humanitarianexchange044.pdf - Humanitarian Practice Network

We last featured thehumanitarian crisis in theoccupied Palestinian terri-tories in November 2004 –nearly five years ago. Sincethen, the humanitariansituation has steadily wors-ened. Continuing violencehas killed, injured anddisplaced many and causedthe widespread destructionof homes and infrastruc-ture. Expansion of thecontroversial barrier walland the related ‘closuresystem’ has underminedlivelihoods, exacerbatedpoverty and caused aserious deterioration inbasic services. These restrictions havecontributed to an unemployment rate ofover 40%, and associated low self-esteem, depression and family violence.As the overview article by PhilippeLazzarini of OCHA makes clear, the crisisin the oPt is not just a humanitarian one:it is a crisis of human dignity.

This issue of Humanitarian Exchange

focuses on this human dignity crisis.Articles set out the current situationin the oPt and outline the impact ofthe barrier and the closure system.Rolf Holmboe, Denmark’s represen-tative to the Palestinian Authority,describes his government’s pro-gramme to enable municipalities toprovide basic services and supportcommunity development. Otherarticles look at UNDP’s efforts tohelp individuals and commun-ities to reclaim their agency anddignity, the hidden crisis ofdisplacement, the impact ofhuman rights group B’Tselem’sdistribution of video cameras

to Palestinian civilians and a community-based child protection programme insti-gated by Save the Children.

Articles in the policy and practice sectioninclude an examination of civil–militaryrelations in natural disasters, methods formeasuring the socio-economic impact ofpost-disaster shelter programmes and thechallenges of emergency nutrition pro-gramming in Eritrea. Others focus on a new decision-making tool for use incomplex humanitarian environments, thequestion of whether chronic conflict andrecurrent disasters exacerbate socialdivisions or strengthen cohesion, the waysin which the media influence charitablegiving and the lessons learned from thedeployment of UN and EU hybrid pro-tection forces in Chad.

As always, we welcome any comments or feedback, which can be sent [email protected] or to The Coordinator,Humanitarian Practice Network, 111Westminster Bridge Road, London SE1 7JD,UK.

Commissioned and published by the Humanitarian Practice Network at ODI

Number 44September 2009

HumanitarianExchange

In this issueThe crisis in the West Bank and Gaza

2 Putting dignity at the heart of the humanitarian crisis in the occupied Palestinian territory

4 The Barrier: implications and prospects6 Gaza: challenges and adaptation9 DEEP: a new approach to poverty

reduction 11 Using cameras to enhance protection and

accountability in the Occupied Territories13 Community-based child protection in the

Gaza Strip16 Internal displacement in the occupied

Palestinian territory

Practice and policy notes

19 When there are no statistics: EmergencyNutrition Programming in Eritrea

21 Protection and humanitarian space: a case-study of the UN Mission to the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)

24 Making the tough calls: decision-making incomplex humanitarian environments

26 Media and message: communicating crises29 Military responses to natural disasters: last

resort or inevitable trend? 32 Measuring the socio-economic impact of post-

disaster shelter: experiences from two RedCross programmes

34 A grassroots perspective on risks stemmingfrom disasters and conflict

About HPNThe Humanitarian Practice Network at the OverseasDevelopment Institute is an independent forumwhere field workers, managers and policymakersin the humanitarian sector share information,analysis and experience. The views and opinionsexpressed in HPN’s publications do not necessarilystate or reflect those of the Humanitarian PolicyGroup or the Overseas Development Institute.

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ohamed H

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HUMANITARIANexchange2

THE CRISIS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA

The Gaza Strip in early 1992: the first intifada is yet to end,and intensive diplomatic efforts – which would lead laterto the Oslo Accords – are ongoing, raising hopes for an endto the Israeli occupation and the establishment of anindependent Palestinian state. Although that period wasviolent, with daily mass demonstrations, confrontations,arrests and casualties, it was at least possible to dream ofa better future. Returning 16 years later, in 2008, with themedia and the international community highlighting amajor humanitarian crisis in Gaza, I was prepared for theworst. However, unlike Somalia, where I had just endedmy last assignment, the population in Gaza was not on thebrink of massive starvation, nor were there hundreds ofthousands of internally displaced people. This is adifferent type of crisis, one which is not immediatelyapparent in this dense urban landscape. The population isenduring a massive assault on its human dignity: 1.5million children, women and men are gradually losing thefreedom to live their lives as they wish – a populationlocked into one of the most densely-populated places onEarth. While the situation in the West Bank is better, theretoo there are some troubling signs of an impending crisis.

The current crisisThe current crisis in Gaza was triggered by the Hamastakeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007 and theunprecedented blockade imposed by Israel. The blockademarked the peak of a gradual process of isolation thatstarted in the early 1990s with the imposition of a generalclosure, which forced Gazans to obtain special permits toleave the Gaza Strip.1 Now in its third year, the blockadehas resulted in a degradation in the living conditions of theentire population. Approximately 120,000 jobs have beenlost as a result of severe import restrictions and an almosttotal prohibition on exports. Three-quarters of thepopulation is affected by poverty and food insecurity.Access restrictions have also led to a steady decline in theinfrastructure and the quality of services in vital sectorssuch as health, water and sanitation and education.

The Gaza population’s distress is compounded by the lackof civilian protection. Israel’s Cast Lead military operation

of 27 December 2008–18 January 2009 provides adevastating example. The bulk of the 1,383 fatalities werecivilians not involved in the fighting, including over 330children.2 Tens of thousands were injured or traumatised.Enduring three weeks of daily bombardment from land,sea and air, the population had nowhere to seek refuge:borders were sealed and safe havens non-existent sinceeven UN premises and schools, where civilians had takenshelter, were hit by direct shelling.

The widespread destruction to homes, infrastructure andproductive assets during the offensive has further deepenedpoverty and undermined the chances of economic recovery,if and when conditions improve. Locked in by a medievalsiege whose enforcers decide what items will be allowed inand what people will eat, Gaza has become a ‘humanitarianwelfare society’ supported by the international community.At the same time, despite billions of dollars pledged at theSharm El Sheikh donor conference in March 2009, homesand schools cannot be repaired due to the ban on the entryof construction materials. Locked in and isolated, Gazans arecollectively prevented from building their own future.Women and children in particular are paying a high price, asshown by a recent UN survey revealing an increase in theprevalence of domestic and gender-based violence. Possiblefactors behind the increase in domestic violence include theunprecedented levels of trauma and stress that emergedafter the conflict, as well as the growing number of maleheads of households who have lost their homes and jobs.3

The internal Palestinian divide between Hamas and Fatahhas increased the burden on an already exhaustedpopulation. At least 360 people have been killed infactional violence since May 2007. Individuals suspectedof affiliation with opposition factions have allegedly beenthe victims of arbitrary arrests, torture and extra-judicialexecutions. Schools and hospitals have been disrupted bystrikes and political infighting. Meanwhile, Hamas isextending its control over every level of the social fabric.‘Morality screening’ is starting to impact upon varioussectors of society, with NGOs being requested to separatefemale from male staff.

Albeit on a different scale and intensity, West Bankers too,including those living in East Jerusalem, are seeing theirfreedom to live and develop their life as they wish being

Putting dignity at the heart of the humanitarian crisis in theoccupied Palestinian territory

Philippe Lazzarini, Head of OCHA oPt

2 See OCHA, ‘Locked In: The Humanitarian Impact of Two Years ofBlockade on the Gaza Strip’, August 2009.3 UNIFEM/UN Inter-Agency Gender Task Force, ‘Voicing the Needs ofWomen and Men in Gaza Beyond the Aftermath of the 23 Day MilitaryOperation’, May 2009, http://www.unifem.org/resources/item_detail.php?ProductID=133.

1 As part of this process of closure, in 1995 Israel built a perimeterfence to separate the Gaza Strip from Israel. This was rebuilt andstrengthened during the second intifada, which began in September2000. For most of the second intifada, permits to enter or leave Gazawere limited mainly to ‘humanitarian cases’.

this is a different type of crisis

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Number 44 • September 2009

eroded as a result of Israeli policies. Restrictions havesignificantly limited the opportunities for economic andurban development. A recent study by OCHA reveals that,in Bethlehem governorate, the land available forPalestinian development amounts to only 13% of theterritory. The remainder, which is under direct Israelicontrol, has been allocated for the construction andexpansion of Israeli settlements, or declared closedmilitary areas or nature reserves.4 In East Jerusalemlikewise, although 30% of land has been zoned forsettlement housing, only 13% has been zoned for thePalestinian population. The extent of the land available forPalestinian development has remained unchanged fordecades. As a consequence, about 30% of houses havebeen built without permits, and between 60,000 and100,000 people are at risk of displacement.5

The Barrier, which Israel began to construct in 2002following a campaign of suicide bombings, is anothercomponent in a system which restricts Palestinian space.Once complete, it will isolate approximately 9.5% of theWest Bank, while its attendant permit and gate regimerestricts access to agricultural land and obligesPalestinians living between the Barrier and the 1949Armistice Line (the Green Line) to apply for permanentresidence permits just to remain in their own homes. TheBarrier, together with access and movement restrictionsand policies restricting the use of land, has haddevastating economic and humanitarian consequences. In2005, under the auspices of then US Secretary of StateCondoleezza Rice, Israel and the Palestinian Authorityreached an Agreement on Access and Movement (AMA),which included an Israeli commitment to reduce thenumber of obstacles (checkpoints and roadblocks)throughout the West Bank. At the time of the agreementthere were some 390 such obstacles; by June 2009 thisnumber had increased to 610, as counted by OCHA andcorroborated by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).6

Recently, the Israeli authorities have taken steps to ease theflow of Palestinian traffic into a number of West Bank cities,reducing travel time. Early reports suggest that thesemeasures have had a positive impact on commercial life insome cities. However, this has taken place in conjunctionwith the entrenchment of some of the mechanisms used tocontrol and restrict Palestinian movement, including theexpansion of the alternative (‘fabric of life’) road network

designated solely for the use of Palestinians, and theexpansion of key permanently-staffed checkpoints. In somecases, these measures have eased access: however, theyexact a price from Palestinians in terms of land loss,disruption to traditional routes and the deepeningfragmentation of West Bank territory.

A close look at a West Bank map shows that most accessrestrictions are strategically located to protect Israelisettlements and settlers. The Israeli settler population hasreached almost half a million, 190,000 of whom live in EastJerusalem. The Barrier will place 80% of the settlerpopulation on the western, ‘Israeli’ side, with the remainderconnected to Israel through a road network restricted toPalestinian use. Settlement is a key concern, not onlybecause it reduces the space available for Palestinian useand movement, but also because the Israeli authoritieshave systematically failed to protect Palestinians fromsettler violence. In summer 2008, for example, I met an 82-year-old man in Hebron. His face was bleeding and he wascrying, having been humiliated by Israeli children who werepreventing him from accessing his land. They put up tents inhis olive and almond fields and threw stones at anyPalestinians attempting to reach the land or simply pass by.According to the Israeli human rights group Yesh Din, over90% of investigations into settler violence are closedwithout an indictment filed against the suspect. Manyvictims do not even file a complaint at police stationsbecause stations are located in settlements.7

Restrictions on the humanitarian responseLocked into Gaza, denied space and access in the WestBank, at risk of house demolition in East Jerusalem, theirbasic rights denied and facing daily humiliation – all ofthese problems provide fertile ground for a prolongedhumanitarian crisis. In this protracted and highlypoliticised conflict, further complicated by the internalPalestinian divide, addressing humanitarian needs in animpartial, neutral manner has become a daily challenge.

This is particularly true in Gaza, where the Israeliauthorities have reduced to a bare minimum the list ofitems considered as humanitarian assistance. Key donorshave linked funds to compliance with a strict ‘no contact’policy with Hamas; by contrast, the latter is increasinglyeager to take an active role in the coordination of aiddelivery. To address this dilemma, humanitarian partners,with the support of some UN member states, havedeveloped a framework for the provision of assistance inGaza. This document spells out the conditions necessaryto ensure that basic needs can be addressed in animpartial and neutral way.8

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4 See OCHA, ‘Shrinking Space: Urban Contraction and RuralFragmentation in the Bethlehem Governorate’, May 2009, http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_bethlehem_shrinking_space_may_2009_english.pdf.5 See OCHA, ‘The Planning Crisis in East Jerusalem: Understanding thePhenomenon of “Illegal” Construction’, April 2009, http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_planning_crisis_east_jerusalem_april_2009_english.pdf.6 This figure does not include the approximately 400 kilometres of theBarrier already constructed, the physical obstacles protecting theIsrael settler community in central Hebron (H2), and the 60–80 flyingcheckpoints which are recorded weekly. See OCHA, ‘West Bank Accessand Movement Update’, May and June 2009, http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_movement_and_access_2009_05_25_english.pdf and http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_movement_access_2009_june_english.pdf.

settlement is a key concern

7 Yesh Din, ‘A Semblance of Law: Law Enforcement upon IsraeliCivilians in the West Bank’, June 2006.8 The full text of the Framework on the Provision of MinimumHumanitarian Assistance in Gaza can be found at http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_humanitarian_framework_english.pdf.

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HUMANITARIANexchange

There is still much distrust between humanitarianorganisations and the Israeli authorities. However, theatmosphere and mindset can change if there is a realcommitment to address the fate of the affectedpopulation, regardless of any political agenda. It is timefor a sincere and substantial dialogue with the Israeliauthorities at every level. Humanitarian organisationsshould avoid being trapped in a hostile, politiciseddebate. In turn, the Israeli authorities should viewcriticism as constructive, and designed to improve respectfor the rights of the civilian population.

The humanitarian response, however important, is not thesolution, as it perpetuates a humiliating feeling of depen-dency on the part of the Palestinian population towards the

international community. Palestinians deserve much morethan food parcels: nothing will substitute for a politicalsolution which lays the ground for future peace, stability andprosperity. Unfortunately, time is running out and frustrationis high. All the ingredients for a new round of violence are inplace. Poverty, isolation and humiliation are recipes forextremism. ‘Unlocking’ Gaza by opening its crossing pointsand freeing up space for Palestinian development in theWest Bank are the first steps towards averting a futureexplosion of violence. Most of all, they are critical in restoringthe dignity of the population, and the Palestinian people’sability to hope and dream for a better future.

Philippe Lazzarini is Head of OCHA oPt. Correspondenceon this article can be sent to: [email protected].

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The Barrier: implications and prospects

Ray Dolphin, OCHA

In mid-2002, following a campaign of suicide attacks byPalestinian militants, the Israeli government approved theconstruction of a Barrier to prevent suicide bombers fromentering the country.1 Five years on, approximately 58.3%is complete, a further 10.2% is under construction and31.5% is planned. The Barrier is made up of fences,ditches, razor wire, groomed sand paths, an electronicmonitoring system, patrol roads and a buffer zone. Around30km consists of 8–9-metre-high concrete slab segmentswhich are connected to form a wall, notably in urban areassuch as Jerusalem and Bethlehem. When completed,approximately 85% of the route will run inside the WestBank and East Jerusalem, rather than along the 1949Armistice Line (the Green Line). Although the Israeliauthorities state that it is purely for defensive purposes,the Barrier encircles 80 Jewish settlements, physicallyjoining them to Israel. The total area between the Barrierand the Green Line amounts to 9.5% of the West Bank. Theestimated cost of the complete Barrier is $3–4 billion.

The ICJ opinionThe Barrier intrudes deep into the West Bank (includingEast Jerusalem). It was the legal implication of thisintrusive route, not the Barrier itself, which was thesubject of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisoryopinion of 9 July 2004.

In its opinion, the ICJ recognised that Israel ‘has the right,and indeed the duty, to respond in order to protect the lifeof its citizens [but] the measures taken are boundnonetheless to remain in conformity with applicableinternational law’.2 The ICJ stated that the sections which

ran inside the West Bank, including East Jerusalem,together with the associated gate and permit regime,violated Israel’s obligations under international law. TheICJ called on Israel to cease construction of the Barrier‘including in and around East Jerusalem’; dismantle thesections already completed; and ‘repeal or renderineffective forthwith all legislative and regulatory actsrelating thereto’. The ICJ also called on Israel to ‘makereparations for the requisition and destruction of homes,businesses and agricultural holdings’ and ‘to return theland, orchards, olive groves, and other immovableproperty seized’.3 The court also obligated member statesnot to recognise the illegal situation created by the Barrier,and to ensure Israel’s compliance with international law.Although this is a non-binding advisory legal opinion, on20 July 2004 the UN General Assembly overwhelminglyapproved Resolution ES-10/15, which demanded thatIsrael comply with the ICJ opinion.

The Barrier’s impact on urban areasContinuing construction of the Barrier inside the WestBank is not only contrary to the ICJ advisory opinion, but isalso having a devastating humanitarian impact onPalestinian cities, towns and villages. The West Bankpopulation depends on East Jerusalem for specialisedmedical and educational services; for work, social andfamily relationships; and for worship at the Al AqsaMosque and Christian holy sites. The Barrier has becomea de facto border, severing historic religious, social andeconomic ties between East Jerusalem and the rest of theWest Bank. Neighbouring Bethlehem is cut off fromJerusalem, restricting its potential for residential andindustrial expansion. If construction goes ahead as1 Since 2004, the number of suicide bombings has decreased. In 2005,

Palestinian militant groups declared a ceasefire on suicide bombingsin Israel.2 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied

Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004. The full text ofthe ICJ opinion, from which all of these quotes are taken, can be foundat www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=5a&case=131&code=mwp&p3=4.

3 Following General Assembly Resolution A/RES/ES-10/17 of January2007, the United Nations Register of Damage Caused by theConstruction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (UNRoD)was established to record, in documentary form, the damage causedby the Barrier. UNRoD receives, processes and reviews claims bypeople who have sustained material damage as a result of the Barrier;by June 2009, more than 1,500 claims forms had been collected.

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planned in the western part of the governorate, the ruralhinterland will be cut off, further reducing Palestinianaccess to land and water resources.4

‘Seam Zone’ communities: living in a closed areaOne consequence of what the ICJ described as theBarrier’s ‘sinuous route’ is that approximately 35,000 WestBank Palestinians will be located between the Barrier andthe Green Line, in addition to the majority of thePalestinian residents of East Jerusalem. Some 10,000Palestinians in the northern West Bank have been in abureaucratic and social limbo for five years, since the areabetween the Barrier and the Green Line was declaredclosed by military order in October 2003. Palestiniansresiding in the closed area (or ‘Seam Zone’) requirepermanent residence permits just to continue to live intheir own homes, a requirement which is not imposed onIsraeli settlers living in the area.

As their centre of life is located on the ‘Palestinian’ side ofthe Barrier, children, patients and workers have to passthrough checkpoints to reach schools, medical facilitiesand workplaces, and to maintain family and socialrelations. These checkpoints generally close at night,posing problems in the case of medical emergencies andfor expectant mothers, who often leave the area weeksbefore delivery to ensure access to proper care. Social andfamily life is also affected, as relatives and friends whowant to visit Palestinians in the closed area requiredifficult-to-obtain visitor permits.

