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Commissioned and published by the Humanitarian Practice Network
at ODI
Number 44December 2003
Network Paper
About HPNThe Humanitarian Practice Network at theOverseas
Development Institute is an independ-ent forum where field workers,
managers andpolicymakers in the humanitarian sector
shareinformation, analysis and experience. The views and opinions
expressed in HPN’s publications do not necessarily state or
reflectthose of the Humanitarian Policy Group or theOverseas
Development Institute.
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Humanitarian Policy Group
SSiimmoonn NNaarrbbeetthh aanndd CCaalluumm MMccLLeeaann
Livelihoods and protection Displacement and vulnerable
communities in Kismaayo, southern Somalia
In brief
• This paper is one of the first attempts to put livelihoods and
protection into practice as a thoroughly integrated framework. Many
of the problems facing internally-displaced people (IDPs) are
related to the protective environment. In such circumstances,
assistance must be designed in such a way that it will promote the
protection of vulnerable groups without adding to their existing
burden.
• This paper is based on the findings of field research on
livelihoods, protection and IDPs conducted inKismaayo and the Lower
Juba Valley inMay 2003, under the auspices of OCHA-Somalia. The
research aimed toobtain a clear understanding of the situation of
IDPs and other vulnerablecommunities in Kismaayo, and of
theoperating environment; and to developan operational plan to
better protect and assist the internally displaced and other
vulnerable groups.
• This paper begins with a brief description of the livelihoods
and protection framework that informed theresearch, and the
methodology theresearch employed. It then provides a briefoverview
of the findings and describes theconcept of a phased operational
plan.
NP 44 crc cover 12/1/03 4:42 PM Page 3
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Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN)Overseas Development
Institute111 Westminster Bridge RoadLondon, SE1 7JDUnited
Kingdom
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Layout and production: Publish-on-Demand LtdPrinted and bound in
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ISBN: 0 85003 699 2Price per copy: £4.00 (excluding postage and
packing).© Overseas Development Institute, London, 2004.
Photocopies of all or part of this publication may be made
providing that the source is acknowledged. Requestsfor the
commercial reproduction of HPN material should be directed to the
ODI as copyright holders. The NetworkCoordinator would appreciate
receiving details of the use of any of this material in training,
research or pro-gramme design, implementation or evaluation.
About the authors
Simon Narbeth is Senior Humanitarian Affairs Officer for UN-OCHA
Somalia. He has worked with WFP Somalia,as a consultant for UN-OCHA
Somalia, and as a research-extension officer for the University of
California.
Calum McLean is Chief of UN-OCHA Somalia. He has worked
extensively in the Horn of Africa over the last 18years, mainly
with the international NGO community.
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i
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
Chapter 2 The analytical framework: livelihoods and protection
3
What is a livelihoods approach? 3
What is humanitarian protection? 4
Livelihoods and protection: bringing the two together 5
Chapter 3 Methodology 7
How to ‘do’ livelihoods and protection research 7
The fieldwork 7
Who is an IDP? 9
Participation and the research environment 10
Further issues and constraints 10
Chapter 4 Livelihoods and protection: study findings 11
Population movement and displacement in Somalia 11
Population movements into the Lower Juba and Kismaayo: a
multi-clan topography 11
The Kismaayo complex 12
Conditions for IDPs 13
The protection environment 13
The implications for aid 14
Chapter 5 An operational plan of action 17
Chapter 6 Conclusions 21
Appendix 1 Camp committee/focus group questions 23
Appendix 2 Household questionnaire 25
List of boxes
Box 1: Defining livelihoods 3
Box 2: Defining protection 4
Box 3: The language of displacement 11
Box 4: Minority status and vulnerability 12
Contents
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ii
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Population displacement is a feature of many conflicts.People
may flee violence or human rights abuse, or theymay become
displaced because the minimal requirementsfor life are unmet – for
instance, during drought or flood, oreconomic upheaval. The
displaced often face specialdifficulties not shared by other groups
touched by conflictor disaster. The displaced are often
disadvantaged in termsof their access to public facilities,
compared to a host orindigenous community. Their location may
influence theiraccess to humanitarian assistance, and their ability
tosurvive and regain their economic security.1 Thehumanitarian
challenge is to deliver assistance andprotection in what are often
unfavourable environments,especially when the authorities are
unable or unwilling toact.
Under hostile and predatory conditions, many of theproblems
facing internally-displaced people (IDPs) andother vulnerable
groups are related to the protectiveenvironment, and the
potentially exploitative relationsbetween them and local authority
structures and hostcommunities. A major dilemma in these situations
is toensure that humanitarian assistance – resources such asfood
aid, as well as activities such as healthcare orschooling – is
accessible to the most vulnerable, and hasthe greatest beneficial
impact. Assistance must bedesigned in such a way that it will
promote the protectionof vulnerable groups without adding to their
existingburden.
Although livelihoods and protection have been broughttogether
elsewhere, at least in theory,2 this paperrepresents the first
attempt to put livelihoods andprotection, as a thoroughly
integrated framework, intopractice in Somalia, and to our knowledge
anywhere.Conditions within the UN aid community are
currentlyconducive for an approach of this nature. Respect forhuman
rights and protection constituted one of the fourmain principles of
the UN Somalia Country Team for 2003(the others were HIV/AIDS,
education and the provision ofbasic services). Furthermore, the
2003 ConsolidatedAppeal stated the importance of ‘assisting in
theintegration and protection of internally displacedpopulations,
minorities, refugees and returnees and othervulnerable groups by
enhancing protection efforts aimedat: building of local and
national protection capacity;participation in governance; increased
humanitarianaccess; awareness raising among populations and
localauthorities; and the development and promotion ofdurable
solutions’.3
In June 2002, the UN Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian
Affairs (OCHA)-Somalia convened aworkshop in Hargeisa, Somaliland,
to raise the profile ofvulnerable populations in Somalia, and to
develop a
strategic framework for UN agencies and the
internationalcommunity to engage with them. The workshop
wasattended by Somali nationals representing all of thecountry’s
regions, as well as representatives from UNagencies, international
NGOs and donors. The resultantframework promotes a cross-cutting
livelihoods approach,rather than the more traditional sectoral
approach(education, food security and rural development,governance,
health and water and sanitation andinfrastructure) used by the UN
and other actors within theSomalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB),
the entityestablished to bring together donors, UN agencies andNGOs
engaged in aid work in Somalia.
The June workshop once again highlighted the
particulardifficulties faced by IDPs and minorities in Somalia. It
wasnoted that, while vulnerable communities face similarchallenges
across the country, IDPs in southern Somaliaare particularly
vulnerable in terms of their livelihoodsecurity and access to basic
services due to the generallypoor protective environment. While
Somali refugees inother countries benefit from return and
resettlementprogrammes, little has been done for people
displacedwithin Somalia beyond meeting short-term needs.
An estimated 320,000–350,000 IDPs are distributedthroughout
Somalia.4 The largest concentrations are inMogadishu and Kismaayo,
with an estimated 150,000and 15,000 respectively. While Mogadishu
is consideredtoo insecure to allow any meaningful work, Kismaayowas
‘reopened’ to international personnel of the UN bythe Security
Coordinator for Somalia (UNSECOORD) inMarch 2002 after the Juba
Valley Alliance (JVA), a clan-based factional alliance, had
established a reasonabledegree of security in the town. It was
therefore thoughtfeasible by the Somalia aid community to
startnegotiating access to IDPs and other vulnerable groupsin the
city, and to start planning interventions. In January2003, the UN
Resident Humanitarian Coordinator andthe head of OCHA-Somalia met
JVA leaders in Eldoret,Kenya. A month later, the Resident
HumanitarianCoordinator, accompanied by representatives from theUN
Children’s Fund, the World Food Programme, the UNDevelopment
Programme and OCHA, held meetings inKismaayo with the JVA
authorities, elders and religiousleaders and civil society groups
(local NGOs, women’sand youth groups). This, and renewed interest
by anumber of agencies in Lower Juba, has provided anopportunity to
address some of the concerns raisedduring the June 2002
workshop.
This paper is based on the findings of field research
onlivelihoods, protection and IDPs in Kismaayo and the LowerJuba
Valley, conducted in May 2003 under the auspices ofOCHA-Somalia.
The research had three main aims:
1
Chapter 1
Introduction
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livelihoods and protection: displacement and vulnerable
communities in Kismaayo, southern Somalia
2
• to obtain a clear understanding of the situation of IDPsand
other vulnerable communities in Kismaayo, andthe issues that they
faced;
• to obtain a clear understanding of the operatingenvironment in
Kismaayo and the areas from which thedisplaced originated; and
• to develop an operational plan to better protect andassist the
internally displaced and other vulnerablegroups. Crucially, this
plan was elaborated within alivelihoods and protection framework.
Ideas for puttingthe framework into practice were initially
developed bythe research team, but this work also draws uponplenary
discussions during a workshop in Nairobi on 11June 2003 to
disseminate and discuss these findings,sponsored by
OCHA-Somalia.
