ORGANIZED LABOUR IN THE 2014 INDONESIAN PRESIDENTIAL ...

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ORGANIZED LABOUR IN THE 2014 INDONESIAN PRESIDENTIAL

ELECTION

Charlotte Corbyn

Australian Consortium for In-Country Indonesian Studies (ACICIS)

Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik

Universitas Katolik Parahyangan

Bandung

December 2014

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ORGANIZED LABOUR IN THE 2014 INDONESIAN PRESIDENTIAL

ELECTION

Charlotte Corbyn

Australian Consortium for In-Country Indonesian Studies (ACICIS)

Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik

Universitas Katolik Parahyangan

Bandung

December 2014

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HALAMAN PENGESAHAN

Nama : CHARLOTTE CORBYN

NIM :

Judul : Ms

Penulis

Charlotte Corbyn

Telah diuji dalam Ujian Sidang Skripsi Program West Java Field Study Research dari

The Australian Consortium for ‘In-Country Indonesian Studies (ACICIS) di

Universitas Katolik Parahyangan Bandung pada Selasa, 16 Desember 2014, dan

dinyatakan LULUS

Tim Penguji

Dr. Mangadar Situmorang Ph.D.

Ketua sidang merangkap anggota

Dr. I Nyoman Sudira Elisabeth Adyiningtyas Satya Dewi, Ph.D.

Anggota Penguji 1 Anggota Penguji 2

________________________________

Elena Williams

Resident Director ACICIS

Mengesahkan,

________________________________

Dr. Mangadar Situmorang Ph.D.

Dekan Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik

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ABSTRACT

Trade unions in Indonesia have been increasingly active since the fall of the New

Order. The 2014 election is particularly indicative of advances that trade unions have

made in their engagement with formal politics, with labour organizations increasingly

politicized. This thesis will be examining the methods through which trade unions

have engaged with the 2014 presidential election, including mobilization and

negotiations with and support for different candidates. This increasing politicization

has occurred within the context of an oligarchic political system, the influence and

presence of which is the subject of ongoing debate. This thesis will assert that labour

organizations, like civil society and politics more generally, are currently contested

between oligarchic and reformist forces. In the 2014 election the labour movement

divided, showing it is in part influenced and drawn into oligarchic politics, but also in

part genuinely concerned with the development of Indonesia’s democracy and

advancement of workers.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are many people who have assisted me in completion of this skripsi, and it is a

pleasure to be able to acknowledge them.

Thank you to Mas Mangadar Situmorang, my supervisor at Universitas Katolik

Parahyangan, for wonderful advice and assistance while I was in Indonesia.

Thank you to my supervisor from Murdoch University, Ian Wilson, not only for your

advice and support on this skripsi, but also for first sparking my interest in Indonesian

politics.

Thank you to the ACICIS staff, for making my visit to Indonesia possible, and for

making it such a pleasure. An interest in Indonesia will always stay with me as a

result of the wonderful program you run. Thank you, particularly, to Ellie Williams

for your excellent advice on this skripsi.

Thank you so very much to Om Bambang Dahana for assisting me with interviews,

for being so welcoming and kind, for always looking out for me and for speaking to

me for hours about labour here in Indonesia.

Thank you to the friends I have made while studying in Bandung for your

encouragement and relief from study. Thanks, in particular, to my friend and

housemate, Grace Dong. Grace, I’ll always remember and be grateful for your support

and kindness. Thank you to Tennille Bernard for your thoughtfulness and always

checking in on me. You’ve both made this year for me.

Thank you to my mum, Pam Corbyn, my sister, Sarah Corbyn, my boyfriend Luke

Carbon and my dear friends in Australia for your kind (and sometimes strict) words

when I was feeling stressed and a little lost.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT 4

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 5

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 8

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 11

THE OLIGARCHIC ARGUMENT 11

PATRIMONIALISM 12

CIVIL SOCIETY 13

NEO-LIBERALISM AND THE OLIGARCHY 14

THE FALL OF SUHARTO 15

POST SUHARTO AND DECENTRALIZATION 15

THE PROSPECT OF CHANGE 17

POWER RESOURCE THEORY 18

COUNTER OLIGARCHIC 20

NON-MATERIAL FACTORS 21

LABOUR 22

POLICY CHANGE 23

AGENCY OVER STRUCTURE 24

INSTITUTIONAL AND PROCESS CHANGE 24

CONCLUSION 25

CHAPTER 3: ORGANIZATION AND CHARACTER OF LABOUR 27

THE BIRTH OF TRADE UNIONISM 28

TRADE UNIONISM AND THE NEW ORDER 29

LABOUR NGOS 32

LABOUR ORGANIZATION POST SUHARTO 34

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NEO-LIBERALISM AND GLOBALIZATION 35

LEGACY OF THE NEW ORDER 36

CHAPTER 4: LABOUR IN THE 2014 ELECTION 39

MOBILIZATION 39

PROVEN ABILITY TO MOBILISE 41

KSPI AND MOBILIZATION 44

MOBILIZATION IN THE 2014 ELECTION 45

FORMAL POLITICS 47

PRABOWO SUBIANTO 48

LABOUR SUPPORT FOR PRABOWO 53

JOKO WIDODO 57

LABOUR SUPPORT FOR JOKOWI 60

CONCLUSION 64

BIBLIOGRAPHY 67

APPENDIX 81

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Under Suharto trade unions in Indonesia were severely limited, in their organization

but also in their engagement with ‘formal’ politics. Since the fall of Suharto in 1998,

trade unions have been increasingly well organized, and increasingly engaged with

the formal electoral system. The 2014 general election marks another milestone in

the development of labour organization in Indonesia. For the first time trade unions

have been highly visible and active, engaging in the formal political process. For the

first time, a union entered into a political contract with a candidate. Contextualizing

this, however, is ongoing academic and public debate on the nature of Indonesian

democracy, and the extent to which it is dominated by oligarchic interests (Halim and

Aritonang 2014, Ford and Pepinsky 2013). The dominant academic story arc on

Indonesia argues that New Order era elites and oligarchs have persisted since the fall

of Suharto, dominating democratic institutions and electoral processes (Aspinall

2013).

In addition their existence within an oligarchic framework, trade unions must contend

with a history of limitations on their political engagement, organisation and activism.

Under New Order era industrial relations policy, independent unions were suppressed,

with only one, strictly controlled, state-sanctioned union permitted to function, the

SPSI. While democratisation also ushered in an explosion of trade unionism, the

legacy of the New Order has been a strong and lasting one, with unions taking some

time to develop good organisational skills, as well as depart from the apolitical nature

of unionism under Suharto. Understanding the role of labour today has potential to

shed light on how labour has contended with challenges arising from its authoritarian

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past and on its experience ‘coming of age’ in a late developing, late democratising

nation.

In the context of these challenges, this thesis will be examining ways in which trade

unions have shown increasing politicisation in this election, by negotiating with

candidates and through mass mobilisation before and during the election. Through

this analysis this thesis will show that, while much of the labour movement are

engaged in continuing reformasi and assisting the cause of lower class interests and

left wing political development, elements have been co-opted by oligarchic and elite

power, to the detriment of Indonesia’s ongoing democratic development and

development of the labour movement. Further, it will show that labour in Indonesia,

while it has ‘come of age’ in respect to it’s a greater level of political engagement, it

continues t o show a pattern of fragmentation and division. The 2014 election

reflected this, with oligarchic power, as well as fragmented activism, evident in major

unions engagement with formal politics.

Chapter 2 is a literature review of literature on Indonesian democracy and power since

the fall of Suharto, with particular focus on the contrast between oligarchic and

counter oligarchic approaches to understanding Indonesian democracy. This chapter

lays the theoretical framework for understanding trade unions in Indonesia, and where

they fit into a system characterized by oligarchic and elite power, as well as contested

and fragmented reformist forces.

Chapter 3 examines the history and development of trade unionism more specifically,

particularly their development under the New Order and since the collapse of Suharto,

with the intention of contributing to understanding of the form and features of labour

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organization in Indonesia today. Of particular importance are the attitudes to

politicization, and the development of political unionism from a

Chapter 4 examines the role of labour in the 2014 election in detail, more specifically

the different ways in which unions have engaged with the political system, including

mass mobilization and direct engagement with formal politics. Mobilization power

refers to the ability to mobilize large number of people in street protests. It will assess

trade union industrial action and demonstrations leading up to the 2014 elections, the

assessment of labour leaders on the importance of these mass mobilizations and the

role of street mobilization in the 2014 election. Engagement with formal politics

refers to the negotiations that occurred (or did not occur) between trade unions and

presidential candidates, as well as as the factors that contributed to trade unions

supporting either Jokowi or Prabowo. Motivations and engagement with formal

politics have been assessed through a combination of public reports on the

engagement of trade unions with candidates, as well as qualitative interviews with

trade union leaders and party officials.

Chapter 5 will conclude, focusing on how labour has engaged with formal politics in

the 2014 presidential election, managing to have some success and influence on

candidates, but also showing co-option by oligarchic and elite powers. The sum is an

image of labour, which is highly fragmented, characterized by contestation between

reformist and oligarchic influences.

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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

To explore the role of trade unions in Indonesia today, it is necessary to place them in

their context in Indonesian politics and society. That is, it is necessary to understand

the current power configurations and forces at play in Indonesia to understand how

trade unions might fit into and influence this picture. Currently two main approaches

can be identified within the literature exploring this topic. The first, ‘oligarchic’

approach, focuses analysis on the role that material wealth and oligarchic forces play

in shaping Indonesian politics and society. This approach gives a relatively minor

level of attention to forces external to the oligarchy having any great influence on

politics and society. Further, it holds that the effect of democratisation has not made

this oligarchic class redundant, merely made them adapt to a new manner of

organization and wealth defense. This approach, led by Jeffrey Winters, Vedi Hadiz

and Richard Robison, contains internal differences, although is clearly distinguishable

from the second, ‘counter oligarchic’ approach, which I will give further attention to

shortly.

THE OLIGARCHIC ARGUMENT

Vedi Hadiz and Richard Robison describe oligarchy as “a system of power relations

that enables the concentration of wealth and authority and its collective defense”

(Hadiz and Robison 2013, 37). Oligarchy, in their analysis, refers to the development,

interaction and finally the fusion of capital with public authority. This fused politico-

business elite employs its resources in the continual and collective defense of their

status and wealth. Hadiz and Robison’s analysis can be contextualized within their

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structural political economy, neo-Marxist theoretical approach. Their work attempts

to understand how market capitalism influences different structural forces within

society, and subsequently shapes and influences power configurations. They see the

development of oligarchy as a result of the growth of market capitalism, and in

particularly a condition of late-developing capitalist nations (Hadiz and Robison

2013, 38-39). This approach and context lends itself to their analysis of the

development of the oligarchy under the New Order and to their analysis of why the

oligarchy has been able to persist through institutional change and democratisation.