Visitor permitsTens of thousands of farmers have land and waterresources located in the closed area between the Barrierand the Green Line; since the imposition of the closedarea in October 2003 in the northern West Bank, theyrequire visitor permits to access their land. To obtain avisitor permit, applicants must satisfy the securityconsiderations necessary for all Israeli-issued permits.They also have to prove ‘connection to land’ in the closedarea by submitting, amongst other official papers, a validownership or land taxation document. This is animpossible requirement for many West Bank Palestinians,since the majority of land has not been formallyregistered and has been handed down by traditionalmethods which do not require formal inheritance

documentation. These requirements also run contrary tocustomary farming practices, whereby extended familiesparticipate in planting, harvesting and maintaining theland. Tenant farmers and landless labourers areparticularly penalised by a permit system where the onusis on the applicant to provide documentary proof of landownership.

In a 2007 UN survey of 67 affected rural communities inthe northern West Bank, village representatives reportedthat fewer than 20% of those who used to work land in theclosed area before completion of the Barrier were beinggranted permits.5 Even in this restricted allocationdistribution is irregular, with some families having morethan one permit-holder, others having a single successfulapplicant – not necessarily the most able-bodied orappropriate – and many families having no permit-holderat all. Those suffering repeated refusals are discouragedfrom reapplying. The short validity period for permits –generally no more than six months – results in farmers’forced inactivity between the expiry of the current permitand its (hoped-for) renewal.

Barrier gatesFor the fortunate few granted visitor permits, access ischannelled through one of the 60 or so gates which theIsraeli authorities have installed along the length of theBarrier. Of these, only 12 open on a daily basis, generallyfor short periods in the early morning, noon and in the lateafternoon. Another ten gates open on two or threeoccasions throughout the week, in addition to the annualolive harvest. The vast majority of gates only open duringthe olive harvest itself, which is inadequate for essentialyear-round activities such as ploughing, pruning,fertilising and pest and weed management. This regime isincompatible with irrigated agriculture and greenhouseproduction, where the produce requires daily care if it isnot to fall victim to disease and rot.

Barrier gates constitute some of the most restrictivecheckpoints in the West Bank. Permit-holders must queuefor their documents to be inspected and their persons andbelongings searched before they are permitted to cross.There are restrictions on the vehicles and materials whichare allowed into the closed area. Considered ‘visitors’, fewfarmers are granted 24-hour permits to remain in theclosed area overnight, and must leave their land beforethe gate is locked in the late afternoon. To make the bestof the limited time available, permit-holders work insummer when the sun is at its height, and in winter queuein the dark and cold before the first gate opening. As thegates are closed and unstaffed between the scheduledopening times, farmers cannot return immediately to the‘Palestinian’ side in cases of accident or emergency. Theopening hours also penalise ‘part-time’ farmers, whomight otherwise cultivate family holdings after work fordomestic consumption or supplementary income.

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4 For an assessment of the Barrier’s impact on Palestinian access tohealth, education, religious and economic services and facilities inJerusalem, see OCHA, The Humanitarian Impact of the West Bank

Barrier on Palestinian Communities: East Jerusalem, Update No. 7,June 2007 (www.ochaopt.org/documents/Jerusalem-30July2007.pdf ).For more information on the impact in Bethlehem governorate, seeOCHA, Shrinking Space: Urban Contraction and Rural Fragmentation in

Bethlehem Governorate, May 2009.

5 UNOCHA/UNRWA Special Focus: The Barrier Gate and Permit Regime

Four Years On: Humanitarian Impact in the Northern West Bank,November 2007 (www.ochaopt.org/documents/OCHA_SpecialFocus_BarrierGates_2007_11.pdf ). This figure was replicated in a follow-upsurvey of the same communities in May–June 2008.

the Barrier is having a

devastating impact on

Palestinian life

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HUMANITARIANexchange

In recent years, Gaza has suffered recurrent bouts of conflict.In 2006, a major Israeli military operation was launched afterthe kidnapping of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. In 2007, Hamastook power following a year of rising tension culminating in ashort civil war with the rival Fatah movement. Renewedtensions between Hamas and Israel escalated into the GazaWar in December 2008 and January 2009. Despite an uneasyceasefire, no one believes that the conflict is over, andeveryone knows that next time will be worse. Meanwhile, theIsraeli restrictions on access and the movement of goodsand people have shattered Gaza’s economy. This blockade,combined with the fundamental struggle between the

nationalist Fatah movement and the Islamist Hamas, hasencouraged the growth of Islamic radicalisation. Thiscombination of external and internal instability is changingthe very fabric of society in Gaza, making religion theultimate yardstick for any public or private activity andnarrowing the space for individual choice.

The challenge posed by these conflicts makes thehumanitarian and development processes much moredifficult, disempowers societal development carriers (themiddle classes and the private sector) and physicallydestroys humanitarian and development efforts. It takes

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Restricting access to land and livelihoodsRestricted allocation of visitor permits and the limitednumber and opening times of the Barrier gates have severelycurtailed agricultural production. Greenhouses aredismantled and land is converted to lower-maintenance, lessperishable but also lower-value crops such as wheat. TheBarrier also isolates grazing land, undermining herders’livelihoods. Signs of displacement from rural areas – aconcern recognised by the ICJ – are apparent, with youngmen, particularly the university-educated, moving to otherWest Bank cities or emigrating entirely. In January 2009, theclosed area designation was extended to Ramallah, Hebronand parts of the Salfit, Bethlehem and Jerusalemgovernorates, raising concerns that the experience of thenorth will be replicated throughout the West Bank.

The way forwardIn recent years, the Israeli authorities have takenadministrative steps to address some of the humanitarianconcerns outlined above. In the northern West Bank, anumber of gates which previously operated only duringthe annual olive harvest now open on a limited basisthroughout the week, to allow for seasonal activities suchas ploughing and fertilizing. Additional permits are alsoissued to farming families during the olive harvest.However, the requirements for agricultural workers toobtain visitor permits have become more stringent overthe years, limiting the number of Palestinians overall whocan cultivate their land. The extension of the closed areaand permit regime to other West Bank governorates inJanuary 2009 risks further restricting access to land in thecentral and southern West Bank.

Regarding the question of the route of the Barrier, whichis at the core of the ICJ advisory opinion, the Israeliauthorities have relocated certain closed areacommunities to the ‘Palestinian’ side of the Barrier.However, these amendments, which are in compliancewith decisions issued by the Israeli High Court of Justicerather than the ICJ advisory opinion, leave the reroutedsections of the Barrier within the West Bank, rather thanrunning along the Green Line or in Israel. In any case, theimpact of these realignments is negligible compared toprojected Barrier construction around the majorsettlement blocs, in particular the Qedumim and Ariel‘Fingers’, which will further fragment the Qalqiliya andSalfit governorates; the encirclement of Ma’ale Adummimsettlement, which will compound the separation of EastJerusalem from the rest of the West Bank; andconstruction around the Gush Etzion bloc, which willsever the Bethlehem urban area from its agriculturalhinterland.

While Israel has a duty to ensure the safety and security ofits citizens in response to attacks by Palestinian militants,this must be in accordance with international law andshould not cause long-term harm to the local Palestinianpopulation. The ICJ advisory opinion called on Israel tocease construction of the Barrier, including in and aroundEast Jerusalem, and to dismantle the sections of theBarrier already completed. In line with the advisoryopinion, Israel should stop all Barrier construction anddismantle or reroute the constructed sections to the GreenLine. Only then will the Palestinian urban and ruralcommunities cut off by the Barrier be able to exercise theirrights to freedom of movement, work, education andhealth and an adequate standard of living. This will alsoensure that no Palestinian land and water reserves areisolated between the Barrier and the Green Line.

Ray Dolphin works with OCHA in the occupied Palestinianterritories as the Barrier Specialist. He is the author of The

West Bank Wall: Unmaking Palestine (London: Pluto Press,2006). His email address is: [email protected].

Gaza: challenges and adaptation

Rolf Holmboe, Danish Representative to the Palestinian Authority

Barrier gates constitute some of

the most restrictive checkpoints

in the West Bank

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Number 44 • September 2009 7

away the very basis for engaging in self-development, whenthe population remains preoccupied with just making do.The challenge is to adapt humanitarian and developmentefforts to counter processes of de-development in society.

A project challenged by warDenmark has been implementing a local developmentproject in Gaza since 1999 – the SMDM (Support toMunicipal Development and Management). It covers 11 outof Gaza’s 25 municipalities, and four of the eight refugeecamps in the ‘Middle Area’ of Gaza, between Gaza City inthe north and Khan Younis in the south. The projectfocuses on developing the capacity of municipalities tobuild and improve physical infrastructure, improvefinancial management and planning as well as engage incommunity development.

The 2006 Israeli military operation hit the Middle Area hard.Basic infrastructure and homes were destroyed. Themunicipalities had to respond to more immediate and short-term challenges, and their engagement in developmentpriorities became difficult. The project faced a choice: waituntil immediate needs had been satisfied, or adapt tobridge the divide between short-term necessity and long-term development. Denmark opted to create a quick ‘sideproject’ to assist in the emergency restoration of publicservices and the rehabilitation of public and privateinfrastructure, and to help the municipalities to continue to

function. Likewise, during the Gaza War in 2008–2009Denmark used project funds to implement an emergencypackage of humanitarian assistance. Among other things,the project supported the paediatric ward and intensivecare unit of the Al Aqsa Martyr’s Hospital, the only hospitalin the Middle Area. The hospital was taking in five to sixtimes its capacity, mostly children, and referral to the over-worked al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City was hazardous. Theproject also supplied tools, animals and seedlings to helpfarmers in the largely destroyed Wadi Gaza municipality torestore their livelihoods.

A project challenged by social struggleLocal government is one of the key battlegrounds in thestruggle between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority. Thepressure on municipalities and civil society organisations toconform to the new societal orientation in Gaza is intense.Municipalities – especially non-Hamas ones – have less andless funding and support with which to carry out their maintasks. Meanwhile, Hamas itself is focusing on providingpersonalised social services, targeted youth work andreligious education. The organisation has seen a dramaticincrease in its financial capacity. Municipalities are losingrelevance as elected service providers for the population, asthe politicised ‘parallel government’ controlled by Hamasslowly takes over their functions. Municipalities are furtherundermined as donors channel emergency responsesthrough external organisations, and in many cases do noteven engage them in decision-making. Neither thePalestinian Authority nor donors provide support foressential municipal service provision, such as water andelectricity.

In the light of these changes, the SMDM is placing muchstronger emphasis on ‘community development’. Theobjective is to strengthen the positive connections betweenmunicipalities and citizens by enabling municipalities torespond to the emerging priorities of the population. If themunicipalities do not respond, the politicised ‘parallelstructures’ will, undermining the municipalities in the eyesof the population. Community development in this contextencompasses activities carried out through localgovernment units to develop social, cultural and communityinfrastructure, support social, cultural and communityactivities and help socially and economically deprivedfamilies (known as Social Hardship Cases – SHC).

These activities are often on a very small scale, below$15,000. The focus is on enablement: support should allowcommunities to carry out an activity themselves, not carry itout for them. Their ownership is the key. All work is basedon the voluntary contributions of citizens (in Gaza there is a

Children at a computer and Internet training session at

a municipal centre for young people in mid-Gaza

©Rolf H

omboe

local government is one of the

key battlegrounds in the struggle

between Hamas and the

Palestinian Authority

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strong tradition of community involvement of this sort). Infact, most financial support goes on buying equipment andmaterial that will allow municipalities and communitygroups to go through with the project. This has enabledmunicipalities to support rehabilitation of damagedinfrastructure, improve medical centres and establish parks.Parks may seem a strange priority, but there are preciousfew places in Gaza where families can relax, so they areextremely popular. People consistently ask for recreationalfacilities such as sports clubs, cultural centres (withcomputer labs allowing access to the outside world) andlibraries. Municipalities have also focused activities onwomen and young people. Both groups face particularchallenges: women’s freedoms are being constrained, whileyoung people face the highest rates of unemployment inGaza, and have few options other than crime, militant workor martyrdom if they want to provide for their families. Awide range of small, targeted vocational training activitiesgive people outlets and extra opportunities. Engaging thepopulation in public awareness campaigns on issues ofpublic concern is also high on the priority list, includingcampaigns to inform children of the dangers of unexplodedordnance and proper environmental behaviour. In many ofthese projects, NGOs play a key role as implementingpartners.

Finally, this work allows municipalities to supportstruggling families or groups – in particular largehouseholds with unemployed parents or war-deprivedgroups. The assistance has focused on helping women tocontribute to their families. Chicken-, rabbit- andbeekeeping use locally available resources, and theproducts are marketable. A simple support package canprovide a family of 12 with 400–600 Shekels a month – inmany cases the only monetary income the family receives.Other activities focus on ameliorating the situation of war-handicapped or the elderly. Again, local NGOs are keypartners in implementing this support.

ConclusionsA key lesson of the work of the SMDM is that outsidesupport to alleviate humanitarian emergencies must be‘owned’ by local governments and communities.Communities are always disempowered by the fact of anemergency; the response should not contribute to thisdisempowerment. Integrating emergency alleviationwithin existing humanitarian stabilisation or developmentefforts saves time and increases the effectiveness of theresponse. Enabling local government to play a key role (forinstance by involving municipal councils in decision-making, rather than as direct implementers) re-empowerslocal governments in a situation of stress and freescapacity to re-engage in humanitarian stabilisation anddevelopment activities beyond the here-and-now.

A second lesson in a fragile state context is that buildingstrong and dynamic relations between municipalities andcitizens is important in safeguarding the whole democraticsystem of local government. Municipal/communityengagement in community development is thereforecomplementary to stabilisation efforts as well asdevelopment projects, and should be an integral part of

both. The main focus should be on working with electedmunicipal councils as the central body for the localdemocratic process, in a way that does not allow for theappropriation of activities by political parties.

The ability of secular, elected municipalities to react toemergency needs and to popular priorities is key.Responding to emergencies through external institutions orNGOs, and not directly with municipalities and municipalcouncils, may simply disempower local government andthereby inadvertently pave the way for politicised ‘parallelgovernments’. Establishing a strong decision-makingstructure, whereby communities can submit proposals tomunicipal councils, for instance through open meetings orpetitions, and allowing councils to respond and makedecisions within a simple and established framework, hasbeen shown to be a key element in strengthening thedemocratic processes of local government.

This in no way precludes partnerships with NGOs inimplementing activities agreed between municipalitiesand citizens. In fact, the engagement of NGOs is in mostcases highly desirable and necessary, not least becausethey have implementation capacity and are informed byideas of fairness and social responsibility. In the SMDMexperience, a very fruitful partnership has been achievedbetween municipalities, the population and local NGOs,allowing both for municipality/community ownership andfor the efficient and effective delivery of communitydevelopment.

A final consideration concerns the role of external donors.Ideally, the donor should step back from the decision-making process in community development and limit itselfto establishing the proper framework for local decision-making (for instance in municipal councils) and for theallocation of resources. It is also important thatmunicipalities/communities are made responsible formonitoring projects – this is an integral part of the‘process of ownership’. This of course does not precludedonor engagement with processes or activities, as long asthe role of elected local government as the responsiblebody is maintained. Donor engagement could contributeto a high degree of local pride in people’s achievements,empowering communities and giving them some hope forthe future. When it comes to outside involvement, thedonor principle of least is best should be followed.

The ability to adapt quickly to integrate emergencyresponses within development efforts can bridge thedivide between emergency and development needs. InGaza, this is of paramount importance. Strengthening localgovernment and enhancing positive relations betweenlocal government units (such as municipalities or villagecouncils) and citizens through ‘community development’ isone response to the challenge posed by the societal divide,and can be an effective way of safeguarding the democraticsystem as a whole.

Rolf M. H. P. Holmboe has been Denmark’s Representativeto the Palestinian Authority since 2005. His email addressis: [email protected].


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Promoting development in the occupiedPalestinian territory (oPt) is becomingincreasingly difficult in the face of anongoing conflict that affects everyaspect of Palestinian social and eco-nomic life. The prolonged political crisishas contributed to the destruction ofthe social fabric and has worsened theeconomic prospects of all Palestinians,plunging many into ever-deeper pov-erty. The 1948 war, the regional wars of1967 and 1973, the 1987 and 2000uprisings and the 2008–2009 Israeliincursion into Gaza have causedrepeated displacement and turnedmany into long-term refugees. In recentyears, the territory has been fragmen-ted following the internal Palestinianconflict, which led to the creation of twolargely separate entities, the Gaza Stripand the West Bank.

Economic and living conditions in theoPt are poor, with an estimated 43% ofthe Palestinian population living belowthe poverty line of $2.30 a day, and about 15% living inabsolute poverty. In the second half of 2007, the level ofunemployment was 23%, with youth unemploymentparticularly dire at 36%. Unemployment was most acute inrefugee camps and in southern Gaza.1 The over-riding causeof spiralling poverty and unemployment is the ongoing‘closure regime’, which restricts the movement of people andtrade within Palestinian areas, into and out of Israel and withthird-party markets.

Sixty-one years of occupation have put Palestinians underalmost unbearable stress. The majority have spent theirsavings, sold property and other assets and cut down ontheir food intake. In response, local and internationalorganisations have launched development interventionsto help people retain or regain their economicindependence, but most have been unsuccessful becauseof the top-down approach they have used. People havebeen targeted via sectors or clusters and excluded fromthe design, decision-making and implementation process,giving them no opportunity to discuss their problems andhow to solve them. For example, women’s empowermentprogrammes are designed and implemented withoutexamining the individual’s circumstances or taking intoconsideration the resources and opportunities actuallyavailable to beneficiaries. In addition, such programmeshave exacerbated family fragmentation, as the focus onwomen and thus the exclusion of men (or the reverse inother programmes) does not reflect a family consensus.

This article discusses a new developmental approachspecifically designed to address the Palestinian context andovercome the long-term problems produced by theprotracted political crisis. This new approach, which aims toassist families to graduate from poverty, goes beyondinterventions such as short-term employment programmesand sector-based projects. The ‘Sustainable LivelihoodsApproach’ on which it is based is a dynamic response thatsupports the development of the family as a unit.

The launch of DEEPIn mid-2007, UNDP inaugurated a pilot programme forchronically poor families in the oPt: the Deprived FamiliesEconomic Empowerment Programme (DEEP). DEEPmerges Promotional Safety Net activities with micro-finance services to create a pathway for poor families tograduate from poverty. The programme also has acapacity-building component for partner NGOs. Thepurpose of merging the two services is to help deprivedfamilies use the grant facility to first build the necessaryeconomic infrastructure and then, through access tomicrofinance, seek to achieve economic sustainability andindependence. DEEP targets the poorest of the poor,people who fall beneath the nationally agreed poverty

DEEP: a new approach to poverty reduction

Rafeek El-madhoun, Ibrahim Sourani, Vanessa Farr, Hanna Nakhleh and Dania Darwish, UNDP

Saleh Al Hams working in his newly established Workshops for Washing

Machines repair shop in Rafah

©Ibrahim

Sourani, March 2009

1 Figures from The Palestinian Economy and the Prospects for Its

Recovery, Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc LiaisonCommittee, Number 1, December 2005.

61 years of occupation have put

Palestinians under almost

unbearable stress

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line. It starts by providing people with a social safety netto enable them to move out of extreme poverty and reachthe ‘normal’ poverty line, at which point microfinanceservices can be offered.

DEEP is a four-year pilot programme, funded by the IslamicDevelopment Bank and executed by UNDP/Programme ofAssistance to the Palestinian People (PAPP) in partnershipwith the Palestinian government and 16 NGO implementingpartners in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The overallobjective is to make 4,000 families economicallyindependent. In addition, support is being provided to12,000 poor families to enable them to access financialservices from micro-finance institutions (MFIs).

