OCIMF Position Paper Lloyd_s Register Risk Assessment of ETOPS Onboard Tank Vessels Final 131109

©Copyright OCIMF 2009

Oil Companies International Marine Forum

Lloyd’s Register Risk Assessment of Emergency Tow-off Pennant Systems

(ETOPS) Onboard Tank Vessels

First Edition October 2009

The OCIMF mission is to be the foremost authority on the safe and

environmentally responsible operation of oil tankers and terminals, promoting continuous improvement in standards

of design and operation

Lloyd’s Register Risk Assessment of Emergency Tow-Off Pennant Systems (ETOPS) Onboard Tank Vessels

2 ©Copyright OCIMF 2009

Issued by the Oil Companies International Marine Forum 29 Queen Anne’s Gate London SW1H 9BU United Kingdom Tel +44 (0)20 7654 1200 FAX +44 (0)20 7654 1205 E-Mail [email protected] Web www.ocimf.com © Oil Companies International Marine Forum, Bermuda The Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) is a voluntary association of oil companies having an interest in the shipment and terminalling of crude oil and oil products. OCIMF is organised to represent its membership before, and consult with, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and other government bodies on matters relating to the shipment and terminalling of crude oil and oil products, including marine pollution and safety.

Terms of Use While the advice given in this information paper (“Paper”) has been developed using the best information currently

available, it is intended purely as guidance to be used at the user’s own risk. No responsibility is accepted by the Oil Companies International Marine Forum (“OCIMF”), the membership of OCIMF or by any person, firm, corporation or organization (who or which has been in any way concerned with the furnishing of information or data, the compilation or any translation, publishing, supply or sale of the Paper) for the accuracy of any information or advice given in the Paper or any omission from the Paper or for any consequence whatsoever resulting directly or indirectly from compliance with, or adoption of or reliance on guidance contained in the Paper even if caused by a failure to exercise reasonable care.


Contents

OCIMF Introduction 4

1 Executive Summary 1-1

2 Introduction 2-1

3 Scope of Work 3-1

4 ETOPS Hazard Assessment 4-1

5 Discussion, Conclusions and Recommendations 5-1

6 References 6-1

7 Definitions and Abbreviations 7-1

8 Appendix A: ISGOTT References to ETOPS 8-1

9 Appendix B: Workshop Presentation Slides 9-1

10 Appendix C: Fire Wire Incidents Summary 10-1

11 Appendix D: Typical Fire Wire Incident Investigation 11-1

12 Appendix E: Typical Deploying ETOPS Job Safety Analysis (JSA) 12-1

13 Appendix F: NTSB and MAIB Incident Report References 13-1

14 Appendix G: Human Factors REBA Fire Wire Analysis 14-1

Lloyd’s Register Risk Assessment of Emergency Tow-off Pennant Systems (ETOPS) Onboard Tank Vessels


OCIMF Introduction The existence of “fire wires” or, more correctly, emergency tow-off pennant systems (ETOPS) is based

more on history and having “always done it that way” than necessity. Historical data shows no documented evidence of their use. At the same time, the tanker industry has evolved bringing the practicality of ETOPS into question. With the continued occurrences of injuries, both minor and serious, to vessel personnel deploying and recovering ETOPS, it is time to discontinue the routine practice of deploying ETOPS. At the 57th Meeting of the OCIMF Ports and Terminal Committee (PTC 57), the Chairman introduced the subject of “fire wires” as a concern in the industry, particularly the frequency of injuries in deployment and recovery, as raised and discussed at the PTC Forums. Acknowledging this increased awareness of the safety of personnel and the continued occurrence of injuries associated with the handling of large steel fire wires, PTC 58 agreed that there were “safety” merits in finding alternatives to “fire wires” and formed a task force to explore the possibilities. The Working Group to Develop Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Towing Off Pennants Performance on Vessels, though, was unable to develop consensus over an equivalent steel wire rope fire rating performance criteria and testing protocol for synthetic fibre construction ETOPS (potentially lighter in weight and more safely handled). PTC 66 approved the Working Group’s recommendation to commission a third party risk assessment of ETOPS intended to evaluate their effectiveness in various scenarios where they may need to be used and any other inherent risks that they pose when being handled. Additionally, the assessment was to include a review of the functional requirements of an emergency towing off system with an evaluation of potential alternative systems that could be utilized. Risk Assessment of Emergency Tow-off Pennant Systems (ETOPS) Onboard Tank Vessels (referred to here as Risk Assessment), following this introduction, was prepared by Lloyd’s Register North America and delivered for presentation to PTC 69. PTC 69 accepted its conclusions and those of the Working Group. The Risk Assessment was developed utilizing a “null hypothesis” approach to the use of a “fire wire” or ETOPS in an emergency situation. The anticipated emergency situation was an escalating fire incident involving either the vessel or the port. The objective was to identify any accidental or hazardous scenario where the use of ETOPS was critical to rescue of the vessel. In conclusion, over the last 42 years there is no documented use of ETOPS. It can be extrapolated from data provided that some 1700 vessel personnel have been injured in the handling ETOPS. The Risk Assessment concludes that the use of ETOPS is not required during any of the identified casualty scenarios that could potentially occur while a vessel is berthed at a dock. Combining the potential for resulting injuries from ETOPS deployment, the unlikely occurrence of a fire scenario that would necessitate the need for a tow-off and the other alternatives that provide inherently safe means of moving a vessel from a berth, it is recommended that ETOPS be eliminated from general use and that they should not be generally considered essential equipment for vessel safety. Additionally, this Risk Assessment satisfies the guidance for marine terminals in ISGOTT Section 26.5.5.2 Emergency Towing-off Pennants—Handling “that a risk assessment is carried out at the terminal to determine whether or not there should be a routine requirement for ships to rig emergency towing-off pennants.”

With the publication of this document, the OCIMF position is that ETOPS are not required and

have not provided benefit in the past.

If, however, individual marine terminal risk assessments or port authorities still require the use of

ETOPS, it is recommended that options other than wire rope be considered.

Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF)

Risk Assessment of Emergency Tow-

off Pennant Systems (ETOPS)

Onboard Tank Vessels. July 2008

Lloyd’s Register North America Inc.

1. Report No. W/O 1529771

2. Report date October 2009

3. Revision date Final

4. Type of report

Risk Assessment of ETOPS onboard Tank Vessels

5. Title & subtitle

OCIMF Risk Assessment of Emergency Tow-off Pennant 6. Security classification of this report

Confidential

Systems (ETOPS) Onboard Tank Vessels 7. Security classification of this page

Controlled

8. Author(s)

B.R. Poblete, B.A.Sc, M.Phil., P. Eng, AMIChemE Senior Risk Management Specialist

S. Dickinson

Senior Consultant

9. Authorisation D.Holmes Manager, Marine Consultancy Services – Americas Region

10. Reporting organisation name and address

Lloyd's Register North America, Inc. 11. Reporting organisation reference(s)

1401 Enclave Pkwy Suite 200 Houston, TX 77077

12. This report supersedes July 2008 (final)

13. Sponsoring organisation name and address

OCIMF 14. Sponsoring organisation reference(s)

c/o ConocoPhillips

15. No of pages

16. Summary The report first provides some historical background and objective of the use of fire wires (the term “fire wire” is commonly used as is synonymous with the more correct “Emergency Tow-off Pennant System (ETOPS)”.). This includes the historical analysis of the fire incidents that have affected the marine industry and then focus on the port / vessel incidents that may require the use of fire wires. Because no evidence was discovered demonstrating that fire wires have been historically utilized, a casualty scenario development exercise was then undertaken to provide a first principle risk assessment on whether fire wires are required during a port / vessel accidental event. The resulting quantity of lost time injuries, recordable injuries and first aid cases, in the USA, presented by OCIMF indicates that the ETOPS deployment activity, in the USA alone, would be a significant operational concern if extrapolated to the rest of the international marine industry. Therefore to fully assess the human aspects of the current fire wire operations, a risk analysis tool called REBA (Rapid Entire Body Assessment) was performed on the fire wire activity videos provided by ConocoPhillips on their oil tankers. This risk analysis tool provides a quick assessment of the potential muscle/skeletal risk to an employee during the performance of their task. The results of the assessment indicated that the highest risk identified is ranked as a ‘medium’ concern and the suggested improvements were to remove the ETOPS all together to eliminate the hazard or if the ETOPS remains in place then either increase the flexibility of the ‘wire’ utilized to reduce the physical stresses associated with feeding it through the guide wire and bending it around the bollards or reduce the height of the bollards or reduce the weight of the wire to minimize the physical strain associated with lifting the wires over them. It must also be realized that there is a high potential for complacency when laying out or storing the fire wire. It is a simple task but it does require continuous training on the identification of the hazards during the ETOPS deployment activity. Other means of reducing potential injury in handling the large fire wires could be an increase in the amount of personnel performing the task, increasing the supervision of the activity or more training of personnel. (No injuries have been experienced by terminal / dock workers as they do not handle the wires.) A ranking of the tow-off alternatives versus the desired parameters indicated the most inherent-safe approach would be to eliminate the ETOPS or to utilize recessed bitts as a means to latch onto the vessel. It is concluded that the use of a fire wire, ETOPS or an equivalent piece of towing equipment is not required during any of the identified casualty scenarios that could potentially occur while a vessel is berthed at a dock. The potential for the need to move the vessel away from the dock, while at the same time being no viable alternative method to ETOPS for moving the vessel away from the dock, is extremely unlikely to occur. Combining the potential resulting injuries from ETOPS deployment, the unlikely occurrence of the scenario that would necessitate the need for a tow-off and the other inherently safe alternatives means of moving the vessel from berth it is recommended that the ETOPS be eliminated from the ISGOTT checklist since it is not an essential piece of equipment for vessel safety.

17. Key words: Risk Assessment; Fire Wires; ETOPS, Tankers,

18. Distribution statement

OCIMF - 2 copies

Lloyd’s Register - 1 copy

M A R I N E C O N S U L T A N C Y S E R V I C E S

Lloyd’s Register North America Inc. 29/10/2009

ii

Contents

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1-1

2. INTRODUCTION 2-1

2.1. Regulatory Guidelines for ETOPS 2-2

2.2. Historical Reference to Fire Wires/Emergency Tow-off Pennant Systems 2-3

3. SCOPE OF WORK 3-1

3.1. Execution Plan 3-1

4. ETOPS HAZARD ASSESSMENT 4-1

4.1. Review of Historical Accidents 4-1

4.2. Development of Casualty Scenarios 4-4

4.3. Functional Requirements of Alternative Fire Wire/Towing-Off Systems 4-10

4.4. Human Factors Assessment of Current Fire Wire System 4-11

5. DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5-1

5.1. Conclusion 5-1

6. REFERENCES: 6-1

7. DEFINITIONS and ABBREVIATIONS 7-1

8. APPENDIX A: ISGOTT References to ETOPS 8-1

9. APPENDIX B: Workshop Presentation Slides 9-1

10. APPENDIX C: Fire Wire Incidents Summary 10-1

10.1. Industry Fire Wire Incidents (Last 5 Years) 10-1

10.2. Lost Time Injuries (13 incidents: 16 lost time injuries) 10-1

10.3. Restricted (Recordable Injury) Work Cases 10-3

10.4. First Aid Cases 10-3

10.5. Near Misses 10-4

11. APPENDIX D: Typical Fire Wire Incident Investigation 11-1

12. APPENDIX E: Typical Deploying ETOPS Job Safety Analysis (JSA) 12-1

13. APPENDIX F: NTSB and MAIB Incident Report References 13-1

13.1. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) - USA 13-1

13.2. Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) UK 13-3

14. APPENDIX G: Human Factors REBA Fire Wire Analysis 14-1

14.1. Approach 14-1

14.2. Findings 14-1

14.3. Suggested improvements 14-2

14.4. REBA Worksheets 14-2



1-1

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The report first provides some historical background and objective of the use of fire wires (the term “fire wire” is commonly used and is synonymous with the more correct “Emergency Tow-off Pennant System (ETOPS)”). This includes the historical analysis of the fire incidents that have affected the marine industry and then focuses on the port / vessel incidents that may require the use of fire wires. This historical identification exercise was intended to provide data on whether fire wires have been utilized during any of the port / vessel fire events. Because no evidence was discovered demonstrating that fire wires have been historically utilized, a casualty scenario development exercise was undertaken to provide a first principle risk assessment on whether fire wires are required during a port / vessel accident event. The resulting quantity of lost time injuries, recordable injuries and first aid cases, in the USA, presented by OCIMF indicates that the ETOPS deployment activity, in the USA alone, would be a significant operational concern if extrapolated to the rest of the international marine industry. Therefore to fully assess the human aspects of the current fire wire operations, a risk analysis tool called REBA (Rapid Entire Body Assessment) was performed on the fire wire activity videos provided by ConocoPhillips on their oil tankers. Other companies were invited to submit videos for evaluation but could not meet the timing of the request.