PATRIMONIALISM

Hadiz and Robison argue that the power and reach of the oligarchy today has three

significant antecedents, the development of patrimonial networks, the suppression of

civil society and the advent of neo-liberalist policies. Like most other scholars

writing on Indonesian democracy they recognize the impact of the oligarchic and

patrimonial networks developed during the New Order as particularly significant to

today’s oligarchy. The New Order began as a state capitalist regime, with state

ownership or monopolies on most industries, for example minerals, transport,

telecommunications and banking (Hadiz and Robison 2005, 222, 2013, 38). While the

ousting of Sukarno meant that some of these industries were sold off, by and large the

state still had a great deal of control over resources and industry, including in the form

of permits and licenses. This served as a resource in the development of a pervasive

and complex patrimonial system, with the military, Suharto and his family, Chinese

business owners and lower level ‘renters and fixers’ extracting the most from it

(Hadiz and Robison 2013, 47). This network served two purposes. Firstly, the

distribution of public power and wealth and secondly, the means by which social

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order was maintained without the need for coercive force. It was only through these

networks of patronage that people were able to advance in careers and business

(Hadiz and Robison 2013, 46). As a result, while the higher echelons of government

benefited the most, they also stretched down to the local level and to society more

generally.

CIVIL SOCIETY

The second significant influence on oligarchic power today is the fragmentation and

disruption of independent civil society and opposition groups under the New Order,

characterized by Hadiz as a “highly state-centered authoritarian corporatist” regime

(Hadiz 2003, 598). There were several methods utilized by the New Order to

suppress potential opposition and civil society. One such method was coercive power,

administered by the state’s powerful security apparatus. The military, along with state

sponsored gangsters, used fear, intimidation and violence to prevent the organization

of opposition groups and civil society. This, coupled with the power of the

patrimonial system, was used to co-opt potential opposition groups and individuals

into organizations and networks that supported the regime (Hadiz and Robison 2013,

46).

Despite their understanding of this decimation of civil society as important, Hadiz

argues that a vibrant civil society is not, alone, indicative of democratisation, and

criticizes transition literature that asserts as much. Offering a more nuanced

discussion of civil society, Hadiz argues that it is not only the presence of an active

civil society, but also the constellation of power within that civil society which is

important (Hadiz 2003, 594). It may be favorable to democratisation, or may not,

depending on what the persuasion of the most active and powerful of interest groups

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within it are. In the case of post–Suharto Indonesia, the most powerful civil society

groups are those that were nurtured by the predatory and capitalist New Order regime,

and therefore groups that are not necessarily favorable to democracy, for example

gangsters or low-level New Order apparatchiks. Those that continue to suffer from

poor organization as a result of their suppression are those that sat outside the New

Order’s capitalist, predatory framework, for example the “liberal intelligentsia,

professional groups…and politically marginalized working class”(Hadiz 2003, 594).

At the same time, pro-New Order, predatory groups were encouraged and nurtured,

and thus are better organized in post-Suharto Indonesia.

NEO-LIBERALISM AND THE OLIGARCHY

Hadiz and Robison’s neo-Marxist positioning is most obvious in the third factor they

argue as significant in the development of the oligarchy. That is, the influence that

neo-liberal, ‘neo-institutionalist’ policies have had on allowing an oligarchic class to

flourish. With the rise of Suharto, and ousting of Sukarno, national state-capitalist

policies began to be wound back, partly at the encouragement of Western

governments and Western trained technocrats. Nevertheless, the state continued to

control a great deal of industry, allowing the previously mentioned patrimonial

networks to flourish. Further, technocratic neo-liberal policy advocated for rational,

technocratic decision-making, and was thus used as a justification for the exclusion of

popular interests and input in decision making processes (Hadiz and Robison 2005,

223).

The collapse of oil prices in the 1980’s caused upheaval. Technocrats were able to

push through a number of significant neo-liberal reforms, aimed at reducing state

monopolies on certain industries and trade permits. Instead of marking the beginning

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of an era of free markets and reduced state power, the state and business elite

continued to work in concert, with the state channeling resources and contracts to

oligarchs (Hadiz and Robison 2005, 224). Internationally, the economic growth and

deregulation of financial markets meant that Western investment was flooding into

Indonesia, propping up this oligarchic class. It is within this context that patrimonial

networks, expropriating and exploiting the free market and neo-liberal reforms, began

to consolidate into an oligarchic class (Hadiz and Robison 2005, 225).

THE FALL OF SUHARTO

The approach scholars take to the collapse of Suharto is indicative of their approach

to understanding Indonesia’s democracy today, particularly the emphasis they place

on elite, as opposed to popular action. Hadiz and Robison argue that the bourgeoisie

in Indonesia gradually developed, from a “bonapartist form…to an oligarchic form in

the later New Order period”. Power was increasingly shared among families drawn

from the political and business elite, including many high-ranking positions reserved

for Suharto’s extended family. This laid the groundwork for rifts to develop among

the political elite. With the upheaval of 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis and

subsequent reforms demanded by the IMF, tensions and fractures began to develop

within the regime, particularly between family members in Suharto’s inner circle and

those left out of it. In the face of popular unrest and opposition, elites previously

supportive of Suharto quietly abandoned him (check and cite this). With Suharto

vacating the presidency, the reformasi movement was still poorly organised, and

unable to halt the ascendance of a well-organised, wealthy, New Order affiliated

political class.

POST SUHARTO AND DECENTRALIZATION

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Key to understanding Hadiz and Robison’s argument, is understanding the influence

that decentralization and institutional change has had on Indonesia’s democratisation

and oligarchic power (Hadiz and Robison 2013, 39). Hadiz and Robison critique

decentralization policy, as well as technocratic “good governance” policy and neo-

liberalist ideology they argue has underpinned it

(Hadiz 2004, Hadiz 2007, Hadiz and Robison 2005, 2013). Decentralization occurred

in Indonesia following the demise of the New Order, as a result of ‘good governance’

policy that was prevalent in academic and institutional literature at the time. The logic

supporting the push rested on an argument that decentralization would bring

government closer to local communities, increase electoral participation, allow

individual cultural and political autonomy and allow intergovernmental checks and

balances (Hadiz 2007, 877). Further, Hadiz and Robison argue it can be understood a

result of neo-liberal trend towards smaller government, less centralized power and

freer markets.

Hadiz and Robison hold that institutional change and decentralization in Indonesia

has not been inherently beneficial to democratisation. Instead, they argue that the

reality of power configurations on the ground is of the greatest importance in

assessing democratisation, misunderstood by technocrats based in Jakarta or at

international organizations. In the case of Indonesia the decentralization of power

paved the way for local elites of New Order era pedigree to use their access to capital

and political violence, as well as democratic rhetoric, to gain positions of public

power and further their own interests (Hadiz 2007, 879). Instead of increased electoral

participation and accountability, decentralization had the effect of allowing networks

of New Order era patronage to flourish under the guise of democracy, appropriating

government power and resources for their own ends (Hadiz 2003, 699). Hadiz argues

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that decentralization, coupled with a disregard for the reality power networks on the

ground, has resulted in government becoming the domain of conflicts between

coalitions of predatory elites, rather than site of democratic conflict between different

elements of society (Hadiz 2007, 878). The importance of this lies in Hadiz and

Robison’s analysis and explanation of how the oligarchy has been affected by

democratic and institutional change. Instead of oligarchic power being reduced and

constrained, it has successfully mutated to take advantage of the new ‘game’ in town

– democracy.

THE PROSPECT OF CHANGE

The usefulness the oligarchic argument is limited without additional attention given to

the avenues and potential for change within Indonesia. Hadiz and Robison propose

that there will be limited, genuine reform as long as New Order era officials remain in

positions of power, and are unwilling or unmotivated to instigate reform. From this

starting point, the question is then, what could instigate such a monumental shift?

Hadiz and Robison propose that liberal politics and labour, given its fragmentation

compared to oligarchic might, will only be able to accomplish piecemeal and gradual

change. Similarly, their critique of institutional and electoral change suggests that a

fix from these quarters is unlikely. Instead, they propose that wholesale change will

be more likely to occur from within the oligarchic elite. There are two possible ways

in which this may happen. The first, is a situation in which capital begins to favor a

system that is more predictable to operate in, although this is by no mean assured by

the example of other late developing nations. The second is through fracture of elites,

as a result of a system of money politics that may struggle to totally absorb conflict

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and competition between different coalitions of oligarchs. The resulting outlook by

Hadiz and Robison is bleak, describing a system of all-encompassing oligarchic

power, against which weak and fragmented popular movements and interests have

little ability to oppose.

POWER RESOURCE THEORY

Support for the oligarchic thesis is also given by Jeffrey Winters, in his work on

oligarchy through the ages, as well as his work specifically on Indonesia (Winters

2011, Winters 2013). There are several differences between his work and that of

Hadiz and Robison, however. Theoretically, Winters approaches Indonesia’s

democracy from the perspective of ‘power resource theory’, studying power

according to the ‘power resources’ held, rather than the power actually exercised.

Possible sources of power include “formal political rights, official positions (both

inside and outside government), coercive power, mobilizational power, and material

power”, all of which are important to Winters in shaping Indonesia’s politics (Winters

2013, 13). Material power, the domain of oligarchs, is particularly significant for its

ability to be converted into other forms of power. Thus, the power of the oligarchy,

however it is expressed and in whatever type of regime, can always be traced back to

wealth inequality. The challenge in situations of great wealth inequality and oligarchy

is understanding the interaction of these different types of power, and in particular the

conditions under which mobilizational power and democratic participation become an

influential and important force in the face of oligarchic power (Winters 2013, 16). His

focus on material inequality generally contrasts to Hadiz and Robison’s specific focus

on oligarchy as an outcome of capitalist development (Winters 2013).

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Winters’ analysis of the Suharto regime is similar to Hadiz and Robisons’s. He argues

that under Suharto ‘s regime oligarchic power developed and became the norm,

subservient only to Suharto, and not to the rule of law. Towards the end of Suharto’s

rule, a previously predictable system of oligarchy was becoming unhinged by the

growing power and favoritism shown to Suharto’s children. Rather than being linked

to wealth defense of the oligarchy, Suharto’s closest circle were increasingly linked to

predatory and unpredictable behavior that threatened them. Growing dissatisfaction

with Suharto and his cronies meant that when the Asian Financial Crisis and oil shock

hit, triggering widespread popular protest, those that had previously supported

Suharto quietly abandoned him (Winters 2013, 18-19). Following Suharto’s

departure, surprisingly few of his supporters and the oligarchic elite were dismissed

with him and, given their great level of material power, they were able to persist into

the new, democratic system.

