Oblicon p6-12 Readings

8/3/2019 Oblicon p6-12 Readings

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administration of justice. He also violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04 of theCode, as well as a lawyers mandate to delay no man for money or malice.

The Court reminds that its foregoing observations on the deleterious effects of forum

shopping did not apply only to Atty. Guerrero, but also to the petitioner as the client whom he

represented. Thus, this decision becomes a good occasion to warn both the petitioner and her

attorney that another attempt by them to revive the issue of Ramonas lack of qualification to

own the land will be swiftly and condignly sanctioned.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorariis denied, and the decision

dated December 5, 2000 promulgated in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 55576 is affirmed.

Costs to be paid by the petitioner.


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matter of the contract of sale is goods,[22] but also to other kinds of property, including realproperty.

[23]

There is also no merit in petitioners' contention that since the lots were owned by themunicipality at the time of the sale, they were outside the commerce of men under Article 1409(4) of the NCC;

[24]thus, the contract involving the same is inexistent and void from the

beginning. However, nowhere in Article 1409 (4) is it provided that the properties of a

municipality, whether it be those for public use or its patrimonial property [25] are outside thecommerce of men. Besides, the lots in this case were conditionally owned by themunicipality. To rule that the donated properties are outside the commerce of men wouldrender nugatory the unchallenged reasonableness and justness of the condition which thedonor has the right to impose as owner thereof. Moreover, the objects referred to as outsidesthe commerce of man are those which cannot be appropriated, such as the open seas and theheavenly bodies.

With respect to the trial courts award of attorneys fees, litigation expenses and moraldamages, there is neither factual nor legal basis thereof. Attorneys fees and expenses of

litigation cannot, following the general rule in Article 2208 of the New Civil Code, be recoveredin this case, there being no stipulation to that effect and the case does not fall under any of theexceptions.[26] It cannot be said that private respondents had compelled petitioners to litigatewith third persons. Neither can it be ruled that the former acted in gross and evident badfaith in refusing to satisfy the latters claims considering that private respondents were underan honest belief that they have a legal right over the property by virtue of the deed ofsale. Moral damages cannot likewise be justified as none of the circumstances enumeratedunder Articles 2219[27] and 2220[28] of the New Civil Code concur in this case.

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the foregoing, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is

AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Melo (Acting Chairman), Puno, andMendoza, JJ., concur.


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In the first ejectment case, the cause of action was private respondent's refusal to comply withthe lease contract which expired on December 31, 1978. In the present case, the cause ofaction is a similar refusal but with respect to the lease which expired in October, 1985 underthe compromise agreement. While the compromise agreement may be res judicata as far asthe cause of action and issues in the first ejectment case is concerned, any cause of action thatarises from the application or violation of the compromise agreement cannot be said to havebeen settled in said first case. The compromise agreement was meant to settle, as it did onlysettle, the first case. It did not, as it could not, cover any cause of action that might arisethereafter, like the present case which was founded on the expiration of the lease in 1985,which necessarily requires a different set of evidence. The fact that the compromise agreementwas judicially approved does not foreclose any cause of action arising from a violation of theterms thereof.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Privaterespondent is hereby ordered to immediately vacate and return the possession of the leasedpremises subject of the present action to petitioner and to pay the monthly rentals due thereon

in accordance with the compromise agreement until he shall have actually vacated the same.This judgment is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla andSarmiento, JJ., Concur.


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In the first ejectment case, the cause of action was private respondent's refusal to comply withthe lease contract which expired on December 31, 1978. In the present case, the cause ofaction is a similar refusal but with respect to the lease which expired in October, 1985 underthe compromise agreement. While the compromise agreement may be res judicata as far asthe cause of action and issues in the first ejectment case is concerned, any cause of action thatarises from the application or violation of the compromise agreement cannot be said to havebeen settled in said first case. The compromise agreement was meant to settle, as it did onlysettle, the first case. It did not, as it could not, cover any cause of action that might arisethereafter, like the present case which was founded on the expiration of the lease in 1985,which necessarily requires a different set of evidence. The fact that the compromise agreementwas judicially approved does not foreclose any cause of action arising from a violation of theterms thereof.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Privaterespondent is hereby ordered to immediately vacate and return the possession of the leasedpremises subject of the present action to petitioner and to pay the monthly rentals due thereon

in accordance with the compromise agreement until he shall have actually vacated the same.This judgment is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla andSarmiento, JJ., Concur.


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The question of the priority of the record of the sheriff's sales over that of the sale from


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Belisario to Borja is extensively argued in the briefs, but from our point of view is of noimportance; void sheriff's or execution sales cannot be validated through inscription in theMortgage Law registry.

The opposition of Adelina Ferrer must also be overruled. She maintained that the land inquestion was community property of the marriage of Eulalio Belisario and Paula Ira: that uponthe death of Paula Ira inealed from is modified, and the defendant Mr. Vicente Sotelo Matti,sentenced to accept and receive from the plaintiff the tanks, the expellers and the motors inquestion, and to pay the plaintiff the sum of ninety-six thousand pesos (P96,000), with legalinterest thereon from July 17, 1919, the date of the filing of the complaint, until fully paid, andthe costs of both instances. So ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor,Ostrand, and Johns, JJ., concur.