This risk analysis tool (REBA) provides a quick assessment of the potential muscle/skeletal risk to an employee during the performance of their task. The results of the assessment indicated that the highest risk identified is ranked as a ‘medium’ concern and that there was no immediate need for drastic action to improve the activity. The recommended improvements were to remove the ETOPS all together to eliminate the hazard or if the ETOPS remains in place then either increase the flexibility of the ‘wire’ utilized to reduce the physical stresses associated with feeding it through the guide and bending it around the bollards or reduce the height of the bollards or lighten the weight of the ‘wire’ to minimize the physical strain associated with lifting the wires over them. This should only be implemented if the effectiveness of the system will not be compromised through having shorter bollards. It must also be realized that there is a high potential for complacency when laying out or storing the fire wire. It is a simple task but it does require continuous training on the identification of the hazards during the ETOPS deployment activity. Other means of reducing potential injury in handling the large fire wires could be increasing the amount of personnel performing the task, increasing the supervision of the activity or more training of personnel. A ranking of the tow-off alternatives versus the desired parameters indicated the most inherent-safe approach is to eliminate the ETOPS or to utilize recessed bitts as a means to make fast to the vessel.

It is concluded that the use of a fire wire, ETOPS or an equivalent piece of towing equipment is not required during any of the identified casualty scenarios that could potentially occur while a vessel is berthed at a dock. The potential for the need to move the vessel away from the dock, while at the same time there being no other viable alternative method to ETOPS for moving the vessel, is extremely unlikely to occur. Combining the potential resulting injuries from ETOPS deployment and the unlikely occurrence of the fire or other scenario that would necessitate the need for a tow-off and the other inherently safe alternative means of moving the vessel from berth, it is recommended that the ETOPS be eliminated from ISGOTT guidance and the ISGOTT checklist since it is not an essential piece of equipment for vessel safety.



2-1

2. INTRODUCTION

The Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) Emergency Tow-off Pennants

(ETOPS) Working Group has been tasked with examining the benefits and risks of

ETOPS with respect to current designs and operations. Lloyd’s Register North America

Inc. (LRNA) was instructed by OCIMF to perform a third party risk assessment on the use

of ETOPS or “fire wires” onboard tank vessels. The term “fire wire” is considered to be

synonymous with ETOPS and is used throughout this study accordingly. It must also be

understood that at this current moment steel (fire) wires are the accepted system used to

assist tugs in the removal of ships from a berth in the event of an emergency, and without

the intervention of any crew member. However it was believed that this system is a

leftover of previous practice, and does not have its basis in current approaches and

technology. Currently tankship operators are experiencing injuries to experienced crew

members during the handling of the steel fire wires. Since the size of the ships has grown

over an order of magnitude since it was first believed steel fire wires were put into service

[A WWII tanker was about 16,500 DWT and today’s Suezmax is about 165,000 DWT, this

is one order of magnitude. A 1950s tanker was 30,000 DWT and today’s ULCC is over

300,000 DWT, again one order of magnitude] there has been a significant increase in the

necessary wire sizes. [i.e. Prior to the change in the OCIMF Manual, fire wires were all ½”

IWRC-IPS, this corresponds to a 11.5 tons (10.4 MT). The largest specified wire for

vessels over 300,000 DWT is 42 mm (1-5/8”). The strength of this wire is 115 tons (104

MT). While ship size went up by a factor of twenty, wire strength increased by one order

of magnitude. Considering the bollard pull of the tugs has also increased, there is an

even greater mismatch]. In turn this has caused an increase in the handling risks onboard

the ships. It must also be noted that the size increase has also made it difficult for tug

operators, who currently utilize equipment designed to handle synthetic ropes rather than

wires, to lift, handle and connect the eye of the much larger fire wires.

The intention of this assessment is to review the requirements for ETOPS for emergency

towing as per recommendation of section 26.5.5.2 Handling of the fifth edition of ISGOTT

(International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals). This assessment will

determine:

• If ETOPS are necessary?

• What are the risks of them having to be used?

• “Do the emergency procedures require the ship to be moved from the berth if it is immobilized by fire?” 1

The risk assessment will evaluate the effectiveness of ETOPS in the various scenarios

where they may need to be used, and any other inherent risks that they pose when being

handled. The risk assessment is intended to cover, in order, the questions such as;

• Are ETOPS used?

• How often are ETOPS used?

• When are ETOPS used?

• What are the risk of fire, shore side and onboard? And

1 ISGOTT, International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals, Fifth Edition, International Chamber of Shipping, Oil Companies

International Marine Forum, International Association of Ports and Harbors, Witherby Marine Publishing, London,2006.



2-2

• If ETOPS are needed, will they work.

In addition LRNA will carry out a review of the functional requirements of an emergency

towing off system and evaluate five potential alternative systems that could be put into

place.

2.1. Regulatory Guidelines for ETOPS

The modern age of large tankers, ULCC, VLCC, Suezmax and Aframax started in the

nearly 1960s and by the mid-60s the major oil companies, at the time, recognized the

need for a safety guide for tankers and terminals. With the input of the American

Petroleum Institute (API), the Institute of Petroleum (IP – London), the International

Chamber of Shipping, and the International Association of Classification Societies they

published the International Oil Tanker and Terminal Safety Guide (IOTTSG) in 1966.

Section 3.6,”EMERGENCY FIRE WIRES FOR TOWING OFF” of IOTTSG states that:

“While at a berth, emergency fire wires for towing off should be positioned both on the

offshore bow and quarter of the ship, and the eyes maintained at or about, the

waterline at all times; except at some terminals where by agreement this is not

considered necessary, for example, some sea berths or where tugs are not available.

Wires should be in good condition and of adequate strength and each wire should lead directly inboard and thereafter to ship’s bollards, properly made fast and adjusted as necessary.”

In 1978 the International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers & Terminals (ISGOTT) –

International Chamber of Shipping and Oil Companies International Maritime Forum

(OCIMF), first published a guide which states in Section 3.5 “EMERGENCY TOWING

OFF WIRES” that

“Except at terminals where no tugs are available, towing off wires of adequate strength

and condition should be made fast to bollards on the tanker, forward and aft, and their

eyes run out and maintained at or about the waterline. For tankers alongside a jetty

the wires should be over the offshore side, and for tankers at a buoy mooring they

should be placed on the side opposite to the hose strings.

.. The arrangement will vary from port to port and the officer responsible should be

advised of local requirements.”

It must be noted that the definition, requirement and use for tow-off equipment (ETOP/fire

wire) has been present in both the IOTTSG (1966) and all 5 editions of ISGOTT from

1978 to 2006; the requirement still exists some 40 years later after its “official”

introduction. Similar language has appeared in all five editions of ISGOTT, including the

Fifth Edition, published in 2006. A complete transcription of the language included in all

revisions of IOTTSG and ISGOTT is included in Appendix A.

Thus, though not explicitly stated, it seems apparent that the objective of ETOPS or Fire

Wires is to provide tugs with a connection point for pulling a tanker or ship away from a

berth, in an emergency situation, without intervention of any of the vessel’s crew

members. The anticipated emergency situation is assumed an escalating fire incident

involving either the vessel or the port facility. It is recognized that there may be



2-3

‘”escalating incidents” other than fire. For the purpose of this study “fire” is synonymous

with other possible incidents.

2.2. Historical Reference to Fire Wires/Emergency Tow-off Pennant Systems

A historical review of nautical handbooks, dating to 1936, has revealed no direct references to fire wires. There were, however, several discussions on the removal of ships from docks that were involved in a fire scenario.

The claim that the technique “has saved more than one ship from fire"5 is obvious, but unfortunately there is no reference to any specific events where the method has been utilized. Some of the older nautical manuals have indicated that a switch from Manila rope to wire was made sometime between 1957 and 1965 after a review of the publication dates of the MERCHANT MARINE OFFICERS' HANDBOOK2 (published in 1942, 1943, 1950 and 1965) and the AMERICAN MERCHANT SEAMAN'S MANUAL3 (published in 1938, 1940, 1942, 1946 and 1957). Neither document specifically mentions the use of “fire wires” per se, or to the use of ropes or wires for removing the ship from a pier, other than those passages cited above.

A historical review of the International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals by OCIMF et al from 1966 to present (original to Fifth Edition) has provided the intent or objectives of a fire wire without being specific on the physical characteristics of the equipment. It was during the Fifth Edition where the nomenclature ETOPS was first introduced and a more prescriptive guideline was provided on the properties and handling of fire wires. The OCIMF Mooring Equipment Guidelines4 provides a more detailed explanation and illustration on the Fire Wires arrangement on a vessel; this guideline refers to the fourth edition of ISGOTT and does not refer to the fire wires as ETOPS which was first referenced in the fifth edition of ISGOTT.

2 MERCHANT MARINE OFFICERS' HANDBOOK, by Edward A. Turpin and William MacEwen, Master Mariners, Fourth Edition

Revised and Enlarged, Copyright 1965 by Cornell Maritime Press, Inc., Centreville, Maryland, pg. 1-19. 3 AMERICAN MERCHANT SEAMAN'S MANUAL For Seamen by Seamen, edited by Felix M. Cornell and Allan C. Hoffman, Fifth

Edition, Copyright 1957 by Cornell Maritime Press, Centreville, Maryland, pp. 98 - 99. 4 Mooring Equipment Guidelines, Second Edition, Oil Companies International Marine Forum, WITHERBY & CO Ltd, London, 1997.



2-4

Table 1: Historic reference of Fire Wires or ETOPS

Date Reference - Edition Comments

1938 American Merchant Seaman’s Manual – First Edition

“Springing a ship from a dock by use of a fire warp.-- Assume the vessel is moored with no power on her engines; it would be good practice to run a hawser from her forward winch to the stream end of the dock so that if a fire breaks out on the dock, the stand-by crew, could, with auxiliary power on the winch, warp or "spring" the ship out into the stream where she could drop her anchor or a tug could take her in tow. Also if a tug was close by it could get hold of the warp and tow the vessel to safety.”

3

1940 American Merchant Seaman’s Manual – Second Edition

1942 American Merchant Seaman’s Manual – Third Edition

Merchant Marine Officers’ Handbook – First Edition

“A fire warp is required by some companies, and it has saved more than one ship from fire. It's a wire lead from the bow along the shed to a post or cleat at the end. In the case of fire in the shed, or on board, the ship can be hauled into the stream even if there is no steam on the main engines.”

2

1943 Merchant Marine Officers’ Handbook – Second Edition

1946 American Merchant Seaman’s Manual – Fourth Edition

1950 Merchant Marine Officers’ Handbook – Third Edition

1957 American Merchant Seaman’s Manual – Fifth Edition

1965 Merchant Marine Officers’ Handbook – Fourth Edition Revised and Enlarged

1966 IOTTSG

1978 Tanker Operations, A Handbook for the Ship's Officer

“Fire on dock. When a fire occurs on the dock or adjacent area, your first concern as officer in charge should be the safety of your ship. Take immediate steps to move her. Shut down the cargo, disconnect hoses and loading arms, single up lines, and have the engineers put steam on the engines. Call the tugs if necessary. If a strong tide is running and no obstructions lie downstream, simply throw off the mooring lines and allow the vessel to drift to safety. When well clear, drop the anchor.”