The sensitive nature of the information contained in thisreport
means that the names of informants and nationalstaff participating
in the fieldwork have been withheld.
The paper begins with a brief description of the livelihoodsand
protection framework that informed the research(Chapter 2), and the
methodology the research employed(Chapter 3). Chapter 4 provides a
brief overview offindings. Although this report is critical of the
current JVAadministration, many of the same issues applied
underprevious occupations. Chapter 5 describes the concept ofa
phased operational plan. Lastly, conclusions are drawn inChapter
6.
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3
What is a livelihoods approach?
Several developmental and humanitarian agencies anddonors are
exploring the livelihoods concept and what itmay mean for their
policies and practice. These include theWorld Bank, the UK’s
Department for InternationalDevelopment, UNDP, the Food and
AgricultureOrganisation and WFP, as well as NGOs such as Oxfam,Save
the Children (UK) and CARE.5
The key element in a livelihoods approach is its
over-ridingemphasis on how people actually live.6 The principles
thatunderlie the approach are:
• it puts people at the centre of analysis and action; • it is
holistic, recognising that there is a multiplicity of
actors, influences, livelihood strategies and outcomes;• it
recognises that livelihoods and the factors that
influence them are dynamic, which means that it isinherently
flexible;
• it is multi-level, in that it tries to bridge the gapbetween
micro and macro factors and incorporate anumber of different
activities; and
• it is cross-sectoral in its approach to programmingthese
activities.
Livelihoods approaches draw attention to the way peoplelive, why
they live that way, and why and how this way oflife changes. The
questions it asks indicate likely entrypoints for interventions –
both short- and long-term – andtheir likely impact on people’s
lives.
To date, livelihoods approaches have been predominantlyused in
academic analysis and NGO practice under theguise of rural
development in peaceful settings. Theiradaptation for use in
situations of chronic political
instability, where violence and poverty have becomeentrenched
and where people’s livelihoods are persistentlyor purposefully
threatened or undermined, is moreproblematic.8 In terms of adapting
the framework to makeit more appropriate for these situations, the
emphasis hasbeen on the concept of vulnerability, components
ofconflict and power relations and their temporaldimensions. The
contextual nature of vulnerability is nowcentral to the livelihood
model. This involves integrating apolitical economy approach into
the livelihoodsframework, looking at vulnerability both as a factor
ofmaterial assets, and in terms of powerlessness, and howthis
changes over time.9 It also requires an understandingof these
processes at the micro level, from the household(however defined),
through to the macro-level processesthat shape vulnerability and
livelihood strategies.
This study includes notions of humanitarian protection inthe
analysis (see below) precisely as a way of describingthis aspect of
vulnerability. It is used also as a means ofidentifying the human
rights claims of claim-holders andthe obligations of duty-bearers,
as well as the immediate,underlying and structural causes of
exploitative or unequalrelations and the non-realisation of rights.
This shouldthen indicate potential solutions to address this
non-realisation of rights, solutions which go hand in hand
withinterventions designed to support material needs.
Moving beyond saving lives to adopting a livelihoods-oriented
approach amid chronic conflict is clearly fraughtwith difficulties
across all phases of activity, frominformation gathering to the
provision of assistance.10
Investigations of livelihoods are investigations into
theworkings of human society, and human societies arecomplex – so
complex and diverse that they easily breakout of any attempts to
confine them within neatly-drawnframeworks, categories and
definitions. They are alsodynamic, in a state of constant change.
The approach is sobroad that problems may arise in identifying the
mostimportant issues. Add to this the difficulties of working
inconflict environments like southern Somalia, and it is clearthat
putting this framework into practice is notstraightforward.
There is also the problem of overcoming the
‘relief-to-development’ mentality (and the so-called
‘livelihoods’gap) that bedevils assistance in Somalia and
elsewhere.11
In Somalia this led to a somewhat artificial division of
thecountry into three zones, in theory reflecting levels
of‘political maturity’ and donor budget lines: crisis (in thesouth
of the country), transition (the middle) andrecovery (the north,
basically ‘Somaliland’ and‘Puntland’). Although this has been to a
degree replacedby a distinction between the stable northern and
theconflict-prone southern regions, the opportunities in the
Chapter 2
The analytical framework: livelihoods and protection
A widely-accepted definition of livelihoods was given byRobert
Chambers and Gordon Conway in 1991:
a livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets
(stores,resources, claims and access) and activities requiredfor a
means of living: a livelihood is sustainable whichcan cope with and
recover from stress and shocks,maintain or enhance its capabilities
and assets, andprovide sustainable livelihood opportunities for
thenext generation; and which contributes net benefits toother
livelihoods at the local and global levels and inthe long and short
term.7
Box 1
Defining livelihoods
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livelihoods and protection: displacement and vulnerable
communities in Kismaayo, southern Somalia
south for moving beyond relief-only activities, tosupporting
livelihoods not just saving lives, and toaddress the dynamics of
vulnerability beyond meetingimmediate material needs, have remained
largelyunexplored.
There is here the potential for bringing together therelatively
separate realms of humanitarian and developmentdiscourses, but in a
more dynamic manner than reiteratingvague platitudes about
disasters being merely an indicationof underdevelopment.12 An
understanding of howhouseholds combine survival and risk-mitigation
strategiescan reveal the fallacies and limitations of
(non-)linkagesbetween humanitarian assistance and
developmentcooperation, and in the case of situations of chronic
politicalinstability, the simplistic and now-contentious
andinappropriate ‘relief to development continuum’ model thatarose
in the mid-1990s.
Livelihoods approaches are complex and difficult toimplement.
But in situations of chronic political instabilityand recurring
crises such as Somalia, can we afford not totake such a
comprehensive approach? In place of short-term and frequently ad
hoc humanitarian relief, livelihoodapproaches provide a
contextualisation of need that isoften lacking in relief needs
assessments.
What is humanitarian protection?
There is increasing recognition that protection, or rather
itslack, lies at the heart of conflict-induced humanitariancrises.
This has led to a renewed interest in internationalhumanitarian,
human rights and refugee law.13 The UN hasadopted several
resolutions on the protection of civiliansin armed conflict, and on
the protection of children andwomen. UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan has introducedthe notion of the ‘Right to Protection’, and
the SecurityCouncil has debated the scope of the
internationalcommunity’s obligation to protect civilians in the
face ofhuman rights violations.14 The ICRC – the onlyhumanitarian
organisation formally mandated by theGeneva Conventions to
intervene on behalf of civilians orsoldiers hors de combat in armed
conflict – engages in avariety of protective actions. The
Inter-Agency StandingCommittee (IASC) has also adopted guidelines
and policydocuments on the protection responsibilities
ofinternational humanitarian agencies.15
One such operational instrument, the UN Guiding Principleson
Internal Displacement, combines existing internationalhuman rights
and humanitarian law to provide guidance forthe assistance and
protection of IDPs.16 Without being aconcrete action plan for
humanitarian organisations in thefield, the Guiding Principles have
at least become a usefulframework for the implementation of
humanitarianprogrammes, as well as strengthening and
complementingthe protection of displaced people. The Principles
cover allphases of the IDP problem, including how to
preventdisplacement, how to provide protection and assistanceonce
people have been displaced, how to achieve their safe
return with dignity, and alternative resettlement
andreintegration.
The primary goals of humanitarian work are to protect lifeand
health, prevent and relieve suffering, and ensure thathuman beings
are treated with dignity. The right to receivehumanitarian
assistance – and the right to offer it – arefundamental principles
underpinned by international law.18
In situations of chronic political instability,
humanitarianneeds are inextricably related to processes of
violence. Inthese instances, violence is more than usually
associatedwith the failure of national or other public actors
includingthe international community to regulate violations
offundamental human rights. But protection has to be muchmore than
an arid legalistic concept founded ininternational humanitarian law
and human rightsinstruments, and divorced from the reality of
humanitarianpractice.19 Humanitarian protection in practice
mustaddress violations at different levels.
Protection is also closely associated with the fundamentalidea
of responsibility and the associated concept ofaccountability.20
This takes two forms. The protection ofvulnerable communities is,
first and foremost, theresponsibility of the state and national
authorities. Insituations of internal conflict, this same
obligation adheresto non-state actors such as insurgent or armed
groups.There is increasing recognition that international and
non-governmental agencies bear a responsibility to identifyand
deliver appropriate assistance to enable betteroutcomes for the
recipients of aid, and further theirprotection.21 This means not
adding to the burden of thedisplaced and exacerbating tensions or
violence in analready-contested environment. It also
meansendeavouring to adhere to the principles and standards
ofhumanitarian action, such as impartiality and neutrality.22
The Guiding Principles do not seek to create a
privilegedcategory of person: they are based rather on
theassumption that the displaced have the same rights
andobligations as anyone else.
