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BOOK IV
OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS
TITLE I — OBLIGATIONS
CHAPTER 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1156. An obligation is a juridical
necessity to
give, to do or not to do.1
Concept of Obligations. — Evidently, the above
definition of
an obligation is adopted from Sanchez Roman’s classic definition
of
an obligation as “the juridical necessity to comply with a
prestation.”2
Manresa, on the other hand, defines it as a “legal relation
established
between one person and another, whereby the latter is bound to
the
fulfillment of a prestation which the former may demand of
him.’’3
It must be observed, however, that obligations may be
either
civil or natural.4 A civil obligation is one which has a
binding force inlaw, and which gives to the obligee or creditor the
right of enforcing it
against the obligor or debtor in a court of justice. This is the
obligation
which is defined in Art. 1156 of the Code. A natural obligation,
on
the other hand, is one which cannot be enforced by action, but
which
is binding on the party who makes it in conscience and according
to
1New provision.24 Sanchez Roman 53.38 Manresa, 5th Ed., Bk. 1,
p. 21.4 Art. 1423, Civil Code.
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OBLIGATIONS
the natural law.5 Thus, when an action has prescribed in
accordance
with the statute of limitations, a natural obligation still
subsists,
although the civil obligation is extinguished. This may be
illustratedby the following example: If A has a right of
action, evidenced by
a promissory note, to collect one thousand pesos from B,
and such
promissory note prescribes after the expiration of ten years
from
the time it accrues,6 although the latter is no longer
bound to pay
the obligation in accordance with the statute of limitations, he
is
still bound to pay in accordance with equity and natural
law.7 It is,
therefore, clear that a civil obligation and a natural
obligation may
be distinguished from each other as follows:
(1) A civil obligation is based on positive law, while a
natural
obligation is based on equity and natural law; and
(2) The former is enforceable in courts of justice, while
the
latter is not.8
Requisites of Obligations. — An obligation has four
essential
requisites. They are:
(1) A juridical or legal tie, which binds the parties to
the
obligation, and which may arise from either bilateral or
unilateralacts of persons;
(2) An active subject known as the obligee or creditor, who
can demand the fulfillment of the obligation;
(3) A passive subject known as the obligor or debtor,
against
whom the obligation is juridically demandable; and
(4) The fact, prestation or service which constitutes the
object
of the obligation.9
The form in which the obligation is manifested is
sometimes
added as a fifth requisite. As a general rule, however, it
cannot be
considered as essential. Obligations arising from law,
quasi-con-
tracts, acts or omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts do
not
require any form whatsoever, yet there can be no question
regard-
53 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 2394-2395.6 Art. 1144, Civil
Code.7 Agoncillo vs. Javier, 38 Phil. 424; Villaroel vs.
Estrada, 71 Phil. 40.8 Art. 1423, Civil Code.9Giorgi, Teoria
de las Obligaciones, Vol. 1, p. 13; 3 Castan, 7th Ed., p. 20.
Art. 1156
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ing their validity or binding force. It is only in obligations
arising
from certain contracts that it becomes essential. Thus, in a
con-
tract involving a donation of personal property whose value
exceedsP5,000.00, the law requires that the donation and the
acceptance
shall be made in writing;10 in a contract of sale of a
piece of land or
any interest therein through an agent, the law requires that
the
authority of the latter shall be in writing;11 in a
contract of simple
loan or mutuum, the law requires that any agreement with
respect
to interest shall be expressly stipulated in writing;12 in
a contract of
antichresis, the law requires that the amount of the principal
and
of the interest shall be specified in writing;13 in a
contract involving
a donation of immovable property, the law requires that the
dona-tion shall be made in a public document, while the acceptance
shall
be made either in the same deed of donation or in a separate
public
document;14 in a contract of partnership where immovable
property
or real rights are contributed to the common fund, the law
requires
that the contract shall be in a public instrument to which an
inven-
tory of the property or real rights, signed by the partners,
must be
attached;15 in a contract of chattel mortgage, the law
requires that
the personal property which is the subject matter of the
contract
shall be recorded in the Chattel Mortgage Register as a
securityfor the performance of an obligation;16 and in a
contract involving
the sale or transfer of large cattle, the law requires that the
sale or
transfer shall be registered.17 Non-compliance with such
formalities
would have the effect of rendering the contract or agreement
void or
inexistent.
Classification of Obligations. — The following is the
primary
classification of obligations under the Civil Code:
(1) Pure and conditional (Arts. 1179-1192).
(2) With a period (Arts. 1193-1198).
(3) Alternative and facultative (Arts. 1199-1206).
10 Art. 748, Civil Code.11 Art. 1874, Civil
Code.12 Art. 1956, Civil Code.13 Art. 2134, Civil
Code.14 Art. 749, Civil Code.15 Arts. 1771, 1773, Civil
Code.16 Art. 2140, Civil Code.17Sec. 22, Act No. 1147; Art.
1581, Civil Code.
GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1156
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OBLIGATIONS
(4) Joint and solidary (Arts. 1207-1222).
(5) Divisible and indivisible (Arts. 1223-1225).(6) With a penal
clause (Arts. 1226-1230).
There are, however, other classifications of a secondary
char-
acter which can be gathered from scattered provisions of the
Civil
Code, such as:
(1) Legal, conventional and penal;18
(2) Real and personal;19
(3) Determinate and generic;20
(4) Positive and negative;21
(5) Unilateral and bilateral;22
(6) Individual and collective;23
(7) Accessory and principal.24
The following, on the other hand, is the classification
of
obligations according to Sanchez Roman:25
(1) As to juridical quality:
(a) Natural — when the obligation is in accordance
with
natural law.
(b) Civil — when the obligation is in accordance with
positive law.
(c) Mixed — when the obligation is in accordance with
both natural and positive law.
18 Arts. 1158-1162, Civil Code.19 Arts. 1163-1168,
Civil Code.20 Arts. 1163-1166, Civil Code.21 Arts.
1167-1168, Civil Code.22 Arts. 1169-1191, Civil
Code.23 Arts. 1207, 1223, Civil Code.24 Arts. 1166,
1226, et seq., Civil Code.258 Sanchez Roman 20-40.
Art. 1156
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2. As to parties:
(a) Unilateral and bilateral — unilateral, where onlyone
party is bound, and bilateral, where both parties are mu-
tually or reciprocally bound.
(b) Individual and collective — individual, where there
is only one obligor, and collective, where there are several
ob-
ligors. The latter may be joint, when each obligor is liable
only
for his proportionate share of the obligation, or solidary,
when
each obligor may be held liable for the entire obligation.
3. As to object: (a) Determinate and generic —
determinate, when the
object is specific; generic, when the object is designated by
its
class or genus.
(b) Simple and multiple — simple, when there is only
one undertaking; multiple, when there are several undertak-
ings. Multiple obligations may be conjunctive, when all of
the
undertakings are demandable at the same time, or distribu-
tive, when only one undertaking out of several is
demandable.Distributive obligations, on the other hand, may be
alterna-
tive, when the obligor is allowed to choose one out of
several
obligations which may be due and demandable, or facultative,
when the obligor is allowed to substitute another obligation
for
one which is due and demandable.
