-
For Peer Review Only
A Harmonized Southeast Asia? Explanatory Typologies of
ASEAN Countries Strategies to the Rise of China
Journal: The Pacific Review
Manuscript ID: RPRE-2011-0112
Manuscript Type: Original Article
Keywords: Southeast Asia, China, Explanatory Typology, Hedging,
Bandwagoning,
Balancing
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
-
For Peer Review OnlyA Harmonized Southeast Asia?
Explanatory Typologies of ASEAN Countries Strategies to the Rise
of China
August 26, 2011
Abstract
In the face of a rising China, some scholars have argued that
ASEAN countries will
choose to either bandwagon with or balance against China, while
others believe they
will respond with a more moderate policy known as hedging. In
considering these
options, ASEAN countries must take into account their individual
interests within the
economic and security structure of this region. In this
research, we argue that each
ASEAN country confronts divergent sets of security and economic
relations with
China, which play a major role in shaping their policy
responses. We can characterize
their responses into four quadrants. Each cell can be
categorized in terms of a high or
low degree of threat perception (HT or LT) from China, as well
as a positive or
negative economic expectation (PE or NE) with China. We thus
hypothesize that
ASEAN countries in the HT-NE situation will balance against
China; those in the
LT-PE situation will bandwagon with China; those in the HT-PE or
LT-NE situations
will hedge against China. Hypotheses will be tested by
investigating two cases,
Vietnam-China (NE-HT) and Cambodia-China (PE-LT) relations.
Page 1 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
Introduction
The end of the Cold War and the rise of China have changed the
international
landscape. For East Asian countries, fear from the threat from
communist ideology
has largely dissipated to the extent that communism is no longer
the primary concern
around which policymaking decisions are made. International
geopolitics, once
defined by the clash of competing superpowers during the Cold
War, has changed, and
the need to rely on building security alliance with the U.S. for
geopolitical survival
has more or less abated. In the present situation, however, the
rise of China regionally
and globally presents a new, dynamic, and potentially volatile
variable in the East
Asian geopolitical arena. For relatively weaker East Asian
nations, the question of
how best to avoid an outright conflict within a changing
regional power structure has
become an important issue.
In this article, we discuss how Southeast Asian states will
respond to a rising
China, whose ascendance may be viewed both as a promising
opportunity and a
potential danger. Despite a litany of literature published on
this topic, many are
plagued with shortcomings we identify as being less relevant,
overgeneralized,
static and outdated. These works generally suffer two drawbacks.
First, though
they pertinently describe patterns of foreign policy behaviors,
many fail to identify the
causes behind such behaviors. This obscures the different
independent variables that
may cause Southeast Asian countries to adopt different policy
options toward China.
The second shortcoming in the existing literature stems from the
treatment of
policymaking as a dichotomy rather than a continuum. In this
framework, Southeast
Asian states are portrayed as pursuing a static strategy instead
of a dynamic one that
constantly evolves in a changing regional landscape. We believe
Southeast Asian
states policies toward China are dynamic, varying among
countries and across
Page 2 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
different periods of time.
In this paper, we introduce an analytical spectrum that
characterizes how
Southeast Asian countries are likely to perceive China based on
the interaction of two
theories: balance of threat and trade expectation. We argue that
these perceptions
will influence the types of policies that these countries will
employ against China,
which include soft-balancing, hedging, and bandwagoning. As
political
climates and situations fluctuate over time, so will the
strategies used by different
players. We hypothesize that Southeast Asian countries
perceiving a high level of
threat from China (HT) and expecting a negative economic
relationship (NE) will
view Beijing as an undesirable regional neighbor, and therefore
more likely to choose
the soft-balancing strategy. On the other hand, if these
countries perceive a low level
of threat (LT) and expect a positive economic relationship (PE),
they will find in
Beijing a more desirable neighbor, and are more likely to adopt
a bandwagoning
strategy. Countries in situations between these two extremes
(either a HT-PE or
LT-NE scenario) will choose a hedging strategy against
China.
We will review past literatures on this topic and point out
their shortcomings in
the next section. In section three, two major pillars for
Southeast Asian states policies
toward China and relevant strategic choices are identified
within a policy spectrum. In
addition, we will discuss the logic behind the analytical model.
In section four, we
offer preliminary empirical evidence to support our theoretical
framework by
discussing cases of Vietnam-China and Cambodia-China relations.
The last section
concludes our studies.
Literature Review
Most literature on the reactions of Southeast Asian states to
the rise of China can
Page 3 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
be divided into four categories. The first category tends to
group Southeast Asian
countries as a unitary international actor embedded within the
framework of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and explains the
individual
countries behaviors through the lens of observing the actions
undertaken by ASEAN.
The second category examines Southeast Asian countries foreign
policymaking as a
response to regional power structures; in this case, these
countries are considered as
belonging to a group of secondary, or weaker, states within the
international
system.1 These two categories seek to depict a general pattern
that reflects interests
concentrated within either ASEAN or a group of secondary
states.
The literature in the last two categories pay attention to
foreign policy variations
among the different Southeast Asian countries, and refrain from
treating Southeast
Asian countries as part of a larger, unitary international
actor. The third category
discusses a range of policy choices that include strategies such
as balancing,
accommodating, bandwagoning, or hedging. Such approach may
overlook the
variation of policy choices among different countries.2 The
fourth category also
1 M. Rajendran, Asean's Foreign Relations: The Shift to
Collective Action (Kuala Lumpur: Arenabuku
sdn bhd., 1985). N. Ganesan, "Rethinking Asean as a Security
Community in Southeast Asia," Asian
Affairs, an American Review 21, no. 4 (1995). Johan
Saravanamuttu, "The Asean Model for Regional
Cooperation," in Asian Peace: Security and Governance in the
Asia Pacific Region, ed. Majid
Tehranian (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999). Amitav Acharya
and Evelyn Goh, Reassessing
Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: Competition,
Congruence, and Transformation
(Massachusetts: Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs, 2007). H.H. Michael Hsiao and
Alan Yang, "Transformations of Chinas Soft Power toward Asean,"
China Brief 8, no. 22 (2008).
Rodolfo C. Severino, The Asean Regional Forum (Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
2009).
2 For example, Landry Haryo Subianto, "New Direction for
Southeast Asia's Regional Relations: An
Indonesian Perspective," in Southeast Asia in the New Century:
An Asian Perspective, ed. Samuel C.Y.
Ku (Kaohsiung: National Sun Yat-Sen University, 2002). Vatthana
Pholsena and Ruth Banomyong,
Laos: From Buffer State to Crossroads (Ching Mai: Meking Press,
2006). Robert Dayley and Clark D.
Neher, Southeast Asia in the New International Era (Singapore:
Westview Press, 2010).
Page 4 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
recognizes the foreign policy variation among each Southeast
Asian country, but pays
attention to the influence of different domestic factors, such
as ideology, leadership, or
regime type, in foreign policymaking.3
In this section, we discuss these divergent perspectives and
identify their
limitations. Afterwards, we briefly propose our idea to mitigate
these identified
shortcomings and offer a theoretical framework based on a
foreign policy continuum
characterized by two relevant conditions, which are threat
perception and
expectation of economic relations.
ASEAN for Socializing China?
The first category of literature focuses primarily on how the
regional institution
of ASEAN influences Chinas external behaviors, and how Southeast
Asian countries
respond. Amitav Acharya suggests that a process-orientated ASEAN
has successfully
created four crucial ideas in the region, which are cooperative
security, open
regionalism, soft regionalism, and flexible consensus.4 These
ideas can be
helpful in shaping a regional identity for its actors to abide
by. Nikolas Busse praises
ASEAN members for abandoning the balance of power logic and
successfully
establishing a regional code of conduct centered around the
concepts of non-use of
force, non-interference, and informality in conflict
management.5 China, as a
more proactive participant in ASEAN, consequently is expected to
be socialized in
3 Recent literatures related, for example, Anak Agung Banyu
Perwita, Indonesia and the Muslin World:
Islam and Secularism in the Foreign Policy of Soeharto and
Beyond (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2007).