4
One definition of protection (and the one used here),elaborated
in an ICRC-sponsored workshop, is from theIASC. Protection
activities are defined as:
Any activity – consistent with the above mentionedpurpose –
aimed at creating an environmentconducive to the respect for human
beings,preventing and/or alleviating the immediate effects ofa
specific pattern of abuse, and restoring dignifiedconditions of
life through reparation, restitution andrehabilitation.17
Box 2
Defining protection
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chapter 2 The analytical framework
5
Protection and the provision of assistance have bothinternal and
external aspects. For external actors, thismeans developing an
understanding of governance (in itswidest sense) in any given
displacement context: what arethe mechanisms of power and the
structures within andbetween different stakeholders and stakeholder
groups?Identifying who is responsible for protection at all levels
isthe first step in making them accountable, both tovulnerable
groups and to the international community. Byimplication, in order
to achieve protection in practice ashift in power relations is
required.
Livelihoods and protection: bringing the two together
In many ways, livelihoods and protection can beconsidered two
sides of the same coin. In this approach,humanitarian action and
humanitarian protection informedby livelihoods analysis are not
seen as separate activities,but as a complementary and synergistic
approach, whichintegrates the ‘software’ of international
humanitarian lawand human rights advocacy with the ‘hardware’ of
materialresource provision.23 Ideally, this would mean reducing
(orpreferably eliminating) the negative impacts of aid.
Fine-grained analysis through the acquisition of knowledge
andinformation should lead to fine-grained or more
sensitiveprogramming and resource provision.
This requires an understanding of the nature of conflictand the
place of resources – including aid – within it.24
Sensitivity to the context and contestability of aid isimportant
if the international community is to reducecriticisms that aid
fuels conflict.25 Without this holistic andcontextual
understanding, the provision of resources mayupset the already
fragile (or exploitative) social balance, ormake things worse than
they already are, including, atworst, leading to an increase in
violence and ultimatelyadding to the humanitarian and protection
burden of thosethat we set out to assist.
In order to achieve humanitarian protection, it is necessaryto
analyse the connections between those in authority andspecific
target groups, so as to explore why a group hasbeen deprived of its
rights. The livelihoods approachfocuses more on the constraints
that prevent people from
realising their rights as a prerequisite for promotingpeople’s
livelihoods. Although these rights are notspecifically outlined in
livelihoods approaches, they are anintrinsic component of them.
Livelihoods approaches help direct protection activities
inpractice. Adding protection to livelihoods analysis helpsfocus
(or direct) the investigative process of fieldwork.Every IDP
situation is different. Livelihood approachesallow us to
contextualise these differences and identify thesocial, political
and economic structures among IDPs, thehost community and those in
authority. The livelihood andprotection framework helps both to
meet basic needs, andto address more underlying protection-related
problems.
This study suggests that the added value of a livelihoodand
protection framework is six-fold:
1. The identification of entry points over the short andlonger
term.
2. The more efficient use of resources.3. An increased positive
impact on beneficiaries.4. The reduced risk of doing harm through
the provision
of aid.5. The opportunity to build a more conducive environ-
ment for human rights.6. The increased opportunity for actually
doing good.
What can be achieved in practice depends very much uponthe
development of protection responses. After all,protection in theory
(or policy) is quite different fromprotection in practice. This in
turn depends upon thewillingness of people and agencies to get
involved in thefield. It depends upon the context of conflict and
theenabling environment within which protection activitiesare
undertaken. Even though problems may be acute andimmediate, they
may take months or years to address.
The combination of humanitarian protection and anadapted
livelihoods framework, which includes a politicaleconomy component,
thus provides the opportunity forinterventions that meet more than
basic needs: it altersand shapes the functions of aid, and the
relationshipsbetween humanitarian organisations and those who
areresponsible and accountable for protection.
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6
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Protection in theory is one thing; operationalisingprotection
and incorporating protection into humanitarianresponse is quite
another, especially when authorities areunwilling or unable to live
up to their responsibilities. In acontested environment where it is
believed that protectionissues are not foremost in the minds of the
authorities,research in this area is highly problematic. Similarly,
wherethe provision of humanitarian assistance is perceived byone or
more sides to the conflict to be politicallymotivated, or when the
resources themselves arecontested, problems may arise. These
concerns dictatedthe research methodology employed here, and
thesubsequent dissemination of information, where nationalstaff
involved in the research process and key informantsmay face threats
to their personal safety.
How to ‘do’ livelihoods and protectionresearch
In the literature, there is little consensus about how to
‘do’livelihoods research in situations of chronic conflict
andpolitical instability.26 While livelihoods models provide
aconceptual background, there is no guidance on thespecific
questions that need investigating; genderanalysis, for example, is
not an explicit component of mostlivelihoods models. Gaps are left
to the researcher orresearch team to fill.
In Kismaayo, the approach used was governed bypragmatic issues
of access, as well as questions aroundthe types of data that could
be collected, and from whom.One of the inherent contradictions of
livelihoodapproaches is that, to be able to ask the right
questions,researchers need to have prior knowledge of the issues
tobe investigated. Paradoxically, this may mean knowing theanswers
whilst endeavouring to abandon anypreconceptions before entering
the ‘field’. As in allresearch, it is important that the methods
used to obtaininformation and data are clearly explained in order
tovalidate findings. This study is no exception. While it
wasthought that predominantly qualitative methods were thebest way
to engage with the complexity of issue-basedlivelihoods research,
the techniques employed weredictated by the need for methodological
flexibility toovercome these and other constraints.
While questions remain over the acceptability (or evenvalidity)
of qualitative issue-based research (such as thedifficulty of
replication), there is a clear need to movebeyond ‘fieldwork by
chatting’, or a set of randomly-executed interviews. Rather, it
demands a rigorouslythought out and structured framework for the
explorationof displacement and the operating environment, whichgets
around potential ‘gatekeepers’ (those with interests
in distorting information), and illuminates the hiddenvoices of
the vulnerable or marginalised. The triangulationof information is
necessary in these settings.
The use of secondary as well as primary informationsources is
particularly important in contestedenvironments where information
is sensitive (for example,on illegal activities), the protection
environment is poor orthere is clear evidence of bias. A literature
review wasundertaken of several key themes and regions:
Kismaayo,the Lower Juba, IDPs (the history of UN and NGOengagement,
the successes and failures in Somalia andelsewhere), and on the
theory and application oflivelihoods, and the theory and
application of protectionand humanitarian assistance. In Nairobi,
interviews wereconducted with representatives from
organisationsengaged in the Lower Juba, or with an interest in
re-engaging; with individuals with an interest in
livelihoodapproaches; and those with knowledge of the Lower Jubain
general and Kismaayo specifically. This first phaseprovided the
background information from which the semi-structured
questionnaires were derived.
Theoretical and practical objectives were balanced againstother
constraints such as time, the availability of staff(especially
suitably qualified female national staff ),personal safety and
health, and restrictions in movementand access to particular
locations and potentialinterviewees.
The fieldwork
Fieldwork, sponsored by OCHA-Somalia, was conductedfrom 11 to 26
May 2003, with the full consent of the JVAleadership. A team of six
national staff (four from OCHA-Somalia and two from the Food
Security Assessment Unit(FSAU), all male) was brought together for
this phase. Itwas hoped to include a specific component on the
linksbetween gender and protection (with a national femalestaff
member from UNICEF Somalia and one from MuslimAid UK) within the
wider study, but this was cancelled dueto increasing insecurity in
Kismaayo during the visit.
After an initial team-building exercise, which included
abriefing on the objectives and approach of the study and
asuperficial ‘ground-truthing’ to ensure that the Englishused in
the field questionnaires had a correspondingmeaning in Somali, an
initial broad overview andsubsequent breakdown of the IDP camps by
relative sizeand clan composition was completed. Interviews were
thenundertaken in what were considered representative campsby teams
of two enumerators. Semi-structured focus groupdiscussions were
held with IDP camp committees,whenever possible including women.
After mapping the
7
Chapter 3
Methodology
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livelihoods and protection: displacement and vulnerable
communities in Kismaayo, southern Somalia
8
camp’s social and economic structures, further interviewswere
conducted with representative households. This two-tier approach
was used in an effort to negate or bypass theinfluence of potential
aid ‘gatekeepers’. (For a furtherdiscussion of the role of these
gatekeepers see thefollowing chapter, and for the questionnaires
see theappendices.) For obvious reasons, interviews in all
campswould have been preferable, but time and the securitysituation
did not permit this. A number of camps were notvisited in the
Galjeecel clan area of Kismaayo due tofighting between rival
militia groups; in all, in-depth focusgroup and household
interviews were conducted in 11camps. Fifteen household interviews
were completed.Debriefings were held at the end of each day to
discuss thefindings and problems, to adjust the approach if
necessary,and to reach a common analysis of displacement,
theprotective environment, and potential activities.
