-
Commissioned and published by the Humanitarian Practice Network
at ODI
Number 51June 2005
Network Paper
About HPNThe Humanitarian Practice Network at theOverseas
Development Institute is an independent forum where field workers,
managers and policymakers in the humanitariansector share
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expressed in HPN’s publications do not necessarily state or
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Max P. Glaser
Humanitarian engagement with non-state armed actorsThe
parameters of negotiated access
In brief
•This paper addresses the question ofhumanitarian engagement
with the non-state armed groups that increasingly populate the
zones in which humanitarianaction takes place. In particular, it
seeks to understand why some combatants react positively and
consistently to humanitarian demands to meet access preconditions,
while others respond erratically, decline to respond or are
hostile.
•The paper looks less at how to negotiate with such groups, and
more at the varioustypes of non-state armed group with
whichnegotiations are likely to be conducted.
•The ultimate objective of this paper is to determine the
parameters of responsiblehumanitarian engagement – that is, to
investigate the scope of successful engagement, one which maintains
minimaloperational preconditions, such as security for aid workers,
and to explore the availablemodalities of engagement.
NP 51 cover 2nd 16/6/05 10:21 am Page 3
-
Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN)Overseas Development
Institute111 Westminster Bridge RoadLondon, SE1 7JDUnited
Kingdom
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[email protected]: www.odihpn.org
Printed and bound in the UK
ISBN: 0 85003 760 3Price per copy: £4.00 (excluding postage and
packing).© Overseas Development Institute, London, 2005.
Photocopies of all or part of this publication may be made
providing that the source is acknowledged. Requestsfor the
commercial reproduction of HPN material should be directed to the
ODI as copyright holders. The NetworkCoordinator would appreciate
receiving details of the use of any of this material in training,
research or pro-gramme design, implementation or evaluation.
Acknowledgements
This Network Paper is based on the research paper Negotiated
Access – Humanitarian Engagement withArmed Non-State Actors,
published in May 2004 by the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy,
Kennedy Schoolof Government, Harvard University.
About the author
Max Glaser is an independent consultant for humanitarian
operations. He can be contacted at:
[email protected].
NP 51 cover 2nd 16/6/05 10:21 am Page 4
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Humanitarian Practice Network
The Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN) is an independent forum
where field workers, managersand policymakers in the humanitarian
sector share information, analysis and experience.
HPN’s aim is to improve the performance of humanitarian action
by contributing to individual and institutional learning.
HPN’s activities include:
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HPN’s members and audience comprise individuals and
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NP 51 cover 2nd 16/6/05 10:21 am Page 2
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110 Room for Improvement: the Management and Support ofRelief
Workers by R. Macnair (1995)
11 Cash-for-Work and Food Insecurity in Koisha, SouthernEthiopia
by P. Jenden (1995)
12 Dilemmas of ‘Post’-Conflict Transition: Lessons from
theHealth Sector by J. Macrae (1995)
13 Getting On-Line in Emergencies: A Guide and Directory to
theInternet for Agencies involved in Relief and Rehabilitation byL.
Aris, P. Gee and M. Perkins (1996)
14 The Impact of War and Atrocity on Civilian Populations:
BasicPrinciples for NGO Interventions and a Critique ofPsychosocial
Trauma Projects by D. Summerfield (1996)
15 Cost-effectiveness Analysis: A Useful Tool for the
Assessmentand Evaluation of Relief Operations? by A. Hallam
(1996)
16 The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda:Study
III ed. J. Borton (1996)
17 Monetisation: Linkages to Food Security? by J. Cekan,
A.MacNeil and S. Loegering (1996)
18 Beyond Working in Conflict: Understanding Conflict
andBuilding Peace (The CODEP Workshop Report), by J. Bennett and M.
Kayitesi Blewitt (1996)
19 Human Rights and International Legal Standards: what
reliefworkers need to know by J. Darcy (1997)
20 People in Aid Code of Best Practice in the Management
andSupport of Aid Personnel ed. S. Davidson (1997)
21 Humanitarian Principles: The Southern Sudan Experience byI.
Levine (1997)
22 The War Economy in Liberia: A Political Analysis by
P.Atkinson (1997)
23 The Coordination of Humanitarian Action: the case of SriLanka
by K. Van Brabant (1997)
24 Reproductive Health for Displaced Populations by C.Palmer
(1998)
25 Humanitarian Action in Protracted Crises: the new
relief‘agenda’ and its limits by D. Hendrickson (1998)
26 The Food Economy Approach: a framework for under-standing
rural livelihoods by T. Boudreau (1998)
27 Between Relief and Development: targeting food aid
fordisaster prevention in Ethiopia by K. Sharp (1998)
28 North Korea: The Politics of Food Aid by J. Bennett (1999)29
Participatory Review in Chronic Instability: The Experience
of the IKAFE Refugee Settlement Programme, Uganda byK. Neefjes
(1999)
30 Protection in Practice: Field Level Strategies for
ProtectingCivilians from Deliberate Harm by D. Paul (1999)
31 The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Health and Well-being by
R. Garfield (1999)
32 Humanitarian Mine Action: The First Decade of a NewSector in
Humanitarian Aid by C. Horwood (2000)
33 The Political Economy of War: What Relief Agencies Needto
Know by P. Le Billon (2000)
34 NGO Responses to Hurricane Mitch: Evaluations
forAccountability and Learning by F. Grunewald, V. deGeoffroy &
S. Lister (2000)
35 Cash Transfers in Emergencies: Evaluating Benefits
andAssessing Risks by D. Peppiatt, J. Mitchell and P. Holzmann
(2001)
36 Food-security Assessments in Emergencies: A
LivelihoodsApproach by H. Young, S. Jaspars, R. Brown, J. Frize
andH. Khogali (2001)
37 A Bridge Too Far: Aid Agencies and the Military in
Humanitarian Response by J. Barry with A. Jefferys (2002)
38 HIV/AIDS and Emergencies: Analysis and Recommend-ations for
Practice by A. Smith (2002)
39 Reconsidering the tools of war: small arms and humanitarian
action by R. Muggah with M. Griffiths(2002)
40 Drought, Livestock and Livelihoods: Lessons from the1999-2001
Emergency Response in the Pastoral Sector inKenya by Yacob Aklilu
and Mike Wekesa (2002)
41 Politically Informed Humanitarian Programming: Using
aPolitical Economy Approach by Sarah Collinson (2002)
42 The Role of Education in Protecting Children in Conflict
bySusan Nicolai and Carl Triplehorn (2003)
43 Housing Reconstruction after Conflict and Disaster bySultan
Barakat (2003)
44 Livelihoods and Protection: Displacement and
VulnerableCommunities in Kismaayo, Southern Somalia by SimonNarbeth
and Calum McLean (2003)
45 Reproductive Health for Conflict-affected People:
Policies,Research and Programmes by Therese McGinn et al.
(2004)
46 Humanitarian futures: practical policy perspectives
byRandolph Kent (2004)
47 Missing the point: an analysis of food security
interven-tions in the Great Lakes by S Levine and C Chastre with
SNtububa, J MacAskill, S LeJeune, Y Guluma, J Acidri and
AKirkwood
48 Community-based therapeutic care: a new paradigm forselective
feeding in nutritional crises by Steve Collins
49 Disaster preparedness programmes in India: a cost bene-fit
analysis by Courtenay Cabot Venton and Paul Venton(2004)
50 Cash relief in a contested area: lessons from Somalia byDegan
Ali, Fanta Toure, Tilleke Kiewied (2005)
Network Papers 1995–2004Network Papers are contributions on
specific experiences or issues prepared either by HPN members
or contributing specialists.
Good Practice ReviewsGood Practice Reviews are major,
peer-reviewed contributions to humanitarian practice. They are
produced periodically.
1 Water and Sanitation in Emergencies by A. Chalinder (1994)2
Emergency Supplementary Feeding Programmes by J.
Shoham (1994)3 General Food Distribution in Emergencies: from
Nutritional
Needs to Political Priorities by S. Jaspars and H. Young (1996)4
Seed Provision During and After Emergencies by the ODI
Seeds and Biodiversity Programme (1996)5 Counting and
Identification of Beneficiary Populations in
Emergency Operations: Registration and its Alternatives byJ.
Telford (1997)
6 Temporary Human Settlement Planning for DisplacedPopulations
in Emergencies by A. Chalinder (1998)
7 The Evaluation of Humanitarian Assistance Programmes inComplex
Emergencies by A. Hallam (1998)
8 Operational Security Management in ViolentEnvironments by K.
Van Brabant (2000)
9 Disaster Risk Reduction: Mitigation and Preparedness
inDevelopment and Emergency Programming by JohnTwigg (2004)
A full list of HPN publications is available at the HPN website:
www.odihpn.org. To order HPN publications,contact
[email protected].
