-
Operational Art and the Narva Front
1944, Sinimäed and Campaign
Planning.
Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of
the University of Liverpool for the degree of Doctor in
Philosophy
by
Major Andrew Michael Del Gaudio, United States Marine Corps
August 31, 2012
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ABSTRACT
There is much written history for the military professional to
read, but little is of value to
his education. While many works are often wonderful reading,
they are too broad or narrow in
scope, often lacking the context to be used for serious study by
professional soldiers. This work
was written with two audiences in mind; my colleagues in the
academic world, along with my
many comrades who are professional soldiers. The present work
was originally conceived as a
contribution to historical literature on the subject of military
education. More specifically, it was
to be an exploration of the concept of operational art and the
manner in which planning was
doctrinally conducted to articulate battle on the Eastern Front
in the Second World War. Any
study of war devoid of the theory and doctrine of the period
would be of little use to academics
and military professionals alike. By the same token, it is often
necessary for an author to relate
the unfamiliar feelings of combat to a reader in order to give
the perspective needed to
understand war. Military professionals should study history to
become better decision makers.
Peter Paret best explained the role of history in relation to
military professionals or historians
when he said, “ By opening up the past for us, history added to
the fund of knowledge that we
can acquire directly and also made possible universal concepts
and generalizations across time.
To enable history to do this, the historian must be objective or
as Clausewitz would have said-
"as scientific or philosophical as possible.” 1
Decision making must be looked at through the lens
of what Clausewitz called “critical analysis."2 Clausewitz
sought to answer the question of
“why” something happened in terms of cause and effect. A
decisions being examined can only
be understood if we know something of the character of the man
who made it. These thoughts
1 Peter Paret, Understanding War (Princeton: Princeton
University Press 1992), 131.
2 Ibid,133. This work provides a central understanding to the
use of history. Paret continues by saying “In
the chapter “Critical Analysis” of On War, Clausewitz
distinguishes between “the critical approach and the plain
narrative of a historical event” and further identifies three
paths that the critical approach might take; “The discovery
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together provide the foundation on which greater understanding
of the art and science of war is
built, thus giving the military professional the tools to
deconstruct a decision in terms of the
problem historically in time and space. This facilitates a
greater appreciation and understanding
of his trade. The “reenacting process” allows scholars and
professional soldiers to reconstruct
problems in terms of the terrain and material used during the
period; giving a clearer view into
the heart of the problem.3 As students of the art and science of
war, we must make every effort
to morally, mentally and physically put ourselves in a position
to understand why leaders made
the decisions they did. While the sheer terror of combat can
never be properly replicated, our
studies must find a way to understand them. The English
language, or any language for that
matter has a poor ability to explain in words, written or
spoken, the horror of war. War is not just
the extension of policy by other means, it is a societal
interaction where human beings struggle
within the phenomenon called war.
We must understand war to be a human activity, thus a social
affair. Grasping human
emotions, we see events capable of motivating or terrifying
combatants in the lonely hours with
the extreme violence typical of combat. In this light, we
correctly educate ourselves about the
true nature of war. War studied at the strategic, operational or
tactical-levels should always
consider decisions made, particularly in terms of their moral,
mental and physical properties.
Common elements to the offense or defense are the weather and
terrain being fought on. While
the weather will ultimately affect each differently, weather has
the ability to complicate terrain in
ways man to this day cannot conquer. The following pages reflect
a military professional’s
understanding of the events at Leningrad, Narva and Sinimäed
from 68 years ago. Understanding
of these events was achieved through German plan for Operation
BLAU. An examination of this
and interpretation of equivocal facts…; the tracing of events
back to their causes…; [and] the investigation and the
evaluation of the means employed.”
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and other operational-level documents has yielded a tremendous
understanding of how the
Germans envisioned the retrograde of their forces into the
Baltic states. It brings the author joy to
know this work can be used to explain the monumental events and
sacrifices of others. To this
end, I have made my finest attempt.
3 Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Decoding Clausewitz (Lawrence: Kansas
University Press 2008), 45.
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DEDICATION
UPON THE BACKS AND IN THE HANDS OF SO FEW RESTED THE HOPES AND
DREAMS OF SO
MANY. THE GRATIFYING WORK OF THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER IS
PROPERLY MOURNED ONLY
BY WE WHO KNEW THEM. ONLY THOSE WHO SUFFERED WITH ME EVER KNEW
THE TRUE COST.
THE AUTHOR
FOR THE MEN OF COMPANY K, THIRD BATTALION, EIGHT MARINE
REGIMENT, RAMADI,
IRAQ 16 MARCH 2006 TO 29 SEPTEMBER 2006
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This study would not have been possible without the efforts of
many. To my advisory
team, Doctor Robert T. Foley and Professor Charles Esdaile who
read my many drafts along
with providing sound mentorship and guidance to complete this
most daunting task, a most well
deserved thank you. Without them, this work could not have been
possible. I must express my
sincerest gratitude to Doctor Eric A. Sibul of the Baltic
Defence College for commissioning my
initial interest in this study and supporting it with several
translations of primary and secondary
sources from Estonian. In the course of providing instruction to
various courses of the Baltic
Defence College, I was given the opportunity to visit Sinimäed
on several occasions. Without
this spark, there could have been no fire. Also, from the Baltic
Defence College a special thank
you is owed to Lieutenant Colonel Gert Rasmussen of the Danish
Army for his translation of
various Danish works relating to the heroic efforts of his
countrymen. At the Estonian National
Defence College, my thanks to Captain Olavi Punga, an excellent
Estonian historian and true
patriot who supplied several firsthand accounts and perspective
from his years of studying the
battle. Without the assistance of the facility of the Tartu
University Geology and Climatology
Department, particularly Mr. Arno Kanal, Assistant Professor of
Soil Science and Dr. Jaak
Jaagus of Climatology, new scientific data could not be shared
in a way meaningful to students
of war. A special thanks to: Colonel David L. Close, USMC,
Colonel Chad E. Kirkley, USMC
(RET), Colonel Lawrence F. Miller, USMC and Lieutenant Colonel
Thomas K. Hobbs, USMC,
all of whom allowed me the opportunity to explore this vast
topic and who saw the usefulness of
this work in the development of young U. S. Marine leaders. A
thanks to the many archivists of
the National Archives in College Park, Maryland who provided
excellent service in finding the
raw material for this study. Lastly, my thanks to Doctor Bruce
I. Grudmundsson of the Marine
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Corps University who was an indispensible academic mentor and
sounding board for my many
ideas related to this topic. While there were many who
contributed to the success of this work,
like commanding Marines, I alone bear responsibility for any
failures.
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Contents
Abstract iii
Dedication vii
Acknowledgements ix
List of Illustrations and Maps xv
1 Introduction with Literature Review 1
1.1 Scope/Purpose of Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Methodology of Examination. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3 Defining the Strategic Problems and the Operational
Environment in
1944. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
1.4 Shaping the Situation in 1944: The Eastern Front from
December
1941- December 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.5 Strategic Guidance and Operational Planning: The German
Perspective. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.6 The Soviet Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
1.7 The Soviet Campaign Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .25
1.8 The German Campaign Plan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.9 The Operational Use of Partisan Forces, Counter Measures
and
Tactical Execution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.10 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37
2 Strategic Ends, the Operational Environment and Doctrine
39
2.1 Strategic Reasoning and the Objective of the German Invasion
of the
Soviet Union. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.2 The Creation of the German Strategic End State and Hitler's
Initial
Planning Guidance. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49
2.3 German Analysis of the Mission and the Enemy . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . .52
2.4 Terrain: Defining the Operating Environment . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .64
2.5 Weather: How Science Affects the Art of War . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .75
2.6 Physical Network Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.7 Railroads. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78
2.8 Roads. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80
2.9 Ports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81
2.10 Air-Fields. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
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2.11 Doctrinal Concepts of Conventional Force Employment and
the
Influence of Strategic Leadership/ The German View of
Developed
Doctrine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2.12 The Soviet View of Doctrinal Development. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . 90
2.13 The Soviet War Aims and Strategy 1944. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .95
2.14 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .100
3 Initial Victories followed by Indecision and Loss: The
German
Operational Plan for Withdrawal in the North 1943/1944
(Operation BLAU) 104
3.1 The Years of Investment on the Leningrad Front through
Late
December 1943. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.2 The German Plan for the Defense of the Leningrad Area
and
Withdrawal to the Baltic States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.3 The Format and Style of "Study" Operation BLAU. . . . . . .
