATTY. MARCELINO CABUCANA,
Before this Court is a complaint filed by Leticia Gonzales (Gonzales) praying that Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, (respondent) be disbarred for representing conflicting interests.On January 8, 2004, Gonzales filed a petition before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) alleging that: she was the complainant in a case for sum of money and damages filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Santiago City, docketed as Civil Case No. 1-567 where she was represented by the law firm CABUCANA, CABUCANA, DE GUZMAN AND CABUCANA LAW OFFICE, with Atty. Edmar Cabucana handling the case and herein respondent as an associate/partner; on February 26, 2001, a decision was rendered in the civil case ordering the losing party to pay Gonzales the amount ofP17,310.00 with interest andP6,000.00 as attorneys fees; Sheriff Romeo Gatcheco, failed to fully implement the writ of execution issued in connection with the judgment which prompted Gonzales to file a complaint against the said sheriff with this Court; in September 2003, Sheriff Gatcheco and his wife went to the house of Gonzales; they harassed Gonzales and asked her to execute an affidavit of desistance regarding her complaint before this Court; Gonzales thereafter filed against the Gatchecos criminal cases for trespass, grave threats, grave oral defamation, simple coercion and unjust vexation; notwithstanding the pendency of Civil Case No. 1-567, where respondents law firm was still representing Gonzales, herein respondent represented the Gatchecos in the cases filed by Gonzales against the said spouses; respondent should be disbarred from the practice of law since respondents acceptance of the cases of the Gatchecos violates the lawyer-client relationship between complainant and respondents law firm and renders respondent liable under the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) particularly Rules 10.01,[1]13.01,[2]15.02,[3]15.03,[4]21.01[5]and 21.02.[6]On January 9, 2004, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline ordered Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. to submit his Answer to the complaint.[7]In his Answer, respondent averred: He never appeared and represented complainant in Civil Case No. 1-567 since it was his brother, Atty. Edmar Cabucana who appeared and represented Gonzales in said case. He admitted that he is representing Sheriff Gatcheco and his wife in the cases filed against them but claimed that his appearance ispro bonoand that the spouses pleaded with him as no other counsel was willing to take their case. He entered his appearance in good faith and opted to represent the spouses rather than leave them defenseless. When the Gatchecos asked for his assistance, the spouses said that the cases filed against them by Gonzales were merely instigated by a high ranking official who wanted to get even with them for their refusal to testify in favor of the said official in another case. At first, respondent declined to serve as counsel of the spouses as he too did not want to incur the ire of the high-ranking official, but after realizing that he would be abdicating a sworn duty to delay no man for money or malice, respondent entered his appearance as defense counsel of the spouses free of any charge. Not long after, the present complaint was crafted against respondent which shows that respondent is now the subject of a demolition job. The civil case filed by Gonzales where respondents brother served as counsel is different and distinct from the criminal cases filed by complainant against the Gatcheco spouses, thus, he did not violate any canon on legal ethics.[8]Gonzales filed a Reply contending that the civil case handled by respondents brother is closely connected with the cases of the Gatchecos which the respondent is handling; that the claim of respondent that he is handling the cases of the spousespro bonois not true since he has his own agenda in offering his services to the spouses; and that the allegation that she is filing the cases against the spouses because she is being used by a powerful person is not true since she filed the said cases out of her own free will.[9]The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP sent to the parties a Notice of Mandatory Conference dated March 1, 2004.[10]On the scheduled conference, only a representative of complainant appeared.[11]Commissioner Demaree Raval of the IBP-CBD then directed both parties to file their respective verified position papers.[12]Complainant filed a Memorandum reiterating her earlier assertions and added that respondent prepared and notarized counter-affidavits of the Gatcheco spouses; that the high-ranking official referred to by respondent is Judge Ruben Plata and the accusations of respondent against the said judge is an attack against a brother in the profession which is a violation of the CPR; and that respondent continues to use the name of De Guzman in their law firm despite the fact that said partner has already been appointed as Assistant Prosecutor of Santiago City, again in violation of the CPR.[13]Respondent filed his Position Paper restating his allegations in his Answer.[14]On August 23, 2004, Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes issued an Order notifying both parties to appear before his office on October 28, 2004 for a clarificatory question regarding said case.