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Notes on the Reception of American Pragmatism in Germany, 1899-1952Author(s): Klaus OehlerSource: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Winter, 1981), pp. 25-35Published by: Indiana University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40319900.
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Notes
on the
Reception
f
American
ragmatism
n
Germany,899-1952*
Klaus Oehler
I.
Contact
quickly
arose
between
the
American
pragmatists
nd
German
scholars,
whether
by
correspondence
or
through
personal
encounter.
James,
or
example,
was in touch with Ernst
Mach,
Wilhelm
Wundt
and
Wilhelm
Jerusalem.
His
contact with
Jerusalem
was
to contribute
much
to thedissemination f pragmaticthought n Germany.
Jerusalem
was
born
in
1854
in Bohmen. After
studying
classical
philology
n
Prague
he
taught
at a
gymnasium.
In 1891 he
completed
his
habilitation
at
the
University
of
Vienna
and,
after
29
years
as
a
university
teacher
there,
was made associate
professor
of
philosophy
and
education
in
1920.
In his
autobiographical
Selbstdarstellung1
Jerusalem
roudlyneglects
to
mention he
political
circumstances
espon-
sible for
his belated
preferment.
His
philosophical
hinking
was
influenced
at an
early tage
by Spencer, eading
to
a
biological
conception
f
psychical
processes
nd in
particular
of
knowledge.
This
tendency
was
reinforced
through
he
influence f Ernst
Mach,
who
was
appointed
to the
chair in
Vienna in
1895,
and
integrated
with
genetical
and
sociological
elements
in
Jerusalem's
hinking.
In his
epistemology,
erusalem
ingled
mainly
phenomenalism
nd
apriorism
ut for attack.
He
saw
logic
as a
general
methodology
f
dunking,
the
purpose
of which
is
to discover a formal
description
f
thought
s it
actually
occurs in
scientific
nd
pre-scientific
experience.
He
termed his
project
empirical
ogic .
In
1905
his
book,
Der kritische dealismusuni die
reine
Logik
provided
subtle
ustification
for
Jerusalem's
rejection
of
critical idealism
and
pure logic.
In
Germany,whereuniversity hilosophywas dominatedby neo-Rantianism,
Jerusalem's
all went unheard. But not
in
England
and
America. In his
Selbstdarstellungy
erusalem
ells us
that
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26 Klaus Oehler
Prof. F. C.
S.
Schiller
published
an article
n the
International
Journal
of
Ethics,
in
which
he said
that
my
conception
of
the
process
of
knowing
and
of truth
was
closely
related
to
the
views
of
the
pragmatists.
And
when
William
James,
with
whom I
had
been
corresponding
or
a
long
time,
sent
me
his
book
on
pragmatism
in
April
1907
I
at once decided
to
translate t
myself
into
German,
a
plan
which
Ernst
Mach
encouraged
me
to
carry
out. The
translation
ppeared
in
the
same
year,
making
pragmatism
nownin
Germany.
Later,
in
1926,
similar
considerations
ad
led
Jerusalem
o
bring
out
a
German
edition of
Lvy-BruhPs
Les
Fonctions
Mentales
dans
les Socits
Infrieures.
Finally,
the
Selbstdarstellung
nforms
us,
he
was
planning
a
sociological
critique
of
human
reason
in which he
wanted
to
be
able
to
describe
the
complex
relationships
etween
knowledge
and
society .
He
died in
Vienna in
1923.
Wilhelm
Jerusalem
was
one of those
philosophers
who are
out
of
step
with the age in which they live. His criticismsof epistemological
idealism,
of
phenomenalism
nd
apriorism,
nd his
biological
and socio-
logical
approach
to
cognitive
processes
marked
him
off,
at least
within
the
German-
peaking
world,
as
one of
the
isolated
precursors
nd
path-
finders
f a
movement hat
would
be
able to
find
a
foothold
n German
philosophy
nly
decades
later. His translation f
James*
ragmatism:
A
New
Name
for
Some Old
Ways
of
Thinking
s one of
the
indispensable
tools
of
German
James
cholarship.
What
might
be
described
s
the official
tarting
point
of
pragmatism's
influence
n
Germany
was
the III
International
Congress
for
Philosophy
held from1 to 5 September,1908, in Heidelberg,with Windelbandas
president.