5

ISGOTT – First Edition

1979 Merchant Marine Officers’ Handbook – Reprinted

ISGOTT – Reprinted April 1979

1984 ISGOTT – Second Edition

1986 ISGOTT – Reprinted April 1986

1988 ISGOTT – Third Edition

1990 ISGOTT – Reprinted March 1990

1991 ISGOTT – Revised 1991

1992 OCIMF Mooring Equipment Guidelines – First Publication

5 Tanker Operations, A Handbook for the Ship's Officer, by G.H. Marton, Copyright 1978 by Cornell Maritime Press, Inc., Cambridge.

Maryland, pg. 175,



2-5

Date Reference - Edition Comments

1996 ISGOTT – Fourth Edition

1997 OCIMF Mooring Equipment Guidelines – Second Edition

2006 ISGOTT – Fifth Edition



3-1

3. SCOPE OF WORK

3.1. Execution Plan

The scope of this ETOPS risk assessment included the following activities:

• Review of historical accidents for evidence on the use of ETOPS in emergencies, and in normal operations

• Identification of whether ETOPS were used to remove burning vessels from a facility, or to remove vessels from a burning facility

• If burning vessels have been removed, determine if the subject fires were within the vessel’s hazardous areas

• Based on historical evidence create a casualty scenario and perform a risk assessment of the effectiveness of ETOPS in each event

• Creation of a Kepner-Tregoe matrix to evaluate the functionality of alternative emergency Tow-off systems, and comparison with the existing fire wire system

• Provide ergonomics evaluation of the fire wire handling.



4-1

4. ETOPS HAZARD ASSESSMENT

4.1. Review of Historical Accidents

A review of the historical accidents that could have required the use of emergency

tow-off by tugs was conducted using Rushbrook’s Fire Aboard – Third Edition6

discussions with the International Fire Investigators and Consultants (in which Dr.

Rushbrook is a Principal Advisor), and review of the UK's Marine Accident

Investigation Board (MAIB), and the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board

(NTSB) accident data. Fire Aboard documents historical fires, both on board vessels

and alongside berths from the early 1800's to 1996. The MAIB and NTSB provided

fire and explosion incident data for merchant vessels in the UK for the period from

1990 to 2008, and in the US for the period from 1971 to 2006, respectively.

To obtain a perspective on the amount of potential ETOPS usage during the period

when the equipment was first introduced as a regulated guideline in 1966 by IOTTSG

(International Oil Tanker and Terminal Safety Guide, if we assume that there were

approximately 304,000 ship voyages or trips in a year, worldwide, and there are two

sets of ETOPS (forward and aft) to be handled per trip and there were at least two fire

wire movements per trip (deployment and retrieval) then the total number of fire wire

handling activities per year would be on the order of 1,215,900. This number is

conservative because in one trip a ship could have multiple landings and the crew

could manipulate the fire wire more than two times to ensure that they are at the

required one or two metres above the waterline depending on the freeboard of the

vessel; which can alter since it is in a loading or unloading during its time at berth.

The total numbers of voyages were generated using Clarkson Research Services

Limited’s ‘The Gas Carrier Register 2008’ and ‘The Tanker Register 2008’ to

determine the total number of tank vessels. The OCIMF ETOPS Working Group

then, depending on vessels type and size, estimated the typical durations of each

voyage. Table 2 represents the composite deployments extrapolated from these

figures.

Table 2: Estimated number of ETOPS deployment in 2007 (vessel number and types provided by OCIMF)

Vessels Type Number

of Vessels

Size (tonne)

Voyages / y

r

Tota

l V

oyages / y

r

Tota

l N

um

ber

of

ET

OP

S

Handlin

g

per

year

Asphalt & Bitumen Carrier 9 10,000 – 50,000 122 1,098 4,392

Bunkering Vessel 2 10,000 – 30,000 122 244 976

Chemical & LPG Carrier 1 15,000 122 122 488

Chemical & Oil Carrier 1591 10,000 – 60,000 122 194,102 776,408

5 60,000 – 80,000 122 610 2,440

3 80,000 – 120,000 122 366 1,464

Fleet Replenishing Vessel 53 10,000 – 60,000 122 6,466 25,864

Methanol Carrier 38 10,000 – 60,000 122 4,636 18,544

1 80,000 – 120,000 122 122 488

6 Rusbrook’s Fire Aboard: A reference book on marine fire-fighting and fire-fighting equipment by Frank Rushbrook CBE, Third Edition,

Lygate, J.F. (editor), Brown Son & Ferguson, Limited, Glasgow, 1998



4-2

Vessels Type Number

of Vessels

Size (tonne)

Voyages / y

r

Tota

l V

oyages / y

r

Tota

l N

um

ber

of

ET

OP

S

Handlin

g

per

year

Molten Phosphorous Carrier 1 30,000 122 122 488

Molten Sulphur Carrier 6 10,000 – 30,000 122 732 2,928

Phosphoric Acid Carrier 6 20,000 – 35,000 122 732 2,929

Product Carrier 706 10,000 – 60,000 46 32,476 129,904

198 60,000 – 80,000 18 3,564 14,256

150 80,000 – 120,000 18 2,700 10,800

5 120,000 – 200,000 9 45 180

Product Carrier / Heavy Lift 4 30,000 46 184 736

Shuttle Tankers 5 10,000 – 60,000 46 230 920

2 60,000 – 80,000 18 36 144

14 80,000 – 120,000 18 252 1,008

41 120,000 – 200,000 9 369 1,476

Sulphuric Acid Carrier 1 16,000 122 122 488

Tanker 250 10,000 – 60,000 46 11,500 46,000

142 60,000 – 80,000 18 2,556 10,224

581 80,000 – 120,000 18 10,458 41,832

316 120,000 – 200,000 9 2,884 11,376

491 200,000 – 320,000 6 2,946 11,784

8 320,000 – 550,000 6 48 192

Total 279,682 1,118,728

Ethylene 4 450 - 3000 18 72 288

Ethylene / LPG 92 1,000 – 24,000 18 1,656 6,624

Ethylene / LPF / Chemical 20 6,000 – 15,000 18 360 1,440

LNG Carrier 33 800 – 60,000 18 594 2,376

176 60,000 – 80,000 18 3,168 12,672

47 80,000 – 120,000 18 846 3,384

LNG / Ethylene / LPG 4 1,000 – 30,000 18 72 288

LNG / Regasification 4 77,000 18 72 288

LPG Carrier 952 150 - 60,000 18 17,136 68,544

LPG / Chemical 10 3,000 – 20,000 18 180 720

LPG / Oil 3 2,000 – 4,000 46 138 552

Total 24,294 97,176

Total Number of ETOPS handling in 2007

303,976 1,215,904

Assumptions: Vessel Round Trip Time Voyages per Year ULCC 60 days 6 VLCC 60 days 6 Suezmax 40 days 9 Aframax 20 days 18 Panamax 20 days 18 Shuttle 8 days 46 < Panamax 6 days 61 Product 8 days 46 Chemical* 3 days 122 < 125 m3 LNG 20 days 18 > 125 m3 LNG 20 days 18 *Chemical Carriers tend to make multiple stops on a voyage in any given port.



4-3

Therefore using an assumption that there were zero tanker movements in 1900 and

303,976 tanker movements in 2007, a quadratic curve-fit imposed on the data from

1966 to 2007 would provide a total of 33.3 million deployments of ETOPS; historically

from 1966 to 2007.

Since 1966, when ETOPS was first introduced by ISGOTT, there have been 85

relevant ship fires documented in data from Rushbrook’s, MAIB and the NTSB.

There were 20 fire incidents involving tank vessels at berth or at a dock (0.9% of the

total of 2,129 documented ship fires from 1966 to 2008). Thus there were only 20

potential opportunities to utilize the fire wire if the fire incident escalated to a point that

the ETOPS could have been an alternative when a decision had been made to move

the vessel away from the port. During those restricted opportunities the ETOPS or fire

wires have never been documented in any of the resources consulted as having been

used to move a berthed vessel during a fire incident. Other informal

correspondences with OCIMF members, US Coast Guard, SIGTTO and tug boat

operators have also resulted in no recorded fire events utilizing ETOPS from their

operational experiences. Anecdotal claims of use during the Persian Gulf War have

been passed on. However, war and other Force Majeure issues are beyond the

scope of a study of this nature.

Since there is no known historical evidence of the use of fire wires the resultant

qualitative risk assessment will be based on the premise of the “null hypothesis”

approach and the requirement for the fire wire will be justified utilizing a casualty

scenario based approach, similar to the IMO guidelines contained in

MSC.1/Circ.1212 of 15 December 2006. The “null hypothesis” approach is a risk

assessment methodology utilized to demonstrate and document the need for critical

barriers/safeguards or emergency equipment required to meet the intended

objectives of the proposed system. Concurrently, the technique is utilized to

demonstrate, justify and eliminate any excess system or equipment not required to

meet the intended operational or emergency goals and objectives. A very good

example of the use of the “null hypothesis” is when determining the amount of

portable fire extinguishers on an offshore platform. Under normal design conditions

there would be portable extinguishers located all over the facility even if it is a bit

excessive; the perception is that more is better. The difficulty is that if you were then

trying to rationalise the quantity of extinguishers based on the fire risk on the platform

you would be perceived by the personnel as reducing the level of safety on the

facility. Another alternative design approach is to first determine the fire risk in each

of the areas of the facility, start with no portable extinguishers, and then justify the

placement of the equipment at each area of the platform; the perception in this case

is that you are improving the safety of the facility with the addition of the

extinguishers. The same technique has been utilized on the rational of determining

the need for subsea emergency shutdown valves between loading systems and

offshore platforms.

As mentioned above the objective of fire wires is to provide tugs with a connection

point for pulling a tanker or ship away from a berth, in an emergency situation, without

intervention of any of the vessel’s crew members. The anticipated emergency

situation is an escalating fire or similar incident involving either the vessel or the port

facility. The risk assessment will evaluate whether there is a need for ETOPS during

the identified casualty scenarios.



4-4

4.2. Development of Casualty Scenarios

The development of the casualty scenario commences with an incident or initiating

event that will potentially require the removal of a vessel from a berth due to the

escalation of the event; on the vessel or port (see definitions of hazard terms in

Section 7 – Definitions and Abbreviations). Before addressing the consequence

aspect of the developing scenario where the potential to utilize ETOPS could be

taken there must be first an appreciation on the potential for this type of accidental

event to occur as an initiating event.

Potential for Fire Initiating Event from the Port or Vessel

The information obtained from Rusbrook, MAIB and NTSB has indicated that the

potential for a fire affecting a vessel or port that will necessitate the separation of the

two potential sources of hazard is highly unlikely based on “zero uses” (from 20

incidents) in 33.3 million deployment opportunities. It must be emphasized that none

of the fire incidents mentioned the use of ETOPS to separate the vessel and port

facility; to minimize fire or other escalation.

