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Explaining Variation in the Effect of Priority Congruence on
Satisfaction with Democracy in Europe
Stefanie Reher
Nuffield College
Department of Sociology, University of Oxford
[email protected]
ABSTRACT
Political representation is a key element of the democratic
process in representative
democracies for it achieves rule by the people by translating
citizens’ preferences into policies.
Citizens therefore tend to be more satisfied with the
functioning of democracy when
representatives more closely reflect their policy preferences.
Previous studies have shown this
relationship primarily for policy positions. Since policy
priorities are an equally important
component of policy preferences, this paper analyses to what
extent congruence in policy
priorities affects satisfaction with democracy across the
European Union. The results of
multilevel analyses using the 2009 European Election Study show
that priority congruence
positively affects satisfaction in a range of countries but the
effect varies in both strength and
statistical significance. This variation is shown to be partly
due to differences in the quality of
democracy and governance. Since citizens in less democratic
countries should place more
emphasis on more basic elements of democracy than substantive
policy representation when
evaluating their system, priority congruence affects
satisfaction with democracy more strongly
in the highly democratic countries. A society’s experience with
democracy also increases the
effect of priority congruence, yet the results are less
robust.
Paper prepared for presentation at the 7th General Conference of
the European
Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) in Bordeaux, September
4-7, 2013
Draft version – please do not cite without permission.
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INTRODUCTION
In order for a democratic system to be stable, a certain level
of satisfaction with the functioning
of democracy among its citizens is assumed to be vital. Scholars
have thus looked at a variety of
factors that influence how satisfied citizens are with their
democracy, including inputs and
outputs of the political system as well as individual-level
characteristics and political
predispositions (Aarts and Thomassen 2008; Anderson 1998;
Anderson and Guillory 1997;
Bernauer and Vatter 2011; Clarke et al. 2009; Curini, Jou, and
Memoli 2012; Dennis and Owen
2011; Listhaug, Aardal, and Ellis 2009; Norris 2011) . Amongst
these, a range of studies show
that citizens who are better represented by political
representatives tend to be more satisfied
with democracy and have higher levels of political trust
(Anderson et al. 2005; Miller 1974;
Miller and Listhaug 1990, 1998; Muller 1970; Weil 1989). When
conceptualising substantive
policy representation, most studies focus on the proximity of
citizens’ ideological or issue
positions to representatives’ (Ezrow and Xezonakis 2011; Kim
2009). However, issue priorities
are also a vital component of policy preferences, as this paper
argues, and it has recently been
shown for the German case that the representation of citizens’
policy priorities also affects
individuals’ satisfaction with democracy (Reher 2012, 2013).
The first contribution of this paper is to show that the effect
of priority congruence on
satisfaction with democracy exists beyond Germany across the
European Union. Priority
congruence is measured by linking national representatives’
policy priorities, which are
measured based on the 2009 European Election Study’s (EES)
candidate survey, with the
priorities expressed by respondents in the EES’s voter survey.
Using cross-national data allows
showing that the strength and statistical significance of the
effect of priority congruence on
satisfaction vary across countries by using a multilevel
regression framework. Two country-
level characteristics are hypothesised to cause this variation:
the quality of democracy and
governance and the age of democracy. Based on the idea that
aspects of democracy and
governance can be conceived of as hierarchically ordered, I
hypothesise that citizens in less
democratic countries will put less emphasis on the quality of
substantive policy representation
when evaluating the functioning of their democracy. The
evaluation criteria at the top of their
“hierarchy” should be more basic elements of democracy and
governance such as freedom of
expression and accountability of elected office-holders.
Secondly, citizens in countries that transitioned to democracy
more recently have been
found to understand democracy in more instrumental and less
process-focused ways, for they
have had less opportunity to learn about the meaning of
democracy (Dalton, Shin, and Jou 2007;
Norris 2011). In addition, in the post-communist countries,
which represent the youngest
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democracies in the sample of EU countries studied in this paper,
democratic transition was
strongly associated with the transition from planned to market
economy. Consequently, citizens
in younger democracies might be inclined to link democracy to
social and economic outcomes
and less strongly to processes such as policy representation.