Pavin Chachavalpongpun, Reinventing Thailand: Thaksin and His
Foreign Policy (Singapore and
Thailand: ISEAS and Silkworm Books, 2010).
4 Amitav Acharya, "Ideas, Identity, and Institution-Building:
From the 'Asean Way' to the 'Asia-Pacific
Way'?," The Pacific Review 10, no. 3 (1997).
5 Nikolas Busse, "Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security,"
The Pacific Review 12, no. 1 (1999).
Page 5 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
informal principles desired by Southeast Asian countries. In
Alice Bas words, China
...has moved from skeptic to observer to participant as a
dialogue partner with
ASEAN and full membership in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and
other
regional arrangements.6 According to Rosemary Foot, the ARFs
central purpose is
to manage transnational conflicts between Southeast Asia and
China and envelop
China in this multilateral organization.7 According to these
scholars, the utilization
of regional organizations remains the primary way in which
Southeast Asian attempt
to engage and socialize China. In doing so, Southeast Asian
countries can seek to
secure a mutually beneficial economic relationship and attempt
to tame Chinas
aggressive posture in the South China Sea. From Chinas
perspective, regional
organizations serve to reassure ASEAN states of Beijings
peaceful regional ambitions
and win over their support, possibly at the expanse of
U.S.-ASEAN relations.
Over the past decade, although China has become a proactive
player in regional
institutions, some scholars have doubted the effectiveness of
attempting to socialize
China according to the desires of ASEAN members. Ba wonders
whether regional
institutions founded by less powerful states are able to
socialize the most powerful
regional player. Her argument suggests a need to include the
variable of power in the
study of Sino-ASEAN relations. Raising the question whos
socializing whom?, she
points out the possibility of ASEAN members being socialized by
China, rather than
the other way around.8
David Jones and Martin Smith argue that although ARF has helped
to avoid
6 Alice D. Ba, "China and Asean: Renavigating Relations for a
21st-Century Asia," Asian Survey 43,
no. 4 (2003).
7 Rosemary Foot, "China in the Asean Regional Forum:
Organizational Processes and Domestic
Modes of Thought," Asian Survey 38, no. 5 (1998).
8 Alice D. Ba, "Who's Socializing Whom? Complex Engagement in
Sino-Asean Relations," The
Pacific Review 19, no. 2 (2006).
Page 6 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
large-scale conflicts between China and other sovereign
claimants to possessions in
the South China Sea, it has merely managed the problem, but not
solved them. They
suggest that prolonging the dispute plays into Chinas hegemonic
ambition of
returning the region to the historical tributary system where
Southeast Asian countries
would obey Chinas mandate of heaven.9 To them, norms in ASEAN
and other
regional institutions are merely ineffective rhetoric in the
larger game of regional
diplomacy, which in reality is always dominated by power
politics. ASEAN,
according to their perspective, is merely a platform for great
powers to pursue their
interests. In March 2010, Chinese officials, bypassing regional
institutions,
unilaterally told Washington that the South China Sea is its
"core interest, which
raised alarm bells throughout Southeast Asia.10 This incident
suggests that regional
frameworks have failed to socialize China into a desirable
player and tame Chinas
aggressive postures in the region. Using ASEAN as a central
factor in understanding
Southeast Asian countries reactions toward the rise of China
might not be a relevant
approach since it not only fails to recognize regional power as
an important factor in
foreign policy, but also neglects possible policy variation,
determined by different
political and economic conditions, within each Southeast Asian
country.
A Group of Secondary States?
Similar to Jones and Smiths argument that regional institutions
are
epiphenomenal to great power politics, other experts suggest
that Southeast Asia is
9 David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith, "Making Process,
Not Progress: Asean and the
Evolving East Asian Regional Order," International Security 32,
no. 1 (2007).
10 Wu Zhong, "A Daring Departure from Deng," Asia Times Online,
August 6, 2010 2010.
.
Page 7 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
composed of ten secondary states sensitive to the variation of
power structure,
rather than regional norms. The balance of power between the
countries in the region
is the most critical factor in determining their foreign
policies. In discussing the
responses of East Asian secondary states toward China, Robert
Ross argues that South
Korea and Taiwan have increasingly developed an accommodating
posture towards
China, while Japan and ASEAN states are joining with the U.S. to
balance against it.11
But balancing is a strategy usually employed by great powers,
i.e. China, India, Japan,
and the United States. David Kang sees Asias order as a
hierarchical one where
China acts a dominant power and the surrounding countries are
secondary states.
Kang argues that in the face of a powerful China, these
secondary states have no
choice but to strive for friendly bilateral relations with
Beijing, and such a hierarchical
order will be stable and peaceful.12
While these arguments suggest that secondary states will
accommodate Chinas
interests, other scholars contend otherwise. In discussing the
foreign policy options of
weaker states, Eric Labs observes that balancing against a
powerful country is a far
more common behavior than accommodation, or also known as
bandwagoning.
Instead of bandwagoning for hedging their bets, weak states
fight by balancing
against a rising power.13 Aaron Friedberg similarly expects
ASEAN states to
internally balance themselves against Chinas growing
capability.14 Furthermore,
Gerald Segal suggests that judging from East Asias recent
history, although China
seems to be an unrivaled player, concerted containment by other
regional players is
11 Robert S. Ross, "Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of
China: Accommodation and Balancing in
East Asia," Security Studies 15, no. 3 (2006): 379-91.
12 David C. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New
Analytical Frameworks," International
Security 27, no. 4 (2003).
13 Eric J. Labs, "Do Weak States Bandwagon?," Security Studies
1, no. 3 (1992).
14 Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in
a Multipolar Asia," International
Security 18, no. 3 (1993/1994): 29-33.
Page 8 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
capable of moderating Chinas aggression.15
In light of the larger debates within the realist school of
international relations
theory regarding whether weaker states are likely to bandwagon
with the most
powerful state or join together to balance against it, scholars
disagree on how
secondary states in Southeast Asia will respond to a rising
China. These conflicting
opinions also highlight what we call the problem of relevance,
in that the traditional
understanding of balancing and bandwagoning, which focus on
formal military
alliances involving alliances and arms buildups, is now no
longer as applicable as it
was before.16 Relying on old notions of international relations
theory from the Cold
War era may lead one to incorrectly assess the complexities of
contemporary
Southeast Asian affairs. Such an approach also downplays the
domestic policy
variations among states and run the risk of
overgeneralization.
Balancing, Bandwagoning, Hedging or Others
Over the past decade, many studies have attempted to redress the
issues of
relevance and overgeneralization by refraining from both
treating Southeast Asian
countries as a unitary actor and confining their assessment of
their China policies to
the limited options of balancing or bandwagoning. Denny Roy
argues that most
Southeast Asian countries neither balance against nor bandwagon
with China. Rather,
their strategies can best be understood as hedging with
different levels. Hedging, in
his understanding, is a policy that seeks positive relations
with all great powers in the
regionsin this case, China and the U.S. In Roys words, Southeast
Asian states
15 Gerald Segal, "East Asia and The "Constrainment" Of China,"
in East Asian Security, ed. Michael E.
Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1998).
16 T.V. Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,"
International Security 30, no. 1 (2005).
Page 9 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
prefer not to antagonize any of the external great powers unless
one poses a direct
threat to a vital interest.17 For example, seeking modest level
of defense cooperation
with Washington can serve as a hedge against a rising China.