The DEEP is unique in that the family-centred approachallows household members to discuss and decide howbest to make progress towards greater economicindependence. Fieldworkers from NGO partners aretrained in sustainable livelihood approaches, with aspecific emphasis on the importance of involvingparticipant families in the design, implementation andevaluation of each intervention. They are trained to givefamilies enough time to discuss their needs and prioritiesaccording to what DEEP describes as their ‘five capitals’(Human, Natural, Physical, Financial and Social), based onthe Sustainable Livelihoods Framework. DEEP considerscross-cutting issues such as the specific needs of differentfamily members: women and men, children, youth and theelderly and people with disabilities. Women, especiallythose who head households, have been particularbeneficiaries of DEEP’s focus on capacity-building andeconomic empowerment. The DEEP modality is muchappreciated by beneficiary families as they are involved inevery aspect of the process and feel ownership of theinterventions designed to help them.

DEEP has its own monitoring and evaluation system, runthrough a web-based database. Information on familyresources, livelihoods and efforts to upgrade businessesis gathered through extensive field visits by NGO partners,to make sure that the goals of the programme are adheredto. Each NGO keeps track of the intervention, providingtechnical assistance such as training, consultation,psychosocial support, referral and networking with otherspecialised NGOs that can offer medical, mental health orsocial services.

The implementation of DEEP in Gaza is facing manychallenges due to Israel’s closure regime, the lack of rawmaterials, a rapid increase in prices and an unstableexchange rate. Despite these restrictions, however, DEEPGaza has begun more than 500 interventions for 950families. This number is planned to double within the nextfew months.

People decideDEEP gives the families who participate in it the chance tochoose from a number of employment alternatives,including agriculture, commerce, industry, services, jobplacements and training. A holistic approach is taken tounderstand the family from all angles, so that interventions

can be designed as a package based on what the familyowns, what it needs and the routes it must take to achieveits goals. Each intervention is given to the family as a one-time grant, with differential financial ceilings ranging from$4,000 to $8,000, determined by the size of family and thetype of intervention. Interventions usually include a mainactivity, with a supporting one to reduce the margin of risk.

Case studiesBecause interventions are individually designed, DEEPemploys a wide range of approaches. In one example – asheep-breeding project – beneficiaries receive a number ofpregnant ewes of a breed known to be highly productive,along with vaccination and veterinary services for sixmonths, medication and animal feed. The package includesall the support necessary to help the family gain animmediate income, whilst imposing no financial stress uponthem. Following the six-month period, the family should beable to sustain the project from their own income.

Another interesting intervention is a cooperative-based FoodProcessing Unit. The project is located in Maghazi refugeecamp, one of the poorest spots in the Gaza Strip. Thebeneficiaries are a group of 12 women, each of whom hasbetween five and 12 family members and an unemployedhead of the family. A feasibility study and consultationprocess was completed, and DEEP’s field analysts ensuredthat the unit would be a good income generation activity andbusiness cooperative for all the women. While the partnerNGO bought the equipment, the women received advancedtraining in baking. After the establishment of the unit, thepartner NGO helped the group to manage the business,including setting up financial and administrative systems.Currently, the unit is producing cookies, pastries and pies,supplying kindergartens, school canteens and local shops inMaghazi.

Another beneficiary, Sameer Al Hams, runs a washingmachine maintenance shop. As Sameer lacked thetechnical, financial and management resources to start thebusiness, one of DEEP’s partner NGOs worked with him toset up a maintenance shop in Rafah. His income has beenexcellent, and Sameer has been able to enroll his daughterin university, save money and generally feel much moresecure. ‘The income earned by your own hand is muchT

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DEEP Gaza has begun more than

500 interventions for 950

families

UNDP believes that beneficiaries

need support and respect as

much as they need food and cash

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Humanitarian actors increasingly recognise the crucialimportance of linking humanitarian efforts to human rightsissues. In the Occupied Territories this interdependence isparticularly stark. Israel’s policies restricting movementwithin the West Bank and between the West Bank andIsrael, Gaza and other areas are a central factor in thePalestinians’ increasing poverty, unemployment and foodinsecurity, as well as their lack of access to urgently neededmedical treatment. The lack of accountability of Israel’ssecurity force personnel – both individual and systemic – isa direct cause of high rates of civilian death and injury.

In order to address the overlapping human rights andhumanitarian problems in the West Bank and Gaza Strip,B’Tselem has developed a new and rapidly growinginitiative: distributing cameras to Palestinian families livingin high-conflict areas, and training participants as agents forprotection and change. With the 150 cameras B’Tselem hasdistributed to date, the harsh reality of Palestinian life underIsraeli occupation has been brought to the attention of theIsraeli and international public, providing a tool forprotection, deterrence and accountability.

B’Tselem’s ‘camera work’In June 2008, B’Tselem camera recipient and trainee MunaNawaj’ah captured on film four masked settlers attackingthree members of the Nawaj’ah family with clubs as they

grazed their flock on private Palestinian land south of theSusiya settlement, in the southern Hebron hills. B’Tselemreleased the footage, sparking a flood of publicity that ledto the detention of three of the attackers. Without thisvideo evidence, the family would have remained helplessvictims, unable to pursue their livelihood for fear of furtherattack. Attacks such as this, and other human rightsviolations that have long remained unseen, have becomefront-page stories; the Susiya incident, for example,received extensive media coverage both within Israel andinternationally, including in the New York Times and on theBBC. Israeli law enforcement agencies, confronted withthe hard evidence of raw footage, can no longer simplydismiss Palestinian complaints as unfounded. The head ofthe family, 61-year-old Khalil Nawaj’ah, said: ‘The onlyweapon we have is the media’. This comment reflects theempowerment that the cameras can bring: Palestinians nolonger have to stand on the sidelines, but can use the newtechnology B’Tselem has provided to take non-violent,effective action.

Video footage also attracted widespread media attentionand prompted legal action over an incident in thePalestinian village of Ni’ilin in July 2008. B’Tselempublicised film showing an Israeli soldier firing arubbercoated steel bullet, at extremely close range, at acuffed and blindfolded Palestinian detainee being held in

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better than any other kind of money,’ he says. ‘When youwork everything tastes better. You can send your children toschool and you do not feel like a beggar. I have regained myself-esteem.’ Another beneficiary, Naema Al Shenbari, is anentrepreneur who developed her project idea with supportfrom a DEEP partner NGO. She started by opening a smallgrocery, and has been able to grow the business into a mini-market. Naema, who is managing her project with greatskill, has employed her brother to work in the market at areasonable salary. Her income has been sufficient for her tosupport her family and even start saving.

ConclusionDEEP’s strategy of helping people to decide on the bestmeans to address their needs, come up with solutions andfeel ownership of their income-generating projectsrepresents a new participatory tool for development in boththe West Bank and Gaza. The partnership is based onmutual trust and respect between all stakeholders in DEEP:UNDP counts on its partner NGOs, our partners count onfamilies and families count on UNDP and the NGOs. Thismeans that all the stakeholders involved feel commitmentto and ownership of their programme. Before they becamepartners in DEEP, families were not only deprived of accessto income, food or shelter, but also of opportunities to voice

their views and express their needs in developmentalprojects. Through DEEP, they are not only improving theirlivelihoods, but also beginning to perceive themselvesdifferently, as agents of their own well-being.

Beneficiary families note that, although they have beenreceiving food and cash assistance for years, they feeldehumanised every time they line up to receive it. UNDPbelieves that they need support and respect as much asthey need food and cash. To help these families we mustfirst help them speak out. We need to listen to them, gaintheir confidence and trust in the services being offeredand enable them to understand that DEEP will empowerthem. Deprived people are oppressed because they do notgive voice to their needs, and many have become trappedin a culture of silence. DEEP listens respectfully to poorpeople and designs interventions which seek to enrichthem in a multitude of ways.

Rafeek El-madhoun is DEEP project coordinator-Gaza.Ibrahim Sourani is DEEP Project Assistant-Gaza, Vanessa

Farr is the Gender Advisor, Hanna Nakhleh is DEEP NGOGrants coordinator and Dania Darwish is UNDP/PAPPCommunication Officer. Correspondence concerning thisarticle can be sent to: [email protected].

Using cameras to enhance protection and accountability in theOccupied Territories

Risa Zoll, B’Tselem

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place by a lieutenant-colonel. The videoclip shows the soldier aiming hisweapon at the legs of the Palestinian,Ashraf Abu Rahma, 27, from a distanceof about 1.5 metres. A Palestinian girlfilmed the incident from her house inthe village. B’Tselem collected thefootage and immediately forwarded acopy to the Military Police InvestigationUnit, demanding that the soldier bebrought to justice. B’Tselem alsodemanded an investigation into theinvolvement of the officer who washolding the detainee down. Chargeswere filed against both the soldier andthe officer, as a direct result of theirrefutable evidence of the incident.

Cameras in the hands of trainedPalestinians have enabled B’Tselem tocollect and use footage documenting therange of human rights infringementsaffecting Palestinians’ daily lives. Theevidence of repeated and consistentviolations challenges Israeli claims thatincidents are isolated, and paints a clear picture ofentrenched and systematic rights violations, leading to thecurrent humanitarian situation in the West Bank and Gaza.

Deterrence, accountability and protectionB’Tselem’s 150 cameras have been distributed in both urbanand rural areas, in residential areas near checkpoints andmilitary bases and in selected refugee camps. The camerasare transferred periodically to different areas in accordancewith the severity of events and conflict. The cameras are ahighly effective way of documenting the severe humanrights abuses taking place in the Occupied Territories,acting as a catalyst for change among decision-makers andthe Israeli public. The production and distribution offirsthand video accounts make a significant contribution toB’Tselem’s efforts to engage policy-makers, the media andmembers of the general public – creating compelling andirrefutable evidence of the impact of Israel’s policies andpractices on Palestinians.

The project has also had far-reaching effects within thePalestinian community. Armed with video cameras andextensive training, participants in the project are no longervictims. The video camera empowers its users to takeaction in their own defence. In one example, a 15-year-oldboy from Ni’ilin, who used to throw rocks and resort toviolence in the belief that there was no way to change hismiserable situation, now picks up his video camera,becomes a journalist and films away. He explains that‘people from the outside see what’s going on here’, raisinghopes for change and improvement. Palestinians’perception of the power of the cameras as a source ofprotection can best be understood through the insistenceof one elderly Palestinian man from the southern Hebronhills, who refused to give up his camera even though it wasbroken: broken or not, he said, the camera constituted hisonly defence.

The presence of cameras acts as a deterrent to violence inmany cases where Jewish settlers and security forcepersonnel realise they are being filmed. Project footageclearly shows that a camera prevents situations fromescalating, because settlers and soldiers fear being heldaccountable. On several tapes, individuals are seencovering their faces or leaving when they see the camera.Palestinian families living adjacent to Jewish settlementsdo not leave their homes without taking cameras withthem: they act as protection for Palestinians, human rightsdefenders and humanitarian actors alike.

Through the project, B’Tselem has also made progress inpromoting greater accountability by forcing the militaryand police to open investigations into specific incidents.In the West Bank, bureaucratic obstacles can detervictims of abuse by settlers or soldiers from lodgingcomplaints. Over the past year, however, video footagehas been increasingly used to force the army and police toopen an investigation or to arbitrate equitably where theywould have previously dismissed Palestinian claims.Footage of violence by settlers and soldiers hasgenerated widespread public discussion regarding therule of law.

B’Tselem has also succeeded in airing the project materialon major Israeli and international news networks,exposing audiences worldwide to previously unseenfootage. While human rights advocates and humanitarianactors have long relied on moral appeals to direct themedia’s attention to pressing issues, B’Tselem now servesas a source of objective, high-quality material fortelevision reporters, film-makers and even bloggers.

Finally, the initiative has also served to empower individualsand communities, not least women and young people, whohave taken the lead in being trained and using the cameras.T

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An Israeli soldier firing a rubber bullet at a Palestinian detainee,

Ni’ilin, July 2008

©B

’Tselem Video D

epartment

HE44 crc 13/10/09 9:34 am Page 12


The Gaza Strip is one of the most densely populated areasin the world, with 1.5 million people concentrated in anarea of only 365km2. More than half of these people arechildren below the age of 18, of whom 69% are refugees.Violence has had an appalling impact on Gaza’s children.Between 2000 and 2008, over 600 were killed in conflict-related violence; another 300 died in Israel’s militaryoffensive, Cast Lead, in December–January 2009.1 Some50,000 were displaced.

Child protection in GazaStarting in 2006, Save the Children and its partnerorganisations have carried out a number of qualitativeparticipatory assessments in the villages of Beit Lahia, BeitHanoun, Jabalia, Shejahiya, Bureij, Magazi, Qarara, Khozaand Al Shoka. The main objective of the work has been toidentify emerging child protection risks as a consequence ofthe armed violence in Gaza, and its impact on children’slives. The assessments have also identified the traditionalmethods used by parents and other care-givers to protectchildren from violence, abuse, neglect and exploitation.

Through a participatory exercise, children identified themain protection risks they face at home, in schools and inthe wider community. Two main child participatory toolshave been used: the Child Protection Map and the Matrixand Ranking of Child Protection Risks. First, the childrendrew on maps of their villages what they considered to bethe day-to-day risks they faced, then listed all theprotection risks identified on the map, wrote them in aMatrix, ranked the identified protection risks anddiscussed causes and possible responses.

Most of the children said that domestic violence hadincreased. They indicated that their parents were morenervous and reacted more violently towards themwhenever they were disrespectful or disobedient. Thisthey related to the worsening economic conditions facing

their families. Unemployment and the loss of jobopportunities have led to economic hardship andfrustration within families, increasingly expressed asverbal and physical violence towards children and women.

Children also noted that violence among their peers, in theform of bullying or fights, had become more common.During discussions, children stated that every child hadjoined a ‘gang’ as a means of self-defence. Childrenreported that their role models were Palestinian fightersbecause ‘they are the only ones doing something toprotect us from the war and the occupation’. They alsosaid that they believed that no one was really interested inprotecting them, and that teachers, local organisationsand politicians had only their personal interests in mind.

The findings of these consultations were discussed laterwith parents, teachers and other school personnel, healthworkers, religious leaders and extended family leaders,municipal employees and other professionals, such aspolice officers, doctors, professors, company directorsand members of community-based organisations.Although most of the adults were surprised by thechildren’s answers, they agreed with what they had said.The adults explained that their role as parents and care-givers had become more difficult as their children weremore rebellious, disobedient and difficult to control.Parents noted that, because they had less income andcould not prevent recurrent outbreaks of violence, theirchildren no longer respected them or believed that theywould be able to protect them. Parents and othercommunity members felt that political rivalries had alsocreated tensions and even conflict within communities.Parents also highlighted feelings of isolation and

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Previously isolated families now take part in regular supportmeetings, and community networks have developed.Beleaguered families now see footage they shot on localand international television channels. As an extension ofB’Tselem’s efforts to establish video documentation andadvocacy as a permanent tool for the Palestiniancommunity, Palestinians are being taught how to reviewfootage and identify material to use, enabling families to actas independent advocates.

Law enforcement officials the world over are charged toserve and protect, a mission honoured more in the breachthan in the observance by Israel’s security forces with

regard to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.Palestinians armed with cameras, trained in their use and indocumentation techniques, have stepped in to fill thisbreach, and are succeeding in calling the attention of lawenforcement agencies and the public to rights violations. Inthis way, through the accumulation of a strong body ofphysical evidence highlighting the effects of Israel’s policiesand practices, the human rights and humanitarian contextin the Occupied Territories can begin to change.

Risa Zoll is International Relations Director at B’Tselem:The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in theOccupied Territories.

Community-based child protection in the Gaza Strip

Dominique Sbardella, Save the Children

most of the children said that

domestic violence had increased

1 See Defence for Children International, Palestine Section,http://www.dci-pal.org.

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helplessness. Parents defined ‘childprotection’ as security, access to ser-vices such as health and education, theend of the occupation and jobs toensure that children have food, clothingand other necessities. At the same time,care-givers admitted that violencetowards children had increased, andthey were aware of the negative impactof physical and verbal abuse on thedevelopment of the child.

Supporting community-basedchild protectionFollowing these consultations, Save theChildren Sweden and its partnerorganisation, the Palestinian Center forDemocracy and Conflict Resolution(PCDCR), began supporting community-based child protection groups in threevillages in the south of the Gaza Strip, AlShoka, Khoza’a and Qarara.2 Thesecommunities, which are located alongthe eastern border of the Strip, wereselected because they have been heavily affected by armedconflict. The main source of income for families in thesecommunities used to be agriculture and labouring work inIsrael, but since 2005 Palestinian workers have not beenallowed to cross into Israel for work. Meanwhile, intensifiedconflict from 2006 resulted in the destruction of citrus grovesand agricultural land by the Israeli army. Save the Childrenand PCDCR already had a presence in the three targetedlocations, and the good relationship the agency enjoyed withthese communities was another factor influencing the choiceof location.

With the support of Save the Children and PCDCR a ChildProtection Committee was formed in each community,involving influential community members, representativesfrom community-based organisations, primary health clinics,schools and the police and religious leaders. Following abrainstorming session focusing on the causes of violenceagainst children, the committees highlighted the need tointervene in the domestic, school and peer spheres throughawareness-raising and capacity-building, by establishing amonitoring system to detect children at risk of or alreadyaffected by violence, and to create a referral mechanism.Young adults were chosen for training to help them raiseawareness of children’s rights, child protection risks and thenegative impact of violence, abuse, neglect and exploitationon children’s cognitive, emotional and physical develop-ment. In addition, children from the three communities,supported by the members of the Child Protection

Committees, were asked to identify trusted individuals in thecommunity to act as focal points for receiving children’sreports and concerns and providing advice and guidance.Referral mechanisms linking the committees to healthclinics, schools and other organisations were alsoestablished, both for referral purposes and to strengthencoordination between care-givers and service providers.

Within each committee, two sub-committees wereestablished, one comprising fathers and the othercommunity workers. The fathers’ sub-committees areresponsible for mediating between students, teachers andparents (as fathers are traditionally in charge of a child’seducation), for example preventing or intervening in casesof conflict or where a child drops out of school. Thecommunity workers’ sub-committees are involved in casemanagement, and are focal points for children and parentsusing the referral mechanisms.

Following Operation Cast Lead in early 2009, a newassessment was carried out by the child protectioncommittees. This highlighted the need to enhance thecapacity of families to protect their members duringemergencies, and support for the sub-committees to identifychildren and adults psychologically affected by the conflict.Many families still live close to the Israeli border, but leavetheir homes every night to stay with relatives in villages orT

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A Palestinian child in Gaza

©Save the Children

2 Save the Children defines a community-based child protection groupas ‘a collection of people, often volunteers, that aim to ensure theprotection and well-being of children in a village, urban neighbour-hood or other community, for example an IDP camp, temporary settle-ment or migrant population … Community based child protectiongroups can also link with mechanisms at the district or provinciallevel’. Save the Children, An Inter-agency, Multi-country Assessment

of Community Based Child Protection Groups, unedited paper.

the sub-committees agreed to

develop and pilot community-

based emergency preparedness

plans

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other locations considered safer. Every adult and childinterviewed during the assessment expressed feelings ofconstant insecurity and powerlessness, as well as adesperate need to develop strategies to ensure that childrenand women at least can find refuge in safe shelters.