. . . . 122
3.4 The Content of Study Operation BLAU . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .123
3.5 Coordinating the Ends and Means with the Ways . . . . . . .
. . . . . .135
3.6 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .145
4 The Art and Science of Breakout Attack: The Soviets Attack
into
the Teeth of BLAU 149
4.1 Soviet Shaping Actions Prior to January 14, 1944. . . . . .
. . . . . . 152
4.2 The Science and Art of Soviet Decisive Operations for
Breakout and
Follow-on Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .159
4.3 Soviet Forces Reach the Luga Line and Prepare to Create
Bridgeheads into Estonia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
4.4 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .191
5 Conventional Means of Exploitation: German Defense in
Depth
versus Soviet Attack in Depth 194
5.1 The "Panther Position". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
5.2 Army Group North creates Army Detachment Narva. . . . . . .
. . . 200
5.3 The Soviet Amphibious Attempt at Mereküla . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . 211
5.4 The Soviet Attack Through the Isthmus and Actions at
Sinimäed.217
5.5 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .244
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6 Irregular Warfare and Conventional War 246 6.1 Defining and
Deconflicting Terms of Reference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
6.2 Soviet Ideology and its Applications for Partisan Warfare. .
. . . . 252
6.3 Soviet Partisan Task Organization for Operations in the
Baltic. . .256
6.4 German Anti-Partisan Doctrine and Operations. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . .263
6.5 German Task Organization for the Defense of Estonia. . . . .
. . . . 269
6.6 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .283
7 Conclusion 285
7.1 Strategic Ends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
7.2 Doctrinal Development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .. . . . . . 293
7.3 Tactical Means. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
7.4 Operational Ways. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
Bibliography 306
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List of Figures, Pictures and Maps
Figures:
Figure 1: Example "Z" Diagram of Ends, Ways and Means. . . . . .
. . . . . .4
Figure 2: "Z" Diagram of the First Soviet Campaign Goal . . . .
. . . . . . . 26
Figure 3: "Z" Diagram of the Second Soviet Campaign
Goal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 29
Figure 4: "Z" Diagram of the German Campaign Goal . . . . . . .
. . . . . . .34
Figure 5: Example Planning Hierarchy. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .40
Figure 6: Weather Data for February 6, 1944 . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . 76
Figure 7: Weather Data for February 6, 1944 . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . 77
Figure 8: The Port City of Tallinn prior to the Second World War
. . . . . .83
Figure 9: Diagram of Tallinn Airfield Prior to the Second World
War . . . 84
Figure 10: Example German Defense in Depth . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .88
Figure 11: Model of Soviet Campaign Design. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .97
Figure 12: Depiction of German Withdrawal using Plan BLAU . . .
. . . 125
Figure 13: Example Tactical German Withdrawal . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . .127
Figure 14: Temperature Chart for 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . 166
Pictures:
Picture 1: General Marcks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
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Picture 2: Port of Tallinn Prior to the Second World War . . . .
. . . . . . . .82
Picture 3: Soviet Leningrad Campaign Medal . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .159
Picture 4: Russian War Memorial from the Northern War of 1700 .
. . . .180
Picture 5: Damaged Cemetery Cross in Narva . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . 181
Picture 6: The City of Narva during the 1944 Battles . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .197
Picture 7: German 20mm Anti-Aircraft Gun in Direct Fire Mode . .
. . . 198
Picture 8: German Tactical Level Command Post in the Narva Area
1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
Picture 9: Mereküla Landing Beach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . 214
Picture 10: Soviet Mereküla Landing Memorial . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . 216
Picture 11: An SS Artillery Soldier from Holland . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 219
Picture 12: Fritz von Scholz Awarding his Men. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . 237
Picture 13: Soviet Attack of a German Train . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . 262
Picture 14: Grave of a Danish SS Man from the Narva Battles . .
. . . . . 292
Maps:
Map 1: German OKH Operations Section Situation Map November 12,
1943
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Map 2: Position of the III SS Panzer Corps on the East Side of
the Narva
River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Map 3: Situation of the III SS Panzer Corps in February 1944 . .
. . . . . . 31
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Map 4: German Delay and Defend Positions Labeled A-K . . . . . .
. . . . 35
Map 5: Marck's Plan for the Invasion of the Soviet Union . . . .
. . . . . . . 59
Map 6: German Graphic Control Measures for Operation BLAU . . .
. . 123
Map 7: Strategic Situation of Army Group North, January 14, 1944
. . . 157
Map 8: Northern Crossing Points for Second Shock Army . . . . .
. . . . .174
Map 9: Situation in the Narva Area in February 1944 . . . . . .
. . . . . . . 175
Map 10: German Map from February 13, 1944 Showing the Soviet
Landing
Attempt at Mereküla . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . 211
Map 11: Position of the III SS Panzer Corps on the East Side of
the Narva
River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . 221
Map 12: German Withdrawal from Narva July 25-26, 1944 . . . . .
. . . . 225
Map 13: Current 1:50,000 Map of the Sinimäed (Blue Hills) Area .
. . . .226
Map 14: Attacks Against the "Tannenberg Position" July-
September 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 228
Map 15: Original 1:50,000 Map of the Sinimäed Area . . . . . . .
. . . . . .231
Map 16: Soviet Map of the Blue Hills Attack . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .232
Map 17: The "Tannenberg Position" and "Marienburg Position"
Used
Together . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .243
Map 18: Soviet Partisan Activity, January 14, 1944 . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .277
Map 19: Rail Network in the Baltic Area . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .278
Map 20: Soviet Partisan Activity, January 31- February 27, 1944.
. . . . 280
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Map 21: Soviet Partisan Activity, January 31- February 27, 1944.
. . . . 281
Map 22: Soviet Partisan Activity, March 27- April 27, 1944. . .
. . . . . 281
Map 23: Soviet Partisan Activity, July 3- September 17, 1944. .
. . . . . 282
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction with Literature Review
1.1 PURPOSE/SCOPE OF WORK:
The painful human phenomenon known as war is a form of social
interaction like all others.
Unlike other endeavors man participates in, which easily divide
into fields of either art or science,
war appeals to both equally. Equally affecting the art and
science of war are the moral, mental and
physical dimensions which man contributes to war while being
subject to them himself. The art of
war is concerned with intangible and fluid factors such as the
effect of leadership on the human
will, while the science of war appeals to more tangible,
consistent factors such as the effects
created by the employment of weapon against targets. The art and
science of war affects the
strategic, operational and tactical levels of war equally. A
belligerent nation must first understand
its own strengths and weaknesses, then those of the enemy to
correctly employ the art and science
of war to win at all three levels. It is thought by many
military professionals and historians alike
that nations can compensate for weaknesses at one level of war,
yet still win the war with total
dominance in the others. War is not governed by natural laws,
but rather by luck and chance. In
war, lessons observed come at a heavy cost. Winning at one level
of war may provide a short term
solution, but to win at war, a nation must be able to
effectively communicate national objectives
or end states from the strategic level into tactical action.
Combatants must use their respective
doctrines to link the use of tactical battle as a means to
securing national political objectives as
their ends. History has shown through timeless examples that
nations capable of efficiently
communicating the emergence of strategy and tactics through
their campaign design and plans
usually win their wars.
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The study of war throughout history has yielded significant
reflections from which historians
and professional soldiers have both learned. Both professional
soldiers and historians usually fail
to understand the outcome of events relative to the contemporary
mentality tasked to solve the
original problem. Often this leads historians and professional
soldiers to the wrong conclusions,
as little adjustment is made from the present mentality.
Professional soldiers study history to
develop their decision making and judgment for future
engagements. For the study of history to
be relevant to professional soldiers, problems must be
understood in the ex-ante, while examined
in the ex-post to see possibilities for a future war.4
5
Map 1: German OKH Operations Section Situation Map November12,
1943
4 An ex-ante view of a problem is to understand it as it was at
the time. The ex-post point of view sees the
original problem through the lens of what is known today in
reflection of the time.