Barry Eichengreen, Yeongseop Rhee, and Hui Tong investigated the
economic
implications of Chinas growth to Asian countries, and found that
whereas
high-income neighbors, such as Singapore, can enjoy economic
benefits, low-income
countries, such as Vietnam, may be affected negatively.18 John
Wong and Sarah Chan
also notice that Sino-ASEAN economic relationships are both
competitive and
complementary. While Singapore and China can benefit from each
other by
specializing in different sectors and industries, most
developing countries in Southeast
Asia are competing for foreign direct investment (FDI) in the
same sectors and
exporting products for similar markets.19 As such, the unique
economic conditions in
each Southeast Asian country can affect their perception of
China in very different
ways. Discussing Southeast Asias views on the rise of China,
Evelyn Goh suggests
that it is useful to divide Southeast Asian countries into
maritime and continental ones,
which the former are more reassured by wider geographical
distance between them
and China, i.e. the stopping power of water, while the latter
are more anxious of their
powerful continental neighbor.20 This would result in different
perceptions of threat,
characterizing states with different geographical features and
strategies to engage
17 Denny Roy, "Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or
Bandwagoning?," Contemporary Southeast
Asia 27, no. 2 (2005): 311-12.
18 Barry Eichengreen, Yeongseop Rhee, and Hui Tong, "China and
the Exports of Other Asian
Countries," Review of World Economics 143, no. 2 (2007).
19 John Wong and Sarah Chan, "China-Asean Free Trade Agreement:
Shaping Future Economic
Relations," Asian Survey 43, no. 3 (2003).
20 In Gohs classification, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and
Singapore belong to the maritime
group; Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam and Thailand belong to
the continental group. Evelyn Goh,
"Southeast Asian Perspectives on the China Challenge," Journal
of Strategic Studies 30, no. 4-5 (2007):
823-28.
Page 10 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
Beijing.
Although scholars have paid attention to the policy variations
between states,
policy options are often treated as static and dichotomous,
rather than dynamic and
continuous. For example, as a continental state that is in
competition for foreign
economic advantages with China, Vietnam should see China as a
grave threat and
consequently balance, or at least hedge, against Beijing.
However, Vietnams policy
towards China has changed several times in the past two decades,
suggesting that
Hanois response to China has been a dynamic one that is
determined by altering
conditions.21 As a consequence, identifying the most relevant
conditions and then
constructing a continuous policy spectrum would be a most
helpful approach in
understanding Southeast Asian states responses to a rising
China.
Domestic Factors
Domestic factors, such as ideology or regime type, sometimes
play important
roles in shaping foreign policy. For example, while ideology has
traditionally aligned
Vietnam with the socialist front, Carlyle Thayer has noted that
the ambivalence in
Vietnam's China policy reflects the tension that occasionally
arises when ideology and
national interest cannot be reconciled.22 On the other hand,
ASEAN was established
by countries threatened by the spread of communism that sought
close defense
cooperation with the U.S.
After the end of the Cold War, ideological conflicts between
communist and
21 Alexander L. Vuving, "Strategy and Evolution of Vietnam's
China Policy: A Changing Mixture of
Pathways," Asian Survey 46, no. 6 (2006).
22 Carlyle A. Thayer, "Sino-Vietnamese Relations: The Interplay
of Ideology and National Interest,"
Asian Survey 34, no. 6 (1994).
Page 11 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
democratic camps became largely irrelevant and no longer
constituted the most
critical pillar in the making of Southeast Asian states foreign
policies. In less
autocratic Southeast Asian states, such as the Philippines,
domestic politics is capable
of determining foreign policy. For instance, Renato De Castro
argued that the
disappearance of the threat of communist ideology and the
influence of a Philippines
Senate opposed to U.S. military bases were two major causes that
drove away the U.S.
naval station in Subic Bay.23
Furthermore, the influence of domestic politics may be salient
in investigating
how different types of regime affect foreign policies settings.
Countries with similar
political institutions may be less willing to fight each
other.24 From this perspective,
most Southeast Asian countries are more or less autocratic
countries, which would
downplay the importance of domestic political factors. The most
significant external
challenge confronting them may be the rise of China and how to
position themselves
within the great power rivalry between China, India, Japan, and
U.S. The salience of
domestic factors would decline as the competition among great
powers in Asia
becomes more intense.
In this section, we have classified past literatures regarding
Sino-Southeast Asian
relations into four categories and identified their limitations.
Most of them suffer from
being less relevant, overgeneralized, static and outdated. In
the next section,
we seek to mitigate these shortcomings by developing a
theoretical framework that
first identifies the interplay of two major factors that concern
Southeast Asian states
23 Renato Cruz De Castro, "The Revitalized Philippine-U.S.
Security Relations: A Ghost from the Cold
War or an Alliance for the 21st Century?," Asian Survey 43, no.
6 (2003).
24 For democratic peace, see Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal
Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2,"
Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, no. 4 (1983). For
authoritarian peace, see Mark Peceny, Caroline C.
Beer, and Shannon Sanchez-Terry, "Dictatorial Peace?," American
Political Science Review 96, no. 01
(2002).
Page 12 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
the most. Using this analysis as a framework, we present a
spectrum best capturing
Southeast Asians foreign policies toward China. Such an approach
allows us to
understand how each Southeast Asian state will dynamically
respond to a rising China
during different points of time.
Typologies of Strategies to the Rise of China
In this section, we identify and discuss two influential factors
in determining
Southeast Asian states policies toward China. Next, we present
policy options and
construct a policy spectrum which corresponds to the interplay
of such factors.
Threat Perception and Expectation of Economic Relations
When analyzing the strategic options of any state, it is always
crucial to identify
factors that concern it the most. Investigating Southeast Asian
perspectives on the
challenges posed by a rising China, Goh pointed out that
territorial disputes over
islands in the South China Sea, Sino-U.S. conflicts, Chinas
regional domination, and
the economic benefits or costs of Chinas growth are factors that
Southeast Asian
states worry about the most.25 She categorizes them into three
dimensions: political,
military, and economic challenges. Similarly, we boil down these
categories in a
broader way that includes only two factors: threat perception
and the expectation of
economic relations.
The ideas behind the first pillar that constitutes the
underlying basis of our policy
25 Goh, "Southeast Asian Perspectives on the China Challenge,"
813-15.
Page 13 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
spectrum, threat perception, derive from the balance of threat
theory. Stephen Walt,
studying the sources of alliances, argues that a great powers
aggregate power,
geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions
are the four
major sources of threats, which serve as a signal to surrounding
states and influence to
their decisions over whether or not to ally with another state.
When a powerful
country has a high aggregate value of those four factors, it
will generally be perceived
as a grave threat that and trigger surrounding states to ally
against it.26 Using Walts
theoretical framework, we find it useful in evaluating the
extent to which each
Southeast Asian country feels threatened by China. Countries
facing a higher threat
perception of China are likely to feel less secure, and as a
result will seek ways to
check its aggressive postures. Countries that face a lower
threat perception are more
reassured of the benefits of Chinas growth, and will worry less
about suffering losses
from a powerful China.
Whereas Chinas growing economic and military strengths can be
seen as a
potentially threatening posture, the maritime-continental
divide27 mentioned earlier
may lead maritime Southeast Asian states to be more reassured by
the larger
geographic distance, while continental states may perceive a
higher threat because of
their proximity. But Chinas recently military excursions into
disputed islands in the
South China Sea is also a signal to maritime states of its
aggressive intentions.28 In
addition, Beijings unilateral decision to build dams in the
upstream of Mekong River,
without approval from the Mekong River Commission (MRC), to
secure the power of
26 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, Cornell Studies in
Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1987).
27 Goh, "Southeast Asian Perspectives on the China Challenge,"
823, 28.