In response to the needs expressed, the sub-committeesagreed to develop and pilot community-based emergencypreparedness plans. Commitments were made to activelyinvolve all community members in identifying the mainprotection risks and possible solutions, to identify and useresources available within their communities and toinvolve other national and international humanitarianorganisations. Emergency sub-committees were sub-sequently established and trained in emergencypreparedness planning and response by Save and itspartner, PCDCR. The sub-committees have identified threemain scenarios for which communities need to beprepared: conflict, floods and epidemics. Accordingly, theyhave developed a plan to ensure the preparedness andprotection of every community member, with a specialfocus on the most vulnerable, including children.

The plans, which are largely the same for the threecommunities, allow for further capacity-building ofcommunity focal points on primary health care, thedistribution of first aid equipment, information andcommunications networks, evacuation plans for schools andother public services, tracing mechanisms for separatedfamilies and care for orphaned children and those separatedfrom their parents or main caregivers. In the near future, theemergency plan will be discussed with organisations such asUNRWA, the ICRC, the Palestinian Red Crescent Society,UNICEF, the Save the Children Alliance and nationalorganisations. Children are to be actively involved, withcapacity-building tools in areas such as first aid, disaster riskreduction and mine risk education. Children’s sub-committees have been established in each community toincrease participation in the decision-making process withinthe Child Protection Committees, to improve communicationbetween children and decision-makers and to ensure a morechild-friendly approach to protection issues.

It is too early to evaluate the impact of the Child ProtectionCommittees and the activities implemented in terms ofreduced levels of violence, abuse, neglect and exploitation.Nevertheless, ongoing monitoring indicates that thecommittees have succeeded in encouraging and facilitatingmore open discussion about child protection risks, children’srights and the responsibilities of government, care-givers

and other duty-bearers, and in supporting families andcommunities to protect their children. Examples include theactive involvement of religious leaders in awareness-raisingactivities, such as discussing the importance of respectingchildren’s rights during Friday prayers, the regularparticipation of professionals from the three communities inindividual case management meetings and the developmentof emergency preparedness plans.

Conclusion: first stepsThe work outlined here constitutes only a first step towardsa functional and effective child protection mechanism in theGaza Strip. To be effective, community groups need to beintegrated and coordinated with the national child protectionsystem at all levels. Yet in the Gaza Strip, a national childprotection system, in terms of governmental action towardsthe prevention, detection and response to violence againstchildren, does not exist. Judicial and welfare services havebeen severely disrupted, which means that civil society hasbeen the main body seeking to support child protection byraising families’ and children’s awareness of children’s rightsand protection strategies, providing services, monitoringchildren’s rights and advocating on child protection withnational and international actors. That said, there is a clearlack of effective coordination between local organisationsproviding support to children and adults and, as aconsequence, an effective referral system is still not in place,and reliable data on child rights violations is not available.

Save the Children and PCDCR believe that, to achieve long-lasting changes in the lives of children, community-basedchild protection committees will have to be supported andstrengthened over the long term. Ensuring children’s rightsto protection necessitates not only the establishment ofcommunity-based mechanisms for prevention andresponse, but also changes in the attitudes and practicesof individuals and communities. PCDCR has prioritised itsinterventions in the three targeted communities, to ensurethat it will be able to accompany the committees throughthe years, expanding and supporting their work. Save theChildren is engaged in a four-year strategy which aims tostrengthen the national child protection system. It is thestrategy of Save the Children, PCDCR and the committeesto link the national social welfare system to community-based mechanisms.

Dominique Sbardella is Regional Child Protection andEmergency Program Advisor, Regional Office for MENA,Save the Children Sweden. Her email address is:[email protected].

Write for HPN

All the articles and papers published by HPN are written by HPN members, readers or others working with nationaland international NGOs, UN agencies, government and donor institutions, or by academics, independentconsultants and others. HPN is pleased to consider articles and papers for publication submitted by anyoneinvolved in some way in humanitarian action. Submissions may be sent electronically to [email protected] or postedto HPN, Overseas Development Institute, 111 Westminster Bridge Road, London SE1 7JD, UK.

HE44 crc 13/10/09 9:34 am Page 15

Although internal displacement of Palestinians in theoccupied Palestinian territory (oPt) is at least as oldas the occupation itself, it has only recently becomea subject of concern among national andinternational organisations. There are severalreasons for this. For some, displacement was eithernot clearly understood or viewed as too sensitive anissue, as its underlying implications would entail amore direct confrontation with Israel as an occupyingpower. This would call upon the internationalcommunity to address, not only the humanitarianeffects of the occupation, but also an Israeli policythat, as noted by International Court of Justice, isillegally manipulating the demography of the oPt.There was also reluctance to address an issueviewed as outside the parameters of existingmandates, which confined UN agencies to reportingon and responding to the humanitarian situation inthe oPt, rather than addressing the policies causingdisplacement.

Moreover, for many international and national NGOsthe patterns of displacement, in their severity andconsistency, revealed an undeclared Israeli policy offorced displacement, for the purpose of divestingPalestinian ownership guaranteed under internationallaw, and in doing so placing at risk the notion of a two-state solution.

Internal displacement in the oPtNumerous studies by NGOs and the UN haverecognised displacement as a result of a vast array ofIsraeli policies, including house demolitions and thedenial of building permits, forced evictions and landconfiscation for settlement expansion and relatedinfrastructure, the construction of the Wall and itsassociated closure regime and the revocation of residencyrights in Jerusalem, along with military operations andsettler violence.2 Under international human rights andhumanitarian law, Israel as the occupying power in theWest Bank and Gaza Strip has the primary responsibilityfor safeguarding Palestinians from arbitrary displacement.In fact, Israel is the primary perpetrator of arbitrarydisplacement and forcible population transfers.

According to the Palestinian NGO BADIL, an estimated120,000 people have been displaced over the last four

decades.3 Accurate data on the scale of displacement is,however, scarce, and there are significant informationgaps. No one knows how many IDPs there are or theirgeographical distribution, and the protection concernsthey face have not been clearly identified. Generally,displacement occurs near Israeli settlements and relatedinfrastructure, military zones in the West Bank and the‘buffer zone’ along the boundaries of the Gaza Strip, aswell as around areas of Wall construction. Others havebeen displaced due to military operations, and havesought temporary shelter and protection with relatives, inpublic buildings or in schools, either until the violenceends or longer-term accommodation with relatives or hostcommunities becomes possible. Displacement entails lossof access to land and property, undermines families,


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Internal displacement in the occupied Palestinian territory

Karine MacAllister and Karim Khalil

Members of a family threatened with eviction,

Sheikh Jarrah, Jerusalem, April 2009

©A

nne Paq/Activestills.org

1 See Joint Submission to the Human Rights Council on the HumanRights Situation in Palestine and Other Arab Occupied Territories,A/HRC/7/NGO/71, CARE International, the Norwegian Refugee Council,DIAKONIA, Doctors Without Borders, Premiere Urgence, the IsraeliCommittee Against Home Demolitions (ICAHD), MA’AN DevelopmentCentre and the Comitato Internationale per lo Suiluppo dei Popoli (CISP),25 February 2008.2 NRC-IDMC, ‘Occupied Palestinian Territory: Forced DisplacementContinues’, 10 September 2008, p. 1. See also OCHA, The

Humanitarian Impact on Palestinians of Israeli Settlements and Other

Infrastructure in the West Bank, July 2007.

3 This is a cumulative figure of persons displaced since 1967. Thefigures are estimates only based upon anecdotal evidence and estimated population growth rates since 1967. This figure does notinclude the estimated 40,000–70,000 still displaced as a result ofevents in Gaza in December 2008 to January 2009. The IsraeliCommittee Against House Demolition has estimated that over 24,000Palestinian houses have been destroyed since 1967. ICAHD, Statistics

on Housed Demolitions, 4 July 2009.

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restricts access to social welfare and livelihoods andinflicts wide-ranging physical and psychological damage,including trauma and anxiety.

Responding to internal displacementOver the past few years, international actors haveincreasingly come to recognise that forced displacement istaking place in the oPt. Local and international NGOs haveplayed a considerable role in lobbying the internationalcommunity, particularly the UN. In 2003, the UN SpecialRapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the oPtwarned of the effects of the Wall in causing displacement.4

The following year, the ICJ concluded that the Wall was illegalunder international law and was altering the demographiccomposition of the oPt.5 UNRWA, UNDP and OCHA (whichbegan operations in 2000) have all addressed the problem ofdisplacement. In February 2009, the Office of the HighCommissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) was for the firsttime called upon to monitor and report on human rightsviolations, including arbitrary displacement.6 In March 2009the Representative of the Secretary-General on the HumanRights of IDPs, Walter Kalin, declared that Israel’s occupationhad resulted in the large-scale, arbitrary displacement ofPalestinians.7

In line with this growing recognition of displacement,pressure has increased for a more coordinated andcomprehensive response. In November 2007, the Inter-Agency Protection Sub-Working Group on ForcedDisplacement (DWG) was established under the ProtectionWorking Group, led by OHCHR. The DWG is currently underthe Protection cluster, which is chaired by OHCHR with thesupport of OCHA; the cluster was adopted in the oPt inMarch 2009. The DWG has a broad membership, includingUN agencies, international and local (Israeli andPalestinian) NGOs and donors. The working group aims toensure an effective and transparent inter-agency responseto different phases of displacement (before (preventive),during and post), enhancing the analysis and collation ofinformation and encouraging the international communityto address forcible and arbitrary displacement.8 The DWGis currently chaired by OCHA.

UNWRA and UNDP have undertaken projects of shelterreconstruction and repair on behalf of displaced

Palestinians (refugees and IDPs). UNWRA also providesemergency humanitarian assistance, including emergencyshelter, cash assistance, food and housing kits. Theagency makes no distinction between refugees and non-refugees during a crisis, though once the emergencyresponse scales down aid is generally provided only torefugees. ICRC has responded to the immediateemergency needs of IDPs, and has also undertakenprojects which are preventive in nature. Palestinian, Israeliand international NGOs have been active in researchingand publicising instances of arbitrary displacement.Several NGOs, including NRC and human rightsorganisations such as the Jerusalem Aid and HumanRights Centre, the Society of Saint Yves, the PalestinianCentre for Human Rights and BIMKOM, provide legal aidand assistance. Other NGOs, such as the EcumenicalAccompaniment Program in Palestine and Israel (EAPPI),have sought to assist communities by providing a physicalpresence to deter or reverse displacement, as in Hebronand Bil’in, Yanoun and Al Aqaba in the West Bank.

Evaluating responses to displacementThere has been a notable rise in awareness of forceddisplacement, and responses have become morecoordinated. However, there are constraints and a numberof shortfalls. The lack of protection for Palestinians in theoPt, including IDPs and those at risk of displacement, isprobably the largest challenge facing the DWG, along withthe lack of accountability of perpetrators. The operationalenvironment remains constrained by the Israeli legalregime and policies of occupation. As the occupyingpower, Israel is the de facto if not de jure authority in theoPt. Organisations that do not comply with Israeli lawsand regulations risk criminal prosecution or expulsion.Furthermore, most donors will not fund projects which donot respect Israeli military laws and regulations. The UN,NGOs and human rights organisations have facedharassment, intimidation and criminal prosecution.

No one UN agency has the capacity to protect PalestinianIDPs and those at risk of displacement, and until recentlyno one agency was specifically mandated to addressinternal displacement and seek durable solutions. TheCluster Approach may address this gap by consolidatinginter-agency responses under the cluster lead, but itseffectiveness is yet to be determined. Under the clustermechanism, internal displacement falls under OHCHR’smandate, with support from OCHA. However, OHCHR haslimited capacity and resources.

There are also key limitations in efforts to prevent andrespond during the various phases of displacement. Nofull profiling exercise has been undertaken to determine

4 Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on HumanRights on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian TerritoriesOccupied by Israel since 1967, Commission on Human Rights, SixtiethSession, E/CN.4/2004/6, 8 September 2003, p. 1.5 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied

Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136, para. 122.6 Human Rights Council, Resolution A/HRC/S-9/L.1/Rev.2, 12 January2009, para. 11. 7 Human Rights Council, Tenth Session, 10 March 2009.8 Inter-Agency Protection Sub-Working Group on Forced Displacement,Strategy paper (draft version), February 2008.

an estimated 120,000 people

have been displaced over the

last 40 years

there has been a notable rise

in awareness of forced

displacement, and responses

have become more coordinated

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the number, location and protection needs of IDPs.Currently, the response to internal displacement in the oPtis mainly confined to the emergency phase during whichdisplacement occurs. Few organisations monitor thesituation of IDPs in the months following displacement,and programmes targeting IDPs in the post-emergencyphase remain limited. The mid- and long-term response isgenerally limited to shelter reconstruction, although NGOsare paying greater attention to livelihoods, psychosocialsupport and legal matters.

In the majority of cases where displacement is foreseeable,the DWG and other relevant actors are often unable toprevent it. Although national and international NGOs and UNagencies are active in publicising the problem and raisingawareness, the impact of this work on deterring displace-ment is still unclear. Evaluating the impact of preventiveadvocacy is difficult. The DWG maintains an emergencywarning system of impending situations of forced displace-ment, which it communicates via its network and to donorsand other members of the international community, butdemolitions and evictions continue, despite efforts by NGOsand other actors to delay or annul eviction orders.

There are certainly considerable constraints in searching fordurable solutions based on the individual and preferredchoice of the IDP, such as return and property restitution.Restitution or return in the West Bank has largely beenconfined to areas under Palestinian Authority jurisdiction(Areas A and B), whereas most displacement is confined toArea C and East Jerusalem. In Gaza, Israeli sanctions onconstruction materials mean that reconstruction projects forover 15,000 housing units remain at a standstill, and returnto the status quo ante is unlikely. For the vast majority ofPalestinians displaced in the West Bank and Gaza, the returnof those forcibly displaced remains tied to the reversal ofpolicies of occupation which entail their displacement.

ConclusionAlthough the DWG has been a leading actor in promotingthe mainstreaming of internal displacement responses

within international agencies, UN-mandated institutionsand the international community more broadly remainreluctant to contextualise the problem and address its rootcauses, because doing so is perceived as politicallysensitive. The international political climate has played asignificant role in explaining the hitherto conservativenature of the response, with little diplomatic pressureexerted on Israel to address displacement, andparticularly to prevent or put a stop to the policies causingit. Ultimately, the humanitarian community has limitedpower in the face of Israeli intransigence. The presence ofhumanitarian actors is tolerated in so far as they mitigatethe humanitarian consequences of the occupation,without having the clout to contest the nature of theoccupation or the policies of arbitrary displacement takingplace under it.

There are a number of ways in which the response tointernal displacement in the oPt can be strengthened.First and foremost, the international community,particularly donors, must make a commitment toaddressing displacement and its root causes, andchallenge Israeli policies which cause displacement andrestrict and limit the humanitarian response. This shouldinclude supporting and building institutional capacitywithin UN agencies, NGOs and the Palestinian Authority,in particular in mainstreaming displacement responses.The lack of a comprehensive profile of displacedcommunities in the oPt continues to limit agencies’ abilityto respond adequately to protection needs. This gapshould be addressed. Finally, in the absence ofinternational political will efforts to raise awareness ofthe problem and mitigate the impact of displacement onPalestinians should be further supported and encouragedby the international community.

Karine MacAllister ([email protected]) is adoctoral candidate at the University of Montreal, Canada.Karim Khalil ([email protected]) is country analyst forthe oPt at the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre,Geneva, Switzerland

Solving the risk equation: People-centred disaster risk assessment in Ethiopia

Tanya Boudreau

Network Paper 66, June 2009

We live in a world buffeted by hazards. Some 85% of the world’s population resides in areas affected at least once inthe past 30 years by a major earthquake, tropical cyclone, flood or drought. In the last 20 years, well over two millionpeople have been killed by natural disasters. The total number of people affected each year has doubled over the lastdecade. For these people, it is not a question of whether major hazards will occur, but when.

With so many of the world’s people so close to the edge, an active disaster risk management system, capable of bothcorrective (current disasters) and prospective (future potential disasters) risk management is essential. In Ethiopia thesystem has to be especially sensitive, able to detect when even a small shock might result in catastrophe. This paper arguesthat the information and analysis system recently established within the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture represents asubstantial new opportunity for people-centred disaster risk assessment. The national livelihoods database provides thecapacity to understand the diverse vulnerabilities of populations and to mathematically link these to hazards. The paperalso discusses several methodological and conceptual advancements relevant to disaster risk reduction, including multi-hazard risk analysis, survival and livelihoods protection thresholds and seasonal tools for analysing intra-annual variability.

HE44 crc 13/10/09 9:34 am Page 18

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14 The Impact of War and Atrocity on Civilian Populations: Basic Principles for NGO Interventions and a Critique of

Psychosocial Trauma Projects by D. Summerfield (1996)

15 Cost-effectiveness Analysis: A Useful Tool for the Assessment and Evaluation of Relief Operations? by A. Hallam (1996)

16 The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda: Study III ed. J. Borton (1996)

17 Monetisation: Linkages to Food Security? by J. Cekan, A. MacNeil and S. Loegering (1996)

18 Beyond Working in Conflict: Understanding Conflict and Building Peace (The CODEP Workshop Report), by J. Bennett and M. Kayitesi Blewitt (1996)

19 Human Rights and International Legal Standards: what relief workers need to know by J. Darcy (1997)

20 People in Aid Code of Best Practice in the Management and Support of Aid Personnel ed. S. Davidson (1997)

21 Humanitarian Principles: The Southern Sudan Experience by I. Levine (1997)

22 The War Economy in Liberia: A Political Analysis by P. Atkinson (1997)

23 The Coordination of Humanitarian Action: the case of Sri Lanka by K. Van Brabant (1997)

24 Reproductive Health for Displaced Populations by C. Palmer (1998)

25 Humanitarian Action in Protracted Crises: the new relief ‘agenda’ and its limits by D. Hendrickson (1998)

26 The Food Economy Approach: a framework for understanding rural livelihoods by T. Boudreau (1998)

27 Between Relief and Development: targeting food aid for disaster prevention in Ethiopia by K. Sharp (1998)

28 North Korea: The Politics of Food Aid by J. Bennett (1999)

29 Participatory Review in Chronic Instability: The Experience of the IKAFE Refugee Settlement Programme, Uganda

by K. Neefjes (1999)

30 Protection in Practice: Field Level Strategies for Protecting Civilians from Deliberate Harm by D. Paul (1999)

31 The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Health and Well-being by R. Garfield (1999)

32 Humanitarian Mine Action: The First Decade of a New Sector in Humanitarian Aid by C. Horwood (2000)

33 The Political Economy of War: What Relief Agencies Need to Know by P. Le Billon (2000)

34 NGO Responses to Hurricane Mitch: Evaluations for Accountability and Learning by F. Grunewald, V. de Geoffroy & S. Lister (2000)

35 Cash Transfers in Emergencies: Evaluating Benefits and Assessing Risks by D. Peppiatt, J. Mitchell and P. Holzmann (2001)

36 Food-security Assessments in Emergencies: A Livelihoods Approach by H. Young, S. Jaspars, R. Brown, J. Frizeand H. Khogali (2001)

37 A Bridge Too Far: Aid Agencies and the Military in Humanitarian Response by J. Barry with A. Jefferys (2002)

38 HIV/AIDS and Emergencies: Analysis and Recommendations for Practice by A. Smith (2002)

39 Reconsidering the tools of war: small arms and humanitarian action by R. Muggah with M. Griffiths (2002)

40 Drought, Livestock and Livelihoods: Lessons from the 1999-2001 Emergency Response in the Pastoral Sector in

Kenya by Yacob Aklilu and Mike Wekesa (2002)

41 Politically Informed Humanitarian Programming: Using a Political Economy Approach by Sarah Collinson (2002)

42 The Role of Education in Protecting Children in Conflict by Susan Nicolai and Carl Triplehorn (2003)

43 Housing Reconstruction after Conflict and Disaster by Sultan Barakat and Rebecca Roberts (2003)

44 Livelihoods and Protection: Displacement and Vulnerable Communities in Kismaayo, Southern Somalia by SimonNarbeth and Calum McLean (2003)

45 Reproductive health for conflict-affected people: policies, research and Programmes by Therese McGinn, SaraCasey, Susan Purdin and Mendy Marsh (2004)

46 Humanitarian futures: practical policy perspectives by Randolph Kent (2004)

47 Missing the point: an analysis of food security interventions in the Great Lakes by Simon Levine and Claire Chastre(2004)

48 Community-based therapeutic care: a new paradigm for selective feeding in nutritional crises by Steve Collins (2004)

49 Disaster preparedness programmes in India: a cost benefit analysis by Courtenay Cabot Venton and Paul Venton (2004)

Network PapersNetwork Papers provide longer treatments of particular areas of humanitarianconcern. We publish four a year.