The results of multilevel logistic
regression analyses indicate that the quality of democracy
indeed strongly and significantly
affects the strength of the congruence-satisfaction link, while
the age of democracy has a similar
but less robust effect.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Policy Congruence and Satisfaction with Democracy
Citizens’ level of satisfaction with democracy should reflect an
evaluation of their perceptions of
various criteria they consider relevant for democracy on the
basis of their expectations towards
these criteria (Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson 1995; Norris
2011: 77; Thomassen 1995;
Wagner, Dufour, and Schneider 2003). Since the reflection,
promotion, and implementation of
citizens’ policy preferences by the elected representatives are
major elements of representative
democratic systems, they should be – and have been found to be –
important criteria whose
fulfilment citizens take into consideration when evaluating the
system they live in (Aarts and
Thomassen 2008; McAllister 2005; Miller 1974; Muller 1970). In
Dennis and Owen’s (2011:
401) words,
[…] public dissatisfaction with politics and government is
connected fundamentally to
popular perceptions about the political process and
representation. In a fully operative
democracy, people are likely to have developed the firm
expectation that they have the
right to be heard, and that officials should be responsible to
their needs and take action.
If people have come to feel that their own needs, wants,
interests, concerns, values, or
demands are not being effectively represented in the policy
process, then no matter
how felicitous the nature of system outputs is perceived to be,
popular resentment
likely will result.
Due to its central role in democracy, policy representation is a
frequently studied
concept in political science (Powell 2004). The quality of
policy representation is usually
conceptualised as the degree of congruence between citizens’ and
representatives’ (individual
representatives’, parties’, governments’, or legislatures’)
preferences. In most of these studies,
policy preferences are measured in terms of positions on a
policy or ideological spectrum (e.g.
Borre 2000; Erikson, Mackuen, and Stimson 2002; Ezrow and
Xezonakis 2011; McDonald and
Budge 2005; Powell 2004; Rosema, Denters, and Aarts 2011). While
policy priorities are more
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and more recognised as important elements of policy preferences
(Hobolt and Klemmemsen
2005; Jennings and John 2009; Jones and Baumgartner 2004;
Lindeboom 2012; Pennings 2005;
Soroka and Wlezien 2010), they remain largely neglected in
research satisfaction with
democracy. Several scholars (Curini, Jou, and Memoli 2012; Ezrow
and Xezonakis 2011; Kim
2009; Uyar 2013) have shown that congruence in policy positions
between citizens and
representatives increases satisfaction with democracy, but only
Reher (2012, 2013) has looked
at congruence in issue priorities and found similar effects on
satisfaction.
However, policy priorities are an important component of policy
preferences and should
thus receive more attention in research on representation and
its consequences (cf. Lindeboom
2012). Issue priorities are often recognised as playing a role
in determining the issues
dimensions for which it is most important that citizens’ and
representatives positions align
(Abramowitz 1995; Giger 2011), for citizens will not feel well
represented if politicians reflect
their positions, yet only with regard to issues which they do
not consider crucial (Jones and
Baumgartner 2004). However, priorities matter above and beyond
their moderating function.
This is most obvious in the case of valence issues, where the
aims with regard to a policy issue
are generally uncontroversial – for instance, virtually everyone
prefers low unemployment to
high unemployment and environmental protection to environmental
damage (Budge and Farlie
1983; Clarke et al. 2009; Enelow and Hinich 1984; Stokes 1963).
Differences in policy
preferences on valence issues are therefore defined by
differences in the importance assigned to
an issue relative to others, since they often involve trade-offs
(such as environmental protection
and low energy prices) and because resources as well as
representatives’ as well as the public’s
attention capacities are constrained (Jones and Baumgartner
2004). Hence, in the case of
valence issues congruence in priorities is equivalent to
congruence in preferences (Aldrich and
Alvarez 1994: 295).