Pragmatism
was
the
main
object
of
discussion,
unning
ike
a
red thread
through
all
sections,
as is
shown
by
the
proceedings
f
the
congress,
which
were
published
n 1909.2
After Windelband's
address,
Josiah
Royce,
from
Harvard,
who
had been
strongly
influenced
by
Peirce,
gave
the
opening
paper
on
the
subject
of The Problem
of
Truth
in
the
Light
of
Recent
Discussion . In
spite
of the fact that
Royce's
paper
mentionsPeirce
several
times,
and
names
him
as the
founder of
pragmatism,
t
was not
Peirce's
pragmatism
hat
was
discussed,
but that
of
James,
Schiller
and
Dewey
-
Jamesattracting
the
most
attention.
In
his
paper,
Royce
describeshis
philosophy
s
absolute
pragmatism by
which
he means
-
so
Jerusalem
ays
in his
remarks n
Royce's
paper
-
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Notes on ReceptionofAmericanPragmatismn Germany,1899-1952 27
a
voluntaristically
nterpreted oncept
of truth. As we leaf
through
the
pages
of
the
congress
report,
we
find
contributions
rom
Baldwin,
Ladd
Franklin, Lask,
Schiller,
Armstrong
and
Jerusalem.
Paul
Cams,
editor
of the Monist is
also
represented
with a
paper
in which
he makes
a
sharp
division
between
Peirce and the other
pragmatists.
As
a
result
of the 1908
Heidelberg
philosophy
ongress,
pragmatism
became known within
German
philosophy
and stimulated
lively
dis-
cussion.
Among
the
firsttreatmentswere
Ludwig
Stein's
essay
Prag-
matism 3 nd Gnther
Jacoby's
Der
Pragmatismus.
Neue Bahnen in der
Wissenscbaftslehre
es Auslands.
Eine
Wrdigung*
Jacoby,
at the
time
a
young
teacher
of
philosophy
t
the
University
of
Greifswald,
wrote
in the
foreword f his
book:
For
years
pragmatism,
with its unusual
concept
of
truth
has
been the source
of
controversy
n
Anglo-American
philosophy,
and more
recently
also in
Germany. Ultimately
the
debate
resolves
nto
a
disagreement
bout
words. It is
essentially
matter of indifferencewhetherwe associate one opinion or
another with
the word
truth . On the other
hand,
it is
not
a
matter
of
indifference hich criteria we
adopt
for
making
assertions:
we
can
judge
them
to
be
true or false. This holds
especially
for scientific
ropositions.
Pragmatism
s
by
nature
a
theory
of science. The aim
of
this
work is
to transform
the
dispute
over the
pragmatic concept
of
truth
into
a dis-
cussion
of
the
pragmatic
conception
of
science. It
is
an
expression
of
the
conviction
that
the
pragmatic
theory
of
science s
meaningful
nd
fruitful:
though
admittedly
ts
scope
can onlybe estimated fter t has been tested n practice.
The
outbreak of World War I
abruptly
broke
off the
development
of
the
pragmatism
ebate
that
had
begun
to
spread
through
Germany
n
the
pre-war
years.
The fact that
it was not
resumed
fter
the war
is
one of
the
most
significant
acunae in the
history
of
German
philosophy.
Instead
of a
productive exchange
of ideas
there
arose
a
long
chain of
misunderstandings
nd
misconceptions
f
American
pragmatism,
rigi-
nating
from
some of
the most
eminentGerman
philosophers,
nd
passed
on with
an
amazingly
uncritical
self-assurance
o
others.
The most fateful role was
perhaps
that
played
by
Max
Sender's
influential
reatise Erkenntnis
und
Arbeit.
Eine
Studie ber
Wert
und
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28 Klaus Oehler
Grenzendes
pragmatischen
otivs n der Erkcnntnis
er
Welt .5
Although
Scheler
discusses
Peirce's
pragmatic
maxim,
there
is
every
reason
to
suppose
that
he knew
only
the
Jamesian
version
and
had not
actually
read
Peirce.
But
even
Scheler's
critique
of
James
s now
desperately
n
need
of
revision,
and
his assessment
f
pragmatism
n
general
betray
prejudices
against
American
culture that were
typical
of
cultivated
Europeans
n
the
twenties,
igns
of a resistance owards
the
strange
and
the
unfamiliar
n
as far
as
it
threatened o
expose
the
presuppositions
n
which theirown
position
rested. This remained
typical
of the German
attitude
to
pragmatism
between the wars.