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3
The purpose of this work is to explore the relevance of campaign
design and planning through
the examination of operations conducted in the Baltic region in
1944. [See Map 1] By first
developing an understanding of the operational environment along
with the numerous challenges
created by the terrain and weather, the issues associated with
operational design and planning are
properly framed for investigation. By examining the variables of
the Soviet and German strategic
situations and doctrines, scholars and professional soldiers
gain a better understanding of how
each combatant’s war planners interpreted their desired
strategic (end) states through the creation
of operational plans (ways). With this understanding, historians
and professional soldiers
correctly see the desired end states linked to the creation of a
campaign plan through applied
theory in the forms of doctrine and tactical battle. Thus,
campaign planning joins the desired
strategic end state to the use of tactical battle as a means to
achieve the specified ends of a
strategy.6 [See Figure 1] Identifying the emergence or ways is
the essence of the campaign plan.
In today’s parlance, military professionals refer to this
practice of linking strategy to tactics as
“operational art.”7
5 NARA RG 242, Stack 33, Row 77 Compartment 15-17 Boxes
1-48.
6 Using the model of ends, ways and means as a method for
campaign planning was introduced to the author by Dr. Bradley Meyer
while serving as a student at the U.S. Marine Corps School of
Advanced Warfighting
in 2009. The origin of ends, ways and means was first recorded
to describe strategy in the May 1989 edition of
Military Review by Colonel Arthur F. Lykke, Jr. See: Arthur F.
Lykke, Jr., “Defining Military Strategy,” Military
Review, May 1989, 2-8. When speaking of a theory for strategy,
H. Richard Yarger stated of Lykke's work that,
"There is little evidence that collectively as a nation there is
any agreement on just what constitutes a theory of
strategy. This is very unfortunate because the pieces for a good
theory of strategy have been lying around the U.S.
Army War College for years-- although sometimes hard to identify
amongst all the intellectual clutter. Arthur F.
Lykke, Jr.'s Army War College strategy model, with its ends,
ways and means, is the center piece of this theory. The
theory is quite simple, but it often appears unduly complex as a
result of confusion over terminology and definitions
and the underlying assumptions and premises." See: J. Boone
Bartholomees, Jr., ed., The U.S. Army War College
Guide to National Security Issues, Volume I (Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 45. 7 Explaining operational
art in terms of a cybernetic control loop is possible through the
use of a “Z”
diagram as seen in Figure 1. For more on the cybernetic control
loop, see Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics or Control
and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (New York, NY:
The Technology Press, 1948).
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4
Figure 1
As a term which gained popularity in the late 1970s and 1980s in
the western militaries,
“operational art” has often been a “used and abused” military
term.8 In the years following the
beginning of the “War on Terror” or the “Long War,” operational
art has been equally challenged
for its relevance by military and academic circles. Professional
soldiers and scholars have both
searched history to validate or disprove the notion of
operational art as a credible tool. Today, a
common mistake regarding operational art is to apply an ex-post
understanding of the term to
historical scenarios without an understanding of the context.
Indeed, this problem is part of a
wider issue stemming from the military field, confusing the
currency of an issue with overall
relevance for the study of war. Two themes currently falling
into this confusion are the ideas of
joint operations and countering an asymmetric threat. Using the
case study of the Baltic in 1944,
these issues can be addressed, yielding an ex-post understanding
based upon ex-ante thought and
actions.
Harnessing effects created by the synergy of joint operations is
as much a popular theme
today as it was throughout the Cold War. At the heart of all
force employment considerations is a
doctrine for the conduct of war. Doctrine is based on theory
regarding the nature of war. While
the idea of joint operations finds roots in the Second World
War, the name “joint” was certainly
not applied in Soviet or German thoughts about the strategic,
operational or tactical levels. A
8 Michael Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military History,”
Parameters Vol XI No 1, 9-14.
ENDS(DESIRED STRATEGIC
OUT COME)
WAYS(THE CAMPAIGN
PLAN)s
MEANS(USE OF TACTICAL
BATTLE)
-
5
similar idea which serves to confuse the issue further is the
employment of weapons known as
combined arms.9 Combined arms as we know it today, seeks to
place the enemy in the “horns of
dilemma,” meaning if the enemy is not exposed to the dangers
created by your direct fires, he is
susceptible to the effects of indirect fires. This concept
existed before the Second World War,
being resident in the doctrine of both the Soviet and German
Armies. While the use of naval fires
or air delivered ordinance in support of ground operations is
certainly considered combined arms,
it is not necessarily a joint operation. How a nation employs
its forces through its doctrine
determines if an operation is considered joint. A purpose of
this work is to make clear the reason
why we find so few works written on the joint use of forces in
the Second World War. While the
German and Soviet air forces and navies were separate services,
during the course of the 1944
campaign, each nation had different command relationships
between the services. While the
Soviets subordinated their air force and navy under the command
and control of the ground
commander for employment, the Germans continued to maintain
three autonomous forces.
Explored during the course of this work is how the Soviet air
force and navy were largely
used to provide tactical level support to the army in the
prosecution of their operations out of the
Leningrad pocket into the Baltic state of Estonia. Soviet
thought regarding the use of naval fires
and airpower as a method of supporting ground tactical actions
were considered enabling
operations necessary for the army to conduct operational
breakthrough.10
In 1944, the German air force on the other hand was in midst of
a doctrinal dilemma. No
doubt, learning something of the value of strategic bombing from
the Western Allies in 1942/43,
9 Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, United States Marine Corps,
Warfighting MCDP-1 (Washington, DC:
U.S. Marine Corps, June 20, 1997), 94-5.
10
Faculty of History and Military Arts, Развитие Тактики Советской
Армии В Годы Великой
Отечественной Войны (1941-1945 гг.), (Evolution of Soviet Army
Tactics during the Great Patriotic War (1941-
1945) (Moscow, USSR: Military Publishing House, 1958). This work
provides understanding of the Soviet view of
the Second World War. While it is written in typical Soviet
style, it exposes much about Soviet ex-ante thought on
-
6
the leadership of the German Air Force sought to return to their
original concept of employment
laid out before the war.11
German air force leadership thought it prudent to return to
regaining air
supremacy and attacking targets such as rail junctions and
production capability. In essence, the
German leadership was interested in conducting a strategic
bombing campaign of its own, while
continuing to support the tactical needs of the army. The
employment of the German air force in
Russia was explored in recent years by Richard R. Muller in The
German Air War in Russia.12
The development of German air force doctrine was explored as a
combined effort by James S.
Corum and Richard R. Muller in The Luftwaffe’s Way of War.13
Both works of scholarship
provide great depth of thought in their comparison of German
actions during the war to their
doctrine as it developed and evolved throughout the Second World
War. Reading these works, it
quickly becomes clear they were written to substantiate the
airpower paradigm of the U. S. Air
Force. According to the paradigm, airpower is inherently
offensive as a capability, strategic by
nature, so air power must be independent as its own service to
be used properly.14
Histories of the Second World War usually only consider
conventional ground combat
operations without ever mentioning the role of airpower or naval
power. The campaign in the
Baltic,1944 provides an excellent opportunity to explore how the
Germans and the Soviets used
or did not use their air and naval forces in conjunction with
ground actions. Unlike land locked
operations in the central Soviet Union or the miniscule naval
operations conducted by the Soviets
how lessons were observed at the tactical level of war and
incorporated throughout the greater Soviet Army. In
essence this work demonstrates how the Soviet Army observed and
shared lessons across the force. 11
James S. Corum and Richard R. Muller, The Luftwaffe’s Way of War
(Baltimore, MD: The Nautical &
Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1998). 12
Richard R. Muller, The German Air War in Russia (Baltimore, MD:
The Nautical & Aviation Publishing
Company of America, 1992). 13
James S. Corum and Richard R. Muller, The Luftwaffe’s Way of War
(Baltimore, MD: The Nautical &
Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1998). 14
This paradigm was taught to the author during the course of his
education at the U.S. Marine Corps
School of Advanced Warfighting in 2009. The author is indebted
to the teaching of Dr. Wray Johnson for the time
he spent explaining this concept.
-
7
in the Black Sea, operations in the Baltic Sea provide an
example to examine the use of naval
force in conjunction with air and ground forces.