(c) Positive and negative — positive, when the obligor
is obliged to give or do something; negative, when the
obligor
must refrain from giving or doing something.
(d) Real and personal — real, when the obligation con-
sists in giving something; personal, when the obligation
con-
sists in doing or not doing something.
(e) Possible and impossible — possible, when the ob-
ligation is capable of fulfillment in nature as well as in
law;
impossible, when the obligation is not capable of
fulfillment
either in nature or in law.
(f) Divisible and indivisible — divisible, when the obli-gation
is susceptible of partial performance; indivisible, when
the obligation is not susceptible of partial performance.
GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1156
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“This enumeration of the sources of obligations supposes
that
the quasi-contractual obligation and the obligation imposed
by
law are of different types. The learned Italian jurist, Jorge
Giorgi,criticizes this assumption and says that the classification
embodied
in the Code is theoretically erroneous. His conclusion is that
one
or the other of these categories should have been suppressed
and
merged in the other. (Giorgi, Teoria de las Obligaciones,
Spanish
Ed., Vol. 5, Arts. 5, 7, 9) The validity of the
criticism is, we think,
self-evident and it is of interest to note that the common law
makes
no distinction between the two sources of liability. The
obligations
which in the Code are indicated as quasi-contracts, as well as
those
arising ex lege, are in the common law system merged
into thecategory of obligations imposed by law, and all are
denominated
implied contracts.’’29
Art. 1158. Obligations derived from law are not
pre-
sumed. Only those expressly determined in this Code or in
special laws are demandable, and shall be regulated by the
precepts of the law which establishes them; and as to what
has not been foreseen, by the provisions of this Book.30
Obligations Arising from Law. — Unlike other
obligations,
those derived from law can never be presumed. Consequently,
only
those expressly determined in the Civil Code or in special laws
are
demandable. These obligations shall be regulated by the
precepts
of the law which establishes them, and as to what has not
been
foreseen, by the provisions of Book IV of the Civil Code.31
How can we determine whether an obligation arises
from
law or from some other source, such as a contract,
quasi-contract,criminal offense or quasi-delict? It must be noted
that in the birth or
generation of an obligation, there is always a concurrence
between
the law which establishes or recognizes it and an act or
condition
upon which the obligation is based or predicated. According
to
Manresa, when the law establishes the obligation and the act
or
condition upon which it is based is nothing more than a factor
for
determining the moment when it becomes demandable, then the
law
29Leung Ben vs. O’Brien, 38 Phil. 182.30 Art. 1090, Spanish
Civil Code.31 Art. 1158, Civil Code.
GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1158
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OBLIGATIONS
itself is the source of the obligation; however, when the law
merely
recognizes or acknowledges the existence of an obligation
generated
by an act which may constitute a contract, quasi-contract,
criminaloffense or quasi-delict and its only purpose is to regulate
such
obligation, then the act itself is the source of the obligation
and not
the law.32 Thus, if A loses a certain amount
to B in a game of chance,
according to Art. 2014 of the Civil Code, the former may recover
his
loss from the latter, with legal interest from the time he paid
the
amount lost. It is evident that in this particular case the
source of
the obligation of B to refund to A the
amount which he had won from
the latter is not a contract, quasi-contract, criminal offense
or quasi-
delict, but the law itself.33 The same can also be said
with regard tothe obligation of the spouses to support each
other,34 the obligations
of employers under the Labor Code,35 the obligations of the
owners of
the dominant and servient estates in legal easements,36 and
others
scattered in the Civil Code and in special laws.
Art. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the
force of law between the contracting parties and should be
complied with in good faith.37
Obligations Arising from Contracts. — A contract is
a
meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds
himself,
with respect to the other, to give something or to render some
service.38
As a rule, contracts are perfected by mere consent, and
from that
moment the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of
what
has been expressly stipulated but also to all of the
consequences
which according to their nature may be in keeping with good
faith,
usage and law.39 These contracts are commonly called
consensual
contracts. Once the contract is perfected, the valid contract
has theforce of law binding the parties to comply therewith in good
faith,
where neither one may renege therefrom without the consent of
the
other. (Tiu Peck vs. CA 221 SCRA 618 [1993]) There are
certain
328 Manresa, 5th Ed., Bk. 1, p. 48.33Leung Ben vs. O’Brien, 38
Phil. 182.34 Art. 291, Civil Code; Pelayo vs. Lauron, 12 Phil.
453.35Bautista vs. Borromeo, 35 SCRA 119.36 Arts. 634, 687,
Civil Code.37 Art. 1091, Spanish Civil Code, in modified
form.38 Art. 1305, Civil Code.39 Art. 1315, Civil
Code.
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contracts, however, called real contracts, such as deposit,
pledge
and commodatum, which are not perfected until the delivery of
the
object of the obligation.40 Whether the contract is
consensual or real,the rule is that from the moment it is
perfected, obligations which
may be either reciprocal or unilateral arise. Reciprocal
obligations
are those where the parties are mutually or reciprocally obliged
to
do or to give something; unilateral obligations, on the other
hand,
are those where only one of the parties, the obligor, is obliged
to do
or to give something.
Unlike other kinds of obligations, those arising from
contracts
are governed primarily by the agreement of the contracting
parties.This is clearly deducible not only from the nature of
contracts, but
also from Art. 1169 of the Code which declares that such
obligations
have the force of law between the contracting parties and
should
be complied with in good faith. “Compliance in good faith’’
means
performance in accordance with the stipulations, clauses,
terms
and conditions of the contract. Consequently, the Code
recognizes
the right of such contracting parties to establish such
stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient,
provided
they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
orpublic policy.41 Good faith must, therefore, be observed to
prevent
one party from taking unfair advantage over the other party.
In
the case of Royal Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 143
SCRA 608
(1986), it was ruled that evasion by a party of legitimate
obligations
after receiving the benefits under the contract would
constitute
unjust enrichment on his part. However, in default of an
agreement,
the rules found in the Civil Code regulating such obligations
are
applicable.42
Art. 1160. Obligations derived from quasi-contracts
shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter 1, Title XVII,
of
this Book.43
Obligations Arising from Quasi-Contracts. —
Quasi-
contracts are those juridical relations arising from lawful,
voluntary
40 Art. 1316, Civil Code.41 Art. 1306, Civil
Code.42 Art. 1305, et seq., Civil Code.43New
provision.
GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1160
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OBLIGATIONS
and unilateral acts, by virtue of which the parties become
bound
to each other, based on the principle that no one shall be
unjustly
enriched or benefited at the expense of another.44 The most
importantof these juridical relations which are recognized and
regulated
by the Civil Code are negotiorum gestio45 and
solutio indebiti.46
Negotiorum gestio is the juridical relation which arises
whenever a
person voluntarily takes charge of the agency or management of
the
business or property of another without any power or authority
from
the latter.47 In this type of quasi-contract, once the
gestor or of ficious
manager has assumed the agency or management of the business
or
property, he shall be obliged to continue such agency or
management
until the termination of the affair and its
incidents,48 exercising such
rights and complying with such obligations as provided for in
the
Code.49 Solutio indebiti, on the other hand, is the
juridical relation
which arises whenever a person unduly delivers a thing
through
mistake to another who has no right to demand it.50 In this
type of
quasi-contract, once the delivery has been made, the person to
whom
the delivery is unduly made shall have the obligation to return
the
property delivered or the money paid.51
The Civil Code provides other instances of
quasi-contract.Examples are those found in Articles 2159, 2164 to
2175.