Of
course,
there
were
ex-
ceptions.
Gustav
Mllcr's
account
of Peirce's
thought
n the
Archiv
fr
Geschichteder
Philosophies
93
1,8
shows
not
only
insight
nto
the
struc-
ture of
Peirce's
logic
and
metaphysics,
but
also discovers
links
with
German
thought,
n
particular
with
Hegel, Schelling
and
the
romantics,
which
might
have done
much
to clear
the
way
for
a more
sympathetic
Peirce
reception.
In
practice,
exceptions
such as this
had little
effect
on
the main
development.
Not even the comparativelybundantsupplyof translations f works
by pragmatists
was
sufficient
o induce a
change.
James'
The Will
to
Believe
and
Other
Essays
in
Popular
Philosophy
had
appeared
as
early
as
1899 in a
translation
by
Thomas Lorenz. In
1907 there
followed
the
translation
nto
German
of
James'
Varieties
of Religious
Experience
by
Georg
Wobbermin and
in
1914
A
Pluralistic Universe.
F. C. S.
Schiller's
Studies in
Humanism
appeared
n
translation
by
Rudolf
Eisler
as
Humanismus:
Beitrdge
zu
einer
pragmatischenPhilosophie.
Several
works
by
John
Dewey
were
also
translated
nto German
immediately
after
their
appearance
in
the
United
States.
Although
pragmatism
became betterknown as a resultof these efforts t was not destinedto
take
root
at
that
point
in
German
history.
The
most
prominent
victim
of
Scheler's
misguided
nterpretation
f
pragmatism
was Max
Horkheimer,
whose
critique
of
pragmatism
was
directly
nfluenced
y
Scheler.7
Like
Scheler,
Horkheimerhad
probably
read
nothing
by
Peirce.
The
impression
hat
Horkheimer
gave
when
teaching
was that
-
even
as
an
emigr
n
the
United
States
he had not
taken
American
philosophy
eriously.
That
this
was
a
characteristic
f
members
of
the
Frankfurt
School has
been
confirmed
y
Martin
Jay's
The
Dialectical
Imagination.0
In New
York
the
Institu
pursued
a
policy
of
separatism,
motivated
by
a
need
to
maintain
ts
own
identity
and
survive as a
consciously
German
entity.
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Notes on ReceptionofAmericanPragmatismn Germany,1899-1952 29
The Institutes utsider
tatus,
despite
ts
connectionswith such
prestigious
enefactors
s Columbia
University
nd the
Ameri-
can
Jewish
Committee,
was thus secure.
The costs this entailed
were obvious.
Although
often n some
contact
with
the
regular
faculty
at
Columbia,
the FrankfurtSchool remained
generally
outside the
mainstream of American academic
life.
This
allowed it to
make
assumptions,
uch
as
the
equation
of
prag-
matism with positivism,that lacked complete validity. It
also cut
the Institut off from
potential
allies
in
the
American
intellectual
tradition,
uch as
George
Herbert Mead.9
As
though by way
of
compensation,pragmatism
particularly
as
taught
by
James
and
Dewey
-
found
an echo
which has
gone
almost
unnoticed until the
present day,
but
which was nonetheless
mportant,
in
Arnold Gehlen's Der
Menscb. Seine
Natur
uni
seine
Stellung
in
der
Welt.10 Two
years
previously
there
had
appeared
E.
Baumgarten's
Der Pragmatismus. . W. Emerson,W. James, . Dewey (1938), a
comprehensive
nd
informative
tudy
on which Gehlen
was able
to draw.
Gehlen was induced
to
look
upon
pragmatism
s
an
ally by
the
fact
that
t attributed central
philosophical
mportance
o action.
The idea of
pragmatism
was to be conceived
ater
on,
by
Mach
and Sorel for
example,
independently
f the
American
move-
ment
beginning
with
Peirce
in
1878;
in
fact there s
a
strong
basis
for
t in Aristotle
nd above
all in
Hobbes.