Despite the departure of Suharto, elites within and outside of the formal party system

continued the deep relationship that had developed over the course of the New Order,

now without the controlling influence of Suharto. In analyzing this relationship,

Winters gives a greater focus to national level politics, as opposed to Hadiz and

Robison’s focus on decentralization and politics at the local level (Ford and Pepinsky

2013, 6). In Winter’s post New Order Indonesia, oligarchic wealth and power has

become a necessary prerequisite to any person gaining a party nomination or running

a political campaign. Political power, when gained, generally owes something to its

oligarchic backing, and as a result becomes complicit in wealth defense of this

oligarchic class. This is only further complicated by a weak and corrupt legal system,

with legal action against the corrupt methods of oligarchs always a possibility, and

therefore used as extortion to gain further financial support and or backing by those in

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public office. Democratic change may have changed ‘the game’ somewhat, with

financial or political success now dependent on the deployment of wealth and

successful use of the law, elections, extortion and public office (Winters 2013, 29)

Potential for change within the Winter’s thesis rests on his understanding of power

resource theory. Great material wealth can be expressed through “formal political

rights, official positions (both inside and outside government), coercive power and

mobilizational power”. The only way that the oligarchic elite can be challenged, is

through the expression of power across each of these categories, sufficient to threaten

the material power and wealth defense of the oligarchy. Like Hadiz and Robison,

Winters argues that the fragmentation and weakness of civil society has limited the

potential for mobilizational change within Indonesia. Labour is not a significant

feature to be considered for Winters, and he instead looks at the mobilizational

potential of society more broadly.

COUNTER OLIGARCHIC

The counter-oligarchic approach is far more disparate than the oligarchic argument,

with a greater range of scholars taking a greater range of approaches to understanding

democracy in Indonesia. Broadly, the counter-oligarchic approach gives attention to a

broader range of factors, outside of a powerful and wealthy elite. For example

individual agency, popular mobilization, the organization of opposition or reformist

forces, and electoral processes are all important in counter-oligarchic work (Caraway

and Ford 2014, 2). These scholars also identify a number of shortcomings in the

oligarchic thesis, including a lack of attention given to non-material factors, policy

change, the role of agency over structure and the influence of institutional and process

change. In sum, after giving greater credit to a greater range of factors at play in

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Indonesia, the counter-oligarchic thesis takes a more optimistic view of Indonesia’s

democratisation. This thesis will be utilizing the work of Edward Aspinall, Michele

Ford, Teri Caraway, William Liddle and Thomas Pepinsky, among others, to identify

these weaknesses and shortcomings in the oligarchic thesis (CITE ALL COUNTER-

OLIGARCHIC).

NON-MATERIAL FACTORS

The oligarchic thesis gives extensive focus to the role of capital in shaping power

structures and struggles in Indonesia. Winters, in his analysis of Indonesia today,

gives non-material factors some consideration in his use of a “power resource theory”

framework, however still emphasizes the role of material-power for how it influences

and is the source for other types of power. Hadiz and Robison assert that they do

indeed account for non-material factors, particularly notions of “nationalism,

populism and corporatism” and their role in wealth defense against liberal and social

democratic critics (51). However this apparent account of non-material factors is

identified as a tool of the authoritarian government, and linked to the role of the

patrimonial networks in co-opting the middle classes, and not in and of itself

identified as a legitimizing force across society more broadly.

There are non-material factors not recognized or credited by Hadiz, Robison and

Winters, which are recognized by scholars falling into the ‘counter-oligarchic’ camp.

With regard to Indonesia’s transition to democracy, non-oligarchic scholars tend to

give a greater level of attention to the role that the reformasi movement played in

bringing about the fall of Suharto. In Aspinall’s case, he argues that popular

mobilization and protest has been too “blithely” written out of the picture. He

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contends that, in the ten years prior to Suharto’s fall and in the tumultuous months

that immediately preceded it, popular pressure was of great significance, including for

the influence it had on elites and elite fracture (Aspinall, 105).

Non-oligarchic scholars also focus their attention on a broader range of factors that

shape Indonesian politics and society post-Suharto, critiquing the oligarchic thesis for

its failure in this regard (CITE ALL Pepinsky, 87). Aspinall traces this a

misunderstanding of lower class organization in Indonesia to its differences to

democratisation in Latin America and Europe (CITE). To test his assertion that lower

class activism can be effective, he closely looks at two issues, labour rights and

healthcare, and how fragmented activism and electoral populism have been influential

in these areas. While he accepts that activism, as a result of decades of suppression

and disturbance, may be highly fragmented, he argues it is nevertheless effective,

particularly as a result of mobilizational political pressure. Secondly, he asserts that

the influence of democratisation has been felt through the pressure of the ballot box,

with many candidates’ forced to try and appeal to lower class interests and policy

demands.

LABOUR

Organised labour, like other non-material factors, is given little consideration by

Hadiz and Robison, or by Winters. In Hadiz and Robison’s case, they emphasize its

fragmentation and disorganization, and the absence of a social democratic, labour

based party (Caraway and Ford 2014, Hadiz and Robison 2013, 259). Winters

emphasizes the inability of labour to have any meaningful influence when faced with

oligarchic power. The sum of this analysis is an overemphasis on oligarchic power, at

the expense of a deeper understanding of the influence that labour can and does have

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in Indonesia’s democracy today (Caraway and Ford 2014, 1-2) This lack of attention

is partially remedied in the work of counter-oligarchic scholars, particularly Benny

Hari Juliawan and his focus on street politics, Edward Aspinall and his focus on

labour rights policy development and Teri Caraway and Michele Ford, and their work

on labour organization and its role in an apparent oligarchic framework.

Michele Forde and Teri Caraway write extensively on labour organization in

Indonesia (Caraway and Ford 2014, Caraway, Ford, and Nugroho 2014, 1-2, Ford,

2004b, 2006). They argue that organised labour has been able to advocate for change

and achieve certain goals far more effectively than they were able to under Suharto,

despite its fragmentation and despite functioning within an oligarchic framework.

These goals have been able to be achieved through two key methods, ill considered

and not explained by oligarchic scholars: mobilizational power, and elite competition

exploited by labour organizations (Caraway and Ford 2014, 3). Benny Juliawan

critiques the dominant writing on Indonesia’s democracy for its failure to

acknowledge the influence that organised labour has in Post Suharto Indonesia. He

argues that successful mass mobilization on the streets, across multiple instances and

across many jurisdictions; shows that labour can and does have an influence within

Indonesia.

POLICY CHANGE

The oligarchic argument gives limited attention to policy change, making little effort

to analyze the development of socially focused policy developments within Indonesia

(Aspinall 2013, 104). Edward Aspinall is particularly critical of the oligarchic

argument on this point, arguing that Hadiz and Robison give insufficient time and

attention to understanding how and why policies favoring the working classes have

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been enacted within an oligarchic framework, and within the framework of a

devastated left. Nevertheless, his understanding of this element of Indonesian

democracy does not entirely dismiss the oligarchic premise. Instead, he understands

policy developments as the result of a combination of factors, including fragmented

activism and electoral populism within the context of a fractured elite, under pressure

from institutional and structural change (Aspinall 2013, 103).

AGENCY OVER STRUCTURE

The oligarchic thesis, particularly Hadiz and Robison only gives limited attention

given to the role of personal and collective agency, with their primary focus instead

on the structural influences on Indonesian democracy. If individual reformers emerge,

they argue that they are simply drawn into the existing web of oligarchic influence,

leaving little room for appreciating and understanding reform. Countering this,

Aspinall argues that, while oligarchic power does have a huge influence, popular

agency is nevertheless important to shaping political outcomes, contributing to a

system that is marked by constant contestation, rather than oligarchy. In William

Liddle’s “theory of action”, he argues that individuals can and do have the ability to

“create, mobilize and deploy” political resources, rather than solely focusing on the

structural influence that originates in material inequality. The core point of the

‘agency over structure’ approach is that a ‘black and white’ analysis of Indonesian

democracy, based on material inequality alone, does little to capture shades of

difference and contest that are the result of popular and individual agency.

INSTITUTIONAL AND PROCESS CHANGE

25

Despite analyzing Indonesia since the fall of Suharto, and all the institutional and

process change that it has entailed, Hadiz, Robison and Winters consider that actual

power configurations have not changed a great deal. This approach has been criticized

for insufficient attention given to the way in which democratic institutions and

processes have forced oligarchic elite to consider policies that appeal to the masses,

for example health or labour reform (CITE- Aspinall)

Instituional and process change since the fall of Suharto has opened up a space for

labour to engage with formal politics, through the influence of votes as well as a

greater ability to mobilise and have their voice publically heard. This thesis will focus

on understanding what the increasing politicization of labour can indicate about the

state of Indonesian democracy and oligarchy.

CONCLUSION

In engagement with oligarchic and counter oligarchic theory on Indonesia, this thesis

will address a number of shortcomings in the current literature. Firstly, it will be

focused on labour organization and its engagement with oligarchic and elite politics, a

topic on which there has been limited research. Secondly, it will be commenting on a

contemporary event, and therefore one that has not yet had a significant amount of

analysis on it.

This thesis will argue that Indonesia’s labour movement is characterized by extreme

fragmentation and division, all the more acrimonious as a result of the increasing

politicization of labour in a fiercely divided presidential election. This contestation

and division is a characteristic of counter-oligarchic theory, in that it accounts for the

role of capital and oligarchic figures in shaping democracy and policies, as well as

genuine activism and reform from popular interests and electoral pressure. Like

26

counter-oligarchic theorists assert, labour politics in Indonesia can be characterized by

contestation and fragmented activism.

27

CHAPTER 3: ORGANIZATION AND CHARACTER OF LABOUR

Analysis of labour organization in developing countries, as well as labour

organization itself, has been heavily influenced by scholarship on and experience of

labour organization in Western, early industrialized countries (Ford 2004a, 3).

Following observations that transposing such theories and models to developing

countries was problematic, scholarship giving greater attention to factors and

explanations particularly common to developing countries proliferated (Kerr and

Siegel 1955 in Ford 2004, 3). Of these approaches, two distinct explanations on the

formation and nature of labour organization in developing countries can be

recognized: structural and cultural approaches (Siddique 1989). Structuralist analyses

have given their attention to Indonesia’s experience as a late-industrializing nation, as

well as emphasized corporatist elements of the New Order and post-New Order

political climate and structure. Culturalists instead emphasize the impact of local

culture, including patrimonialism and its restricting effect on the will of workers to

challenge authority (Ford 2004b). It is likely that both cultural and structural factors

have been influential, with features of the New Order, patrimonialism and paternalism

and Indonesia’s democratisation in a globalized, neo-liberal environment all

contributing to the organization of trade unions today. Further, Michele Ford argues

that the ideology and practice of Western labour organization cast a long shadow

across industrial relations under Suharto, and did indeed have some influence on New

Order era trade unionism. This chapter will assess the historical factors contributing to

28

the organization of trade unions today, in order to better understand divisions and

fragmentation of labour organizations in the 2014 presidential election.