28 For example, after Peoples Liberation Armys Navy (PLAN) was
discovered doing construction on
Mischief Reef in 1995, Manila sensed the growing threat from
Beijing and started to rethink the
possibility to revitalize its defense cooperation with U.S. See
Castro, "The Revitalized Philippine-U.S.
Security Relations: A Ghost from the Cold War or an Alliance for
the 21st Century?," 977-80.
Page 14 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
water distribution undoubtedly alerted member states of the MRC
of a more
aggressive intention and resulted in a higher perception of
threat from Beijing.29
It is important to note that different Southeast Asian states
disputing over different
issues with China at different points of time will receive
different levels of threat
perception emanated from China.
Aside from threat perception, Sino-Southeast Asian economic
relations serves as
the other pillar of our policy spectrum. Whether a deeper and
more open economic
relationship with China is beneficial or not to Southeast Asian
states remains
controversial. A more relevant analysis should focus on the
different domestic
economic conditions of each state. Thanks to the inception of
the ASEAN-China Free
Trade Agreement, many Southeast Asian countries expect to
attract more FDI and
export more products to China. Others, however, fear that future
FDI will decrease,
accompanied by an increase in the trade deficit with China.30
These contrasting
expectations have been thoroughly discussed in disagreements
among IR scholars
over the impact of interdependence on conflicts. Realists argue
that greater
interdependence may lead to more conflict due to the increasing
vulnerability of the
more dependent side. The vulnerable would be compelled to
control what they depend
on.31 Liberals, on the other hand, argue that the interdependent
relationship offers
absolute economic benefits to most involving parties, and
therefore no incentive for
29 Marwaan Macan-Markar, "Mekong River's Development May Flow
into Conflict " Asia Times,
March 26, 2002 2002.
30 For the variation of ASEAN-China frameworks impact on
Southeast Asian states, see Eichengreen,
Rhee, and Tong, "China and the Exports of Other Asian
Countries." Wong and Chan, "China-Asean
Free Trade Agreement: Shaping Future Economic Relations." John
Ravenhill, "Is China an Economic
Threat to Southeast Asia?," Asian Survey 46, no. 5 (2006). Chia
Siow Yue, "Asean-China Economic
Competition and Free Trade Area1," Asian Economic Papers 4, no.
1 (2005).
31 Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 1st ed.
(Boston, Mass.: McGraw-Hill, 1979).
Page 15 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
conflict exists.32
In an attempt to mediate this discrepancy between realists and
liberals, Dale
Copeland suggests a theory of trade expectation, which puts more
weight on the
expectation of future impact from interdependence. Following
along his work, we
recognize that for a state participating in an economically
complex world, the
relationship of interdependence within a certain time period is
less important than its
expectation of future economic situation.33 In the context of
this paper, the
expectation of future economic impact on Southeast Asian
countries is of greater
significance than the past or current situation. For example,
should a Southeast Asian
country, currently competing with China on FDI inflows and
export markets, expect
to suffer from higher unemployment rate soon, then the
interdependent relationship
between them would be considered as a negative one that leads to
a fear of losing
economic interests.34 As a consequence, China would be perceived
as a less desirable
player in the region.
Taking these two factors into account, we can say that a higher
threat perception
and negative economic expectation will make Chinas presence in
Southeast Asia
undesirable. On the other hand, a lower threat perception and
positive economic
expectation will make China a more acceptable partner. Since
this interplay of these
32 Richard N. Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State :
Commerce and Conquest in the Modern
World (New York: Basic Books, 1986). Robert O. Keohane and
Joseph S. Nye, Power and
Interdependence : World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1977).
33 Dale C. Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory
of Trade Expectations,"
International Security 20, no. 4 (1996).
34 For Indonesia, ASEAN plus framework raise the awareness of
endangering domestic sectors. See
Deddy Saleh, "Indonesia's Fta Policy and Its Perspectives on an
East Asian Fta," in East Asian
Economic Regionalism: Feasibilities and Challenges, ed. Choong
Yong Ahn, Richard E. Baldwin, and
Inkyo Cheong (Netherlands: Springer, 2005); Anis Chowdhury,
"Indonesia's Hesitance with Afta and
Afta Plus: A Political Economy Explanation," in FTA, Regional
Integration and Development (Pusan
National University, Busan, South Korea2007).
Page 16 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
two factors varies across different countries and time periods,
we can construct a
spectrum of the desirability of China (from the perspective of
Southeast Asian states),
ranging from the most undesirable to the most desirable. A
figure capturing this idea
is shown in Figure 1. This spectrum later will correspond to
possible policy options.
From Soft-Balancing to Bandwagoning for Profit
Given that China presents different options and challenges for
each Southeast
Asian state, their response to its presence will vary. According
to the prevailing
literature on this matter, these states will either balance
against China by allying with
Washington, hedge against China by means of maintaining
defensive pacts with both
Beijing and Washington, or bandwagon with China.35 These policy
options can be
seen as a set of fluid, flexible strategies that take into
account changes in the
geopolitical situation. States are likely to choose the
balancing strategy when China is
considered threatening, adopt the bandwagon strategy when Chinas
posture is seen as
more favorable, and hedge if their assessment of China is
somewhere in between.
Given that each Southeast Asian country will choose different
strategies in response to
different situations during different periods, we do not believe
that any particular
single strategy is enough to explain each states
policymaking.
It is necessary to clearly define the terms balancing,
bandwagoning, and
hedging in our framework. According to IR scholars, a balancing
strategy refers
to the balance of power. Naturally, power is important for
states to survive. For great
35 For balancing strategy, see Ross, "Balance of Power Politics
and the Rise of China: Accommodation
and Balancing in East Asia." For hedging strategy, see Roy,
"Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or
Bandwagoning?." Ann Marie Murphy, "Beyond Balancing and
Bandwagoning: Thailand's Response to
China's Rise," Asian Security 6, no. 1 (2010). For bandwagoning,
see Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The
Need for New Analytical Frameworks."
Page 17 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
powers, they need enough material power to survive a war with
others. Weaker states
can choose to ally with powerful sides in order to seek
protection. Maintaining a
balance of power is considered to promote stability, since equal
power distribution
between different alliances will raise the cost of war and
decrease the likelihood of an
easy victory.36 As we have mentioned, however, while survival
has historically been
the main motivation for weaker states to balance against a
rising power, this threat has
largely diminished in the post-Cold War era.37 In Southeast
Asia, the shared norm of
non-interference has been embraced, rendering actual territorial
invasions less likely.
Today, diplomacy replaced military as an alternate means to
resolve disputes.38
Not only in Southeast Asia, but around the world, the reliance
on military
alliance as a strategy to hard balance against others is
becoming an increasingly rare
occurrence. Instead, states are more likely to adopt a soft
balancing strategy to
contain perceived threats. Soft balancing involves the formation
of limited diplomatic
coalitions or entities through upgrading existing alliances.
Examples of soft balancing
include coalitions in international organizations and joint
military exercises. Roy uses
a similar concept called low-intensity balancing to describe
that, rather than
forming formal military alliance with Washington, some Southeast
Asian countries
have been trying to bring more U.S. military power back in Asia
to constrain China.39
Such strategies include containing China through forming
diplomatic coalitions in
international organizations to check Chinas ambitions, or
bringing other great powers,
36 For the argument of war being least likely if power is
distributed equally and its counterargument,
see Wagners discussion in R. Harrison Wagner, "Peace, War, and
the Balance of Power," American
Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (1994).
37 Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy," 54-55.
38 Robin Ramcharan, "Asean and Non-Interference: A Principle
Maintained," Contemporary Southeast
Asia 22, no. 1 (2000).
39 Roy also called this soft balancing. See Roy, "Southeast Asia
and China: Balancing or
Bandwagoning?."