Operations in the Baltic in 1944 provide the scholar and
professional soldier another unique
possibly for the study of war. Many today act as if the current
wars are the first time a uniformed
conventional symmetric force has been used against a
non-uniformed asymmetric force.15
Indeed,
this is not the case. While history is replete with examples,
the case study of operations in the
Baltic from 1944 have largely gone unexplored.16
During the course of operations in the Soviet
Union, German forces observed value lessons about how the
Soviets “operationalized” the use of
partisan forces in concert with conventional force
operations.17
Partisan actions often created
several serious challenges for German forces. In a constant
balancing act to find the appropriate
level of troop strength for the front lines, and the need to
secure rear areas, the Germans always
had units of battalion or regimental strength occupying
positions near senior headquarters or
significant lines of communication. This was necessary to
protect vital command and control
structure as well as nodes and modes of communication for
resupply to the front. A central lesson
this work will examine is the Soviet as well as the German use
of unconventional forces in
concert with conventional forces to accomplish a common
strategic end state. To the present,
many still believe only the Soviets used unconventional forces.
A factor never considered in the
15
See the work of von der Heydte for an introduction to
conventional forces working with irregular forces.
Friedrich August von der Heydte, Modern Irregular Warfare, In
Defense Policy and as a Military Phenomenon
(New York, NY: New Benjamin Franklin House, 1986).
16
Two more recent works published in the last 20 years have
examined the problem of using a partisan
force in the Baltic. Albert M. Zaccor (1994) and Alexander Hill
(2007) have both address the issues in, Albert M.
Zaccor, “Guerrilla Warfare on the Baltic Coast: A Possible Model
for Baltic Defense Doctrines Today,” The Journal
of Slavic Studies 7:4, 682-702 and Alexander Hill, “The Partisan
War in North-West Russia 1941-44: a Re-
Examination,” Journal of Strategic Studies 25:3, 37-55. Both
work present information in a historical context that
could be of use to those that currently plan operations in the
Baltic states. 17
Department of the Army, Edgar M. Howell, Department of the Army
Pamphlet No 20-244 The Soviet
Partisan Movement 1941-1944 (Washington D.C.: Department of the
Army 1956). This highly under used work is
one of the finest to be written to date on the Soviet use of
unconventional forces during the Second World War. In
researching this work, the author found the background documents
(in six boxes) of this work, located at NARA to
be of great service.
-
8
study of the Second World War, is what was happening in the
occupied territories. Indeed,
nothing has been written which examines the thoughts and actions
of the native populations
during the conduct of the Second World War in relation to the
major combatants. While it is
widely known how the Soviets employed partisans against German
front and rear areas with equal
effectiveness, the story of German anti-partisan efforts is
incomplete.18
While many works have been written describing the brutality of
the German anti-partisan
effort, these works lack the correct context. In the Baltic
region in 1944, the Baltic states each
wanted to regain their independence from the Germans and Soviets
alike. In the case of Estonia,
men fought in the uniform of both combatants conventionally as
well as unconventionally. In the
service of the Germans, Estonian men fought in the uniform of
the 20th Waffen SS Division.19
Incorrectly, many have drawn the conclusion that these men were
all dedicated National Socialists
who wanted to fight for Adolf Hitler and the Nazi regime. While
this may have been the case for
some, it certainly was not the case for all. There are two
factors of critical importance, 1) The
Germans deliberately drew on the native populations of the
occupied territories to fulfill the
never-ending requirement for manpower to serve at and support
the front.20
Many senior German
Officers did not feel non-Germans deserved to wear the field
grey of the German Army, hence
placing non-Germans under the command of Himmler and the
Waffen-SS. 2) in the titanic
struggle that was the Soviet-German War; the Estonians had a
plan to reestablish their
18
Valdis Redelis, Partisanenkrieg (Heidelberg, Germany: Kurt
Vowinckel Verlag, 1958). This work
constitutes an excellent ex-post look at operations conducted
against partisan formations during the Second World
War. The strength of the work is the comparison of operations
connected in the west with those operations in the
east. The work takes a very good look at how the Germans waged
war at the moral and metal dimensions through
over reliance in physical measures. 19
Mart Laar, Eesti Leegion, Sõnas Ja Pildis, (The Estonian Legion)
(Tallinn, Estonia: Grenadier
Publishing, 2008). A recent ex-post work which re-examines the
role the Estonian Soldier played in the Second
World War. The first of many recent works which challenge the
traditional view of Estonians being ardent Nazis
fighting for Hitler’s Germany. 20
Alfred Bilmanis, Latvia Under German Occupation 1941-1943
(Washington D.C.: Latvian Legation
1943). An interesting work, albeit difficult to find, written
during the war which explains what was happening in the
occupied territories of the Baltic.
-
9
independence. This task was to be accomplished through the use
of conventional forces, such as
the 20th Waffen SS Division or the lesser known operations of
the Omakaitse or the Estonian
Home Guard.21
As developed in the course of this work, the Germans used the
Omakaitse to help
secure the rear areas in conjunction with dedicated uniformed
German forces such as the
Kommandant des rückwärtigen Armeegebietes or Korück.22
While there is little doubt the efforts
of the Omakaitse benefited the Germans in the north, the
motivation of this organization was to
again secure Estonia’s independence from foreign invaders and
prevent a recurrence of 1940 with
another Soviet occupation.
There is no doubt that for history to be of use to the
professional soldier, he must be able to
apply lessons being learned from what he is studying to current
problems. In doing so, a
professional soldier develops his judgment and increases his
decision making ability for future
conflict. Understanding the application of combat power on the
battlefield is best gained though
the painful experiences provide by war. Leaders do themselves a
service by not just merely
reading about war during times of peace, or in between
deployments, but through studying war
and how it is waged. Studying war means not only understanding
the tangible and intangible
factors of the art and science of war, but how these factors
contribute to the decisions being made
on the battlefield at the strategic, operational and
tactical-levels. Some have argued in the past that
study of war must stop during the execution of a campaign.23
While the campaign being executed
clearly take precedence over everything, leaders must continue
to challenge their minds and look
21
Recent documentation recovered from the Estonian National
Archives reveal a close connection between
the Omakaitse and the German Army. These documents will be
further explored in chapter six. 22
When comparing the Oberkrietes documents against document from
the captured German records section
of NARA and interesting comparison can be done between what was
being reported about Soviet partisan activities
at the tactical level and what the Germans were relaying from
the operational level back to Berlin. 23
See Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Letters on Strategy
(London, UK: Kegan Paul, Trench,
Trübner &Co. Ltd, 1898). as he discussed this idea in great
detail in the course of two volumes.
-
10
to other examples from the past to find similarities, thus
creating efficiencies for their own time.
In doing this, professional soldiers and scholars use history
for a valuable purpose.
1.2 METHODOLOGY OF EXAMINATION:
To gather relevant ex-ante lessons from the Soviet breakout of
the Leningrad pocket and the
invasion of the Baltic States in 1944, the framework of the
strategic, operational and tactical
levels are used throughout the course of this work. Several
works of literature exist from both the
Soviet and German perspectives which enable modern scholars and
professional soldiers to learn
valuable ex-post lessons for current operations. While thinking
of war in terms of the strategic,
operational and tactical levels is thought to be a modern
construct, this framework has roots in the
Soviet way of war.24
Therefore examining the Soviet breakout of the Leningrad pocket
along with
the subsequent campaign using the levels of war is not repugnant
to the past. This was the method
used by Soviet military leaders during the course of the Second
World War to frame problems.
Conversely, the Germans tended to view the conduct of war in
terms of only strategy or tactics. It
is important to understand that what the Germans generally
considered “strategy,” was in fact
what we now think of today as the operational level of
war.25
Many of the works which already exist on the Soviet breakout of
the Leningrad pocket and
the subsequent German defensive campaign follow the German
methodology, meaning they are
either written from the strategic or tactical level
perspectives. Much of the literature being cited
throughout the course of this work examines only the strategic
or tactical levels. To properly
examine the operational aspects of this campaign from planning
through execution, primary
24
Faculty of History and Military Arts, Развитие Тактики Советской
Армии В Годы Великой
Отечественной Войны (1941-1945 гг.), (Evolution of Soviet Army
Tactics during the Great Patriotic War (1941-
1945) (Moscow, USSR: Military Publishing House, 1958).