NP 51 cover 2nd 16/6/05 10:21 am Page 5
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i
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
Aims and scope 2
Chapter 2 The changing conflict context and the rise of new
non-state armed groups 5
Spoilers 5
The ‘learning belligerent’ and the civilian connection 5
Trinitarian and non-trinitarian warfare 6
Chapter 3 Characteristics and classifications of ANSAs 7
Command structure 7
Independence from state control 7
The use of violence for political purposes 8
Excluded categories 8
Effective control over population and territory 8
Classifying ANSAs in economic terms 9
The need for fighters 9
External relations: recognition and legitimacy 10
The civilian position: in- and out-group membership 10
Classifying ANSAs in political terms 11
Chapter 4 Engaging ANSAs: effectiveness and reliability 13
Objectives and tactical position 13
Organisational structure and internal discipline 14
Analysing the risks and benefits of humanitarian engagement
14
Mitigating contextual factors: security strategies and promoting
IHL 16
Chapter 5 Modalities, levels and interlocutors 19
Direct or indirect engagement? 19
High or low? 19
Open or confidential? 19
The choice of interlocutor 20
Phases of engagement 20
Chapter 6 Conclusions and recommendations 23
Unwarranted humanitarian engagement 23
Recommendations 23
Best practice guidelines 23
Contents
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Humanitarian engagement with non-state armed actors: the
parameters of negotiated access
Annex 1 Recommended reading 25
Annex 2 Bibliography 25
List of boxes
Box 1: Negotiated access: principled process or accommodation of
interests? 3
Box 2: Trinitarian and non-trinitarian warfare 6
Box 3: Persuasion: promoting IHL to change combatants’ behaviour
16
List of figures and tables
Figure 1: The function of civilians in conflict 3
Figure 2: Trinitarian warfare 6
Figure 3: Non-trinitarian warfare 6
Table 1: ANSA classification 11
Table 2: Willingness and capability 13
Table 3: Objectives and structure 13
Table 4: Risk–benefit analysis according to the classification
of ANSAs 15
Table 5: General risks–benefits from humanitarian engagement
15
Figure 4: Choice of interlocutor: direct and indirect contacts
20
ii
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Over the last several decades, non-state armed groups have
become acommon feature of civil conflicts andinternal wars. These
Armed Non-State Actors (ANSAs) go by manynames, including
liberation move-ments, rebel groups, paramilitaries,insurgents and
warlords, mercena-ries and private military and securitycompanies.
The category could nowalso include transnational
terroristorganisations such as Al-Qaeda. Theproliferation of armed
non-stategroups mirrors the proliferation ofinternal conflicts
across the globe.International wars such as the US-led invasions of
Afghanistan andIraq are now very much theexception: virtually all
of today’sconflicts are internal to states, notinternational.
The proliferation of ANSAs hascomplicated humanitarian
accessbecause it has contributed to adeterioration in the security
conditions for aid workers inconflict zones. These armed groups may
also compromisethe impartiality of aid and the status of civilians
by co-optingthem for logistical or political support, blurring
thedistinction between combatant and non-combatant.Civilians may be
recruited as fighters, whether voluntarily orthrough coercion, and
civilian environments may be used toprovide tactical cover.
Humanitarian assistance may beblocked if its delivery is deemed not
in the armed group’sinterest. The provisions of International
Humanitarian Law(IHL) may be breached, and humanitarian
accesschallenged, as a deliberate strategy of war.
The difficulties ANSAs raise for humanitarian agenciesmean that
negotiating with them for access to vulnerablepopulations has
become an inevitable – and very complex– part of the humanitarian
experience in many contexts.The overall objective of humanitarian
aid is to provide life-saving assistance and alleviate suffering.
In achieving thisobjective, safe access to vulnerable and needy
people inwar zones is essential. Hence, the direct aim
ofhumanitarian engagement with ANSAs is to secure twopreconditions
as minimal operational criteria. The first isensuring security
guarantees for aid workers. The secondis to secure the ANSA’s
respect for the rules of IHL. Withrespect to the latter,
recognising the special status ofcivilians and their right of
access to impartial humanitarianassistance is crucial. Over the
past decade, a third, morecontentious, aspect of engagement has
emerged, namelythe need to protect civilians as such.1 Negotiating
access
with ANSAs suspected of breaching human rights orcommitting
crimes against humanity has raised questionsas to whether access
agreements with such groups serveor undermine the protection of
civilians, as agreementsmay accord undue legitimacy to these ANSAs.
They mayalso jeopardise any ‘common front’ intended to
isolateabusive ANSAs, as these groups may play onehumanitarian
actor off against another. Here, the issue of‘responsible
engagement’ comes into focus, meaningaccess negotiations promoting
‘humanitarian space’ (ageneral respect for IHL principles), as
opposed to accessnegotiations that create ‘agency space’,
meaningagreements that pertain only to some humanitarian actorsbut
not others, or which fail to establish general securityguarantees,
or to prevent continued breaches of IHL.
To be sure, ANSAs are not the only forces abusing civilians
orbreaching IHL; ‘regular’ armies violate these rules as
well.However, this paper concentrates on ANSAs because of
theirprevalence, their tremendous variety, the very
differentconflict contexts in which they operate and the
diverseaccess difficulties they present. The paper also focuses on
aspecific subset of the humanitarian enterprise, namely
non-governmental humanitarian agencies, referred to here asNGHAs,
meaning those non-governmental agenciesinvolved in the provision of
emergency life-saving assistancein the context of conflict and
war.2This focus reflects the factthat, as the international
community has progressivelywithdrawn from so-called non-strategic
states (Rwanda,Somalia or the Democratic Republic of Congo, for
instance),
1
Chapter 1
Introduction
A former Janjaweed fighter guards a humanitarian NGO vehicle,
West Darfur, August 2004
©M
ax P. Glaser
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Humanitarian engagement with non-state armed actors: the
parameters of negotiated access
NGHAs are, more than ever before, being forced to engagewith
ANSAs to negotiate access conditions on their own.At the other
extreme, mainly as a result of the ‘War onTerror’, conflicts such
as those in Afghanistan and Iraq aresaturated with third states’
strategic interests, politicisingthe context and compromising
humanitarian accessconditions. This dual international response has
meantthat the negotiation of access progressively takes
placebetween non-state actors: NGHAs on the one hand, andANSAs on
the other. Although other agencies involved inhumanitarian action,
such as UN bodies and the ICRC, alsoengage with ANSAs, these
organisations are moreformally configured within the framework of
internationalconventions and diplomacy. This does not, in itself,
alterthe challenge of humanitarian engagement that theseagencies
face. For NGHAs, however, it underlines theimportance of enhancing
knowledge of the intricacies ofhumanitarian engagement and access
negotiation withANSAs, as they increasingly deal with these
groupsbilaterally.
Aims and scope
Aid workers in conflict zones encounter armed men on adaily
basis, at roadblocks for example. While dealing witharmed actors
certainly calls for negotiation skills, thispaper seeks to address
some of the broader aspects ofhumanitarian engagement with
non-state groups. Inparticular, it seeks to understand why some
combatantsreact positively and consistently in response
tohumanitarian demands to meet access preconditions,while others
respond erratically, decline to respond or arehostile. This problem
in turn raises other immediatequestions. What level of interlocutor
– the leadership, amid-level commander, or a field combatant – is
likely toproduce the most effective result? Should one seek
directcontact, or work through a civilian go-between? Is it
betterto conduct negotiations openly, or should they
beconfidential?
Questions like these underscore the importance of asystematic
approach to assessing the likelihood that aparticular armed
non-state group will respect the termsof a negotiated access
agreement. In other words, howreliable is the access agreement
likely to be? To addressthese questions, this paper looks less at
how tonegotiate, and more at the various types of non-statearmed
group with which this negotiation is likely to beconducted, with
the proviso that the former is aprerequisite to the latter. The
ultimate objective of thispaper is to determine the parameters of
responsiblehumanitarian engagement with ANSAs – that is,
toinvestigate the scope of successful engagement, onewhich
maintains minimal operational preconditions, suchas security for
aid workers, and to explore the availablemodalities of engagement
with ANSAs.
The objective of humanitarian engagement with ANSAs isto
‘negotiate’ the minimal preconditions necessary foraccess. These
are security of aid workers, and respect for
the principles and rules of IHL. The term ‘negotiate’
isdeliberately placed in quotation marks here, since what
isnegotiated, and with whom, is as unclear as how tonegotiate.
Arguably, even the term ‘negotiation’ isinadequate, since the
principles of IHL as conceived inthe Geneva Conventions are by
definition non-negotiable.Agreements on access between ANSAs and
humanitarianagencies do not express compromise on a contestedissue,
but rather the balancing of pragmatic interests.Agreement on access
expresses the coincidence of eachside’s internal goals; it does not
necessarily reflectagreement on shared principles of IHL. In this
sense,negotiation is not so much principle-driven, but rather
adynamic bartering process formed and fed by itsparticipants: ANSAs
and NGHAs. In practical operationalterms, negotiation can be deemed
successful if itchanges the behaviour of the non-state armed actor
in itstreatment of civilians and its respect for aid workers.Thus,
rather than judging humanitarian engagement andaccess negotiations
on legal, moral or ethical grounds,this paper analyses these issues
pragmatically, in termsof the underlying interests of the
humanitarianorganisation and the non-state actor.
In order to understand the dynamics of negotiated access,three
dimensions are important:
• the specific relationship between the ANSA andcivilians;
• the ANSA’s internal organisation and commandstructure; and
• the ANSA’s external relations and supporting actors.