The initiating event or incident that will be the basis of the casualty scenario development was a vessel (LNG, chemical, oil, LPG, cargo, etc) loading or unloading flammable or fluids or gases at a dock. This entails the fact that the vessel is secured at berth and operating at its highest hazard potential during loading or unloading cargo. The three marine accident scenarios that have been historically identified7 are vessel collision, fire and extreme weather. The initiating accidental event for this report will be a fire scenario on the vessel or at the dock/port (see definitions of dock and port in Section 7 – Definitions and Abbreviations) during the critical loading/unloading operation. The modern design of most ports and vessels have, based on the current international standards such as API, NFPA and SIGTTO for ports and IMO (STCW, SOLAS & MARPOL), IACS, Classification Society and Flag State rules for vessels, incorporated effective safeguards (engineered controls, training requirements for hazardous and flammable cargo and operating & maintenance procedures) that would minimize the likelihood and consequence of an accidental fire event that would affect either the vessel or port during these modes of operations. The modern design of most dock and terminal facilities designate separation distances8 9 10 11 between the vessels and port facilities are such that minimum distances are required to ensure that any identified accidental events will not simultaneously involve the vessel and the port or berth facility or escalate from one to the other. This uncontrolled fire event will form the start point of the casualty scenario that would determine if ETOPS could be an option of separating the ship from the port. It is found in Rushbrook’s that

“When man learnt to build ships capable of journeying far and wide over the oceans, he would have ever-present in his mind the danger of fire; and by reason of the very limited fire-fighting equipment available, he would have to pay strict attention to fire prevention”.

7 Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, F.P. Lees, Butterworth, London, 2003

8 Standards for the Construction and Fire Protection of Marine Terminals, Piers and Wharves, National Fire Protection Association, NFPA

307, 2006 Edition 9 Standard for the Production, Storage and Handling of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 59A, 2006

edition 10

Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) – Production, Storage and Handling, Canadian Standards Association, CAN/CSA – Z276-01, July 2003 11

Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Building, American Petroleum Institute, API RP 752, 2nd Edition, May

2003



4-5

This statement reiterates the need for maintaining the fire-involved ship at port during any emergency fire fighting scenario and the need for fire prevention at the berth and the vessel.

Today we have better fire protection both onshore and onboard ships and this minimizes the potential for fires on both in a port and vessel. Since the mid-1970s tank vessels of 20,000 DWT have been fitted with inert gas systems, thereby reducing the likelihood of fire. During this same time terminals have been modernized and fire fighting capabilities, including mutual aid organizations have been established. Most of the new tugs have been equipped with better fire fighting capabilities and many are equipped to a FiFi 1 standard. Larger ports have improved their fire boat capabilities. All of this becomes a critical path in the decision to move a vessel and these active and passive fire protection systems will be additional safeguards or barriers of protection to prevent a fire from escalating on a vessel or port.

It must also be clarified that the loading or unloading operations is only a very small portion of the total voyage duration of a tanker vessel thus the likelihood of an accidental fire event during this critical operation (loading or unloading) is extremely unlikely. Since the vessel is in an unloading or loading scenario it must be emphasized that the dock and vessel staff are more vigilant during this portion of their delivery voyage and thus the failure of detection of a hazardous gas scenario is also highly unlikely. This means that for a fire on either the vessel or port escalating to either facility would also be a highly unlikely event. The likelihood of having a fire event simultaneously on both the port and vessel is therefore an extremely unlikely event to occur.

Casualty Scenario

The casualty scenario is meant to describe the development of the set of conditions

and factors that have to be met to propagate the initial scenario of the fire on the port

or vessel to the point where a decision will be made on how to remove the vessel

from the port; the end event. Fire has been chosen as the cause throughout the

casualty scenarios. However, any other cause (i.e., gas release, terrorist threat

radiation retreat, etc.) other than fire could be substituted with identical results.

During the progression of this casualty scenario decision tree the null hypothesis

process is in effect; where the use of ETOPS is essential or required to safely remove

the vessel from the berth.

The means of moving the vessel away from the port does not necessarily mean the

use of the fire wire due to the following reasons:

• During a fire scenario the decision to move a fire-involved vessel away from the terminal rests with a port authority or similar organizations in other locations. The decision will involve the balance between the safety of the port and the surrounding shipping lanes. The last thing a port authority would like to do is jeopardize the safety of the traffic along the shipping lanes if the vessel is not seaworthy. It must be noted that in the NFPA 140512 “Guide for Land-Based Fire Fighters Who Respond to Marine Vessel Fire” (Sections 4.6, 14.8 and 14.9) there is a strong recommendation that a vessel, involved in a fire scenario, should not be moved from a berth due to ease of access to the vessel for fire fighting activities and unlimited supply of manpower and equipment to

12

Guide for Land-Based Fire Fighters Who Respond to Marine Vessel Fires, National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 1405, 2006 edition



4-6

extinguish the flames. Moving a vessel off the berth adds to the complications of weather, current and limited access to both fire fighting equipment and manpower; this could also jeopardize the economy of the shipping channels due to the potential for obstruction of commercial traffic with the burning vessel. The decision to move the vessel will be the responsibility of the Port Authority or Captain of the Port.

A very good example of the difficulties of addressing a fire on a ship away from the dock13 (Fire Aboard, Second Edition, Chapter Five, Some Major Disaster to Ships in Port)

The “Seawise University” – January 9th, 1972. “…Later she was moved to a berth

approximately half a nautical mile from the oil installations on the eastern side of Tsing Yi Island, one mile from Ywai Chung container berth and two miles north of Green Island explosives depot. The distance from the main Island Navigation Company’s office and also from the Central Government Pier was about three nautical miles. These distances were to assume great importance when fire subsequently ravaged the huge vessel! …When this situation is compounded by the fact the ship lies at anchor with about three miles of open water between it and the fire fighting services, then it is small wonder that disaster lay just around the corner! …Some difficulties were experienced in getting through to the Fire Brigade on the 999 telephone system and it was not until 11:52 a.m. that they received the call to the Seawise University. Immediately three fireboats, Fireboats Nos. 1 and 2 and Fireboat the Alexander Grantham were ordered to the scene. It is now that the three miles of water between the fireboats’ station and the Seawise University became of crucial importance! Fireboat No. 1 reached the scene at about 12:27 p.m., closely followed by the Alexander Grantham. But the fires had now been burning for an hour or so …By the time the Director of the Hong Kong Fire Services, Mr. A.E. H. Wood, reached the Seawise University at about 1:45 p.m. the situation on board must have been quite desperate. Even before the first fireboat reached the scene, Mr. Worrallo, Assistant Chief Fire Officer, Hong Kong Island, had circled the Seawise University in a helicopter at about 12:10 p.m. and seen smoke pouring from the superstructure for half the length of the ship from the stern and decided that the situation was so serious that he sent out a “disaster alarm”. This then can be taken as a measure of the size of the problem facing the professional fire fighters at the time of their arrival!

• The decision to move a tug into a towing scenario with a fire-involved tanker rests with the tug master who is responsible for the safety of his crew. It would be irresponsible for him to jeopardize the safety of his crew. The tug master would also have to be cognizant of the loss of the strength of the ETOPS and connections due to the equipment exposure to the fire onboard the vessel.

After the fire has been controlled or extinguished the decision to move the vessel

will be a joint decision between the tug/salvage/tank vessel master and the port

authority. Since the fire wire could have been exposed to the fire scenario the use

of this equipment will be avoided in favour of another means of moving the vessel.

Exposure of the ETOPS to a fire would most likely severely reduce the strength of

the steel wire. After prolonged exposure to fire; the temper of the wire changes

and the strength of the steel will vary. The unknown structural condition of the

ETOPS makes it an unlikely choice for a tug master to utilize in a towing scenario

if the vessel is seaworthy. There is time for the port authority to decide on an

effective means of removing the vessel from the berth including leaving the

damaged ship at its present location. There would also be suitable time to

properly rig satisfactory towing apparatus.

13

Fire Aboard: A reference book on marine fire-fighting and fire-fighting equipment by Frank Rushbrook CBE, Second Edition, Lygate, J.F.

(editor), Brown Son & Ferguson, Limited, Glasgow, 1961



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• The use of the vessels propulsion system, if functional, will be utilized

in most instances in preference to moving a ship "dead stick" with tugs.

It must be noted that in Table 1 the vessels referred were powered by

steam. Today, with the exception of some LNG vessels, diesel

engines are the propulsion system of choice; power is available as

soon as the engines are started.

• If the towing option has been decided, due to the loss of propulsion,

after the fire scenario on the vessel has been controlled the tug master,

who will be performing the operation, will determine how he will move

the vessel. The tug master will more than likely utilize rope rather than

wire due to the ease of attachment and handling by the crew; there is

also emergency tow gear and tow points available to the tug or salvage

master at the forward and aft ends of the vessel.

• If time is not a factor in moving the vessel there is a possibility to utilize

two tugs to perform the movement from berth. This and other options

may be considered. It must be noted that any tug, given the choice of

towing equipment, would prefer to use their lines due to the familiarity

with their maintenance history. It must be noted that when moving a

vessel, particularly at speeds less than 5 knots, two tugs are needed to

maintain control of the vessel. If the intention is to hold a vessel off the

dock it will require the use of two vessels. If the intention is to tow the

vessel it is possible to utilize a single tug once the vessel is moving. It

also must be emphasized that if the vessel is within a harbour it would

be very risky to move an unpowered ship without the use of multiple

tugs.

• The large diameters and weights of the ETOPS make the handling of

this equipment an issue for not only the ship’s crew, but for the tug’s

crew as well. Tankers in the 100,000 to 300,000 DWT range require a

38 mm (1-1/2”) diameter 60 m (197’) IWRC wire rope. This rope

weighs 6.19 kg/m (4.16 lb/ft) with the entire rope weighing

approximately 371.5 kg (819.5 lb). The ship’s crew has to place the

wire on the bitt and tend the eye which hangs overboard. The tug’s

crew, to make up, must bring the eye aboard and attach it to the tug’s

towline. Considering modern harbour tugs rely on synthetic tow lines,

joining the steel fire wire to the synthetic tow line requires a thimble be

temporarily spliced onto the fire wire’s eye and the fire wire be

shackled to the towline. The breaking strength of a 38 mm wire is 90

MT (99 tons), so a 90 mm (3-1/2”), 54kg (120 lb) shackle is needed.

Add to this the freeboard of the vessel can range from about 9 m

(29.5’) to 16 m (52.5’) it is unreasonable to expect a tug’s crew to move

onto the fendering of the tug, grab onto the eye of the fire wire, pull it

aboard, and then make fast to the towline. It is particularly

unreasonable when emergency towing packages are fitted and in many

ports the tug crews have drilled in their use. In an emergency the tug

would just shackle the wire to their hawser without having to fit a

thimble to the fire wire; the thimble wouldn’t be used.



4-8

• Concern exists that the current ETOPS, especially on the larger sized vessels, are currently undersized and may have to increase in diameter and strength to tow the large vessels. There is also a concern that the bollards, attached to the deck, are not designed for the potential load of the fire wire towing capacity. It must be noted that the standard deck fittings are 70 MT (77 ton). The breaking strength of a 38 mm (1-1/2”) 6 x 19 IWRC Improved Plow Steel wire is 90 MT (99 ton). The bollard pull of many of the new harbour tugs is in the 70 MT (77 ton) to 91 MT (100 ton) range. There is a significant mismatch with the ship’s fittings being the weak link.

• Another area to look is in the proportions of hawser size to ship size. In the early 1960's we were looking at 50,000 DWT as being the largest ships. Now the vessels such as Aframax, Suezmax, VLCC and ULCC are pushing the envelope of ship sizes. There is a concern that the effects will be on the fire wire sizes if the hawser has gone through this dramatic change. The issue here is that for the 38 mm wire, as an example, allowing for a 50% loss in strength, it is vastly undersized for the tugs. If you size the wire to 70 MT strength and with the 50% margin, the correct diameter would be a 48 mm (1-7/8”) steel wire weighing 9.67 kg/m (6.5 lb/ft). This is a 56% increase in weight.

The following decision matrix is based on the start point of zero “ETOPS” usage in 300,000 dockings. Each decision point made along the scenario (from top to bottom) lowers the likelihood of utilizing the ETOPS for the upcoming decision. It can be confidently stated that ultimately, at the extreme end of the scenario development, the decision to utilize the ETOPS is virtually nil.



4-9

Figure 1: Casualty Scenario for removal of ship from port

Vessel / Terminal casualty during active scenario

Does the vessel have to

be moved?

No

Can the ship be released by the

dock?

Can the vessel move without assistance?