But agreement with representatives on policy priorities should
also directly affect
perceptions of the quality of representation in the case of
position issues in the Downsian
(1957) tradition, where competing opinions exist on an issue. If
a citizen has the impression
that representatives address the issues she considers most
important, she should feel that the
‘chain of delegation’ (Strøm 2000) between constituents and
representatives functions properly
and that representatives are in fact concerned with achieving
policy outcomes that are
beneficial to society, rather than for instance with their own
interests. If, in addition, a citizen’s
policy positions are aligned with representatives’, she should
be even more satisfied with the
functioning of the representation process. Yet, even if they are
not, she will have the feeling that
the important issues are at least addressed. Congruence in
policy priorities should thus have an
effect on perceptions of representation that is unconditional on
position congruence.
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Moreover, it should be rather rare that a position issue is
highly salient in the political
debate but that only one point of view is voiced. If, for
instance, a party campaigns for an
extension of abortion rights, it is unlikely that there will be
no other party taking the opposite
stance, particularly if a substantial part of the public is
against the proposed policy. Of course
citizens’ positions may nevertheless be more or less well
represented, for instance, if one has an
extreme view while parties are more moderate. But if we accept
that in most cases where a
position issue is highly salient different views on it will be
voiced in the political debate, we can
consider the representation of policy priorities to act as a
cognitive shortcut to the
representation of preferences, for determining whether one’s
concerns are addressed in the
political debate is less cognitively demanding than determining
how well parties’ policy
positions match one’s viewpoint. The first contribution of this
paper is therefore to test to what
extent the relationship between congruence in issue priorities
and satisfaction with democracy
beyond Germany, where Reher (2012, 2013) has shown that the
effect exists:
HYPOTHESIS 1: Higher levels of priority congruence are
associated with higher levels of
satisfaction with democracy across the European Union
countries.
Cross-national variation in the effect of priority congruence on
satisfaction
While priority congruence, much like the quality of political
representation in general, should
affect satisfaction with democracy in most contexts, there is
reason to believe that there will be
some variation in the relationship. Recall the assumption that
citizens’ are satisfied with
democracy when their perceptions of the reality in their country
match their expectations
towards different aspects of democratic systems. Priority
congruence should thus affect an
individual’s satisfaction only if she considers substantive
policy representation a relevant aspect
of democracy and if she accepts congruence in issue priorities
as a valid indicator of the quality
of policy representation. To the extent that there is variation
in these attitudes and perceptions,
the effect of priority congruence on satisfaction will also
differ. Reher (2013) has shown that the
effect differs across individuals with higher and lower levels
of political sophistication.
Assuming that people’s expectations towards democracy also
depend on the context in which
they live, we can expect that:
HYPOTHESIS 2: The strength of the effect of priority congruence
on satisfaction with democracy
varies across the EU countries.
A particularly important set of country-level characteristics
that should cause variation
in the effect includes the quality of democracy and governance
as well as a society’s amount of
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experience with democratic rule. For a number of reasons, which
I explain in more detail below,
I expect that in countries with deficiencies in the functioning
of democracy and governance as
well as in countries with a shorter history of democracy,
citizens’ satisfaction with democracy
will be less strongly affected by congruence with their
representatives in issue priorities. The
mechanisms argued to be behind these relationships are related
to differences in expectations
towards and conceptions of democracy.
The moderating effect of the quality of democracy and
governance
Most classical definitions of democracy are restricted to
procedural elements such as free and
fair elections, freedom of expression, the right to assemble,
and the rule of law, among others
(Dahl 1989; Schumpeter 1942). We can think of these formal rules
and procedures as the most
basic and necessary elements without which a country cannot be
considered democratic. In
addition, there are aspects that can “deepen” democracy or
improve the quality of democratic
governance, even in contexts where the procedural requirements
are fulfilled. Opinions on what
this set of aspects encompasses can be vastly different but
often include universal and extensive
citizen participation as well as the representation of
minorities in the legislature. The quality of
substantive representation can also be considered to be such an
element of representative
democracy. While some level of congruence between citizens’
preferences and the policies
enacted by parliament and the government can be considered
necessary for a country to be a
properly functioning representative democracy, there can be
large differences in the quality of
substantive representation across contexts in which political
institutions and processes are
functioning according to democratic standards. Thus, all else
equal, a representative democracy
can be considered to be of even better quality when policy
congruence is higher, as the policies
discussed and implemented are closer to the actual will of the
people.