Page 18 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
such as India, Japan, or U.S., into the region by mean of
holding joint military
exercises or hosting military bases for them.
In contrary to the strategy of balancing against a perceived
threat, bandwagoning,
or cooperation in hopes of seeking protection or other benefits,
is another commonly
discussed behavior when states confront grave threats.40
According to most IR
scholars, this involves forming military alliances with the
potential threat. In our
discussion, bandwagoning refers to Southeast Asian countries
seeking military
alliances with China, whether to appease Beijings aggression or
share spoils from
potential future conflicts. The end of the Cold War, however,
has made this logic less
relevant since international wars between great powers seem less
likely to occur,
especially in East Asia.
Some scholars propose that bandwagoning is more about gaining
interests than
ensuring survival. When a great power emerges as a revisionist
one, it would attract
weaker states that seek benefits from joining the revisionist
group. Bandwagoning
exists as a choice for weak states to respond to a threat,
rather than a part of that threat;
therefore, bandwagoning should be more relevant if understood as
a way to profit, not
survive.41 Here we adopt the interpretation that bandwagoning,
for Southeast Asian
countries, is to seek intensive defense and economic cooperation
with China at the
expense of cooperating with other major powers42 for the sake of
securing
40 For discussions of balancing vs. bandwagoning, see Stephen M.
Walt, "Alliance Formation and
the Balance of World Power," International Security 9, no. 4
(1985): 4-8. Roy, "Southeast Asia and
China: Balancing or Bandwagoning?," 306-08. Robert G. Kaufman,
"to Balance or to Bandwagon?
Alignment Decisions in 1930s Europe," Security Studies 1, no. 3
(1992): 419-24. David C. Kang,
"Between Balancing and Bandwagoning: South Korea's Response to
China," Journal of East Asian
Studies 9, no. 1 (2009): 5-9.
41 For this interpretation, see Schwellers balance of interests
theory. Randall L. Schweller,
"Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back
In," International Security 19, no. 1
(1994).
42 Great powers mentioned here are India, Japan and United
States.
Page 19 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
opportunities elsewhere.43 When Chinese actions are perceived as
more desirable,
Southeast Asian states will be more prone to choose a
bandwagoning strategy.
Between the strategies of soft-balancing and bandwagoning for
profit, playing
safe is another policy option for Southeast Asian States in
dealing with China.
Potential regional institutions capable of resolving
controversies are still in the
making in East Asia; therefore, for weaker players like the
Southeast Asian countries,
there is great uncertainty ahead. Choosing to side exclusively
with China, India, Japan,
or the U.S. may be unwise and unnecessarily risky. On the other
hand, developing a
strategy to maintain an equal relationship with all the great
powers may be the most
rational choice. For example, states can maintain a modest level
of defense
cooperation with Washington while still militarily and
economically engaging China
in a positive way. This strategy is typically called
hedging.44
A hedging strategy offers more flexibility for countries dealing
with uncertainty.
Maintaining equal distance with major powers would serve
secondary states interests,
especially when current Sino-U.S. relationship in East Asia is
stable but competitive.45
However, should threats from China become more severe or
economic benefits less
favorable, an initial hedging state might turn to side with
other powers to constrain
China. On the other hand, if the threat from China diminishes
and economic benefits
become more favorable, a hedging state may lean more and more
toward China, to the
point of adopting a bandwagoning strategy to seek greater
profits from closer
relations.
43 For a bandwagon for profit case, see Murphy, "Beyond
Balancing and Bandwagoning: Thailand's
Response to China's Rise."
44 Roy, "Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or
Bandwagoning?."
45 Gaye Christoffersen, "The Role of East Asia in Sino-American
Relations," Asian Survey 42, no. 3
(2002). Shannon Tow, "Southeast Asia in the Sino-U.S. Strategic
Balance," Contemporary Southeast
Asia: A Journal of International & Strategic Affairs 26, no.
3 (2004).
Page 20 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
Here we hypothesize that if a Southeast Asian state perceives
higher threats and
expects to suffer economically from cooperation with China (an
HT-NE undesirable
China), it is more likely to choose a soft balancing strategy;
if it foresees lower
threats and expects to benefit economically from cooperating
with China (a LT-PE
desirable China), it is more likely to choose a bandwagoning
strategy; if it perceives
higher threats but expects to benefit economically from
cooperating with China, or
perceives lower threats but expects to suffer economically from
cooperation with
China, it is more likely to choose a hedging strategy. We
demonstrate this theory
with a policy spectrum, ranging from soft-balancing, hedging to
bandwagoning, in
Figure 1.
In the next section, we use two cases, Sino-Vietnam and
Sino-Thailand relations,
to test our hypothesis.
Empirical Evidences from Vietnam and Cambodia
Southeast Asia is of great geo-economic and geo-political
interest to China.
Much of Chinas trade and oil from the Middle East, for example,
passes through this
region. Moreover, ASEAN member states are regarded by China as
an ally in their
fight to resist Western pressure on issues such as domestic
political liberalization and
human rights.46 Clearly, looking beyond the border and securing
national interests in
the region by harmonizing Southeast Asia is in line with
Beijings grand, publicized
strategy of peaceful ascendancy and peaceful development.
In this section, we will examine Vietnam-China and
Cambodia-China relations
as evidences to support the explanatory typologies described in
the previous section.
46 Jian Yang, "China's Security Strategy and Policies," in Asian
Security Reassessed, ed. Stephen
Hoadley and Jrgen Rland (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, 2006).
Page 21 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
In the case of Vietnam-China relations, we argue that Vietnam
has long regarded
China as a security threat due to the ongoing territorial
dispute in the South China Sea.
Although both sides are working on promoting sub-regional
economic and local
infrastructure development, the territorial dispute, and the
conflict over export
competition, remains at the forefront of Vietnams posture toward
China. Its
soft-balancing strategy, therefore, is to ally with the United
States bilaterally and to
enmesh China in a multilateral framework based on regional
consensus and norms.
On the other side, the case of Cambodia-China relations has all
the characteristics of a
win-win partnership. We argue that there is no direct security
conflict between China
and Cambodia since Cambodia is not involved in the South China
Sea dispute. And as
the bilateral trade between the two countries increases rapidly,
Cambodia expects, and
also needs, to maintain the political coalition with Beijing to
attract more investments
and foreign aid from China. The bandwagoning strategy, so to
speak, seems to be its
most rational policy.
Vietnams Balancing Strategy against China (HT-NE Type)
A rising power may spell troubles for its neighbors.
Accordingly, Chinas rapid
economic growth and the expansion of military capability have
caused much alarm to
its Southeast Asian neighbors in the 1990s and early 2000s.47
Some ASEAN
countries have pursued balancing or bandwagoning strategies to
deal with Beijing,
while others, such as Malaysia and Singapore, followed a hedging
policy.48 As
discussed, the balancing strategy is the policy based on a grave
sense of security and
47 Ravenhill, "Is China an Economic Threat to Southeast
Asia?."
48 Kuik Cheng-Chwee, "The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and
Singapore's Response to a Rising
China," Contemporary Southeast Asia 30, no. 2 (2008).
Page 22 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
economic threats,49 and our review of Vietnam-China relation
demonstrates such a
case supporting the HT-NE type of China-ASEAN relations.
While Vietnam and China are both communist countries with a
similar
authoritarian regime type, this factor alone cannot eliminate
Vietnams perception of
China as a potentially threatening neighbor. Factions among
Vietnamese policy
communities have debated different policies toward China for
years. Some who
support maintaining a positive relationship with China
anticipate that goodwill
diplomacy will attract more Chinese investment and boost mutual
trade. Others
worried about Chinas military presence and economic dominance in
the region prefer
a more hostile stance to Beijing. In effect, Vietnams threat
perception towards China
is mainly derived from security interests and negative
expectation of economic
interests.