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50 Cash relief in a contested area: lessons from Somalia by Degan Ali, Fanta Toure, Tilleke Kiewied (2005)

51 Humanitarian engagement with non-state armed actors: the parameters of negotiated armed access by MaxGlaser (2005)

52 Interpreting and using mortaility data in humanitarian emergencies: a primer by Francesco Checchi and LesRoberts (2005)

53 Protecting and assisting older people in emergencies by Jo Wells (2005)

54 Housing reconstruction in post-earthquake Gujarat: a comparative analysis by Jennifer Duyne Barenstein (2006)

55 Understanding and addressing staff turnover in humanitarian agencies by David Loquercio, Mark Hammersley andBen Emmens (2006)

56 The meaning and measurement of acute malnutrition in emergencies: a primer for decision-makers by Helen Youngand Susanne Jaspars (2006)

57 Standards put to the test: implementing the INEE Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crisis

and Early Reconstruction by Allison Anderson et al. (2006)

58 Concerning the accountability of humanitarian action by Austen Davis (2007)

59 Contingency planning and humanitarian action: a review of practice by Richard Choularton (2007)

60 Mobile Health Units in emergency operation: a methodological approach by Stéphane Du Mortier and Rudi Coninx(2007)

61 Public health in crisis-affected populations: A practical guide for decision-makers by Francesco Checchi, MichelleGayer, Rebecca Freeman Grais and Edward J. Mills (2007)

62 Full of promise: how the UN’s Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism can better protect children by Katy Barnett andAnna Jefferys (2008)

63 Measuring the effectiveness of Supplementary Feeding Programmes in emergencies by Carlos Navarro-Colorado,Frances Mason and Jeremy Shoham (2008)

64 Livelihoods, livestock and humanitarian response: the Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards by CathyWatson and Andy Catley (2008)

65 Food security and livelihoods programming in conflict: a review by Susanne Jaspars and Dan Maxwell (2009)

66 Solving the risk equation: People-centred disaster risk assessment in Ethiopia by Tanya Boudreau (2009)

Good Practice ReviewsGood Practice Reviews are major, peer-reviewed contributions to humanitarianpractice. They are produced periodically.1 Water and Sanitation in Emergencies by A. Chalinder (1994)2 Emergency Supplementary Feeding Programmes by J. Shoham (1994)3 General Food Distribution in Emergencies: from Nutritional Needs to Political Priorities by S. Jaspars and H. Young

(1996)4 Seed Provision During and After Emergencies by the ODI Seeds and Biodiversity Programme (1996)5 Counting and Identification of Beneficiary Populations in Emergency Operations: Registration and its Alternatives

by J. Telford (1997)6 Temporary Human Settlement Planning for Displaced Populations in Emergencies by A. Chalinder (1998)7 The Evaluation of Humanitarian Assistance Programmes in Complex Emergencies by A. Hallam (1998)8 Operational Security Management in Violent Environments by K. Van Brabant (2000)9 Disaster Risk Reduction: Mitigation and Preparedness in Development and Emergency Programming by John

Twigg (2004)10 Emergency food security interventions, by Daniel Maxwell, Kate Sadler, Amanda Sim, Mercy Mutonyi, Rebecca

Egan and Mackinnon Webster (2008)


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Famine and drought pose a regular threat in Eritrea, alongwith the rest of the Horn of Africa. Consecutive years ofdrought, high food prices and the global economicdownturn all suggest that hunger and malnutrition levelsare high. However, unlike in neighbouring countries noreliable national nutrition statistics are available to showthis. There have been no comprehensive nutrition surveyssince 2005, and World Food Programme (WFP) generalfood distributions have been suspended since 2006. Theactivities of international NGOs are restricted.1

In August 2008, CAFOD was alerted to a poor rainy seasonby its local partner in Eritrea, and warned that thedeteriorating nutritional situation in 2008 would continueto worsen until the next harvest in November 2009. Unableto conduct a nutrition survey or obtain statistics fromothers, CAFOD was faced with the question of how to justifya response in the absence of reliable data. Knowing thathumanitarian capacity was severely limited and thatgeneral food distributions would not be allowed, theagency nonetheless decided to establish a supplementaryfeeding programme.

This article explains the challenges of operating in anenvironment where there are no statistics, and how theresulting programme provided CAFOD with a clearerunderstanding of the context and supporting evidence ofthe nutrition situation in Eritrea.

Using the evidence availableThe evidence that is available paints a dismal picture of thehumanitarian situation in Eritrea. In 2008 the kremti rainsfailed, and as a result people harvested very little or nothingduring October and November. A September 2008 forecastby the European Union’s Joint Research Centre (JRC)estimated 2008 cereal crop production at no more than200,000 MT, barely 30% of the country’s total annual needs.The next main harvest will not be until October andNovember 2009. Access to water is very poor; only 32% ofthe population have access to a safe supply. Pastoral areashave also been badly affected due to the lack of pasture forlivestock grazing.

Local food prices have escalated and Eritrea is top of thelist of countries most vulnerable to high global prices.2

Commodity prices are very high, many food items areunavailable in the markets and the cost of livestock hasdropped in relation to the price of grain. An estimated two-thirds of the population lives below the poverty line, withrates as high as 80% in rural areas. Military mobilisationhas depleted the productive labour force, leading to areduction in the range of household earning opportunitiesand limiting the income of many households to that of asoldier’s salary, just $20 per month. With the traditionalstaple food, teff, costing around $8 a kilo, it is animpossible luxury for the majority of households. Even itscheaper replacement, sorghum, is $2 per kilo.

Government policy is another factor. General fooddistributions have been suspended to vulnerable groupsin favour of food or cash for work. Access to food is tightlycontrolled. Farmers are required to give a certainproportion of their harvest to the government, and thegovernment forbids the transport of food between

PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES

When there are no statistics: Emergency Nutrition Programming in Eritrea

Nik Bredholt, Laura Donkin and Caroline Muthiga, CAFOD

Malnourished mothers and children in Asmara queue to

receive their monthly food ration

©Laura D

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1 For an overview of the difficulties facing NGOs in Eritrea, see ‘Eritrea:How Bad Is the Food Crisis Really?’, 12 June 2009, IRIN, http://www.reliefweb.int.2 According to the FAO, Eritrea is top of a list of 22 countries that areparticularly vulnerable to the impact of global food price rises due to acombination of high levels of chronic hunger (75%) and its status as a netimporter of food and fuel. See http://www.fao.org/isfp/isfp-home/en.

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regions. The harvest collected by the government isallocated to its fair price or rationing scheme, wherebyeach family is able to purchase a fixed quantity of basicfood and fuel items at a lower price. The ration variesaccording to availability; the current quota for a family offive is 10kg of sorghum and 2.5 litres of oil. This supply isboth insufficient and unreliable, but because people areunable to legally purchase more than the ration they areforced to buy what they can on the black market, at muchhigher prices.

The operating environment for humanitarian agencies inEritrea remains unpredictable. Fuel is in short supply andtherefore rationed. Vehicles require permits to travel. It isdifficult for international staff to get work permits. NGOs areunable to import food items, including oil. If imports arepossible an import tax of 18.5% must be paid. NGOoperations have been reduced, with the suspension ofsome programmes and the closure of others; 32international agencies have withdrawn from Eritrea, andonly five remain. UNICEF and WHO are the only internationalactors managing nutrition programmes in Eritrea (theseprogrammes are implemented by the Ministry of Health).

Under these conditions, it is reasonable to expect thatnutrition is severely affected, particularly among the mostvulnerable groups. In February 2009, the Food andAgriculture Organisation (FAO) reported that 2 millionEritreans required food aid, and that an estimated 75% ofthe population was vulnerable to inadequate nutrition.3

According to UNICEF, malnutrition underpins over 60% ofunder-five mortality in the country, with acute respiratoryinfections and diarrhoea the main causes. Malnutritionamong women of childbearing age is put at 38%nationally, and 53% in the most drought-affected regions.4

According to a recent UNICEF report, rates of acutemalnutrition in Anseba and Gash Barka provinces wereabove 15%; by February 2009, admission rates totherapeutic feeding centres were already two to six timeshigher than in 2008. Although comprehensive data is notavailable for 2009, food prices have risen, the harvest hasbeen poor and the political and economic context has notimproved. It is therefore reasonable to assume that thenutrition situation has not got any better either.

The supplementary feeding projectOn the basis of this analysis of the food crisis, thechallenges of the operating environment and availablefunding, CAFOD decided to initiate a three-month pilotsupplementary feeding programme (SFP) from November2008 to January 2009. It was hoped that this pilot woulddemonstrate that CAFOD could operate effectively andenable the gathering of information to present a case todonors for a larger, longer SFP.

The pilot project was supported by the Ministry of Healthand local government authorities. It was implemented bylocal partners in Barentu, Debub, Northern Red Sea andAnseba Regions, through 22 distribution sites in villagesand health clinics. The project provided a monthlysupplementary food ration to nearly 7,000 moderatelymalnourished children under five, approximately 3,000malnourished pregnant women in their third trimester andmalnourished lactating mothers of babies up to six months.Beneficiaries received 9kg of supplementary food (DMK)per month. DMK is similar in nutritional value to CSB orUNIMIX, and is produced in Eritrea. It is made from a cerealbase (sorghum and millet), chickpeas, peanut paste andmineral mix. The ration would normally include oil, but as oilcould not be imported or procured locally it was decided toincrease the monthly ration from 7kg to 9kg in order to meetthe recommended calorie intake, though it was recognisedthat the proportion of fat was too low.

Community screening

The local partners identified target areas based onconsultation with the Ministry of Health at national andlocal level, UNICEF, local health services and communityleaders. A quota system was used to determine the numberof beneficiaries in each area. In the absence of a nationalnutrition survey, CAFOD recommended that field partnersscreened all children under five and pregnant and lactatingmothers in each target area before the first distribution, toidentify and register beneficiaries. The mid-upper armcircumference (MUAC) of all children under five was taken;those under 13cm were weighed and measured. Those witha weight for height (WFH) measurement below 80% wereadmitted into the programme. Those below WFH 70% wereclassified as suffering from severe acute malnutrition andreferred to therapeutic feeding centres. A MUACmeasurement of under 23cm was used as the cut-off pointfor pregnant and lactating women.

Without a full nutrition survey, it was not possible toestablish global or severe acute malnutrition rates. However,the village-based rapid screening, which covered 20,725children, provided a clearer indication of the nutritionsituation. In Anseba zone, of the 9,012 children screened0.2% were severely malnourished and 20% moderatelymalnourished. At the start of the project, 517 severelymalnourished children in Gash Barka Zone were registered,which is an extremely alarming figure. Although feedbackand registration documents from staff suggested that thiswas correct, CAFOD had no access to the region to verify this.

Factors indicating a food crisis

The supplementary feeding project targeted nearly 10,000malnourished children and pregnant and lactating mothers.CAFOD conducted a review of the project in January 2009,

local food prices have escalated

3 ‘The Drought and Food Price Situation in Eritrea’, FAO Presentationon behalf of UNCT Eritrea, 10 February 2009, Nairobi.4 UNICEF Humanitarian Action Report 2007, http://www.unicef.org/har07/index_37429.htm.

village-based rapid screening

provided a clear indication of the

nutrition situation

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In Chad, government forces, rebels, militias and ethnicgroups frequently clash. A number of inter-related factorsare in play in the violence, including scarce naturalresources such as land, livestock and water, historicalgrievances and the inequitable distribution of economicresources, the proliferation of arms and weak democraticprocesses and state institutions. Refugee and IDP camps

in eastern Chad have become increasingly militarised;recruitment campaigns including the forced recruitment ofchildren are commonplace among all parties to theconflict, and the camps are allegedly used as rear basesfor rest and recuperation by rebel groups of both Chadianand Sudanese origin. In all, an estimated 260,000refugees from Sudan and 70,600 from the Central African

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and the agency continues to request feedback frompartners. CAFOD believes that the following factors all pointto a food crisis in the areas where the project wasimplemented. As far as we know, no other agencies areproviding supplementary feeding in these areas.

• The SFP was carried out during the three months afterthe annual harvest period, which is when peopleusually have the best access to food. It was thereforelikely that the food security situation would continueto deteriorate until the expected rains in July.

• During the review we found that, just a few monthsafter the harvest, some households had alreadystarted to adopt coping mechanisms to deal with foodshortages. These included selling family assets (mainlylivestock), travelling long distances to harvest wildfruits and berries and reducing the frequency of mealsand the amount of food consumed.

• During the three-month programme, high numbers ofbeneficiaries travelled long distances, some from areasoutside the region of operation, to be registered in theSFP. In some areas, moderately malnourished childrenand mothers who met the admission criteria had to beturned away due to limited resources.

• The majority of severely malnourished childrenidentified were unable to access therapeutic feedingservices due partly to a shortage of services in certainareas, and practical constraints which preventedmothers from seeking medical care for their children.5

As these children were not receiving any treatment, theSFP had little choice but to admit them despite the factthat it could not provide adequate treatment.6

• Analysis of the end of project data reveals low cure ratesand a longer length of stay compared with other SFPs. Atthe end of the project a significant number of childrenand mothers were still moderately malnourished and inneed of continued supplementary food rations. At the

end of the SFP in January 2009 there were still 2,381moderately malnourished and five severely malnourish-ed children in Debub, and 1,786 and 234 respectively inGash Barka. SFP distribution staff attribute this to thelack of additional food sources within the family and thesharing of the DMK ration. Feedback from beneficiariesconfirmed that families had shared DMK as they had littleor no access to other food sources. The data andbeneficiary feedback indicate that beneficiaries wereusing DMK as their main food source, rather than as afood supplement.

• At least 50 more severely malnourished children wereadmitted to health centres between January and April2009. In Debub zone, 98 severely malnourishedchildren were identified in mid-March 2009, but clinicswere unable to admit them due to a lack of TFCsupplies. Based on our knowledge of the constraintscommunities face in accessing TFC services, we believethat many more severely malnourished children havenot sought or received treatment.

• During the latest Vitamin A campaign, conducted inearly May 2009 by the Ministry of Health, at least 8,486moderately malnourished children were identified;they have no access to treatment.

ConclusionCAFOD believes that a food crisis persists in its areas ofoperation in Eritrea. In the present situation, it is difficult tosee how the food security situation can improve, even ifrains are adequate. It is reasonable to assume that this mayalso be the case in other areas where data does not exist, asmany of the causes of food shortages are nationwide andthere are no other large-scale SFP programmes and nogeneral food distributions. With general food distributionsprohibited, there is a strong argument for continuing andexpanding supplementary feeding programmes. CAFOD hassecured funding to continue the project until April 2010 andis seeking further funds to increase its scale and duration.We believe that the learning and data from thesupplementary feeding project itself provides a betteroverview of the nutrition situation and is a strongjustification for further donor funding.

Nik Bredholt ([email protected]) is Head ofHumanitarian Programmes – ATLE for CAFOD. Laura Donkinand Caroline Muthiga are Humanitarian Officers.

5 The majority of beneficiary households are headed by women. It isdifficult for women to stay in the clinic for the duration of the therapeutic treatment or to travel long distances to collect the therapeutic food every week from clinic-based out-patient therapeuticservices.6 During the review, it was noted that, in order to prevent malnourished children from deteriorating and to reduce the incidenceof malnutrition, it is necessary to provide communities with nutritionservices closer to their homes. Since then, the local partner hassuccessfully advocated for an out-patient TFC at Engherne clinic.

Protection and humanitarian space: a case-study of the UN Missionto the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)John Karlsrud and Diana Felix da Costa

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Republic are living in eastern Chad. A further 171,000Chadians have been displaced. The need for humanitarianassistance has been enormous. Insecurity prevails andviolations of basic human rights are frequent andsystematic. Meanwhile, although cross-border raids bySudanese Janjaweed militia and ethnic conflict havebecome less frequent in recent years, the securityenvironment for the humanitarian community hasdeteriorated as a result of increased banditry.

The international community responded to the ongoingviolence in Chad by authorising the deployment of a UNcivilian and police mission, MINURCAT, and a Europeanmilitary force, EUFOR, to protect refugees, IDPs andhumanitarian workers and widen humanitarian space. Inaddition, an 850-strong Chadian police/gendarme force –the Détachment Intégré de Securité (DIS) – has been trainedand mentored by MINURCAT.1 The decision to establish amilitary force – EUFOR – under separate command wastaken when it became clear that Chad would not accept aUN force. While this presented coordination difficulties, onthe positive side EUFOR could mobilise, deploy and developbases much faster than a traditional UN force and provideprotection by presence more rapidly. On 15 March 2009,after one year of operation, authority over the militarycomponent of the mission was transferred as planned fromEUFOR to MINURCAT.

MINURCAT and protectionThe protection activities of MINURCAT include regularmilitary patrols and escorts, training and mentoring of theDIS to providing security in refugee and IDP camps, as wellas population centres, and deploying human rights,political and civil affairs, gender and other civilian officersto the field to monitor the situation and supportintercommunity reconciliation initiatives, all gearedtowards creating safe and secure conditions for the returnof refugees and IDPs.

With the adoption by the UN General Assembly in 2005 ofthe ‘Responsibility to Protect’ principle, the mandate ofpeacekeeping missions has become more proactive andhas gradually expanded to include the protection ofcivilians, as well as UN personnel and humanitarianworkers. MINURCAT is the first UN peacekeeping missionwith a comprehensive protection mandate. While this is alaudable development it also poses some new challenges.With this expanded mandate, missions must also reflectmore deeply on how they relate to national securityinstitutions, which have the primary responsibility forcivilian protection. Chad possesses a plethora of security

actors. National forces include the Armée Nationale du

Tchad (ANT), the Gendarmes, the Police and the DIS.Ensuring a coordinated and comprehensive securityresponse to the spectrum of threats present in easternChad, while maintaining the integrity and neutrality ofprotection activities, is a significant challenge.