In the case of Perez vs. Palomar, 2 Phil. 682, it
was significantly
noted that in a quasi contract where no express consent is given
by
the other party, the consent needed in a contract is provided by
law
through presumption (presumptive consent). Presumptive
consent
gives rise to multiple juridical relations resulting in
obligations for
delivery of the thing and rendering of service.
Art. 1161. Civil obligations arising from offenses
shall
be governed by the penal laws, subject to the provisions of
Article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter
2,
44 Art. 2142, Civil Code.45 Art. 2144, Civil
Code.46 Art. 2154, Civil Code.47 Art. 2144, Civil
Code.48 Ibid.49 Arts. 2144-2152, Civil Code.50 Art.
2154, Civil Code.51 Ibid.
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Preliminary Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of
this Book, regulating damages.52
Obligations Arising from Criminal Offenses. — As a
rule,
every person liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.53 This principle
is based on the fact that, generally, a crime has a dual aspect
— the
criminal aspect and the civil aspect. Although these two aspects
are
separate and distinct from each other in the sense that one
affects
the social order and the other, private rights, so that the
purpose of
the first is to punish or correct the offender, while the
purpose of the
second is to repair the damages suffered by the aggrieved party,
it
is evident that the basis of the civil liability is the criminal
liabilityitself.
Please note, however, that there are offenses and special
crimes
without civil liability. Examples are crimes of treason,
rebellion,
illegal possession of firearm and gambling. But a person who is
not
criminally liable may still be civilly liable.
Idem; Enforcement of civil liability. — In general
and
prior to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 2000, the
following
rules are observed in the enforcement or prosecution of civil
liabilityarising from criminal offenses:
(1) Institution of criminal and civil actions. —
When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of
civil
liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly
instituted with
the criminal action, unless the offended party (i) expressly
waives
the civil action, or (ii) reserves his right to institute it
separately, or
(iii) institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
(2) Independent civil action. — In the cases
provided in
Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines,
an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from
the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during
the
pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved.
Such
civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
52 Art. 1092, Spanish Civil Code, in amended
form.53 Art. 100, Revised Penal Code. This rule, however, is
subject to the rules stated
in Arts. 101, 102 and 103, Revised Penal Code.
GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1161
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OBLIGATIONS
(3) Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In
all casesnot included in the preceding rules, the following rules
are observed:
(a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the sameoffense may
be instituted separately, but after the criminal
action has been commenced, the civil action cannot be
instituteduntil final judgment has been rendered in the criminal
action;
(b) If the civil action has been filed ahead of the
criminalaction, and the criminal action is subsequently commenced,
thecivil action shall be suspended in whatever stage before
final judgment it may be found, until final judgment in
criminal
action has been rendered. However, if no final judgmenthas been
rendered by the trial court in the civil action, thesame may be
consolidated with the criminal action uponapplication with the
court trying the criminal action. If the
application is granted, the evidence prevented and admittedin
the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproducedin the
criminal action, without prejudice to the admission ofadditional
evidence that any party may wish to present. In case
of consolidation, both the criminal and the civil action shall
be
tried and decided jointly;
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry withit
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from
adeclaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civilmight arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled
to
the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in
themanner provided by law against the person who may be liablefor
restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for thedamage
suffered.
Pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule III of the Revised Rules of
CriminalProcedure 2000, however, it is stated that except for civil
actions
provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code,
thecivil action which has been reserved cannot be instituted until
final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. The
actioncontemplated, as pointed out by Justice Oscar Herrera in
his
Treatise on Criminal Procedure, is a civil action arising from a
crime
if reserved or filed separately and a criminal case is filed if
it has to
be suspended to await final judgment in the criminal action.
The rule clarifies that, “During the pendency of the
criminal
action, the period of prescription of the civil action which
cannot
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be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been
suspended
shall not run.’’ Otherwise stated, the period of prescription of
the
civil actions under Section 3 of the aforementioned rules shall
not besuspended because they can be instituted separately. This
refers to
civil actions arising from the offense charged which have not
been
reserved or civil actions that have been filed ahead of the
criminal
action but have been suspended. (Justice Oscar M. Herrera,
Treatise
on Historical Development and Highlights of Amendment of
Rules
on Criminal Procedure, February 2001).
(4) Judgment in civil action not a bar. — A
final judgment
rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant from civil
liabilityis no bar to a criminal action.
(5) Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. — A
petition
for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency
of
a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the
of fice of
the fiscal (prosecutor) or the court conducting the
preliminary
investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court
for
trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same
criminal
action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
2000
provides for the elements of a prejudicial question. They are:
(a) the
previously instituted civil action which involves an issue
similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal
action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether
or
not the criminal action may proceed.
Section 7 limits a prejudicial question to a “previously
insti-
tuted civil action’’ in order to minimize possible abuses by the
sub-
sequent filing of a civil action as an after thought for the
purpose ofsuspending the criminal action. (Justice Oscar M.
Herrera, Treatise
on Criminal Procedure, February 2001)
At a glance, therefore, the following are the
salient changes
brought about by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
2000,
as more specifically discussed hereunder by Justice
Herrera in his
Treatise on Criminal Procedure:
a. The rule changes the 1985 rule as amended in 1988.
Under the 1985 Rule, the action for recovery of civil
liabilityarising from crime including the civil liability under
Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising
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OBLIGATIONS
from the same act or omission are deemed impliedly
instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives
the
civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately,
orinstitutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Under the present rule, only the civil liability arising
from
the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
his
right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action
prior to the criminal action.
b. Under the former rule, a waiver of any of three
civil
actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the
res-ervation of the right to file any of said civil actions
separately
waives the others. This is no longer provided for. The
reserva-
tion and waiver refers only to the civil action for the
recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged. This does
not
include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34
and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the
same
act or omission which may be prosecuted separately even
with-
out a reservation.
c. The rulings in Shafer vs. Judge, RTC of
Olongapo
City, 167 SCRA 376, allowing a third-party complaint, and
the
ruling in Javier vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 171
SCRA
376, as well as Cabaero vs. Cantos allowing a counterclaim
are
no longer in force. Under the 2000 Rules, these pleadings
are
no longer allowed. Any claim which could have been the
subject
thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.
d. The rule also incorporated Circular 57-97 on the
filing of actions for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22mandating the inclusion of the corresponding civil action for
which the filing fee shall be paid based on the amount of
the
check involved. In other cases, no filing fees shall be
required
for actual damages.
Idem; Id. — Effect of acquittal. — If the accused
in a
criminal action is acquitted of the offense charged, can a civil
action
for damages based on the same act or omission still be
instituted?