We can think of such aspects as being at a different level in
the hierarchy of democratic
elements from the more basic freedoms, institutions, and
procedures that are more crucial in
defining whether a country passes as democratic. Only when these
fundamental criteria are
fulfilled do aspects further down in the hierarchy, such as
substantive representation, become
priorities in the quest to improve democracy. If we assume that
such a hierarchy also exists
with regard to people’s values and expectations, similar to
Maslow’s (1954) ‘hierarchy of needs,’
the quality of policy representation should play a stronger role
in citizens’ evaluation of their
democracy in more democratic countries where more basic aspects
of democracy are in place.
Citizens in less democratic systems, on the other hand, should
pay more attention to the
presence and quality of more fundamental elements of democracy
and governance.
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In addition, democratic aspects can be conceived of as being
conditional on each other in
a similarly hierarchical fashion. If, for instance, elected
representatives are not accountable, if
government and administration are ineffective, or if political
decisions and their execution are
subject to corruption, citizens will not trust that the policies
promised by their representatives
will actually be turned into effective policy. Congruence in
policy preferences should thus not be
as consequential for citizens’ satisfaction with democracy in
contexts where the relationship
between policy proposals and policy outcomes is not very strong.
Moreover, if the
representational link between citizens and representatives does
not function as it should in
democratic systems – i.e., where representatives do not address
particular issues in order to
reflect their constituents’ preferences but for other reasons,
which may again be linked to
clientelism and corruption – congruence in policy priorities
will be more or less coincidental
and not reflective of the quality of the representational
process. Thus, citizens will not consider
high levels of policy congruence as a valid indication of a
well-functioning representation
process and differences in priority congruence should therefore
not affect satisfaction with
democracy in these contexts.
HYPOTHESIS 3: The effect of priority congruence on satisfaction
with democracy is stronger in
countries with higher levels of democracy and good
governance.
The moderating effect of democratic experience
In addition to differences in priorities based on the supply of
democratic rules and institutions,
variation in the conception of democracy should also lead to
differences in the effect of priority
congruence on satisfaction. Since satisfaction with democracy
reflects how well one perceives
the political system to perform in comparison to one’s
expectations, and since different ideas
about what democracy is should result in different expectations,
the predictors of satisfaction
with democracy should vary with one’s understanding of
democracy. Studies of how people in
different parts of the world conceptualise democracy show that,
generally, most people
associate democracy with freedom, the rule of law, and
democratic institutions. However, there
is also substantial variation (Schedler and Sarsfield 2007),
which has been found to be related to
individuals’ socio-demographic characteristics, such as gender,
education, and religiosity, but
also to the political and social contexts in which individuals
are embedded (e.g. Bratton and
Mattes 2001; Doherty and Mecellem 2012; Miller, Hesli, and
Reisinger 1997; Norris 2011).
Dalton, Shin and Jou (2007) show that citizens outside Western
democracies are more
likely to define democracy in terms of social and economic
benefits, which are not aspects of
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democracy according to democratic theory, although people across
the world do also link
democracy with freedom and liberties as well as democratic
institutions and processes.
Analysing time-series trends of how citizens in countries that
recently underwent
democratising regime changes understand democracy, they show
that this pattern appears to
be due to differences in a society’s experience with democracy.
The longer a country has been
democratic, the argument goes, the more its citizens learn about
democracy and, hence, are
more likely to define it in terms of freedoms and rights as well
as institutions and procedures
rather than social and economic benefits.
Amongst the 27 EU countries on which this study focuses,
societies’ experience with
democratic rule varies quite substantially. Spain, Portugal, and
Greece, for instance, became
democratic only in the 1970s, when the United Kingdom had
already been ruled democratically
continuously for at least a century. The most important gap in
experience with democracy,
which may imply important differences in the understanding of
and expectations towards
democracy, however, exists between Western Europe and Central
and Eastern Europe, for the
post-Communist countries have only become democratic within the
past 30 years and are still
strongly shaped by their political and societal past.
Dalton and colleagues (2007) show that, indeed, citizens in the
post-Communist
countries are less likely to link democracy with institutions
and processes while giving more
weight than Western Europeans to social and economic benefits,
even though their focus on
such aspects is still less strong than in other world regions.
