Obama Public Engagement Strategy

8/9/2019 Obama Public Engagement Strategy

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Americas Extended Hand:

Assessing the Obama Administrations

Global Engagement Strategy

B Kristin M. Lord and Marc Lnch


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Cover Image

In Octobe 2007, then Senato Baack Obaa addesses a cowd of oe t han 5,000 on Haden

Lawn, in font of West Hall, at a late oning capaign stop at Aizona State Univesit .

(TOm STOry)

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank, rst, the dozens o dedicated U.S. government ocials who spoke with us, oten severaltimes, during the course o our research (and to whom we granted anonmit to encourage rank conversation). Their insightswere vital to this report and we hope our analsis serves them well, even and perhaps especiall, where we were critical. Wealso wish to thank the external reviewers who provided extremel helpul comments: Sean Ada, Bruce Gregor, Goli Ameri,James Glassman, and Nick Cull.

Finall, we received enormous and enormousl patient support rom our CNAS colleagues, especiall Patrick Cronin,Abe Denmark, Andrew Exum, Ashle Hofman, Christine Parthemore, Shannon OReill, Travis Sharp, and Lizzie Threlkeld.Richard Fontaine, Bob Kaplan, and John Nagl gave particularl detailed and helpul comments. Eugene Chow deserves specialmention or his research assistance, as does Will Rogers who laid out the report. Finall, we thank Nate Fick or editorial andsubstantive guidance that shaped and improved the nal product. CNAS is a vibrant and supportive environment or act-

based, principled, and pragmatic national securit research because o all o them.


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By Kristin M. Lord and Marc Lync

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Americas Extended Hand:

Assessing the Obama Administrations Global Engagement Strategy


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Americas Extended Hand:Assessing the Obama Administrations Global Engagement Strategy

About the Authors

Dr. Kritin M. Lord is Vice President and Director o Studies at te Center or a New American

Security.

Dr. Marc Lynch is Associate Proessor o Political Science and te Director o te Institute or

Middle East Studies at te George Wasington University, Elliott Scool o International Aairs, and

a NonResident Senior Fellow at te Center or a New American Security.


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I . E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y Engagement is a pillar and guiding principleo President Barack Obamas oreign policy.At the beginning o Obamas presidency, the

United States aced a global public widely angry

at America and distrustul o its motives. An

unpopular war in Iraq and a controversial war on

terror threatened Americas moral authority over

seas and divided even Americas allies. Despite

substantial reorientation during the Bush admin

istration, this sentiment lingered, providing an

all too convenient rallying point or Americas

enemies and intractable political obstacles tocooperation with the United States. Damaged

credibility constrained American power.

Barack Obama pledged to renew Americas

relationship with the world, working in concert

with other nations to address shared global chal

lenges. He signaled a strong break rom the past

and delivered an ambitious series o speeches

designed to build a strong oundation o support

or his administrations oreign policy agenda.

But while his eorts enjoyed early success -

improving oreign public opinions o America

and raising hopes globally the administration

struggled to deliver on its promises. It raised

expectations that the administration could not

ulill in the short term and is scrambling to

ulill in the longer term.

his paper assesses the administrations global

public engagement strategy and its implemen

tation to date. hough the administrations

commitment to engagement has encompassed

a range o eorts such as negotiating withadversaries as well as allies, working through

multilateral institutions, and a stronger com

mitment to diplomacy, we ocus on just one key

dimension o the presidents broader engage

ment strategy, which we term strategic public

engagement and deine as eorts to engage,

inorm and persuade oreign publics to advance

U.S. national interests. We do not address

engagement through statetostate diplomacy


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and we touch only briely upon the chal lengeo combating violent extremism, which is the

subject o a separate paper by the Center or a

New America Security (CNAS).

In conducting this assessment, the authors met

together or individually with dozens o key

government oicials (to whom we promised

anonymity to guarantee rank discussions)

across the relevant agencies, reviewed a range o

policy documents and initiatives, and analyzed

the role o U.S. public engagement in key parts

o the world. Our goals are straightorward: to

assess critically what has been done and what

remains to be done in order to maximize the

chances that the administration can succeed in

advancing Americas national security objec

tives through public engagement.

We examine, irst, the administrations over

all philosophy regarding public engagement

and show how it both diers rom those o

previous administrations and demonstrates

striking continuity with the last years o theBush administration. Second, we examine the

administrations public engagement strategy in

three key policy areas relations between the

United States and the Muslim world, combating

violent extremism and promoting democracy

and human rights - and in each o our coun

tries - Iran, China, Aghanistan and Pakistan.

hird, we discuss the Obama administrations

eorts to build the inst itutional capacity neces

sary to execute a whole o government public

engagement strategy as recommended by morethan earl ier reports that criticized Americas

capacity to engage in successul, coordinated

public diplomacy. In part icular, we ocus on

the roles o the president himsel, the National

Security Council (NSC), Department o Deense

(DOD), State Depar tment, Broadcasting Board

o Governors, and the administrations eorts to

synchronize the activities o these organizations.

In assessing the success o public engagement, it isimportant to recognize both the limits and poten

tial o this nebulous instrument o statecra.

Public engagement is no silver bullet. I policies

are unpopular, no amount o snazzy marketing

will make them beloved. I national interests are

undamentally at odds, no amount o dialogue

will align them. Practitioners o public engage

ment can aspire only to explain the motivation

behind unpopular policies (that U.S. attacks on

al Qaeda are intended to counter terrorism, not

to wage war on Islam, or instance), put themin context, and highlight the many areas where

interests and values do overlap. Public engage

ment is also used most eectively in concert

with other instruments o power, as a sort o

diplomatic orcemultiplier that can ampliy the

impact o agi le diplomacy, eective development

activities and successul military operations.

Finally, public engagement provides policymakers

with options when other instruments o statecra

are severely constrained.

We conclude that, in many ways, the Obama

administration has achieved its initial objective

o restarting Americas relationship with the

world. he administration clearly understands

the importance o dialogue and o listening to

oreign publics, and it is attempting to incor

porate a sensitivity to public opinion into its

oreign policy decision making and translate

public support into political leverage. It has

aggressively reached out to oreign populations

through mass media, embassies, and Internetbased social media. It has conronted directly

issues o major political concern abroad, such as

the ArabIsraeli conlict, while also working to

build partnerships that will advance lowerpro

ile but urgent issues o shared concern, such as

economic opportunity and education. President

Obamas personal popularity is high. His widely

admired speeches, like his Cairo address to the

worlds Muslim communities and his words


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upon accepting the Nobel Peace Prize, have

riveted people around the globe. he adminis

tration has also made behindthescenes changes

designed to strengthen interagency coordination

and improve the organizations that support U.S.

public diplomacy and strategic communication.

Tough it is challenging to discern clear instances

in which public engagement alone made an

impact, the past months suggest some tan

gible results: greater support rom NAO allies

in Aghanistan, more support or the admin

istrations policy on Iran, and an al Qaeda

organization on the deensive. Te willingness o

world leaders to convene in Washington or

the April summit on nuclear security urther

demonstrated a new receptivity to U.S. leadership.

Many actors contributed to all o these accom

plishments, o course, but more avorable public

views o the United States created a political

climate more conducive to success.

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

EU

UK

USA

China

Russia

Iran

Figure 1: Positive Views o Key Countries According to 28 Nation Poll

Source: BBC World Service, "Global Views o United States Improve Wile Oter Countries Decline" (8 April 00).


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Yet, at the same time, high expectations havegiven way to skepticism as the administration

has struggled to deliver on its early promises.

he administration has been less successul at

implementing engagement strategies to sup

port speciic oreign policy objectives and slow

to jump through the windows o opportunity

it has opened. It has grappled to ind the right

balance between building trust, credibility, and

longterm relationships on the one hand and

developing more tactically ocused engagement

strategies to advance particular oreign policyobjectives on the other. Eorts to del iver on

the promises made and expectations raised by

President Obamas speeches have been inade

quately communicated (e.g., the ollowup to the

presidents Cairo overture to the Muslim world)

or else have simply been unmet (e.g., promises

to close Guantanamo). It is not yet clear i the

administrations quieter means o promoting

democracy and human rights will ultimately

prove more successul than the Bush administra

tions more vocal approach.