Yes

No Action

Required

Vessel moves off dock on its

own power

Is assistance available in the time frame required and

capable?

No

Is it a Dead Ship?

Normal undocking operations.

Is crew available and able to secure

assist tugs?

No No Action

Required

Yes

Yes

No No

Action Required

Yes

No

Yes

Secure vessel using towing lines supplied

by tugs

Yes

No

Evaluate Tow-off Options

Tugs may not utilize ETOPS since the condition of the wire

is unknown.

This will be the decision of the Port Authority or Captain of the Port and the preference is

leave the vessel in place due to the unlimited access to firefighting

equipment and manpower and this keeps the ship channel free

from obstruction (dead ship).



4-10

4.3. Functional Requirements of Alternative Fire Wire/Towing-Off Systems

If there were a need for an alternative towing-off system then the desired parameters would be:

• Available during all scenarios;

• Sufficient number of units with required spare capacity;

• Ease of operability, training and maintenance (consideration about human factors);

• Sufficient strength to successfully control the ship towed away from incident to place of safety

The result of the above casualty hazard assessment systems indicates the following options could be evaluated with regards to the above mentioned performance parameter for a ETOPS alternative:

1. No system at all;

2. System located at each quarter. Recessed bollards (bitts) above the Ballast, Half

Load, and Full Load waterlines;

3. System fore and aft. Complete use of non-fire resistant synthetic lines

throughout;

4. System located at each quarter (i.e., within the hazardous area). Use of non-fire

resistant synthetic throughout;

5. System located at each quarter (i.e., within the hazardous area). Complete use

of fire resistant synthetic throughout. Fire resistant is to be determined by the

ability to withstand a 2000 °C fireball for twenty (20) seconds, and a sustained

exposure of 300 °C for 20 minutes;

6. System located at each quarter (i.e., within the hazardous area). Use of wire

around the bollard and through a chock, with synthetic line forming the rest of the

outboard line;

7. 38 mm IWRC steel fire wire as described by OCIMF Mooring Equipment

Guidelines and the International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals

(ISGOTT);

The performance of any chosen alternative to ETOPS should have the equivalent level of safety but meet the intent of having a system that can safely tow the vessel off the berth. It was originally intended that a Kepner-Tregoe methodology was proposed to rank the different options based on the desired identified parameters but since there is no critical requirement for a fire wire under all the casualty scenarios the ranking evaluation was never performed. Based on a simple assessment using the above desired parameter the order of preference is listed in Table 3 for alternatives to ETOPS. Note that the simplicity of having no system or recessed bitts has the lowest maintenance and operational requirement and has addressed the human factors concerns of the current steel fire wire requirement. A more detailed Kepner-Tregoe risk ranking could be performed but the above order of presentation would remain the same, with regards to relative safety since we are comparing the alternatives 3 to 7 to the inherently safe alternatives of 1 and 2.



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Table 3: Comparison of Tow-off alternatives based on desired parameters

DESIRED PARAMETERS >>>>>>>>>>> ALTERNATIVES

Available during all scenarios

Sufficient number of units with required spare capacity;

Ease of operability, training and maintenance (consideration about human factors

Sufficient strength to successfully control the ship tow away from incident to place of safety

1. No system at all; Yes

Not required

Yes – no training required

Not required

2. System located at each quarter. Recessed bollards above the Ballast, Half Load, and Full Load waterlines;

Yes Yes Yes – no training required

Yes – some strength required to place the rope on the recessed bollards

3. System fore and aft. Complete use of non-fire resistant synthetic lines throughout;

Not available if fire on deck

Yes

Human factors still to be considered

Yes

4. System located at each quarter (i.e., within the hazardous area). Use of non-fire resistant synthetic throughout;


Yes


Yes

5. System located at each quarter (i.e., within the hazardous area). Complete use of fire resistant synthetic throughout. Fire resistant is to be determined by the ability to withstand a 2000 °C fireball for twenty (20) seconds, and a sustained exposure of 300 °C for 20 minutes;

Yes Yes


Yes

6. System located at each quarter (i.e., within the hazardous area). Use of wire around the bollard and through a chock, with synthetic line forming the rest of the outboard line;


Yes

Only for the synthetic portion of line. Human factors still to be considered

Yes

7. 38 mm IWRC steel fire wire as described by OCIMF Mooring Equipment Guidelines and the International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals (ISGOTT);


Yes No Yes

4.4. Human Factors Assessment of Current Fire Wire System

The current maintenance and operations of the fire wires, on the vessels today, has indicated that the equipment is manually demanding and is prone to injuries. A review



4-12

of OCIMF membership recorded fire wire related incident data, from 2002 – 2007 in the USA, indicated the following results: Types of Injuries Number

Long Term Disability 1

Major Injury (Lost Time Accidents) 16

Minor Injury (Recordable and First Aid) 8

Near Misses 5

Fatality (single/multiple) 0

Fire Wire used in an incident 0

Number of times ETOPS deployed (1966 – 2007) 33.3 million (estimated)*

*This represents a total world-wide figure This data indicates that the ETOPS deployment activity, in the USA alone, would be a significant operational concern if extrapolated to the rest of the international marine industry (Note: From 2001 to 2006, MARAD (http://www.marad.dot.gov/MARAD%5Fstatistics) figures recorded 122,261 tanker dockings). Assuming that the same 4 x figure for handlings it would make it 489,044 deployments. This is an injury rate of 31/489,000; this indicates a significant amount of injuries worldwide. This would indicate that approximately 2000 mariners have been injured since 1966 worldwide in the handling of fire wires. During this same period, there has been no one in terminals or ashore injured by the handling of fire wires. Therefore, to fully assess the human aspects of current fire wire operations, a risk analysis tool called REBA (Rapid Entire Body Assessment)14 was performed on the fire wire activity videos provided by ConocoPhillips on their oil tankers. This risk analysis tool provides a quick assessment of the potential muscle/skeletal risk to an employee during the performance of their task. It was originally developed as a quick ergonomics, investigative postural assessment, and tool of reported, work-related, entire body disorder issues. The assessment provides a score on a comprehensive list of

• Posture;

• Repetition;

• Muscle Loading;

• Joint Angles. The target areas are the neck, trunk, upper and lower limbs; the parts of the body required to manipulate a fire wire. No intervention is required for the lowest score. The completed chart is designed to indicate where ergonomics interventions are required to lower the score. The recommended interventions can be prioritized in a cost-benefit order. Normally a “before” and “after” video will demonstrate the effectiveness of the intervention. The base case, with the steel wires, has provided some benchmark that would have to be improved with a proposed alternative arrangement, if the use of fire wires or ETOPS was retained. The results of the assessment indicated that the highest risk identified is ‘medium’ (‘medium’ risk means that further investigation is required and improvements should be performed soon) and that there were no immediate needs for drastic action to improve the activity. The following improvements were suggested to further reduce the risks to personnel:

14

Rapid entire body assessment (REBA); Sue Hignett and Lynn McAtamney, Applied Ergonomics. 31:201-205, 2000



4-13

1. Remove the activity, thus removing the hazards. Note that the major hazard risks, that the fire wire system is designed to manage, must still be adequately controlled if this system is removed.

Assuming the ETOPS remains in place: 2. Increase the flexibility of the ‘wire’ being used to reduce the physical stresses

associated with feeding it through the guide wire and bending it around the bollards.

3. Reduce the height of the bollards to reduce the physical strain associated with lifting the wires over them. This should only be implemented if the effectiveness of the system will not be compromised through having shorter bollards.

4. Reduce the weight of the ‘wire’ being used to improve or ease the manual handling process.

It must also be realized that there is a high potential for complacency when laying out or storing the ETOPS. It is a simple task but it does require continuous training on the identification of the hazards during the ETOPS deployment activity. Other means of reducing potential injury in handling the large fire wires could be

• Increasing the amount of personnel performing the task;

• Increasing the supervision of the activity;

• More training of personnel.



5-1

5. DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The report was developed with the premise utilizing a “null hypothesis” with regards to the use of a “fire wire” or ETOPS (Emergency Tow-off Pennants) to provide tugs with a connection point for pulling a tanker or ship away from a berth, in an emergency situation, without intervention of any of the vessel’s crew members. The anticipated emergency situation is an escalating fire incident involving either the vessel or the port. This means that the objective of this document is to identify any accidental or hazardous scenarios (through analysis or historical review) where the use of the fire wire or an equivalent piece of equipment is critical to the success of the risk management operations or the removal or separation of the escalating accidental potentials (separation of the ship from the dock); i.e. to determine the need for ETOPS or a required equivalent piece of equipment.

5.1. Conclusion

It is concluded that the use of a fire wire, ETOPS or an equivalent piece of towing equipment is not required during any of the identified casualty scenarios that could potentially occur while a vessel is berthed at a dock. The potential for the need to move the vessel away from the dock, while at the same time having no viable alternative method to ETOPS for moving the vessel away from the dock, is extremely unlikely to occur. Combining the potential resulting injuries from ETOPS deployment, the unlikely occurrence of the fire scenario that would necessitate the need for a tow-off and the other inherently safe alternatives means of moving the vessel from berth, it is recommended that the ETOPS be eliminated from ISGOTT and the ISGOTT checklist since it is not an essential piece of equipment for vessel safety.



6-1

6. REFERENCES:

1) ISGOTT, International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals, Fifth Edition, International Chamber of Shipping, Oil Companies International Marine Forum, International Association of Ports and Harbors, Witherby Marine Publishing, London,2006.

2) AMERICAN MERCHANT SEAMAN'S MANUAL For Seamen by Seamen, edited by Felix M. Cornell and Allan C. Hoffman, Fifth Edition, Copyright 1957 by Cornell Maritime Press, Centreville, Maryland, pp. 98 - 99.

3) MERCHANT MARINE OFFICERS' HANDBOOK, by Edward A. Turpin and William MacEwen, Master Mariners, Fourth Edition Revised and Enlarged, Copyright 1965 by Cornell Maritime Press, Inc., Centreville, Maryland, pg. 1-19

4) Mooring Equipment Guidelines, Second Edition, Oil Companies International Marine Forum, WITHERBY & CO Ltd, London, 1997.

5) Tanker Operations, A Handbook for the Ship's Officer, by G.H. Marton, Copyright 1978 by Cornell Maritime Press, Inc., Cambridge. Maryland, pg. 175

6) Rusbrook’s Fire Aboard: A reference book on marine fire-fighting and fire-fighting equipment by Frank Rushbrook CBE, Third Edition, Lygate, J.F. (editor), Brown Son & Ferguson, Limited, Glasgow, 1998

7) Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, F.P. Lees, Butterworth, London, 2003

8) Standards for the Construction and Fire Protection of Marine Terminals, Piers and Wharves, National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 307, 2006 Edition

9) Standard for the Production, Storage and Handling of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 59A, 2006 edition

10) Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) – Production, Storage and Handling, Canadian Standards Association, CAN/CSA – Z276-01, July 2003

11) Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Building, American Petroleum Institute, API RP 752, 2nd Edition, May 2003.

12) Guide for Land-Based Fire Fighters Who Respond to Marine Vessel Fires, National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 1405, 2006 edition

13) Fire Aboard: A reference book on marine fire-fighting and fire-fighting equipment by Frank Rushbrook CBE, Second Edition, Lygate, J.F. (editor), Brown Son & Ferguson, Limited, Glasgow, 1961

14) Rapid entire body assessment (REBA); Sue Hignett and Lynn McAtamney, Applied Ergonomics. 31:201-205, 2000



7-1

7. DEFINITIONS and ABBREVIATIONS

Dock A pier, berth, jetty, or other loading/discharge facility. Local area

Port The overall area including the dock. A global description of the area

Hazard Situations, conditions, characteristics, or properties that create the possibility of unwanted consequence.