Vietnam has encountered several threats from China on the
economic front, most
notably trade deficit, unemployment issue, and infrastructure
development related to
national security. In recent years, bilateral trade volume
between Vietnam and China
has been growing substantially, with annual growth around 30%.
Chinas southern
provinces, such as Guangxi, pursues sub-regional strategies
supported by Beijing and
Indochinese ASEAN countries, and Vietnam is its primary partner
in Indochinese
peninsula. But it is estimated that Vietnams trade deficit
towards China has
significantly increased from US$ 0.2 billion in 2001 to US$ 12.6
billion in 2010.50
The exchange of Vietnams raw material (iron and coal) for Chinas
high-price
products (steel and mechanic equipment) is one of the reasons
for this increasing trade
deficit, which is also leading to the decline in Vietnams market
share of domestic
49 Ravenhill, "Is China an Economic Threat to Southeast
Asia?."
50 Trade statistics comes from The Council of Taiwanese Chambers
of Commerce in Vietnam,
http://www.ctcvn.org/yncj-nry.aspx?sn=2811 (accessed on
2011/3/7)
Page 23 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
products. The current situation in bilateral trade between
Vietnam and China, as well
as the surging deficit, will inevitably exacerbate the negative
interdependence
relationship and raise Hanois threat perception of China.
In addition to the deficit issue, unemployment has become
another point of
contention in their economic relationship. As we conduct field
work at the
Vietnam-China border in Guangxi province, current sub-regional
development
strategies pursued by both sides are fostering a closer
local-to-local partnership. For
example, Vietnamese commodities are easily seen in Fangcheng in
China, while many
of the factories and power stations in the northern provinces of
Vietnam were built
with Chinese funding. Chinas investment was expected to provide
employment
opportunities for local Vietnamese. However, some Chinese
companies that have
established factories in Vietnam, such as the power stations in
Halphong, hire only
Chinese migrant workers, thus making Vietnamese labor become
less competitive. In
this regard, foreign investment projects like this has
threatened local labor markets
and has also resulted in fostering a negative image towards
Chinese economic
expansion initiatives. From Vietnams perspective, future
economic relationship with
China is not expected to be desirable.
A third feature of the negative interdependence between China
and Vietnam is
related to local infrastructure investment projects. In recent
years, Vietnam planned to
build a 1,570 km high-speed rail throughout Hanoi and Ho Chi
Minh City. Several
countries such as Japan, Korea, and China, have expressed their
interest and
willingness to invest in this project. If the cost and
technology are considered, Japan
and China are the most competitive candidates. Japan, the number
one creditor of
Vietnam with US$ 8.4 billion, has the most advanced Shinkansen
technology. China,
on the other hand, has initiated a new building scheme at the
lowest cost while it has
offered to develop a high-speed rail link between Ho Chi Minh
City and Phnom Penh,
Page 24 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
the capital of Cambodia.51 Consequently, Vietnam rejected Chinas
proposal and
chose Japans plans. It was said that the decision to choose
Japans proposal instead of
Chinas was made on account of its high-speed rail technology.
However, domestic
critics revealed that this decision was made based on Vietnams
national security
concern. They argued that Vietnamese political elites were
worried potential border
skirmishes and tensions over disputed territory between two
states. They fear that if
war broke out, the high-speed rail built by China may be a
critical infrastructure that
can be used to transport and supply troops and aid in a swift
invasion of Vietnam.
Clearly, China is still regarded as a potential foreign invader
to Vietnam.
Much of the perception of China as a threat is related to the
South China Sea
dispute. On March 5th 2011, Vietnam protested a military drill
conducted by China
drilling in the Spratlys, arguing that the PLAs anti-piracy
exercise intruded upon
Vietnamese territory.52 This is not a unique incident, as the
South China Sea and
surrounding archipelago have been problematic military
flashpoints for decades.
Understandably, Beijings assertive claim over this region is
problematic in the eyes
of the ASEAN countries. Among them, Vietnam has been the most
active state in
working on a multilateral process of dispute resolution,
especially during its ASEAN
chairmanship in 2010. Vietnam vigorously publicizes and
internationalizes the South
China Sea disputes on almost all the major occasions related to
ASEAN meetings, and
is constantly seeking for possibilities to work with potential
allies to balance Chinas
rising influence in the region.53
51 According to the blueprint of Beijing-Shanghai high-speed
rail, this 1,318 km rail construction
project will cost RMB 221 billion while Japanese proposal is
expected to cost RMB 380 billion.
52 China Post, "Vietnam Protests China's Spratly Military
Exercises," March 5, 2011 2011. (accessed
on 2011/3/9)
53 The Hanoist, "Vietnam Hedges Its China Risk," Asia Times,
June 30, 2010 2010. (accessed on
2011/3/7)
Page 25 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
For example, during the summer of 2010, disputes between the
U.S. and China
in the ARF meeting centered on South China Sea issues, where
U.S. Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton noted that the maritime security was a
pivotal issue.54 No
parties reached an agreement after the meeting; however, the
debates have triggered
subsequent confrontations between China and its neighbors. In
August 2010, U.S.
bilateral cooperation with Vietnam on this ongoing dispute led
to a joint military
exercises in the region. The joint training, which also involved
the super-carrier USS
George Washington, focused on non-combat operations, and was the
first military
exercise conducted by the U.S. and Vietnam, who only a few
decades ago were
enemies.55 This military exercise, which also included naval
drills by U.S. and South
Korean troops in the Yellow Sea, infuriated Beijing.56 It is
clear that Vietnam, with its
increasing emphasis on economic dynamism, emerging markets, and
national security,
has successfully gained support from the U.S. to counterbalance
Chinas claims and
military presence in South China Sea. Thus, negative economic
expectation and high
threat perception have led Vietnam to adopt a soft-balancing
strategy against China.
Cambodias Bandwagoning Stance with China (LT-PE Type)
54 Bloomberg Businessweek, "U.S. Signals to China It Won't Keep
out of South Sea," July 23, 2010.
(accessed on 2010/12/2).
55 Voice of America, "Us, Vietnam to Launch Unprecedented Naval
Exercises," August 10 2010.
(accessed on 2010/12/2)
56 Hannah Beech, "Asia's New Cold War," Time, October 3, 2010.
(accessed on 2010/12/2)
; Alan Mascarenhas,
"China's Navy Is Worrying Its Neighbors," Newsweek, August 1,
2010. (accessed on 2011/3/2).
Page 26 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
Since bandwagoning is more about weak states deferential or
subordinate
response to a potential threat or an existing hegemon, it begins
within an asymmetric
power structure and may lead to asymmetric exchange between a
strong state and a
weak one. The relationship between Cambodia, a small ASEAN
member state, a
powerful China is a good example how the bandwagon strategy
works to the benefit
of both sides.
Regarding the case of Cambodia-China relations, it has all the
trappings of a
win-win partnership. Although Cambodia scholars usually
publicize that their
government does not regards China as either a friend, foe,
threat, or guarantor,57 it is
evident that the Cambodian Royal Government champions a
pro-China policy on
political and economic issues. In effect, Cambodia is
maintaining a close relationship
with China because it needs support in domestic politics,
security arrangements, and
economic development. Economically speaking, Chinas impressive
market and
economic growth is a great promise and stimulus to Cambodia,
where domestic
market has been rather weak, and which highly desires foreign
investments from
China. On the political front, Cambodia seeks to take advantage
of Chinas powerful
influence in international affairs to gain more prestige and
influence against another
neighboring power, Thailand, especially in light of the ongoing
Thailand-Cambodia
border dispute.