Of these three aspects, the first is of primary importance,since
civilians serve as the link between the humanitarianNGO and the
ANSA: access to civilians is the motive forseeking engagement with
an armed non-state group.Civilians are not simply inactive
‘bystanders’ in conflict:they can fulfil diverse, crucial roles, as
fighters, politicalsupporters, labourers, messengers or proxy
targets.Often, these roles are not picked by choice, but rather
area consequence of the manner in which civilians areimplicated and
configured in conflict by warring parties,be they ANSAs, their
opponents, competing non-stategroups or a state’s military forces.
Civilians may activelyside with an ANSA to extract advantage, or
they may becoerced into doing so. The precise outcome of
accessnegotiations (the balance of interests that is
reached)depends mainly on the attitude of the ANSA towardscivilians
(supportive or indifferent?); the degree to whichthe ANSA is
dependent on civilians (supportiveconstituency or opposed
community?); and the ANSA’smode of control over civilians
(protective or oppressive?).These relationships appear to have a
strong influence onANSA attitudes towards humanitarian access
andpresence, depending on how this presence dovetails withtheir
interests.
One of the first steps in assessing the reliability of
aparticular armed group is understanding the context of
2
NP 51 2nd 16/6/05 10:24 am Page 2
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negotiation, and the distinctive characteristics of thegroup or
groups in question, their underlying interestsand the nature of
their relationship with the civiliansunder their control. To that
end, this paper offers twotypologies by which ANSAs can be grouped.
The first,based on a socio-economic model of
ANSA–civilianrelations, distinguishes four types of
relationship:symbiotic, parasitic, independent and predatory.4
Thistypology describes specific ‘terms of exchange’ betweenANSAs
and civilians, in particular as they relate to so-called war
economies, in which, for example, civiliansreceive protection from
an armed group in exchange forservices or support, or are compelled
to provide theseservices under threat of abuse. The second model
uses apolitical, rather than economic, classification. It
identifiesfour categories of ANSA–civilian relations:
protective,competitive, antagonistic and sectarian. Both
typologiescan be used to identify and determine the risks
andbenefits of humanitarian engagement with ANSAs inmore objective
terms.
The approach outlined in this paper is of course open todebate.
It is hoped that it will be seen and used as a way togauge and
assess how NGHAs approach non-state armedgroups in the service of
their humanitarian work. Perhapsthe best point of departure is to
understand that not allANSAs are the same: different groups pose
differentchallenges and operate in different ways. This
counselscaution in regarding ANSAs as somehow monolithic.
Themethodology offered here should therefore not be seen asa ‘magic
bullet’, solving all the problems, but rather itshould provide
NGHAs with the flexibility they need toapproach different
situations and different groups.Ultimately, the methodology should
encourage analysis ofthe civil relations that underlie the process
of negotiatingaccess, and a move away from the view that the
problem ofnon-state armed groups is solely a military or
securitymatter.
Chapter 1 Introduction
3
Box 1
Negotiated access: principled process oraccommodation of
interests?
The principles of IHL as stated in the Geneva Conventionsare
non-negotiable. What then is ‘negotiated’ whenengaging with an ANSA
for humanitarian access? What canbe bartered or traded with a
non-state armed group inexchange for its granting access to a
humanitarian agency?
OLS: the original model of ‘negotiated access’
Operation Lifeline Sudan was initiated in 1989 as atripartite
agreement between the UN, the Sudanesegovernment and the Southern
opposition rebel groupthe Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). It
is seen asthe prototype model of ‘negotiated access’. By signingthe
agreement, the Sudanese government temporarilyceded sovereignty of
Southern Sudan to the UN, leavingthe latter with the problem of
administering aid. Theagreement was supported by so-called ‘ground
rules’intended to provide security guarantees to aid workers,as
well as protection to civilians. In practice, however,the ground
rules were used more as a tool to providesafe access than as a
means of holding rebel authoritiesaccountable.3 One of the major
reasons for this was thecontested legitimacy of the Southern rebels
in the eyesof the government in Khartoum. Neither the UN nor
theNGHAs in Southern Sudan had any choice but to workwith the rebel
authorities, even if they were notrecognised. The OLS agreement
could not ‘solve’ theissue of legitimacy, and was in fact designed
in such away that it circumvented it to facilitate
humanitarianaccess and aid. This had the effect of leaving a gap
inaccountability mechanisms, in particular in respect ofthe
Southern rebels.
Figure 1
The function of civilians in conflict
For NGHA
Victims of war and conflict
Beneficiaries/recipients of aid
Logistics, labour force, safe harbour
‘Enemy’ (genocidal and ethnic conflict)
Target (support basis of opponents)
For ANSA
(Political) support basis
Fighters (combatants)
CIVILIANS
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4
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Over the last decade and a half, the nature of conflict
haschanged dramatically. The Cold War was driven largely bythe
ideological conflict between the superpowers, playedout in proxy
conflicts in the developing world. In countriessuch as Ethiopia,
Angola or Mozambique, ANSAs involvedin these conflicts portrayed
themselves as ‘liberationmovements’, fighting a political fight for
nationalliberation. Since the end of the Cold War, these
ideologicalconflicts have given way to wars fought more
explicitlyover resources. In countries such as Angola and
SierraLeone, conflict became less a means to an end than an endin
itself; ‘exploiting the fruits of insecurity and chaos to
thebenefit of armed factions and militia’.5 In these
conflicts,non-state armed groups like Charles Taylor’s
NationalPatriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) or the Revolutionary
UnitedFront (RUF) in Sierra Leone have abused relief aid
throughlooting and manipulation, and utilised it as a
conflictresource.
Meanwhile, ethnically-driven conflicts in Rwanda and theBalkans,
and the ongoing war in Ituri, DRC, have created afresh set of
problems for the humanitarian enterprise: howto avoid partisan aid
in a conflict where (mainly) one sideis being victimised. The
standard humanitarian response of‘proportional assistance to both
sides’ does not work, asby default it tends to serve the interests
of the mostpowerful (and ruthless) party to the conflict.6 Finally,
thepost-9/11 ‘War on Terror’ has seen the emergence of newstrains
of transnational non-state actor, exemplified by Al-Qaeda and its
affiliates, with their strong anti-Westernphilosophy and nihilistic
methods. More recently,international conflict under the ‘War on
Terror’ rubric hasspawned new non-state groups seeking to
exploitinstability and oppose Western occupation. These
groupsdemonstrate little concern for civilians or aid workers,
asboth are considered proxy targets in the achievement oftheir
goals.
Spoilers
The concept of ‘spoiler forces’ has emerged to describegroups
that profit from instability or lawlessness, and whichaccordingly
seek to prevent or ‘spoil’ the establishment ofpeace. The concept
distinguishes between ‘limitedspoilers’, ‘greedy spoilers’ and
‘total spoilers’.7 As the labelsuggests, limited spoilers may be
relatively easy to containas their demands are parochial, and
limited to localconcerns. Greedy spoilers may be appeased once
specificgrievances, usually economic, are addressed. Totalspoilers,
however, pose severe challenges to peace. Al-Qaeda is perhaps the
extreme example of a group thatcould also include the Islamic
insurgents fighting Westernoccupying forces and their local allies
in Iraq. Such groups
also pose serious challenges to humanitarian access inconflict
zones; to illustrate a point already powerfully madeby the bomb
attacks against the UN and the ICRC inBaghdad in 2003, one Iraqi
insurgent group adopted thename Mujahideen Sans Frontières in a
chillingly clearreference to the humanitarian agency Médecins
SansFrontières. In Afghanistan, so-called ‘neo-Taliban’ forceshave
attacked Afghans perceived as supporting the new,Western-backed
regime, as well as foreign construction andaid workers. In the most
notorious incidents, an ICRCdelegate was killed in late 2003, and
five MSF aid workerswere murdered in May 2004.
The ‘learning belligerent’ and the civilianconnection
Through their engagement with aid agencies, ANSAs
haveprogressively gained experience of, and insights into,
thedynamics of humanitarian engagement in conflict, andhave adapted
their approaches and tactics accordingly. Forexample, in October
1996, at the height of the Congoleserebel offensive in Kivu, the
Rwandan military preventedhumanitarian agencies from reaching the
refugee camps inGoma. The Rwandan leadership maintained that their
ownexperience in ‘bush war’ taught them that NGOs’ logisticsand
means of communication could be used to theadvantage of their
opponents; denial of access waspredicated on a desire to deny that
advantage to theInterahamwe and the former Rwandan army.8
The ‘learning belligerent’ makes choices on the basis ofrational
considerations and pragmatic interests. It isimportant that NGHAs
recognise that this adaptive processis taking place, and apply
their own reciprocal, adaptivelearning, in particular for
operational staff responsible forinitiating engagement with ANSAs.
For NGHAs, this learningincludes acknowledging the difference
between negotiationseen as the establishment of ‘humanitarian
space’, andnegotiation to achieve ‘agency space’. Where the latter
mayresult in the acceptance of one or more (specific) NGHAs byan
ANSA to provide humanitarian assistance, the former ismuch broader,
and aims at generating blanket respect forIHL by ANSAs, including
the security of aid workers and theprotected status of civilian
hors de combat. The eagernessof some NGHAs to gain access to
civilians can easily beexploited by ANSA leaders to play one agency
off againstanother, as the RUF did in Sierra Leone, for instance.9
Thisissue will be taken up again in the following chapters.