Moreover, though reorms to the institutions o

public engagement are underway in the ederal

government, the ability to implement public

engagement strategies remains hampered by

limited capacity and insu icient coordination.

For all the ta lk o smart power and whole o

government strategies, bureaucratic obstacles

continue to block reorm eorts. Major positions

remain unilled, or have been illed only recently

ater long vacancies, while key oices work withskeleton stas and scanty budgets. Questions

swirl among stakeholders about leadership, strat

egy, authorities, and coordination.

While we ind some o the most vocal criticism

o the administrations engagement strategies

unpersuasive, we do identiy a number o ser ious

problems that the administration should take

into account and adjustments it should consider

in the uture.1 Speciical ly, the U.S. government

needs more consistent development and execution o public engagement strategies or issues

and regions across its oreign policy agenda; a

State Department with less diuse authority

over public diplomacy and a stronger institu

tional capacity to perorm at the highest level;

and a Pentagon with stronger oversight over

inormation operations and the public engage

ment activities o combatant commands, and a

rebalanced relationship with civilian agencies.

A comprehensive external review o U.S. broad

casting strategy and the Broadcasting Board oGovernors as an organization is also needed.


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S U M M A R Y O F K E Y R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S

Te purpose o this report is to assess rather than recommend specic policies or activities, something already

done in more than 30 recent reports. Nonetheless, we make numerous specic recommendations in the course

o our analysis. A ew o these recommendations ollow:

Develop public engagement strategies in support o all major policy initiatives , especially those identi

ed in the orthcoming National Security Strategy.

Leverage renewed U.S. standing in countries like urkey, Indonesia and Brazil, where the popularity o

the American president has not translated into greater cooperation with or changed policies toward the

United States.

Devote more attention to ollowing through on major policy speeches by the president ; lay the ground

work in advance and engage all relevant government agencies as well as the private sector.

Recognize President Obamas important role in public engagement , but build the U.S. governments

capacity or public engagement across agencies and in the eld as well as in Washington.

Do not recreate a separate U.S. Inormation Agency but do create a small, grantgiving nonprot orga

nization to empower the private sector and support U.S. strategic public activities.

Conduct a major independent review o U.S. government broadcasting and the Broadcasting Board

o Governors; develop a strategy or the uture. Make the chairmanship o the Broadcasting Board o

Governors, an agency with a million dollar budget, a ulltime position.

Coordinate mutually reinorcing global engagement and counterterrorism activities more eectively .

Rebalance the roles o the Deense and State Departments in public engagement.

Avoid the temptation to make the National Security Council an operational agency ; ocus on setting a

unied strategy and coordinating agencies across the government.

Develop, within the State Department, a more unied public engagement strategy and organization

that coordinates public aairs, public diplomacy, and countering violent extremist ideologies across the

Departments many sources o power and with other government agencies.

Strengthen oversight over inormation operations at the Department o Deense . Assess public engage

ment activities o the combatant commands and determine which public engagement unctions are best

le to civilian agencies.


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ways unairly so, and ew around the world revisedtheir views. Polls showed ew signicant shis in

oreign public opinion despite these changes in

policy. Tis reality was reected in the shrewd deci

sion by the administrations nal Under Secretary o

State or Public Diplomacy and Public Aairs, James

Glassman, who played down eorts to improve

Americas image and instead ocused on tarnishing

al Qaeda. President Obama oered an opportunity

to start over, reinorced by a unique personal story

and a oreign policy vision centered upon engage

ment, dialogue, mutual interest and mutual respect.

President Obama moved quickly to translate this

opportunity into action. His inaugural address

oered a vision o a new American approach to

the world. In his rst week in ofce, the presi

dent announced that he would close the military

prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, within a year,

and he rmly rejected the language and rhetoric

o the global war on terror. He gave his rst

televised interview to an Arab television station,

alArabiya, and later delivered a prerecorded

message directly to the Iranian people. He rmly

committed to the responsible withdrawal o U.S.

combat orces rom Iraq, oered an outstretched

hand to Iran and engaged directly and personally

on the IsraeliPalestinian conict. In addition,

President Obama delivered a series o ambitious

speeches, most notably in Prague, Ghana, Cairo,

Oslo and at the United Nations, and travelled to

more oreign countries in his rst year than any

other president in history.3 Each o these speeches

was surrounded by a largescale public engagement campaign, led by Washington but with

heavy participation rom embassy stas world

wide, aimed at engaging indigenous populations.

In a sense, then, the Obama administration

treated its rst year as a reset phase, the

beginning o the administrations eorts not the

end, in the words o Deputy National Security

Adviser Benjamin J. Rhodes.4 Tis was not only

about popularity. Te strategic logic was clear:

II. ThE OBAMA ADMINISTRATIONSPUBLIC ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY:

AN OVERVIEW

"I took oce at a time when many around the

world had come to view America with skepticism

and distrust. Part o this was due to mispercep-

tions and misinormation about my country. Part

o this was due to opposition to specic policies, and

a belie that on certain critical issues, America has

acted unilaterally, without regard or the interests o

others. And this has ed an almost reexive anti-Americanism, which too oen has served as an

excuse or collective inaction."

- President Obama, Address to the United Nations

General Assembly, September 23, 2009

Barack Obama assumed the Presidency with a

unique opportunity and a maniest intent to rebuild

Americas relationship with the rest o the world. As

argued by opinion leaders across the U.S. political

spectrum, Americas global standing was in tatters

due to an unpopular war in Iraq, a perception ounbridled American unilateralism and charges that

the United States hypocritically advanced democ

racy abroad while compromising democratic values

at home. By the close o ormer President George W.

Bushs administration, the president was personally

unpopular overseas, with only percent o urks,

percent o Pakistanis, percent o Indonesians,

percent o Germans and percent o Britons

holding at least some condence that he would do

the right thing in world aairs.2 President Obama

promised a new beginning or Americas relationship with the world, a vision or which oreign

populations seemed to yearn.

Te presidential transition created an opportunity

or a new start. Although the tone and substance

o U.S. oreign policy changed markedly between

the rst and second Bush administration, the world

seemed not to notice. George W. Bush had become a

symbol o the worlds dismay with America, in some


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create openings or new policies that mighthave been rejected i advanced by the previous

administration, leverage the Presidents personal

popularity and the resh start he oered, and lay

the groundwork or an ambitious oreign policy

agenda that would require global support. In par

ticular, the Obama administration sought to:

Enhance U.S. credibility and moral authority

in the eyes o oreign populations.

Reverse trends toward greater antiAmeri

canism and undercut eorts o adversaries toexploit that sentiment or their own purposes.

Highlight shared interests and values in ways

that would acil itate cooperation.

Build peopletopeople relationships

that would orm the basis o longterm

partnerships.

Far more than a eelgood extra, public engage

ment was considered an essential oundation or

diplomacy and a means o political leverage. Te

administrations gamble is that politics mattersin the calculations o oreign leaders, includ

ing leaders o authoritarian states, and the new

administration could leverage more avorable

views o Obama personally and the United States

generally to inuence these calculations or, at a

minimum, to head o gratuitous opposition.

Te presidents personal commitment to engage

ment is shared by the major oreign policy principals

in the administration. Secretary o Deense Robert

Gates and Secretary o State Hillary Clinton have

articulated a shared vision o smart power and

have spoken oen o the need to realize a whole o

government approach to addressing oreign policy

problems, an approach that incorporates public

diplomacy and strategic communication.5 Secretary

Clinton has made public outreach a central part

o her oreign visits, appearing on Indonesian

talk shows, in a discussion in Doha televised by

alJazeera, in Indian villages, in town hallstyle

meetings with Pakistani journalists, and at round

tables with students in Mexico, to name but a ew

examples.6 She created an ambitious social media

outreach ofce that reports directly to her. Adm.