As
pragmatism
is the only philosophyto date that fundamentally ees man
as a
being
that
acts,
its
standpoint
is,
at least
at
present,
preferable
o
any
other.11
Correspondingly,
ehlen sees
a
major
step
forward
n
the
basic
prag-
mtist thesis
that
all
psychical
processes,
ncluding
the
pre-linguistic
ones,
are
communicative
n nature.
James9
dentification f
mental
processes
with action
involving
the
anticipation
of ends
and
means
is
extended
by
Dewey,
in
as
far
as
he shows
that
this
anticipation
s not
an
isolated
process,
but
that the basic structure
f
all mental
phenomena
is
action directed
towards another.*'12
A reference
o Mead would have
been
appropriate
here.
There is no doubt
that
Gehlens
Der Mensch is
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30 Klaus Oehler
the
first
large-scale
application
of
pragmatic
principles
in German
thought.
It
is
genuinely
pragmatic;
it
was born from
the
spirit
of
pragmatism.
In the
thirties here
were
already
isolated
signs
of the
beginning
of
a
new
phase
in
the
reception
of
pragmatism
n
Germany
which
has
continued
until
the
present
day.
Its
main
discovery
has been
that
Charles
Sanders
Peirce
was
the true
father of
American
pragmatism.
At
the
beginning
of
this
new
development
we find Heinrich Scholz's
review
of the firstfive volumes of Peirce's Collected
Papers
in the Deutsche
Literaturzeitung 1934,
1936).
There
followed
n 1937
a short
article
in the
Deutsches
Aielsblatt.
The
author was
Jrgen
von
Kempski,
and
the
appearance
in
1952 of his
book
Charles
S.
Peirce
uni der
Prag-
matistnus13
arks
the real
beginning
f the modern
phase
n the
reception
of
pragmatism
n
Germany.
Since
then,
James,
Dewey
and
Schiller
have
come
to
be
judged
increasingly
n relation to
Peirce.
II.
That the receptionof pragmatism, nd particularly eirce's thinking,
should
-
with
the above
noted
exceptions
-
have
proved
such
a
laborious
process
in
Germany
is
not without
irony.
Some
years
ago,
Heidegger's
Sein uni Xeit
(1927)
was
translated nto
English,14
making
his
existential
ontology
accessible to American
philosophers
s
a whole
for the
first
ime.
Since then it has
been
interesting
o note
that
many
of
them
have
reacted
by
pointing
out
the similarities
etween
this
form
of
existential
philosophy
nd
pragmatism
s
it
arose
and
developed
in
America.
This
is
not
the
result
of
a
misconception
n
the
part
of
the
Americans. Over
forty years
ago, qualified opinion
-
particularly
among emigrantGerman philosophers had drawn attentionto this
parallelism,
nd
many today
still believe that
the sensational
reception
accorded to
Heidegger's
book
by
the
German
philosophical
world
n 1927
would have
been
tempered
-
without
detracting
from
Heidegger's
achievement had
Germans
been more familiar with
the
pragmatist
tradition. The
material ink
between
Peirce's
pragmatism
nd
the more
recent existentialist
movement,
founded in
Heidegger's
existential
ontology,
is
the central
importance
attached to the
analysis
of
pre-
scientific
xperience.
Both
Peirce and
Heidegger
view
subjectivity
not
through
he
mirror f
epistemological
eflection,
ut as
-
in a
Heideg-
gerian
German - Dasein in
language
and
history.
This means that
Peirce,
like
Heidegger
after
him,
can be found
posing
the
question
of
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Notes on Receptionof AmericanPragmatismn Germany,1899-1952 31
the
meaning
of
existence,
nd that Peirce sees
reality
not
as
the
anti-
thesisof
subjectivity,
ut
as
something
hat is
always
already
mediated
by
the
sign
process
(semiosis).
The hermeneutic
language
in
which
Heidegger expresses
himself
should not
be allowed to
disguise congruence
with
pragmatist
hinking
at
many points.
Heidegger's
ntention
n Sein und
TLeitwas to renew
the
question
of the
meaning
of
existence,
question
that is
already
somehow
understood
whenever
t
becomes
a
topic
of conversation.
There is
always
an
average
understanding
hat dominates he
question,
nd the
problem
is
to
recognize
this,
and see
through
t. Existence must
be
questioned
with
regard
to
its self
evidence,
the
multiplicity
f
meanings
through
which
existence
perceives
entities must be
made
explicit.