In all previous studies of IDP camps, no mention has beenmade of
the timing of interviews. This study suggests thatthis is a major
weakness, with important implications forthe demographic profile of
interviewees, the perceived andobserved demographic make-up of
camps and theprovision of humanitarian assistance. Income
generationtakes precedence over answering questions – thelikelihood
is that those working or seeking employmentwill be out of the camps
during working hours. There arealso opportunity costs involved in
participating ininterview sessions. To minimise disturbance and
todetermine who would be available for interview sessions,the roles
and daily work burden of men, women andchildren were established,
and the schedules for campcommittee and household interviews were
arranged toaccommodate these activities and routines. This
oftenmeant conducting interviews early in the morning or late inthe
evening, before or after work. This limited the numberof interviews
that could be conducted during this two-week period.
Although the focus of this study was Kismaayo, it was feltthat
the IDP issue could not be fully understood without atleast some
attempt to conduct research in other settings ofdisplacement. Two
villages from the east and west bank ofthe Juba river near Jamaame
were chosen because theywere accessible, and judged by the team
members to berepresentative of the Juba Valley more widely.
One of the main differences between this work andprevious
studies or assessments is the way that a ‘camp’was defined. This
study used a definition that includedseveral households of
displaced persons in a formergovernment or publicly-owned building,
such as a bank, aswell as much more immediately recognisable
structures,such as walled camps like Dhumaase, with over
350households. Perhaps understandably, and given thedynamic nature
of displacement in the Lower Juba, thetotal number of camps
identified in this study (23) is atodds with previous assessments,
where even rudimentarydefinitions are not supplied: 26 (ICRC) and
17(UNCU/OCHA).
A further weakness of much livelihoods research is aninability
to combine micro- with macro-level analysis of thewider dynamics of
conflict (including its political economy)and, for IDP research in
particular, the multiple dimensionsof displacement and the wider
processes of vulnerability ingeneral. Displacement should be
analysed in a widercontext to consider what has led to it, what its
conditionsare, and how or why this is likely to change.
Displacementis a symptom of profound problems, but it may also be
anoutcome of positive choice. Generalised discussions
aboutdisplacement do not illuminate the micro-level processesof
livelihood patterns. Ultimately, therefore, this researchis
grounded in the experiences and perspectives of thepeople affected
by displacement: it is a ‘view from thedoorstep’, an explicit
recognition of the complexity anddiversity of vulnerable people
themselves.
Similarly, most programmes for IDPs are based on theassumption
that they always want to go home (in Somalia apoorly understood
notion in itself ). Although this mayindeed be the case, it cannot
be taken for granted. Nor canit be assumed that IDPs are
disconnected from the worldoutside. The idea that the IDP camp (or
for that matterrefugee camp) is somehow a ‘sealed container’
plagues theliterature, but we should not assume automatically that
tiesto ‘home’ (wherever it may be and in whatever form theymay
take) have been broken. Moreover, displacement maynot necessarily
be a temporary interruption to normal life –it may also be an
opportunity for long-lasting change. Thisprompted several questions
put to the displaced: where ishome, why did you choose Kismaayo,
why this particularcamp, why have you moved, why don’t you return,
can youreturn, if you return what are the potential problems
thatyou face, what connections do you have with home?
The answers to these questions have repercussions for theways in
which assistance is conceived and implemented:two extremes would
suggest that the displaced may beassisted at the site of refuge
with the knowledge that thisis where they will permanently settle;
or there is arecognition that they are in limbo, until such time
asconditions are ripe for return so that their immediate basicneeds
are met and little else. An approach somewhere inthe middle would
meet basic needs, but would also makean investment in future return
by raising the levels of the‘mobile’ livelihood assets of human
capital (education andskills training, for example). Answers to
these questionswould also acknowledge the role of aid resources,
byencouraging further displacement because of theattractive force
of aid, encouraging return by undertakingresource activities in
‘home’ areas, or even by encouragingpermanent settlement.
These levels of analysis are brought together in Figure 1.
Byusing a series of porous circles, this figure endeavours
toportray the dynamic nature of displacement and break awayfrom the
notion of the IDP camp as sealed container. Startingfrom the centre
of the large circle, the diagram describes therelationship between
individuals (small solid circles) withina household, between
households within a camp, and then
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9
between camps within Kismaayo. It also shows the
possibleconnection to home areas and to the diaspora (for
examplethrough remittances), and the relationship between IDPsand
the host community, the authority (in this case the JVA)and the aid
community. These relationships are, in turn,shaped by the security,
political and business environment,in Kismaayo and beyond.
Who is an IDP?
Despite the widespread promotion of rights and protectionfor
IDPs, the definition of the term ‘IDP’ itself, at least inpractice,
is fuzzy. This lack of clarity poses problems forresearch, analysis
and subsequent action, as previousstudies in Somalia have
indicated.27 Internally-displacedpeople are, according to the
Guiding Principles:
persons or groups of persons who have been forced orobliged to
flee or to leave their homes or places ofhabitual residence, in
particular as a result of or in orderto avoid the effects of armed
conflict, situations ofgeneralized violence, violations of human
rights ornatural or human-made disasters, and who have notcrossed
an internationally recognized State border.
How useful for this study is this definition? One of thecentral
problems is that the debate on internaldisplacement is dominated by
the actors who ‘invented’the IDP category in the first place.
Endeavouring to render
the complexity and disorder of a disaster into a coherentsystem
and an enabling environment, internationalbureaucracies define
institutional tasks and create spacesof action. This creates and
gives form to a particularfunctional interpretation of social and
humanitarian reality.Ultimately, this will have implications for
who is includedand excluded from this process. Operational clarity
andeffectiveness depends upon the ability to identify, andthen
select and deliver resources to, those identified to bemost in need
on the basis of how they fit somepredetermined criteria, in this
case ‘IDP’. These labelsbecome defining terms for aid agencies,
creating divisionsof labour as actions become compartmentalised,
with theirown set of defining terms.
It is clear that the IDP label as it is applied in Somalia
lackscohesion and is plagued with difficulties, not least becauseof
the complex and dynamic patterns of populationmovement within the
country (see Chapter 4). In southernSomalia in particular, these
labels become part of thecommon vocabulary of the disaster-affected
in a bid to gainaccess to resources. It may be obvious, but in
reality IDPsdo not carry signifying markers of identification. They
areoften, but not always, indistinguishable from other groups,such
as the urban poor. In Kismaayo, the urban poor ofteninhabit the
same areas as those considered better off.What the homogenising
label of IDP obscures may be moreimportant than what is brought
into focus. Given thedifficulties in identifying and then locating
urban poor and
chapter 3 Methodology
Figure 1 The Kismaayo IDP complex
Host
Security
Aid
BusinessDiaspora
‘Home’
?JVA Political
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livelihoods and protection: displacement and vulnerable
communities in Kismaayo, southern Somalia
other vulnerable groups, this study, by necessity and likethose
before it, focused on so-called ‘camps’ and thoseliving in
them.
While the label IDP serves its purpose in drawing attentionto
the plight of the displaced, and in the political sense
ofmobilising resources on their behalf, its utilitarian value asa
prescriptive operational label for the assessment andmonitoring of
needs and the provision of resources isdubious. Obviously, clear
distinctions need to be drawnbetween movement and the forced or
stress migrationevident in the outpouring of people from areas of
conflict ordrought as described in the Guiding Principles. While
intheory the people-centred focus of livelihoods approachesenables
this, in practice the practicalities and trade-offs ofthis research
meant that the camps became the centralfocus. Therefore, those
outside of the camps were generallyexcluded from the
information-gathering exercise.
What remains, especially in terms of protection, is
adetermination of the degree of access to justice,employment,
health and education facilities, clean water andsystems of
governance of the people in the camps. Thedisplaced are, by the
very fact that they no longer live in theirhome, and by inference
clan, areas, especially vulnerable interms of protection.
Vulnerability and the degree ofintegration into the host community
then become thedefining terms of study. This, in turn, widens the
information-gathering exercise, and starts to bridge the potential
dividebetween host and displaced communities.
Participation and the research environment
Although livelihoods approaches are consideredparticipatory, the
type and level of overall participation inthis study was determined
by the context in which theresearch took place. This included not
favouring one groupover another, or one clan over another. One
extremeexample of this methodological inclusiveness was evidentin
interviews held with representatives from the twohuman rights
organisations present in Kismaayo: onefavouring the Marexaan-led
JVA alliance and the secondthe former Harti-led occupation of
General Mohamed SaidHersi ‘Morgan’. But it meant, at times,
excluding those whowould hinder information flows; so that elders
of ‘minority’clans could talk freely, meetings were held in
neutralvenues and behind closed doors. Efforts were made toinclude
IDPs as much as possible, but businessmen,religious leaders, staff
from local NGOs and other lessprominent figures were also
heard.
Interviews with multiple actors and between multiple
sitesallowed for a crosscheck or triangulation of findings,although
this did not necessarily clarify who was being
truthful or not. It did, however, help to make sense of
thecontradictions and ambiguities both within and betweenindividual
accounts. In this way, a more complete andsubtle picture of
displacement was pieced together thanwould have been possible with
answers taken solely fromthe displaced (especially in the presence
of aidgatekeepers). The likelihood that the prospect of aid
mayinflate answers is an unfortunate element that must beconsidered
in future studies.