‘Control over civilians’ is a central aspect in the process
ofnegotiating access with ANSAs. The nature of theANSA–civilian
relationship is of crucial importance, since itinfluences the
degree to which the ANSA will be willing to
5
Chapter 2The changing conflict context and the rise of new
non-state armed groups
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respect access preconditions, and the likelihood that theaccess
agreement will hold. In internal conflicts, control andaccess to
civilians (or the denial of these things toopponents) is decisive
for an ANSA’s functions andobjectives, regardless of whether they
are aiming at awinning strategy, or obstructing the victory of
theiropponents. Civilian populations are caught in conflict,
assurrogate political agents, as (part-time) fighters, asproviders
of resources and logistics, as proxy targets(‘human shields’), or,
in the worst case, as the object of waritself. NGHA interests in
accessing these populations caneasily clash with ANSAs, as
civilians are regarded asbeneficiaries by the former, but as
decisive resources by thelatter. Hence, agreement on humanitarian
access willdepend mainly on the significance of the role civilians
play inthe interests of the ANSA with whom access is
negotiated.
Trinitarian and non-trinitarian warfare
To understand this shift in the position of civilians inwarfare,
the idea of a transformation from ‘trinitarianwarfare’ to
‘non-trinitarian warfare’ is useful (see Box2).10 This clarifies
that targeting of civilians in war is not anew phenomenon; however,
the manner in which civiliansare configured in a belligerent’s war
strategies haschanged the character of this targeting. Rather
thanbeing tactical targets, civilians have moved to theforefront of
warfare as objective targets in a deliberatestrategy of control.
ANSA commanders, as newbelligerents, have concomitantly adapted
their strategiesboth with regard to civilians and with regard to
NGHAsand other humanitarian agents coming to the assistanceof
civilians.
Humanitarian engagement with non-state armed actors: the
parameters of negotiated access
6
Box 2
Trinitarian and non-trinitarian warfare
Carl Von Clausewitz, the classic nineteenth-century theorist of
conflict, described warfare as comprising a trinity ofelements: a
government, its army and the civilian population from which that
army was drawn. In ‘non-trinitarian’ warfare,this relationship
between government, army and civilian population is distorted. The
‘government’ may or may not exist,or at least not in the sense in
which Clausewitz understood it. In internal conflict, the
government is challenged by otherarmed groups, or its control over
territory and population may be incomplete; in some cases, there
may be no centralauthority at all. These ‘non-trinitarian’ wars
tend to be about controlling a population (or denying that control
to anopponent), rather than controlling a specified territory (the
territory of an opponent state, for example). Here, therelationship
between the non-state group, the government and the civilian
population is of crucial importance.
Figure 2Trinitarian warfare
Government A
Citizens Army
Government B
Army Citizens
Figure 3Non-trinitarian warfare
Government (?)
Civilians
(competing)ANSA
Army/paramilitary
Opposition(ANSA)
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The most general definition of an armed non-state actor isas
follows: ‘Groups that are armed and use force to achievetheir
objectives and are not under state control’.11 Thisdefinition is
useful in evaluating engagement with armedgroups, as it avoids
politically-charged terms like ‘terrorist’and ‘freedom fighter’,
and is not specific with regard to theconflict dynamics (whether
armed groups are involved in abattle against a state, for example,
or between each other).At the same time, however, such a broad
definition doesnot fully take into account the wide variety of
non-statearmed groups that exist, the diverse conflicts in which
theyoperate and the wide range of possible relationshipsbetween the
armed group and the civilian population, all ofwhich are important
in assessing the reliability ofhumanitarian access agreements.
For the purposes of access negotiations, several featuresof an
ANSA have been suggested as being important.These include a basic
command structure; independencefrom state control; and the use of
violence for politicalpurposes (as opposed to, for instance,
criminalobjectives).12 Ideally, these are the minimum criteria
thatan ANSA should meet if humanitarian engagement is toresult in
effective change in the ANSA’s attitude towardscivilians. A fourth
criterion, suggested by this author, is theexercise of effective
control over a territory and apopulation. These criteria should not
be interpreted toorigidly; rather, they are guidelines by which to
judge themotivation and ability of a particular ANSA to respond
tohumanitarian engagement, and the reliability of theagreements
eventually reached.
Command structure
An armed non-state actor mustdemonstrate some degree of
basiccommand structure, though this maynot necessarily be unified.
Commandcan be centralised, expressing a higherdegree of
organisation, or decent-ralised, as is often the case with
groupsoperating in guerrilla warfare. Theefficiency of the control
and commandstructures is expressed in a higher orlower degree of
discipline among thecombatants. This is a crucial deter-minant in
the ability of the group tofulfil security guarantees to an
aidagency, and in its ability to abide by IHL.(This qualification
obviously alsoapplies to ‘regular’ armed forces;undisciplined
troops or an unstructuredcommand may make these
formationsunreliable.)
Related, though distinct, ANSAs may sometimes collaborateand
coordinate their actions, thus forming a common front.Once the
reasons for such a collaboration disappear andrivalry develops, the
front disintegrates, often taking accessagreements with it. In
Afghanistan during the 1990s, forexample, once the common enemy
disappeared with thewithdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989, the
mujahideen revertedto internecine fighting. Although the various
factionspossessed independent command structures, their
rivalryincreased the insecurity facing NGHAs in Afghanistan,
whichhad formerly depended on various factions for
cross-borderaccess, but were now suspected of being in alliance
withrival groups.13 Similarly, once the South Sudan rebelmovement
effectively split in 1992, the parameters ofnegotiated access
shifted dramatically, as the Sudanesegovernment played one faction
off against another. Thefactions themselves then followed suit,
playinghumanitarian actors off against each other.
Independence from state control
The level of independence from state control is crucial.Some
ANSAs operate as a form of extension or proxy forcefor governments.
Examples of such groups include theAutodefensas Unidades de
Colombia (AUC) paramilitaries inColombia and the Janjaweed fighters
in Darfur, Sudan, aswell as death squads like Arkan’s infamous
paramilitaries inthe Balkans or the Interahamwe in Rwanda. Since
thesegroups exist precisely to circumvent state or
governmentaccountability and operate outside the law,
stateinvolvement is often clear but officially denied. Such
groups
7
Chapter 3Characteristics and classifications of ANSAs
Abandoned Soviet armour outside Mazar e Sharif, Afghanistan,
February 2004. Once Soviet forces withdrew in 1989, the
mujahideen
reverted to internecine fighting
©M
ax P. Glaser
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Humanitarian engagement with non-state armed actors: the
parameters of negotiated access
frequently do not possess the independent authority todecide
their actions, and so engagement for the purpose ofprotection or
access will be ineffective. This does not meanthat contacts should
never be contemplated with groupsoperating in collusion with the
state, but rather that it maybe difficult to identify appropriate
levels of effectiveleadership which will assume responsibility, and
are willingand able to instruct subordinate troops.
The use of violence for political purposes
This is the hardest characteristic to pin down because of
theopacity that surrounds the political agendas of many
armednon-state actors. Many have no clearly defined political
aims;others claim to struggle for ‘social justice’, but may not
putthis into practice through ensuring the protection of
civilians.ANSAs may not necessarily aim at regime change or the
totaltakeover of the state. Instead, they may operate in a way
thatdenies control to the adversary, for example the government,the
official authorities or intervening forces, by generating
orperpetuating insecurity and instability. Some observersidentify
these tactics as attempts to ‘redefine the social andpolitical
context by violent means’.14 The fact that a grouprepresents a
non-state entity does not in itself make itnecessarily
illegitimate, nor does it mean that every actiontaken by state
actors (for example the military or the police)is legitimate.
There is also an issue here to do with the scale or nature ofthe
violence deployed. When massacres, systematicviolence, mutilation,
abduction or rape take place,perpetrated either by state or
non-state actors, engagementfor the purpose of access becomes
questionable. The resultsof engagement with ANSAs that gravely
violate human rightsmay have detrimental effects on civilians. In
the Balkans, forexample, the preconditions attached to access
played intothe hands of those actors engaged in ethnic cleansing.
Whileit can be argued that violence inflicted by extremist groups
inIraq and Afghanistan is politically motivated, the
deliberatetargeting of humanitarian staff negates any potential
positiveoutcome from engaging with this type of ANSA.
Excluded categories
The characteristics of ANSAs described above exclude
threecategories of actors: criminal groups, terrorist
organisationsand private commercial actors. These groups do not fit
thecategory of ANSA as defined here, and as a consequenceengaging
with these actors will not yield any positive results,or will
expose the NGHA to extreme danger.
Criminal groups are excluded not so much due to
theirunlawfulness but rather because they do not aspire tocontrol
territories or populations (with the possibleexception of extortion
rackets run at local levels), andbecause they use violence mainly
for financial, rather thanpolitical, gain. Engaging with such
groups may not delivereffective results in terms of protecting
civilians, whileexposing staff to risks such as abduction and/or
extortion.
Likewise, ANSAs which are involved in parallel
criminalactivities (for example cross-border drug and arms
trading,human trafficking, abduction or extortion) raise the
stakesof engagement for access purposes and for the protectionof
civilians, as the NPFL in Liberia, the RUF in Sierra Leoneor UNITA
in Angola have all demonstrated.