The military force should provide a safe and secureenvironment in eastern Chad, patrolling main roads anddeploying at short notice to protect civilians threatened byJanjaweed and other militias. However, one of the mainchallenges has been banditry, which EUFOR was initially notcalibrated to respond to. This forced a fundamentalrethinking of how the military should respond to threats inthe area. It became clear that what was needed was a mobileand flexible force more reliant on light vehicles for patrollingand helicopters for rapid deployment. MINURCAT’s conceptof operations has been reconfigured accordingly. However,the force is currently at 48% deployment of the mandated5,200 soldiers, and only three out of 18 military helicoptershave been deployed. In the absence of forces andhelicopters, MINURCAT has provided military escorts as atemporary measure to ensure continued humanitarianoperations, but this is a compromise that both humani-tarians and the mission would like to discontinue. Most ofthe force is scheduled to arrive before the end of the year;Bangladesh has pledged to send another three utilityhelicopters.

The DIS meanwhile is intended to strengthen security at IDPsites, refugee camps and population centres. The DIS is anew element in the UN peacekeeping context, representingthe first time that a national security force has becomeintegrated into and accountable to a UN mission. So far, theDIS has had a positive impact in the east. It is now deployedto all stations and posts in eastern Chad, and feedback fromthe humanitarian community indicates that it is providingsecurity. The DIS will continue to improve its performancewith further training. Although there was a surge inhijackings, assaults and robberies in the first three monthsof 2009, DIS officers have made a number of arrests,including of military personnel. Some serious disciplinarycases involving the DIS have emerged, but nationalauthorities have been quick and firm in dealing with them.

The DIS is funded to the end of 2009 from the MINURCATTrust Fund, with contributions totalling €21 million, butfunding for 2010 is still not secured. MINURCAT hasequipped the DIS with vehicles, uniforms and side-arms,and is building police stations in six major towns and policeposts in 12 refugee camps. Despite initial delays, 850 DISofficers have been trained and deployed to eastern Chad.UN Police provide in-service mentoring support at a ratio ofone UN officer to every three DIS colleagues. MINURCATand national authorities have worked to secure thesignificant participation of women in the DIS, and currentlywomen make up around 10% of both the DIS and the UNPolice (81 out of the total of 850), enabling the force tobetter communicate with women in the camps.

The UN Police and the DIS are part of a comprehensivestrategy to tackle impunity. In the judicial sector, MINURCAT,P

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the mandate of peacekeeping

missions has become more

proactive

1 The DIS was initially named Police Tchadienne pour la protection

humanitaire (PTPH), but was renamed to reflect the composition of theforce, of which half are from the Police and half from the Gendarmerie.

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together with UNDP and the European Commission, isworking to support the government in an effort to strengthenthe judicial and prison system by establishing mobile courts,training judges and prison personnel and supporting therevision of the judicial and penal systems. One challenge hasbeen frequent escapes by prisoners caught by the DIS,underscoring the need for improved prisons and a com-prehensive approach to tackle impunity. Prosecutors andjudges who have been deployed to the east have receiveddeath threats and have in some cases refused to stay, andtheir security remains a major concern.

MINURCAT has also been tasked to assist authorities inpromoting and implementing local-level reconciliation ineastern Chad, aimed at improving inter-community dialogueand restoring traditional protection mechanisms disruptedby the increase of violence. This includes supportingcustomary conflict management and resolution institutions,which in many rural areas have been the only existingstructures for regulating disputes and protecting commun-ities, while also extending the presence of the state intothese areas.

UN agencies and NGOs are also undertaking protectionactivities in Chad. A protection cluster has been establishedfor coordination purposes in the capital, N’Djamena, and inAbéché in eastern Chad. Sub-clusters have also been set upin smaller towns in the east. Human rights and civil affairsofficers represent MINURCAT in the protection clusters.MINURCAT liaises with the humanitarian community on aweekly basis through meetings hosted by OCHA. The SRSG,the Force Commander, the Police Commissioner and UNSecurity are present to ensure that humanitarians’ securityconcerns are dealt with comprehensively.

SummarySince January 2009, humanitarian organisations haverepeatedly been forced to scale down or suspend theiroperations because of violent incidents. The combinationof a wide proliferation of arms, local resentment due to theinequitable distribution of humanitarian aid skewedtowards refugees and an ample supply of materialresources and money from the international communityhas created fertile ground for widespread banditry,targeting humanitarians in particular. Coupled with thelack of a programme to rid eastern Chad of arms, this putsthe onus on the providers of security. The successful workof the DIS, in cooperation with MINURCAT and nationalforces, is of paramount importance for the continuedoperation and presence of humanitarian agencies.

The international community must reflect on the nature ofthe threats faced in situations such as in Chad, and

calibrate their response accordingly, both in terms ofsecurity support and funding. Being the central pillar ofthe mission, the DIS should not have to rely entirely onvoluntary contributions from donors. UN member statesshould revise the rules for assessing UN mission budgetsto include interventions such as these. MINURCAT hastaken into account some of the lessons learned from thecooperation with EUFOR and deployed a more mobilemilitary force.

The DIS has the potential to be a seed for wider securitysector reform (SSR) in Chad. In April 2009, an EUdelegation visited Chad to assess opportunities for SSR.This is encouraged by the government of Chad and maycreate an entry point for other capacity developmentprogrammes in the security and governance sectors.Conversely, the UN has only a mentoring and advisory rolewith regard to the DIS, and no executive authority. Thismeans that the UN cannot guarantee the impartiality ofthe DIS. Some have argued that this is a significant risk tothe impartiality of the UN itself. This will remain one of themain challenges facing the mission.

The deployment of a multidimensional presence also hadits advantages and disadvantages. EUFOR could deploymuch faster than a traditional UN force and could rapidlyestablish bases and stabilise the situation in the field. Thisshould form a model for future cooperation between theUN and the European Union. However, there is a need toimprove the framework for cooperation between the twoentities to enhance coordination and information-sharingmechanisms.

On the civilian side, MINURCAT is intensifying its efforts topromote inter-community dialogue. This is instrumental tothe successful implementation of the larger recoveryprogramme recently agreed between the government ofChad and the UN. It also has the potential to create a morecommunity-based movement for peace and politicalparticipation in eastern Chad. Only by addressing poverty,developing state capacities, extending basic services andsupporting income-generating efforts can a sustainablefoundation be built for long-term peace and development.Long-term civilian protection requires a political solution.MINURCAT’s mandate is exclusive to the east of thecountry. As has been repeatedly emphasised by the UNSecretary-General, the sources of conflict and insecurity ineastern Chad will only be addressed through an inclusiveand comprehensive national political process.

John Karlsrud is Special Assistant to the SpecialRepresentative of the Secretary-General, MINURCAT([email protected]). Diana Felix da Costa is a student in theNOHA Masters Programme in International HumanitarianAction, University of Groningen, The Netherlands([email protected]). The views expressed in thisarticle are those of the authors and do not necessarilyrepresent those of the Department of PeacekeepingOperations, the Department of Field Support, the UnitedNations Development Programme or the United Nations.

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MINURCAT has also been tasked

with assisting in local-level

reconciliation in eastern Chad

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We are not certain where the line is between being

practical – and therefore liaising with the local power

base – and taking a principled stand. World Visionstaff survey, April 2008

In a world where very few NGOs are perceived to be

neutral by the beneficiary population, the urgency of

good policy thinking cannot be overstated. WorldVision staff survey, March 2008

The world of the humanitarian worker has changed. It hasgrown more insecure and more complex in recent decades.As we strive for greater professionalism, accountability,adherence to standards and improved quality across theindustry, we also require more rigour in terms of ourdecision-making abilities and processes. This articleprovides an update on progress in applying the ‘HISS-CAM’ tool, developed in 2008 as the result of a WorldVision study into NGO staff engagement with military,police and other armed actors.1 We and other agencieshave found that the lessons from this research do not stopwith armed actors and militaries. Rather, they point morebroadly to the need for better analysis and appropriatedecision-making processes to meet the specificchallenges of today’s operating environments.

The tough callsDrawn from World Vision’s experience over the past year,the following three examples are typical of the types of‘tough calls’ confronting aid workers.

In Afghanistan, a convoy carrying 500 tonnes of food wasdispatched to meet the needs of pregnant and lactatingmothers and children under two years of age. En route, 10tonnes of rice was seized from the convoy by a disgruntledex-commander. After consulting local leaders, he agreed toreturn the commodities and retreat on the condition that theWorld Food Programme (WFP) established operations in hisarea. The request was reasonable given the clear need forhumanitarian assistance in that area, and if World Vision –as WFP’s implementing agency in the area – were to acceptthis offer, staff security might improve and access to theoriginal target population might increase. But what wouldbe the implications for the agency’s independence? Andwould the office be showing that it could be manipulated forpolitical purposes? In this case, World Vision suspended thedispatch of further convoys to the province, and consultedwith the local authorities and police in the areas concerned.Rather than accepting the offer of a police escort, the WorldVision logistics team decided to explore an alternativeoption that involved outsourcing the transport of foodthrough local contractors.

In eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, assessmentsconducted by World Vision staff confirmed widespreadreports that fear of attacks by armed actors was theprimary protection concern among women and children.While inter-agency initiatives to address this issue werebeing developed through the protection cluster, thesewere not sufficiently advanced to implement immediately.With funding available for this work, World Vision faced adecision – whether to initiate an individual agencyresponse utilising the legal knowledge and skills ofexperienced protection staff, or wait for the inter-agencyinitiative to become operational. Key questions includedwhether engaging directly with actors such as the nationalmilitary and police through training would enhance WorldVision’s legitimacy or detract from it in the eyes of the localpopulation. What would be the risks to the organisation’sperceived impartiality? And how would the organisationmitigate any potential negative impacts? In this case,World Vision decided to develop training modules indomestic and international human rights law, Inter-national Humanitarian Law and other humanitarianprinciples, focusing on the responsibilities of governmentauthorities to protect civilians. The agency also formedcommunity protection committees.

In Darfur, World Vision was approached to manage fooddistributions in a displacement camp. Large numbers ofchildren were suffering malnutrition and were in need ofurgent medical and nutritional assistance. There wasconcern, however, that aid entering the area could beappropriated by one of the parties to the conflict. The use ofarmed escorts to protect food convoys was raised in acoordination meeting, but allegations of abuse of the localpopulation by the military, as well as resource constraintsamong the police, made any offer of support from thegovernment problematic. It was decided that the only viablesolution for protecting the convoys was to coordinatemovements with UN peacekeeping troops. No other agencywas prepared to provide assistance to the camp, which wasdeemed too dangerous to reach. Should World Visionservice the camp? How compelling was the need? Whatwould be the implications of association with the UN? Andwould it be possible to ensure adequate protection of staff?In this last case, World Vision decided to proceed with theuse of UN armed escorts. Over the following months, it wasthe only major international agency providing assistanceP

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Making the tough calls: decision-making in complex humanitarianenvironments

Ashley Clements and Dr Edwina Thompson

1 See Edwina Thompson, Principled Pragmatism, World VisionInternational, 2008, www.worldvision.org.uk/upload/pdf/Principled_pragmatism.pdf.

how should operational

humanitarian agencies navigate

these complex environments and

make these tough calls?

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(including food, WASH and health services) to the camp andits host population.

Despite the apparently satisfactory outcomes in theseexamples, it is clear from a due diligence perspective thatthe decisions made could have benefited from greatertransparency, inter-agency consultation and documentationto ensure that key issues were considered.

Responding to the tough callsSo how, then, should we as operational humanitarianagencies navigate these complex environments and makethese tough calls? We argue that the key to solving thisproblem is adhering to our humanitarian principles; theseare what set us apart from other actors sharing our operatingspace, and provide us with the legitimacy we need to sustainour engagement. The difficulty of translating principles intopractice, however, is well known among agency staff. Thenotion of impartiality, for example, is widely accepted byNGOs, but what does it look like on the ground?

In the face of growing risks and a more complex operationalenvironment, we require a greater capacity for decision-making and on-the-hoof reflection, which takes into accountboth the principles at the core of our identity and thecontextual realities and needs we seek to address. This wasthe reasoning behind the initial development of ‘HISS-CAM’(see Box 1). The concept can be depicted as a kind ofbalancing act – providing agency staff with a framework forbalancing the ethical considerations (‘principles’) andtactical choices (‘pragmatism’) that are necessary to fulfilthe humanitarian imperative (see Box 2). The three-step‘CAM’ process is depicted as the fulcrum through which thehumanitarian team can effectively weigh operationalchoices against principles to determine the best course ofaction. ‘HISS-CAM’ stops short of providing an ‘answer’ to agiven problem, but instead offers a framework for arriving ata decision after careful consideration of key issues andpotential mitigating options.

We have found that this step-by-step approach ofbreaking down complex decisions improves the likelihood

that vital areas are taken into consideration, such as theperceived impartiality of an organisation, the safety andacceptance of staff and the sustainability of programmaticinterventions. Again, the aim is not to provide prescriptiveguidance, but rather to help build staff confidence andcapacity in making difficult decisions.

‘HISS-CAM’ was originally designed as a tool for equippingstaff with the ability to determine appropriate levels ofinteraction with armed actors in areas that are consideredto fall within the category of ‘exceptions to the rules’. Suchexceptional and often unpredictable circumstances couldinvolve situations in which either military engagement in atraditionally humanitarian activity seems necessary inorder to save lives and alleviate suffering, or where theenvironment obliges humanitarian actors to interact witharmed groups, often at the risk of jeopardising staffsecurity and invoking negative perceptions of theorganisation. As can be seen in Figure 1, ‘HISS-CAM’ linksdirectly to the Office for the Coordination of HumanitarianAffairs (OCHA)’s ‘continuum of engagement’, whichdescribes the spectrum of possible interactions betweenhumanitarian and military operations. These range fromco-existence to co-operation. Our policy added a fourth ‘C’(curtail presence) to provide entities with the option tosuspend engagement altogether, even if only temporarilywhilst strategies are revised.

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Box 1: The ‘HISS-CAM’ tool

Humanitarian imperative

Impartiality and independence

Safety

Sustainability

Compelling aim

Appropriate, adapted, adequately informed

Minimal negative impact

Figure 1: The balancing act

Humanitarian imperative

Impartiality and independence

Safety

Sustainability

Curtail presence

Co-existence

Co-ordination

Co-operation

Principles Pragmatism

CAM

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Humanitarian agencies rely heavily on the media to raiseawareness of crises and generate income. For the media,however, the driving force is the search for a story. Despite

levels of death and destruction far outstripping the acutecrises which seize the headlines, chronic emergenciessuch as civil wars and ongoing famines are neither

When making decisions about how to proceed, or whenreviewing a current mode of operation, the action ismeasured against the four key sets of principles listedunder the banner of ‘HISS’. The first two elements –adherence to the humanitarian imperative, and impartialityand independence – are derived directly from the Red CrossCode of Conduct. The last two concepts – security andprotection, and sustainability – are practical considerationsconnected to the ‘Do No Harm’ principle. Within the contextof development work, which is underpinned by long-termconsiderations that aim to assist communities to overcomepoverty and injustice, any compromise of these principlesclearly requires the highest level of justification and aconsideration of mitigating options.

From our experience, not only has ‘HISS-CAM’ provedhelpful to staff in making more transparent, accountableand considered choices for engagement with military andother armed actors, but it also offers a platform forcollaborative decision-making that incorporates essentialelements of humanitarian best practice and codes ofconduct. Its field applications have shown that the tacticalchoices laid out in OCHA’s continuum of engagement can besubstituted for a range of other operational questions, suchas entry/exit to an area, engagement/non-engagement witha group or proceed/do not proceed with an operationalchoice. The tool also provides a format for documenting thereasons for reaching a particular decision, which can thengo towards future organisational learning and ultimatelyhelp to improve the quality of humanitarian work. To date,‘HISS-CAM’ has been applied by World Vision in at least 16field situations in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and theCaucasus (see Box 2).

Looking ahead‘HISS-CAM’ introduces transparency and rigour to thedecision-making process, and an opportunity to considercritical elements which might not otherwise featureadequately. At its simplest level, the tool can promptagency staff to re-evaluate the constraints of theircontexts; something which is frequently neglected indynamic, high-pressure environments.

The ability to use ‘HISS-CAM’ as a collaborative tool – bothwithin a field operation and between agencies – offers apotentially new level of inter-agency collaboration, whichseems increasingly relevant in complex environments. Thisshared approach has been applied in the recent Sri Lankacrisis as a way for multiple agencies to discuss issues,review past decisions and reach shared agreement on theappropriate actions to be taken. We see many moreopportunities to use and develop the tool further, and

would encourage other agencies to seek out opportunitiesfor inter-agency collaboration, particularly when decisionsare critical to our security and our ability to operate inemergencies. Not only does a tool like ‘HISS-CAM’ have thepotential to facilitate communication within different officesand between agencies, but it also assists in bringing localstaff into discussions, building their capacity to think as ahumanitarian and communicate their ideas in a jointplatform. A further benefit during the response phase of adisaster is that the tool can connect local staff better withvisiting international staff, who convey operational realitiesto donors and the public in fundraising centres.

There is no way to guarantee ‘good’ decisions in complexenvironments – a multitude of variables and risks and alack of information will certainly continue to plague thedecision-making process. We can, however, make better

decisions, and we should strive for the best possiblecourse of action given the constraints. ‘HISS-CAM’ hasbegun to provide one answer to our dilemma of how to putour principles into practice, by allowing humanitarians insome of the world’s most chronic and complex crises tomake more considered, transparent, consultative (and yetrapid) decisions under pressure.

Ashley Clements is a former Policy Adviser for WorldVision’s Global Rapid Response Team ([email protected]).Dr Edwina Thompson is Senior Civil-Military-Police Adviserin World Vision’s Humanitarian Emergency Affairs team. Forspecific questions relating to ‘HISS-CAM’ or civil–militaryresearch, please write to [email protected].

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Media and message: communicating crisesJoanna Matthews

Box 2: Putting it into practice

The following is a list of practical applications of ‘HISS-CAM’ conducted by World Vision staff:

• Afghanistan: Acceptance of grants; outsourcing trans-portation of assets to third parties

• Georgia: Distribution of ready-to-eat meals and Humani-tarian Daily Rations supplied by the US government duringthe conflict

• Myanmar: Use of military assets in the Cyclone Nargisresponse

• Somalia: Options for continued programme viability insouth-central regions

• Sri Lanka: Humanitarian access in Vanni province;humanitarian support to internment camps; advocacy toarmed group forcibly taking products from the agency’sagricultural farm

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immediate nor spectacular enough to warrant extensivecoverage. Millions have died in the Democratic Republic ofCongo (DRC), making the conflict there the deadliest sincethe Second World War, dwarfing the combined death-tollsof all the other high-profile natural disasters and acts ofterrorism of the past decade. In contrast, the Indian Oceantsunami, which caused 187,000 deaths, received moremedia attention in the first six weeks after it struck thanthe emergencies in the DRC, northern Uganda and Darfurcombined over a whole year.1 The result of this media blitzwas that, by February 2005, the international communityhad donated $550 per person affected by the tsunami,compared to just $9.40 for each person affected byconflict in the DRC. The Charities Aid Foundation in the UKestimates that donors gave around £1 per head less toother charities in 2004/5 than they would have done hadit not been for the tsunami appeal – equivalent to £48million (around $80 million) diverted from other causes.