Michael Mullen, Chairman o the Joint Chies o

Sta, is an outspoken supporter o global public

engagement and the need to rebuild American

credibility overseas. Furthermore, the President

appointed close advisors to senior strategic communications positions in his National Security Council.

More than one year into the new administration,

there are signs that the president has succeeded in

transorming at least some aspects o Americas

standing in the world. President Obamas per

sonal popularity is high, and views o the United

States have improved rapidly throughout much

o the world and, outside o the Arab world,

have largely stayed there. Between February

Te strategic logic was

clear: create openings or

new policies that might

have been rejected i

advanced by the previous

administration, leverage

the Presidents personalpopularity and the resh

start he ofered, and lay

the groundwork or an

ambitious oreign policy

agenda that would require

global support.


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and August o last year, approval o the United

States increased by percentage points in

Bahrain, in Kuwait, in Egypt, and in

Morocco.7 Outside the Middle East, avorable

views increased by points in Germany and

France, in Indonesia, in Mexico, in the

United Kingdom, in Brazil and Nigeria, and

in Argentina.8 Gallup surveys show that overall

global views o American leadership have risen by

points in the year Obama has been president.9President Obamas surprising selection or the

Nobel Peace Prize demonstrated the hopes and

aspirations placed upon him by wide swaths o

the world, even i it mystied many Americans.

Having restored a more positive image o the

United States, the administration is now embrac

ing a role as a convener and global hub as part o

its broader strategy o engagement. Te Nuclear

Security Summit showed this at the traditional

level o diplomacy, positioning President Obama

at the center o a large gathering o world lead

ers united by shared norms and institutions. Te

Entrepreneurship Summit in April similarly

saw the United States at the center o an emerging

global network, with some leading entrepre

neurs rom Muslim communities around the world

converging on Washington to exchange ideas,

build ruitul connections with each other andAmerican business people, and to plan a range o

ollowup activities ocused on shared interests

and opportunities. Tough one attendee indicated

a disappointing showing by American business

entrepreneurs (as opposed to social entrepreneurs)

at the Summit, these activities show promise.

However, i the Obama administration contin

ues to embrace its role as a global convener, it

should be careul not to repeat the past mistake

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

2000 2002 2003 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Britain

France

Germany

Turkey

Pakistan

Indonesia

Jordan

Figure 2: Global Views o the United States in Select Countries rom 2000-2009

Source: BBC World Service, "Global Views o United States Improve Wile Oter Countries Decline" (8 April 00).


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As trained social scientists, we eel bound to dene

our terms. In te area o public engagement, we do so

reluctantly. Far too muc energy as been spent over

te last ew years in arguments over terms and deni

tions. Indeed, it is emblematic o te problems wit tis

eld tat tere is still no consensual denition or its

core activities.

Plic diplomac, dened as te promotion o national

interests troug eorts to engage, persuade, and inu

ence oreign publics, traditionally ocused on longterm

relationsip building and a ew core activities suc as

broadcasting, excange programs, and publications. Many

policy makers seeking support or teir missions com

plain tat traditional public diplomacy ails to adequately

grapple wit vital, urgent callenges to American interests.

Plic afairs, wic engages bot domestic and oreign

audiences, typically ocuses on sortterm eorts to

engage te media and sape te our news cycle.1

Tese eorts attract criticism or being too tactical and

too ocused on te sort term, even wen tey are

intended to be strategic and run out o te Wite house

(e.g., te illated Ofce o Global Communications in te

early Bus administration).

Strategic commnication is an integrated process

tat includes te development, implementation,

assessment and evolution o public messages actions

in support o policies, interests, and longterm goals2.

As it is implemented in practice, owever, it generally

ocuses on tactically supporting military or counter

terrorism objectives (sometimes including inormation

operations and/or covert psycological operations

known as PSYOPS), wit an implied subordination to

sortterm policy goals suc as building support or

te war in Iraq or gting te war o ideas against al

Qaeda. As Cairman o te Joint Cies, Admiral Mullen

recently complained, te strategic communication

rubric tends to substitute messaging or interaction and

to prioritie sort term mission requirements over te

longerterm building o relationsips and credibility.3

While this is not how sophisticated plic diplomac,

plic afairs or strategic commnication proessionals

wold perceive their jos, these terms have ecome

tarnished and loaded. Te problem wit all o tese

denitions is tat in practice tey are dened more by

wo executes te mission tan by teir objectives or

metods. Public diplomacy, watever its orm, is seen as

wat te State Department does. Strategic communica

tion, watever its orm, is viewed as wat te Deense

Department does. Public aairs, watever its orm, is seen

as wat ofces carrying tat name do, wic is principallymedia relations. We tereore propose a master concept

o strategic public engagement, te promotion o

national interests troug governmental eorts to inorm,

engage, and inuence oreign populations. We preer tis

term because it leaprogs denitional debates and gets

past bureaucratic tur wars, allowing policy makers to

ocus on wat te U.S. government sould be doing and

howrater tan who sould be doing it. Strategic public

engagement incorporates all o te American govern

ments deliberate communications wit te rest o te

world.

In our view, tis term conveys te strategic and sys

tematic use o engagement to acieve a oreign policy

objective, not engagement as an end in itsel. It entails

a planned process, based on a careully researced

understanding o te audience and o its interests,

couced in language calibrated to engage te audience

in te intended manner, using te best one or twoway

metod o engagement (weter a speec, an edu

cational excange program, social networking tools,

an American Center, or a documentary produced by

nonAmerican lmmaker wo sares an aborrence or

violent extremism even i e disagrees on oter topics),as part o a larger strategy, and evaluated to determine

i it is successul in advancing te intended goals.

1. DSB Task Force on Strategic Communication report (2008), 2.

2. Ibid, 2.

3. Admiral Michael G. Mullen. Strategic Communication: Getting Back to Basics.Joint Forces

Quarterly, Issue 55,( Fourth Quarter), 2009.

D E F I N I N G S T R A T E G I C P U B L I C E N G A G E M E N T


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o appearing to put the United States at the centero every global challenge, ocusing too much on

us and not enough on them. And, ideal ly,

the eort to promote entrepreneurship will soon

see the U.S. government step out o the drivers

seat and shi momentum to the private sec

tor. Nonetheless, these two initiatives are well

chosen. Tey advance causes that carry tangible

benets or American security over the long term

and simultaneously emphasize the positive role

America can play in the world. Tis is the best o

public engagement positive action, in supporto American interests, that also underscores the

image America wishes or itsel, and creates an

environment more conducive to cooperation.

Shortalls and ChallengesDespite this auspicious beginning, as the admin

istration entered its second year, there was a

palpable sense that the Obama bubble had deat

ed.10 Te high expectations and hopes placed on

the new President seemed to move rom blessing

to curse as the Obama Administration struggled

to implement its ambitious agenda. A grow

ing tide o opinion questions whether President

Obamas deeds will ever match the promise o his

words, whether he tried to do too much at once,

and whether he has even signicantly changed

the Bush administrations policies. Some o these

criticisms are exaggerated. But several problems

are real and merit attention.

ThE SAY-DO GAP

Te Obama administration aces a new orm o

the wellworn saydo gap, the perceived distance

between words and deeds that bedeviled the Bush

administrations communication eorts. Large

swaths o world opinion viewed the Bush admin

istration as hypocritical, advancing standards o

democracy and human rights and the peaceul res

olution o conicts that it was unwilling to accept

or itsel.11 Tis perception became so crippling

that many oreign societies reused to listen to the

Bush administrations arguments and to assume

the worst about American intentions. Tis problemwas acknowledged in the late years by the Bush

administration, which ound that the personal

animosity toward President Bush was so deeply

embedded across much (but certainly not all) o

the world that it overshadowed admirable initia

tives like the presidents commitment to ghting

AIDS in Arica or combating human trafcking.