It is
through
the
manifold
significance
f entities
that
the
constitution
of
existence
becomes
xperience,
nd
hence
experience
ecomes
the
possibility
f
relat-
ing
to
the
world,
the
possibility
hat determines
he
perspective
under
which the
world
reveals tself
to
me.
Within
the
circle
of
this
question-
ing, knowledge
s
absorbed
as a
process
of
self-understanding
hrough
things. Knowledge occurs through nterpretation ithinsituations; t
does
not seek
itself,
t
is not for
its
own
sake;
its
concern
s
to act
ade-
quately
to
situations,
o
know
one's
business
where
he
business
s com-
mon
property.
Dasein can be
interpreted
nd
reinterpreted
ndefinitely.
The future reveals
a
new
reality,
nd
in the
light
of
a new
reality
the
past
also
takes on a new
appearance.
While
travelling
orward
nto
a new
reality
n the
future,
man is
at
the
same
time on
his
way
into
a new
past.
As existence s illuminated
n this
way,
truth
comes
into
being.
Not
just
the individual
s individual
s
involved,
but also
the other
as other.
It
is,
perhaps,
n the decisive
significance
ttached
to the
other
in
the
inter-
pretation f Ufethatpragmatismndexistentialismavemost n common.
Knowledge
is
always
situated
within
a horizon
that
is not
itself
determinable
n terms f
knowledge.
This
is
what
Heidegger
has
in
mind
when
he
says
that
knowledge
s
a founded
mode of
Being-in-
he-
world.
It
is
also
the
message
behind
pragmatic
relativism:
all
knowledge
is
relative to
a situation.
The truth value
of
knowledge
ies
in
the
clarifi-
cation of
situations,
n the fact
that
particular
operations
belong
to
particular
situations.
Pragmatism
has also
done
much
to
uncover
the
concealed
presuppositions
f
modern
science.
Long
before
Heidegger
it
had shown what sort of pre-scientificnd pre-philosophical xperience
of the world
must be
presupposed
f science
is
to
emerge.
This
level of
awareness
on
top
of
the
so-called
natural
standpoint
s
apriori,
but
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32 Klaus Oehler
not
in the
way
assumed
by
classical transcendental
philosophy.
The
pragmatists
were
quick
to
see
that the
apriori
in
its full
scope
is not
simply
identical with
the conditions of
the
possibility
of
objective
knowledge
of
objects,
but that
this
also
implies
that
basic
understanding
which
life
has
prior
to
all
conceptual
determination
f
reality.
The
foundationof
existence occurs within the
sphere
of
this
understanding.
It
seems to me that
on this
basic
question
it
is indeed
justifiable
to
equate
the
teachings
of Peirce and
Heidegger.
It is thus not
surprising
hat an
important
ole is
played
in
pragmatic
idealism
by
the
interpretation
f
our
implicit
understanding
f
things.
For
Peirce this
applies
not
merely
o
the
critique
of
words
but to
trends
of
thought.
As his
paper
on
The Fixation of
Belief
shows,
the
historical
dimensionmust
be
absorbed within
philosophical
method.
In
Germany
this
method,
following Dilthey
and
Heidegger,
is
known
as
hermeneutics,
ut
its basic
characteristics ave
been
part
of
American
philosophical
thinking
for
at
least
a
century.
There is
even
a
case
to
be
made for
maintaining
that
the
historico-hermeneutical
mode
of
thoughthas been specificto Americanphilosophicalthinkingsince its
beginnings.
This
tendencymay
have
something
o do
with the
uniquely
American
synthesis
f
a
variety
f
European philosophical
nd
theological
traditions. t is
certain,
t
any
rate,
that
philosophical
hermeneutics
as
never been a German
monopoly,
and
it
can
be
argued
that
it
is
only
thanks
to
Peirce and
other
American
epistemologists
that
certain
anachronistic
figures
of
thought,
carried over from
Kantianism
into
Germanhermeneutic
hilosophy,eading
to
the
hypostatisation
f
language
as the
subject
of
history,
ave
been excised.
Language,
the structures
f
which are
continually
being
transformedn the course of
history,
must
also be seenas mediated. It was also Peirce who recognizedthe pressure
exerted
by
reality
n the
structure f
language:
the force or
resistance
f
external
nature,
and the
force
or
compulsion
of social
power
structures.