[15]On the said date, only respondent appeared[16]presenting a sworn affidavit executed by Gonzales withdrawing her complaint against respondent. It reads:SINUMPAANG SALAYSAYTUNGKOL SA PAG-UURONG NG DEMANDAAko, siLETICIA GONZALES, nasa tamang edad, Pilipino, may asawa, at nakatira sa BarangayDubinan East, Santiago City, makaraang manumpa ayon sa batas ay nagsasabing:Ako ang nagdedemanda opetitionersaCBD Case No. 04-1186na may pamagat naLeticia Gonzales versus Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr.na kasalukuyang nahaharap saCommission on Bar DisciplinengIntegrated Bar of thePhilippinesAng pagkakahain ng naturang demanda ay nag-ugat sa di-pagkakaintindihan na namamagitan sa akin at ninaMr. and Mrs. Romeo and Anita Gatcheco.Dahil sa aking galit sa naturang mag-asawa, idinawit ko siAtty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr.sa sigalot na namamagitan sa akin at sa mag-asawangGatcheco,gayong nalalaman ko na siAtty. Marcelino C. Cabucanaay walang nalalaman sa naturang di pagkakaintindihan.Makaraang pag-isipang mabuti ang paghain ko ng demanda kontra kayAtty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr.,nakumbinsi ako na ang pagdedemanda ko kayAtty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr.ay isang malaking pagkakamali dahil siya ay walang kinalalaman (sic) sa di pagkakaintindihan naming(sic) ng mag-asawang Gatcheco.SiAtty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr.ay di ko rin naging abogado saCivil Case No. 1-567 (MTCC Br. I Santiago City)na inihain ko kontra kayEduardo Mangano.Nais kong ituwid ang lahat kung kayat aking iniuurong ang naturang kasong inihain ko kontra kayAtty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr.at dahil dito ay hindi na ako interesado pang ituloy and naturang kaso, at aking hinihiling sa kinauukulan na dismisin na ang naturang kaso.Ginawa ko ang sinumpaang salaysay na ito upang patotohanan sa lahat ng nakasaad dito.[17]Commissioner Reyes issued an Order dated October 28, 2004 requiring Gonzales to appear before him on November 25, 2004, to affirm her statements and to be subject to clarificatory questioning.[18]However, none of the parties appeared.[19]On February 17, 2005, only respondent was present. Commissioner Reyes then considered the case as submitted for resolution.[20]On February 24, 2005, Commissioner Reyes submitted his Report and Recommendation, portions of which are quoted hereunder:The Undersigned Commissioner believes that the respondent made a mistake in the acceptance of the administrative case of Romeo Gatcheco, however, the Commission (sic) believes that there was no malice and bad faith in the said acceptance and this can be shown by the move of the complainant to unilaterally withdraw the case which she filed against Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. However, Atty. Cabucana is reminded to be more careful in the acceptance of cases as conflict of interests might arise.It is respectfully recommended that Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. (be) sternly warned and reprimanded andadvised to be more circumspect and careful in accepting cases which might result in conflict of interests.[21]On June 25, 2005, a Resolution was passed by the Board of Governors of the IBP, to wit:RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2005-153CBD CASE NO. 03-1186Leticia Gonzales vs.Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr.RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that respondent made (a) mistake in the acceptance of the administrative case of Romeo Gatcheco, Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. is hereby WARNED and REPRIMANDED and advised to be more circumspect and careful in accepting cases which might result in conflict of interests.[22]Before going to the merits, let it be clarified that contrary to the report of Commissioner Reyes, respondent did not only represent the Gatcheco spouses in the administrative case filed by Gonzales against them. As respondent himself narrated in his Position Paper, he likewise acted as their counsel in the criminal cases filed by Gonzales against them.[23]With that settled, we find respondent guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.It is well-settled that a lawyer is barred from representing conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.[24]Such prohibition is founded on principles of public policy and good taste as the nature of the lawyer-client relations is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.[25]Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.[26]One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.[27]
As we expounded in the recent case ofQuiambao vs. Bamba,[28]The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyers respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.[29]The claim of respondent that there is no conflict of interests in this case, as the civil case handled by their law firm where Gonzales is the complainant and the criminal cases filed by Gonzales against the Gatcheco spouses are not related, has no merit. The representation of opposing clients in said cases, though unrelated, constitutes conflict of interests or, at the very least, invites suspicion of double-dealing which this Court cannot allow.