THE BIRTH OF TRADE UNIONISM

The birth of labour movement in Indonesia can be traced to the early 20th century,

with the first trade unions forming in the 1920s, when Indonesian was still under

Dutch control (Tambunan 2014 119). Influences at this time were external, with

Western educated intellectuals, Western debate on socialism and Dutch socialists all

important to their initial growth and development (Ford 2004a, 6). Their

development went further than simply advocating for improved rights and conditions

for workers, however, and they also became an important vessel for organizing and

nurturing the growing independence movement (Tedjasukama 1958).

Following independence in 1945 these trade unions continued their activism, and

continued to be a sizeable component of Indonesian civil society and an influential

movement with in politics (Tambunan 2014 120, Juliawan 2014 20), the most

influential of which was All Indonesian Centre Workers Organisation (SOBSI), a

union with close links to the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) (Hadiz 2002 131).

As an indication of the level of involvement and membership trade unions enjoyed, in

1958, of a workforce of 32 million people and of that a reported 2.5 million formal

workers, 5 million were reported as trade union members (Hawkins, 1963 260; Ford

2009, 25 in Tambuna 2014 120). Their size and influence contributed to the

enactment of laws relating to workers rights, primarily on improvement to workers

wages and salaries (Tjandra 2008, 2). Throughout this time they also maintained their

links to Western socialist ideology, with Indonesian translations of texts on Marxism,

Leninism and the history of socialism in Europe commonly available (Tambunan

29

2014 120). By tracing the labour movement in Indonesia back to its birth and noting

its origins, it is possible to see that the labour movement in Indonesia initially had a

strong ideological underpinning and a strong role in civil society, and an influential

role among the political class.

TRADE UNIONISM AND THE NEW ORDER

The ousting of Sukarno, and with it a tidal wave of anti-left wing and anti-communist

rhetoric and violence, signaled a new era for labour in Indonesia1. There were two

initial, explicit objectives of Suharto’s New Order that were particularly influential,

the decimation of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and rejection of any left-

wing ideology or movement and, secondly, upholding the official state ideology of

Pancasila (Ford 2004a, 8). In practice, these twin objectives were used to justify

policies that gave continuing economic development and political stability the utmost

primacy (Ford 2001 103, Wiratraman 2014 77). To achieve this a system called

Golangan Karya, or ‘functional groups’, was implemented. Under Golangan Karya

single organisations were permitted for representing particular groups in society, in

this case workers (Ford 2003, 96). It was in this climate, in the 1970s, that Pancasila

Industrial Relations were developed, and that a single unified union, the All Indonesia

Labour Federation (FBSI), was sanctioned (Wiratraman 2014 77).

1 On the 30th September 1965 a military coup resulted in the ousting of Suharto, as well as a

brutal attack against left wing political organizations and affiliates, particularly the PKI and

affiliated union, the SOBSI. Official data on the victims is not known, however it is estimated that

around half million people were killed and almost a million people arrested and imprisoned

(Hearman 2009).

30

HARMONIOUS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EMPLOYERS AND

WORKERS

Suharto’s Pancasila Industrial Relation system, like the New Order more generally,

followed a corporatist structure. Using a combination of oppression and

patrimonialism, state sanctioned groups in society were permitted to function only

where they contributed to economic development and political stability of the nation2.

In the case of labour organizations this meant that a “harmonious” relationship

between employers and employees was expected, and certainly not antagonism or a

class related conflict (Ford 2004a, 14, Wiratraman 2014 ). Conflict was expected to

be resolved by consensus, with the progress of the company given priority by all

parties in negotiations. This ‘harmonious’ relationship was built on the belief that

employers and employees had shared interests - so long as the company was

economically secure and profitable, workers’ social and economic interests would

also be met (Mufakhir 2014 103). Any action that threatened a company’s

profitability, for example strike action, was considered a threat to the harmonious

relationship between employers and employees, a threat to the interests of workers

themselves and, more broadly, a threat to the country’s economic stability, security

and development. As a result, the state would intervene, either using the military or

police, condemning and restricting such action as counter-productive to the country’s

economic development, as well as communist by nature.

2 In Opposing Suharto (2005) Edward Aspinall argues that coercion was only one element of the

methods used by the New Order to maintain power. In addition to coercion and oppression of potential

opposition groups, the New Order developed a system of patrimonialism and co-optation. This served

to channel potential threats to the regime into ‘semi-opposition’ groups, enmeshed into the New

Order’s system of corruption and deal making and therefore limited in their independence, will and

ability to oppose the regime (Aspinall 2005, 2010).

31

Illustrating this approach to unionism, at an event marking the 25th anniversary of the

SPSI (formerly the FBSI) the then Minister for Manpower, Latief, said:

“Unions are part of the infrastructure of Pancasila Industrial Relations. They

are not designed for confrontation, but to assist management as a partner in

running the company, which, in turn, helps improve the welfare of workers

and their families”

(Waspada 22 Fenruary 1997, cited in Ford 2004a, 26).

This attitude reveals an influence of both structural and cultural factors on the form

and organization unionism took. The state’s influence indicates a structural

understanding of labour, while the emphasis on family and not challenging authority

may, in part, be derived from traditional Javanese culture.

APOLITICAL TRADE UNIONISM

Under Pancasila Labour Relations the New Order used rhetoric and policies that

promoted the political independence of trade unions. The highly politicized form of

unionism common in the West was eschewed, and in its place an indigenous form of

trade unionism that stressed unions should be ‘pure’ and apolitical was promoted.

Under this regime, it was argued that unions should be concerned with economic

issues of their members only, and not with using workers as a political ‘tool’. As a

result trade unions had a strong market orientation, with largely economic goals and

concerns (Tjandra 2008, 45). Despite rhetoric, the function of this requirement was

less for the benefit of workers, and more to to ensure that the one state sanctioned

trade union, the FBSI was not politically active and a threat to the New Order. It was

also, likely, a response to the period under Sukarno in which unions had a great deal

32

of influence and political involvement (Ford 2004a, 27). In reality, trade unions’

independence from politicization simply meant that unions could be politically active

in a way that threatened the New Order - strong links existed between FBSI and

Golkar, Suharto’s political party. It’s leadership consisted of individuals with deep

links to Golkar, and its lower level membership often consisted of retired members of

the military or bureaucracy (Ford 2004a, 12).

Accompanying emphasis on economic unionism, as well as the focus on ‘pure’ and

‘independent’ unionism was the New Order’s strong anti-communist, anti- leftwing,

stance. The New Order’s legitimacy was constructed on a threat of communism; a

threat which they then continued to emphasize in rhetoric and in policy over the

course of the New Order (Hadiz 2008, 530). The threat of communism was used as

justification in the suppression of independent trade unions, and to ensure that there

was no deep left wing ideology underpinning them. In its place, state sanctioned

Pancasila ideology was upheld. The sum of trade unions’ apolitical, corporatist and

anti-left wing characteristics was a system of organized labour that was dedicated to

meeting only short-term socio-economic goals of its members, as opposed to working

toward any long-term, ideologically driven, political agenda. Further, they were

severely restricted in their activity and organizing ability. These characteristics

contribute to an understanding of the form and values of organized labour in

Indonesia has taken post New Order (Ford 2004a, 13).

LABOUR NGOS

The inadequate and weak nature of labour organisation and lack of independent and

effective representation of workers under the New Order left a gap in Indonesian

politics and civil society. Despite there being considerable discontent among workers

33

at various times throughout the regime, it was not able to be accomodated by sate

sanctioned trade union representation (Ford 2003, 96). Labour focussed non

government organisations, as actors outside of the state sanctioned union system,

were able to step in and fill this shortfall, acting as advocates on labour issues.

Michele Ford has identified two main approaches that have been utilised by NGOs in

labour advocacy, particularly prominent during the latter years of the New Order

(Ford 2003, 97). The first approach adopted local level strategies, for example legal

advocacy and workers’ education, and usually in cooperation with workers’ groups.

Upon the collapse of the New Order and relaxation of regulation on unions, many of

these NGO supported workers’ groups became trade unions. The second approach

utilised by labour NGOs and identified by Ford was those NGOs that gave greater

attention to policy advocacy and research. It was these NGOs that aso engaged more

deeply in international campaigns of significance to labour rights and conditions in

Indonesia (Ford 2003, 98). NGOs have been a significant part of the growth and

development of labour activism, contributing to the growth of trade unionism, but

also active on behalf of labour in their own right.

34

LABOUR ORGANIZATION POST SUHARTO

The fall of Suharto in 1998 was the result of a number of factors, with academic

debate over the significance that popular interests had compared to the role of elites

and elite fracture not settled3. While several scholars do give greater credit to the role

of popular action, they do not consider trade unions, specifically, as particularly

influential or significant, a result of the tight restriction of independent unionism over

the course of the New Order (Aspinall 2013, 119). Upon the collapse of the New

Order the new government ratified a number of ILO conventions fundamental to the

freedom of workers to collectively organize, namely the ILO Convention No. 87 on

the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize (Suryomenggolo

2014, 5, Ford 2001 108). There was a subsequent explosion in activity in organized

labour. A mere two years after the collapse of Suharto, when there was only one trade

union permitted, “twenty-four national unions and more than ten thousand enterprise

unions” were registered with the state (Aspinall 2013, 109). Despite this explosion in

organized labour, a number of scholars have noted that labour’s power and influence

in the years following the New Order was limited (Aspinall 1999, Hadiz 2002 ,

Juliawan 2014 , Tornquist 2004). There are a number of reasons that unions have had

limited influence and power post Suharto, namely the influence of the New Order on

society and organization, and their experience growing within a neo-liberal,

globalized political and economic context (Suryomenggolo 2014, 10).

3 For further discussion on the divide between oligarchic and counter-oligarchic assessments of

Indonesian democracy see Chapter One.

35

NEO-LIBERALISM AND GLOBALIZATION

Democratisation in Indonesia has occurred during a period of time when neo-liberal,

‘market friendly’ policy has been the norm. Further, organized labour has had to

contend with the challenge of globalization. In reflection of this, following the

immediate democratisation and liberalisation of labour law following the New

Order’s collapse, was a ‘swing’ toward more ‘flexible’ neo-liberal labour policy, a

pattern common to many late democratizing, post authoritarian nations as they seek to

replace instruments of authoritarian control (Suryomenggolo 2014, 5). Wiratraman

has examined different ways in which neo-liberal policy, influenced or directly

instigated by institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF and aimed at enhancing

market flexibility, has threatened the rights and organizing abilities of labour

(Wiratraman 2014 74).

There are three ‘rounds’ of labour reform or attempted labour reform that Wiratraman

identifies as significant. The first was from 1997 - 1998, following the onset of the

Asian Financial Crisis, the second was in the early 2000s, under the Wahid and

Megawati. Administrations and finally, the third, which was during President

Yudhoyono’s tenure (Wiratraman 2014 84-85). Each of these waves of reform were

aimed at enhancing labour flexibility, and included policies related to more flexible

outsourcing, increased foreign workers, greater levels of contract workers, limiting

the role of the state in settling labour disputes, more flexible minimum wage and

limiting the right to strike (Wiratraman 2014 85). While still under debate, the most

recent wave of reforms has been identified as potentially highly damaging for

institutionalizing labour market flexibility, including through contractual work and

outsourcing, and thereby endangering trade unions’ ability to collectively organize

36

(Suryomenggolo 2014, 5). Furthermore, neo-liberal rhetoric has contributed to the

sidelining of left wing ideology.

