HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE NETWORK IN SOUTH AMERICA

LCDR Hui Lee LCDR Ashwin Anupdev 03 Nov 2011

HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE NETWORK IN SOUTH AMERICA

Background Network Model Network Formulation Analysis Conclusion

AGENDA

BACKGROUND

Dec 2004 – Indian Ocean, Tsunami from a 9.1 mag earthquake, over 283,000 death.

Oct 2005 – Pakistan, 7.6 mag earthquake, over 87,000 death.

Jan 2010 – Haiti, 7.0 mag earthquake, over 316,000 death.

Mar 2011 – Japan, Tsunami from a 9.0 mag earthquake, over 5,000 death

BACKGROUND

Global reach and provide an immediate response to distressed populations wherever and whenever.

Provide rapid, effective, low-cost and sustainable services.

Build key capacity in partner nations to promote national security and stability in the theater.

US DEPT OF DEFENSE (DOD)

An earthquake of magnitude 8.0 – Honduras.

USSOUTHCOM – tasked to provide humanitarian relief.

Network operation – deliver water, power generator, communication and medical support.

Purpose - analyze the cost savings and the benefits of network.

SCENARIO - HONDURAS

Nodes :• Fleet Industrial Supply Centers• Naval Air Stations• US Naval and Coast Guard ships• Fixed Air wings• Defense Logistic Agencies• NPS HFN team (Hastly Formed Network – Nemesis

Network Warfare Van, deployable wireless communications)

NETWORK MODEL

Intermediate node –FISC San Diego, NAS Forth Worth, Ships.

End node - USSOUTHCOM – all activities report back for completion.

Edges – (Transfer Cost, 0, Capacity)

Limiting factors – capacity availability and cost of modes Ships Planes Trucks

NETWORK MODEL

NETWORK

SupplyIntermediateDemand

NETWORK

FORMULATION

Primal Problem – LP – to find the min- cost multi commodity flow

Dual Problem – MIP – to find the best interdiction plan (arc or node)

To find the min-cost flow with the current interdiction plan

FORMULATION

Objective Function

Constraints◦ BALANCE OF FLOW◦ CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS◦ FIXING Y

PRIMAL PROBLEM - LP

ANALYSIS

Arcs – eliminate an arc completely by putting maximum delay.

Nodes – eliminate node completely by putting maximum delay in arc between fake start and end nodes.

ATTACKS

ATTACKING NODES

MIN-COST FLOW

OPERATOR RESILIENCE (ARCS)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9500

550

600

650

700

750

800

850

ATTACKS

CostCOST(IN 1000)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7500

550

600

650

700

750

OPERATOR RESILIENCE(NODES)

ATTACKS

COST

(IN 1

000)

For more number of attacks the Cost changes slightly.

Big jump from 1 to 2.

The cost does not change when NasFortWorth is attacked.

When FiscJacksonville is interdicted the cost goes up to huge amounts.

ATTACKS(NODES)

Pre-position the equipment and supplies in the near high probable disaster areas.

Shorter response distance and time will result less cost overall.

CONCLUSION

If the project presentation was next week?

◦ Time Element

◦ Stochastic Element

◦ Cost considered per unit of shipment

◦ Complex network

CONCLUSION

THANK YOU

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