Further issues and constraints
The use of the livelihoods and protection framework as
theanalytical approach met with several obstacles. Teammembers from
different backgrounds each faced learningchallenges. This was
particularly noticeable for the OCHAstaff when introduced to the
livelihoods framework. Allteam members found the rights-based
approaches toprotection novel.
Second, despite our best efforts, given the short periodof time
to build trust and break down barriers, it was feltthat certain
discussion themes – the numbers of IDPs, thedeplorable state of
sanitation, lack of education andhealth facilities, or population
estimates – were beingdeveloped at least partly for effect, and the
teammembers were being addressed as potential benefactors.In
addition, a constant theme was interview fatigue anddisappointed
expectations – after numerous studies ofIDP camps in Kismaayo over
the years with little concreteto show in terms of resources, there
is evidentdissatisfaction with agencies. Efforts must be made
tocoordinate information-gathering exercises to minimisethis.
Third, although efforts were made to conduct interviews
inmultiple sites, the lack of geographic spread throughoutthe Lower
Juba is a noticeable weakness of this study.Ideally, more time
would lead to greater coverage(including the Bajuni islands, which
appear to be ignoredin assessments).
The last problem is to do with language. Although it ispossible
to function at certain levels using only Af-Soomaali (or
Af-Maxaatiri), the official language duringcolonial and pre-war
administrations, Bantu client groupsspeak Af-Maay, Bajuni islanders
speak Swahili-basedKibajuni, and the Mushunguli of the Juba river
speakMushunguli. Effective and nuanced communicationrequires some
knowledge of the appropriatelanguage/dialect if any type of
socio-economic,monitoring or extension work is to be
successfullyundertaken. However, only one member of the teamspoke
Af-Maay.
10
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What emerges from this research is a picture of complexity(and
the difficulties of undertaking activities in Kismaayo).This is
perhaps not surprising given the researchframework. But this does
not mean that the picture is socomplex that nothing can be done. It
raises a number ofissues and potential entry points for further
action.
Population movement and displacement in Somalia
The history of migration and conquest in Somaliainfluences
everything, from dialects and language to thenature of ethnic or
clan identity, land tenure and ownershiprights, and the fluidity of
political and clan alliances.Population movement is a common and
often ‘normal’feature of Somali society, notably among pastoral
andagro-pastoral economies, where population displacementsare by no
means random or limitless. In its grazing,permanent cultivating and
trading centres, and above all inits wells and water points, every
clan and group possessesa series of points between which movement
rotates.Migration and household splitting do not necessarilyreflect
an exception to the normal patterns of society. Inagricultural and
agro-pastoral populations, householdmembers do not even necessarily
live togethercontinuously year-round: the numbers present at any
giventime depend largely upon the season, the nature of
theproductive assets available to the household, economicand
employment opportunities elsewhere (most likely tobe found in urban
centres), kinship ties and the strength ofsocial networks, and the
nature of the shock or stressexperienced.
At the height of the conflict in the early 1990s, over
onemillion Somalis are estimated to have fled to
neighbouringcountries in the region and outside of Africa.28
Peoplecontinued to leave southern Somalia in large numbers
until1995. Others chose to move to safer areas within
Somaliainhabited by their kin and extended families. Waves
ofdisplacement, and even multiple displacements, of
varyingmagnitude continue in some parts of southern Somaliadue to
localised conflict, droughts and floods. Rapidurbanisation (or
rural-to-urban drift in search of new orbetter livelihoods),
refugee return and reintegration, andthe continuing return of
people to their home areas due toa generally improving security
situation make the picturestill more dynamic and complex.
Population movements into the Lower Jubaand Kismaayo: a
multi-clan topography
In recent decades, like the rest of Somalia, settlementpatterns
in the Juba Valley and Transjuba have beenanything but static. The
Juba Valley in particular hasexperienced dramatic population
movements over the last
150 years. A significant theme has been the migration ofSomali
clans from the more arid central, north-eastern andOgadeni plains
southwards in search of better pasturageand water. In the 1970s and
1980s, large-scale state farmsand agro-industrial and refugee
resettlement projectsattracted settlers from other regions of
Somalia.29
More recently, there have been distinct waves of migrationto
Kismaayo (and to the camps), a consequence of conflictin the early
1990s, the El Niño floods in 1997, and conflictagain in 2002 and
2003. The main areas of origin havebeen the Juba Valley and Gedo
region to the north,Mogadishu and, further afield, Galgaduud region
to thewest, and Bay region to the north-east. The ‘pull’
ofpotential aid resources, social connections,
economicopportunities and the ‘West Bank’ effect (thelegitimisation
of occupation), all have drawn migrants tothe town. There is also
continuous movement betweenKismaayo and the Juba Valley to market
farm produce,seasonal migration for land preparation, and the
familialmigration of resource sharing.
This migration has fundamentally altered the ethniccomposition
of the area, affecting everything from access toagricultural land
and aid resources to the politics ofadministration. The issue of
guri (‘local’) versus gelti(‘outsider’) is a profoundly important
undercurrent in theregion’s politics and in the competition over
resources. Ithas also been problematic for the important issue of
landtenure and access to agricultural resources. Although landgrab
is not a new phenomenon during the past decade,Bantu communities on
the west bank of the river Juba inparticular (notably between
Kamsuuma and Kismaayo)have seen their land occupied by the Habr
Gedir andGaljeecel and, around Buale, by Absame clans.
Agriculturalimplements and water pumps have been looted,
watermanagement systems have fallen into disrepair, and where
11
Chapter 4
Livelihoods and protection: study findings
Several Somali words hint at the complexity and subtletyof
population movement, even in the absence of conflict:the term
kiinaan describes the voluntary movement ofpeople in search of
resources, from Bakool to relativesliving in Bay region; hayaan
describes a long journey;and qaxooti describes someone who has
travelled agreat distance and is destitute. Perhaps barakac
comesclosest to a Western understanding of IDP – it
describessituations where people are obliged to move after
havinglost all their possessions.
Box 3
The language of displacement
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livelihoods and protection: displacement and vulnerable
communities in Kismaayo, southern Somalia
land is no longer farmed it has reverted toscrub. Although some
patron–clientsharecropping arrangements exist on landunder
‘occupation’, the collapse ofplantation agriculture has
dramaticallyreduced income opportunities.
Alongside the dramatic decline in employ-ment opportunities due
to the collapse ofplantation agriculture, there has been
aconcomitant increase in economicmigration to the urban market
centre ofKismaayo. This has resulted in themovement of large
numbers of clan militiaand livestock:
1. Marexaan An estimated 4,000–5,000households have arrived from
twomain directions: Awudwaaq district ofGalgaduud region and Gedo
region.
2. Harti Since January 2003, an estimated 800–1,000families have
arrived from refugee camps in Kenya(including Dadaab), from
Mogadishu and from villagesof the eastern and coastal areas of
Kismaayo district. Afurther 500 former militia from Baidoa district
are alsothought to have arrived.
3. Absame From villages west of Jilib, from Buale andDobley and
from some areas of Afmadow and Hagar,100–200 households have
arrived. A further 200–300former militia have arrived in Kismaayo
seekingemployment.
4. Ormaale As a consequence of fighting in Buale, 20families
moved to Kismaayo.
Most observers agree that Kismaayo will be one of the lastplaces
in Somalia to experience peace. This is attributable,among other
things, to the large number of clans (between18 and 20), and
competition for its relatively rich naturalresources and the
strategic and economically important
seaport and airport. Although the rudimentary JVAadministration
in place in Kismaayo has provided order inthe town (though some
interviewees suggested that theJVA had at most 80% control of the
militia) this seems to bedevised primarily to regulate the benefits
of occupationand to prevent in-fighting within the dominant
Marexaanand Habr Gedir clan duopoly.
The Kismaayo complex
Ultimately, the stability of Kismaayo depends upon afragile mix
of political, militia and business actors thatshare a common
interest – generating and using incomefrom the ‘taxation’ of port
and airport activities. The controlof these resources is highly
politicised (clan-based) andhighly contested. The sums at stake are
relatively large: inApril 2003, for example, 23,000mt of sugar was
imported,generating estimated ‘tax revenue’ of $202,400;
364,90325kg sacks of charcoal were exported, generating a
‘taxrevenue’ of $183,000. The over-exploitation of
naturalresources, including offshore fisheries, is much inevidence,
and customary management mechanisms havebeen over-ridden in the
interests of profit. Many areas ofthe Juba Valley have been
stripped of acacia trees forcharcoal production, the largest of the
natural-resourceexport trades. Although this level of deforestation
andenvironmental degradation such as soil erosion is
notsustainable, wood biomass will remain the only availablesource
of fuel for most Somali households. The charcoaltrade is tied to
the survival strategies of some of the mosteconomically
marginalised households, as well as topowerful vested interests.