With
uncanny
insight
he describes in The
Fixation
of
Belief
the
methods
f total domination n a
way
that freeshim of
any suspicion
of
having
failed to
recognize
the
objective
frameworkwithin
which social
behaviour must
be understood
-
or of
sublimating
t to
a
politico-*
socially
neutral evel. The
American
pragmatists
were
always
well
aware
that
the
objective
framework n the basis of which
alone social
action
can
be understood
s constituted
by language,
work
and
power.
The
names of
Peirce,
James,
Dewey
and Mead
have
long
since
become
symbols
f
this
knowledgethroughout
he world. If
there eems
to
be
a
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Notes on Receptionof AmericanPragmatismn Germany,1899-1952 33
need
today
to
bring
home to
German
philosophical
hermeneutics
hat
tradition s not an
absolute
power,
and
that
the real
problem
s to
make
tradition
omprehensible
ithin the
structure
f social
life,
so
that
we
can
give
conditions
outside tradition
ccording
to
which transcendental
rules
governing
the world view and action
vary empirically ,16
hen
it
only
serves s a reminder
f
how much German
philosophical
hermeneu-
tics could
long ago
have
learnt from the American
pragmatists.
nstead
their heories
ave
for
decades been
gnorantly
efamed
s
Americanism .
Just
how stubborn his
prejudice
s,
and how
deeply-rooted
n German
thinking,
n
example
will show. In
1966,
a
conversation
took
place
between Martin
Heidegger
and
the editor
of the German
weekly maga-
zine,
Der
Spiegel,
Rudolf
Augstein.
Heidegger
requested
that
the con-
versation hould not
be
published
during
his lifetime.
He saw
it as
an
opportunity
o answer criticisms
that
had
been made
of
his attitude
during
the Third
Reich
and to offer n
explanation
of his
behaviour.
The conversationwas
published
after his death
in 1976 under
the
title:
Nur noch ein Gott
kann
uns retten .18
Even
in this
final
statement,
made at the end of a long life, Heidegger was unable to resistde-
nouncing
the
Americans'
pragmatism ,
which he
identifies
with
posi-
tivism:
They [the Americans]
are still
caught up
in a
type
of
thinking
that,
as
pragmatism,
romotes
echnical
operation
nd
manipulation,
ut
at the same time bars the
way
to
an awareness
of the
specific
character
of modern
technology.
There
are,
nevertheless,
here
and
there in
America
attempts
being
made to break
away
from
pragmatic-positivist
thinking. 17
When he was in
Hamburg
in
1967
Heidegger
told
me
that
pragmatism
was
nothing
but
a
Weltanschauung
for
engineers
nd
not
for human
beings
n the full sense of
the word .
The
alignment
f
prag-
matismwithpositivisms typicalof the superficial iew of pragmatism
held
by
the German
middle-class
during
the
first
half this
century.
Hitler's hatred
of
Americanism
was a
perverted
form of
this
Anti-
americanism,
hich he
gave
vent
to in one
of his
monologues
n 1942
at
the
Fhrerhauptquartier :
I
have
a hatred and
an aversion of
the
deepest
sort
against
Americanism.
There
is not
a
single
European
state
with which one feels
ess
sympathy .18
Although
a new
picture
of
the
philosophy
f
American
pragmatism
has
developed
mong
informedGerman
philosophers
ince
the renaissance
of interestn Peirce, t would be unrealistic o assertthat for the mass
of
public
opinion
in
Germany
and
Europe
as a whole
the word
prag-
matism is
free of
prejudices.
To
the
average,
uninformed
mind,
it
is
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34 Klaus Oehler
today
still
vaguely
associated with the
conception,
which
Heidegger
so
clearly
but
erroneously
ut
into
words,
of
something
hat
promotes
technical
operation
nd
manipulation,
ut
at
the
same time
bars
the
way
to
an
awareness
f the
specific
haracter
f modern
technology .
Anyone
who
knows
the
history
f
American
pragmatism
from Peirce
to
Dewey
will
realise that
just
the
opposite
s the
case.