[30]Respondent further argued that it was his brother who represented Gonzales in the civil case and not him, thus, there could be no conflict of interests. We do not agree. As respondent admitted, it was their law firm which represented Gonzales in the civil case. Such being the case, the rule against representing conflicting interests applies.As we explained in the case ofHilado vs. David:[31][W]e can not sanction his taking up the cause of the adversary of the party who had sought and obtained legal advice from his firm; this, not necessarily to prevent any injustice to the plaintiff but to keep above reproach the honor and integrity of the courts and of the bar. Without condemning the respondents conduct as dishonest, corrupt, or fraudulent, we do believe that upon the admitted facts it is highly inexpedient. It had the tendency to bring the profession, of which he is a distinguished member, into public disrepute and suspicion and undermine the integrity of justice.[32]The claim of respondent that he acted in good faith and with honest intention will also not exculpate him as such claim does not render the prohibition inoperative.[33]In the same manner, his claim that he could not turn down the spouses as no other lawyer is willing to take their case cannot prosper as it is settled that while there may be instances where lawyers cannot decline representation they cannot be made to labor under conflict of interest between a present client and a prospective one.[34]Granting also that there really was no other lawyer who could handle the spouses case other than him, still he should have observed the requirements laid down by the rules by conferring with the prospective client to ascertain as soon as practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client then seek the written consent of all concerned after a full disclosure of the facts.[35]These respondent failed to do thus exposing himself to the charge of double-dealing.We note the affidavit of desistance filed by Gonzales. However, we are not bound by such desistance as the present case involves public interest.[36]Indeed, the Courts exercise of its power to take cognizance of administrative cases against lawyers is not for the purpose of enforcing civil remedies between parties, but to protect the court and the public against an attorney guilty of unworthy practices in his profession.[37]In similar cases where the respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting interests a penalty ranging from one to three years suspension was imposed.[38]We shall consider however as mitigating circumstances the fact that he is representing the Gatcheco spousespro bonoand that it was his firm and not respondent personally, which handled the civil case of Gonzales. As recounted by complainant herself, Atty. Edmar Cabucana signed the civil case of complainant by stating first the name of the law firm CABUCANA, CABUCANA, DE GUZMAN AND CABUCANA LAW OFFICE, under which, his name and signature appear; while herein respondent signed the pleadings for the Gatcheco spouses only with his name,[39]without any mention of the law firm. We also note the observation of the IBP Commissioner Reyes that there was no malice and bad faith in respondents acceptance of the Gatchecos cases as shown by the move of complainant to withdraw the case.Thus, for violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and taking into consideration the aforementioned mitigating circumstances, we impose the penalty of fine ofP2,000.00.WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVI-2005-153 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines isAPPROVEDwithMODIFICATIONthat respondent Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. isFINEDthe amount of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) with aSTERN WARNINGthat a commission of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.DR. GIL Y. GAMILLA, NORMA S. CALAGUAS, IRMA E. POTENCIANO, EDITHA OCAMPO, LUZ DE GUZMAN, GLICERIA BALDRES, FERDINAND LIMOS, MA. LOURDES C. MEDINA, HIDELITA GABO, CORAZON CUI, REMEDIOS T. GARCIA, RENE ARNEJO, RENE LUIS TADLE, LAURA ABARA, PHILIP AGUINALDO, BENEDICTA ALAVA, LEONCIO CASAL, CARMELITA ESPINA, ZENAIDA FAMORCA, CELSO NIERA, CESAR REYES, NATIVIDAD SANTOS and MAFEL YSRAEL,complainants, vs. ATTY. EDUARDO J. MARIO JR.,respondent.THIS DISBARMENT CASE EMANATED from an intra-union leadership dispute some seventeen (17) years ago that spilled over to the instant complaint alleging impropriety and double-dealing in the disbursement of sums of money entrusted by the University of Sto. Tomas to respondent Atty. Eduardo J. Mario Jr. as president of the UST Faculty Union and his core of officers and directors for distribution among faculty members of the university.[1]For a sense of history, sometime in 1986 respondent Atty. Mario Jr. as president of the UST Faculty Union and other union officers entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the management of UST for the provision of economic benefits amounting toP35 million.Instead of creating a harmonious relationship between the contracting parties, the collective bargaining agreement regrettably engendered disputes arising from the interpretation and implementation thereof one of which even reached this Court.[2]The 1986 collective bargaining agreement expired in 1988 but efforts to forge a new one unfortunately failed.In 1989 the faculty members of UST went on strike and as a counter-measure UST terminated the employment of sixteen (16) officers and directors of the UST Faculty Union including respondent.The dismissal precipitated anew bitter legal battles which were resolved by this Court in favor of the dismissed employees by ordering their reinstatement with back wages.