25 The Germans certainly had understanding of the ‘operational
level’ long before any other military, but
did not express it as a distinct level of war as the Soviets
did. Indeed, the Russians developed it from the ideas of
Sigismund von Schlichting. The Germans certainly used the terms
‘operatv’ and ‘Operationen’ as a distinction from
tactical and tactics in the First World War.
-
11
German and Soviet source documents will be used to fill in the
holes which exist in the
historiography of this portion of the Eastern Front. For the
needed operational examination of the
German defensive campaign from the Leningrad pocket to the
defense of the “Panther Line”
culminating at Sinimäed or the Tannenbergstellung, along with
operations into Latvia, a valuable
series written by German commanders and planners has been found.
From the Foreign Military
Studies series, comes P-035.26
In the past, many scholars dismissed the Foreign Military
Studies
as a credible reference because of obvious bias and the lack of
references. Many of these studies
were written from memory, as many of the source documents were
not yet found. It should be
remembered that few documents in history were written
objectively. When the documents of the
Foreign Military Studies are combined and cross referenced
against the Captured German records
holdings of the National Archives and Records Administration, a
clear and concise operational
picture of events emerges.27
The value of P-035 is clear, being written by the commanders
and
primary planners of operations in the wake of the Leningrad
breakout it covers events to the
demise of Army Group North in the Kurland pocket.28
Many of the operations have long since
been forgotten and it is time to learn from their fine
example.
The National Archives and Records Administration contains a
wealth of German
information in the “Captured German Documents” section. Close
inspection of these holdings
yielded T-314, roll number 1362 as well as several others. This
collection is Army Group
26
Department of the Army, MS# P-035 Retrograde of Army Group North
During 1944. (Carlisle, Army
War College: Foreign Military Studies Department 1950).
27
Bernd Wegner wrote in The Road to Defeat: The German Campaigns
in Russia 1941-43, "The most
important results of this interest (Western interest in the war
in the east post the Second World War) were the
hundreds of operational studies on the war in the East produced
by German generals after the end of the Second
World War for the Historical Division of the United States
Army." See: Bernd Wegner, “The Road to Defeat: The
German Campaigns in Russia 1941-43,” Journal of Strategic
Studies, 13:1, 105-127. 28
The work of Generalleutnant Oldwig von Natzmer is the primary
section of P-035 that deals with the
defense of the Leningrad pocket. Natzmer served as an Operations
Officer at the division level in both Italy and
Russia until 1943. In the latter part of 1944, he would be
promoted to the rank of Generalmajor and assigned the
duties of the Chief of Staff for Army Group Kurland. Natzmer
demonstrates exceptional understanding of the front
and communicates clear understanding of events in terms of cause
and effect.
-
12
North’s log book of situation reports from subordinate
headquarters along with recorded
commander’s estimates of the enemy and friendly situation from
the time of the actions to be
examined. These are vital pieces of the Narva Front which have
never been explored. The
captured German documents section also contains several army,
corps and division records
related to the actions from the Soviet breakout of Leningrad
through the Narva Front from the
German perspective.
Writing a history of the Second World War from the Soviet
perspective, even today, is
still a problematic for western historians. Western historians
with a background in Russian aside,
access to the ЦА МО РФ (Central Archives of the Ministry of
Defense) is still extremely
difficult to gain. During Soviet times, the archive was
administered by the Military History
Institute which was founded in 1966.29
Under the hand of Lieutenant General P.A. Zhilin, the
first director of the Institute, many relevant works were
written. Zhilin was instrumental in
writing and editing the История второй мировой войны 1939-1945.
(History of the Second
World War 1939-1945).30
This 12 volume series is considered the definitive official
Soviet
history of the Second World War and was better written than
previous attempts.31
Many of the
pertinent 11 million documents in the holdings of the archive
were used in the construction of the
History of the Second World War 1939-1945.32
While Russia continues to placate the west with
the recent release of documents relating to the Katyn Forest, it
must be remembered that Russia
29
P.H. Vigor, The Study of Military History and the Soviet Union.
Contained in the holdings of the U.S.
Army Center for Military History, HRC 091.711, pg, 24. 30
While this is the Official Soviet History of the Second World
War, the 12 volume series of the latter
Soviet Union included several general details that enable the
scholar and professional soldier the ability to
understand basic strategic goals and some tactical realities.
See: История второй мировой войны 1939-1945,
(History of the Second World War 1939-1945, Volume
I-XII.)(Moscow, USSR: State Publishing, 1970s). 31
The original six volume series of the Second World War was
written during the Khrushchev era,
suffering much in the way of propaganda from that time. See:
История Великой Отечественной войны
Советского Союэа1939-1945, (History of the Soviet Great
Patriotic War 1939-1945, Volume I-VI.)(Moscow,
USSR: State Publishing, 1960s). 32
P.H. Vigor, The Study of Military History and the Soviet Union.
Contained in the holdings of the U.S.
Army Center for Military History, HRC 091.711, pg, 27-28.
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13
only provides access to those documents it wants seen.
Potentially, what could yet be contained
in the Russian Archives are documents that relate to the
consolidation objectives for the Baltic
states once they were again under Soviet control. These
documents could further connect events
of 1944 and the Soviet campaign plan with the overall political
end state. This would also help
clarify Soviet war termination criteria and lend understanding
to what the official Soviet
priorities were for the Baltic after the Second World War. While
the digital age has made gaining
Soviet information somewhat easier, the reliability of this
information is difficult to ensure.
While scholars believe gaining access to Russian primary sources
through the Russian
State Archives is too difficult, many relevant documents remain
in former Soviet occupied
countries such as Estonia where the actions took place. Weather
and light records essential to
understanding local conditions in Estonia from 1944 were found
in the possession of Tartu
University. 33
Located in the holdings of the Estonian National Archives in
Tallinn are critical
document related to the Soviet and German occupations along with
the details of subsequent
partisan actions. These documents not only provides the Soviet
side of the campaign, but from
intelligence work, professional soldiers and scholars may be
able to regain a perspective lost
from German documents captured at the time of the campaign.
1.3 DEFINING THE STRATEGIC PROBLEMS AND THE OPERATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT IN 1944:
Among the questions which confront scholars or professional
soldiers studying any campaign
or battle is defining the political and strategic reasons why
combatants fought. The reasons men
fight are as old as man himself. The motivations to initiate
hostilities throughout the centuries
vary, but a general commonality linking nation states or
individuals to violent action stem from
33
Tartu University Astronomic Observatory, Astronomic Calendar,
21st Edition 1944, (Dorpat (Tartu),
Estonia: University Publishing 1943, as well as the Eesti
Meteoroloogiajaamade Vork, Weather Record,
February 1944, (Dorpat (Tartu), Estonia: Station Year Record
1944.
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14
either a perceived or real fear of something or someone, the
need to maintain personal or national
honor and some form of personal or national interest.34
In the past two decades historians have
debated the extent of power exercised by Hitler and Stalin in
their respective countries. This
thesis assumes both as pivotal in their role of forming and
executing policy within the limits of
their reach. Both Hitler and Stalin knew the Non-Aggression Pact
of August 1939 would not last.
Some scholars believe Stalin had plans to attack Hitler before
Germany could attack the Soviet
Union. The fact is open hostility between Germany and the Soviet
Union began with the German
attack of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.35
The strategic reasons behind the German attack
have generally been identified with the need for resources, such
as oil and grain, as well as for
ideological reasons such as lebensraum, or living space.36
The horrific contributions to the
physical dimension are well known. The political motivations for
this conflict fueled the brutality
of fighting at the tactical level on both sides as each
combatant made consistent efforts to de-
humanize their opponent.37
Thus the political motivations for the conflict are directly
linked to the
moral and mental dimensions of war through physical evidence
.
With an understanding of the strategic motivations for war in
1941, scholars and professional
soldiers are better able to understand how these motivations
evolve over the course of the war as a
34
Thucydides, Landmark Thucydides (New York, NY: Free Press,
1998), pg 43. 35
While to date, a significant topic of discussion, several
authors are examining the possibility of a Soviet
attack before the German general assault of June 22, 1941. The
argument of Gorodetsky has also been looked at by
Joachim Hoffman and Viktor Suvorov independently. See: Gabriel
Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, Stalin and the
German Invasion of Russia (Hartford, CT: Yale University Press,
1998). 36
Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Munich, Germany: Zentralverlag der
NSDAP, 1941) 726. Chapter 14,
beginning on page 726 of this edition instructs the world on
Hitler’s ideas for the East. While the subject of German
goals in the East are still hotly debated, Hitler's thoughts
dominated the National Socialist Party and the logic for
war with the Soviet Union as future chapters will show.