Economically, Cambodia has benefited from China, which has been
its most
important aid provider and critical investor since the 2000s. In
2007 and 2008, for
example, Beijing poured US $600 million and USD$260 million,
respectively, in
Cambodia, most of which were used to construct roads, highways,
and local irrigation
57 Sisowath Doung Chanto, "Cambodia," in Betwixt and Between:
Southeast Asian Strategic Relations
with the U.S. And China, ed. Evelyn Goh, Idss Monograph No. 7
(Singapore: Institute of Defence and
Strategic Studies, 2005), 83.
Page 27 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
systems. In 2010, China also provided US $300 million in loans
and US $15 million
in foreign aid to Phnom Penh. It is estimated that Beijing has
contributed more than
1,500 km worth of roads and bridges in Cambodia. A new and solid
domestic
transportation network is anticipated to boost economic growth
in Cambodia and
promote the growth of trade volumes. In 2009, the total
bilateral trade volume
between Cambodia and China was US $791 million, and the number
now amounts to
US $1.12 billion, reflecting a growth rate of 41.5%.58 In
December 2010, both sides
have pledged to increase trade volume to US $2.5 billion by
2015. In effect, just as in
other ASEAN countries, trade cooperation has been regarded as
pattern cooperation
for Cambodia-China relations.
As the bilateral trade figures rapidly increase, Cambodia seeks
to maintain a
comprehensive partnership with Beijing to attract more
investments and foreign aid
from China. To accomplish this, the bandwagoning strategy
appears to be the most
rational policy option. While Cambodia is promoting its local
economy by
establishing 22 economic zones, the Royal Government continues
to ask for Chinas
support to invest in key areas. For example, the development of
the Sihanoukville
Special Economic Zone has received investments by a
collaborative effort by the
Cambodia International Investment Group Co. Ltd. and the Taihu
Cambodia
International Economic Cooperation Zone Investment Co. Ltd, a
state-owned
enterprises in China approved by Ministry of Commerce.59 For
China, the investment
58 People's Daily, "Chinese Vice Commerce Minister Praises
China-Cambodia Cooperation," February
22, 2011. (accessed on 2011/3/10).
59 Invest in Cambodia, "Special Economic Zones." (accessed on
2011/3/7).
; Sihanoukville Special Economic Zone,
"Introduction of Sihanoukville Special Economic Zone." (accessed
on 2011/3/7). Chinese Chamber of
Commerce in Cambodia, "Sihanoukville Special Economic Zone
(Ssez) Investment Policies."
(accessed on 2011/3/10). .
Page 28 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
project clearly underscores its commitment to the core values of
its going out
strategy. For Cambodia, the development of local industries in
areas such as textile
and clothing, machinery and electronics, and high-tech products
is highly desirable.
As these examples show, foreign aid, bilateral trade and new
investment projects are
the pillars behind Phnom Penhs pro-China policy.
Along with its beneficial economic relationship with China,
Cambodia does not
see a threat in Beijing. Generally speaking, unlike other ASEAN
countries, Cambodia
does not have any significant disputes with China, except for
the environmental
degradation and water dispute in the lower Mekong River basin
resulting from the
Chinas dam construction project in upper stream of the river,
which runs through its
southern provinces. Although the members of Mekong River
Commission, which
includes Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, have criticized
Chinas dam
construction project for retaining water and draining the
downstream region of
water,60 this issue has yet to damage the amity and cooperation
between Cambodia
and China.
Since there has yet to be any significant conflicts between
China and Cambodia,
the Cambodian government, shortly after its membership in ASEAN,
has sought to
work with China and improve its bilateral relation with Beijing
politically and
strategically. Since then, China has become Cambodias main
protector by providing
military aid and security guarantees.61 In the recent case of
Thailand-Cambodia
border dispute, China holds a key to the territorial dispute. As
mentioned above,
China offers military assistance to Cambodia, such as supplying
weapons that are sent
to the front lines to in this conflict. Such relationship is
kind of a reply to Chinas
60 Huw Pohlner, "Water, Leadership and Geopolitics in
Continental Asia," East Asia Forum Quarterly
2, no. 3 (2010): 6-7.
61 Dayley and Neher, Southeast Asia in the New International
Era, 270-71.
Page 29 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
investment policy in Indochinese Peninsula, an action which
redirects attention of
those countries who has depended in trade, economics and
politics on Thailand so
much and so much and for so long. Because Cambodia is rather
small in scale if
compared to Thailand, Cambodia hopes strongly to publicize its
border dispute to the
international community. As a result, Cambodia has adopted an
increasingly
submissive posture to China, which, despite acting neutral in
the eyes of the public,
has actively supported Cambodian development.
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the interplay of Sino-Southeast
Asian countries
economic and security relations by introducing the theories of
trade expectation and
balance, which help explain divergent Southeast Asian countries
responses to a rising
China. From the cases of Vietnam-China and Cambodia-China
relations, we offer
empirical evidences that correspond to explanatory typologies.
Countries that perceive
a grave sense of threat and expect to suffer economically from
cooperation with China,
such as Vietnam, will choose a soft balancing strategy;
countries such as Cambodia,
which perceives a low sense of threat and expects to benefit
economically from
cooperation with China, is more likely to choose a bandwagoning
strategy.
With the global academia and policy communities focusing on the
rise of China,
it is understandable that small states appear to be mere
peripheral players in the East
Asian power structure. However, when investigating the typology
of small states
responses to this rising power, we may find that they are more
likely to leverage their
importance in the power game, which may lead to a further
theorizing process of
future ASEAN-China relations.
Page 30 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
Reference
Acharya, Amitav. "Ideas, Identity, and Institution-Building:
From the 'Asean Way' to
the 'Asia-Pacific Way'?" The Pacific Review 10, no. 3 (1997):
27.
Acharya, Amitav, and Evelyn Goh. Reassessing Security
Cooperation in the
Asia-Pacific: Competition, Congruence, and Transformation.
Massachusetts:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2007.
America, Voice of. "Us, Vietnam to Launch Unprecedented Naval
Exercises." August
10 2010.
Ba, Alice D. "China and Asean: Renavigating Relations for a
21st-Century Asia."
Asian Survey 43, no. 4 (2003): 62247.
. "Who's Socializing Whom? Complex Engagement in Sino-Asean
Relations."
The Pacific Review 19, no. 2 (2006): 157 - 79.
Beech, Hannah. "Asia's New Cold War." Time, October 3, 2010.
Businessweek, Bloomberg. "U.S. Signals to China It Won't Keep
out of South Sea."
July 23, 2010.
Busse, Nikolas. "Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security."
The Pacific Review
12, no. 1 (1999): 39 - 60.
Cambodia, Chinese Chamber of Commerce in. "Sihanoukville Special
Economic
Zone (Ssez) Investment Policies."
Cambodia, Invest in. "Special Economic Zones."
Castro, Renato Cruz De. "The Revitalized Philippine-U.S.
Security Relations: A
Ghost from the Cold War or an Alliance for the 21st Century?"
Asian Survey
43, no. 6 (2003): 971-88
Chachavalpongpun, Pavin. Reinventing Thailand: Thaksin and His
Foreign Policy.
Singapore and Thailand: ISEAS and Silkworm Books, 2010.
Page 31 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
Chanto, Sisowath Doung. "Cambodia." In Betwixt and Between:
Southeast Asian
Strategic Relations with the U.S. And China, edited by Evelyn
Goh. Singapore:
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2005.
Cheng-Chwee, Kuik. "The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and
Singapore's Response
to a Rising China." Contemporary Southeast Asia 30, no. 2
(2008): 159-85.
Chowdhury, Anis. "Indonesia's Hesitance with Afta and Afta Plus:
A Political
Economy Explanation." In FTA, Regional Integration and
Development.
Pusan National University, Busan, South Korea, 2007.