A quantitative survey of press coverage reveals that, interms of column inches, acute disasters attractsignificantly more attention in proportion to their actualseverity than long-term crises, with a strong correlationwith the amount of money donated by the public. Butissues of quality as well as quantity seem to play a key rolein this process. A content analysis of a representativesample of UK newspaper coverage from the Indian Oceantsunami and the war in DRC reveals a number of trendsthat can be seen as either ‘positive’ or ‘negative’, i.e. likelyto encourage or deter donations.

‘Positive coverage’: the Indian Ocean tsunamiThe tsunami represents a disaster so apocalyptic in itsscale and so fertile in its media applicability that itprovides a paradigm for ‘positive’ coverage in terms of theissues that excite the media and consequently encouragethe British public to ‘dig deep’. A ‘Wave of Death’, it ‘torechildren from their parents’ arms’. As a natural disasterthat showed man pitted against the elements, the tsunamiprovided a politically neutral story of universal interest.The poignancy of the disaster was increased by its timing;it struck on Boxing Day, which meant that the media couldtap into seasonal philanthropy, emphasising that, ‘asBritain wallows in the excesses of Christmas, Britonsshould direct their wallets eastwards’. Unusually fornatural catastrophes, it was a story touching Westerninterests as developed countries mourned their own lostcitizens and were brought closer to the realities ofdisaster. Human interest is a key factor, and emotivestories of Western loss were a powerful feature of the

coverage; The Times reported the loss of three membersof film director Richard Attenborough’s family, underliningthe indiscriminate terror of the wave, engulfing celebritiesand ordinary folk alike.

The response of the public soon became a story in its ownright as Britons gave at a rate of £1 million an hour. The presscongratulated the public on its altruism, The Sunday Times

saying that ‘the British public should be feeling a little betterabout itself this morning’. This fervent philanthropy and self-congratulation in turn perpetuated the discourse of ‘them’and ‘us’, in which the West is portrayed as ‘expert, theholders of life-saving knowledge, providers and saviours’,while the Indian Ocean countries are depicted ‘as chaotic,foolish and as recipients and victims’.2 Though not politicalin its origins, the story acquired political endorsement as thenation’s leaders responded to the public mood, with BritishPrime Minister Tony Blair promising that the UK governmentwould surpass whatever the general public contributed.Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, the tsunamigenerated a wealth of dramatic, terrifying images fromholidaymakers and photojournalists alike.

When looking at the aspects of the tsunami that provokedthis spate of media attention and this outpouring of aid, it ishard to disentangle the motivations of the media from themotivations of the British public, as the press will alwayschoose to report primarily on what they know will interesttheir readers. But it is undeniable that the discourses ofdisaster used in the tsunami struck a powerful chord,stimulating unparalleled charitable giving.

‘Negative’ coverage: the conflict in the DRCMeanwhile, events that happen to the world’s poorestpeople in countries that are off the Western ‘radar’ maysimply be ignored by the media because they do not containenough of the positive triggers discussed above. But‘negative’ coverage may also take the form of exposure thatis in some way hostile or critical; rather than focusing on thefacts of a crisis and the humanitarian toll it exacts, itconcentrates instead on damaging stereotypes of countries,criticisms of governments and other agencies, evocations ofguilt or allegations of corruption.

Unlike the act of God of the tsunami, the DRC conflict is oftenpresented as somehow self-inflicted, a convoluted andconfusing conflict impervious to outside understanding. AsThe Guardian put it, ‘both groups are armed by the samemaster, Rwanda … it’s hard to see why they’re fighting’. Themilitary nature of conflict in the DRC has been emphasisedby the British media, a trait which may discourage a moregenerous response from the public. In situations of conflict,civil society often clamours for a political response, such asintervention to end the war, over a humanitarian one; as aresult, if the media plays up the conflict and disregards thehumanitarian needs it creates, charitable giving is likely tobe less generous.3

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acute disasters attract

significantly more attention in

proportion to their actual

severity than long-term crises

1 Reuters Foundation AlertNet, Factsheet: Alertnet Top 10 ‘Forgotten’

Emergencies, 2002, http://www.alertnet.org/thefacts/reliefre-sources/111038817665.htm.

2 T. Skelton, Representations of the ‘Asian Tsunami’ in the British

Media (Singapore: National University of Singapore, Asian MetaCentreResearch Paper Series, 2006).3 C. Nursey, ‘The International Tsunami Response: Showcase orCircus?’, Humanitarian Exchange, 32, 2005.

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The discourse of corruption and brutality also serves tocultivate a negative stereotype of Africa as a continentbeyond hope and help. Rather than encouraging sympathy,it may simply reinforce what one commentator has called‘afro-pessimism’ – a post-colonial perception of ahomogenous block of uncivilised people incapable of self-government.4 In addition, it can pander to a sort of morbidfascination with a part of the world which is disjointed fromus in the West, geographically and culturally. In this sort ofcoverage, civilians are reduced to nameless extras, lurkingin the shadows while Western aid workers or celebritytourists occupy centre stage.5 In other words, Africa hasbecome an image of disaster. We have come to expect it,and our expectations are reinforced by the media; whenthrough bafflement or boredom we fail to respond, mediacoverage declines still further.

ConclusionHowever independent-minded we like to think we are, it isindisputable that the media shape our perceptions of manyissues, and that knowingly or unknowingly we absorb theinformation and opinions which they feed us. We rely on themedia to keep us up to date with the ever-shifting patternsof disaster, conflict and poverty in our high-speed world. Ifjournalists produce a particularly stirring story, we may feelmoved to make a charitable donation. Yet editors do notprioritise crises according to humanitarian need or objectivelevels of severity, but rather by stories, by images, by drama.They select stories based on their experience of what sellspapers, and what the British public wants to read. The under-reported crises across the world relating to poverty, to civilwar, to fractious politics and, arguably, to all things African,however devastating, fail to ‘tick the right boxes’. So beginsa vicious spiral whereby crises get relegated to the league of‘forgotten emergencies’: lack of coverage, lack of awareness,lack of public sympathy, lack of financial support.

It should be stressed that this is not a criticism of theBritish media. Rather, it serves to demonstrate themobilising effect that their coverage has on the massconsciousness of Britain, and to suggest that the public,aid agencies and the media themselves should be moreaware of the power of that effect. Every party needs toadopt a level of responsibility, and move to improverelations and communications. From the publicperspective, we perhaps need to analyse more carefullythe way in which we respond to acute disasters, andrecognise that, however commendable and urgent ourgenerosity, it rarely provides a sustainable solution. Wealso need to be aware of the limitations of relying on onesource of information, and look elsewhere for explanationand detail, both from aid organisations and specialisthumanitarian media outfits and from all the new sourcesof information made available by digital technology. Onthe part of aid organisations a further effort is needed toimprove relations with the mass media in terms of

supplying current, comprehensive human-interestupdates on crises that need a response from the generalpublic – as well as news on any positive outcomes thathave emerged and sustainable solutions that have beenimplemented. In-house media and professional marketingcampaigns are also essential in order to harness aresponse from a public bombarded with choice andanaesthetised by disaster.

It is difficult to fully disentangle who is responsible for theoften conspicuous discrepancies between humanitarianneed and media coverage. What is clear, however, is that,in a world littered with disasters, and with increasedaccess to media, from traditional newspapers to onlinenews 24 hours a day, there is an imperative need foraccurate, responsible, transparent and trustworthyreporting systems. It may transpire that, however muchinformation the British public are given about the relativeseverity of particular crises, they will still be morereluctant to donate money for long-term, sustainable,humanitarian causes than for acute emergencies. How tochange that particular mentality will be the next bigchallenge.

Joanna Matthews is a freelance copy-writer and socialmarketer for charitable and Corporate Social Responsibility(CSR) projects. Her email address is: [email protected]. This article is taken from a Mastersdissertation submitted to the University of Westminstercomparing four major humanitarian crises: the Indian Oceantsunami, the war in the DRC, the earthquake in Pakistan andthe war in Sudan.

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References and further reading

R. Bennett and M. Daniel, ‘Media Reporting of ThirdWorld Disasters: The Journalist’s Perspective’, Disaster

Prevention and Management, 11, 2002.

N. Gowing, ‘Noisy Emergencies and the Media inHumanitarian Practice’ Humanitarian Exchange, 18, 2002.

L. Ndangam, ‘Heart of Darkness – Western MediaRhetoric on Africa: Constructing and Associating Meaningover Time’, paper presented at the 23rd Conference andGeneral Assembly of the International Association forMass Media Research, Barcelona, 21–26 July 2002.

C. Nursey, ‘The International Tsunami Response: Show-case or Circus?’, Humanitarian Exchange, 32, 2005.

G. R. Olsen, K. Hoyen and N. Carstensen, ‘HumanitarianCrises: What Determines the Level of EmergencyAssistance? Media Coverage, Donor Interest and theAid Business’, Disasters, 27, 2003.

R. Omaar and A. de Waal, ‘Disaster Pornography fromSomalia’, Media and Values 61, 1993.

T. Skelton, Representations of the ‘Asian Tsunami’ in

the British Media (Singapore: National University ofSingapore, Asian MetaCentre Research Paper Series,2006).

4 L. Ndangam, ‘Heart of Darkness – Western Media Rhetoric on Africa:Constructing and Associating Meaning over Time’, paper presented atthe 23rd Conference and General Assembly of the InternationalAssociation for Mass Media Research, Barcelona, 21–26 July 2002.5 R. Omaar and A. de Waal, ‘Disaster Pornography from Somalia’,Media and Values, 61, 1993.

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States are increasingly contributingmilitary assets in humanitarianemergencies. As a result, the humani-tarian community has paid growingattention to civil–military relations,culminating in a series of guidelinesand research activity and morefrequent interaction on the ground.Most of this work has focused oncomplex emergencies. The subject isundoubtedly more contentious inconflict settings, where blurring thelines between humanitarian and mili-tary actors can compromise neutralityand independence, restricting humani-tarian access and increasing securityrisks. It is also relevant in responses tonatural disasters, for two reasons.First, many recent large-scale disas-ters have occurred in contexts ofongoing conflict or violence, whichmeans that some of the issuesencountered in complex emergenciesalso apply. Second, many govern-ments are gearing up for a greatermilitary role in disaster response, and military involve-ment, whether national or international, is likely tobecome more frequent.

This article is part of an ongoing research project conductedby the British Red Cross to examine civil–military relations innatural disasters, with specific reference to the experiencesof the International Federation of Red Cross and RedCrescent Societies. Desk-based case studies and interviewsconducted so far focus on four recent operations in whichthe Federation was involved: the tsunami response in Aceh(2004), the Pakistan earthquake (2005), floods and acyclone in Mozambique (2007) and the Haiti hurricane(2008). Some of the main findings are highlighted below.

Military involvement in natural disastersWhile the involvement of the military in relief operations isnot new (think of the 1948–49 Berlin airlift, for example),military engagement in relief activities has grown since theearly 1990s. Military resources were used in response tothe 1991 cyclone in Bangladesh, and after Hurricane Mitchin Central America in 1998. More recently, the US militarysupported the response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, theUK military was brought in to help tackle floods in Britainin 2007 and huge numbers of Chinese troops weredeployed in the aftermath of the earthquake in Sichuanprovince in 2008. Following the October 2005 earthquakein Pakistan, domestic and international military actorsmounted the largest humanitarian helicopter airlift everseen. Regional alliances too are paying growing attention

to the role of the military. Initiatives are currently underway in the Asia-Pacific region, largely in reaction to thetsunami. NATO is playing a growing role in disasterresponse, for example in the US Katrina response and thePakistan relief operation in 2005.

There are various factors driving the growing interest ofthe military in responding to disasters: assisting reliefefforts can improve the military’s image and providetraining opportunities, and may also be a way for themilitary to diversify their role at a time when armed forcesglobally are experiencing budget cuts. With an increase inthe incidence of natural disasters, national and foreignmilitaries can be expected to play a bigger role –particularly in large-scale disasters, where the capacity ofhumanitarian organisations may be stretched.

Humanitarian actors view these developments with a waryeye. In the US, the NGO consortium InterAction has raisedconcerns about the newly established US Command forAfrica (AFRICOM), whose tasks include supportinghumanitarian assistance. Growing interest within the

Military responses to natural disasters: last resort or inevitable trend?

Charles-Antoine Hofmann and Laura Hudson, British Red Cross

A German military helicopter transporting relief items for the Pakistan Red

Cross and IFRC following the earthquake in 2005

various factors are driving the

growing interest of the military in

responding to disasters

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European Union in deploying civil defence and militaryassets outside EU territory has prompted similar concerns.Critics of the military’s involvement in relief claim that it isinefficient, inappropriate, inadequate and expensive,contrary to humanitarian principles and driven by politicalimperatives rather than humanitarian need.

Guidelines on civil–military relations innatural disastersThe Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil

Defence Assets in Disaster Relief, known as the Oslo Guide-lines,1 state that, whereas the involvement of domesticmilitary forces is often a first resort due to lack of capacityelsewhere, the use of foreign military assets must be a lastresort. These guidelines also clearly affirm the primaryresponsibility of the affected state for providing humani-tarian assistance on its territory, and state that foreignmilitary and civil defence assets must complement (ratherthan supplant) existing relief mechanisms. The finalauthority over the use of foreign military assets clearly lieswith the affected state: for instance, the Indonesian govern-ment accepted a good deal of foreign military support, butput a 90-day limit on deployments. The principles of GoodHumanitarian Donorship affirm ‘the primary position ofcivilian organisations in implementing humanitarian action’,and require states to ensure that military assistance is ‘inconformity with international humanitarian law andhumanitarian principles, and recognises the leading role ofhumanitarian organisations’.

The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement has its ownguidelines on relations with the military. The key principlesare as follows:

• While maintaining a dialogue with armed forces at alllevels, components of the Movement preserve theirindependence of decision-making and action.

• All components of the Movement ensure that they actand are perceived as acting in accordance with theFundamental Principles, in particular independence,neutrality and impartiality.

• Each component draws a clear distinction between therespective roles of military bodies and humanitarianactors, paying particular attention to perceptionslocally and within the wider public.

• The use of military assets by a component of theMovement – in particular in countries affected byarmed conflict and/or internal strife/disturbance – is alast resort solution, which can only be justified byserious and urgent humanitarian needs, as well as bythe lack of alternative means.

• The Movement does not use armed protection.

Nature of the dialogue and interaction withthe militaryDepending on the context, the form of engagementbetween military and humanitarian actors varies, rangingfrom keeping a safe distance to much closer levels ofcollaboration, sometimes with recourse to military assets.

Developing good personal contacts with the military hasproved valuable whatever level of coordination is required.For example, despite a desire to publicly distancethemselves from the UN mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH),Federation staff developed discreet personal contacts.This helped the Federation access important securityinformation and increased MINUSTAH’s understanding ofthe Red Cross’ concerns.

Military assets as a last resort

The principle of last resort is key for the Red Cross.Perceived as a useful ‘safeguard’ from an operationalperspective, it can, however, be hard to apply in practice.Indeed, it implies that programme managers shouldexplore every available option before making an informeddecision. In rapid-onset situations, pragmatism oftenprevails and good judgement is generally sufficient toassess whether realistic alternatives are available.

In Pakistan, there was a clear justification for theFederation to use military assets, primarily air transport.Similarly in Aceh, the rapid deployment of militaryhelicopters from the region was vital: waiting for civilianplanes would have resulted in severe delays andadditional loss of life. A more difficult question concernswhen to revert to civilian capacity after the initial surgeperiod has passed, particularly as military assets areusually perceived as a ‘free good’. While this holds truefrom the perspective of an aid agency, costs are alwaysborne by the state. Ultimately, using military assets mayhave implications for the overall humanitarian aid budget,and it is generally accepted that military assets are usuallymore expensive than civilian ones. It should be noted thatsome governments, including the UK, make entirelyseparate allocations for military expenditure associatedwith humanitarian relief and state aid budgets. Over time,however, this might skew aid financing, effectivelyreducing funding to aid budgets.

Armed escorts

In all four of the case studies, the Federation abided by itsrule of not using armed escorts. For example, the Pakistanimilitary asked humanitarian convoys to use armed policeescorts in the North-West Frontier Province. This wasresisted by the Federation. In Aceh, government forcesinitially denied the Federation access to some locationsthought to harbour supporters of the separatist Free AcehMovement, unless staff were accompanied by armedmilitary escorts. Further negotiations enabled theFederation to proceed alone and without incident.

Public perceptions

In all of the case studies, Federation staff consideredpublic perceptions of the Movement’s independence andneutrality when deciding on levels of coordination with themilitary. For example, in Haiti the Federation sought toavoid direct public engagement with MINUSTAH. Privately,however, it coordinated with MINUSTAH when organisinga distribution to ensure that MINUSTAH troops wereavailable to respond if security became an issue. Thiscautious approach may have helped the Federation to

1 Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in

Disaster Relief, OCHA, November 2006.

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reach some areas after the hurricanes in the south-east ofthe country, whereas access was blocked for the UN.

Conclusion: challenges and opportunities forhumanitarian actorsMany humanitarian actors understand that the military canplay a legitimate and at times vital role in supportinghumanitarian relief efforts. Given the growing involvementof military actors in relief activities, humanitarian organis-ations have an opportunity and, some argue, a respons-ibility to engage more strategically with the military in orderto limit the risks inherent in their involvement and maximisethe potential benefits to the disaster response system andaffected populations. The question for humanitarianorganisations is no longer whether to engage with themilitary, but rather how and when to do so.

Issues to consider• Civil–military relations currently occupy a marginal

place in the humanitarian sector. Apart from the ICRC,which due to its mandate must address the issuecarefully and consistently, most organisations havevery little – if any – capacity in this domain. Yetinteraction with the military – both national andinternational – is likely to become more common.Humanitarian personnel need training, which shouldinclude familiarisation with military operating stylesand terminology and operational guidance tailored tospecific contexts or scenarios.

• At the policy level, agencies should be working toinfluence military doctrine and explain their concerns,and support the dissemination and implementation ofexisting guidelines and the development of improvedtools. The recent British Armed Forces doctrinepublication on Disaster Relief Operations benefited fromconsultation with agencies, even changing its title from‘humanitarian relief operations’ on the basis of agencyadvice. This engagement should not be limited to themilitary, but should extend to governments, who decidethe roles the military will play in disaster response.

• With the military’s growing interest in supporting reliefinterventions in foreign countries, it is crucial for statesthat are prone to natural disasters to ensure that theyhave a proper understanding of key rules and principles,such as the Oslo Guidelines. Preparedness should beimproved through the development of national disaster

plans and training activities. The Federation’s Inter-national Disaster Response Laws, Rules and Principles(IDRL) programme can play an important role here, bysupporting governments to strengthen their domesticlegal and policy frameworks for disaster response.2

• Finally, dialogue and coordination within the humani-tarian community is badly needed. While most debatesfocus on civil–military relations in countries such asAfghanistan, where conflict is the defining feature, verylittle attention is paid to the growing role of the militaryin natural disasters and the implications for humani-tarian actors and the principles that underpin their work.

At the time of writing, Charles-Antoine Hofmann wasHumanitarian Policy Advisor at the British Red Cross.Laura Hudson is a BRCS Policy Officer; her email addressis [email protected]. The views expressed in thisarticle are those of the authors and do not necessarilyrepresent the position of the Red Cross Movement.