LEGACY OF THE NEW ORDER

As has already been discussed, the New Order was highly controlling of trade

unionism and the left. For thirty years the Pancasila model of industrial relations was

strictly upheld, including apolitical unionism, a suppression of left wing ideology and

emphasis on ‘harmony’ between employers and employees.

The apolitical nature of unionism persisted in the election immediately following the

end of the New Order. In research undertaken by Michele Ford (2005) and Ollie

Tornquist (2004) on the 1999 General Election, many activists and leaders from

labour organizations showed negative attitudes towards engagement with political

parties, including towards forming a ‘labour’ party, arising from a suspicion of the

motives and interests of these parties. While this does show a persistence of New

Order era rhetoric and Pancasila industrial relations, it was not an entirely

unjustifiable position to hold, either. In the 1999 general election four political parties

with a purportedly labour base contested the election. Three of the leaders from these

four parties had a history as an elite in the state sanctioned union SPSI or the New

Order regime. Juliawan, during research conducted in 2008 and 2009, similarly found

that many leaders and activists were suspicious of overtly political unionism. Similar

to criticism of political unionism and the requirement for “pure” unionism during the

New Order, trade unionists expressed concern that their interests would be “hijacked”

by forces outside of the union and contrary to the union’s interests (Juliawan 2014 20-

21).

37

Anti-left wing sentiment has similarly persisted in Indonesia’s post New Order trade

union movement, leading to the ongoing marginalization of left wing ideas (Juliawan

2014 19). New Order rhetoric linking trade unionism to communism has been

successful in stigmatizing the movement, persisting in some areas even today. The

1965 anti-communist/left wing purge may have also “traumatized” workers in

particularly affected areas, making deep involvement in trade unionism a less

attractive prospect (Tambunan 2014 123). Further, unions do not necessarily identify

strongly with left wing ideology. In an interview with a union leader from XXXX in

Karawang, the union was identified as more of a “community” focused organization

than a left-wing organization. This is not only limited to trade unions directly,

however. Interviews with NGOs working with trade unions undertaken in September

2014 cited anti-left wing sentiment among the public more broadly persisting as well,

with strong left-wing ideology not usually articulated strongly for this reason. Public

anti-left and union sentiment has been exacerbated employers’ groups and investors

using the media to condemn strike action, union campaigns and minimum wage

campaigns. Common fears/criticism voiced by employers in such situations is similar

to rhetoric used during the New Order, arguing union action is disruptive to economic

growth and damaging to foreign investment (Ford 2013, 233).

In addition to challenges from neo liberalism and the legacy of Pancasila Industrial

Relations, unions have had to contend with more practical shortcomings in terms of

organizational ability. The suppression of trade unions for thirty years meant that

trade unions, save for the state sanctioned union, had no opportunity to build

organizational structures or experience. Several scholars have noted that the

institutional capacity to “collect membership fees, to conduct collective bargaining,

and to defend their members in disputes” has been lacking among many unions

38

(Quinn 2003, Isaac and Sitalaksmi 2008, and Kelly 2002, in Juliawan 2014 36). In

addition, trade union membership is generally comprised of low wage, unskilled

workers with little job security, for whom union organizing represents a high risk,

particularly given the practice of union busting (Tambunan 2014 123).

39

CHAPTER 4: LABOUR IN THE 2014 ELECTION

The labour movement in Indonesia has been described as fragmented, divided and

weak. Nevertheless, this election marked a significant moment for trade unionism in

Indonesia, with unions engaging in the formal political contest, following a trend of

increasing political engagement first notable in the 2004 election. The means through

which they have gained influence include mass mobilization and engagement with

presidential candidates, although all are ultimately related.

The two presidential candidates in the 2014 presidential election represented a stark

contrast in the development of Indonesia’s democracy, however this did not mean that

trade unions united behind one candidate. Instead, unions have been divided, with a

great many supporting Jokowi, but one of the most powerful union confederations,

KSPI, opting to support Prabowo. This split has caused deep division within the

movement, continuing after the election of Jokowi (Iqbal 2014 , Chandra 2014 ,

Manuswar 2014). The position trade unions have taken in this election and the means

through which they have engaged with the democratic process are of interest to

understanding labour’s role within Indonesia’s democracy, particularly within the

context of significant oligarchic power.

MOBILIZATION

Since the fall of Suharto the labour movement has needed to contend with the shadow

of thirty years of authoritarianism and suppression of their independence, as well as

the challenges of trying to have their voice heard in a developing democracy, where

economic pressures for flexibility and competitiveness are high (Juliawan 2011, 349).

40

Despite these challenges trade unions have become increasingly adept at mobilization,

gaining influence with government and private industry primarily through street

protests and strikes

While labour’s particular role as a significant political force is still developing, its

ability to mobilize on a nationwide scale, as well as on a more regular, smaller scale,

is more certain. Labour has successfully staged mass mobilization events both in

response to broader social issues, for example social security, as well as in response to

more traditional labour issues such as minimum wage or working conditions. Indeed,

since the fall of Suharto and restrictions on dissent, there has been a significant

expansion in the number of street protests (Juliawan 2011, 356). As an indicator of

the growth since the New Order, from 1989 to 1994 there were 2263 work stoppages

across Indonesia (Kammen 1997, 357, in Juliawan 2011) From 1999 to 2005 Juliawan

found there were 2759 work stoppages in the Tanggerang area alone (2011, 356).

Another, more recent, set of analysis from Anom Astika (sourced from media reports)

identified 1,114 demonstrations across Indonesia in the period from 5th January to 25th

January 2013 (Astika 2013 in Aspinall 2013, 107).

There have also been a gradually increasing number of protests in the years following

the collapse of Suharto. Juliawan examined the occurrence of street protests in Medan

and Tanggerang from 2005 to 2008. He found in 2005 there were 124 and 125 street

protests in Tanggerang and Medan respectively. In 2008 there were 289 and 189

protests respectively, indicating expansion the number of street protests in the post-

Suharto years, (Juliawan 2011, 356).

This proliferation of labour mobilization indicates that labour have managed to

establish a space where dissent and possibly influence with state and capital is

41

possible. This protest does not rely on formal institutional structures and interplay

between elites, instead gaining power from the mass mobilization of workers in public

spaces (Juliawan 2011, 352). These labour protests in Indonesia have taken a variety

of forms, though Juliawan has described a typical labour protest as follows:

“[they] vary from a quiet work stoppage followed by sit-ins within the walls of

the factory premises to noisy marches through the streets and lengthy

occupations of government buildings. In many cases, the struggle starts with

unanswered demands or failed negotiations; a demonstrasi then ensues either

in the factory compound or in public spaces, such as the streets, urban

landmarks or government buildings” (Juliawan 2011, 357).

Depending on the size of the action, protestors usually block the streets they are

adopting as their stage, in the process causing significant interruption to traffic

(particularly in Jakarta, notorious for traffic problems). Indeed, it is not always a side

product of the protest, but often an explicit purpose. In an informal interview with the

organizer of a toll road workers union, blocking the toll road was cited as an

achievement of a protest against the use of short term contracts. Disruption to the

traffic and surroundings areas has the effect of making the size of the protest appear

more significant, forcing the engagement of the public with the protest and issues

raised, as well as potentially demanding the attention of the media.

PROVEN ABILITY TO MOBILISE

Labour has managed to prove mobilisational ability and influence by a number of

successful, mass mobilization protests and strikes, as well as by numerous smaller

scale actions. These protests and actions, as well as larger scale mobilisations, have

been a regular feature of post Suharto Indonesia, indicating that labour are gaining

42

influence with government and capital through this method of engagement. There are

a number of potential benefits to workers unifying in protest action, including policy

gains in social security issues and working conditions, as well as a sense of dignity

and pride in self-expression. Importantly however, the influence of mobilization goes

beyond immediate policy responses or wage rises. Incidences of mass protests or

work stoppages also demonstrate the ability of labour to mobilize and gain influence,

and as a result increase their power and bargaining ability, without necessarily having

to mobilize each time. These incidences cause government and capital to response to

the potential labour have to mobilize. This means that, while mobilization in relation

to the 2014 election may be important to labour’s influence and power in it, what is of

greater influence are incidences of mass mobilization in which labour proved its

ability, and the need for it to be noted.

There have are a number of examples of labour mobilizing on a national scale

successfully influencing policy as well as demonstrating their ability to mobilize and

influence policy. Particularly significant incidences include mobilization in 2001 to

support the reinstatement of ‘Ministerial Decree 150/2000’ on redundancy and

severance payments, to abort anti-labour reforms to the Manpower Law in 2006, and

to prevent a temporary wage rise freeze proposed in 2008 (Juliawan 2011, 364).

More recently, there was a wave of mass mobilization in 2011 and 2012, in relation to

labour based issues, as well as broader issues on social security and fuel subsidy

reform (Aspinall 2013, 111). In October 2012 a two-day national strike was held, with

workers demanding minimum wage increase, universal healthcare, abolition of

outsourcing and protection for domestic workers. These demands indicated labour’s

increasing politicization, and expansion into social areas, rather than simply labour

issues (as was typical of New Order era unionism).

43

A broad coalition of union confederations formed a unified workers council, the

Majelis Pekerja/Buruh Indonesia or Indonesian Workers Council (MPBI) to

coordinate and participate in the strike action, including major confederations the

KSPSI, KSBSI, KSN and KSPI confederations (IndustriALL 2013). Approximately 2

million people participated in the action, marking a significant milestone for the

labour movement (Lane 2012). This was the first national strike in Indonesia’s

history, and was indicative of excellent organizational ability and confidence on the

part of the labour movement.

The response of the government was also indicative of their sensitivity to the strike

action. Negotiations with MPBI on the issues they were raising occurred on the first

day of the action and, following this strike, minimum wage increases of forty percent

occurred (Lane 2013). This was in the context of opposition from the powerful

employers union, and often-corrupt politics, demonstrating that mobilization is an

effective tool against these challenges, and the success of democratic protest and

action against the oligarchy (Ford and Caraway 2014).

In October 2013 a second, though smaller, national strike was held, with workers

demanding an end to outsourcing, an increase to the minimum wage (of 50%) and a

social security scheme for all Indonesians. This national strike was coordinated by a

new coalition of unions called the Labour Movement National Coalition (KNGB),

instead of MPIB. KNGB was comprised of KSPI, as well as smaller left leaning

unions, such as KSN. Larger confederations such as KSPSI and KSBSI did not

support the strike, believing it was not time to again call for a large increase to the

minimum wage, although it may have also indicated a breakdown in the relationship

between the major federations (Lane 2013).