Te Obama administration aces a dierent kind

o saydo gap: a gap between promises and

what is actually delivered. Having raised expecta

tions on a wide range o issues, the United States

is now paying the cost or ailing to live up to its

own rhetoric. Brilliant speeches and an ambitious

policy agenda raised the hopes o the world but at

the cost o racing beyond the ability o American

diplomacy to deliver. o be clear, the problem is

notthat President Obama has ailed to transorm

the world overnight, which would prove an impos

sible test and which neither he nor his advisors

expected. It is that he has allen short o the litmus

tests he created or himsel, such as promising to

close the prison at Guantanamo within a year. It

is that he ailed to sufciently set in motion the

many bureaus, embassies, combatant commands

and other parts o the U.S. government, and the

countless private businesses, nongovernmental

organizations, media organizations, and proes

sional societies outside the U.S. government to

implement the vision he presented.12

Some conclude that the administration should not

have overpromised, and should not have gone so ar

to distinguish itsel rom the outgoing administration. Tis criticism is not warranted. Making the

most o the change rom President Bush to President

Obama to reap the strategic benets o a resh start

requiredlaying out bold markers to highlight the

dierences. On issues ranging rom arms control

and the environment to Middle East peace and

the relationship with the Islamic world, President

Obama could only ully harvest the benets o

change by staking out clear, dramatic new paths.


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Still, the administration has suered the consequences o raising expectations beyond what it

could deliver and or not responding as well as it

might have to circumstances it could not control,

but potentially could have inuenced - like the

rapidly evolving domestic politics in Iran and

Pakistan, or the grim stalemate that stymied the

push or IsraeliPalestinian peace.13 And at times,

the administration is suering rom its ailure to

take public opinion sufciently into account. In

authoritarian countries like Kyrgyzstan, protecting

American interests like the U.S. air base in Manasat the expense o not publicly criticizing an oppres

sive regime appeared a reasonable and pragmatic

policy - until the day the revolution started and

opposition orces won. In key theaters like Yemen

and Pakistan, the use o drone strikes in support o

important counterterrorism objectives has risked

inaming public opposition and undermining

support or the broader mission. Te administra

tion has sought to minimize this allout by using

ever more precise weapons and embedding more

aggressive military tactics in a more holistic strategy. Te risk remains nonetheless.

Midway through Obamas second year in ofce,

the administration now has to conront the rising

cost o this pattern o bold commitments ollowed

by limited delivery. Administration ofcials argue

that this is more a problem o perception than o

reality: as in the debate over health care reorm,

they suggest, the president sets out ambitious goals

which then are accomplished through hard work

and persistence. Te perceived pattern has undermined American credibility and limited reception

to new presidential rhetoric, which always aced

a natural limit particularly in the Arab world,

where the IsraeliPalestinian conict weighs heav

ily in local views o U.S. credibility.

Te potential temptation is to respond by upping

the ante, promising jobs in the Middle East or

an IsraeliPalestinian nal status peace agree

ment. Tis would simply deer the problem and

raise the stakes in the saydo gap, which is poi

son to credibility in any domain. People need to

see the United States delivering on its promises or

they will begin to tune out even the most stirring

rhetoric. One solution would, o course, be simply

to achieve more policy successes. Short o that, a

communications strategy should systematically

and consistently engage and explain to peopleabroad the administrations longterm strategy,

where it serves mutual interests, and any progress

made. No policy or ollowup activity will change

minds i intended audiences do not know about it.

TACTICAL ENGAGEMENT

Another challenge to the administrations

approach is striking the right balance between the

longterm building o new relationships with or

eign populations, (or instance through educational

and proessional exchanges) and the shorttermdemands o tactical strategic communication.

Te Obama administration certainly considers its

postCairo eorts to build relations in the elds

o science, education, and entrepreneurship to be

strategic, in that they contribute to building the

longterm oundation or healthier relationships

between American and Muslim societies and help

to marginalize extremists by shoring up popula

tions potentially at risk to radicalization.

Te high expectations

and hopes placed on

the new President

seemed to move rom

blessing to curse as the

Obama Administration

struggled to implement itsambitious agenda.


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Yet, the administration has at times seemed less

interested in designing tactically ocused pub

lic engagement campaigns aimed at achieving

speciic goals or engaging speci ic audiences orgeographic regions.14 It has shown little inclina

tion to leverage its popularity to gain political

advantage: in rising powers such as Brazil,

Indonesia and urkey, where the President is

popular; in Japan, where trust in the United

States to do the right thing in world aairs

jumped rom percent to percent between

and ;15 and in Israel, where the United

States ailed to reach out to the peace camp

and lost control o the presidents image to the

point where Prime Minister Netanyahu gainedrather than suered rom an open conrontation

with him. here are exceptions. For instance,

though it was slow to emerge, the administra

tion developed a careully designed interagency

public engagement strategy in Aghanistan and

Pakistan. However, this highly ocused eort

in a theater o con lict is the exception to what

seems a wider rule.

WEAK INSTITUTIONS, INSUFFICIENT RESOURCESTe administration also continues to struggle

with a more longstanding problem in U.S. public

diplomacy and strategic communication: weak

institutions, weak coordination across agencies

and inadequate resources relative to the mis

sion. While calling or a whole o government

approach has become an allpurpose mantra in

policy circles, translating it into practice remains

a challenge. As discussed in detail in section III,

ongoing problems within and between dierent

arms o the U.S. government continue to rustrateeorts at executing a wellcoordinated, eective

engagement strategy. Tough President Obama

will be an important asset as long as he remains

popular with oreign audiences, no presidents

personal popularity is sufcient to invite long

term success. President Obama, and all American

presidents who succeed him, need wellunction

ing, wellunded public engagement institutions

to advance American policy interests, both in

Washington and at embassies, consulates, com

batant commands, and other U.S. governmentoutposts overseas.

Te challenge or the administration is now to

capitalize on the new opportunities it has created

or itsel and address the perceived gap between

promise and action. I not addressed, this gap will

diminish the Obama administrations own suc

cess in restoring American credibility and carry

longterm consequences or American interests.

Te Obama administration still has time to head

o this negative perception and capitalize onthe new start it has generated or America. Te

administration has successully charted a new

course. Now it must ollow through.

Deining Strategic Plic EngagementEngagement is a pil lar o President Obamas

oreign policy. Indeed, to the extent there is an

Obama Doctrine, comprehensive engagement is

one o its guiding principles, viewed at the high

est levels as a crucial means to achieve a broader

Te administration also

continues to struggle

with a more longstanding

problem in U.S. public

diplomacy and strategic

communication: weak

institutions, weakcoordination across agencies

and inadequate resources

relative to the mission.


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|

set o oreign policy objectives.16 Engagement- which encompasses tools as disparate as nego

tiations, dialogue, consultation, network building

and public diplomacy - is central to the admin

istrations policy on nearly every priority issue,

whether Iran, Pakistan, arms control, or climate

change.17 Tis paper ocuses on one dimension

o this general principle: the eort to engage,

inorm, and persuade oreign publics to advance

U.S. national interests. We call this eort stra-

tegic public engagement; others preer the more

amiliar terms o public diplomacy or strategiccommunication. (See Dening Strategic Public

Engagementonpage ) It is public because it

involves reaching out to populations, not just gov

ernments overseas. And it is engagement because

it is a twoway process, an ongoing interaction,

rather than a oneway message aimed exclusively

at inuencing oreign populations. Understanding

oreign publics is a central part o strategic

communication. Crucially, it is conceived as a

ullscale interaction, dealing with a wide range

o issues o shared interest and concern (as diverseas economic opportunity and disease prevention).

his concept o strategic public engagement, by

whatever name, was not invented by the new

administration. It is the product o years o

hardearned experience and sustained thought

inside and outside the U.S. government. Because

o this gradual process, it is jarring to consider

the enormous changes between and .

he early Bush administration saw itsel engaged

in a war o ideas against radical Islam andcombating an antiAmericanism grounded in

a deep opposition to American values rather

than a political response to American oreign

policy. Its public diplomacy was perceived by

much o the world as too much lecturing and

moralizing rhetoric, ocused on message con

trol and in luencing target audiences, and too

little consultation, listening, and dialogue. his

characterization was in act something o a

caricature, but in the atermath o the war onterror and invasion o Iraq, people in many or

eign countries were primed to see the worst.