Christoffersen, Gaye. "The Role of East Asia in Sino-American
Relations." Asian
Survey 42, no. 3 (2002): 369-96.
Copeland, Dale C. "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of
Trade
Expectations." International Security 20, no. 4 (1996):
5-41.
Daily, People's. "Chinese Vice Commerce Minister Praises
China-Cambodia
Cooperation." February 22, 2011.
Dayley, Robert, and Clark D. Neher. Southeast Asia in the New
International Era.
Singapore: Westview Press, 2010.
Doyle, Michael W. "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,
Part 2." Philosophy
and Public Affairs 12, no. 4 (1983): 323-53.
Eichengreen, Barry, Yeongseop Rhee, and Hui Tong. "China and the
Exports of Other
Asian Countries." Review of World Economics 143, no. 2 (2007):
26.
Foot, Rosemary. "China in the Asean Regional Forum:
Organizational Processes and
Domestic Modes of Thought." Asian Survey 38, no. 5 (1998):
425-40
Friedberg, Aaron L. "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a
Multipolar Asia."
International Security 18, no. 3 (1993/1994): 5-33.
Ganesan, N. "Rethinking Asean as a Security Community in
Southeast Asia." Asian
Affairs, an American Review 21, no. 4 (1995): 210-26.
Page 32 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
Goh, Evelyn. "Southeast Asian Perspectives on the China
Challenge." Journal of
Strategic Studies 30, no. 4-5 (2007): 809-32.
Hanoist, The. "Vietnam Hedges Its China Risk." Asia Times, June
30, 2010 2010.
Hsiao, H.H. Michael, and Alan Yang. "Transformations of Chinas
Soft Power toward
Asean." China Brief 8, no. 22 (2008): 11-15.
Jones, David Martin, and Michael L.R. Smith. "Making Process,
Not Progress: Asean
and the Evolving East Asian Regional Order." International
Security 32, no. 1
(2007): 148-84.
Kang, David C. "Between Balancing and Bandwagoning: South
Korea's Response to
China." Journal of East Asian Studies 9, no. 1 (2009): 1-28.
. "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical
Frameworks."
International Security 27, no. 4 (2003): 57-85.
Kaufman, Robert G. "to Balance or to Bandwagon? Alignment
Decisions in 1930s
Europe." Security Studies 1, no. 3 (1992): 417 - 47.
Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. Power and Interdependence
: World Politics
in Transition. Boston: Little, Brown, 1977.
Labs, Eric J. "Do Weak States Bandwagon?" Security Studies 1,
no. 3 (1992):
383-416.
Macan-Markar, Marwaan. "Mekong River's Development May Flow into
Conflict "
Asia Times, March 26, 2002 2002.
Mascarenhas, Alan. "China's Navy Is Worrying Its Neighbors."
Newsweek, August 1,
2010.
Murphy, Ann Marie. "Beyond Balancing and Bandwagoning:
Thailand's Response to
China's Rise." Asian Security 6, no. 1 (2010): 1 - 27.
Paul, T.V. "Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy."
International Security 30, no.
1 (2005): 46-71.
Page 33 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
Peceny, Mark, Caroline C. Beer, and Shannon Sanchez-Terry.
"Dictatorial Peace?"
American Political Science Review 96, no. 01 (2002): 15-26.
Perwita, Anak Agung Banyu. Indonesia and the Muslin World: Islam
and Secularism
in the Foreign Policy of Soeharto and Beyond. Copenhagen: NIAS
Press,
2007.
Pholsena, Vatthana, and Ruth Banomyong. Laos: From Buffer State
to Crossroads.
Ching Mai: Meking Press, 2006.
Pohlner, Huw. "Water, Leadership and Geopolitics in Continental
Asia." East Asia
Forum Quarterly 2, no. 3 (2010).
Post, China. "Vietnam Protests China's Spratly Military
Exercises." March 5, 2011
2011.
Rajendran, M. Asean's Foreign Relations: The Shift to Collective
Action. Kuala
Lumpur: Arenabuku sdn bhd., 1985.
Ramcharan, Robin. "Asean and Non-Interference: A Principle
Maintained."
Contemporary Southeast Asia 22, no. 1 (2000): 60-88.
Ravenhill, John. "Is China an Economic Threat to Southeast
Asia?" Asian Survey 46,
no. 5 (2006): 65374.
Rosecrance, Richard N. The Rise of the Trading State : Commerce
and Conquest in
the Modern World. New York: Basic Books, 1986.
Ross, Robert S. "Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of
China: Accommodation
and Balancing in East Asia." Security Studies 15, no. 3 (2006):
355 - 95.
Roy, Denny. "Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or
Bandwagoning?"
Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, no. 2 (2005): 305-22.
Saleh, Deddy. "Indonesia's Fta Policy and Its Perspectives on an
East Asian Fta." In
East Asian Economic Regionalism: Feasibilities and Challenges,
edited by
Choong Yong Ahn, Richard E. Baldwin and Inkyo Cheong, 75-94.
Page 34 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
Netherlands: Springer, 2005.
Saravanamuttu, Johan. "The Asean Model for Regional
Cooperation." In Asian Peace:
Security and Governance in the Asia Pacific Region, edited by
Majid
Tehranian, 97-111. London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999.
Schweller, Randall L. "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the
Revisionist State Back
In." International Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 72-107.
Segal, Gerald. "East Asia and The "Constrainment" Of China." In
East Asian Security,
edited by Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E.
Miller,
159-87. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998.
Severino, Rodolfo C. The Asean Regional Forum. Singapore:
Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, 2009.
Subianto, Landry Haryo. "New Direction for Southeast Asia's
Regional Relations: An
Indonesian Perspective." In Southeast Asia in the New Century:
An Asian
Perspective, edited by Samuel C.Y. Ku, 149-96. Kaohsiung:
National Sun
Yat-Sen University, 2002.
Thayer, Carlyle A. "Sino-Vietnamese Relations: The Interplay of
Ideology and
National Interest." Asian Survey 34, no. 6 (1994): 513-28.
Tow, Shannon. "Southeast Asia in the Sino-U.S. Strategic
Balance." Contemporary
Southeast Asia: A Journal of International & Strategic
Affairs 26, no. 3 (2004):
434-59.
Vuving, Alexander L. "Strategy and Evolution of Vietnam's China
Policy: A Changing
Mixture of Pathways." Asian Survey 46, no. 6 (2006): 805-24.
Wagner, R. Harrison. "Peace, War, and the Balance of Power."
American Political
Science Review 88, no. 3 (1994): 593-607.
Walt, Stephen M. "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World
Power."
International Security 9, no. 4 (1985): 3-43.
Page 35 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
. The Origins of Alliances, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs.
Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1987.
Waltz, Kenneth Neal. Theory of International Politics. 1st ed.
Boston, Mass.:
McGraw-Hill, 1979.
Wong, John, and Sarah Chan. "China-Asean Free Trade Agreement:
Shaping Future
Economic Relations." Asian Survey 43, no. 3 (2003): 507-26.
Yang, Jian. "China's Security Strategy and Policies." In Asian
Security Reassessed,
edited by Stephen Hoadley and Jrgen Rland. Singapore: Institute
of
Southeast Asian Studies, 2006.
Yue, Chia Siow. "Asean-China Economic Competition and Free Trade
Area1." Asian
Economic Papers 4, no. 1 (2005): 109-47.
Zhong, Wu. "A Daring Departure from Deng." Asia Times Online,
August 6, 2010
2010.
Zone, Sihanoukville Special Economic. "Introduction of
Sihanoukville Special
Economic Zone."
Page 36 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960
-
For Peer Review Only
Figure 1. A Spectrum of the Desirability of China
Page 37 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email:
[email protected]
The Pacific Review
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960