The trade providesopportunities for the urban and rural poor
(cutting andproducing charcoal, processing and re-bagging
inKismaayo, and portering and loading activities), as well asfor
groups who have an interest in maintaining the trade(transporters,
brokers, exporters, the JVA and the militia).
For all its problems, the urban centre of Kismaayo
remainsattractive for those seeking employment and income
12
Somalia is one of the few virtually ethnicallyhomogeneous
countries in Africa, if not the world.Nonetheless, it has its
cultural and ‘ethnic’ splits. Thesubtleties and implications of
socio-ethnic stratificationwithin Somali society have remained
largely ignored. Anumber of minority groups exist, such as the
Bantu (inthe Juba Valley divided into the Shanmbara and
theMushunguli), Benadiri, Midgaan, Bajuni, Eyle, Tumal,Yibir and
Galgaala, characterised not only by physicalappearance, but also by
the stigma of occupationalstatus and long-forgotten grievances of
‘ritual un-cleanliness’. The latter are often
indistinguishablephysically from the majority clans.
Box 4
Minority status and vulnerability
A charcoal store: wood biomass is often the only available
source of fuel
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chapter 4 Livelihoods and protection: study findings
13
opportunities. Men are largely dependent on low-paid
andshift-based work in the port (other activities include
marketportering, the production of lime, quarrying,
buildingconstruction, seasonal farming activities and
charcoalproduction), and women upon low-paid work as
domesticservants, selling water, collecting and selling
firewood,house-mudding and seasonal farming activities. Children
relyon shoe-shining, begging and the collection of discarded
qatleaves for resale. The sub-contracting of labour is
commonbetween stronger clans, such as the Marexaan, and
the‘minorities’, and there are frequent accounts of the non-payment
of wages. For Bajuni fishermen, gatekeepers mostlycontrol the
revenue from fishing.
Conditions for IDPs
The IDP camps of Kismaayo are crowded, and mostshelters are
rudimentary structures made of scavengedmaterials. They lack
adequate sanitary facilities, and theincidence of communicable
diseases appears to be high,although conditions vary between camps.
Many latrineshave collapsed or are simply full, and have
beenabandoned. In some instances, communal areas outside ofthe
camps are used as informal latrines. The domestic useof
contaminated water is a major contributor to poornutritional
status. For groups along the Juba Valley unableto purchase clean
water, the river provides for their needs.This greatly increases
the risk of water-borne disease.
There is a common and strong desire for educationamongst IDPs
and other vulnerable groups in Kismaayo (aselsewhere in Somalia).
In Kismaayo, where there is no freeprimary or secondary education,
access is determined bythe ability to pay for private facilities
(Quranic schools costup to SShs10,000 a month per child, and
non-religiousschools SShs20,000–40,000/month/child). For
minoritygroups, including many in the camps, the ability to pay
ispartly determined by socio-ethnic status.
The protection environment
Many of the problems facing IDPs and other vulnerablegroups in
Kismaayo are related to the protectionenvironment. Individuals from
weak and powerless clanssuch as the Bantu, Bajuni and Galgaala
(including those inthe IDP camps) rarely enjoy the protection
afforded toothers. These entrenched socio-ethnic divisions
affectaccess to economic capital (such as employmentopportunities);
this in turn affects the degree of access (orreinforces the lack of
access) to education and healthfacilities.
There are numerous accounts of gender-based violence: ofsexual
abuse in IDP camps and in the workplace. Generalabuse takes the
form of theft, beatings, the non-paymentof wages and the constant
reinforcement of socio-ethnicstatus (through the use of terms such
as adoon or slave).When human rights violations take place, in the
absence ofany properly functioning mechanisms for the rule of
law,individuals from ‘minority’ or weak clans in Kismaayo oftenhave
little recourse to systems of justice – whether throughcustomary
law (xeer) or religious law (sharia). Thesubtleties of political,
economic and social discriminationremain largely hidden to
outsiders.
While it is easy to criticise a particular clan group
orauthority structure for the treatment of minority groups
inKismaayo, and Bantu and Bajuni groups have beenparticularly
persecuted, the reinforcement of socio-ethnicstatus is not unusual
in Somalia. Furthermore, during the1990s conflict between the
factions led by Colonel OmarJess, Hussein Aideed and General
Mohamed Said Hersi‘Morgan’ became the defining feature of the Lower
Juba, asthe region endured some of the worst fighting in the
civilwar. The area and the town of Kismaayo changed handsnumerous
times. Each time, retreating militia looted andpillaged, and
incoming militia did likewise.
Aid gatekeepers are an importantelement of the protection
environment.These were seen as a potentialobstacle in the research
process. Interms of aid, they are generallyconsidered a negative
influence,positioning themselves prior to thedelivery of assistance
to the camps totake advantage of potentially valuableresources. One
interviewee suggestedthat the gatekeepers took as much as75% of the
aid delivered to the camps.
At the same time, however, gate-keepers offer some degree of
pro-tection to camp residents, especiallythose from weak or
minority clans. ASomali proverb describes this situationwell: Ama
buur ahaw ama mid ku-tiir-sanaw (‘Either be a mountain or leanon
one’). In other words, members of
Kismaayo’s camps are crowded, and shelters are built of
rudimentary materials
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14
weak clans seek protection from a strong one, in terms
ofsheegata (adoption and client status) or, moreimmediately, the
protection of a gatekeeper. Even thoughliving conditions are
extremely poor, many of the displacedfeel safer as part of a group
in a camp, receiving‘protection’ from a Marexaan gatekeeper.
Moreover,economic migrants might consider living in a camp as
low-cost housing: rents for an arish (a wooden shack) are in
theregion of SShs40–60,000 per month, whereas a room in astone
house would cost SShs100,000 a month.30 In returnfor this
‘protection’, and in lieu of ‘rent’, the gatekeeperwill receive a
portion of the assistance packages allocatedto the displaced.
The implications for aid
One of the key issues raised during this researchconcerned the
potential negative impact of aid. InKismaayo, aid resources are
likely to be a source ofdispute, destabilising an already-fragile
environment andreinforcing the existing socio-ethnic divisions and
patternsof power. This raises a number of issues (and
challenges)outlined below. One interviewee asserted succinctly that
ifthese are not addressed, it would be like putting ‘fuel intothe
fire’. Rather than simply ‘rushing in’ in an ad hocmanner, this
suggests a more tentative and coordinatedapproach to committing
resources, which incorporatesanswers to these challenges in an
operational plan.
1. How does the international community work with a defacto
authority like the JVA without conferringcredibility on its
occupation and illegitimateadministration? Although this issue is
not new inSomalia, the perceptions of other (excluded) groupsremain
important.31 If this is ignored, the aidcommunity runs the risk of
adding to the security threatfaced by international and national
field staff.
Some interviewees suggested that potential aid flows
intoKismaayo and the Lower Juba will be insignificantcompared to
the revenue collected from the sea andairport. What is sought by
the JVA is not materialassistance per se, but a reinforcement of
their claim ofauthority in the wider Somali political arena. By
workingwith the JVA clan duopoly in Kismaayo, the
internationalcommunity is, in the eyes of the clans inside and
outside ofKismaayo town (whether guri or gelti), legitimising
thisclaim, albeit inadvertently. The international community isno
longer perceived to be neutral in its engagement in theregion. This
is reinforced by concentrating assistance inKismaayo to the
exclusion of other clans and clan areas.
To counter this, a much more transparent and inclusiveapproach
to engagement in the region, not just inKismaayo, is required. All
clan parties in the region, guriand gelti, must be approached and
brought intonegotiations on the provision of assistance. This is a
muchhigher tier of engagement than that normally considered
inSomalia (where negotiations are held with local authorities
only). However, this may lead to accepting some degree
oftrade-off between identified needs and operationalpragmatism.
2. The international aid community in Somalia fallssomewhere
between operational pragmatism and aprincipled approach
(‘principled pragmatism’). But howpragmatic (or unprincipled) is
the internationalcommunity prepared to be? There must be a
bottomline below which agencies suspend activities orwithdraw. This
is rarely defined, and the negativeimpacts of aid are rarely
monitored. Consequently, theboundaries of operational pragmatism
continuallyshift. Although this lack of clarity and
consistencyallows the international community to continueworking in
contested environments, this comes at acost: it allows those
seeking to manipulate theresources of aid to operate between these
fuzzyboundaries.
3. International assistance must be sensitive to the multi-clan
topography of Kismaayo and the Lower Juba ingeneral. This means
‘thinking multi-clan’ at several levels:
• humanitarian agencies have a responsibility to ensurethat, in
the hiring of national staff, vehicles and securityguards, clan
affiliation is taken into consideration. Forexample, the hiring of
vehicles from only one clan in amulti-clan environment will
exacerbate underlying clantensions, increase the competition for
resources, andreinforce existing power and wealth structures
withinthe community. In Kismaayo, and in other parts ofSomalia,
this lack of sensitivity has led to threats ofviolence against
national and international staff;
• determining clan ‘boundaries’ in geographic terms andin terms
of the clan make-up of, for example,administrations, local NGOs and
community-basedorganisations to inform initial access negotiations
(seeabove) and in the provision of assistance; and
• multi-clan projects should be considered, following theexample
of several private enterprises in Kismaayo (inthe
telecommunications and remittance sector and inthe provision of
private health facilities). These haveproven less prone to looting
during conflict as theinterests of several clans are affected.