By the last years o the Bush administration,

however, this approach had changed dramati

cally. hinking on strategic communication

(as on so many oreign policy issues) matured

rapidly across the U.S. government, which

began to pay ar more attention to the ideas

and attitudes o the targeted audiences and put

ar more eort into encouraging eedback. he

last years o the Bush administration saw the

reconceptualization o public engagement to

ocus not just on oneway messaging but also

on building relationships, twoway communica

tion and the need to support credible thirdparty

voices instead o putting the United States at the

center o every dialogue.18 James K. Glassman,

its last Under Secretary o State or Public

Diplomacy, emerged as a passionate advocate o

what he cal led Public Diplomacy .. rooted in

Internetbased dialogues.19 American o icials

returned to alJazeera ater years o de acto

boycott, while public diplomacy leaders eagerly

embraced the potential o the Internet and pub

licprivate partnerships. his change has been so

widely accepted across party and organizational

lines that ew now recognize its importance or

its extent.20

he turn to this listenercentric concept o

strategic communication is rooted in practical

experience. Navigating the new global inorma

tion environment requires a concerted ocus onlistening and on conversation, rather than on

controlling messages. he administrations pri

mary statement o its strategic communication

strategy to date begins rom the assertion that

the United States must do a better job under

standing the attitudes, opinions, grievances, and

concerns o peoples not just elites around the

world.21 his attempts to appeal to audiences

in ways that resonate with them, not just us, and


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to listen and understand relevant audiences ontheir own terms. he administration built upon

its predecessors evolution into an engagement

oriented approach to strategic communication,

with a particular emphasis on understanding

oreign publics and on synchronizing words

and deeds. It also attempted to broaden engage

ment well beyond a counterterrorism ocus

to engage wider publics on a broader range o

issues, and to institutionalize the new concept

across the whole o government.

he concept o strategic public engagement that

seems to drive the Obama administration stems

rom the recognition o the rising power o or

eign populations and the dramatic shits in how

inormation lows in todays world. Mobilizing

public support abroad is not just about being

liked it can help to achieve oreign policy

objectives, or at least head o act ive opposi

tion. Publics have always been powerul; indeed,

Benjamin Franklin sought to build popular

support in Europe or the American revolution

aries. However, due to the spread o democracy,

inormation and communication technologies,

and changing global norms, the latent power o

publics has grown exponentially. New media and

inormation technologies, like social networking

and Internetcapable cell phones, have trans

ormed the dynamics o communication and

interaction across the world and opened up new

opportunities or genuine global engagement.

Coupled with hour telev ision news broad

casts, this t rend makes inormation accessible towider and wider audiences and puts world lead

ers under unprecedented scrutiny. Under these

conditions, words, tone and speed matter more

than ever beore.22

he imperative to listen and engage with

oreign publics does not mean that oreign

opinion should drive American oreign policy.

he United States must protect its own interests

and promote its own agenda. At times that wi ll

lead the United States to pursue policies thatare unpopular - and that is both expected and

proper. he goal is not simply to be liked. It is to

be more in luential and thereore more eective

at lower cost.23 In a world where oreign public

opinion has ever greater impact on the success

or ailure o vital American national interests,

it should be weighed in making policy decisions

and should shape how the United States pur

sues its policies and how U.S. leaders talk about

American policies. Listening, understanding and

engaging makes or better policy, helps to avoidunnecessary conlicts, and should ideally allow

policymakers to oresee and preempt objections

to policies that sound worse in the ield than

they do in Washington.

Tere is no contradiction between public engage

ment and hardnosed diplomacy, even with

hostile or unpleasant regimes. Te administra

tion has held up the iconic Ronald Reagan, who

energetically engaged Soviet leaders and publics

behind the Iron Curtain, to show the eective

ness o reaching out to even the most oppressive

regimes while simultaneously engaging their

people.24 It has rejected the view that the United

States should not both engage the Iranian people

and negotiate with the regime, or that it could not

both reach out to Muslims and combat al Qaeda.

Engagement should not be held hostage to the

actions o the extremist ringe or to the demands

o authoritarian regimes. Te administrations

engagement eort sought to change the terms o

the relationship, away rom exclusively ocusingon the hotbutton political issues that divide and

toward the broad swath o economic and social

interests that could unite.

he eects o strategic public engagement will

rarely be elt in a single, dramatic outcome.

Instead, they shape the environment in which

political leaders operate. When American stand

ing is high and its president and policies popular,

then political leaders will stand to gain rom


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aligning with the United States and risk politicalharm i they do not. When American standing is

low, the incentives reverse, and political lead

ers gain by distancing themselves rom America

and suer through association. hus, during

Operation Desert Storm, the irst Bush admin

istration was able to assemble an overwhelming

international coalition to liberate Kuwait and to

maintain it in support o a push or ArabIsraeli

peace. In , by contrast, the administra

tion o President George W. Bush was unable to

muster international support or the invasiono Iraq, while political leaders such as Gerhard

Schroeder in Germany scored political victories

by publicly opposing the United States. In ,

world leaders (the most since the ounding o

the United Nations) enthusiastically converged

on Washington or the nuclear summit, jockey

ing or public meetings with President Obama

that would presumably be popular with their

own publics. It is diicult to imagine a similar

gathering during the Bush administration.

In assessing the success o public engagement

strategies, thereore, it is important to recognize

both the limits and potential o this nebulous

instrument o statecrat . Public engagement is

no silver bullet. I policies are unpopular, no

amount o snazzy marketing will make them

beloved. I national interests are undamen

tally at odds, then no amount o dialogue will

align them. Public engagement can only hope

to explain the motivation behind unpopular

policies (or instance, t hat U.S. attacks on alQaeda are intended to counter terrorism not

evidence o an American war on Islam), put

them in context, and highlight the many areas

where interests and va lues do overlap. Public

engagement is also used most e ectively in

concert with other instruments o power, as

a sort o diplomatic orcemultiplier that can

ampliy the impact o agile diplomacy, eective

development activities, and successul military

operations. Battleield success may win public

support but only i those publics sense a chang

ing tide and enemies are not able to manipulate

inormation in images to challenge that percep

tion. In diplomacy, e ective public engagement

can play apreventive role, allowing the United

States to shape and articulate its policies in ways

that head o opposition beore it arises. Finally,

public engagement provides policy ma kers with

options when other instruments o statecrat are

severely constrained. Force is a blunt instrument

and can only be applied, or even threatened, to

good eect in a relatively narrow set o circum

stances. Diplomacy must conront the political

context in which oreign leaders act, a political

context that potentially can be shaped through

public engagement. Where diplomatic relations

are strained, as with Iran, reaching out directly

to a countrys people opens new opportunities to

shape the broader relationship.

President Obamas national security team has

set out to ensure that strategic public engage

ment matters in oreign policy, that it is taken

seriously in policymaking and integrated in an

anticipatory ashion to avoid preventable disas

ters. Public diplomacy veterans will recognize

this ideal - immortalized by the journalist and

I policies are unpopular,

no amount o snazzy

marketing will make

them beloved. I

national interests are

undamentally at odds,

then no amount odialogue will align them.