[3]In 1990 Secretary of Labor Ruben D. Torres prescribed the terms and conditions of a five (5)-year collective bargaining agreement between UST and the UST Faculty Union retroactive to 1988 when the 1986 collective bargaining agreement expired.In the same year, the administration of UST and the UST Faculty Union also entered into a compromise agreement for the payment ofP7,000,000.00 from whichP5,000,000.00 was intended to settle the back wages and other claims of the sixteen (16) union officers and directors of the UST Faculty Union, including herein respondent, who were earlier ordered reinstated by this Court, and the sum ofP2,000,000.00 to satisfy the remaining obligations of UST under the 1986 collective bargaining agreement.It appears from the record that onlyP5,000,000.00 for the back wages and other claims of respondent Atty. Mario and other concerned union officers and directors was paid immediately by UST while the satisfaction of the balance ofP2,000,000.00 was apparently deferred to some unspecified time.In 1992 UST and the UST Faculty Union executed a memorandum of agreement to settle the salary increases and other benefits under the collective bargaining agreement effective 1988 for the period 1 June 1991 to 31 May 1993 for a total ofP42,000,000.00. It was agreed that the benefits accruing from 1 June 1991 to 31 October 1992 were to be taken from the sum ofP42,000,000.00 which UST would release directly to the faculty members, while the remainder of theP42,000,000.00 package would be ceded by UST to the UST Faculty Union which would then disburse the balance to cover the benefits from 1 November 1992 to 31 May 1993.The memorandum of agreement also charged the amount ofP2,000,000.00 agreed upon in the 1990 compromise agreement as well as the attorneys fees of Atty. Mario worthP4,200,000.00 against theP42,000,000.00 outlay.In accordance with the memorandum of agreement, UST took care of the disbursement ofP20,226,221.60 from the total commitment ofP42,000,000.00 to pay for the following expenses: (a)P2,000,000.00 as payment for unpaid obligations to faculty members under the 1986 collective bargaining agreement; (b)P13,833,597.96 for the salary increases of faculty members from 1 June 1991 to 31 October 1992; (c)P192,623.64 for telephone, electricity and water billings; and, (d)P4,200,000.00 paid to the UST Faculty Union as attorneys fees.The expenses left a collectible sum ofP21,773,778.40 from the obligation ofP42,000,000.00.The university however relinquished onlyP18,038,939.37 to the UST Faculty Union which wasP3,734,839.03 short of the balance ofP21,773,778.40.In the meantime, the UST Faculty Union placedP9,766,570.01 of the amount received from UST in the money market to earn as it did makeP1,146,381.27 in interest.For benefits corresponding to 1 November 1992 to 31 May 1993, the UST Faculty Union charged against the short-changed amount ofP18,038,939.37 a total ofP16,723,638.27 consisting of the following expenses: (a)P10,521,800.64 as the amount paid for salary increases beginning 1 November 1992 to 31 May 1993; (b)P578,296.31 which was refunded to the faculty members whose salaries were reduced as a result of their participation in the 1989 strike; (c)P2,045,192.97 as amount paid to the faculty members representing their December 1992 bonus; and, (d)P3,578,348.35 for reimbursements to the University of Santo Tomas.The expenses left a balance ofP5,050,140.13, i.e., the remainder ofP1,315,301.10 out of theP18,038,939.37 earlier turned over by UST to the UST Faculty Union, plus the deficit amount ofP3,734,839.03 which UST later turned over to the UST Faculty Union after previously failing to deliver the amount.To the sum ofP5,050,140.13, the UST Faculty Union added the interest earnings ofP1,146,381.27 from money market investments as well as the amount ofP192,632.64 representing the disallowed amount of expenses earlier deducted by UST from theP42,000,000.00 package.All in all, the money left in the possession of the UST Faculty Union wasP6,389,154.04 which it distributed among the faculty members in 1994.Complainants as members of the UST Faculty Union questioned the alleged lack of transparency among the officers and directors of the union in the management and disbursement of the monetary benefits for the faculty members.They initiated two (2) complaints with the Office of the Regional Director, National Capital Region, Department of Labor and Employment, one on 18 October 1995, docketed as Case No. NCR-OD-M-9412-022, and another, on 16 November 1996, docketed as Case No. NCR-OD-M-9510-028.In both pleadings, they prayed for the expulsion of the officers and directors of the union led by respondent Atty. Mario because of their alleged failure to account for the balance of theP42,000,000.00 ceded to them by UST and the attorneys fees amounting toP4,200,000.00 which they deducted from the benefits allotted to faculty members.