44

KSPI AND MOBILIZATION

While demonstrating the power of labour, these national strikes particularly showed

the power of the main organizing union behind them, the Metal Workers Federation

(FSPMI), and its confederation, the Indonesian Trade Union Confederation (KSPI).

The KSPI is one of the largest confederations in Indonesia, with 1.8 million members,

and the largest when also considering factional division within other unions (Iqbal

2014). It is also one of the best-funded and best organized unions in Indonesia, a

result of a good ability to collect dues, strong institutional structures, strong

leadership and funding from overseas sources (Siljabat 2013).

In an interview with Iqbal he articulated the importance of labour having been able to

mobilize, directly relating policy successes to the two national strikes held in 2012

and 2013 respectively. He expressed frustration felt by KSPI that, that despite

Indonesia’s economic growth, there was initially “no attention [for labour]. Nothing

from government or employers about what could improve labour. Nothing.”

Following this inattention from government KSPI pursued a strategy (called ‘concept,

lobby and action’ or ‘CLA’), in which mobilization is a key component. First, they

focus on developing a concept, such as an end to outsourcing or decent wages.

Second, they lobby government, parliament members and employers associations.

Finally, if they are unsatisfied with the response, they take action by mobilizing

members to pressure government, parliament and employers groups (Iqbal 2014).

Iqbal noted that this strategy has been successful. In reference to the influence of

national strikes in 2012 and 2013, as well as KSPI’s regular mobilization of on May

Day, Iqbal said the following:

45

“After that we are win. After that we can get some issues. For example in

2012, increasing minimum wage 30-42%...inflation only 6%. Social security

reform, health insurance for lifetime…and also outsourcing, reduced because

government announced a new regulation for outsourcing workers. Only five

industries can use outsourcing workers. This is a win.”

Apart from the strategic focus on mobilization, KSPI‘s creation of the Garda Metal

has been important to their mobilization ability. The Garda Metal is a union run

brigade charged with protecting workers during strikes and actions from employer

sponsored gangsters, or providing a sense of security in the face of strong military and

police presences at rallies (Lane 2014, interview with Said Iqbal 2014). The presence

of the Garda Metal demonstrates organized labour’s participation in a political system

in which violence and physical intimidation are commonly used tools.

An additional, important, factor in KSPI’s organizational success is the president of

KSPI, Said Iqbal. Iqbal has a reputation for being highly charismatic and highly

persuasive, important skills for persuading workers of the need to strike and which

candidate to offer their support to.

Attempts at mass mobilization or protest in Indonesia without the participation or

support of KSPI will have only a limited influence. During interviews with activists

from two labour NGOs two interviews stated that, despite some unions unfavorable

attitude towards KSPI, the labour movement still needs KSPI due to their excellent

organizing and mobilizing ability (November 2014).

MOBILIZATION IN THE 2014 ELECTION

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Trade unions ability to mobilize has been the source of their power in a political

system where there is no institutionalized means for them to contribute, nor any left

wing, workers party, through which they have representation. Their ability to

mobilize has likely contributed to Prabowo actively seeking the support of trade

unions, with regular demonstration a significant feature of elections in Indonesia.

Indeed, street activism was a particular feature of this election, with Jokowi

particularly recognized for a large network of volunteers expressing their support for

him publically.

PAYMENT FOR DEMONSTRATIONS

Complicating the increase in mass mobilization in Indonesia are concerns that public

protest and strike action are motivated by factors external to the workers and their

needs. These accusations likely have their root in New Order era mobilization, when

labour was accused of having outside influence from academics, foreigners or

communism. Following the collapse of Suharto, public protests were instead

discounted by arguing they had been paid to protest, thereby delegitimizing the issues

raised. It is possible they were indeed paid; the economic recession meant small sums

may have been enough to suffice for enticement to protest (Juliawan 2011).

Despite this, Juliawan has argued that in Post Suharto years the level of organization,

coordination and persistency shown by organized labour protests in indicates a level

of commitment and consistency that is unlikely to be the result of financial

motivation. This is supported by the size of national strike action, as well as the

regularity of smaller actions. Instead, Juliawan argues that labour protest is discounted

by the public, as a reflection of the suspicion people feel towards elite politics.

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It is possible that there were instances of donations from political parties to trade

unions for campaigning during the 2014 election, and there are many unverified

reports of this occurring. This would not run counter to Juliawan’s argument that

sustained commitment indicates genuine motivations. Engagement for political

campaigning does not have a long history, and would require participation of workers

for a short period of time only.

In an interview with KPBI, a union alliance that supported Jokowi, the chairperson

said ‘Team Prabowo’ had offered KPBI 100,000RP per person campaigning in Bekasi

and Jakarta. When questioned about whether Prabowo had assisted with campaign

financing, Said Iqbal said all campaign costs were paid for by the union.

When asked about whether Jokowi funded campaigns of unions that supported him,

many interviewees commented that Jokowi did not have any funds to be able to do

this, and all support for him was on a volunteer basis only. However, Jokowi was

supported by APINDO, the employers group. In an interview with an official from

KSPSI, there was commentary that Andi Gani (from another KSPSI faction) had

received funding assistance from APINDO for campaigning purposes, although this

cannot be verified.

FORMAL POLITICS

The 2014 election was another milestone in the increasing politicization of labour,

with all major confederations choosing to align with one of the two of the main

candidates. This was indicative of the increasing politicization and confidence of

labour in working within the formal political system, however also the continuing

fragmentation of the movement and division between trade unions.

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The most powerful trade union confederation, KSBI, as well as a number of smaller

trade unions, aligned with Prabowo in the electoral contest, while the remaining major

confederations supported Jokowi. There are a number of interesting points that can be

drawn from trade union alignments, particularly in relation to trade unions offering

their support to Prabowo, a candidate who represented a return to a more authoritarian

style of governance.

The following section will discuss the contrasting candidates, Prabowo and Jokowi,

before assessing the motivations and incentives behind different elements of the

labour movement supporting different candidates, and what this indicates about the

role of labour functioning within an oligarchic system.

PRABOWO SUBIANTO

HISTORY

Prabowo Subianto has been a recurring character in Indonesian politics, with a

background highly representative of the New Order, as well as oligarchic politics post

New Order. His great wealth, family ties to Suharto and military power in the New

Order, but also recurring power in post-New Order politics, are representative of the

oligarchic argument that New Order era elites have merely adapted to democratic

structures and institutions to retain power.

Prabowo has been accused of committing a number of serious human rights abuses

during his military career, in West Papua, East Timor and (Klinken 2014). This is

particularly related to his long career with Kopassus, Indonesia’s Special Forces unit,

which has a record of human rights abuses in internal conflicts (Adams 2010). Most

politically damaging to him are accusations of human rights abuses during the fall of

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Suharto, when Prabowo was Lieutenant General of Kopassus, Indonesia’s Special

Forces unit. He was accused of orchestrating the kidnapping of twenty two pro-

democracy activists, of which seven have never been found. In 1998 Prabowo was

investigated for this incident by a military honor board, and discharged after they

apportioned responsibility to him (Mietzner 2014, Human Rights 2010). In 2006

Indonesia’s National Commission on Human Rights recommended he should be

prosecuted for this incident. However, to date he has not been prosecuted (Cochrane

2014). Prabowo has said he accepts responsibility for the kidnappings, as the

commander of the forces that undertook them. However he denies knowledge of the

kidnappings or ordering them.

In addition to the well-publicized accusations of kidnapping, Prabowo has a

questionable human rights record in East Timor and West Papua. Prabowo was a

senior military officer with Kopassus in East Timor in 1983, then again from 1988 to

1989. In East Timor he is associated with training militia groups, which have had

many human rights abuses recorded against them, as well as unproven suggestions

that his unit was involved in a massacre of civilians in the village of Kraras, East

Timor (Santoso 2013). When in West Papua he was associated with an incident in

which civilians were shot at from a helicopter marked with the Red Cross symbol,

however this is also unproven.

Following the collapse of the New Order, Prabowo made the transition to democratic

politics, initially as a member of Golkar, Suharto’s political vehicle during the New

Order. In 2004 he nominated to become Golkar’s presidential candidate, however

failed. Following this failure he left Golkar to form Gerindra, with the intention of

nominating for President in the 2009 election. His party did not receive the requisite

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number of votes in the legislative election, and he instead ran with Megawati’s (PDI-

P) ticket as the Vice Presidential nominee. He was again unsuccessful.

Attitudes of trade unions and other civil society groups towards Prabowo have

included criticism of this background, including of alleged human rights abuses

during his time in the military. Further criticism has been directed at his commitment

to democracy and intent to return to authoritarianism and his credentials as a

supporter of the labour movement and labour rights (Interviews, November 2014).

Many academics have also written on the risk of democracy reversal under Prabowo.

ANTI-DEMOCRATIC

Prabowo’s anti-democratic characteristics can be identified in his military and New

Order background, but also in rhetoric used in his campaign, policies he was

advocating and behavior immediately following the election. This was supported by

interviews with a deputy chairman of Gerindra, in which anti-democratic attitudes

were regularly and openly expressed. This included criticism of democracy and its

suitability for Indonesia and ‘Asian’ culture, criticism that the media is ‘too free’,

admiration of Lee Kwan Yew and China’s system of governance and concerns that

the military does not have enough power at present.

Marcus Mietzner has argued that democracy can be characterized by policy and

rhetoric that is moderate, pragmatic and pluralistic in nature, as candidates or leaders

attempt maintain to their legitimacy by appealing to a broad cross section of society.

Conversely, Meitzner identifies “populist militancy” or “radical populism” as an

important precursor to authoritarianism, particularly in post-authoritarian nations.

Prabowo’s strategy in this election can be characterized as “populist militancy”, as he

utilized strong and aggressing nationalist and populist rhetoric.

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As an example, the following translation is taken from an impassioned speech given

in Medan, in which Prabowo incited anger against a vaguely defined foreign ‘enemy’.

“Beware all you foreign stooges! All you who can only slander, can only

insult people, but have never never defended the people, never gave thought to

the people, never gave thought to the poor, who only at election time pretend

to care for the people (Subianto 2014, translated by Gammon 2014).

As another example, during a speech at a campaign event at Jakarta’s Bung Karno

Stadium Prabowo targeted “unnamed liars, corruptors, weaklings… and foreign

powers” for Indonesia’s problems (Mietzner 2014). Prabowo was painting an image

of threats against Indonesia, particularly in relation to foreign interests taking

Indonesian natural resources that only he, a ‘strong’ leader, would be able to resolve.

This rhetoric may appear hollow when considered against Prabowo, and his tycoon

brother, Hashim Djojohadikusumo’s, own financial interests and wealth, gained in the

mining industry, and likely as a result of rent seeking and patronage (Mietzner 2014,

114).