The terms ‘terror’ or ‘terrorist’ are much more ambiguous.Terror
is generally seen as a tactic of warfare aimed atundermining
morale. Government armies as well as ANSAsmay use this tactic; the
US military did so with its ‘Shock andAwe’ campaign in Iraq. The
terms ‘terrorist’ or ‘terror group’mainly serve the political
purpose of de-legitimising specificgroups. This is, of course, not
to deny that some ANSAsdeploy terror tactics. However, groups which
apply terrorexclusively or excessively do not generally appear to
beresponsive to humanitarian arguments. One exception tothis may be
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in SriLanka, a group
which has applied terror tactics extensivelyin large-scale suicide
bombings, but which has also beenrelatively reliable in its
dealings with humanitarian agencies.
The last exclusion concerns private companies, usuallyoperating
on behalf of contracting states. Private militaryand security
companies are increasingly providingcommercial security services
and military and tacticalsupport in conflict zones. Firms such as
Executive Outcomesand Sandline have been active in Sierra Leone and
Angola,and in Iraq and Afghanistan private companies have
beencontracted by the occupying powers to secure roads andcivil and
military facilities, and for de-mining. Some of theseactivities
will by default also facilitate access forhumanitarian agencies.15
There is an ongoing debate as towhen private actors operating on a
commercial basis qualifyas mercenaries. Some criteria to define
this status havebeen developed, though the distinction is not
clear-cut.16
Nonetheless, this mix of civil and military affairs constitutesa
growing concern for humanitarian agencies. Ifhumanitarian access is
contingent on the activities of thesecompanies, it would appear
more effective to address thecontracting state or the contracting
military forces overissues of humanitarian access, since
accountability remainswith the contracting parties.
Effective control over population and territory
In addition to the three characteristics outlined above,
ANSAsshould exercise effective control over territory
andpopulation. The question of control is decisive in
determiningthe ANSA’s ability and willingness to stick to
accessagreements; it is highly dependent on the extent to which
theANSA exercises control over civilians, the manner in which
itdoes so and the degree to which it depends on civiliansupport.
This is not, however, as clear-cut as it sounds.‘Effective control
over territory’ is not synonymous withclearly-defined frontlines or
borders; rather, the ANSAdominates a given territory by virtue of
its operations andtactics. Such dominance is not necessarily
achieved by
8
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Chapter 3 Characteristics and classifications of ANSAs
permanent occupation, as it can be exerted throughintermittent,
hidden or remote presence, such as throughcombatants or agents
embedded within the civilianpopulation. By the same token,
‘effective control overpopulation’ should not be interpreted as, or
confused with,‘good treatment’, nor does it necessarily imply
active supportor the identification of civilians with the ANSA’s
aims. Controlcan be obtained through abuse, terror and
intimidation,through repression, propaganda or intermittent
hostileactions in specific areas, designed to deny control to
ANSA’sopponents. There is clearly little use in engaging with
anANSA for the purposes of humanitarian access if it does
notexercise any control over territory or population. But
moreimportant than merely establishing the fact of control
isunderstanding the quality and the manner by which control
isachieved: through actions sympathetic to, and supported
by,civilians, or through abuse.
The support of a population for a particular armed group isfar
from given, and notions such as ‘popular support’ forarmed struggle
are not as straightforward as claims for it byvarious ANSAs may
suggest. Civilian support or oppositioncan be invisible, latent or
inaccurately expressed. Equally,lack of civilian support, criticism
or opposition may remaininvisible, unexpressed or unnoticed. In
Colombia and SriLanka, the public expression of opinions about
armed non-state groups is stifled by the fear of being identified
as asupporter or opponent of the insurgents.17 This may result
inpolitical stigmatisation, the loss of economic assets,
legalprosecution or, in extreme cases, physical abuse, expulsionor
even execution. Considerations like these are particularlyimportant
when choosing civilian interlocutors to participatein access
negotiations with armed groups (this idea isdeveloped later in this
paper).
Classifying ANSAs in economic terms
The analysis of civilians and armed groups in war economieshas
produced a general classification of civil–militiarelations
expressed in economic terms.18 In a war economy,civilians can be of
utilitarian importance to an ANSA’sincome, and civilians can profit
from cooperating with theANSA.19 The benefits for civilians can be
economic, in theform of income or employment, either by joining the
ranks ofan armed group as combatants, or by supplying
logisticsupport. Civilians can also benefit from the protection of
anANSA in exchange for their collaboration.
The classification outlined here defines ANSA–civilianrelations
according to the following categories:
• Symbiotic economic relations: militia aim at restructuringsome
social order in exchange for support and revenues,resembling and
emulating the function of the state.
• Parasitic economic relations: militia offer protection
tocivilians in exchange for collaboration, resemblingmafia
protection rackets in their extortive character.
• Independent sources of revenue: militia are notdependent on
the population for income (civilians may
participate in cross-border trade or the extraction ofprecious
mineral resources).
• Predatory economic relations: militia are careless of thefate
of the population, rule through fear and intimidationand prey on
the population to increase their power.
These typologies suggest different opportunities forhumanitarian
negotiation: in other words, the possibility ofinfluencing an
ANSA’s treatment of civilians. Clearly,influencing an ANSA’s
behaviour towards civilians will bemost difficult in a context of
predatory economic relations,where the group has no apparent
interest in improving thefate of civilians. It will be easiest
where symbiotic economicrelations exist, when such an interest is
assumed. However,the question remains as to what drives an ANSA to
engagewith humanitarian actors to negotiate access. In otherwords,
what are the advantages or rewards for an ANSA inengaging with a
humanitarian agency? Conversely, what arethe disadvantages or
penalties of non-engagement? Toanswer this question requires
investigation of the potentialof aid or aid agencies to sustain,
enhance or impair thecapabilities of the ANSA.
The need for fighters
The need for fighters should be regarded as a key issue in
anANSA’s survival. Combat capacity may serve the interests
ofcivilians in their search for protection and security, as well
asin terms of income opportunities. A prerequisite to
civiliansupport for an ANSA is that the latter truly
representscivilians’ concerns, and acts accordingly. This is
evidentlymore likely when ANSAs are dependent on support
fromcivilians (a symbiotic relationship, according to the
typologyabove), as opposed to ANSAs that act independently
ofcivilian support. Access to food and income are strongincentives
to recruitment. Parasitic or opportunistic groupscan utilise these
factors to entice and attract fighters to theirranks. Hence, in
conditions where incomes are low, andwhere there is political
instability and a lack of economicopportunities, it is relatively
easy for ANSAs to attractunemployed men. Consequently, being a
fighter hasincreasingly become a vocation in itself. Fighters
easilyswitch from one ‘employer’ to the other, as demonstrated
bydefeated Interahamwe forces during the late 1990s, whodispersed
and joined various ANSAs as far afield as Angolaand
Congo-Brazzaville. In West Africa, fighters of variousfactions
continuously cross over to competing groups.20
Loyalty is no longer expressed in terms of tribal or
ethniclineage, as patronage-financing takes over as a
recruitmentmechanism.21 In such conditions, personal needs and
theprevailing market forces of recruitment become moreimportant
than other identity definitions, such as race,ethnicity, political
affiliation or geographic origin. Thedecisive role aid can play in
raising fighters among refugeecommunities has been addressed
extensively,22 but shouldnot be overlooked in the context of
internal conflicts, whereemployment conditions offered by an ANSA
to prospectivecombatants may include the benefits accruing
fromhumanitarian services, such as medical aid, food and
shelter.
9
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Humanitarian engagement with non-state armed actors: the
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10
External relations: recognition and legitimacy
The presence of humanitarian agencies can itself beimportant to
an ANSA in terms of recognition. Not all ANSAsmay be sensitive to
this – total spoiler forces in particular areunlikely to be – but
others may be responsive to issues oflegitimacy and recognition.
Alternatively, an ANSA may seekto delegitimise an adversary, either
by demonstrating itsmisbehaviour (in terms of abuse) or by showing
the‘rightness’ of its own policies and attitudes towards
NGHAs.Permitting or preventing humanitarian action can be used
forpropaganda purposes, as the RUF has shown in Sierra Leoneby
allowing certain agencies to operate, while rejecting theUN. At a
time when human rights violations are increasinglybeing addressed
via international tribunals, sanctions andinternational
indictments, ANSA leaders are more sensitivethan in the past to
exposure to criminal charges, and showmore concern about this risk.
To mitigate it, ANSA leadersmay try to ‘play the humanitarian card’
by allowinghumanitarian aid in, thereby showing their respect
forinternational conventions and discrediting charges
ofmisbehaviour. The degree to which this sensitivity will play
arole obviously hinges on the intentions of ANSA leaders,
theirpersonality, the tactical position in the conflict and
theamount of (credible) pressure exerted upon them. Obviously,this
sensitivity to ‘humanitarian concerns’ can be symboliconly, and
lacking in true commitment: granting access tohumanitarian aid may
thus serve a false function. Thesefactors need to be taken into
account, especially whendealing with particularly abusive ANSAs,
which are guilty orsuspected of human rights violations and crimes
againsthumanity.