[4]On 2 July 1997 complainants filed the instant complaint for disbarment against Atty. Mario accusing him of (a) compromising their entitlements under the 1986 collective bargaining agreement without the knowledge, consent or ratification of the union members, and worse, for onlyP2,000,000.00 when they could have received more thanP9,000,000.00; (b) failing to account for theP7,000,000.00 received by him and other officers and directors in the UST Faculty Union under the 1990 compromise agreement; (c) lack of transparency in the administration and distribution of the remaining balance of theP42,000,000.00 package under the 1992 memorandum of agreement; (d) refusal to remit and account for theP4,200,000.00 in favor of the faculty members although the amount was denominated as attorneys fees.Complainants asserted that respondent violated Rules 1.01[5]and 1.02[6]of Canon 1; Rule 15.08[7]of Canon 15; Rules 16.01,[8]16.02[9]and 16.03[10]of Canon 16; and Rule 20.04[11]of Canon 20, of theCode of Professional Responsibility.On 4 November 1997, after several extensions Atty. Mario filed his comment on the complaint.He alleged that the issues raised therein were the same issues involved in the two (2) complaints before the Bureau of Labor Relations and therefore constituted forum-shopping, and further explained that he had adequately accounted for the disbursement of the money demanded by complainants.On 18 March 1998 we referred the disbarment complaint and the comment thereon to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from notice thereof.On 18 May 1999 we received theReportof IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro as well as theResolution of 30 March 1999of the IBP Board of Governors adopting and approving theReportwhich found the complaint meritorious and suspended respondent Atty. Mario from the practice of lawuntil such time that the required detailed accounting of the questioned remittances made by UST to the UST [Faculty Union] during his incumbency as President and Legal Counsel has been officially submitted and reported to the UST [Faculty Union]and to the IBP.On 7 September 1999 respondent filed his comment on the IBPReportandResolutionand alleged the same contentions he previously asserted.On 27 October 1999 we referred the case back to the IBP for a more detailed investigation and submission of report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from notice.In the meantime, or on 27 May 1999, the Regional Director found merit in the two (2) complaints docketed as Case No. NCR-OD-M-9412-022 and Case No. NCR-OD-M-9510-028 and ordered the expulsion of respondent and the other officers and directors of the union led by respondent Atty. Mario because of their failure to account for the balance of theP42,000,000.00 that had been delivered to them by the management of UST, and their collection of exorbitant and illegal attorneys fees amounting toP4,200,000.00.[12]On 9 March 2000 the Bureau of Labor Relations in the appeal docketed as BLR-A-TR-52-25-10-99 set aside theOrderof the Regional Director.It found that the balance of theP42,000,000.00 which UST delivered to the UST Faculty Union had been fully and adequately accounted for by respondent and the other officers and directors of the union.[13]Nonetheless, the Bureau of Labor Relations ordered respondent and the other officers and directors of the union to distribute the attorneys fees ofP4,200,000.00 among the faculty members and to immediately hold the elections for union officers and directors in view of the expiration of their respective terms of office.On 16 March 2001 theDecisionof the Bureau of Labor Relations was affirmedin totoby the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60657.[14]TheDecisionof the Court of Appeals was elevated to this Court, docketed G.R. No. 149763, where the case is allegedly still pending resolution.On 25 September 2002 we received the detailedReport and Recommendationof IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro and the IBPResolutionof 3 August 2002of the Board of Governors adopting and approving theReportwhich recommended the lifting of Atty. Marios suspension from law practice since he had sufficiently accounted for the funds in question.For a start, it appears that complainants did not file a petition with this Court to review the IBPResolutionexonerating respondent from the accusations against him and lifting his suspension from the practice of law, an action otherwise required under Sec. 12, Rule 139-B of theRules of Courtif the case against respondent could still proceed in this Court.Nevertheless since the IBPResolutionis merely recommendatory, and considering further the instructional value of this case to members of the Bench, many of whom are engaged simultaneously in other businesses or professions, we find it prudent and judicious to decide the instant case once and for all.In fine, there are ethical lapses on the part of respondent Atty. Eduardo J. Mario Jr. in the manner by which he secured theP7,000,000.00 by virtue of the compromise agreement and theP4,200,000.00 attorneys fees under the memorandum of agreement. Although the record shows that the Bureau of Labor Relations found respondent as having adequately accounted for the disbursement of the funds which the UST Faculty Union received through the series of agreements with the management of UST, this Court believes that Atty. Mario failed to avoid conflict of interests, first, when he negotiated for the compromise agreement wherein he played the diverse roles of union president, union attorney and interested party being one of the dismissed employees seeking his own restitution, and thereafter, when he obtained the attorneys fees ofP4,200,000.00 without full prior disclosure of the circumstances justifying such claim to the members of the UST Faculty Union.As one of the sixteen (16) union officers and directors seeking compensation from the University of Santo Tomas for their illegal dismissal, respondent was involved in obvious conflict of interests when in addition he chose to act as concurrent lawyer and president of the UST Faculty Union in forging the compromise agreement.The test of conflict of interest among lawyers iswhether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof.[15]In the same manner, it is undoubtedly a conflict of interests for an attorney to put himself in a position where self-interest tempts, or worse, actually impels him to do less than his best for his client.Thus it has been held that an attorney or any other person occupying fiduciary relations respecting property or persons is utterly disabled from acquiring for his own benefit the property committed to his custody for management.[16]This rule is entirely independent of whether fraud has intervened as in fact no fraud need be shown; no excuse will be heard from an attorney because the rule stands on the moral obligation to refrain from placing oneself in positions that ordinarily excite conflict between self-interest and integrity.Necessarily, a lawyer cannot continue representing a client in an action or any proceeding against a party even with the clients consent after the lawyer brings suit in his own behalf against the same defendant if it is uncertain whether the defendant will be able to satisfy both judgments.[17]No doubt, a lawyer is not authorized to have financial stakes in the subject matter of the suit brought in behalf of his client.[18]In the instant case, quite apart from the issue of validity of the 1990 compromise agreement, this Court finds fault in respondents omission of that basic sense of fidelity to steer clear of situations that put his loyalty and devotion to his client, the faculty members of UST, open to question.Atty. Mario both as lawyer and president of the union was duty bound to protect and advance the interest of union members and the bargaining unit above his own.This obligation was jeopardized when his personal interest as one of the dismissed employees of UST complicated the negotiation process and eventually resulted in the lopsided compromise agreement that rightly or wrongly brought money to him and the other dismissed union officers and directors, seemingly or otherwise at the expense of the faculty members.The facts would affirm this observation.In brokering the compromise agreement, respondent receivedP5,000,000.00 as compensation for the dismissed union officials while onlyP2,000,000.00 apparently settled USTs obligations in favor of the faculty members under the 1986 collective bargaining agreement when their original claim amounted to at leastP9,000,000.00.Worse, theP2,000,000.00 concession for accountabilities demandable long ago in 1986 was paid only in 1992 under the memorandum of agreement, or a period of more than two (2) years after the execution of the compromise agreement, in contrast to the immediate payment of theP5,000,000.00 to Atty. Mario and the other union officers and directors.Respondent Atty. Mario ought to have disclosed to the members of the UST Faculty Union, if not the entire bargaining unit of faculty members, his interest in the compromise agreement as one of the dismissed union officers seeking compensation for the claim of back wages and other forms of damages, and also the reasons for reducing the claim of the faculty members from more thanP9,000,000.00 to onlyP2,000,000.00.As the record shows, the explanations for respondents actions were disclosed only years after the consummation of the compromise agreement, particularly only after the instant complaint for disbarment was filed against him, when the accounting should have been forthcoming either before or during the settlement of the labor case against the management of UST.Equally important, since respondent and the other union officers and directors were to get for themselves a lions share of the compromise as they ultimately did, Atty. Mario should have unambiguously divulged and made clear to his client the compelling probability of conflict of interests.He should have voluntarily turned over the reins of legal representation to another lawyer who could have acted on the matter with a deep sense of impartiality over the several claims against UST and an unfettered commitment to the cause of the faculty members.Furthermore, there was lack of notice and transparency in respondents dual role as lawyer and president of the UST Faculty Union when he obtainedP4,200,000.00 as attorneys fees.Without ruling on the validity of the collection of attorneys fees so as not to pre-empt the decision in G.R. No. 149763 on this issue, the record does not show any justification for such huge amount of compensation nor any clear differentiation between his legal services and his tasks as union president comprising in all probability the same duties for which he had collected a hefty compensation as attorney for the union.The situation of Atty. Mario is not any different from that of an executor or administrator of an estate who may not charge against the estate any professional fee for legal services rendered by him because his efforts as such are already paid for in his capacity as executor or administrator.