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U.S. Inormation Agency director Edward R.Murrows remark that he wanted to be in on

the takeos, not just the crash landings - as a

goal long sought, but never achieved.25 Te same

could be said o the administrations ambition to

bring together all relevant agencies, domestic and

oreign policy alike, to coordinate strategic public

engagement across the whole o government. As

the issues discussed below in more depth sug

gest, delivery has not yet matched the ideal. Te

administration thus ar has done much better at

policy rollouts than at either proactively shapingthe environment with an eye toward the uture

or ollowing up on the bold policy statements and

principles laid out in speeches.

In short, the philosophy behind the administra

tions approach to strategic public engagement is

sound, even i key problems remain unresolved.I sustained throughout the administration, the

payo should be greater support or a wide vari

ety o oreign policy objectives.

III. PUBLIC ENGAGEMENTAND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

o illustrate the strengths and weaknesses o the

administrations perormance, we briey assess

the strategic public engagement dimension o

several discrete areas o U.S. oreign policy. We

examine three key policy areas - U.S.Muslim

World relations, combating violent extremism

and democracy and human rights - and our

key countries - Iran, China Aghanistan and

Pakistan. It is vital to emphasize that in most

cases, it is too soon to assess the success or ailure

o these eorts. Te administration has aced a

daunting set o challenges abroad, as well as having

to manage an economic disaster while pursuing a

difcult domestic political agenda. It understands

these challenges as longterm ones, and its public

engagement reects this. No administration could

reasonably be expected to solve the ArabIsraeli

conict or the Iranian nuclear issue or reverse a

decade o tense relations with the Muslim world

in its rst months. It has demonstrated persistence in its pursuit o these objectives in the ace

o signicant resistance and limited early returns.

Yet some lessons can be gleaned rom the record to

date - and there is time or the administration to

adapt and adjust.

One-wa commnication

Speeces

Broadcasting

Media Interviews

Webpages

Print publications

Signs and advertising

Exibits

Two-wa commnication

Town halls

Internet cat and blogs

Social networking

Callin sows

Track II dialogues

Conerences

Relationship-ilding

Proessional excanges

International visitor programs

Art and cultural excanges

Speaker programs

Educational excanges

T h E T O O L S O F P U B L I C E N G A G E M E N T

U.S. government ocials have countless ways to inorm, engage, and inuence oreign publics in support o oreign policy objectives.

To be used or best efect, these tools o public engagement should be selected careully and used in concert with each. An illustrative

list ollows.


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Otreach to Mslim Societies"I have come here to seek a new beginning

between the United States and Muslims around

the world; one based upon mutual interest and

mutual respect; and one based upon the truth

that America and Islam are not exclusive, and

need not be in competition. Instead, they over-

lap, and share common principles - principles o

justice and progress; tolerance and the dignity o

all human beings."

- President Barack Obama, Cairo, June 2009

One o the Obama administrations irst cha l

lenges was to begin to rebuild relations with

the worlds Muslim populations, relations that

had deteriorated precipitously in the new mil

lennium. he rebuilding eort began rom the

belie that Americas relations with . billion

Muslims around the world could not orever be

deined by the lens o counterterrorism. he

administration sought to:

Signal a clear break with the past administration, which had become not only unpopular but

also distrusted by most o the worlds Muslims.

Develop a broader based relationship with over

one billion members o the worlds population

who, while extremely diverse, also share a com

mon religious and cultural bond.

Positively engage a bulging new generation o

Muslim young people, who are key to the long

term stability o regions critically important to

the United States.Build a oundation or addressing shared chal

lenges such as the protection o human rights,

economic development, and the ArabIsraeli

conict.

President Obamas Cairo speech to the Muslim

world epitomized t he potential o strategic pub

lic engagement. he speech itsel was a classic

piece o presidential public diplomacy, a global

spectacle that ocused the worlds attention on

a inelycrated speech ollowed by twowayengagement via social media and acetoace

interactions at embassies. It sought both to

organize a wideranging relationship with the

Muslim world across a broad spectrum o areas

o common interest such as education, jobs, and

opportunity and to pursue a keen strategic pur

pose o marginalizing al Qaeda and rebuilding

Americas standing in the Muslim world. o do

so, it illustrated the shared interests o Muslim

societies and the United States in countering

violent extremists, rhetorically uniting them inthe ight against terrorism and countering the

idea that Americans see Muslims only through

a lens o terrorism. Importantly, it also extended

the discussion o shared interests and values ar

beyond terrorism to include science, education,

and entrepreneurship - even as it acknowledged

real dierences. he speech directly addressed

the political issues o primary concern to many

Muslims it hoped to reach, including the Israeli

Palestinian conlict.

Te process o shaping and then disseminating

the speech also worked well. With the coordina

tion o the NSC and with a leading role or the

State Departments Policy Planning sta, all rel

evant government agencies contributed to shaping

its themes and language. Outside experts con

tributed their views, and input on attitudes and

opinions in the targeted countries was careully

evaluated in advance. Finally, this speech was

ollowed by a campaignlike eort to continue the

dialogue via embassyorganized sessions and onsocial media, and to implement longterm pro

grams that built on the relationships and interests

outlined by the speech. o eectively engage

young people, who make up large percentages o

their respective populations, the Obama admin

istration chose to ocus on science, technology,

education and entrepreneurship and using social

networking technologies and text messages, both

o which are widely used by young Muslims.


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Te aermath o the Cairo speech also demonstrates the limitations o the administrations

eorts to date. Many Muslims chaed at the

absence o rapid, visible ollowup.26 Muslims

abroad expected actions - not plans - in the days

and months that ollowed the speech. When they

saw little ollowthrough in the short term, and

public debate quickly turned to the stando over

Israeli settlements, views o the Cairo overture

appear to have rapidly soured. Te label o words

without deeds, once it sticks, is difcult to remove.

Te administration argues that it has in act met

many o the promises it made in the speech and,

in any event, the objective was to start building a

longterm relationship not launch a series o new

initiatives. It has adhered to its commitment to a

responsible withdrawal rom Iraq in the ace o

turbulence and some pressure to relax its time

table, and has craed an eective message on

the need to transition to true Iraqi sovereignty.

It has actively sought IsraeliPalestinian peace

negotiations, paying signicant domestic and

international political costs despite little immedi

ate progress. It ullled another o its promises by

appointing White House staer Rashad Hussain

to be the American envoy to the Organization

o Islamic Countries. Administration ofcials,

like Farah Pandith, Special Representative to the

Muslim World (a political appointee who stayed

on rom the Bush administration), have trav

eled widely as they seek to build new networks

and programs to realize the new vision. Te

administration expanded business and education exchange programs, announced a global

entrepreneurship summit, started a und to

support technological development in Muslim

majority countries, appointed science envoys

and launched health initiatives, including a new

global eort to eradicate polio. Embassies around

the world continue to emphasize reaching out to

Muslims. Finally, in April , Secretary Clinton

announced a new initiative called Partners or a

New Beginning, which will engage the considerable resources, capabilities and expertise o the

U.S. private sector to support activities laid out in

the Cairo speech. Among other components, the

new initiative will encourage companies to con

tribute equipment or technology to new centers o

scientic excellence that the U.S. government is

launching in many predominantly Muslim coun

tries or partnerships between U.S. and oreign

universities to improve business education.27

Nonetheless, ollowup activities rolled out so ar

have received little publicity and have not been

craed into, or perceived as, a coherent and per

suasive narrative o ongoing robust engagement.28

Tere has been no sustained, ongoing campaign

to inorm either Americans or oreign Muslims

o progress on these programs. Until the recent

Entrepreneurship Summit and Partners or a

New Beginning, there had been no major roll

outs o new programs to reocus attention, and it

is not clear how much attention either program,

launched in Washington, garnered overseas. It

is difcult to change perceptions when ew are

aware o the activities. Frustrated administration

ofcials complain that the administration has not

had sufcient time to undamentally change how

the government does business, and that the media

ignore their substantive accomplishments to date.