Incidents or

Initiating

Events

Events in an accident sequence that begin a chain of events. This chain of events will result in one or more unwanted consequences with measurable effects unless planned safeguards interrupt the progression of the chain

Accidents Marine casualties such as a collision, grounding, allision, capsizing, sinking, or exposure of a mariner to a specific hazardous condition

Consequences

Unwanted events that can negatively affect subjects of interest. These include property damage or loss, mariner injury or illness, oil spill, loss of marine commerce, etc.

Effects Measurable negative impacts on subjects of interest (i.e. the magnitudes of the consequences)

Safeguards

Planned protections that are intended to interrupt the progression of accident sequences at various points in accident chains of events. Safeguards can be applied as barriers at any or all of the transitions in the accident sequence model. These planned protections may be physical devices, human interventions, or administrative policies.

Causes

Underlying reasons why the initial incident occurs and safeguards fail to

interrupt the chain of events. The causes, sometimes called root causes,

are typically weaknesses in management systems, which create error-

likely situations for people and vulnerabilities in equipment

AFRAMAX A tanker of 70,000 - 120,000 dwt

API American Petroleum Institute

dwt Deadweight Tons

ESD Emergency Shut Down

ETOPS Emergency Tow-Off Pennants System

IMO International Maritime Organization

IP Institute of Petroleum

IOTTSG International Oil Tanker and Terminal Safety Guide

ISGOTT International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals

IWRC Independent Wire Rope Core (smaller wire rope within the strands of the outer wire rope)

LNG Liquid Natural Gas

LPG Liquid Propane Gas

LTA Lost Time Accident

LRNA Lloyd's Register North America, Inc.



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MAIB UK Major Accident Investigation Board

MT Metric Ton

NTSB US National Transportation Safety Board

NFPA National Fire Protection Association

OCIMF Oil Companies International Marine Forum

REBA Rapid Entire Body Assessment

SIGTTO Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators

SUEZMAX A tanker between 120,000 - 160,000 dwt (the largest ships capable of fitting through the Suez Canal fully loaded)

ULCC Ultra Large Crude Carrier - capacity for 320,000 to 600,000 dwt

VLCC Very Large Crude Carrier - capacity for 200,000 to 320,000 dwt.



Appendices



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8. APPENDIX A: ISGOTT References to ETOPS

The following ISGOTT references are under copyright of the International

Chamber of Shipping and Oil Companies International Marine Forum. The

material has been reproduced with their permission.

• International Oil Tanker Terminal Safety Group – International Oil Tanker

and Terminal Safety Guide, 1966

o “3.6 EMERGENCY FIRE WIRES FOR TOWING OFF

� 13.2.2.5, 13.4.5.4, 13.5 While at a berth, emergency fire wires for towing off should be positioned both on the offshore bow and quarter of the ship, and the eyes maintained at, or about, the waterline at all times; except at some terminals where by agreement this is not considered necessary, for example, some sea berths or where tugs are not available. Wires should be in good condition and of adequate strength and each wire should lead directly inboard and thereafter to ship’s bollards, properly made fast and adjusted as necessary.”

• International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers & Terminals, International

Chamber of Shipping, Oil Companies International Marine Forum,

o “3.5 EMERGENCY TOWING OFF WIRES

� Except at terminals where no tugs are available, towing off wires of adequate strength and condition should be made fast to bollards on the tanker, forward and aft, and their eyes run out and maintained at or about the waterline. For tankers alongside a jetty the wires should be over the offshore side, and for tankers at a buoy mooring they should be placed on the side opposite to the hose strings. In order that sufficient wire can pay out to enable the tugs to tow effectively, enough slack should be retained between bollard and chock and prevented from running out by a ropeyarn or other easily broken means. The arrangement will vary from port to port and the officer responsible should be advised of local requirements.”

• International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers & Terminals, Second Edition,

International Chamber of Shipping, Oil Companies International Marine

Forum, International Association of Ports and Harbors

o “3.7 EMERGENCY RELEASE PROCEDURES

� 3.7.1 General Means should be provided to permit the quick and safe release of the ship in case of need in an emergency. The method used for the emergency release operation should be discussed and agreed, taking into account the possible risks involved.



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� 3.7.2 Emergency Towing Off Wires Except at terminals where no tugs are available, towing off wires of adequate strength and condition should be made fast to bollards on the tanker, forward and aft, and their eyes run out and maintained at or about the waterline. On tankers alongside a jetty the wires should be hung in positions which tugs can reach without difficulty, usually the offshore side; for tankers at a buoy berths they should be hung on the side opposite to the hose strings. In order that sufficient wire can pay out to enable the tugs to tow effectively, enough slack should be retained between the bollard and the chock and prevented from running out by a rope yarn or other easily broken means. The arrangement will vary from port to port and the officer responsible should be advised of local requirements.”

• International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers & Terminals, Third Edition,

International Chamber of Shipping, Oil Companies International Marine

Forum, International Association of Ports and Harbors



� 3.7.2 Emergency Towing Off Wires Except at terminals where no tugs are available, towing off wires of adequate strength and condition should be made fast to bollards on the tanker, forward and aft, and their eyes run out and maintained at or about the waterline. On tankers alongside a jetty the wires should be hung in positions which tugs can reach without difficulty, usually the offshore side; for tankers at a buoy berths they should be hung on the side opposite to the hose strings. In order that sufficient wire can pay out to enable the tugs to tow effectively, enough slack should be retained between the bollard and the chock and prevented from running out by a rope yarn or other easily broken means. The arrangement will vary from port to port and the officer responsible should be advised of local requirements.”

• International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers & Terminals (ISGOTT), Fourth

Edition, International Chamber of Shipping, Oil Companies International

Marine Forum, International Association of Ports and Harbors




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� 3.7.2 Emergency Towing Off Wires (Fire Wires) Except at terminals where there no tugs are available, towing off wires of adequate strength and condition should be made fast to bollards on the tanker, forward and aft, and their eyes run out and maintained at or about the waterline. On tankers alongside a jetty the wires should be hung in positions which tugs can reach without difficulty, usually the offshore side; for tankers at a buoy berths they should be hung on the side opposite to the hose strings. In order that sufficient wire can pay out to enable the tugs to tow effectively, enough slack should be retained between the bollard and the fairlead and be prevented from running out by a rope yarn or other easily broken means. There are various methods for rigging emergency towing wires currently in use and the arrangement may vary from port to port. Some terminals may require a particular method to be used and the ship should be advised accordingly.”

• ISGOTT, International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals, Fifth

Edition, International Chamber of Shipping, Oil Companies International

Marine Forum, International Association of Ports and Harbors

o “26.5.4 Emergency Release Procedures Means should be provided to permit the quick and safe release of the ship in case of need in an emergency. The method used for the emergency release operation should be discussed and agreed, taking into account the possible risks involved.

o 26.5.5 Emergency Towing-Off Pennants

� 26.5.5.1 Rigging Except at terminals where no tugs are available, it has become standard practice to have fire wires or more correctly emergency towing-off pennants, provided by the tanker so that in an emergency a tug can pull the ship away from the berth without the intervention of any crew member. There are various methods for rigging emergency towing-off pennants and the arrangement may vary from port to port. The preferred method is to secure the inboard end to bollards, with a minimum of five turns, and to lead the outboard end direct to a shipside chock with a bight hanging over the side ad no slack on deck. The outboard end of the line is provided with an eye to which a messenger line is attached and led back to the deck. During loading or discharging, the messenger is



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periodically adjusted to maintain the eye of the emergency towing-off pennant on or two metres above the waterline. (See OCIMF ‘Mooring Equipment Guidelines’ for further details and illustrations.) Where terminals require that an alternative method be used, the ship should be advised accordingly. On tankers alongside a jetty the emergency towing-off pennants should be rigged on the offshore side. For tankers at a buoy berths they should be hung on the side opposite to the hose strings. Table 26.1 give guidance on Minimum Breaking Loads (MBL) and lengths for emergency towing-off pennants for various ship sizes. The lengths of pennant may vary, dependent on positioning of mooring bitts and the ship’s freeboard. The pennants should be in good condition. It should be noted that this information is provided for guidance only and is not intended to indicate a uniform standard.

Emergency towing-off pennants should not be attached to a set of bitts with Safe Working Load (SWL) that is less than the Minimum Breaking Load (MBL) of the pennant. (Note: For double bollards, the SWL marked on the bollard should be the maximum allowed when using a wire or rope belayed in a figure of eight near the base of the bollard. This will be half the maximum permissible SWL when a single eye is place over the bollard.)

� 26.5.5.2 Handling Attention is drawn to the hazards associated with the ship’s crew handling heavy wires that are hung over the ship’s side, in particular the risk of strain injuries. Handling of towing-off pennants is increasingly being cited as a cause of personnel injury, particularly for spinal and muscular back complaints. It is recommended that terminals review their requirement for emergency towing-off pennants by considering the following:



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• Are they really necessary? What is the real risk of them having to be used?

• Do the emergency procedures require the ship to be moved from the berth if it is immobilized by fire?

• 26.5.5.3 Possible Future Developments

Previous editions of ISGOTT have specifically referred to ‘Fire Wires’ and ‘Emergency Towing-Off Wires’ because there were no viable alternative to wires for this purpose. Mooring Equipment Guidelines (OCIMF) specifically prohibits the use of synthetic or natural fire ropes for this purpose on the ground that they would burn in the event of a fire.

Since the 4th

Edition of ISGOTT was published in 1996, synthetic fibre ropes having the potential to combine high strength, low stretch and light weight (typically about one seventh the weight of a wire of equivalent strength) have become available. It is likely that, during the life of this 5

th

Edition, synthetic fibre ropes with fire resistance characteristics comparable to wires will become available.

This edition of ISGOTT therefore leaves open the question of whether emergency towing-off pennants should be of wire or of some other material. If terminals wish to accept the use of synthetic fibre lines that can provide similar functionality to wires whilst being safer for personnel to handle on the ship and on the tugs, they are encouraged to do so.



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9. APPENDIX B: Workshop Presentation Slides



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10. APPENDIX C: Fire Wire Incidents Summary

Fire wires or “Towing-off wires” are required by petroleum terminals and are mandated under OCIMF Mooring Guidelines- Section 3.11 ISGOTT –Chapter 3.7.2 10.1. Industry Fire Wire Incidents (Last 5 Years)

Data received from National Safety Council, Marine Section, Waterborne Transport Group. It is agreed by Safety Professionals of member shipping companies that many more incidents and near misses have not been reported, world-wide. Currently 26 incidents involving Fire Wires are on the list. Thirteen (13) of the incidents resulted in 16 Loss Time Work injuries. Additional injuries requiring medical treatment or first aid are also listed, as are near misses. Many companies have assured that additional lost time, medical treatment and first aid injuries have occurred in past decades. For the purpose of this risk assessment, we have only requested data from the past five years. 10.2. Lost Time Injuries (13 incidents: 16 lost time injuries)

1. 2004 - Cadet was assisting with stowing fire wire on storage drum. The

Cadet was spooling wire on the storage drum and used his hand to guide

the wire on the drum. During this operation he was squatting down and for

some unknown reason lost his balance. This resulted in injury to left hand

thumb.

2. 2004 - A Utility was paying out a fire wire when wire ran away and resultant

surge in wire pulled out the bights of wire on deck which whip-lashed and

struck the Utility in the lower abdomen. The Utility was hospitalized for

swelling and bleeding of genital area with severe pain, resulting in a lost

time injury.

3. 2005 - An experienced employee stepped over a fire wire to look more

closely at why it was not running out. The fire wire became freed and

pinned the employee’s foot and ankle against a bitt, resulting in a broken

leg and lost time injury.

4. 2005 - Three deckhands and one officer were about to make fast the fire

wire. While lowering the fire wire, the person who payed out the wire lost

control of it. The weight of the wire which had already been payed out over

the ship’s side suddenly become too much for him – and by the time he

realized this it was far too late to call the others for help. The wire started to

run out in an uncontrolled manner. When the whole length of the wire had

passed out it came to rest, stopped by the eye at the end of the wire.