[19]Indeed, he could have avoided complaints and perceptions of self-enrichment arising from the levy of attorneys fees by spelling out the terms and bases for the claim ofP4,200,000.00 since the compensation for his services as president of the union should have otherwise covered his legal services as well.Regardless of the motivations of respondent in perfecting the compromise agreement or demanding the inexplicable attorneys fees, his actions were not transparent enough to allow the bargaining unit ample information to decide freely and intelligently.Clearly, he violated Canon 15 of theCode of Professional Responsibilityrequiring every lawyer toobserve candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.Lawyers are vanguards in the bastion of justice so they are without doubt expected to have a bigger dose of service-oriented conscience and a little less of self-interest.As indispensable part of the system of administering justice, attorneys must comply strictly with the oath of office and the canons of professional ethics - a duty more than imperative during these critical times when strong and disturbing criticisms are hurled at the practice of law.The process of imbibing ethical standards can begin with the simple act of openness and candor in dealing with clients, which would progress thereafter towards the ideal that a lawyers vocation is not synonymous with an ordinary business proposition but a serious matter of public interest.The evidence on record proves that Atty. Mario failed to disclose at crucial moments significant information about the manner by which he secured theP7,000,000.00 by virtue of the compromise agreement and theP4,200,000.00 attorneys fees under the memorandum of agreement.A simple accounting of the money that he and others concerned received from UST, as well as an explanation on the details of the agreements, would have enlightened the faculty members about the probability of conflict of interests on respondents part and guided them to look for alternative actions to protect their own interests.In light of the irrefragable fact of respondents misdemeanor, a possible mitigation of his actionable conduct was that the attorneys fees and the compromise agreement were negotiated and finalized under the most strenuous circumstances where his leadership and that of his core officers and directors were incessantly challenged by complainants allegedly aided by factions within UST itself.He might also have believed that the settlement achieved immense benefits for his constituents which would not have been otherwise obtained if he had chosen to relinquish the rein of legal representation to some other lawyer.Finally, it was not improbable for him to suppose though wrongly that he could represent and in some manner serve the interests of all of them, including his own, by pushing for and seeking the approval of the agreements himself.[20]We reiterate that the objective of a disciplinary case is not so much to punish the individual attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice by sheltering the judiciary and the public from the misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court.Restorative justice not retribution is our goal in this type of proceedings.In view of this, instead of taking a more stern measure against respondent, a reprimand and a warning would be sufficient disciplinary action in accordance with our ruling inSumangil v. Sta. Romana.[21]Hence, Atty. Mario is admonished to refrain from all appearances and acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating conflict of interests, and to behave at all times with circumspection and dedication befitting a member of the Bar, especially observing candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his client.[22]WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo J. Mario Jr. is REPRIMANDED for his misconduct with a warning that a more drastic punishment will be imposed on him upon a repetition of the same act.
Attorney; conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment.Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.Section 27, Rule 138 provides that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.In a disbarment case, the Court will no longer review a final judgment of conviction. The crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. The lawyers final conviction of the crime of direct bribery clearly falls under one of the grounds for disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138. Disbarment follows as a consequence of the lawyers conviction of the crime.Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. vs. Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa.A.C. No. 7360, July 24, 2012.
FELICITAS S. QUIAMBAO,Adm. Case No. 6708 VS ATTY. NESTOR A. BAMBA,Promulgated:We are aware of the hapless fact that there are not enough lawyers to serve an exploding population. This unfortunate state of affairs, however, will not seize this Court from exercising its disciplinary power over lawyers culpable of serious indiscretions. The incidence of public force must be deployed to bear upon the community to eventually forge a legal profession that provides quality, ethical, accessible, and cost-effective legal service to our people and whose members are willing and able to answer the call to public service.In this administrative case for disbarment, complainant Felicitas S. Quiambao charges respondent Atty. Nestor A. Bamba with violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests when the latter filed a case against her while he was at that time representing her in another case, and for committing other acts of disloyalty and double-dealing.From June 2000 to January 2001, the complainant was the president and managing director of Allied Investigation Bureau, Inc. (AIB), a family-owned corporation engaged in providing security and investigation services. She avers that she procured the legal services of the respondent not only for the corporate affairs of AIB but also for her personal case. Particularly, the respondent acted as her counsel of record in an ejectment case against Spouses Santiago and Florita Torroba filed by her on 29 December 2000 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Paraaque City, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 11928. She paid attorneys fees for respondents legal services in that case.