37
The brutality of fighting on the Eastern Front is well known.
For general examples of conduct in the East,
see: Earl F. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in
the East (Washington D.C.: Department of the
Army 1968), Omer Bartov, ‘Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third
Reich,’ Journal of Modern History 63 (March
1991), 44-60., or Klaus Jürgen-Müller, ‘The Brutalization of
Warfare: Nazi Crimes and the Wehrmacht,’ in John
Erickson and David Dilkes, ed. Barbarossa: The Axis and the
Allies. Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press,
1993.
-
15
result of sustained operations. While there are several
variables effecting the Germans and
Soviets, there are two which the combatants have in common,
those being the terrain and the
weather.
When combined, terrain and weather have the ability to bring
operations to a standstill at the
strategic, operational and tactical levels. Terrain and weather
are often overlooked by scholars and
professional soldiers when examining the strategic context of a
conflict. Often, most think terrain
and weather are too tactical a consideration to examine.38
This lack of understanding demonstrates
many think of war in isolation, meaning the strategic level
independent from the operational and
the tactical isolated from the strategic and operational levels.
If nothing else, terrain and weather
are unifying factors which interconnect the levels and
dimensions of war more closely.
A key consideration of why terrain and weather are so important
in the study of war resides in
the notion of time and space. The considerations of time and
space are the dominate factors
governing the employment and sustainment of forces at the
strategic, operational and tactical
levels. Forces failing to understand the terrain and the effects
of weather will never be able to
effectively measure how long it will take to move their forces
into contact with the enemy, or how
long it will take to resupply those forces once in
contact.39
In the 1950s, the United States Army spent considerable effort
employing captured German
officers with Russian Front experience to write about the
terrain and weather of northern
38
What is important about terrain and weather is not the
conditions, but the effects they have on military
operations. Terrain and weather impact not only the abilities of
leaders to employ weapons in cold weather because
they are frozen at the tactical level, these conditions
typically inhibit strategic and operational leaders ability to
mass
material, manpower or firepower to assist the tactical level.
39
Documents of the Estonian National Archives, ERA 1091-1-1797
contain detailed information which
scientifically demonstrates the Estonian port and airfield
composition which would dictate German logistical
throughput capacity.
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16
European Russia.40
The result was a series of studies elaborating issues associated
with operating
in Russia. These studies are an excellent collection of lessons
observed, but lack significant
explanation of the operations conducted to be of value to
scholars. These studies also lack
conclusive modern scientific evidence.41
One of the goals of this work is to show the
interconnection between the sciences of climatology and geology
in relation to planning and
executing a campaign plan.
1.4 SHAPING THE SITUATION IN 1944: THE EASTERN FRONT FROM
DECEMBER
1941- DECEMBER 1943:
With hostilities between Germany and the Soviet Union commencing
with Operation
Barbarossa on June 22, 1941, German ground forces quickly
advanced through Soviet defenses,
winning tremendous early victories at the tactical and
operational levels. German forces were
organized into three Army Groups, Army Group North, Army Group
Center and Army Group
South to cope with the vastness of Soviet Russia.42
Initial German intelligence and staff estimates
grossly underestimated the Soviet will and their numerical
strength.43
False initial reading of
Soviet capabilities was further reinforced by the continuous
German victories, creating a false
sense of confidence throughout the German forces.
40
Department of the Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet No
20-290 Historical Study Terrain Factors
in the Russian Campaign (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army
1951). A must for beginners looking to
understand the terrain in relation to the problems associated
with operating in Russia. 41
See Ivar Arold,Translated by Eric A. Sibul, Eesti Maastikud,
(The Landscapes of Estonia).Tartu, Estonia:
Tartu University Press 2005. This work is the best of its kind
to understand the physical nature of the Estonian
landscape from its formation during the ice ages though
transformation from land erosion. In order to understand
why some pieces of terrain are impossible to attack or defend,
requires scientific understanding of the physical
composition of the terrain. 42
Army Group North by Walter Haupt has long been considered the
industry standard for the operations in
the northern AO. At issue with the work is the lack of depth in
the references used throughout. This work mainly
treats the problems of the tactical level of war without
explaining the strategic context. 43
NARA T-312, Roll 776, First Frame 8425689.General Marcks wrote
an numbered 23 page report dated
August 5, 1940.This report was a pre-conflict assessment
(Estimate of the Situation) written to evaluate a future
conflict with the Soviet Union. As Germany had yet to lose
anyplace at this stage of the war, Hitler and others in the
German High Command cast the report aside as a “defeatist”
outlook for a future war.
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17
In December 1941, German offensive actions ground to a halt as
severe weather conditions
and relentless Soviet counter attacks crippled German manpower
and equipment. The distance of
German lines of communication made the timely delivery of
replacements increasingly difficult.
The Soviets analyzed how the Germans worked along exterior lines
of communication and
created plans to affect their usage.44
Like all invaders of Russia, the Germans were susceptible to
the extreme weather and distances create by the terrain. With
the Germans manning massive rear
areas, the Soviets understood how the German lines of
communication (LOCs) were susceptible
to partisan activity. In concert with conventional Soviet
offensive actions, partisan bands began
cutting German LOCs. With the thought of inflicting massive
causalities and regaining lost
territory, the Soviets executed a series of winter offensives in
1941-42. In the north, the Germans
were stopped outside Leningrad, beginning a siege lasting over
900 days.45
Moscow was saved in
the center, while the Soviets fought desperately in the south,
losing large amounts of territory and
manpower in the process.
Throughout 1942-43, the Soviets found ways to break the massive
German offensives. First,
the Soviets broke the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad. A hard
blow, but one from which
Germany could recover. In the late summer of 1943, the Soviets
inflicted the death blow on
German forces at Kursk. Collectively, the losses the Germans
suffered in manpower and
equipment were more than they could replace. The Soviets applied
a strategy of attrition, using
superior strength in manpower and material to continually weaken
German forces.
Throughout the remainder of the summer of 1943 and while
continuing to fight the Germans,
the Soviets continued to build significant combat power for a
general offensive. The Soviets
44
Lieutenant General Colmar von der Goltz, The Conduct of War
(Kansas City: MO, The Hudson-
Kimberly Publishing Company,1896), 82. This classic work
explains the difference between lines of operation and
lines of communication. These concepts will be further developed
in coming chapters. 45
Harrison E. Salisbury, The 900 Days, The Siege of Leningrad (New
York, NY: Harper and Row,1969).
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18
enjoyed significant success in the fall of 1943 by retaking
Kiev.46
On September 9, 1943 the
Soviet commander of the Leningrad Front, General Govorov, sent
forward his estimate of the
situation recommending an attack of Army Group North to STAVKA
for their approval.47
Fearing insufficient combat power, the STAVKA informed General
Govorov to continue holding
positions around Leningrad while continuing to build combat
power for a general assault. On
October 12, 1943, STAVKA informed General Govorov “We do not
object to your plan of
operations for the Leningrad Front. Put it into effect quickly
in the event of an enemy
withdrawal.”48
Soviet strategic assessments of the situation led to the belief
that German Army
Group South was close to total failure. Stalin’s “Broad Front”
strategy was launched in January
1944 across the entire Russian Front. Designed to attack the
Germans everywhere, the “Broad
Front” tested German defenses for weaknesses. Once weaknesses
were identified, the Soviets
would commit significant forces to attack, with follow-on
reinforcements to exploit success.49
The Germans in December 1943 could do little to defend the
ground they held. To support
offensive actions at Stalingrad and Kursk, Germany took men and
material from other fronts
giving Army Group South the manpower and material it
required.50
Thus, Army Group North, a
supporting effort, was incapable of supporting the main effort
to the south. Throughout the fall of
1943, Army Group North secretly began planning a delay and
defend operation to withdraw
46
Earl F. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the
East (Washington D.C.: Department of
the Army 1968), 185. 47
David M. Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad (Lawrence, KS:
University of Kansas Press, 2002), 331. 48
Ibid, 332.