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References and further reading

C. Harkin, The 2004 Tsunami: Civil Military Aspects of the

International Response (London: Tsunami EvaluationCoalition, 2005).

IASC, Civil–Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies,An IASC Reference Paper, 2004.

IASC, Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence

Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities

in Complex Emergencies, 2006.

InterAction, InterAction on Civil Military Relations, PolicyBrief, September 2008.

M. Jochems, ‘NATO’s Growing Humanitarian Role’,NATO Review, Spring 2006.

J. Krombach-Wagner, ‘An IHL/ICRC Perspective on“Humanitarian Space”’, Humanitarian Exchange, 32,2006, http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=2765.

OCHA, Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and

Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (Geneva: UnitedNations, 2007).

R. Rana, ‘Contemporary Challenges in the Civil–MilitaryRelationship: Complementarity or Incompatibility?’,International Review of the Red Cross, 855, 2004.

SCHR, SCHR Position Paper on Humanitarian–Military

Relations, 2004.

SIPRI, The Effectiveness of Foreign Military Assets in

Natural Disaster Response (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2008).

E. Thomson, Principled Pragmatism: NGO Engagement

with Armed Actors, World Vision International, 2008.

V. Wheeler and A. Harmer, Resetting the Rules of

Engagement: Trends and Issues in Military–Humanitarian

Relations, HPG Report 21 (London: ODI, 2006).2 See http://www.ifrc.org/what/disasters/idrl/index.asp.

many humanitarian actors

understand that the military can

play a legitimate and effective

role in supporting humanitarian

relief efforts

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Post-disaster shelter programmes aim to meet urgent andimmediate housing needs. Although evaluations havehighlighted short-term benefits and have helped to improveprogramme design and shelter options, little attention hasbeen paid to the longer-term socio-economic impact of theseinterventions. Following an initiative of the Netherlands RedCross (NLRC) and the International Federation of Red Crossand Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), two long-term studies onpost-disaster shelter programmes were conducted incollaboration with Eindhoven University of Technology(TU/e) in the Netherlands. The first considers the long-termsocio-economic impact of a shelter programme imple-mented in 1999–2001 in Vietnam. The second covers aTransitional Shelter (TS) programme implemented by theIFRC and others in Aceh, Indonesia.

This is a standardised methodology for measuring long-termimpact, making comparisons between different post-disaster housing programmes more accurate. It is our beliefthat such a standardised research methodology can givevaluable insights into shelter impacts, helping organisationsto formulate sustainable shelter responses which considerboth immediate and long-term needs.

Research approachPost-disaster housing programmes are very context-specific.Housing design and implementation must take into accountkey economic, social, political, environmental and culturalfactors, including how households make their living. Thus,analysing the impact of such programmes requires a flexibleand context-specific approach. This need is typicallyanswered by embracing a qualitative approach, such asindepth household interviews and group discussions.Although we acknowledge the value of qualitative methods,the case studies below are analysed in the belief that thelong-term impact of housing can be better understood whencombining qualitative approaches with quantitative tools ofanalysis, using a standardised research approach. Byagreeing on and using a standardised research approachand indicators, it is possible to determine the impact andeffectiveness of different shelter programmes.

Both studies discussed here are based on a researchapproach which includes a focus on social as well astechnical factors, a comparison between beneficiaries ofthe shelter programme and non-beneficiaries, qualitativeand quantitative data, objective and subjective indicatorsand a focus on socio-economic impact over time. For thelatter it is best to analyse housing conditions, and thesocio-economic and demographic characteristics ofhouseholds at different points in time (e.g. before/justafter project implementation and several years afterproject termination). In the Vietnam case study, it wasnecessary to reconstruct baseline data for households in2000. For the study in Aceh, baseline data was collected in

2008, soon after the project ended; the intention is that,four or five years from now, new data will be collected andcompared with the baseline information.

‘Starter houses’ in VietnamIn 1999, tropical storms and floods struck the centralprovinces of Vietnam, destroying 55,000 houses and badlydamaging hundreds of thousands more. In collaborationwith other Red Cross societies, the Vietnamese Red Crossdeveloped a storm-resistant starter-house, consisting of agalvanised steel frame and metal roofing system,positioned on a steel-reinforced concrete foundation.Beneficiary households were responsible for finishing andexpanding their houses. In subsequent years, for example,beneficiaries could replace the bamboo mat walls usedimmediately after the disaster with masonry wall-infill, oreven extend the houses. Some 20,000 houses wereconstructed between 1999 and 2001.

The absence of baseline data was a significant obstacle todetermining the socio-economic impact of the shelterprogramme. Although the initial selection procedures andcriteria for identifying beneficiaries were available, widersocio-economic household data was not recorded. Inaddition, to measure the impact of the shelter programme,it was critical to identify a comparison group which had notreceived shelter support but had (back in 2000) similarcharacteristics to the beneficiaries (average age andnumber of household members, sources of income, level ofincome, geographical location, etc.). These problems wereaddressed by analysing secondary data, such as govern-ment poverty maps from 2000. In addition, interviews wereheld with key informants, including community leaders andlocal Red Cross officials involved in the project in 2000.Semi-randomised sample procedures were applied to selectbeneficiary and non-beneficiary households. Finally, 94beneficiaries and 159 non-beneficiaries were interviewed.Household interviews covered objective data, such ashousing conditions, but also recall questions regardingchanges in living standards since 2000. This researchapproach – in particular having a comparison group andapplying basic statistical analyses – provided valuableinsights into socio-economic impact.

Impact of the shelter programme in Vietnam

Overall, beneficiaries were satisfied with the ‘starterhouse’, especially its good resistance to storm damage. Incase study interviews, respondents also noted that housemaintenance and repair costs were considerably lowerthan before the programme. In a few cases, communityleaders reported that these costs had dropped to zero.However, it was still not clear whether these maintenanceand repair costs were really different for the comparison(non-beneficiary) group, and if so, whether the differencewas substantial.

Measuring the socio-economic impact of post-disaster shelter:experiences from two Red Cross programmes

Simone van Dijk and Alexander van Leersum

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Data analysis indicated that the difference was indeedstatistically significant and that the house maintenanceand repair costs for beneficiaries were a third less thanthose of non-beneficiary households. Qualitative inter-views indicated that, as a (secondary) effect, beneficiaryhouseholds were able to spend more money on food,education and health. The quantitative analysis indicatedthat beneficiaries were more satisfied with their currenthouses and had more diverse diets than the comparisongroup. On average, beneficiary households could affordtwo meat-meals a week, while non-beneficiary house-holds could afford just less than one. Beneficiaryhouseholds also possessed more consumer goods, suchas rice cookers, than non-beneficiaries.

Transitional shelter programme in Aceh,IndonesiaThe tsunami of December 2004 displaced over 550,000people in Aceh. The IFRC and other Red Cross and RedCrescent Societies reacted by implementing a transitionalshelter programme.

From August 2005 to December 2007, almost 20,000transitional shelters were built, targeting people still livingin tents or shacks. The objective of the programme was to‘fill the gap’ between emergency shelter, such as tents, andpermanent houses. By providing steel-framed houses withwooden walls, floors and metal sheet roofs, the transitionalshelter programme aimed to improve living conditions for atwo- to four-year period, giving beneficiaries the oppor-tunity to rebuild their permanent homes and livelihoods. Todetermine whether the programme did indeed improvesocio-economic conditions and thus helped people torebuild homes and livelihoods, a comparison was madebetween 300 households that had lived in transitionalshelters for a period up to four years, and 300 householdsthat had not. Both groups were already living in permanenthouses when the study was conducted, which made itpossible to make a good comparison.

The data gathered was used to create a baseline. This

sketches the social and economicsituation of households now, makingit possible to compare the two groups.The data will also be useful for apossible further study in four or fiveyears’ time. When data is collected attwo different points in time it is easierto measure actual impact.

Impacts of the transitional shelter

program in Aceh

Analysis of the quantitative datashows that the transitional shelterprogramme has had a strong socialimpact and a slight economic impacton beneficiaries. The majority ofhouseholds that have lived in atransitional shelter evaluate theinfluence of the shelter on their livesas ‘very positive’ or ‘positive’. Further-more, the baseline data shows that,

even after moving to permanent houses, large numbers ofbeneficiaries still use the transitional shelters either asadditional living space or as business premises. Thisdemonstrates that transitional shelters are not just atemporary post-disaster housing solution, but are avaluable asset which can be used by beneficiaries tofurther improve their lives. It is however important to notethat the positive impact is only maintained when ahousehold lives in the transitional shelter for a relativelyshort period, which means that transitional shelter shouldbe a short-term housing solution. This is mainly becausetransitional shelters do not have enough facilities to allowa family to live in them for a long period of time. Follow-upresearch should tell us more about when this positiveimpact starts to decrease, and the maximum period that afamily should live in a transitional shelter.

ConclusionThe Vietnam case study clearly illustrates that basicquantitative research tools can be a valuable addition topersonal stories and narrative reports. Quantitative analysescomparing beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries have servedto substantiate and fine-tune assessments of the actualsocio-economic impact of the housing intervention. Thestudy on the Transitional Shelter programme in Acehhighlights the value of analysing and comparing differenttypes of intervention. It has indicated some of the diverseand dynamic ways in which beneficiaries use the shelter theyreceive, and how the intervention impacted on their lives inthe immediate and intermediate term. The study hasgenerated valuable baseline data, which can be used forfollow-up research. By applying a standardised method-ology, comparison between programmes becomes a morerealistic proposition. Standard long-term impact evaluationscan also help organisations to develop a more sustainableshelter response strategy that corresponds to immediateand long-term needs.

Simone van Dijk and Alexander van Leersum are freelanceconsultants. Their email addresses are: [email protected] and [email protected].

A starter house built by the Vietnamese Red Cross in Huyen Ky Anh,

Ha Tinh province, Vietnam

©A

lexander van Leersum (2006)

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Aid agencies are increasingly concerned with addressingdisaster risk reduction in situations of conflict or chronicpolitical instability. However, the interplay betweendisaster and conflict and the specific impact on people’slivelihoods are still poorly understood. What impact doeschronic conflict have on social relations and on people’slivelihoods, and do recurrent disasters further contributeto tensions and divisions, or do they offer opportunitiesto strengthen social cohesion? To find an answer to thisquestion, we need a better understanding of whataffected people do, what survival strategies they adoptand what kind of assistance would be relevant andappropriate to reduce the negative impact of disastersand conflict.

This article discusses issues to consider when programmingaid in areas affected by both conflict and disasters, basedon grassroots experiences from Afghanistan, Burundi,Nigeria, the Philippines and Sudan. People engaged withlocal communities in these countries presented their viewsat a panel facilitated by Mary Anderson at the WorldConference on Humanitarian Studies in Groningen on 4–7February 2009.

Local institutions matter A focus either on disaster risk reduction or conflictprevention simplifies local realities and will make aidprogramming less effective. Disaster and conflictoutcomes are inter-related. However, how and to whatextent they are so depends on local institutionalarrangements: the rules, laws, traditions, values, normsand organisations that govern or regulate people’sbehaviour. These include power relations, which governwho sets the rules, who benefits from them, and who isexcluded.

To understand the impact of both disasters and conflicton local communities and people’s livelihoods, it iscrucial to explore local institutions and how they havechanged over time. This means exploring institutionswhich regulate:

• the maintenance of social order;• the handling of dissent and conflict;• access to and control of resources for securing

livelihoods;• social protection;• the management of collective resources;• the implementation of gender and household policies;

and• community survival strategies and solidarity with the

most vulnerable people in the community.

The importance of local institutions was a key insightgained by Cooperation for Humanitarian Assistance (CHA),

an Afghan NGO working with eight villages in Balkhprovince. Balkh is prone to floods and drought affectingthe availability of water in a 10km-long irrigation canalused by all eight of the villages. During the spring, floodsdamage houses and crops in the upstream villages, whiledownstream villagers depend on these floods for irrigationwater. Upstream villagers lobby for flood protectionmeasures, while downstream villagers oppose thembecause such measures stop them from accessing waterduring the spring. Tensions between upstream anddownstream villages have increased since 2001, when theTaliban were defeated. Under the Taliban, water wasdistributed according to land size, an approach whichhelped keep tensions over water in check. After 2001,however, local government positions were seized by eliteswho changed the water distribution rules to favourupstream villagers, with whom they are closely affiliated.As a result, from March to October upstream villagers takeall the water, closing the gates to prevent water flowing todownstream villages. Consequently, the prolongeddrought in 2006–2007 in these areas forced downstreamvillagers to diversify their livelihood strategies. Youngpeople opted to join armed groups, whose activities arelinked to the broader conflict in Afghanistan. In this case,communities depending on the same irrigation water needto renegotiate the rules governing water distribution tobetter deal with drought, to reduce tensions over waterand to prevent youth from taking up arms.

Affected communities are not passive victimsWhile it is generally recognised that local communitiesactively respond to and cope with disasters, in warcontexts they are often portrayed as passive victims. Casestudies show, however, that these people activelyparticipate in making war or peace. Droughts inAfghanistan and Southern Sudan put pressure on scarceresources. Such conditions cause people in SouthernSudan to attack adjacent villages and cattle herds, while inAfghanistan people engage in the war economy as analternative option to earn an income. Such harshcircumstances in combination with conflict can further beexploited by external militia to suit wider political andmilitary interests. Although the decision to take up arms isoften triggered by disaster, and influenced by limitedlivelihood options and the wider conflict context, localresidents can also decide to resist violence and makepeace. Instead of focusing on the issues that trigger war orencourage peace, it is important to explore how people actin the face of conflict, approaching them as active andcreative individuals.

Engage with ‘friends, enemies andresponsible state actors’Efforts to reduce disaster risk and stop violence locallydraw on the social and organisational skills of community

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A grassroots perspective on risks stemming from disasters andconflict

Annelies Heijmans, Ifeanyi Okechukwu, Annemarie Schuller tot Peursum and Regine Skarubowiz

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members and their ability to engage with a wide range ofactors. Examples from Nigeria, Southern Sudan and thePhilippines show that grassroots early warning systemsnot only warn people of potential danger or disaster risk,but also encourage – in fact they require – the involvementof those who initiate risk reduction or peace efforts, thosepotentially involved in violence and acts that increasepeople’s vulnerability and actors whose responsibility it isto maintain law and order and provide safety andprotection. Typically, local leaders or local NGOs play afacilitative role.

In Southern Sudan, natural disasters such as seasonalflooding exacerbate poverty because they destroylivelihoods and displace people. Subsequent shortagescause conflict and intensify cattle raiding as a way ofsecuring livelihoods among the agro-pastoralist Nuer andDinka tribes. In turn, clashes over grazing land and waterdestroy livelihoods, cause insecurity and increasepeople’s vulnerability to future droughts or floods. Toreduce disaster risks, World Vision encourages people toform disaster preparedness committees tasked withreviving indigenous early warning systems for rainfall andwinds. World Vision also provides tools to improvedrainage systems and dykes to protect people’s crops.Young people, who were the perpetrators of attacks, aremade responsible for the construction and maintenance ofthe dykes. In this way, cattle raids have been reduced asyoung people are given opportunities to improve theircommunity’s livelihoods. In order to enhance cooperationbetween hostile communities, World Vision has providedtraining on non-violent conflict resolution, organisedpeace conferences and helped local leaders to settledisputes peacefully. To ensure lasting reconciliation, localinstitutions seek support from the National PeaceCommission and government officials to work out ethnicand political power struggles.

In post-conflict Burundi, recurrent natural hazardsincrease people’s vulnerability. Drought and resulting foodshortages in 2006 caused people to migrate, puttingpressure on host communities’ land and resources.Humanitarian organisations started food distributions,but these only increased conflict between the displacedpopulation, residents and repatriated Burundian refugees,as some groups were served while others were excluded.To reduce tensions, the Burundian affiliate of the Agencyfor Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD)facilitated a process of community dialogue. Represen-tatives from conflicting parties – men, women and youngpeople – exchanged views on the tense situation, itsconsequences and possible solutions. Through negotiateddialogue, community representatives worked out a‘community social contract’ containing commitments toaddress the needs of vulnerable groups, enhance social

cohesion and ensure the sound management of naturalresources. A peace committee formally signed the contractand monitored compliance, and an action plan wasdeveloped to combat land degradation and enhance foodsecurity. Confidence and social cohesion among thevarious groups improved and agricultural productionincreased as a result of improved water management andthe adaptation of agricultural techniques appropriate fordrought-prone areas.

Implications for aid programmingWhen aid agencies seek to support local communitiesaffected by both disasters and conflict, they first need tounderstand how people have historically made a livingunder these difficult conditions. This includes exploringthe economic, social and political linkages betweencombatants and civilians in order to understand whatpeople do, their motives and risk perceptions. The nextstep is to explore the crucial institutions in the community,and how they relate to the wider socio-economic andpolitical context.

The cases described here show the relevance of strength-ening community institutions like early warning systems,social contracts and Spaces for Peace. They highlightpeople’s organisational and political abilities and theircapacity to engage with a broad range of actors includingthose committing violence, at and beyond grassrootslevel. Local conflicts are often intertwined with larger andgeographically wider social and political dynamics.Likewise, disaster vulnerability connects local conditionsto the macro-context and economic, social and politicalprocesses in society. Therefore, efforts to reduce the risksstemming from disasters and conflict will only becomeeffective when people at the grassroots build institutionallinkages horizontally with other communities facingsimilar problems, and vertically with government officials,members of parliament or other decision-makers who canbe held accountable for improving safety and protection,or who can influence policies that avoid creating new risksand mitigate the impact of existing ones. To maximiseeffectiveness, it is important that aid agencies recognisethe inter-regional and even international dimensions ofthe issues which they intend to address locally. If they donot do so, they will fail to find durable solutions to theissues underlying local disaster and conflict vulnerability.Reducing risks stemming from the interplay of disastersand conflict requires above all a long-term commitmentboth from people at the grassroots and from supportingagencies.

Annelies Heijmans is a doctoral candidate and consultant,Wageningen University (Disaster Studies), the Netherlands.Her email address is: [email protected]. Ifeanyi

Okechukwu is Program Manager Conflict Prevention,WANEP, Nigeria ([email protected]);Annemarie Schuller tot Peursum is Representative forOxfam-Novib in Burundi (Annemarie.Schullertot [email protected]); Regine Skarubowiz is Program OfficerHumanitarian Emergency Affairs, World Vision, Sudan([email protected]).

disaster and conflict outcomes

are inter-related

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Humanitarian Practice Network

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HPN’s aim is to improve the performance of humanitarian action by contributing to individualand institutional learning.

HPN’s activities include:

• A series of specialist publications: Humanitarian Exchange magazine, Network Papersand Good Practice Reviews.

• A resource website at www.odihpn.org.• Occasional seminars and workshops bringing together practitioners, policymakers

and analysts.

HPN’s members and audience comprise individuals and organisations engaged in humanitarianaction. They are in 80 countries worldwide, working in northern and southern NGOs, the UN andother multilateral agencies, governments and donors, academic institutions and consultancies.HPN’s publications are written by a similarly wide range of contributors.

HPN’s institutional location is the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at the Overseas DevelopmentInstitute (ODI), an independent think tank on humanitarian and development policy. HPN’spublications are researched and written by a wide range of individuals and organisations, andare published by HPN in order to encourage and facilitate knowledge-sharing within the sector.The views and opinions expressed in HPN’s publications do not necessarily state or reflect those of

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