But in a undamental way, such complaints miss

the point: when the goal is to change the narra

tive, a ailure to change the narrative can only be

judged asa ailure. Te administration may still

be successul in changing the narrative over thelonger term, but it has not achieved that goal yet.

Te reception o the Cairo speech, marked rst

by hope and then by disappointment, shows

the difculty o changing the narrative and the

importance o listening to what the intended

audiences consider important. Arabs viewed

the speech through the lens o specic poli

cies, particularly the IsraeliPalestinian conict,

and watched careully or evidence that the


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administration was both credible and capableo delivering on its promises. Administration

ofcials appeared rustrated that the Cairo speech

got hijacked by the ensuing public battle over

Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Yet they

should learn rom the act that it did. President

Obama was correct to directly tackle the Israeli

Palestinian issue in the Cairo speech and to

commit the United States to a sustained, active

role. Te Cairo speech could not have succeeded

without such a clear message on how the United

States would address the Palestinian issue. Eventhough the administration correctly identies a

wide range o issues where the United States and

Muslims could cooperate to mutual advantage,

the settlements issue, rightly or wrongly, remains

a litmus test or U.S. credibility with Arab audi

ences. Tough Arabs in general and young Arabs

in particular are highly concerned with issues like

jobs and education, Arab media and the politi

cal elite are consumed by the peace process; they

treat it as an index o American credibility, and

will not allow it to be sidestepped in avor o eventhe worthiest o other programs.

he presidents Cairo speech was arguably

the highlight o his strategic public engage

ment eorts to date. However, it could have

had greater impact i the preparation had been

done in advance in order to allow new initia

tives to be introduced quickly to capture the

momentum. Similarly, the demand or an Israeli

settlement reeze in advance o negotiations

with the Palestinians was well communicatedand eectively integrated into a wider regional

strategy. However, litt le was done to engage

Israeli public opinion in advance in order to build

support or such a move, and there seemed to be no

plan B when the Netanyahu government reused

to agree. As a result, the administration lost a great

deal o credibility and goodwill on both sides o

the struggle. Finally, the disconnect between

this broadbased Muslim outreach and more

traditional counterterrorism and combatingviolent extremism eorts (see below) has proven

challenging both inside the government and in

the public debate. hough policy disagreements

will persist, the United States can hope to start a

shit in Muslim perceptions regarding American

motives and trustworthiness that will inluence

whether those disagreements are seen as discrete

points o departure or chapters in a decadeslong

story o betrayal.

Comating Violent ExtremismTe Obama administration sought to rerame

Americas relationship with the worlds Muslims,

moving away rom the Global War on error

that dened the post/ Bush administra

tion (even aer the administration itsel tried

to abandon the term, indicating the stubborn

stickiness o public perceptions). Tis meant

detaching the broadbased global engagement

eorts rom major ongoing eorts ocused on

combating violent extremism. Even as the admin

istration accelerated Predator strikes against al

Qaeda targets and escalated the military and,

to a lesser extent, the civilian commitment to

Aghanistan, President Obamas engagement with

the Muslim world explicitly aimed to broaden the

relationship and not rame it primarily in terms

o what administration oicials have cal led the

distorting lens o counterterrorism. President

Obamas team, as the Bush administration came

to accept in its inal years, understood the urgent

need to prevent the consolidation o a "clash o

civilizations" narrative that empowers extremistson both sides. o combat violent extremism, the

administration seeks to:

Undercut al Qaedas global prominence by reduc

ing its centrality in ofcial U.S. government

rhetoric while continuing or expanding concrete

actions to destroy and degrade its network.

Drive a wedge between Muslim populations and

violent Islamist extremists to deprive the latter


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o support and succor, in order to isolate andmarginalize extremists rom their own societies,

each other, and global Muslim populations.

Understand the local drivers o extremism and

tailor specic approaches to countering the

appeal o extremist ideas at the national and

local levels.

Undermine a narrative o American perdy and

Muslim victimhood that attracts money, recruits

and sympathy to extremist causes, and conclu

sively reject the narrative o an America at war

with Islam.

Support or give space to credible, indigenous

voices that reute violent Islamist narratives

and take t he United States out o the center o

such debates.

Te new approach to countering violent extrem

ism, thereore, ocused not on al Qaeda per se

but on marginalizing violent extremists while

engaging broader audiences. As White House

Countererrorism Advisor John Brennan put it,

Rather than looking at allies and other nationsthrough the narrow prism o terrorism, whether

they are with us or against us, the administration

is now engaging other countries and people across

a broader range o areas.29 Te guiding principle

was to isolate and marginalize extremists, rather

than magniy their voices, while oering a positive

American message rooted in common interests

and deating the perception o a Western war on

Islam. Te ocus on violent extremism rather

than on al Qaeda or radical Islam t comortably

in this rhetorical strategy moving away rom awar o ideas that ocused attention upon religion

and elevated al Qaedas status.

Te administration continued to counter extremist

narratives across old and new media environments,

and built on the initiatives o the last years o the

Bush administration to empower, support and

ampliy credible voices inside the Muslim world

speaking out against extremism. It also sought

to harness other oreign policy tools, like development, in support o the mission o combating

violent extremism. Te director o the National

Countererrorism Center, Michael Leiter, argues

that the single largest area o growth over the last

ew years "involves deeper causes and root causes

o radicalization and terrorism" in order to more

eectively counter extremist messaging.30

Te decision not to see the Muslim world through

the lens o terrorism has led Obama administra

tion ofcials to separate global engagement and

public diplomacy rom eorts to counter violent

extremism and the spread o terrorist ideologies.

In so doing, some argue privately that the Obama

administration has overcorrected in playing down

violent extremism and now must take steps to link

the two eorts as appropriate without undermin

ing the objective o winning broader Muslim.

Tis overcorrection is reected in government

agencies, where global engagement and counter

terrorism stas are reportedly reluctant partners.

Te determination to avoid raming relations with

Muslims in terms o counterterrorism rame led to

hesitation about linking eorts to counter violent

extremism with broader public diplomacy, despite

the obvious strategic relationship. Te problems

are undamental: aer all, though the United States

and Muslim societies around the world may share

many interests, the reason the United States is

engaging specically withMuslim communities

abroad, and not nations or regions, is a concern

about Islamist extremism and terrorism directed at

Americans in the United States and overseas.Over the last several years, the U.S. government

has taken a more disaggregated and indirect

approach to countering terrorism. Overall, this

approach appears to be succeeding in conounding

al Qaedas communications strategy, as evidenced

by the growing Muslim condemnations o its

methods and ideology.31 With the United States

government taking a less prominent role, Muslim

voices increasingly stepped orward - with or


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without support rom Western or Muslim governments - to challenge al Qaeda and other violent

extremists. Notably, al Qaeda was instrumental in

marginalizing itsel. In the last years o the Bush

administration, the carnage in Iraq and terror

ist attacks killing innocent Muslims, as well as al

Qaedas public battles with more popular Islamist

groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, alien

ated much o the Muslim mainstream. Al Qaeda

continues to struggle in the Arab world, and shows

ew signs o regaining ground lost over the last

ew years. Meanwhile, the administrations kineticoperations are enjoying success in seriously

disrupting al Qaeda."32 An engagement strategy

bolsters this eort by peeling away support - even

i those ocused on broader public engagement shy

away rom the counterterrorism dimension.

At the same time, the extremist threat has evolved

into dierent orms - especially domestic radi

calization and recruitment in English and spread

in specic theaters like Pakistan and Somalia. Al

Qaeda afliates such as al Qaeda in the Arabian

Peninsula and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

began to step up as global threats in their own

right. Te administration needs to do more to gain

the initiative on countering violent extremism in

those arenas, but without surrendering its winning

strategy in the broader Muslim and Arab worlds.