Prabowo’s blustering and aggressive nationalist rhetoric was accompanied by imagery

strongly associated with Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno. Prabowo wore a

traditional cap associated with Sukarno, and also used a vintage style microphone

associated with him. The purpose of this association was to link Prabowo to

Indonesia’s anti-colonial movement, and to enhance further his nationalist and

populist appeal.

As well as imagery related to Sukarno, Prabowo adopted a strong military style

throughout his campaign, using private militias and marching bands throughout. This

strong militaristic approach can also be seen in Prabowo’s political party. In

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interviews undertaken in November 2014, Gerindra’s deputy chairman described

cadre-training camps conducted by Gerindra, in which men are trained in “ideology

and discipline”. Imagery of the training camps (below), show they are highly

reminiscent of military training. The same Gerindra official also expressed a belief

that the military in Indonesia is too weak, particularly in comparison to a powerful

police force. This strong militaristic style of campaigning was tapping into a sense of

longing within the electorate for the New Order, as well as Prabowo’s projected

image of a ‘strong leader.’

A RETURN TO THE 1945 CONSTITUTION

Prabowo’s anti-democratic tendencies went further than militant populist rhetoric, as

he hinted at features of Indonesian democracy being detrimental and ill suited to

Indonesia. Speaking at an event on the 28th July he said:

“I believe much of our current political and economic systems go against our

nation’s fundamental philosophy, laws and traditions, and against the 1945

Constitution…Many of these ideas that we have applied are disadvantageous

to us, they do not suit our culture”

This was similarly supported by interviews with the Deputy Chair of Gerindra, Arief

Poyuono, who stated that democracy is not suited to Indonesia, that Indonesians were

not ready for democracy and that governance in nations such as China or Singapore

present a better alternative for Indonesia (Interviews undertaken in November, 2014).

Continued reference to a return to the 1945 Constitution is also of interest to assessing

Prabowo’s commitment to democracy. The 1945 Constitution implies removing all

post-Suharto, democratizing reforms, including “direct presidential elections, a

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stronger parliament, a human-rights charter, and…a system of checks and balances”

(Mietzner 2014, 115). Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner have argued that

Prabowo intended to wind back direct elections of local and national leaders if elected

(Mietzner 2014, Aspinall and Mietzner 2014). Indeed, following Jokowi’s election

Gerindra’s Merah Putih faction introduced legislation to abolish direct elections of

governors and local mayors, only halted when there was public outcry and President

Yudhoyono issued an emergency government regulation to maintain direct elections

(Parlina 2014).

LABOUR SUPPORT FOR PRABOWO

PRABOWO’S RECORD ON LABOUR ISSUES

Prabowo has a poor record on labour issues, evident in his own businesses and in

comments he has previously made about labour. Prabowo’s business interests are

predominantly through the Nusantara Group, which engages in the mining, forestry,

plantation and energy industries. His wealth, as reported to the Corruption Eradication

Commission (KPK), is approximately US$140.46 million (Jong and Widhiarto 2014).

Prabowo’s track record on labour is compromised by issues at Kertas Nusantara, a

paper mill he is the majority owner of. Following financial difficulties of the company

in early 2014, 600 workers went on strike saying they had not been paid for five

months (Hidayat 2014).

In relation to the 2012 national strike Prabowo discussed the importance of labour

taking into consideration the needs of the employers in their demands. Recounting a

conversation he had with workers he said the following:

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“Some time ago I met with a group of workers, they asked for a wage

increases. I said we don't have the money. You need to be wise…It was my

duty to remind [them]… Think first, if you force the issue, who knows, we may

all suffer financially” (Atriana 2012).

This language is strongly evocative of New Order era industrial relations policy,

which focused on the need for employees and trade unions (SPSI) to work for the best

interests of the company.

POLITICAL CONTRACT

Prabowo committed to a ten point political contract ten issues important to labour, as

a result of negotiations with KSPI. Prabowo agreed to all of KSPI’s ten demands,

with no substantive change to them. He sought changes only to wording, but not to

the principles of these demands (Interview with Said Iqbal 2014)

In this contract, Prabowo’s commitments included the following:

1. Raise the minimum wage by 30% in 2015

2. Rejection of minimum wage suspensions

3. Mandatory pensions for workers by July 2015

4. Health insurance for all workers and poor

5. Remove outsourcing, particularly for state owned enterprises

6. Increased protections for migrant workers and domestic workers

7. Revision of bill relating to law societies

8. Raise wages of teachers, particularly part time teachers

9. Introduce/improve public housing and pubic transportation for workers

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10. Introduce compulsory education up to year twelve and scholarships for

children of workers4.

This political contract represented a milestone for organized labour, with no other

comparable offer ever made to trade unions in previous presidential elections. Iqbal

emphasized how, despite labour’s achievements as a result of mass mobilization,

labour has been locked out of negotiation with parliament in previous years. In

relation to social security reform and not being able to directly negotiate with

government, he said “its very tough…its very, very tough and difficult”, expressing

great frustration with labour’s ability to negotiate and have a voice in government.

As a result of this frustration of labour’s goals, KSPI focused on a political strategy as

well as the concept-lobby-action approach. Part of this political approach was seeking

to become more partisan in the 2014 presidential election, and entering into an

alliance with the candidate that was most accommodating to their demands. Prabowo

was the only candidate in the election that agreed to their demands, and as such he

received the full support of KSPI.

These commitments are undoubtedly attractive to organized labour, however the

reliability of these promises is questionable, given Prabowo’s history and track record

on labour rights. When trade unions and labour NGOs who either supported Jokowi

or remained unaligned, were questioned about Prabowo’s commitment to labour they

were scathing about whether he was genuine.

4 See Appendix 1 for original Indonesian version

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The chair of KPBI, a council of labour organizations that supported Jokowi (and the

successor of MPBI), was asked why he did not support Prabowo, given his promises

to labour, said the following:

“[the commitments are] only a statement. Not included in the vision and

mission of Prabowo. Different to Jokowi’s vision and mission. Jokowi have

many many concepts for the workers. Everything is good for workers. For

Prabowo, only a statement, nothing else…Prabowo only ‘okay Iqbal, okay

Iqbal’“

Similarly, other union leaders and activists, when interviewed on the likelihood

Prabowo could have raised the minimum wage by 30% in 2015, were highly skeptical

and scathing of his promises. This is supported by Prabowo’s negative attitude

towards union demands in 2012 to raise the minimum wage by 40%.

Two interviewees from labour NGOs, interviewed informally, expressed concern that

Prabowo was simply seeking support from whichever corner he could, and would

agree with all demands in order to gain such support, without necessarily keeping

such promises. This is supported by Prabowo’s agreement to all ten of KSPI’s

demands, with no substantive changes sought, as well as the unlikely nature of some

promises (e.g. raising the minimum wage by 30%). This is particularly concerning in

light of Prabowo’s anti-democratic attitudes, and the possibility that he was seeking

election only to return Indonesia to authoritarianism.

MINISTERIAL POSITION

In addition to the political contract, the Minister for Manpower position was promised

to Said Iqbal if he won the election. In an interview with Iqbal, conducted after the

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election, this was defended as a way in which labour could have decent representation

within government. Indeed, this in itself is not necessarily problematic. Trade union

leaders filling government positions is not unusual, or hidden, among liberal

democracies where trade unions have a considerable amount of power or have their

own political representation. More concerning, however, is that the offer was not

made public as the ‘ten commitments’ to labour were. It was rumored, however not

publically admitted to by Prabowo or Iqbal. It is likely this was either to avoid the

perception that Iqbal was concerned only with an appointment to this powerful

position and that this was the genuine reason for his support to Prabowo.

POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

In 2009 Said Iqbal ran as a candidate in the 2009 legislative elections for PKS, the

Prosperous Justice Party. PKS is an Islamic political party that has had moderate

success in legislative elections, currently holding 40 seats in the legislative assembly.

Like other Islamic parties, PKS supported Prabowo in the election and is part of

Gerindra’s Merah Putih faction. During an interview Iqbal commented on the need for

unions to remain independent, and on the independence of KSPI. This was

particularly compared to KSPSI, with criticism given to the close PDI-P affiliation of

one of its factional leaders, Andi Gani. Despite this, his own political affiliation with

PKS shows that KSPI is not necessarily entirely independent, and political links with

PKS may have an influence on which candidate was supported.

JOKO WIDODO

Jokowi represented a stark alternative to Prabowo Subianto, and a break from the

New Order. Jokowi has no background in politics under Suharto, and no family

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connections that assisted his rise to prominence. Through a laid-back, humble and

approachable style, he presented an image of an ordinary, middle class Indonesian

rather than one of the elite.

Jokowi first achieved success in his hometown of Solo, where he built a successful

furniture business. In 2005 he successfully ran for Mayor of his hometown, and

gained a reputation for improving health and education services, strategies to address

corruption, and for a blend of pro-poor and pro-business policies. He was reelected

Mayor of Solo in 2010 with 90.1% of the vote

In 2012, thanks to a rising national profile, he caught the attention of the PDI-P, and

other elites (including Prabowo), and received the nomination in Jakarta’s

gubernatorial election. He won this election, defeating candidates who had appeared

stronger and better funded than he was. After improving healthcare access for the

poor, introducing a university scholarship program and prioritizing public transport to

tackle the city’s traffic issues, his media presence and popularity rose further.

Jokowi’s popularity began to be reflected in polling on possible presidential

candidates. Although initially seeming reluctant, Jokowi’s positive polling gave

Megawati and the PDI-P little option to offer him their nomination for the presidency.

In March 2014 he officially began his campaign (Sherlock 2014).

In Jokowi’s mission and vision statement he laid out his aims to regain trust in public

institutions, particularly law enforcement, enhance economic independence, increase

productivity and competitiveness, raise citizens quality of life and bring about a

“mental revolution” in national culture. These goals and aims were based on

Pancasila, as well as Trisakti, the principles of political sovereignty, economic

independence and distinct cultural character that were popularized by Sukarno. These

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policies are not highly distinct from Prabowo’s. Like Prabowo, he advocates for

nationalist economic policies, although his approach is far more moderate than

Prabowo’s, and the aggressive, anti-foreigner style is absent. Like Prabowo, he also

references Sukarno and Pancasila in his campaign.

Despite similarities in their policies, however, the approach they take is drastically

different. Prabowo advocated change through a ‘top down’ approach, greatly focused

on a need for ‘strong leadership’, worrying when his anti-democratic rhetoric and

background are also considered. Conversely, Jokowi’s approach to ‘change’ in

Indonesia was based, not on the actions of the state, but on the actions of the people.

He advocated a ‘mental revolution’ and on the development of a nation based on

gotong royong, a philosophy of working together towards a collective goal. He

represented a moderate, continuation of reformasi while Prabowo represented a

potential return to authoritarianism.