Universitat
amburg
NOTES
*
Translator's
ote: This is
an
authorized ranslation f
a
text
based
on Klaus
Oehler's
ntroductions
o
the
Jerusalem
ranslation f
James'
Pragmatism
W. James,
Der
Pragmatismo:
Ein
Neuer
Name
fur
alte
Denkmetboden,
elix
Meiner
Verlag,
Hamburg
1977)
and to his
own translation f Peirce's
How to
Make Our
Ideas
Clear
(Charles
S.
Peirce,
Ueber
die
Klarbeitunserer
Gedanken,
ittorio
Klostermann
Frankfurtm
Main,
1968)
-
John
topford,
niversity
f
Hamburg,
xford
University.
1. WilhelmJerusalem,McincWege und Ziclc in RaymundSchmidt d., Die
Pbilosopbie
er
Gegenwart
n
Selbstdarstellungen,
II
(Leipzig:
Felix
Meiner
erlag, 922)
S3-9S.
2.
Bericht
ber
den
III.
Internationalen
ongress
r
Philosophic
u
Heidelberg
1.
bis
5.
September
908,
Th.
Elsenhans
d.,
(Heidelberg,
909).
3.
Ludwig
Stein,
Pragmatism
n Archiv
fur
Gescbicbte
der
Pbilosopbie,
XI,
1909
(Berlin:
Carl
HaymannsVerlag).
4.
Gnther
acoby,
er
Pragmatismo.
Neue Babncn n
der
Wissenscbaftslebre
es
AusUnds.
Eine
WrdigungLeipzig:
Drr,
1909).
5.
Max
Schei
r,
Erkenntnis nd
Arbeit. Eine
Studie
ber Wert
und
Grenzen
e*
pragmatischen
otivs in
der
Erkenntnis er Welt
in Die
Wissens
ormen
und
die
Gesellscbaft,Leipzig:Der Neue-Geist erlag,1926), 231-486.
6.
Gustar
Mller,
Charles
Peirce n
Archiv
fr
Gescbicbte
er
Pbilosopbie,
L,
1931
(Berlin:
Carl
Hermanns
Verlag),
227-238.
See also
E.
Waibel,
Der
Pragmatismo
hi
der
Gescbicbte
er
Pbilosopbie
Bonn,
19H)>
and Klaus
Oehler,
Ein in
Vergessenheit
geratener
eichen-theoretiker
es Deutschen dealismus:
Johann
Gottlieb
Fie
h
e
in
Zeicbenkonstitution.
kten
des
2.
Semiotiscben
olloquiums egens
urg,
A.
Lange-Seidl
ed.,
(Berlin:
De
Gruyter, 980), pp.
63-75.
7.
Cf.,
Max
Horkheimer,
Zum
Problem der
Vahrheit
(1935)
in Kritiscbe
Tbeorie,
(Frankfurt-am-Main:
.
Fischer,
968)
228-76 and
Zur Kritikder instru-
mentellen
ernunft
1947) (Frankfurt
m
Main:
S.
Fischer,
967).
8.
Martin
Jay,
The
Dialectical
magination:
A
History
of
the
Frankfurt
chool
and
the nstitute
f
Social
Research 923-1950
Boston:
Little,
Brown
nd
Co.,
1973).
9. Ibid.,p. 289.
10.
Arnold
Gehlen,
er
Menscb.
SeineNatur
und
seine
tellung
n
der
Welt
(Berlin:
Junker
nd
Dnnhaupt,
940).
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NotesonReceptionfAmericanragmatismnGermany,899-1952 35
11.
Ibid.,
pp.
326f.
12.
Ibid., p.
18*.
13.
Jrgcn
on
Kempski,
harles
Sanders
Prirce
nnd der
Pragmatismus
Stuttgart:
Kohlhammer,
952).
14. Martin
Heidegger,
eing
and
Time,
tr.
John
Macquarrie
nd
Edward
Robinson
(Oxford:
Basil
Blackwell,
9*2).
If.
Jrgcn
Habermas,
Zur
Logik
der Sozialwissenschaften
n
Pb'tlosopbiscbe
Rundschau,
eiheft
,
1967,
179.
16. Der
Spiegel,
976,
No.
23,
pp.
193-219.
17. Ibid.,p. 214.
18.
Adolf
Hitler.
Monologe
m
FMbrerbauptquartier,
941-1944.
Albrecht
Knauer
Vcrlag,
Hamburg,
980,
tub 7.1. 1942.