49
Reference to the Soviet strategic goals and "Broad Front" are
found in the Soviet Official History. See:
История второй мировой войны 1939-1945 (History of the Second
World War 1939-1945) Мocквa, Воениздат,
Volume VIII (Moscow, USSR: State Publishers, 1977), Pgs
119-127.
50
Material from the Italian Campaign are useful for comparing the
status of other German Armies to the
condition of the Eastern Front in 1943/44. See: Historical
Section, 5th
US Army (Col John D. Forsythe), Fifth Army
History Part IV Cassino and Anzio (Florence, Italy: L’Impronta
Press, 1945).
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19
forces back to pre-established positions along the “Panther
Line” further to the west.51
On January
14, 1944 the Soviets launched an attack breaking the German hold
on the city of Leningrad. This
attack was a supporting effort designed to enable ongoing
offense actions to the south and to
reoccupy the Baltic region from German forces. These details
form the bases of the operating
environment in the fall of 1943/44. Attention is now to be paid
to German strategic guidance and
how operational planning was conducted in the late war
period.
1.5 STRATEGIC GUIDANCE AND OPERATIONAL PLANNING:
THE GERMAN PERSPECTIVE:
There are two prominent reasons among the many why the Germans
wanted to maintain
control of the Baltic region. The foremost German strategic
concern was their relationship with
Finland and to maintain secure lines of operation and
communication with them. Finland was
important to the German war effort because it protected the
flank of Swedish iron ore to the west
while placing pressure on Soviet forces in the northern portion
of the Leningrad pocket. With this
in mind, Hitler was determined not to lose Estonia. The
relationship with Finland was so vital to
German interests that Hitler sent a delegation to Finland headed
by General der Infanterie Dr.
Waldemar Erfurth.52
In MS# P-041bb or The German Liaison Officer with the Finnish
Armed
Forces, Erfurth explained as a result of two meetings between
the German and Finnish forces in
“Salzburg on May 25, 1941 and Zossen on May 26, 1941, it had
been agreed that a German
51
The contents of plan Fall BLAU are examined of the first time in
the course of this work. See NARA T-
311, Roll 76, First Frame 7099655 or First Frame 9103373 AOK 18
Ia Nr. 059/43 g.Kdos.Chefs for the contents of
Plan BLAU. 52
General der Infanterie Dr. Waldemar Erfurth, a.D. was a prolific
author before and after the Second
World War. Before the Second World War, Dr. Erfurth wrote
Surprise which compared and contrasted the German
experiences in the First World War against the writings of von
Schlieffen’s Cannae. In Surprise, Erfurth felt the
essence of Cannae was the idea of Vernichtungsschlacht or
“victory through a single battle” (Pg 7). Surprise was an
attempt to show the theoretic connection of von Clausewitz’s
theory for war with von Schlieffen’s work regarding
the practice of the First World War. This was a common practice
for German military writers in the post World War
period. After the Second World War, Erfurth authored for the
U.S. Army Historical Division OKH Project #7 or
MS# P-041bb The German Liaison Officer with the Finnish Armed
Forces. A more in-depth treatment of this topic
was covered in his work Der Finnische Krieg, published in
1950.
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20
General was to be sent to the Finnish headquarters as liaison
officer of the Army High Command
(OKH) and the Wehrmacht High Command (OKW).”53
Although not written in a formal tasking
statement, Erfurth had six core tasks that did not change during
the conduct of the war comprising
his mission to Finland:
1. Establishing and maintaining contact between the German and
the Finnish High
Commands.
2. Coordination of planning.
3. Representation of mutual wishes regarding warfare in
common.
4. Briefing of both sides on the situation of the war at any
given moment.
5. Liaison between the German sectors and the Finnish sectors
adjacent to them.
6. Exercising the power of a commander of a military area
(Wehrkries) in regard to the
German agencies and troops in the Finnish zone of
operations.54
This relationship helped secure German economic and operational
interests in the Baltic while
operating against the Soviet Union. Throughout the course of the
relationship with Finland,
General staff officers were sent from Germany to observe all
facets of the relationship as
objective observers. 55
This was done to give planners in Berlin some idea of what
capacity
Finnish forces had to continue the war. On one such visit, a
General staff officer named Major
Jordan conducted a visit to Finland between June 7 -23, 1943.
Apparently asked by his higher
headquarters to comment on the dedication of the Finnish forces,
he stated in the first section of
his official report of June 25, 1943:
The view being held by many Germans that the Finnish soldier is
especially good and that
the entire Finnish nation, unlike any other, is fully
participating in the war effort to the last
man and woman, is not justified according to the statements of
responsible German officers.
53
Department of the Army, MS# P-041bb The German Liaison Officer
with the Finnish Armed Forces.
(Carlisle, Army War College: Foreign Military Studies Department
1952), 1. 54
Ibid, 2.
55
Bernd Wegner correctly stated that Finnish support for the
German war effort began to decline in early
1942. "Confidential surveys showed a dramatic decline of
expectations of victory among the Finnish population,
which stood in sharp contrast to the repeated declarations of
loyalty to Germany by the Finnish government, and to
reports in the Finnish press, which were often characterized by
censorship and self-control." See: Bernd Wegner,
“The Road to Defeat: The German Campaigns in Russia 1941-43,”
Journal of Strategic Studies, 13:1, 105-127.
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21
It may well be true that the Finnish soldier is a particularly
adept forest fighter and that
Finnish troops are in many respects superior to the German
troops, for example in hunting
down the enemy in the woods, conducting small-scale operations,
and adapting themselves to
the difficult local conditions. However, the Finns generally
tend to avoid heavy fighting, and
in the opinion of General Dietl it appears extremely doubtful
whether the Finns will be able to
cope with a heavy Russian attack which, even though it may not
be imminent, is bound to be
launched at some time in the future.56
After the resignation of the Finnish President, Field Marshal
Mannerheim believed he no
longer had to honor previous agreements.57
Seeing the war was not going to end well for the
Germans, he negotiated a separate peace with the Soviet Union to
preserve his own country's
freedom. “According to the Soviet conditions of the Finnish
capitulation, Finnish territory had to
be cleared of German troops by September 15, (1944).”58
With German troops having to be
removed from Finland, the Germans could not maintain pressure on
the northern flank, requiring
the Germans to conduct a withdrawal from the Baltic region,
sealing the fate of Estonia and
Eastern Europe. To explain how fighting on the Narva Front could
assist in a German withdrawal,
it is necessary to look at MS# 151, Fighting on the Narva Front,
the Evacuation of Estonia and
the Withdrawal to the Dvina .
Examination of MS# 151 reveals discussion of the German plan for
withdrawal.
Accordingly, the following steps were taken:
1. The operation was assigned the code name “Entruenpelung”
house-cleaning. All
equipment not absolutely needed was moved to Germany.
2. A small group of officers, sworn to absolute secrecy,
conducted a dry run of the
planned operation under the code name “Tannenbaum I”. Direction
of the withdrawal and
lines of resistance were established on the maps and were
reconnoitered on the ground
inconspicuously.
3. Armeeabteilung Narva designated highways for motorized and
horse-drawn vehicles.
Bridges are to be reinforced.
4. Depots were established for all classes of supply.
56
NARA CMH, Files Stalingrad to Berlin RG 319, Stack Area 270, Row
19, Compartment 31, Shelf 4-6,
Box 9. 57
Department of the Army, MS# P-041bb The German Liaison Officer
with the Finnish Armed Forces.
(Carlisle, Army War College: Foreign Military Studies Department
1952). 58
Ibid, 78.
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22
A withdrawal directly west toward Reval (Tallinn) and the Island
of Ösel (Saaremaa) would have
been the least difficult for Armeeabteilung (Army Group) Narva.