Nobody was hit by the running wire, and there was no damage to the

material. The person paying out the wire realized his limitations too late –

and gave no kind of signal until it was too late. One AB and the officer were

standby to assist him – but it didn’t seem that any help was needed.

5. 2005 - During arranging of fire wire, the weak link that held the wire broke

due to a sudden movement of the wire. It hit a crewmember causing injury



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requiring 5 stitches to his left leg. At the same time, his leg hit the Panama

chock causing a significant inflammation.

6. 2006 - After unmooring operation at SPM, two of ship crew members

commenced securing of fwd fire wire. A lost time accident happened when

the crew member lowered down the loop/slack of the fire wire hanging on

the ship side. The rope which is tied to the fire wire for adjusting the height

of the wire above sea level, slipped from his hand and got tangled around

his wrist. As this rope is made fast and slacked from a pulley, crew member

struck his hand against the pulley. The wounded crew member was given

first aid and sent off duty for observation. After further examine of crew

members hand and medical advice over radio, rescue helicopter was

requested. The crewmember had sustained a lost time injury.

7. 2006 - During recovering of the fire wire a crewmember was guiding the

wire, which was lying on deck, onto the winch. A sudden unfolding of a tight

bend on the wire in front of him, resulted in hitting the crewmember in the

face/mouth.

8. 2005 - While lowering the aft fire wire, the wire ran out some length. This

happened in spite of crew having taken a figure 8 turn before slacking wire.

Three (3) workers experienced lost time injuries.

9. 2003 - When deploying the fire wire over the side of the ship, the wire

bounced on the deck and hit a crewmember on the right shin. Crew

member received a small abrasion, slight swelling and pain from injury. First

aid was administered onboard however the crewmember was sent ashore

for follow up medical attention 2 days later and was found unfit for duty.

10. 2005 - While tending a fire wire at Port of Jose, VZ, a crewmember suffered

a fracture and minor laceration to his lower leg. The vessel was loading

and the crewmember was adjusting the height of the fire wire so the eye of

the wire was approx 2 meters above the sea surface. The stopper /

preventer mechanism failed allowing the unsecured wire on the deck to

move suddenly, catching the crewmember’s leg and resulting in him being

thrown to the deck.

11. 2007 - On October 11, after the vessel had been made fast, the forward

mooring gang proceeded to prepare the vessel for cargo operations. One of

the operations was to lower and set the fire wire over the side of the vessel.

Whilst the fire wire was being lowered the slack wire on the deck was

incorrectly left unsecured and the fire wire ran over the side in an

uncontrolled fashion. The cadet was standing near to the slack wire and

was struck whilst he tried to get himself out of the way of the fast moving

wire. The wire striking the cadet caused him to become unbalanced and he

fell to the deck landing on and fracturing his right wrist.

12. 2008 - The 2nd Officer suffered an injury during the securing of a fire wire.

The 4th ring finger of the right hand was partially amputated.

13. 2007 - A fire wire ran out crushing a Deck/Engine Utility’s right ankle and

lower leg between the wire and a bitt resulting in a broken leg.



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10.3. Restricted (Recordable Injury) Work Cases

1. 2006 - Restricted (Recordable) Work Day Case - Crewmember strained shoulder while setting the forward fire wire. The crewmember was holding the wire and in the process of tying a stopper on the wire when the other end was let go by the Bo’s’un, who had not first verified if all was clear and everyone ready, causing the wire to run out. The sudden motion of the wire wrenched his shoulder. Crewmember was sent to the doctor and returned fit for duty with restricted work, rest / light duty for 2 days.

2. 2006 - While the new pumpman and an AB were rigging the fire wire aft, the rope stopper parted and the slack on the wire ran out striking the pumpman on the shin of the left leg causing a minor wound. The crew had just moored the vessel.

10.4. First Aid Cases

1. 2006 - After completing un-mooring, the fire wire was retrieved. The person releasing the wire let off to many turns on the bollard while there was still too much slack on the rope-stopper. This resulted in an uncontrolled release of the wire, about 50cm rushed out.

2. 2006 - While transferring fire wire, one crew member was tripped over

because his boiler suit stuck on the stanchion securing post, luckily the crew member did not suffer from loss time injury.

3. 2006 - While rigging the fire wire which had been recently greased, the wire

was being lowered the grease flew off and the crew member got some grease on/ near the eye and face, he was not wearing Safety glasses.

4. 2006 - While securing the fire wire and removing turns from the bitt, the wire

jumped & slipped on the bitt hitting the right leg of third officer causing a minor cut.

5. 2007 - Vessel was to send life rafts for service on arrival. Accordingly crew

was in the process of shifting the forward life raft aft. After securing the life raft on the trolley the crewmember decided to push the trolley unaccompanied by the bo’s’un who had gone down to the fore peak store. The crewmember then had to navigate the trolley over the laid out fire wire. He held the trolley with one foot acting as a stopper and used his hands to lift the fire wire over the trolley. At this point of time the vessel rolled and the crewmember lost control of the trolley. It went rolling towards the trolley uncontrollably and was stopped by the railings of the vessel. Immediately the duty officer called the B’o’sun on the UHF and informed him of the on goings. The Bo’s’un stopped the AB and asked for one other crew to assist in the job.

6. 2005 - First Aid Case - Crew member punctured left hand from handling fire

wire fish hook. The wire had a frayed wire which punctured his gloves and cut his hand. Crew member was sent to hospital, received tetanus shot and antibiotics. Crew member returned back to vessel and was able to resume normal duties.



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10.5. Near Misses

1. 2006 - While securing a Fire Wire from bitts, the loop of the wire unexpectedly rolled over missing the crew member slightly. Had it hit the crewmember, result could have been quite serious.

2. 2005 - Taking in the fire wire before departure. When taking of the wire from

the bitt, it was 2 man doing this operation The fire wire was secured on the mooring winch and when the last loop on the bitt was taken off the fire wire slipped due to the stopper did not manage to hold the weight of the wire and started running out in a uncontrolled manner. When the whole length of wire had passed out it was stopped by the eye at the end of wire.

3. 2006 - During mooring operation the second officer was not present when

rigging of fire wire was being carried out since he had to attend to some other duty, the task also given to riding crew. Since Terminal required to have 2 Mooring Teams, assistance was given by Riding Team, who should have been utilized only for Manning the Mooring Winch Controls and not engaged in Rigging Fire Fires after completion of Mooring Ops. Fire wires can be dangerous and should not be handled by untrained riding crew members.

4. 2006 - While fixing fire wire one turn of figure of eight jumped off from bitts

and could have caused injuries to a crew member but being vigilant he safely cleared himself from jumping part of the fire wire. This turn was jumped off the bitts because there was twist in the wire before taking figure of eight on bitts.

5. 2006 - While transferring fire wire, one crewmember tripped because his

boiler suit stuck on the stanchion securing post.



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11. APPENDIX D: Typical Fire Wire Incident Investigation



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12. APPENDIX E: Typical Deploying ETOPS Job Safety Analysis (JSA)



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13. APPENDIX F: NTSB and MAIB Incident Report References

13.1. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) - USA

http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/M_Acc.htm

Title: Engineroom Fire on Board the Liberian Tankship Seal Island while Moored at the Amerada Hess Oil Terminal in St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands October 8, 1994

NTSB Report Number: MAR-95-04, adopted on 12/12/1995

NTIS Report Number: PB95-916404 (At Port)

Title: Explosion and Fire on Board the U.S. Tankship OMI Charger at Galveston, Texas October 9, 1993.



Title: Explosion and Fire Aboard the U.S. Tankship Jupiter Bay City, Michigan September 16,1990.


NTIS Report Number: PB91-916404

Title: Explosion aboard the Maltese Tank Vessel Fiona in Long Island Sound near Northport, New York, August 31, 1988.



Title: Explosion and Fire Aboard The U.S. Tank Barge STC 410 at The Steuart Petroleum Company Facility Piney Point, Maryland December 20, 1986.



Title: Fires on Board the Panamanian Tank Ship Shoun Vanguard and The U.S. Tank Barge Hollywood 3013 Deer Park, Texas October 7, 1986.



Title: Explosions and Fires Aboard the U.S. Tankship Omi Yukon in the Pacific Ocean About 1,000 Miles West of Honolulu, Hawaii October 28, 1986.





13-2

Title: Explosion Aboard the U.S. Tank Barge TTT 103 Pascagoula, Mississippi July 31, 1986.



Title: Explosion and Sinking of the United States Tankship SS American Eagle, Gulf of Mexico, February 26 and 27, 1984.



Title: Explosions and Fire on Board the U.S. Tankship SS Golden Dolphin in the Atlantic Ocean, March 6, 1982.



Title: Explosion and Fire on Board the U.S. Tankship Monticello Victory, Port Arthur, Texas, May 31, 1981.



Title: Liberian Tank Vessel M/V Seatiger Explosion and Fire Sun Oil Terminal Nederland, Texas, April 19, 1979.



Title: Liberian Tankship SS Sansinena Explosion and Fire, Union Oil Terminal Berth 46, Los Angeles, California, December 17, 1976.


NTIS Report Number: PB-293268/AS (At Port)

Title: M/T Elias Explosion and Fire at the Atlantic Richfield Company Fort Mifflin Terminal, Delaware River, Pennsylvania, April 9, 1974.


NTIS Report Number: PB-282425/AS (At Port)

Title: Tank Barge Ocean 80, Fire and Explosions, Carteret, New Jersey, October 25, 1972.


NTIS Report Number: AD-A011033



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13.2. Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) UK

http://www.maib.gov.uk/publications/investigation_reports.cfm

Esso Mersey Published 1993

Motor tanker Explosion resulting in the loss of two lives

(At Port) 04/09/91

Esso Mersey re-opened

inquiry Published 1996

Motor Tanker Explosion resulting in the loss of two lives

(At Port) 04/09/91

Multi-tank Ascania

(No 22/2000)

Chemical tanker Fire on board 19/03/99

Border Heather (No 5/2006)

Tanker Explosion and fire

(At Port) 31/10/05

Hilli (No 4/2007)

Liquid Natural Gas tanker

Explosion resulting in one fatal and one serious injury (At Port)

10/10/03



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14. APPENDIX G: Human Factors REBA Fire Wire Analysis

14.1. Approach

A manual handling assessment was undertaken to provide insight into the manual handling risks associated with use of the fire wires. This assessment was undertaken using the Rapid Entire Body Assessment (REBA) methodology15. The method uses a scoring system based on the position of body parts and then combines these scores to provide an overall risk rating for that posture. The assessment includes:

o Scoring the trunk, neck and legs o Scoring the upper arms, lower arms, and wrists (for left and right sides of the body) o Scoring the load / force and coupling factors.

Video footage was used as the basis for this assessment. A selection of assessments was undertaken based on the activities in the task analysis. All activities that could pose a manual handling issue were assessed.

14.2. Findings

Essentially the use of REBA demonstrated that the manual handling risk presented in using the fire wires is related to the following activities; each of the following was rating as ‘medium risk’ in the REBA method:

1. Feed the loop of the fire wire through the wire guide 2. Lift/pull wire over bollard 3. Push wire into position between bollards 4. Feed the loop of the fire wire through the wire guide 5. Loop the fire wire over the bollards (in a figure 8 pattern) - Lift/pull wire over bollard 6. Loop the fire wire over the bollards (in a figure 8 pattern) - Bend wire around bollard 7. Loop the fire wire over the bollards (in a figure 8 pattern) - Push wire into position

between bollards. A full list of the findings is provided in Table 1 below. The REBA data sheets are provided at the end of the appendix.