The civilian position: in- and out-groupmembership
In order to assess the various difficulties and (unintended)harm
to civilians that may result from an NGHA negotiatingaccess with an
ANSA, the concept of ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’ membership can be a
useful tool.23 ‘In-group’members are those civilians that form the
ANSA’sconstituency; ‘out-groups’ are those civilians outside
thatconstituency. In-groups are treated better than out-groups,as
they enjoy the protective capacities of ANSAs. Out-groupsare at
best ignored, and at worst deliberately targeted, as forexample in
ethnic wars. In-/out-group membership can bedecided by ideology,
politics, ethnicity, nationality, tribal orclan delineation, by
shared economic objectives or bycommon economic grievances.24 The
underlying assumptionin this approach is that the larger the
in-group constituency,the more responsive the ANSA will be to
attempts topersuade it to improve the lot of civilians.
Consequently,civilians may possess more leverage over the ANSA
tonegotiate better treatment and access opportunities forNGHAs. The
larger the in-group constituency, the less likely itis that
humanitarian access will be challenged: by organisingassistance for
its own constituency, an armed group that isdependent on civilian
support is likely to find that supportincreased. However, it is
also likely that the members of the
out-group will view this aid as partisan. More importantly,
inmany situations it is precisely the out-group that is likely tobe
most in need of aid and protection.
Utilising in-/out-group analysis to estimate the challenge
tohumanitarian access can also be a dangerous exercise, as ittends
to overlook the political dynamics of conflict. It isprecisely when
access is least challenged – when an ANSAhas a broad constituency –
that aid is most likely to beconsidered as partial (by the ANSA’s
opponents), or that itwill fuel the conflict by enhancing the
ANSA’s capabilities.Adversaries may perceive assistance as
partisan, and maylaunch attacks on civilians, or even on the
agencies aidingthem. To guard against a partial response,
even-handednessis commonly advised, so that assistance is provided
to bothsides in the conflict proportional to prevailing
needs.However, in conflicts that generate asymmetric needs –
thatis, where one side objectively has more humanitarian needsthan
the other or, worse, where only one side is in need –such an
approach draws aid into the politics of conflict bydefault. The
potential risks involved in such an even-handedapproach were
demonstrated in Bosnia, where Serb militiainsisted on the equal
distribution of aid on a fifty-fifty basis,whereas an independent
needs assessment would havefavoured non-Serb Bosnians.25 Accepting
these demandsenhanced support for the Serb leadership among the
in-group constituency, and the Serbs sustained their capacity
tocleanse the out-group. In Ituri district in the DRC, the
Hemaleadership stated that it would respect humanitarian aid solong
as its adversaries, the Lendu, were not aided, whereasthe
humanitarian needs of the Lendu objectively were larger.This
negative attitude among the Hema leadership led to theassassination
of five ICRC staff in 2001. MSF had suspendedits activities in 2000
after a series of incidents and threats.26
These examples demonstrate that the treatment of the ‘out-group’
is particularly important, as this may be precisely thegroup that
is targeted by the ANSA, and hence is most inneed of aid and
protection. Out-group civilians can representthe ‘adversary’, but
this is not necessarily synonymous with‘enemy’: civilians can be
targeted by ANSAs just for beingsuspected of providing support to
opponents. This is thecase in Colombia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sri
Lanka and theDRC, where massacres frequently occur in retaliation
foralleged support to opponents, or as a deterrent to suchsupport.
The treatment of the out-group therefore does notfollow the same
rationale as that of in-groups. Whereas thelatter may in the worst
case simply be neglected by an ANSA,the former will be treated much
more harshly. This isespecially the case when ANSAs are not just
excluding out-group civilians, but are particularly negative and
hostile. Atthe extreme, this hostility takes the form of ethnic
cleansingand genocide. In-/out-group membership analysis is thus
auseful tool in determining an ANSA’s dependence on in-groups, but
it can be misleading as a way of establishing theterms of access to
out-groups. The analysis of in-/out-groupdynamics must therefore be
carefully evaluated in the light of the prevailing political
context and conflict dynamics, inorder to avoid unintended negative
and controversialconsequences.
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Chapter 3 Characteristics and classifications of ANSAs
11
Classifying ANSAs in political terms
The issues explored above introduce a political dynamicinto the
classification of ANSAs. A classification in politicalterms
expresses both the attitude of the ANSA towardscivilians (those
targeted by NGHAs), and the quality of theANSA’s dependence on
civilians. Such a classificationallows us to identify the potential
compatibility orincompatibility between the interests of the NGHA
and theinterests of the ANSA. A classification in political
termsalso expresses the various combinations of civilian rolesin
conflict as presented in Figure 1 (page 3). Thisclassification
should not be seen necessarily as analternative to the economic
typology described above –rather, it attempts to include the
various categories as setout there. The categories are defined as
follows, with thecorresponding categorisation of ANSA–civilian
economicrelations given in brackets:
• Protective (symbiotic): the ANSA plays an active role inthe
protection of civilians and the promotion of civilorganisation. The
ANSA and civilians share commonvalues and interests. Civilians are
not defined by in-and out-group divisions. Civilians support ANSA
aimsand fight on a volunteer basis. The ANSA actively
seeksrecognition and is sensitive about human rightsconcerns.
Example: liberation movements.
• Competitive (predatory or parasitic): the ANSA acts in
competition with state or non-state actors, rallying thesupport
of civilians, or denying that support toopponents. Civilians may be
implicated with the ANSAthrough labour relations and (illicit)
trade, orcontracted as fighters, but they do not necessarilyshare
the ANSA’s interests. Example: factions within awar economy.
• Antagonistic (independent or predatory): the ANSA isdriven by
a self-centred identity based on ethnicity orreligion. It is
supported by, and raises fighters solely from,the in-group, and
acts on that group’s behalf. It is highlyantagonistic towards the
out-group, and insensitive to itshuman rights concerns. It seeks
recognition for itsfunction of defending the in-group rights.
Examples:groups engaged in genocidal war, ethnic cleansing.
• Sectarian (independent): the ANSA is driven byextremist
ideology or nationalism. Civilians andfighters are mobilised
through the promotion ofextreme views towards out-groups or
opponents (forexample, ‘the West’). The ANSA does not
seeklegitimacy or recognition, but emphasises its
credibilitythrough hostile actions, and is insensitive to
humanrights concerns. Example: Islamic extremist groups.
Table 1 summarises this four-fold classification. Itdescribes
the type of relationship between the ANSA andcivilians that would
correspond to each category, and thenature of the in-out group
dynamics.
Table 1: ANSA classification
Protective
Competitive
Antagonistic
Sectarian
Dependency on civilians
The ANSA is highly dependent on civilian support,and is likely
to protect civilians and be open toengagement with NGHAs.
The ANSA vies for control over, or support of, civil-ians.
Depending on its tactical and politicalposition, the ANSA may be
responsive to humani-tarian engagement, but can equally
becomenegative if competing ANSAs are deemed to profitfrom aid, or
where civilians are not supportive ofan ANSA, or of no use to it
economically or asfighters.
ANSA depends on support of the in-group againstthe out-group,
and in-group support will be verystrong. Humanitarian needs are
likely to be veryhigh in the out-groups, and assistance to
theseout-groups is likely to be strongly opposed by theANSA.
Independent from broad popular support. Recruitsfrom extreme
political groups.
In-out group dynamics
Strong in-group dynamics. The broader thisconstituency, the more
responsive the ASNA willbe to humanitarian engagement.
The ANSA is sensitive to in- and out-groupdynamics, responds
positively to engagement foraccess purposes, but likely to abuse
this for polit-ical or war- economy goals.
Extremely strong in-out group dynamics. The out-group is the
major target in conflict, often definedin political, ethnic or
religious terms. A positiveresponse to engagement is vulnerable to
abusefor purposes of propaganda or legitimacy.
Extremely limited in-group dynamics, if at all. Out-group can be
defined as 'the other' in very broadterms. Highly insensitive,
engagement unlikely tohave an effect.
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Key to the question of humanitarian engagement withANSAs is the
reliability of the agreements reached. Willthese agreements
effectively meet the two basicoperational preconditions of
humanitarian action: securityfor aid workers, and respect for the
principles of IHL? Thereliability of agreements depends on the
willingness of theANSA to comply with the terms, and its capability
to do so.This can be formulated as follows:
• Willingness: why is the group receptive to
humanitariandemands?
• Capability: how will/can the group adhere to theagreement?
The model followed in this paper is based on a set of
implicitassumptions. The first is that the responsiveness of a
non-state armed group to demands for humanitarian access isdirectly
related to the degree to which the ANSA isdependent on civilians.
The greater the degree ofdependence, the more likely it is that the
ANSA will respecthumanitarian access agreements. A second
assumption isthat an ANSA’s behaviour towards civilians, and
itsresponsiveness to humanitarian demands, is stronglyinfluenced by
its dependence on external relations, and thedegree to which the
group seeks legitimacy, recognition orcredibility. Thus, the more
an ANSA seeks recognition,legitimacy or credibility, the more
responsive it is likely to beto humanitarian access demands. But it
is also important tounderstand the distinctive characteristics of
the non-stategroup in question. In particular, how does its
commandstructure and objectives influence its capability
andwillingness to comply with access conditions?
The evaluation of the humanitarian response in the GreatLakes
used the following model (Table 2) to highlightissues of
willingness and capability as they related toquestions of access.