4. Programmes must integrate protection and assistance.The
incentive of humanitarian assistance provides anopportunity to put
across more assertively the need forprotection for vulnerable
groups and to improve theprotective environment. But how does the
internationalcommunity work with or around entrenched
socio-ethnicdivisions to ensure that aid resources most benefit
thosetargeted? Similarly, how does the internationalcommunity work
with or around aid gatekeepers?Ultimately, we can either accept
some degree ofdiversion (the pragmatic approach) or enforce a
zero-tolerance policy (a principled approach). However, bothrequire
that effective monitoring and evaluation
livelihoods and protection: displacement and vulnerable
communities in Kismaayo, southern Somalia
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chapter 4 Livelihoods and protection: study findings
indicators are applied and enforced. Furthermore, as theGuiding
Principles suggest, the international communitymust be careful not
to accord special privileges to targetgroups for fear of creating
(or exacerbating) tensionsbetween them and the host community.
5. The focus of humanitarian assistance is on thoseconsidered
most vulnerable. To encourage local‘ownership’ of project
activities, the internationalcommunity should endeavour to use the
‘pillars’ ofSomali society (such as the ulamaudiin or
religiousleaders, clan elders and the dynamic businesscommunity) to
work for the benefit of the vulnerableand the implementing
agencies. Using these ‘pillars’ toprovide resources (such as cash
or credit), act asguarantors, or simply to facilitate access,
transfers the
responsibility and risk of potential asset loss to
theseintermediaries.
6. Due to the fragility of the security situation and
themulti-clan topography of the region, ‘mobile resources’such as
mobile health clinics or veterinary services maybe more appropriate
than ‘fixed’ facilities such ashospitals. These could operate a
routine multi-locationand multi-clan itinerary (Tuesday in Buaale,
Thursday inAfmadow, and so on) and could incorporate
healtheducation literature (on HIV/AIDS, female genitalmutilation
and sanitation). In case of renewed fighting,they could be
‘evacuated’. This approach has the addedbenefit of addressing two
common complaints: why doall the resources focus on Kismaayo; and
why do theytend to focus on urban areas?
15
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16
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17
This paper argues for an approach to programming that
isincremental, based on local realities and
knowledge-basedoperations, and where individual activities, such
asagreement on the principles of engagement anddisengagement or the
provision of clean water andimproved shelter, are integrated within
one holisticoperational plan. Because it seeks to address issues in
aholistic and integrated manner, the operational
frameworknecessitates a collaborative approach by a number
ofagencies (from the UN and the NGO community) withdifferent,
albeit overlapping, mandates and expertise.While this is a
challenge in itself in terms of agency buy-inand effective
coordination, it also provides the opportunityto phase the
activities of agencies. Phasing is important fortwo reasons: first,
as part of a logical process ofsequencing interrelated components
for strictlyprogrammatic purposes; and second, to avoid the
suddenarrival of large amounts of resources in an area that
ispolitically fragile and potentially highly volatile, and
wherecompetition for aid resources frequently results in
conflictbetween rival groups.
Figure 2 (overleaf ) shows suggested phases and
potentialactivities.32 The vertical thick line on the left shows
initialre-engagement. The thick horizontal lines, for example
thecreation of humanitarian space and basic needs, show themain
phases within which potential activities (the thinlines) take
place. Hashed vertical lines show where aphase or activity is
initiated, for example an agreement onthe creation of humanitarian
space and the start ofactivities to meet basic needs.
These cannot be seen in simple linear terms, with oneactivity
starting after another has finished. In this plan,activities across
several phases may take placeconcurrently in the same humanitarian
space. What isimportant is the relative temporal position of
activities andtheir connection to one another.
In Kismaayo, as in other contested environments, thecreation of
an enabling and conducive environment for theprovision of material
assistance and the promotion ofprotection must be developed to an
acceptable levelbefore these resources are committed. In addition,
acoherent approach by the international community is asine qua non
for the success of principles of engagementand disengagement. These
two aspects, together withskilful programming by well-informed
individuals, areessential to develop a process for intervention
that avoidsmany of the pitfalls associated with
fragmentedapproaches with poor follow-up. This especially
concernsincreasing the competition for resources, leading togreater
instability and ultimately decreasing the impact ofaid. It should
also be made clear that interventions in theoperational plan would
be required to be implemented in
the ‘home areas’ of Lower Juba, rather than just inKismaayo.
Equally, material assistance has to be providedto a wider community
than just the IDPs, in terms ofneutrality and impartiality on the
one hand, but also as apragmatic means to reduce the potential for
conflictbetween groups, or the targeting of aid providers.
The first phases of engagement, then, would largelyinvolve
‘software’ activities that build a conduciveenvironment for more
resource-based interventions. Indifficult operating environments,
the first object of theseinitial activities would be to establish
very clear groundrules, particularly with the authorities that
control territoryand ‘public’ assets, such as the port in the case
ofKismaayo. Ground rules would ideally identify modes
ofcommunication through accepted focal points to avoid aplethora of
individuals acting without the knowledge ofothers; agree on the
independence of agencies, forexample in recruiting staff without
interference fromauthorities or clan leaders; contextualise the
normal‘privileges and immunities’ that are accorded UN agenciesand
staff, such as the tax-free import of goods forhumanitarian
programmes; develop complaintsprocedures; and agree on what level
of reporting isrequired to maintain an acceptable level of
transparency.As a central part of the development of ground rules,
theroles and responsibilities of the various parties need to
beclearly defined to reduce the risk of misunderstandings inthe
future. It is important here for the various ‘non-stateactors’ to
commit to ensuring a level of security thatenables the agencies to
function. Internationally-recognised humanitarian principles would
underpin theessence of the ground rules, and the process provides
anopportunity to build the capacity of authorities andleadership on
these principles.
The development of ground rules can lead logically to thefirst
elements of building a protective environment. Oncethe ground rules
have been developed, a process forbuilding the capacity of
duty-bearers can begin, typicallyby promoting the Guiding
Principles on InternalDisplacement. This would normally be led by
OCHA, incollaboration with other agencies according to
capacity.This can appear to be wildly optimistic in the kind
ofpredatory operating environments like Kismaayo, andespecially
where there is likely to be resistance to‘Western-driven’
instruments of international law.However, the engagement of
religious leaders and arbitersof customary law (xeer) and secular
law may place theGuiding Principles within a more appropriate
culturalfabric. Of course, there is the potential for discrepancies
inthe detail between the three bodies of law operating inSomalia
(i.e., sharia, xeer and secular law) andinternational law, but the
essence or spirit of the laws arecompatible and complementary. This
process is also
Chapter 5
An operational plan of action
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livelihoods and protection: displacement and vulnerable
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18
Figu
re 2
O
pera
tion
al p
hasi
ng a
nd p
oten
tial
act
ivit
ies
Tran
slat
ion
of a
ll do
cum
ents
Prot
ecti
ve e
nvir
onm
ent
Adv
ocac
y fo
r pr
otec
tion
Prom
otio
n of
HR
into
the
Con
stit
utio
n
Stru
ctur
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eeds
Agr
icul
tura
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abili
tati
on
Inco
me
gene
rati
on
Dev
elop
alt
erna
tive
s to
the
cha
rcoa
l tra
de
Impr
ove
heal
th fa
cilit
ies
Mon
itor
ing
and
Eval
uati
on
Coor
dina
tion
Impr
ove
shel
ter
Prov
isio
n of
cle
an w
ater
Trai
ning
of p
olic
e
Reac
h ag
reem
ent
on t
he p
rinc
iple
s of
eng
agem
ent
and
dise
ngag
emen
t
The
crea
tion
of h
uman
itar
ian
spac
e
Stre
ngth
enin
g of
the
judi
ciar
y
Stre
ngth
en t
he v
oice
of t
he d
ispl
aced
Inte
grat
ion
of la
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e/la
nd r
ight
s in
to t
he C
onst
itut
ion
Dev
elop
an
unde
rsta
ndin
g of
the
deg
ree
of c
ompl
imen
tary
bet
wee
n xe
er, s
hari
a, IH
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nd H
R
Bas
ic n
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Cons
truc
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it la
trin
es
Skill
s tr
aini
ng
NP 44 crc 12/1/03 4:43 PM Page 18
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important in the gradual facilitation of better
governancestructures, driven ultimately by Somalis.
Once the ground rules have been established, and workhas been
initiated to build a protective environment, it isimportant to
embark on more tangible programmes on theground. In Kismaayo, IDPs
have very poor access to basicservices, and their living conditions
have been describedas sub-human. Work with communities on
improvingaccess to these services can make a real difference to
howpeople live, particularly their physical well-being.