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(f) ORDERING petitioners to respect the right of the Department of Public Works andHighways to its lease contract until the expiration of the lease period; and


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(g) DELETING the award of P60,000.00 for attorneys fees and P15,000.00 forlitigation expenses against respondent MCIAA and in favor of petitioners.

This Decision is without prejudice to the claim of intervenor one Richard E. Enchuan on hisallegation that he acquired through deeds of assignment the rights of some of hereinpetitioners over Lots Nos. 916 and 920.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, and Tinga, JJ., concur.


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and should be complied with in good faith." The petitioner has ignored these exhortations andis therefore not entitled to the relief he seeks.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition for review isDENIED, with costs against the petitioner. For deliberately changing the language of Section6(b), paragraph 3, of P.D. No. 1746, Atty. Gregorio B. Escasinas is hereby fined P1,000.00, withthe warning that repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely. It is soordered. Concur.


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There is merit in the claim that the interests the plaintiff should pay on the obligationshould be counted from the date plaintiff has ceased to pay said interests, or fromAugust 6, 1944. This should be corrected.

We find no reason to disturb the finding of this Court in so far as the penal clause isconcerned. All things considered, this finding should be maintained.

Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration filed by the plaintiff is denied.

The motion for reconsideration filed by the defendant is also denied. However, thedispositive part of the decision rendered in this case should be modified as follows:


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In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from should be modified in the senseof ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant Syjuco the sum of P216,000, Philippinecurrency, value of two promissory notes, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum from August 6, 1944, up to May 5, 1949, and with similar interestfrom May 6, 1949 until said amount is paid in full. It is further ordered that should the

amount of this judgment principal and interests, be not paid within ninety (90)days from the date this judgment becomes final, the properties mortgaged should besold at public auction, and the proceeds applied to the payment of this judgment inaccordance with law, with costs against the plaintiff.

However, this judgment shall be held in abeyance, or no order for the executionthereof shall be issued, until after the moratorium orders shall have been lifted.

The Chief Justice and Justices Pablo and Padilla dissented and voted also to let the case be setfor hearing.


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contract of lease cannot be made to depend exclusively upon the free and uncontrolled choiceof the lessee between continuing the payment of the rentals or not, completely depriving theowner of any say in the matter. Mutuality does not obtain in such a contract of lease and noequality exists between the lessor and the lessee since the life of the contract would bedictated solely by the lessee.

21

After the lease terminated on 1 June 1994 without any agreement for renewal being reached,petitioner became subject to ejectment from the premises. 22 It must be noted, however, thatprivate respondents did not include in their Answer with Counterclaim a prayer for therestoration of possession of the leased premises. Neither did they file with the properMetropolitan Trial Court an unlawful detainer suit

2against petitioner after the expiration of

the lease contact. Moreover, the issues agreed upon by the parties to be resolved during thei l h i i f h d h lidi f i d '


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pre-trial were the correct interpretation of the contract and the validity of private respondents'refusal to accept petitioner's payment of P400 as monthly rental.

24They later limited the issue

to the first, i.e., the correct interpretation of the contract. 25 The issue of possession of theleased premises was not among the issues agreed upon by the parties or threshed out beforethe court a quo. Neither was it raised by private respondents on appeal.

Accordingly, as correctly contended by the petitioner, the Court of Appeals went beyond thebounds of its authority 26 when after interpreting the questioned provision of the lease contractin favor of the private respondents it proceeded to order petitioner to vacate the subjectpremises.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partly GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court ofAppeals is REVERSED insofar as it ordered the petitioner to immediately vacate the leasedpremises, without prejudice, however, to the filing by the private respondents of an action forthe recovery of possession of the subject property.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.


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While a guarantor may bind himself solidarily with the principal debtor, the liability of aguarantor is different from that of a solidary debtor. Thus, Tolentino explains:

A guarantor who binds himself in solidum with the principal debtor under the provisions of thesecond paragraph does not become a solidary co-debtor to all intents and purposes. There is adifference between a solidary co-debtor, and a fiador in solidum (surety). The later, outside ofthe liability he assumes to pay the debt before the property of the principal debtor has beenexhausted, retains all the other rights, actions and benefits which pertain to him by reason ofrights than those bestowed upon him in Section 4, Chapter 3, title I, Book IV of the Civil Code.

Section 4, Chapter 3, Title I, Book IV of the Civil Code states the law on joint and severalobligations. Under Art. 1207 thereof, when there are two or more debtors in one and the sameobligation, the presumption is that obligation is joint so that each of the debtors is liable onlyfor a proportionate part of the debt. There is a solidarily liability only when he obligation


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expressly so states, when the law so provides or when the nature of the obligation so requires.

Because the promissory note involved in this case expressly states that the three signatoriestherein are jointly and severally liable, any one, some or all of them may be proceeded against

for the entire obligation. The choice is left to the solidary creditor to determine againstwhom he will enforce collection.

Consequently, the dismissal of the case against Judge Pontanosas may not be deemed ashaving discharged petitioner from liability as well. As regards Nayve, suffice it to say that thecourt never acquired jurisdiction over him. Petitioner, therefore, may only have recourseagainst his co-makers, as provided by law.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is here DENIED and the questioned

Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.


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Oblicon p6-12 Readings

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