This question requires a qualified answer. If the acquittal of
theaccused is based on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action to recover damages
based
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on the same act or omission may still be instituted.54 In
such case,
mere preponderance of evidence shall be suf ficient in
order that
the plaintiff will be able to recover from the
defendant.55 On theother hand, if the acquittal is based on
the ground that he did not
commit the offense charged, or what amounts to the same thing,
if
the acquittal proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment
that
the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist, the
subsequent institution of a civil action to recover damages is,
as a
general rule, no longer possible.56
Idem; id. — Effect of independent civil actions. —
As a
rule, the civil action to recover damages from the person
criminallyliable is not independent from the criminal action. This
is true even
where it has, to a certain extent, been separated by the
injured
party from the criminal proceedings either by reserving his
right to
file a separate civil action or by commencing the action to
recover
damages ahead of the criminal action. In the first, the right to
file a
civil action shall depend upon the result of the criminal
action, while
in the second, once the criminal action is instituted, the
action to
recover damages shall be suspended.57 There are, however,
certain
exceptional cases or instances under the Civil Code where the
civil
action to recover damages is entirely separate and independent
from
the criminal action, although the act or omission which is the
basis
thereof may be a criminal offense. They are:
first, where the civil
action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission
complained of as a criminal offense or
felony;58 and second, where the
law grants to the injured party the right to institute a civil
action
which is entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action.59 As
a matter of fact, we can even go to the extent of saying that
thesecases or instances also constitute the exceptions to the rule
that if
the accused in the criminal action is acquitted on the ground
that he
did not commit the offense charged, the subsequent institution
of a
civil action is no longer possible.
54 Art. 29, Civil Code.55 Ibid.56Sec. 3(c), Rule 111,
New Rules of Court.57Sec. 3(b), Rule 111, New Rules of
Court.58 Arts. 31, 177, Civil Code.59 Arts. 32, 33, 34,
Civil Code.
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OBLIGATIONS
With regard to the first, it must be noted that where the
civil
action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission
complained of as a criminal offense or felony, such action
mayproceed independently of the criminal action and regardless of
the
result of the latter.60 It is evident that in such case the
basis of the
civil action may be an obligation arising from the law,
contract,
quasi-contract, or quasi-delict. Thus, a postmaster, who has
been
charged criminally for malversation of government funds
under
his custody, may still be made a defendant in a civil case for
the
recovery of the funds, not on the ground of malversation, but
on
the ground that under Sec. 633 of the Revised Administrative
Code,
he can be held accountable therefor.61 The basis of the
civil action
in such case is not the obligation arising from the criminal
offense
of malversation, but the obligation arising from the law.
Similarly,
if a passenger in a certain bus institutes a civil action to
recover
damages from the operator of the bus line for injuries sustained
in
an accident, such action is separate and distinct from the
criminal
prosecution of the driver for criminal negligence and may,
therefore,
be continued regardless of the result of the latter.
Consequently,
he can still recover damages even if the driver is acquitted in
thecriminal action, because it is clear that the action in such
case is
based on culpa contractual and not on the act or
omission of the
driver complained of as felony.62 The same principle is
also applicable
if the offense charged constitutes what is known as culpa
aquiliana
or quasi-delict under the Civil Code.63 In such case, the
injured party
can always institute a civil action to recover damages
independently
of the criminal action and regardless of the result of the
latter. This
is so even granting that the accused is acquitted in the
criminal
action either on the ground of reasonable doubt or on the
groundthat he did not commit the offense charged. The reason for
this is
that the basis of the civil action is no longer the criminal
liability of
the defendant, but a quasi-delict or tort.64
60 Art. 31, Civil Code.61Tolentino vs. Carlos, 39 Off.
Gaz., No. 6, p. 121.62San Pedro Bus Line vs. Navarro, 94 Phil. 840;
Bernaldes vs. Bohol Land Trans.
Co., 7 SCRA 276.63 Art. 2176, et seq., Civil
Code.64 Art. 2177, Civil Code; Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario,
73 Phil. 607; Dyogi vs.
Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095; Calo vs. Peggy, 103 Phil. 1112;
Stanvac vs. Tan, 107 Phil. 109.
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With regard to the second, it must be observed that there
are
five exceptional cases or instances, in addition to that which
is stated
in Art. 31 of the New Civil Code, where the law itself
expresslygrants to the injured party the right to institute a civil
action which
is entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.
They
are: (1) interferences by public of ficers or employees or
by private
individuals with civil rights and liberties,65 (2)
defamation,66 (3)
fraud,67 (4) physical injuries,68 and (5) refusal or
neglect of a city or
municipal police of ficer to render aid or protection in
case of danger
to life or property.69 In all of these cases or instances,
although the
act or omission may constitute a criminal offense in
accordance
with our penal laws, the injured party may institute a civil
actionto recover damages which is entirely separate and distinct
from the
criminal action. Once the action is instituted, then it may
proceed
independently of the criminal action, and shall require only
a
preponderance of evidence.70
Idem; id.; id. — Effect of failure to make
reservation. —
Section 2 of Rule 111 of the New Rules of Court states: “In the
cases
provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil
Code of
the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate
anddistinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured
party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided
that the
right is reserved as required in the
preceding section.’’ The insertion
in the foregoing provision of the phrase provided the right is
reserved
as required in the preceding section, resulted in a debate
among
academicians which lasted for more than twenty years.
Finally, interpreting the above provision, the Supreme
Court,
in Garcia vs. Florido,71 declared:
“As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent actcausing
damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime
or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa
extra-contractual.
65 Art. 32, Civil Code.66 Art. 33, Civil
Code.67 Ibid.68 Ibid.69 Art. 34, Civil
Code.70 Arts. 32, 33, 34, Civil Code.7152 SCRA 420. This case
was also cited and quoted in Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91
SCRA 113.
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OBLIGATIONS
The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter
isa distinct and independent negligence, having always had its
own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of
theview that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action
based
upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the
criminalproceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the
result
of the latter. Hence, ‘the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111
with
reference to Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is
contrary
to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these
articleswere drafted and are intended to constitute as exceptions
to
the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule
111.
The proviso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as an
unauthorized amendment of substantive law.’ x x x’’
Again, in Abellana vs. Marabe,72 the Supreme
Court declared:
“The restrictive interpretation x x x does not only
result
in its emasculation but also gives rise to a serious
constitutional
doubt. Article 33 is quite clear: ‘In case of x x x physical
injuries,
a civil action for damages entirely separate and distinct from
thecriminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such
civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution,
and shall require only preponderance of evidence.’ That is
asubstantive right not to be frittered away by a constructionthat
would render it nugatory, if through oversight, the
offended parties failed at the initial stage to seek recovery
for
damages in a civil suit. x x x The grant of power to this
Court
both in the present Constitution and under the 1935 Charterdoes
not extend to any diminution, increase or modification of
substantive right. It is a well-settled doctrine that a court is
to
avoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as
would give rise to a constitutional doubt. x x x The law as
an
instrument of social control will fail in its function if
through aningenious construction sought to be fastened on a legal
norm,
particularly a procedural rule, there is placed an impediment
to
a litigant being given an opportunity of vindicating an
allegedright.’’