The recommended approach in thiscontext was called ‘strategic
coordination’, involving theUN, the local military and political
actors, and rebelauthorities. It aimed to secure the acceptance of
warringparties to a framework of consent for IHL and
humanitarianprinciples.27
Table 2: Willingness and capability
A similar matrix (see Table 3) can be produced in line withthe
analysis of ANSA–civil relations in Chapter 3. Thiscorrelates an
ANSA’s structure with its objectives, toassess how challenging
humanitarian engagement withthat group might be.28 Narrow
objectives signify a highdegree of self-interest (for example,
gains from the wareconomy); broad objectives indicate that the
group seeksbenefits for the population at large (for example,
landreforms), or at least for a wider group than just
ANSAcombatants. Clearly, an ANSA that fits in the BroadObjectives
box in this table would have greater interest incomplying with
humanitarian demands for access, sincedoing so benefits the
constituency that the ANSA claims torepresent. The categorisation
‘clear’ or ‘loose’ in referenceto the ANSA’s structure is an
elaboration of the minimalqualifying characteristic discussed in
Chapter 3: the needfor a basic command structure. Obviously, the
clearer thecommand structures the better organised the
command,generating a higher degree of internal discipline,
andmaking it more likely that combatants will abide by
theleadership’s instructions. Hence, adherence to
accessstipulations will be more reliable. In a disorganised,chaotic
or loosely organised group, there is less likelihoodthat members
will comply, and consequently accessagreements with such groups
will be unreliable.
Table 3: Objectives and structure
This model complements the willingness/capabilityframework of
consent, indicating the most challengingcircumstances for access.
Unsurprisingly, these occur whenan ANSA is both incapable and
unwilling to comply with thepreconditions for access. However, this
model allows us toshow how the ANSA’s objectives and
organisationalstructure determine that capability and willingness.
Theformer (structure and objectives), in other words, can beused as
indicators for the latter (capability and willingness).The task now
is to identify the apparent or stated objectivesof the ANSA, and
ascertain its organisational structure.
Objectives and tactical position
As the foregoing analysis has shown, ANSAs have widelydivergent
objectives. A sectarian ANSA, with no clear
13
Chapter 4Engaging ANSAs: effectiveness and reliability
Willing and able(Pure consent)
Willing but unable(Capacity-building required)
Unwilling but able(Pressured consent)
Unwilling and unable(Enforced consent)
Narrow objectives
Broad objectives
Most challenging
Moderately challenging
Moderately challenging
Least Challenging
Loose structure Clear structure
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Humanitarian engagement with non-state armed actors: the
parameters of negotiated access
motive to win a war and thus no clear objective
vis-à-viscivilians, will mostly be insensitive to
humanitarianarguments, and will act quite predictably: engagement
foraccess purposes is likely to elicit a negative response.
Aprotective ANSA, on the other hand, is clearer in itspolitical
goals, and may be likely to be more sensitive toarguments in favour
of the well-being of the civilians onwhich it depends. In between,
one finds the difficult cases:opportunistic and competitive ANSAs,
engaged in war fortheir own benefit or in competition with each
other, whileat the same time making virtuous claims for the social
orpolitical objectives of their struggle (for example,Colombian
guerrilla groups). An ANSA that is stronglyantagonistic towards a
particular group (the out-group)will obviously align its objectives
with the interests of thein-group on whose behalf it claims to
operate, and onwhich it depends.
The tactical position of the ANSA has a major influence onthe
stance it is likely to take towards humanitarianengagement. ANSAs
which are highly dependent oncivilian support but in a weak
tactical position may beinterested in a humanitarian presence, but
unable toprovide security guarantees because their
militarycapabilities are overstretched, or because
theircommunications and command lines are malfunctioning.
Incontrast, an antagonistic ANSA which finds itself in a
weaktactical position may be inclined to provide assurances
foraccess in an attempt to establish a stronger position forthe
in-group civilians that form its constituency. Insummary,
responding positively to engagement in itselfmay not mean that an
ANSA is actually in a position toprovide security guarantees,
either because it is unwillingto do so, or because it is unable to
do so.
Organisational structure and internal discipline
Obviously, the ability of a non-state armed group to adhereto
access agreements is highly dependent on its internalorganisation.
As described above, command structurescan vary from a dispersed
(loose) structure, where thegroup operates in independent units, to
a centralised andhierarchical (tight) structure. The degree of
discipline is notnecessarily directly related to these two
extremes, thoughit is safe to assume that, once a centralised
ANSAdemonstrates a high degree of discipline, the
combatants’behaviour will be consistent. The degree of discipline
in aloosely organised group is primarily dependent on thequality of
the group’s commanders, and on the instructions(if any) given from
the centre. Payment of combatants mayalso play a crucial role in
internal discipline. More looselyorganised groups are more likely
to pay combatants in lootor booty, thereby increasing the risk of
misconduct. In bothtight and loosely organised ANSAs, internal
discipline maybe disrupted if disputes break out between
commanders,perhaps over political direction or strategy, though
this riskis higher in loosely-organised ANSAs, and in coalitions
ofindependent ANSAs. The position the ANSA takes on a
ceasefire or peace negotiations may also trigger seriousclashes
and disputes, as has repeatedly happened inSomalia and, more
recently, in Darfur. The case ofAfghanistan has already been noted.
Once the anti-Sovietcommon front melted away, rivalries and
inter-factionalfighting broke out, and the security environment for
aidworkers deteriorated.
Analysing the risks and benefits of humanitarian engagement
Once one has investigated the particular manner in whichANSAs
are configured – both internally, in terms oforganisational
structure and objectives, and externally, interms of the specific
ways in which civilians relate to theirinterests (in-/out-group
analysis) – it is possible to perform arisk–benefit analysis of the
intended engagement with theANSA for the purpose of humanitarian
access. The risks andbenefits are diverse, and depend on the
tactical position ofthe ANSA, the nature of the conflict and the
specific conflictdynamics (is it internal conflict, as in Colombia,
or a conflictstemming from an external intervention, as for example
inIraq?). Hence, a specific risk–benefit of humanitarianengagement
in particular cases cannot be defined here, sinceeach conflict
arena is unique. Rather, some general risks andbenefits can be
identified, to be applied in each and everysituation, and
reassessed as time passes and humanitarianaccess is achieved. In
other words, it is not sufficient toperform such analysis once: it
must be done prior toengaging with the ANSA, but it is also
extremely important toreassess the analysis, in particular when
there arefundamental changes, such as the introduction of a
newANSA, a split in the ANSA, the arrival of peacekeeping
orenforcement forces, or the achievement of a ceasefire orpeace
agreement.
Table 4 describes the potential risks NGHAs and civiliansface in
dealing with ANSAs in each of the four categoriesset out in Chapter
3.
It is also possible to explore the positive and negativeaspects
of an access agreement for each of the partiesconcerned – the NGHA,
civilians and the ANSA – in a moregeneral way. These are set out in
Table 5; they are notspecified for each category of ANSA as defined
above.29
As stated above, it is beyond the scope of this paper
tocomprehensively explore all the combinations of risks andbenefits
possible in the wide variety of conflict situationsand different
ANSA typologies. The precise outcome of sucha risk–benefit analysis
depends on many factors, such as thenumber of ANSAs involved, their
attitudes towards eachother, their relations with civilians, the
eventual presence of(international) intervention forces and the
position of theincumbent government and its military forces.
Someexamples illustrate the wide variety of possibilities.
• In Liberia, humanitarian access in rebel-held territoriesin
the 1990s was opposed by ECOMOG, the West
14
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Chapter 4 Engaging ANSAs: effectiveness and reliability
1155
African peacekeeping force that deployed to thecountry in 1990.
In an extreme response, ECOMOGaircraft bombed a convoy of
humanitarian vehicles enroute to rebel areas.
• In Colombia, NGHAs trying to reachcivilians in contested areas
facedaccusations that they had beeninfiltrated by informants. These
accu-sations came variously from guerrillagroups, paramilitaries
and govern-ment forces.
• The authorities in Sudan have made itvery difficult for NGHAs
to gain accessto areas controlled by rebels in Darfur.At the same
time, NGHAs operating inrebel-held areas with northernSudanese
staff have faced mistrustfrom rebels.
The variety of possible responses toattempts at securing
humanitarian accessdemonstrates the need to properlyanalyse the
relationship between all the
actors, including relations between armed groups andcivilians,
to identify which actors may feel threatened byaccess or may oppose
it, and which have an interest inencouraging access and so may
accept it, and why.
Protective
Competitive
Antagonistic
Sectarian
Table 5: General risks and benefits from humanitarian
engagement
Threats generated by type of ANSA–civil relations
Accusations against NGHA by incumbentregimes
Accusations against NGHA by competing ANSA
The (political) abuse of aidAbuse of aid to war efforts
Accusations against NGHA by internationalbodies or
governments
Risks generated by humanitarian engagement
Loss of neutrality and/or impartiality of NGHAUndue legitimacy
of ANSA
Retaliation on civiliansThreats against NGHAUndue recognition of
ANSA
Loss of neutrality /impartialityUnintended consequences (e.g.
aiding ethnic cleansing)
Insecurity of aid workers and attacks on NGHAAttacks on
civilians
To civilians
To NHGA
To ANSA
Table 4: Risk–benefit analysis according to the classification
of ANSAs
Positive effects (benefits)
• Access to humanitarian aid• Increased protection
• Fulfil mandate • Meet needs • Staff security
• Access to dialogue• Influence behaviour
Negative effects (risks)
• Perceived as sympathetic to ANSA• Retaliatory attacks by
rivals of ANSA
• External accusations• Internal NGHA divisions• Attacks by
competing ANSAs
• Acquire undue legitimacy• Increased conflict
(other ANSAs)
Sudanese government attack helicopters at Nyala airport, Darfur,
December 2004. The Sudanese authorities have made it very difficult
for
humanitarian agencies to gain access to areas of Darfur
controlled by rebels
©M
ax P. Glaser
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Mitigating contextual factors: securitystrategies and promoting
IHL
As stated at the start of this paper, the objective
ofhumanitarian engagement with ANSAs is to fulfil twofundamental
preconditions – the security of aid workersand respect for IHL. Two
approaches have been applied byvarious humanitarian actors to
mitigate the consequencesof ANSAs’ disrespect for IHL and
prevailing insecurity.These are the adoption of an ‘acceptance
strategy’ forsecurity, and the promotion of IHL.