Whileproviding services in Kismaayo, it would also be importantto
balance assistance in the wider community, especially inthe ‘home
areas’, as a way to reverse the pull-factor of thetowns. Relatively
low-cost activities, such as theconstruction of pit latrines, the
provision of clean waterand improved shelter, should be undertaken
first. Onlywhen these are monitored and evaluated should
moreresource-intensive activities follow. In Kismaayo, UNICEFwould
be expected to play a lead role in the provision ofbasic services,
working both directly and through localpartners such as Muslim Aid
(UK). These kind of activitiesare high-impact and very visible,
while requiring relativelylow levels of resources. They are also
relatively safe frompotential manipulation. This can have a number
of benefitsin addition to the obvious, especially in building
theconfidence of the community. Having tangible programmeson the
ground can also help in defending the software sideof the process
from critics.
More ambitious programmes centred on the rule of law asa means
to directly build the protective environment canbe phased in at
this point. In Somalia, UNDP has an activeprogramme (Rule of Law
and Security or RoLS)incorporating reform of the judiciary, police
reform/training and disarmament, demobilisation andreintegration
(DDR) components, all of which have greatpotential to address some
fundamental issues affectingSomali society, especially vulnerable
communities. HavingIDP issues at the heart of the programme would
enable afocus on aspects such as improving access to the law forIDP
women, or incorporating IDPs into the police forces,and including
the Guiding Principles on InternalDisplacement as well as human
rights law as an integralpart of police training. Again, it is
important to emphasisethat activities related to the rule of law
need to beextended to other parts of Lower Juba (and of
courseelsewhere), as the protective environment for minorities isno
better in rural areas than in Kismaayo. This level ofengagement
obviously requires a high level of trust andgoodwill between the
authorities and the internationalcommunity, and this can only be
built up over time.Improvements in the protective environment would
benecessary to enable the next level of assistance aimed
atlivelihood support and development to occur with anymeaning. As
discussed earlier, many of the causes oflivelihood insecurity are
related to the protectiveenvironment and the inability of
minorities/IDPs to accessservices and income opportunities as
equals.
The next phase would focus on more structural aspects
ofcommunities’ livelihood insecurity and disenfran-chisement.
Projects linked to income generation (micro-credit, business skills
training, literacy/numeracy) wouldaim to make it easier for
vulnerable communities to gainaccess to income opportunities. At
the same time, thisphase would also look at the integration of IDPs
into themainstream of society, either in the place where they
havechosen to live, or back in their home areas. The latterwould
require work related to agricultural rehabilitationand development
in the riverine areas. It would alsorequire research into land
issues, which would need to beresolved if a return ‘home’ was to be
feasible. Thecompetition for resources such as agricultural land is
oneof the most intractable problems of the Somali conflict.
Thehistory of settlement, migration and conquest has createda
complex mosaic of land occupation and ‘ownership’within and between
clan groups. There is little point inintroducing much-needed
resources for the rehabilitationof agricultural land before these
issues are tackled (see, inFigure 2, the intersection of the
vertical line that indicatesthe completion of land tenure activity
and the start ofagricultural rehabilitation). These factors may
well providea pull-factor back to rural livelihoods, and would at
leastgive IDPs a real choice about where they wish to live
andinvest in the future. Certainly, the creation of
betterconditions in the home areas would point the way to
moredurable solutions than previous attempts to bus the IDPshome
with a return package. This phase of the plan wouldalso have to
address difficult issues such as the negativeeffects of the
charcoal trade, especially on the environmentof the area, and look
into ways in which alternative incomesources could be
developed.
Some phases underpin others: the protective
environment,monitoring and evaluation, and coordination.
Theachievement of a protective environment
involvescapacity-building and advocacy in their broadest sense.They
require technical, material and financial support toequip local
institutions and individuals with the resourcesand skills to become
coherent advocates for change.Possibilities include bringing
together hitherto separatecamp committees and incorporating them
into theprotection dialogue and local systems of governance;
andsample testing of rights through the use of questionnairesand
focus groups, workshops, and training days. However,attitudes to
socio-ethnic status require much more thanquick-fix solutions.
A monitoring and evaluation component is central to theefficacy
of this approach. This paper has argued that manyof the problems
facing IDPs and other vulnerable groups inKismaayo relate to the
linkage between socio-ethnic statusand access to resources. This
infers that monitoring andevaluation must move away from
implementationchecklists, noting the number of wells
constructed,tarpaulins delivered or people fed. What is needed
inaddition are more subtle indicators that depict the realimpact of
activities. These indicators could include the
19
chapter 5 An operational plan of action
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livelihoods and protection: displacement and vulnerable
communities in Kismaayo, southern Somalia
20
degree of access to resources based on clanrepresentation (and
particularly the degree of access thatminority clans can develop);
the presence or absence ofaid gatekeepers and the degree of
resource diversion; thescale of the security threat – to
beneficiaries, staff and thewider community – or even changes in
port activity. As thiscomponent underpins basic and structural
needs phases,and indeed should provide the impetus for
continuingengagement or disengagement, a systematic reportingsystem
that is transparent and involves all stakeholdersshould be
established.
Livelihoods approaches have clear implications forcoordination
mechanisms. This paper suggests that,ideally, there would be three
interrelated components.First, a multi-agency, multi-sectoral
information-gatheringphase; second, a common analysis and the
developmentof an agreed operational framework; and, lastly,
theimplementation of activities, including the negotiation
ofhumanitarian space, in a cohesive, phased andcoordinated manner.
There are risks in the creation of
expectations among communities that are not quickly met,and
difficulties associated with agency buy-in andencouraging joint
programming. However, the question iswhether we can afford not to
invest the time and effortrequired to develop programmes that
deliver and havehigh short- and long-term impact.
Finally, livelihoods approaches challenge the sectoralmodel of
coordination that currently exists in Somalia. Thispaper suggests
that multi-agency zonal or regionalcoordination structures are more
appropriate, though themobility of IDPs, and for that matter
pastoralists and agro-pastoralists, means that the validity of
rigidly applied zonaland regional units are problematic.
Appropriate assistancecan only be designed by looking beyond
boundaries,whether these are cartographic (district, regional
andnational) or social (the porous nature of extendedhouseholds,
for example), or even to do with mandate.One implication of
adopting the livelihoods approach morewidely in Somalia would be a
radical rethink of the currentcoordination structures, which are
driven from Nairobi.
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In their synthesis study of livelihoods in situations ofchronic
political instability, Catherine Longley and DanMaxwell raise three
important questions.
1. How can livelihoods analysis be applied to conflictsituations
in order to understand the impact of conflicton livelihoods? How
should livelihoods frameworks beexpanded to incorporate conflict
situations?
2. How can livelihood assessment tools be adapted andapplied in
conflict situations? How can questions ofpower relations, war
economies, human rights andhumanitarian principles be
addressed?
3. What innovative approaches to livelihoodsprogramming can be
developed by agencies insituations of chronic conflict?
While the study described in this paper did not set about
toanswer these questions, in many ways it has addressedthese same
issues in the complex political andhumanitarian environment of
Kismaayo and the Lower Jubamore generally.
The study adapted the conventional livelihood wisdom byincluding
a political economy approach to betterunderstand the impact of
conflict on people’s livelihoodsand the power relations between
IDPs and various othercommunities and external forces. In addition,
theincorporation of ‘humanitarian protection’
considerationsdeepened this analysis by looking at power
andvulnerability within a rights-based perspective, againwithin the
overall umbrella of livelihoods analysis. The
combination of these approaches enabled thedevelopment of an
operational framework that integratesmaterial (‘hardware’) support
to livelihood needs with the‘software’ approach of protection
through the promotion ofinternational humanitarian law, human
rights advocacyand the rule of law. Ultimately, we are better able
toadvocate for the needs of IDPs and the vulnerable ingeneral.
Evidently, the component elements of the operational planare not
innovative; what is new is the integrated,collaborative and phased
nature of their implementation.There is the potential here for an
impact that issignificantly greater than that achieved by isolated,
ad hocand localised approaches. Lastly, the adapted
livelihoodapproach, in combination with the protection of
humanrights, provides us with a dynamic understanding of
theoperating environment within which the impact of aid canbe more
accurately predicted and monitored.
How the operational framework is actually implemented inKismaayo
and in the Lower Juba Valley, and the impact ofthe overall
intervention, remains to be seen. There will bemajor challenges
both within the aid community and in theoperating area. Certainly,
since this approach transcendsspecific agency mandates, ownership
by implementingagencies and by donors will need to be fostered if
this is tobe accepted as an appropriate way forward. What can
beachieved in practice depends very much upon the degreeof buy-in
to the process. Careful monitoring and analysiswill be required to
fully learn the lessons of this initiative.
21
Chapter 6
Conclusions
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Appendix 1
Camp committee/focus group questions
INTERVIEW DETAILS
Name of interviewer(s)
a. Location of interview (name of camp or area)b. Date and time
of interviewc. Composition of group