Thus, in Elcano vs. Hill,73 where the first
defendant had
been previously charged with the criminal offense of homicide
and
subsequently acquitted on the ground that his act is not
criminal,
7257 SCRA 106.7377 SCRA 98.
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because of lack of intent to kill, coupled with a mistake, the
Supreme
Court held, despite the fact that the plaintiffs (who are the
parents
of the alleged victim) failed to make a reservation of their
rightto institute the civil action separately, that such acquittal
of the
defendant in the criminal case has not extinguished his
liability
for quasi-delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code; hence,
that
acquittal is not a bar to the civil action against him. The
same
ruling was applied in Mendoza vs. Arrieta.74 In
effect, the procedural
requirement provided for in Section 2 of Rule 111 of the New
Rules
of Court is not mandatory.
Removal of Reservation Requirement For IndependentCivil
Actions
Accordingly, Section 2 of the New Rules of Court
was likewise
amended to read as:
“SEC. 3. When civil action may proceed independently.
— In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the
Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action
may
be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed
independently
of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance
ofevidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action.’’ (Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
2000).
Under the former rule, the foregoing actions may only
be
allowed if there is a reservation, or were filed ahead of the
criminal
action. (Justice Oscar M. Herrera, Treatise on Criminal
Procedure,
February 2001).
Art. 1162. Obligations derived from quasi-delicts
shall
be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of
the
Book, and by special laws.75
Obligations Arising from Quasi-Delicts. — As it is
used
in this part of the Civil Code, the term
“quasi-delicts”76 refers to all
of those obligations which do not arise from law, contracts,
quasi-
7491 SCRA 113.75 Art. 1093, Spanish Civil Code, in amended
form.76In Spanish law, “cuasi-delitos’’ is sometimes known as
“culpa aquiliana’’ or
“culpa extra-contractual.’’
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OBLIGATIONS
contracts, or criminal offenses.77 Thus, using Art. 2176 of
the Civil
Code and decided cases as bases or anchors, it may be defined as
the
fault or negligence of a person, who, by his act or omission,
connectedor unconnected with, but independent from, any contractual
relation,
causes damage to another person. It is, therefore, the
equivalent of
the term “tort” in Anglo-American law.78
Idem; Persons liable. — Obligations arising from
quasi-
delicts are demandable not only from the person directly
responsible
for the damage incurred,79 but also against the
following:
(1) The father and, in case of his death or incapacity,
themother, with respect to damages caused by the minor children
who
live in their company;
(2) Guardians, with respect to damages caused by the minors
or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and who
live
in their company;
(3) The owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise, with respect to damages caused by their employees
in
the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or
onthe occasion of their functions;
(4) Employers with respect to damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any
business or industry;
(5) The State, when it acts through a special agent; but not
when the damage has been caused by the of ficial to whom
the task
done properly pertains; and
(6) Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades, with respect to damages caused by their pupils and
students
or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.80
It must be noted, however, that the responsibility of the
above
persons or entities shall cease if they can prove that they
have
77Report of the Code Commission, p. 161.78See Elcano and Elcano
vs. Hill and Hill, 77 SCRA 98.79 Art. 2176, Civil
Code.80 Art. 2180, Civil Code.
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observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent
damage.81
Idem; Requisites of liability. — In actions based on
quasi-
delicts, before the person injured can recover damages from
the
defendant, it is necessary that he must be able to prove the
following
facts:
(1) The fault or negligence of the defendant;
(2) The damage suffered or incurred by the plaintiff; and
(3) The relation of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by
theplaintiff.82
Idem; Quasi-delicts and crimes. — Quasi-delicts and
crimi-
nal offenses are sometimes dif ficult to distinguish from
each other.
However, they may be distinguished from each other in the
follow-
ing ways:
(1) Crimes affect the public interest, while quasi-delicts
are
only of private concern;
(2) The Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act,
while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely
repairs
the damages incurred;
(3) Generally, there are two liabilities in crime: criminal
and
civil. In quasi-delict, there is only civil liability; and
(4) Crimes are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because
the
former are punished only if there is a law clearly covering
them,
while the latter include all acts in which any kind of fault
ornegligence intervenes.83
Idem; Scope of quasi-delicts. — In Elcano vs.
Hill (G.R. No.
L-24303, May 26, 1977), the Supreme Court held that
quasi-delicts
include acts which are criminal in character or in violation of
the
penal law, whether voluntary or negligent. Using the exact
language
of the Court, “it is ‘more congruent with the spirit of law,
equity
and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress,’ to hold,
as
81 Ibid.82Taylor vs. Manila Electric Co., 16 Phil.
8.83Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario, 73 Phil. 607.
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OBLIGATIONS
we do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to fault or
negligence,
covers not only acts not punishable by law but also acts
criminal in
character, whether intentional or voluntary or negligent.’’
The above pronouncement of the Supreme Court is
startling. It expands the coverage of quasi-delicts beyond
what
was originally contemplated by the lawmaker.
Under the general plan of our law on obligations, the
scope
of obligations arising from the law, contracts,
quasi-contracts,
and acts or omissions punished by law is well-defined. Their
boundaries are clearly delineated and drawn with precision.
It
is only with respect to obligations arising from quasi-delicts
thatthere is a problem and this is natural because of the very
nature
of such obligations. Under our system of liabilities,
quasi-delicts
must necessarily be a sort of “dumping ground’’ or “garbage
can’’for all kinds of actionable wrongs not falling within the
purview
of the four sources of obligations. As we look at it, the
original
plan envisaged by the lawmaker is as follows:
The coverage of quasi-delicts which do not overlap
with
crimes under the Revised Penal Code and special laws (and
which we can very well call the general rule) are:
first, negligentacts or omissions not punishable as
criminal offenses; second,
intentional quasi-delicts or torts, such as those regulated
by
Arts. 19, 21, 22, 26, 27, 28 and 1314 of the Civil Code;
andthird, the so-called strict liability torts where there is
neithernegligence nor intent to cause damage or injury, such as in
the
case contemplated in Art. 23 of the Civil Code or in the case
of
actionable nuisances under Arts. 694 and 705 of the Civil
Code.
The coverage of quasi-delicts which overlap with acts
or omissions punishable under the Revised Penal Code (and
which we can very well call the exceptions) are: first,
criminalnegligence; and second, acts or omissions punishable
as crimesunder the Revised Penal Code but the Civil Code
expressly
declares that the civil action arising therefrom is separate
and
independent from the criminal action. (Arts. 31, 32, 33 and 34
of
the Civil Code)
We believe that the above arrangement was
deliberately
planned. Thus, according to the Code Commission in its
Report:“The Commission also thought of the possibility of
adopting
the word ‘tort’ from Anglo-American law. But ‘tort’ under
thatsystem is much broader than the Spanish-Philippine concept
of obligations arising from non-contractual negligence. ‘Tort’
in Anglo-American jurisprudence includes not only negligence,
but
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also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and battery,
falseimprisonment and deceit. In the general plan of the
Philippine
legal system, intentional and malicious acts are governed bythe
Penal Code, although certain exceptions are made in the
Project.’’ (Report, pp. 161-162)
Idem; Character of remedy. — In Padua vs. Robles,84 in
his
concurring opinion, Justice Barredo declared: “It is by now
beyond
all cavil, as to dispense with the citation of jurisprudence,
that a
negligent act, such as that committed in this case, gives rise
to at
least two separate and independent liabilities, namely (1) the
civil
liability arising from crime or culpa criminal and
(2) the liabilityarising from civil negligence or the
so-called culpa aquiliana.