Table 4 Results from REBA analyses

Type of fire wire arrangements

Task REBA risk rating

Fire wires permanently stowed on a mechanical winch

Pull wire across the deck towards the wire guide (2 people)

Low

Feed the loop of the fire wire through the wire guide Medium

Loop the fire wire over the bollards (in a figure 8 pattern) - Pull slack wire from winch

Low

Fire wires permanently stowed on bollards on the deck

Lift/pull wire over bollard Medium

Bend wire around bollard Medium

Push wire into position between bollards Medium

15

Sue Hignett and Lynn McAtamney, Rapid entire body assessment (REBA); Applied Ergonomics. 31:201-205, 2000



14-2

Type of fire wire arrangements

Task REBA risk rating

Position the fire wire so that it is opposite the wire guide

Low

Feed the loop of the fire wire through the wire guide Medium

Loop the fire wire over the bollards (in a figure 8 pattern) - Move wire to be close to bollards

Low

Loop the fire wire over the bollards (in a figure 8 pattern) - Lift/pull wire over bollard

Medium

Loop the fire wire over the bollards (in a figure 8 pattern) - Bend wire around bollard

Medium

Loop the fire wire over the bollards (in a figure 8 pattern) - Push wire into position between bollards

Medium

The medium risk rating suggests that while the tasks are not considered to be high risk, they can be improved. With the exception of task 1, the issues are associated with man-handling the wire over and between the bollards on deck. That there are issues associated with both feeding the loop through the wire guide and with bending the wire around the bollards suggests that there is an issue associated with the flexibility of the wire/cable.

14.3. Suggested improvements

That the highest risk identified is ‘medium’ it suggests that while there are risks present they are not calling for immediate or drastic action. However, there are risks presents and it would be beneficial to reduce these risks. Therefore the following improvements are suggested for consideration:

1. Remove the activity, thus removing the hazards. Note that the major hazard risks that the fire wires system is designed to manage must be still be adequately controlled if this system is removed.

2. Assuming the fire wire system remains in place ….

3. Increase the flexibility of the ‘wire’ being used to reduce the physical stresses associated with feeding it through the guide wire and bending it around the bollards.

4. Reduce the height of the bollards to reduce the physical strain associated with lifting the wires over them. This should only be implemented if the effectiveness of the system will not be compromised through having shorter bollards.

14.4. REBA Worksheets

The REBA worksheets for each of the analyses undertaken are presented below. Assumptions made (due to lack of information available) are noted on the worksheets.



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Activties to which this REBA worksheet applies: Pull wire across the deck towards the wire

guide (2 people), Pull slack wire from winch, Pull wires away from bollards, Move wire to be

close to bollards

Group A ADJUSTMENTS TOTALS

Trunk 1

Upright 1

Flexion: 0-20°

Extension: 0-20°2

Flexion: 20-60°

Extension: >20°3

Flexion: >60° 4

Neck 1

Flexion: 0-20° 1

Flexion: >20°

Extension: >20°2

Legs 1

Bilateral weight bearing. Walk; sit 1

Unilaterlar weight bearing; unstable 2

Score from Table A 111 1

Load/ force 2

<5kg 0

5-10kg 1

>10kg 2 Assumption!

Score A (Score from table A + Load/force

score)3

Group B

Uper arms (shoulders) 2 2

Flexion: 0-20°

Extension: 0-20°1

left right

Flexion: 20-45°

Extension: >20°2

Flexion: 45-90° 3

Flexion: >90° 4

Lower arms (elbows) 1 1

Flexion 60-100° 1 left right

Flexion: <60°

Extension: >100°2

Wrists 1 1

Flexion: 0-15°

Extension: 0-15°1

left right

Flexion: >15°

Extension: >15°2

Score from table B 211 211 1 1

L R left right

Coupling 0 0

Good 0 left right

Fair 1

Poor 2

Unacceptable 3

Score B (Score from table B + Coupling

score)

1 1

left right

Score C 31 31 2 2

Activity 0 0

One or more body parts are static for longer

than 1 minute1

left right

Repeat small range motions, more than 4 per

minute1

Rapid large changes in posture or unstable

base1

REBA score (score C + Activity score) 2 2

left right

REBA decision (risk) 2 Low

Wrist deviated/ twisted: +1

Arm abducted/ rotated: +1

Shoulder raised: +1

Arm supported: 1

Shock or rapid build up: +1

If back is twisted or titled to side: +1

If neck is twisted or tilted to side: +1

Knee flexion 30-60°: +1

Knees flexion >60°: +2



14-4

Activties to which this REBA worksheet applies: Feed the loop of the fire

wire through the wire guide


Trunk 3

Upright 1

Flexion: 0-20°

Extension: 0-20°2

Flexion: 20-60°

Extension: >20°3

Flexion: >60° 4

Neck 1

Flexion: 0-20° 1

Flexion: >20°

Extension: >20°2

Legs 1

Bilateral weight bearing.

Walk; sit1

Unilaterlar weight bearing;

unstable2


Load/ force 2

<5kg 0

5-10kg 1

>10kg 2 Assumption!

Score A (Score from table A +

Load/force score)4

Group B


Flexion: 0-20°

Extension: 0-20°1

left right

Flexion: 20-45°

Extension: >20°2

Flexion: 45-90° 3

Flexion: >90° 4



Flexion: <60°

Extension: >100°2

Wrists 1 1

Flexion: 0-15°

Extension: 0-15°1

left right

Flexion: >15°

Extension: >15°2


L R left right

Coupling 0 0

Good 0 left right

Fair 1

Poor 2

Unacceptable 3

Score B (Score from table B +

Coupling score)

1 1

left right

Score C 41 41 3 3

Activity 1 1

One or more body parts are

static for longer than 1 minute 1

left right

Repeat small range motions,

more than 4 per minute 1

Rapid large changes in

posture or unstable base1

REBA score (score C +

Activity score)

4 4

left right

REBA decision (risk) 4 Medium



Shoulder raised: +1

Arm supported: 1


If back is twisted or titled to

side: +1

If neck is twisted or tilted to

side: +1





14-5

Activty to which this REBA worksheet applies: Bend wire around bollard


Trunk 3

Upright1

Flexion: 0-20°

Extension: 0-20°2

Flexion: 20-60°

Extension: >20°3

Flexion: >60° 4

Neck 1

Flexion: 0-20° 1

Flexion: >20°

Extension: >20°2

Legs 1


Walk; sit1


unstable2


Load/ force 2

<5kg 0

5-10kg 1

>10kg 2 Assumption!


Load/force score)4

Group B


Flexion: 0-20°

Extension: 0-20°1

left right

Flexion: 20-45°

Extension: >20°2

Flexion: 45-90° 3

Flexion: >90° 4



Flexion: <60°

Extension: >100°2

Wrists 1 2

Flexion: 0-15°

Extension: 0-15°1

left right

Flexion: >15°

Extension: >15°2


L R left right

Coupling 0 0

Good 0 left right

Fair 1

Poor 2

Unacceptable 3


Coupling score)

1 5

left right

Score C 41 45 3 5

Activity 0 0



left right






Activity score)

3 5

left right




Shoulder raised: +1

Arm supported: 1



side: +1


side: +1





14-6

Activty to which this REBA worksheet applies: Lift/pull wire over bollard

(when wire stored on reel)


Trunk 2

Upright1

Flexion: 0-20°

Extension: 0-20°2

Flexion: 20-60°

Extension: >20°3

Flexion: >60° 4

Neck 1

Flexion: 0-20° 1

Flexion: >20°

Extension: >20°2

Legs 1


Walk; sit1


unstable2


Load/ force 2 Assumption!

<5kg 0

5-10kg 1

>10kg 2


Load/force score)4

Group B


Flexion: 0-20°

Extension: 0-20°1

left right

Flexion: 20-45°

Extension: >20°2

Flexion: 45-90° 3

Flexion: >90° 4



Flexion: <60°

Extension: >100°2

Wrists 1 1

Flexion: 0-15°

Extension: 0-15°1

left right

Flexion: >15°

Extension: >15°2


L R left right

Coupling 0 0

Good 0 left right

Fair 1

Poor 2

Unacceptable 3


Coupling score)

3 3

left right

Score C 43 43 4 4

Activity 0 0



left right






Activity score)

4 4

left right




Shoulder raised: +1

Arm supported: 1



side: +1


side: +1





14-7

Activty to which this REBA worksheet applies: Lift/pull wire over bollard

(when wire stored on bollard)


Trunk 3

Upright1

Flexion: 0-20°

Extension: 0-20°2

Flexion: 20-60°

Extension: >20°3

Flexion: >60° 4

Neck 1

Flexion: 0-20° 1

Flexion: >20°

Extension: >20°2

Legs 1


Walk; sit1


unstable2


Load/ force 2

<5kg 0

5-10kg 1

>10kg 2 Assumption!


Load/force score)4

Group B


Flexion: 0-20°

Extension: 0-20°1

left right

Flexion: 20-45°

Extension: >20°2

Flexion: 45-90° 3

Flexion: >90° 4



Flexion: <60°

Extension: >100°2

Wrists 1 1

Flexion: 0-15°

Extension: 0-15°1

left right

Flexion: >15°

Extension: >15°2


L R left right

Coupling 0 0

Good 0 left right

Fair 1

Poor 2

Unacceptable 3


Coupling score)

2 2

left right

Score C 42 42 4 4

Activity 0 0



left right






Activity score)

4 4

left right




Shoulder raised: +1

Arm supported: 1



side: +1


side: +1





14-8

Activty to which this REBA worksheet applies: Push wire between bollards


Trunk 4

Upright1

Flexion: 0-20°

Extension: 0-20°2

Flexion: 20-60°

Extension: >20°3

Flexion: >60° 4

Neck 1

Flexion: 0-20° 1

Flexion: >20°

Extension: >20°2

Legs 3


Walk; sit1


unstable2


Load/ force 0

<5kg 0

5-10kg 1

>10kg 2 Assumption!


Load/force score)6

Group B


Flexion: 0-20°

Extension: 0-20°1

left right

Flexion: 20-45°

Extension: >20°2

Flexion: 45-90° 3

Flexion: >90° 4



Flexion: <60°

Extension: >100°2

Wrists 1 1

Flexion: 0-15°

Extension: 0-15°1

left right

Flexion: >15°

Extension: >15°2


L R left right

Coupling 0 0

Good 0 left right

Fair 1

Poor 2

Unacceptable 3


Coupling score)

1 1

left right

Score C 61 61 6 6

Activity 0 0



left right






Activity score)

6 6

left right




Shoulder raised: +1

Arm supported: 1



side: +1


side: +1





14-9


Lloyd’s Register North America Inc.

Lloyd’s Register EMEA

T +44 (0)1224 267400

F +44 (0)1224 267401

E [email protected]

Denburn House

25 Union Terrace

Aberdeen AB10 1NN, UK

Lloyd’s Register Asia

T

F

E

Suite 3501 China Merchants Tower

Shun Tak Centre

168

Hong Kong, SAR of PRC

June 2006

Services are provided by members of the Lloyd’s Register Group.

Lloyd’s Register, Lloyd’s Register EMEA and Lloy

are exempt charities under the UK Charities Act 1993.

www.lr.org

S E R V I C E S

29/10/2009

Lloyd’s Register Asia

T +852 2287 9333

F +852 2526 2921

E [email protected]

Suite 3501 China Merchants Tower

Shun Tak Centre

168-200 Connaught Road Central

Hong Kong, SAR of PRC

Lloyd’s Register Americas, Inc

T +1 (1)281 675 3100

F +1 (1)281 675 3139

E [email protected]

1401 Enclave Parkway, Suite 200

Houston, Texas, 77077, USA

Services are provided by members of the Lloyd’s Register Group.

Lloyd’s Register, Lloyd’s Register EMEA and Lloyd’s Register Asia

are exempt charities under the UK Charities Act 1993.

Lloyd’s Register Americas, Inc

+1 (1)281 675 3100

+1 (1)281 675 3139

[email protected]

1401 Enclave Parkway, Suite 200

n, Texas, 77077, USA

OCIMF Position Paper Lloyd_s Register Risk Assessment of ETOPS Onboard Tank Vessels Final 131109

Documents

etops hazard assessment

party risk assessment

practicality of etops

oil products

membership of ocimf

ocimf ports

ocimf mission

emergency towing