The over-all situation however
necessitated a southwesterly and ultimately a southern direction
toward Riga.59
The second critical reason for the Germans to maintain control
of the Baltic region was
for the use of the Baltic Sea by the German navy as a training
ground. While training was
accomplished in the Baltic Sea by the German navy, the value of
the Baltic Sea as a line of
operation and communication was also significant. According to
C.W. Koburger, Jr., in Naval
Warfare in the Baltic, 1939-1945, “an estimated 50-60 percent of
U-boat training was carried out
in the Baltic.”60
German hopes were being placed in the strategic value the U-boat
brought to all
theaters of operation, only as an unfortunate after
thought.61
As the situation continued to
deteriorate on the Eastern Front, Admiral Doenitz recalled in
his memoirs written in 1958, a
meeting he was summoned to on July 9, 1944 with Hitler. Admiral
Doenitz stated:
I took part in a conference on the deterioration of the
situation on the Russian front, to
which Hitler had summoned Field Marshal Model, Lieutenant
General Friessner and
General Ritter von Greim. Hitler asked me what effect a Russian
break through to the
coast would have on naval operations in the Baltic? My answer
was:
Control of the Baltic is important to us. It is of great
importance as regards the import of
the iron ore from Sweden which we require so urgently for our
armaments, and it is of
vital importance to the new U-boats. The most westerly point at
which we can close the
Gulf of Finland to the Russian fleet lies to the east of Reval
[Tallinn]; possession of the
Baltic Islands from this point of view is of equal importance.
If, however, the enemy
59
Department of the Army, MS# 151 Fighting on the Narva Front, The
Evacuation of Estonia and the
Withdrawal to the Dvina (Carlisle, Army War College: Foreign
Military Studies Department 1952), 6-7. 60
C. W. Koburger Jr., Naval Warfare in the Baltic, 1939-1945, War
in the Narrow Sea (Westport, CT:
Praeger, 1994), 70.
61
Since before the beginning of the war in the East, the
leadership of the German navy was trying to
convince Hitler to accept a plan that would allow the German
navy to take the lead in operations against the Western
Allies. Wegner states, "The importance of ideological aims in
Hitler's strategic calculations was evident in his
rejection of plans submitted by the Navy leaders and by the
Foreign Minister Ribbentrop in 1940 as alternatives to
an offensive in the East. The plan developed by the
commander-in-chief of the Navy, Raeder, to shift the main
German war effort to the Mediterranean, the Near East and
North-west Africa, and the concentration on the
disruption of sea links between Great Britain and the United
States favored by the commander of the submarines,
Dönitz, did not, in the end, receive Hitler's approval because
they ignored his most important war aim, namely by
conquest of the East." See: Bernd Wegner, “The Road to Defeat:
The German Campaigns in Russia 1941-43,”
Journal of Strategic Studies, 13:1, 105-127.
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23
were to succeed in breaking through to the coast further south-
in Lithuania, for example,
or East Prussia, the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Islands
would become worthless from
a naval point of view. Enemy naval bases in our immediate
vicinity would then constitute
a grave threat to our iron ore imports, if they did not, indeed,
put a complete stop to it,
and would interfere with the training area for our new U-boats.
The primary object
which, in my opinion, must take precedence over everything else,
including even the
evacuation of the northern Army Groups, must be at all costs to
prevent the Russians
from breaking through to the sea. Once they did so, the exposure
of the flank of our sea
lines of communication to attack from their air bases in
Lithuania would make it
impossible for us to continue to carry supplies by sea for
Finland and the Northern groups
of armies.62
1.6 THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE:
The Soviets traditionally saw the Baltic region as theirs, just
as the Russians did dating back
to the time of Peter the Great and the Northern War against
Sweden.63
The Baltic countries were
secretly sacrificed by Germany to the Soviet Union by the
Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement,
subsequently being occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940.64
The Soviets temporary lost control of
the region for three years as a result of German occupation.
With the breakout of Soviet forces
from the Leningrad pocket in January 1944, reoccupation of
"Soviet" territory was possible. At
this time, the Soviets had every intention of reoccupying the
Baltic region and telling their Anglo-
American allies they were keeping the Baltic States. There were
two purposes in reoccupying the
Baltic States, 1) A buffer from the western powers by using
Poland to the west; and 2)
Reorganizing former German occupied areas under Soviet
Communism. Josef Stalin went to
Yalta with these parameters in mind as he insisted on a Soviet
sphere of control.
Strategically, like their western allies, the Soviets had
already started to think about their
place in the post war world at the time of the Leningrad
breakout and subsequent campaign
62
Karl Doenitz, Memoirs, Ten Years and Twenty Days trans. R. H.
Stevens (New York, NY: The World
Publishing Company, 1959), 398. 63
A.T. Mahan, The influence of Sea Power Upon History (Boston, MA:
Little, Brown and Company,
1897), 231. 64
Alfred Bilmanis, Baltic Essays (Washington D.C.: Latvian
Legation, 1945), Pg 166.
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24
through the Baltic. Having suffered significant causalities, the
Soviets felt it their right to retake
what they saw as theirs. They followed this course of action
diplomatically through the Yalta
conference from February 4-11, 1945.65
By the time of the conference, the Baltic region was
back under Soviet control, with the notable exception of the
Courland Pocket in Latvia.66
The
Yalta Conference was an opportunity to discuss what was going to
be done with the vanquished
and what role the victors would play in the post war world. Once
again, the Soviets had decided
the fate of the Baltic countries and Poland, this time with
their Anglo-American Allies.67
To understand Soviet operations from breakout of the Leningrad
pocket to the attack on the
“Panther Line” and the final assault on Sinimäed (The Blue
Hills) and beyond requires an
examination of Soviet strategic guidance in relation to tactical
actions. For the purpose of this
examination, the three fights will be treated as two different
campaigns, as the campaign goals for
the Leningrad breakout and the attack on the “Panther Line”
differ. The main vehicle for this
examination is the campaign plans themselves and how they were
created as the situation
developed. As has been discussed, the Soviets began to formulate
their strategic plans for 1944 in
the fall of 1943. Soviet operational and tactical momentum in
the fall of 1943 was still focused on
actions in the Ukraine. As General Shtemenko stated:
The main blow, as before, was to be delivered in the Ukraine
west of the Dnieper. The task
here was to smash Manstein’s armies and split the enemy front by
bringing the First and
Second Ukrainian fronts up to the Carpathians. According to the
plan of the campaign, the
earliest offensive (January 12) was to be launched by Second
Baltic Front. On January 14th it
would be joined by the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts. Using
Stalin’s “Broad Front” Strategy
required Soviet Forces to test the Germans everywhere for
weaknesses.68
65
Evan Mawdsley, Thunder in the East (London, UK: Hodder Arnold
Publishing, 2005), 368. 66
See Department of the Army, MS# P-035 Retrograde of Army Group
North During 1944. (Carlisle,
Army War College: Foreign Military Studies Department 1950) for
greater treatment of the Courland Pocket in
relation to operations in Estonia. 67
Mark A. Stoler, The Politics of the Second Front (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1977), 22. 68
S. M. Shtemenko, The Soviet General Staff at War
1941-1945(Moscow, USSR: Progress Publishers,
1975), 198-99.
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25
1.7 THE SOVIET CAMPAIGN PLANS:
At the end of 1943/beginning of 1944, the objective (ENDS) of
Soviet forces operating
around Leningrad was to break the German hold on the city and
liberate it. Through the end of
1943, the Soviets had built the requisite combat power in the
Leningrad pocket to execute
offensive tactical operations (MEANS). With tactical
reconnaissance reports indicating the
possibility of an early German withdrawal from Leningrad, STAVKA
sent the following
instructions to the Leningrad, Volkhov and Northwestern Fronts
on September 29, 1943 to stall
those efforts:
According to agent intelligence, which requires verification,
the enemy is preparing to withdraw
his forces, which are opposing the Leningrad, Volkhov, and
Northwestern Fronts.
In connection with this eventuality:
1. Intensify all types of reconnaissance and determine the
enemy’s intentions.
2. Increase the vigilance and combat readiness of your
forces.
3. Create shock groupings along the likely axes of enemy
withdrawal so that they can pursue
along his withdrawal routes.
4. Create mobile pursuit detachments in first-echelon units and
begin an energetic pursuit in
the event of an enemy withdrawal. While conducting the pursuit,
employ aviation extensively
against the withdrawing enemy.
Report measures undertaken.
Antonov69
69
David M. Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad (Lawrence, KS:
University of Kansas Press, 2002), 332-33.
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26
ENDS(LIBERATION OF
LENINGRAD)
WAY(DESTRUCTION OF
THE 18TH ARMY)s
MEANS(USE OF TACTICAL
BATTLES)
Figure 2
With these ideas in mind the Army Commanders set their staffs to
work to