These two concepts of faults are so distinct from each other
that
exoneration from one does not result in exoneration from the
other.
Adjectively and substantively, they can be prosecuted
separately
and independently of each other, although Article 2177 of the
Civil
Code precludes recovery of damages twice for the same
negligent
act or omission, which means that should there be varying
amounts
awarded in two separate cases, the plaintiff may recover, in
effect,
only the bigger amount. That is to say, if the plaintiff had
alreadybeen ordered paid an amount in one case and in the other
case the
amount adjudged is bigger, he shall be entitled in the second
case
only to the excess over the one fixed in the first case, but if
he had
already been paid a bigger amount in the first case, he may
not
recover anymore in the second case.’’
The above opinion was confirmed in Elcano vs.
Hill.85 Thus,
according to the Supreme Court: “Consequently, a separate
civil
action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or
not heis criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that
the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged
criminally,
to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in
such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two assuming that
the
awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the
extinction of
the civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule
111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the
Revised
Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act
considered
8466 SCRA 485.8577 SCRA 98.
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OBLIGATIONS
as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by
a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged
has
not happened or has not been committed by the accused.”
However, in Mendoza vs. Arrieta,86 a more recent case,
there was
a return to the old doctrine of selection of remedies. In this
case, the
Supreme Court categorically held that since the offended or
injured
party had chosen the remedy of proceeding under the Revised
Penal
Code by allowing the civil action to be impliedly instituted in
the
criminal action, and since the court had expressly declared that
the
fact from which the civil liability did not exist, therefore,
the civil
action for damages subsequently commenced by said injured
partyagainst the defendant has already been extinguished in
consonance
with Sec. 3(c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. And even if
plaintiff’s
cause of action against defendant is not ex-delicto, the
end result
would be the same, it being clear from the judgment in the
criminal
case that defendant’s acquittal was not based upon
reasonable
doubt.
Thus, the problem is still very much with us. The debate
rages
on.
Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario
73 Phil. 607
This case come up from the Court of Appeals which
held
the petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in damages forthe
death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro
Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936,
on the road between Malabon and Navotas, Province of Rizal,there
was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate
Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a
carretela guided byPedro Dimapilis. The
carretela was overturned, and one of its
passengers, 16-year-old Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries
from
which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed
against
Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he
wasconvicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one
year and one day to two years of prision correccional. The
court
in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to
bring a
separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals
af firmed
8691 SCRA 113.
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the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case.
SeverinoGarcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on
March
7, 1939, brought an action in the Court of First Instance
ofManila against Faustino Barredo as the sole proprietor of the
Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8,1939,
the Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages
in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from
the
date of the complaint. This decision was modified by the Court
of
Appeals by reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal
interestfrom the time the action was instituted. It is undisputed
that
Fontanilla’s negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he
was
driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As
to
Barredo’s responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:
“* * * It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla’s
employer.
There is no proof that he exercised the diligence of a good
father
of a family to prevent the damage. (See p. 22, appellant’s
brief.)In fact it is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla
who
had been caught several times for violation of the
Automobile
Law and speeding (Exhibit A) — violations which appeared in
the records of the Bureau of Public Works available to the
publicand to himself. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs
under
the provisions of Article 1903 of the Civil Code.’’
The main theory of the defense is that the liability ofFausto
Barredo is governed by the Revised Penal Code; hence,
his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no
civil
action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally
liable,
Barredo cannot be held responsible in this case. The
petitioner’sbrief states on page 10:
“* * * The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is
beingsued for his failure to exercise all the diligence of a good
father
of a family in the selection and supervision of Pedro
Fontanillato prevent damages suffered by the respondents. In other
words,
the Court of Appeals insists on applying in this case
Article1903 of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is
found in
Chapter 11, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact
makes
said article inapplicable to a civil liability arising from a
crime
as in the case at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16
ofBook lV of the Civil Code, in precise words of Article 1903 of
the
Civil Code itself, is applicable only to “those (obligations)
arising
from wrongful or negligent acts or omissions not punishable
by
law.’ ’’ The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals
is expressed
thus:
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OBLIGATIONS
“* * * We cannot agree to the defendant’s contention.The
liability sought to be imposed upon him in this action is
not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a
misdemeanor(the crime of Pedro Fontanilla), but an obligation
imposed in
Article .1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his
negligence in theselection or supervision of his servant or
employee.”
Speaking through Justice Bocobo, the Supreme Court held:
“The pivotal question in this case is whether the
plaintiffs
may bring this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo,
thus making him primarily and directly responsible under
Article 1903 (now Art. 2180, New Civil Code) of the
Civil Code asan employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant
maintains that
Fontanilla’s negligence being punishable by the Penal Code,
his (defendant’s) liability as an employer is only
subsidiary,
according to said Penal Code, but Fontanilla has not been
sued
in a civil action and his property has not been exhausted.
To
decide the main issue, we must cut through the tangle that
has,
in the minds of many, confused and jumbled together
delitos
and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the Penal Code and fault
or
negligence under Articles 1902-1910 (now Arts. 2176 to 2194,
New Civil Code) of the Civil Code.
“Authorities support the proposition that
a quasi-delict or
“culpa aquiliana’’ is a separate legal institution under the
Civil
Code, with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that
is
entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime. Upon
this
principle, and on the wording and spirit of Article 1903 of
the
Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of
employers
may be safely anchored.
x x x “It will thus be seen that while the terms of
Article.1902
of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough to cover the
driver’s
negligence in the instant case, nevertheless Article 1093
limits
cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions “not punishable by
law.’’ But
inasmuch as Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes
not only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence,
the fault or negligence under Article 1902 of the Civil Code
has
apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that
makes
the “confusion worse confounded.’’ However, a closer study
shows that such a concurrence of scope in regard to
negligentacts does not destroy the distinction between the civil
liability
arising from a crime and the responsibility for
cuasi-delitos
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or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act
causingdamages may produce civil liability arising from a crime
under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action
for cuasi-delito or culpa
extra-contractual under Articles 1902-1910
of the Civil Code.
x x x
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the
separateindividuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa
aquiliana under the Civil
Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction
between
civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by
the
Penal Code) and responsibility for fault of negligence under
Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the
samenegligent act may produce either a civil liability arising
from
a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility
for
fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above cited
render
it inescapable to conclude that the employer — in this case
the
defendant-petitioner — is primarily and directly liable
under
Article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked
should ordinarily be suf ficient to dispose of this case.
Butinasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been
little
understood in the past, it might not be inappropriate to
indicate
their foundations.
“Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in Article 366 punishes
not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to
hold
that Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault
or
negligence not punished by law according to the literal
import
of Article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution
of culpa
aquiliana would have very little scope and application in
actual
life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property
through
any degree of negligence — even the slightest — would have
to
be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability
arising
from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would
remain
for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are
loath to impute to
the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so
absurdand anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the
laws,
disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the
spirit
that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the
law
to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such
ancientorigin and such full-grown development as culpa
aquiliana or
cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in
Articles
1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
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OBLIGATIONS
“Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal
case,proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while
in
a civil case, preponderance of evidence is suf ficient to
makethe defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of
criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond
reasonabledoubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
In
such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible
in a civil action under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code.
Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated
civil
wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
“Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make
de-
fendant’s liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver
andexhaust his (the latter’s) property first, would be
tantamount
to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and
cumbersome
method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy un-
der our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way,
which
is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the
defen-
dant under Article. 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the
law
is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because
the
procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and
productive
of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that profes-
sional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyances usuallydo
not have suf ficient means with which to pay damages. Why,
then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go
through
this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless
procedure?
In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten
and
facilitate the pathways of right and justice.
“At this juncture, it should be said that the primary
and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed
negligence are principles calculated to protect society.
Workmen
and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in
order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or
employerswho principally reap the profits resulting from the
services of
these servants and employees. It is but right that they
should
guarantee the latter’s careful conduct for the personal and
patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, “they
should reproach themselves, at least, some for their
weakness,
others for their poor selection and all for their negligence.”
And
according to Manresa, “It is much more equitable and just
that
such responsibility should fall upon the principal or
director
who could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and
not
upon the injured person who could not exercise such
selection
and who used such employee because of his confidence in the
principal or director.” (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists
also
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29
base this primary responsibility of the employer on the
principleof representation of the principal by the agent. Thus,
Oyuelos
says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before
thirdpersons the employer and employee “vienen a ser como una
sola
personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la
de quienle emplea y utiliza” (“become as one personality
by the merging
of the person of the employee in that of him who employs and
utilizes him.”) All these observations acquire a peculiar
force
and significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there
isneed of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of
owners
of motor vehicles.
“Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions ofboth
the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which
has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres
already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the
character
and ef ficacy of the action for culpa
aquiliana, there has grownup a common practice to seek damages
only by virtue of the
civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that
there
is another remedy, which is by invoking Articles 1902-1910
of
the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed byour
laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and
nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on
culpa aquiliana or extra-contractual.
“In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals should be and is hereby af firmed, with costs
against the
defendant-petitioner.’’
Elcano vs. Hill
77 SCRA 98
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City dismissing the complaint of
plaintiffsfor recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a
minor,
married at the time of occurrence, and his father, defendant
Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting
subsistence,
for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, of
whichwhen criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted
on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of lack
of
intent to kill, coupled with a mistake. According to the
Supreme
Court, speaking through Justice Barredo:
“As We view the foregoing background of this case, the
twodecisive issues presented for Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by
the
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OBLIGATIONS
acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action
forcivil liability was not reserved?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the
Civil Code be applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding
theundisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained
of,
Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting
subsistence
from his father, was already legally married?
“The first issue presents no more problem than the
need
for a reiteration and further clarification of the dual
character,
criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of
obligation
which was firmly established in this jurisdiction
in Barredo vs.
Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated,
on thebasis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the
nature
of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa
criminal or delito and
mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of
decisions of theSupreme Court of Spain, the works of recognized
civilians, and
earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same given act
can
result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but
also
under the Civil Code.
“Contrary to an immediate impression one might get
upon
a reading of x x x Garcia — that the concurrence of the
PenalCode and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate
only
acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts —
deeper
reflection would reveal that the thrust of the
pronouncements
therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually extends
tofault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made
therein to
the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14,
1919,
supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a
negligent
act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force
hereat the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations
which
are derived from acts or omissions, in which fault or
negligence,not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of
Chapter
II, Title XV of this book (which refers
to quasi-delicts.)’’ And it isprecisely the underlined
qualification, “not punishable by law,’’
that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an undesirable
construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that
“killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth life’’ hence, the
rulingthat “(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to
smother
and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin
and
such full-grown development as culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito,
which is conserved and made enduring in Articles 1902 to 1910of
the Spanish Civil Code.’’ And so, because Justice Bocobo was
Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original
text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said
Code,
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31
which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses
theterm, “not punishable by law,’’ thereby making it clear that
the
concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are
criminal incharacter or in violation of the penal law, whether
voluntary or
negligent. Thus, the corresponding provision to said Article
1093in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says,
“Obligations
derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the
provisions
of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book (on quasi-delicts),
and by
special laws.’’ More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177
ofthe new code provides:
“ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence
under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinctfrom the civil liability arising from negligence under
the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.’’
According to the Code Commission: “The foregoing
provi-
sion (Article 2177) though at first sight startling, is not so
novel
or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of
criminal
and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the
criminal
law, while the latter is a culpa
aquiliana or quasi-delict, of an-
cient origin, having always had its own foundation and indi-
viduality separate from criminal negligence. Such
distinction
between criminal negligence and culpa
extra-contractual or cu-
asi-delito has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme
Court
of Spain and outstanding Spanish jurists. Therefore, under
the
proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of
criminal
negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be
a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability
arising
from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a
quasi-delict
or culpa aquiliana. But said article forestalls a
double recovery.”
(Report of the Code Commission, p. 162.) Although, again,
this Article 2177 does seem to literally
refer to only acts of negligence, the same argument of
Justice
Bocobo about construction that upholds “the spirit that
giveth
life’’ rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent
of
the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And
considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations
of
the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability
and
independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal
in
character (under Articles .29 to 32) from the civil
responsibility
arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised
PenalCode, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2
and
3(c), Rule III, contemplate also the same separability, it is
“more
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OBLIGATIONS
congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and
more
in harmony with modern progress,’’ to borrow the felicitous
relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and
Paci fi c Co., 7Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that
Article 2176, where it refers
to “fault or negligence,’’ covers not only acts “not punishable
by
law’’ but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional
and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil
action
lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he
is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided
that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually
charged
also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and
would
be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of
the
two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
otherwords, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par.
(e) of
Section 3, Rule III, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
liability
for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only
and not as a
crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal
case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has
not
been committed, by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold,
in
reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes
voluntary
and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginald
Hill in
the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for
quasi-
delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant
action
against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of
Reginald’s emancipation by marriage on the possible civil
liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered
opinion
that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already
free
from responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon
emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and
under
Article 397, emancipation takes place “by the marriage of
the
minor (child),” it is, however, also clear that pursuant to
Article
399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really
full
or absolute. Thus “Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary
concession shall terminate parental authority over the
child’s
person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property
as
though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or
alienate
or encumber real property without the consent of his father
ormother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only
with
the assistance of his father, mother or guardian.’’
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Now, under Article 2180, “The obligation imposed by
Article2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or
omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
Thefather and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother,
are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children wholive
in their company.’’ In the instant case, it is not controverted
that Reginald, although married, was living with his father
and
getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence
in
question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient
toand dependent on his father, a situation which is not
unusual.
“It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa,
the
reason behind the joint and solidary liability of parents with
theiroffending child under Article 2180 is that it is the
obligation of
the parent to supervise their minor children in order to
prevent
them from causing damage to third persons. On the other hand,the
clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a
minoremancipated by marriage may not nevertheless, sue or be
suedwithout the assistance of the parents, is that such
emancipationdoes not carry with it freedom to enter into
transactions or doany act that can give rise to judicial
litigation. (See Manresa, id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And
surely, killing someone elseinvites judicial action. Otherwise
stated, the marriage of aminor child does not relieve the parents
of the duty to see toit that the child, while still a minor, does
not give cause to anylitigation, in the same manner that the
parents are answerablefor the borrowing of money and alienation or
encumbering ofreal property which cannot be done by their minor
married child
without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
“Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 appliesto
Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of
Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald
is
now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill
hasbecome merely subsidiary to that of his son.
“WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and
the trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance with
theforegoing opinion. Costs against appellees.’’
Mendoza vs. Arrieta
91 SCRA 113
The records show that a three-way vehicular
accidentoccurred involving a Mercedes Benz owned and driven by
Edgardo Mendoza, a private jeep owned and driven by Rodolfo
Salazar and a sand-and-gravel truck owned by Felipino Timbol
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OBLIGATIONS
and driven by Freddie Montoya. As a consequence of the
mishap,two separate criminal actions for damage to property
through
reckless imprudence were instituted. The first was institutedby
Mendoza against Salazar, while the second was institutedby Salazar
against Montoya. There was no reservation madeby both complainants
of their right to institute a civil actionseparately. After hearing
the two cases jointly, the courtrendered judgment acquitting
Salazar on the ground that his jeep was bumped from behind by
the truck causing it to collidewith the Mercedes Benz. Montoya, on
the other hand, wasconvicted on the ground that his guilt was
established beyondreasonable doubt. He was ordered to pay to
Salazar the amount
of P972.50 for actual damages to the latter’s jeep. After
thetermination of the criminal cases, Mendoza filed a civil
case.against both Salazar and Timbol, either in the alternative
orin solidum, for indemnification for damages. Upon motions
ofboth defendants, the respondent court dismissed the case.
Theplaintiff, as a consequence, went up to the Supreme Court
bymeans of a petition for certiorari seeking a review of the
ordersof dismissal. Speaking through Justice Herrera, the
SupremeCourt held:
“We shall first discuss the validity of the Order, dated
September 12, 1970, dismissing petitioner’s Complaint
againsttruck-owner Timbol.
“In dismissing the complaint against the truck-owner,respondent
Judge sustained Timbol’s allegations that the civilsuit is barred
by the prior joint judgment in Criminal Cases Nos.SM-227 and
SM-228, wherein no reservation to file a separatecivil case was
made by petitioner and where the latter activelyparticipated in the
trial and tried to prove damages against jeep-driver Salazar
only; and that the Complaint does not
state a cause of action against truck-owner Timbol inasmuchas
petitioner prosecuted jeep-owner-driver Salazar as the onesolely
responsible for the damage suffered by his car.
“Well-settled is the rule that for a prior judgment toconstitute
a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisitesmust concur:
(1) it must be a final judgment; (2) it must havebeen rendered by a
Court having jurisdiction over the subjectmatter and over the
parties; (3) it must be a judgment on themerits; and (4) there must
be, between the first and secondactions, identity of parties,
identity of subject matter and
identity of cause of action.
“It is conceded that the first three requisites of res
judicata
are present. However, we agree with petitioner that there is
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no identity of cause of action between Criminal Case No. SM-227
and Civil Case No. 80803. Obvious is the fact that in said
criminal case truck-driver Montoya was not prosecuted fordamage
to petitioner’s car but for damage to the jeep. Neitherwas
truck-owner Timbol a party in said case. In fact as thetrial Court
had put it “the owner of the Mercedes Benz cannotrecover any
damages from the accused Freddie Montoya, he(Mendoza) being a
complainant only against Rodolfo Salazarin Criminal Case No.
SM-228.’’ And more importantly, in thecriminal cases, the cause of
action was the enforcement of thecivil liability arising from
criminal negligence under Article100 of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas Civil Case No. 80803 is
based on quasi-delict under Article 2180, in relation
to Article2176 of the Civil Code. As held in Barredo vs.
Garcia, et al.:
“The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate
theseparate individuality of cuasi-delitos or
culpa aquilianaunder the Civil Code. Specifically they show
that there isa distinction between civil liability arising from
criminalnegligence (governed by the Penal Code) and
responsibilityfor fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910
ofthe Civil Code, and that the same negligent act mayproduce either
a civil liability arising from a crime underthe Penal Code, or a
separate responsibility for fault ornegligence under Articles 1902
to 1910 of the Civil Code.Still more concretely, the authorities
above cited renderit inescapable to conclude that the employer, in
this casethe defendant-petitioner, is primarily and directly
liableunder Article 1903 of the Civil Code.”
“The petitioner’s cause of action against Timbol in the
Civilcase is based on quasi-delict is evident from the
recitals in thecomplaint, to wit: that while petitioner was driving
his car along
MacArthur Highway at Marilao, Bulacan, a jeep owned anddriven by
Salazar suddenly swerved to his (petitioner’s) lane andcollided
with his car; that the sudden swerving of Salazar’s jeepwas caused
either by the negligence and lack of skill of FreddieMontoya,
Timbol’s employee, who was then driving a gravel-and-sand truck in
the same direction as Salazar’s jeep; and that as aconsequence of
the collision, petitioner’s car suffered extensivedamage amounting
to P12,248.20 and that he likewise incurredactual and moral
damages, litigation expenses and attorney’sfees. Clearly,
therefore, the two factors that a cause of action
must consist of, namely: (1) plaintiff’s primary right, i.e.,
thathe is the owner of a Mercedes Benz; and (2) defendants’
delictor wrongful act or omission which violated plaintiff’s
primaryright, i.e., the negligence or lack of skill either of
jeep-owner
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OBLIGATIONS
Salazar or of Timbol’s employee, Montoya, in driving the
truck,causing Salazar’s jeep to swerve and collide with
petitioner’s
car, were alleged in the Complaint.
“Consequently, petitioner’s cause of action being based
on quasi-delict, respondent Judge committed reversible error
whenhe dismissed the civil suit against the truck-owner, as said
casemay proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
andregardless of the result of the latter.
“Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an
obliga-tion not arising from the act or omission complained of asa
felony, such civil action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result ofthe
latter.”
“But it is truck-owner Timbol’s submission (as well asthat of
jeep-owner-driver Salazar) that petitioner’s failure tomake a
reservation in the criminal action of his right to file
anindependent civil action bars the institution of such
separatecivil action, invoking Section 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court,
whichsays:
“Section 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases
provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of theCivil
Code of the Philippines, an independent civil actionentirely
separate and distinct from the criminal actionmay be brought by the
injured party during the pendencyof the criminal case, provided the
right is reserved asrequired in the preceding section, Such civil
action shallproceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
andshall require only a preponderance of evidence.’’
“Interpreting the above provision, this Court, in Garcia
vs. Florido, said:
“As we have stated at the outset, the same negligentact
causing damages may produce a civil liability arisingfrom crime or
create an action for quasi-delict or
culpa extra-contractual. The former is a violation
of the criminallaw, while the latter is a distinct and
independentnegligence, having always had its own foundation
andindividuality. Some legal writers are of the view that
inaccordance with Article 31, the civil action based
upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the
criminal
proceeding from criminal negligence and regardless ofthe result
of the latter. Hence, ‘the proviso in Section 2of Rule 111 with
reference to x x x Articles 32, 33 and