Tis requires coordination and careul strategiz

ing across agencies and across groups in those

agencies that deal with both public diplomacy and

positive engagement on the one hand and counter

ing terrorism and violent extremism on the other.It is not necessary to separate these two tracks to

protect President Obamas core strategic agenda o

broadening the relationship with the Muslim world

beyond terrorism. And it could be counterproduc

tive i the two eorts work at cross purposes or ail

to take advantage o obvious synergies.

Te administrations communication strategy

has at times proved difcult to maintain. Te

ailed Christmas Day bombing and the killing

o people and wounding o others by aradicalized American Muslim at Fort Hood,

ex., generated considerable domestic pres

sure to reocus on Islamist extremism.33 Faced

with mounting domestic political criticism and

a media renzy, the administration responded

with rhetoric that seemed aimed more at assuag

ing public opinion than driving a wedge between

broad Muslim publics and violent extremists.

Ofcial communications seemed reactive and in

tension with the earlier strategy. Aer some shaky

steps, the administration reafrmed its core strategy and has restored its balance. Nonetheless, the

pressures o domestic politics and the administra

tions initial reaction demonstrate the difculty o

adhering to even a wellcraed new engagement

strategy when aced with entrenched narratives

and domestic political opposition.

Democrac and Hman Rights"I do have an unyielding belie that all people

yearn or certain things: the ability to speak your

mind and have a say in how you are governed;

conidence in the rule o law and the equal

administration o justice; government that is

transparent and doesn't steal rom the people; the

reedom to live as you choose. hose are not just

American ideas, they are human rights, and that

is why we will support them everywhere."

- President Barack Obama, Cairo, June 2009

Perhaps the one area where t he Obama admin

istration has been criticized or saying too little

in its approach to democracy and human r ights.he administration chose to deemphasize

democracy in its public rhetoric and public

diplomacy programming, even as its unding or

programs such as the Middle East Partnership

Initiative actually increased.34 A wide range

o critics rom the let and right bemoan the

administrations reluctance to oer the ull

throated calls or democracy that characterized

the Bush administrations public diplomacy.


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he critics also lament what they perceive as theObama administrations tendency to construe

national interests narrowly, in ways that mar

ginalize human r ights. o promote democracy

and human rights, the Obama administration

appears to be pursuing the ollowing objectives:

Voice support or political pluralism and

human rights, but tone down calls or democ

racy to avoid promising more than can be

delivered, as well as the appearance o meddling

and tainting dissidents as American pawns.

Promote good governance and political

reedoms through quiet, behindthescenes

diplomacy and support or civil society.

President Obamas approach to rhetoric about

democracy relects the lessons his team learned

rom the Bush administrations experience with

overpromising and underdelivering. While the

previous administration advocated or democ

racy oten and committed substantial unding

to democracypromotion initiatives, especia lly

in the Middle East, its eorts ultimately oundered. he high point o the administrations

public democracy advocacy probably came with

Secretary o State Condoleezza Rices powerul

speech to the American University o Cairo in

the spring o apologizing or decades o

American preerence or stability over democ

racy. However, the success o Islamists in

Egyptian and Palestinian elections in and

, respectively, led the Bush administra

tion to back away rom supporting democracy

in practice, at least in the eyes o Arab people.Many Arabs agreed with the need or democracy

but did not ind the Bush administration a cred

ible or attractive partner in such eorts - and

they (correctly) doubted that the United States

would actually sacriice its interests to promote

democracy. o be air, the Bush administration

promoted democracy in countries like Ukraine

consistently and with less anare. Nonetheless,

the administration ocused on promoting

democracy in the Middle East, and it is or theseactivities that it wil l be most remembered.

President Obamas team argues that both

democracy and human rights - two related

but separate agendas - can bet ter be promoted

quietly through institutional development and

diplomacy, without attentiongetting rheto

ric. he ate o t he previous administrations

Freedom Agenda is taken as an object lesson in

the k ind o overpromising and underdelivery

o which the current administration is now

accused. he Obama administration, there

ore, chose to ocus on building relationships

based on common interest and mutual respect,

emphasizing civil society, human rights and

development, rather t han on promoting democ

racy per se. Secretary o State Hillary Clintons

speech on Internet reedom - pointedly timed

ater Google accounts o Chinese dissidents

were hacked - ocused on building the ounda

tions or the ree low o inormation and her

speeches have generally played down the role o

elections. President Obamas Nobel Peace Prize

speech pointedly noted that the promotion

o human rights cannot be about exhortation

alone.35 In t hat acceptance speech, he deended

engagement with repressive regimes even i

it lacks the satisying purity o indignation

because sanctions without outreach - condem

nation without discussion - can carry orward

only a crippling status quo. As a result o this

approach, the administration has been criticized

or sotpedaling democracy.his approach oers an important test o the

power and role o strategic public engagement.

Does the Obama administrations reticence on

democracy open the space or more e ective

eorts beneath the radar, or does it orgo an

important instrument or advancing American

values and interests in the world? Will publics

ind the administrations relatively lower proile

in advocating democracy to be more appealing


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and ultimately more eective, even though itlacks drama, or see it as a sign that the United

States no longer cares about democracy and is

willing to sacriice their reedom or smoother

political relations with autocratic rulers? When

autocratic governments all, as in Kyrgyzstan,

wil l the people criticize Americas ailure to

speak out against oppression, or recal l Americas

restraint and appreciate respect or their sov

ereignty? It is diicult to judge this early in

the administration. ime will tell whether the

Obama administration has corrected or themistakes o the previous administration - or

overcorrected.

Iran"he United States does not meddle in Irans

internal aairs. Our commitment- our responsi-

bility - is to stand up or those rights that should

be universal to all human beings. hat includes

the right to speak reely, to assemble without ear;

the right to the equal administration o justice,

and to express your views without acing retribu-

tion against you or your amilies."

- President Obama, Nowruz Greeting to the

Iranian People,March 20, 2010

he Obama administration came to oice

with an ambitious plan to engage the Islamic

Republic o Iran in pursuit o an agreement on

its nuclear weapons program and cooperation to

address wider regional security challenges. his

involved a twotrack strategy, o irst attempt

ing to engage with Iran while also preparing theground with the international community to

support sanctions or even military action, should

engagement ail. he United States needed to

simultaneously change the tone o its relations

with Iran without causing Irans neighbors -

rom Israel to the Arab states o the Persian Gul

- to worry about Americas determination to

prevent Iran rom obtaining nuclear weapons.

One o President Obamas most signiicant early

acts o strategic public engagement was his eortto engage the Iranian people directly, an eort

soon complicated by a disputed Iranian election

and the rise o t he opposition Green Movement.

In its eorts to engage the Iranian public, the

administration sought to:

emper longstanding public animosity toward

the United States and create political space or

engagement with the regime.

Prevent the regime rom using antiAmerican

sentiment as a convenient excuse or rejectingcooperation with the United States.

Avoid undermining the Green Movement by

publicly aligning with protesters.

Build international support or sanctions, or

even military orce, should negotiations over the

nuclear issue ail.

As a rst major step, in March President

Obama issued a special video message wishing

the Iranian people a happy Nowruz, the tradi

tional Persian celebration o spring and renewal.36He spoke with a tone o respect and asked the

Iranian people to think about a more peace

ul uture marked by renewed persontoperson

exchanges and trade. Yet this uture, he under

scored, would require Iran to make a choice.

he United States wants the Islamic

Republic o Iran to take its rightul place

in the community o nations. You have

that right - but it comes with real respon

sibilities, and that place cannot be reached

through terror or arms, but rather through

peaceul actions that demonstrate the true

greatness o the Iranian people and civili

zation. And the measure o that greatness

is not the capacity to destroy, it is your

demonstrated ability to build and create.37

his speech was released on the White House

Web site, widely reported in the media, and

urther disseminated through Youube (which


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is blocked in Iran) and Farsilanguage televisionstations based outside Iran. he message was

then underscored by the administrations oer

to participate in direct talks wi

Obama Public Engagement Strategy

Documents