Acceptance strategies
The ‘acceptance strategy’ aims to reduce agencies’vulnerability
to insecurity by enhancing acceptance for thehumanitarian presence
in the surrounding environment.30 Inthis way, the civilian
population, which is sympathetic to thehumanitarian presence, may
act as an early-warningnetwork, thereby increasing the security
parameters inhostile environments. Inherent in this approach is
theassumption that a viable positive connection exists betweenthe
civilian population and the ANSA. As discussed above,such a
connection is not always evident, as the ANSA mayalso be in a
negative and hostile position with regard to thecivilians
concerned. An acceptance strategy will thus onlywork in specific
types of conflict; it is most suited to contextswhere the ANSA is
protective, but in these environmentssuch a strategy is probably
redundant. Conversely, it willdefinitely not work with sectarian
ANSAs. The real challengeis in cases of antagonistic or competitive
ANSAs. In thesecases, the specific conflict dynamic and the
position ofcivilians vis-à-vis the armed group must be established
first,in order to assess the effectiveness of the
acceptancestrategy. If an ANSA has a particularly negative
attitudetowards the civilians the humanitarian agency is aiding,
theacceptance strategy may at best act as an
early-warningmechanism, but it will not necessarily provide a
securityguarantee to aid workers.
Promoting IHL
Promoting IHL principles among ANSAs to enhancehumanitarian
space is a traditional activity of the ICRC, andseveral NGHAs have
followed its example. However, thisstrategy has produced only
limited results. ANSAs often actin breach of IHL and abuse
civilians as a deliberate strategyor as a survival mechanism. It
appears that the willingness ofa particular group to accept IHL
rules depends on whetherdoing so coincides with its tactics and
interests. Theexperiences with promoting IHL described in Box
3demonstrate that ANSA commanders can learn to use IHLterminology
and language, which is perhaps at least a goodstarting-point.
However, in the application of IHL rules, othertactical and
pragmatic interests or sheer opportunism marktheir behaviour. Since
the principles of IHL are non-negotiable, the view that promoting
IHL is more comparableto ‘persuasion’, rather than negotiation,
seems accurate (seethe section on choice of interlocutor in the
next chapter).31
1166
Humanitarian engagement with non-state armed actors: the
parameters of negotiated access
Box 3
Persuasion: promoting IHL to change combatants’ behaviour
DRC: ACF’s sensitisation campaign in South Kivu
During 2000–2001, various so-called Mai-Mai militia andother
competing ANSAs were cause for increasinginsecurity in the province
of South Kivu, DRC. ACFlaunched a broad campaign to disseminate IHL
principlesand values to these groups, in order to make them
morecompliant with humanitarian access needs, and morerespectful of
the status of civilians. According to ACF, theaim was ‘to help all
armed groups understand theprinciples and life-saving importance of
humanitarianaid’.32 Although the campaign managed to reach
manydifferent commanders and groups, and as such can beseen as a
success, its results were limited. It appears thatthe commanders’
knowledge of IHL rules increased, buttheir behaviour did not alter
significantly. Although ACFtemporarily enjoyed greater secure
access, one of its staffmembers was later briefly abducted, casting
doubt on thelasting effects of such dissemination campaigns.
Colombia: ICRC’s promotion of IHL amongst paramilitaries
The ICRC has worked to disseminate IHL principles toparamilitary
forces in Colombia. A study of this work bythe Geneva-based Center
for Humanitarian Dialogue(CHD) found that it had increased
knowledge of IHLamong senior paramilitary commanders. It did
not,however, change paramilitaries’ actual behaviour
towardscivilians.33 The best that could be said was that,
withoutdissemination, the situation would have been much worse(as
one paramilitary member was quoted as saying).Similarly, Human
Rights Watch (HRW) found thatknowledge of IHL among guerrilla
leaders was relativelygood, but in practical terms IHL principles
meant little.
These experiences highlight the limited effect ofdissemination
beyond the integration of IHL language intothe ANSA lexicon. This
can be seen as another dimension ofthe ‘learning belligerent’
phenomenon discussed in Chapter2. IHL promotion campaigns may lead
ANSAs to tolerate anagency’s presence for a time, but changes in
tacticalpositions or the appearance of new actors will
progressivelyundermine these effects. The immediate impact of
suchcampaigns is therefore to temporarily increase ‘agencyspace’,
as opposed to ‘humanitarian space’, or a generalrespect for IHL.
Paradoxically, the promotion of IHL is mostneeded in situations
where it is least likely to be effective.This does not mean that
the dissemination of IHL ispointless, as the increased use of IHL
language can have along-term effect. But it does suggest that, in
the mostdemanding situations, the immediate impact on
accessconditions and security remains limited.
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Chapter 4 Engaging ANSAs: effectiveness and reliability
1177
The degree to which ANSA commanders may be persuadedto accept
IHL is highly dependent on the degree to which anANSA relies on the
civilians NGHAs are trying to reach. Theanalysis of the different
types of ANSA–civil relationsdescribed in Chapter 3 is indicative
of a particular group’spropensity to be persuaded: a protective
ANSA will clearly bemore responsive to persuasion than antagonistic
andsectarian groups.
The question of how agencies should react in operationalterms in
the face of an ANSA’s disrespect for the principlesof IHL and human
rights is a vexed one. In Sierra Leone, forexample, most agencies
refused to work in territoriescontrolled by the RUF. This was in
line with a UN-led policyof isolation. The exceptions were MSF and
ACF, whichcontinued to operate in RUF areas, and were
consequentlycriticised for doing so by other agencies and the UN.
TheUN Secretary-General referred to this as ‘breaking acommon
approach towards a misbehaving warringparty’.34 In their decision
to engage with the RUF, MSF andACF were placing the imperative to
help at least somecivilians above the highly doubtful contention
that the
RUF’s behaviour could somehow be ‘corrected’
throughisolation.
This episode also shows that the acquisition of ‘agencyspace’,
where certain agencies were allowed to operatethanks to limited
concessions by the ANSA, is not thesame as the acquisition of
‘humanitarian space’, wherethe ANSA respects the general principles
of IHL. Thepromotion of IHL may succeed in achieving the former,but
it does not necessarily promote the latter. Someagencies may be
temporarily granted access and givenassurances that access
conditions will be respected,while it may well be the case that the
same ANSAcontinues to breach IHL, commit human rights
violationsand/or deny access to other humanitarian
actors.Notwithstanding some successes, ‘correcting’ thebehaviour of
an abusive ANSA is well beyond the scope,and role, of NGHAs. The
protection of civilians exposed tosuch abuses should be sought in
credible (international)responses, forcing warring parties,
governments andnon-state armed groups to respect the status and
rightsof civilians in war.
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As stated at the outset of this paper, various
immediatequestions emerge when considering the modes ofhumanitarian
engagement. Should one approach ANSAsdirectly or indirectly? Should
the ANSA be engaged at thehighest level possible or the lowest, in
the field? Shouldengagement be done openly, or confidentially?
Direct or indirect engagement?
The question of whether engagement should take place ina direct
or indirect manner hinges mainly on howapproachable the ANSA in
question is. Contacts cannotalways be made directly, as the ANSA
may operate in asubversive fashion, or its leadership may be in a
remotearea. Indirect (or for that matter confidential) contact
mayalso be preferred in cases where the incumbent authoritiesor
competing ANSAs are sensitive to such engagement.There may also be
legal objections to direct contact fromjudicial or political
institutions of the state. In these cases,indirect contact may be
facilitated through parallelchannels by the ICRC or diplomatic
envoys, but this is notalways a viable option.
Direct engagement takes place either with top or
field-levelcommanders; in the latter case, these commanders
willoperate more-or-less as mediators between the NGHA andthe
higher-level leadership. Figure 4 shows a simple modelof the direct
and indirect contacts between an NGHA, thecivilian community and an
ANSA. The most crucialrelationship is that between the potential
civilianinterlocutor and the ANSA command.
Questions that need to be asked here include: can thecivilian
interlocutor ‘negotiate’ safely with ANSAcommanders, or is there
the risk that they will facepersecution by the authorities or rival
ANSA, or evenretaliation from fellow civilians in the community?
Whatseems to enable a civilian interlocutor to influence
ANSAcommanders? Does this potential influence stem from
thecivilian’s privileged position, granted by ANSAcommanders? It is
also important to understand thecommand structure and degree of
internal disciplineprevailing in the ANSA, and the degree of
independence ofthe civilian community from th