[1]About six months after she resigned as AIB president, or on 14 June 2001, the respondent filed on behalf of AIB a complaint for replevin and damages against her before the MeTC of Quezon City for the purpose of recovering from her the car of AIB assigned to her as a service vehicle. This he did without withdrawing as counsel of record in the ejectment case, which was then still pending.[2]Apart from the foregoing litigation matter, the complainant, in her Position Paper, charges the respondent with acts of disloyalty and double-dealing. She avers that the respondent proposed to her that she organize her own security agency and that he would assist her in its organization, causing her to resign as president of AIB. The respondent indeed assisted her in December 2000 in the formation of another security agency, Quiambao Risk Management Specialists, Inc., (QRMSI), which was later registered under complainants name, with the respondent as a silent partner represented by his associate Atty. Gerardo P. Hernandez. The respondent was paid attorneys fees for his legal services in organizing and incorporating QRMSI. He also planned to steal or pirate some of the more important clients of AIB. While serving as legal counsel for AIB and a silent partner of QRMSI, he convinced complainants brother Leodegario Quiambao to organize another security agency, San Esteban Security Services, Inc. (SESSI) where he (the respondent) served as its incorporator, director, and president. The respondent and Leodegario then illegally diverted the funds of AIB to fund the incorporation of SESSI, and likewise planned to eventually close down the operations of AIB and transfer the business to SESSI.[3]For his part, the respondent admits that he represented the complainant in the aforementioned ejectment case and later represented AIB in the replevin case against her. He, however, denies that he was the personal lawyer of the complainant, and avers that he was made to believe that it was part of his function as counsel for AIB to handle even the personal cases of its officers. Even assuming that the complainant confided to him privileged information about her legal interests, the ejectment case and the replevin case are unrelated cases involving different issues and parties and, therefore, the privileged information which might have been gathered from one case would have no use in the other. At any rate, it was the complainant herself who insisted that he stay as her counsel despite the perceived differences among her, her brother, and AIB over the motor vehicle subject of the replevin case. The complainant even asked him to assist her in her monetary claims against AIB.[4]The respondent also denies the charge raised by the complainant in her position paper that he agreed to be a silent partner of QRMSI through his nominee, Atty. Gerardo P. Hernandez, who was his former law partner. He declined complainants offer to assume that role and suggested Atty. Hernandez in his place; thus, 375 shares of stock were registered in Atty. Hernandezs name as consideration of his (Atty. Hernandezs) legal services as corporate secretary and legal counsel of QRMSI. The respondent also denies that he convinced complainants brother Leodegario to organize another security agency and that the funds of AIB were unlawfully diverted to SESSI. It was to complement the business of AIB, which was then in danger of collapse, that SESSI was established. Leodegarios wife and her son have the effective control over SESSI. Respondents subscribed shareholdings in SESSI comprise only 800 shares out of 12,500 subscribed shares. He serves AIB and SESSI in different capacities: as legal counsel of the former and as president of the latter.[5]In his Report and Recommendation[6]dated 31 August 2004, the investigating commissioner of the IBP found the respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests based on the following undisputed facts: first, the respondent was still complainants counsel of record in the ejectment case when he filed, as legal counsel of AIB, the replevin case against her; and second, the respondent was still the legal counsel of AIB when he advised the complainant on the incorporation of another security agency, QRMSI, and recommended his former law partner, Atty. Gerardo Hernandez, to be its corporate secretary and legal counsel and also when he conferred with Leodegario to organize another security agency, SESSI, where the respondent became an incorporator, stockholder, and president. Thus, the investigating commissioner recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year.The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the investigating commissioners report and recommendation, but reduced the penalty from one year to a stern reprimand.[7]The issue in this case is whether the respondent is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests in contravention of the basic tenets of the legal profession.Rule 15.03, Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy and good taste.[8]In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the clients case, including the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.[9]It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.[10]In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it
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