Despite Jokowi’s good reputation as being a ‘clean’ politician, and his image

representing a departure from New Order politics, he is not immune from accusations

of being a part of the oligarchy or ‘old’ elite His selection as PDI-P’s candidate for

the Jakarta gubnertorial election was the result of a number of oligarchic elites

selecting and backing him, including Megawati, Jusuf Kalla and, ironically, Prabowo

and his tycoon brother Hashim Djojohadikusumo (Winters 2014). Similarly, he

received substantial media coverage during his stint as Mayor of Jakarta, a result of

his great popularity, but also of backing from oligarchic media barons. He has also

had to contend with criticism that he is merely a puppet of Megawati, the unpopular

past president and powerful chairperson of the PDI-P (Kapoor and Thatcher 2014).

This image is not undeserved. His cabinet appointments upon his election show a

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substantial number of appointees owe their position to an affiliation with PDI-P and

Megawati, as opposed to experience and talent (Hill and Resosudarmo 2014).

The requirement for Jokowi to have oligarchic and elite backing to be successful in

elections show that he is operating within a strong oligarchic context, where wealth

and connections are very important. However his personal popularity has been able to

counter this, and enabled him to gain first the nomination for Jakarta’s gubernatorial

election, and from this the PDI-P presidential nomination, despite elite unwillingness

to back him in this instance (Sherlock 2014, 22).

LABOUR SUPPORT FOR JOKOWI

JOKOWI’S RECORD ON LABOUR ISSUES

Jokowi’s record on labour issues is mixed, however he has a strong record on social

welfare policies. In 2012, when Jokowi was in office in Jakarta, he approved a 44%

raise to the minimum wage for 2012-2013 (Manning 2014) . This extraordinary jump

was seen as the result of successful mass mobilization of workers, a sense that

Indonesia should rely less on unskilled cheap labour, and more on between paid,

skilled labour for investment and finally that labourers were genuinely underpaid in

comparison to Indonesia’s growing middle class. It is all the more significant when

considering that regional wages set in Jakarta are influential around the nation,

serving as standard against which other regions minimum wages are set and

measured.

During wage negotiations in 2013, Jokowi did not again offer large increases to the

minimum wage, granting only a ten percent increase to workers. This increase was

minimal when compared to the previous years increase of 44%, but also when

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compared to an inflation rate that negated the small rise. The wage increase was set

as an outcome of the Jakarta Wage Council, a body usually made up of government,

employers and workers. In this case workers boycotted it, so Jokowi only received

input from government officials and employers. The resulting raise angered some

unions, with Iqbal commenting “If Joko really approved that wage, that means that he

does not side with the poor…It means that he defends the employers’ interests”

(Primanita 2013).

NEGOTIATION

Jokowi appeared uninterested in negotiation with KSPI. When discussing the political

contract entered into with KSPI, Iqbal commented that his union would consider

supporting any candidate that signed it. He also said that his organization contacted

Jokowi multiple times to negotiate, however received no response. Alternatively,

unions that supported Jokowi and NGO activists said that the relationship between

Iqbal and Prabowo had been developing well before KSPI declared for Pabowo, and

that Jokowi was reluctant to meet with a union that was already intent on supporting

Prabowo. While the truth of this is difficult to determine, it is clear that only Prabowo

and KSPI, and not KSPI and Jokowi, entered into negotiations.

This does also not indicate that Jokowi negotiated with no unions, however. In public

commentary Andi Gani, of KSPSI, commented that while there had been no political

contract entered into with Jokowi, there was regular close communication with him.

In June 2014 he said “ (Mr Joko) has shown us he is a man of reason and listens

before acting, so we prefer that than a leader who is the opposite” (Nazeer 2014).

Other, smaller, unions, such as KSN or and KPBI (a council of different unions) said

they had received no contact from Jokowi.

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NEO LIBERALISM AND EMPLOYER SUPPORT

Discussion with different unions that supported Jokowi conveyed a sense that he was

not necessarily going to be highly considerate of labour and trade unions. Several

interviewees expressed concern that he would not buck Indonesia’s focus on neo-

liberal policies and on attracting foreign investment at the expense of good working

conditions.A further concern was the support given to Jokowi by APINDO, the

powerful employers association, as well as personal support from Sofyan Wanandi,

the powerful chair of APINDO and wealthy businessman (The Jakarta Post 2014).

Mukhtar Gunter, the leader of KSN, a “red”, left leaning trade union confederation,

said in an interview that the union was more intent on putting their support behind

Jokowi, to stop Prabowo, as opposed to endorsing Jokowi. This was reflected in the

level of support they offered Jokowi, only declaring their support late in the campaign

when it appeared Prabowo had a good chance of winning. Similarly, during an

interview with Jumur Hidayat, Chair of ARM, a small council of unions that

supported Jokowi, leader of the Maritime Workers Union and longtime labour

activist, it was stressed that Jokowi would not be ideal for the labour movement, but

at the very least supporting him held no liabilities. Supporting Prabowo, on the other

hand, would have been damaging to the labour movement’s reputation and a much

riskier move for labour’s future.

POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

Like KSPI and Iqbal’s affiliation with PKS, some of the labour unions that supported

Jokowi are also affiliated with political parties. One of the largest trade union

confederations, KSPSI supported Jokowi early in his campaign. This was

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unsurprising given that the leader of a major faction within KSPSI, Andi Gani Nena

Wea, has strong PDI-P affiliations. Andi Gani (as he is known) is the son of Jacob

Nuna Wea, a former labour activist and Minister for Manpower under Megawati.

Interviewees from unions that supported Jokowi and unions that supported Prabowo

commented on this affiliation, saying that Andi Gani is not independent, and never

would have supported another candidate. One official, from an alternative KSPSI

faction, commented that unions are simply instruments of political parties, including

KSPSI.

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CONCLUSION

This thesis has discussed the division of labour in the 2014 election, assessing how it

has developed to have increasing engagement with formal politics, as well as the

motivations behind labour’s engagement with formal politics.

Chapter 2 assessed literature on oligarchy and democracy in Indonesia, including

counter oligarchic and oligarchic approaches to understanding Indonesian politics and

power. Broadly, the oligarchic thesis emphasizes the role of political elites and capital

in shaping power and democracy in Indonesia, at the expense of any focus or

consideration given to lower class, genuine democratic influence from the populace.

While this approach is not entirely incorrect, this thesis asserts that ‘counter

oligarchic’ approaches are a more accurate portrayal of Indonesia politics and society,

given their attention given to a broader range of influences on power, while also

accepting oligarchs hold considerable sway.

Chapter 3 examined the history and background of labour in Indonesia, particularly

the role of organized labour under the New Order and its relation to formal politics.

This chapter showed how organized labour in Indonesia has a history of being

apolitical, a trend that has continued to today in some instances, or is only recently

changing. Understanding the background of labour is important to understanding the

recent politicization of labour., as well as reluctance to become politically partisan

Chapter 4 examines this election in detail, focusing on the two main presidential

candidates, Prabowo and Jokowi, and their respective qualities and offers to labour. In

relation to these candidates this chapter analyzed mobilization of trade unions, and

how this has assisted them in gaining the ear of candidates in the Presidential election.

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It also examined the formal negotiations and motivating factors in labour’s support of

Prabowo and Jokowi respectively.

This chapter found that there are still oligarchic forces influencing labour, particularly

linked to the candidate Prabowo. Prabowo characterizes oligarchic power in many

ways, as a result of his background in the New Order and reputation for human rights

violations. In addition to his poor democratic credentials, however, are anti-

democratic practices that occurred among unions supporting him, including the

possibility of funding in exchange for support, and the offering of ministerial or other

high-level positions to unions leaders in exchange for support.

Support for Prabowo from different unions is complicated by Prabowo’s extensive

promises to labour. These promises raise the question of whether KSPI, in this case,

managed to co-opt oligarchic power, of if labour was co-opted for its mobilization

power. This assessment can be made by evaluating the promises Prabowo made, and

whether he would have been of benefit to labour.

Prabowo’s ten promises would undoubtedly have been of benefit to labour, if he was

able to keep them. However, it is unlikely Prabowo could keep these promises, or that

he intended to keep them, indicated by his anti-labour background as well as the

nature of the commitments. Many unions commented it was not possible to keep

promises around outsourcing or the minimum wage, and that he was only saying what

labour wanted to hear in order to gain their support.

Prabowo’s anti-democratic tendencies and attitudes are also of particular concern. It is

unlikely organized labour would have had increased power or improved living

conditions under a more authoritarian government. These concerns with Prabowo,

should he have come to power, indicate that it is likely some organized labour groups

66

were co-opted by oligarchic forces, as opposed to co-opting oligarchic power for their

own use.

In relation to Jokowi, there are also indications of oligarchic influences, however their

impact is not so severe given the perception of him as a break from New Order era

politicians, and the need many unions felt to halt Prabowo. Nevertheless, there are

strong links between a number of unions that supported Jokowi and political parties,

calling into question the motivations behind their support of Jokowi.

In sum, divisions between labour in the 2014 election indicate that labour in Indonesia

is highly fragmented, a result of a number of different factors, though this thesis has

focused on its position within an oligarchic context. This thesis has found that

labour’s behavior in the 2014 presidential election indicates labour, while becoming

increasingly politicized and showing great mobilization ability, it is still divided by

oligarchic and reformist influences.

67

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81

APPENDIX

APPENDIX 1

Source: Personal correspondence with KSPI

BANGKIT & BERGERAKLAH KAUM BURUH

1. Meningk atk an day a bel i upah pek er j a/ buruh dan masy arak at dengan cara

mengubah jum lah j enis barang dan j asa y ang menjadi k omponen untuk

k ebutuhan hidup lay ak ( KHL ), dar i 60 j enis m enjadi menjadi 84 j enis

barang dan jasa ser ta m eningk atk an produk t i f i tas pek er ja / buruh.

2. Menghapus Kebi j ak an Penangguhan Upah Minimum.

3. Menjalank an Jam inan Pensiun Waj ib bagi buruh / pek er ja per 1 Jul i 2015

sesuai UU SJSN dan BPJS

4. Jalank an Jam inan Kesehatan seluruh rak y at dengan cara cabut perm enk es

69/ 2013 tentang tar i f , gant i INA CBG’s dengan Fee For Serv ice, audi t BPJS

Kesehatan dan BPJS Ketenagak er j aan.

5. Hapus Outsourcing, k hususny a Outsourcing di BUMN.

6. Sahk an RUU PRT dan Rev isi UU Per l indungan TKI.

7. Cabut UU Ormas gant i dengan RUU Perk umpulan.

8. Angk at Pegaw ai dan guru Honorer menjadi PNS, ser ta subsidi Rp 1 Juta per

orang/ per bulan dar i APBN untuk Guru Honorer .

9. Sediak an Transpor tasi Publ ik dan perumahan Murah untuk Buruh.

10. Jalank an Waj ib belaj ar 12 Tahun dan bea sisw a untuk anak Buruh hingga

Perguruan Tinggi .