These results are mirrored by
Norris’ (2011: 159) finding that ‘instrumental’ (focusing on
social and economic benefits) and
‘authoritarian’ – as opposed to ‘procedural’ – notions of
democracy are more prevalent in
societies with less historical experience of democracy,
including the post-Communist countries.
In addition, the transition from socialism to democracy in these
countries was strongly linked to
the shift from planned economy to market economy: “democracy and
the market have been
packaged together as an ideology of opposition to communism”
(Evans and Whitefield 1995:
507). Citizens’ norms and expectations towards the new political
regime were thus strongly
linked with norms and expectations towards the new economic
system (Przeworski 1991; Rose,
Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998; Toka 1995). Hence, we might expect
that the quality of policy
representation has a weaker effect on satisfaction with
democracy among citizens in those EU
countries where the democratic transition occurred more recently
and particularly in Central
and Eastern Europe.
HYPOTHESIS 4: The effect of priority congruence on satisfaction
with democracy is stronger in
countries that have been democracies for longer.
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DATA AND METHOD
Analysing the relationship between congruence in issue
priorities and satisfaction with
democracy across countries is hampered by data requirements. In
order to measure priority
congruence, we need information about both individuals’ and
representatives’ issue priorities in
compatible formats. I use the 2009 European Election Study
(EES), which includes a voter
survey with around one thousand respondents in each country as
well as a survey among
candidates running for European Parliament (EP) seats in the 27
EU member states (EES 2009a,
2009b). While using the EES to draw inferences for the national
level might seem problematic,
since its purpose is to study EP elections, the items I use
refer to the national context. Most
importantly, I measure policy priorities in terms of the issues
that are considered most
important in a respondent’s and a candidate’s country rather
than in the European Union.
Moreover, respondents are asked about their satisfaction with
the functioning of democracy in
their own country.
The two main issues with the data that remain are, first, that
the candidates who
participated in the candidate study stood for election to the
European Parliament and not
national parliaments and, second, that the candidate survey
response rate is very low in some
countries. However, I account for these drawbacks by weighting
the candidate study data and
controlling for the survey response rate, as I will explain
below. In light of a lack of alternative
cross-national data suitable for measuring priority congruence,
using the EES is therefore
appropriate.
Measuring Priority Congruence
The priority congruence variable indicates how salient a
respondent’s issue priorities are
among her country’s EP candidates. Both the voter and the
candidate survey asked respondents
what they thought were the most, second most, and third most
important problems (MIP) their
country is currently facing. The issues mentioned were
summarised into 24 categories (cf. Table
1). Each issue category’s salience among a country’s candidates
was calculated as the relative
frequency with which it was mentioned in the replies to the MIP
questions. The candidates’
issue mentions were weighted, first, based on their party’s vote
share at the most recent
national parliamentary election and, second, based on whether an
issue was mentioned as the
most, second most, or third most important as follows:
Salience = frequency as MIP * .5 + frequency as second MIP * .34
+ frequency as third MIP * .16.
The salience of each issue category among each country’s
candidates is listed in Table 1.
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[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
In a second step, each respondent in the voter survey was
assigned the salience scores derived
from the candidate survey of the issues she mentioned as most
important. The salience scores
for all issues a respondent mentioned were averaged, again
giving more weight to the most
important issue than to the second and third most important
issues:1
Priority congruence = MIP salience *.5 + second MIP salience
*.34 + third MIP salience *.16.
The resulting score indicates the respondent’s level of priority
congruence. If, for instance, a
Polish respondent mentioned the economic situation as the most
important problem, health
care as the second most important problem, and immigration as
the third most important
problem, her priority congruence score will be .379 *.5 + .049 *
.34 +.042 * .16 = .213, because
the weighted percentage of economic issues among Polish EP
candidate’ concerns was 37.9, the
salience of health care was 4.9, and that of immigration was
4.2. The priority congruence score
is thus equivalent to the weighted frequency of the respondent’s
issue priorities on her
country’s candidates’ agendas.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Since this measure is relatively novel, we should explore it in
more detail before
proceeding to the analysis. Theoretically, priority congruence
can range from zero, in case a
respondent’s issue priority is not mentioned by candidates at
all, to one – or one hundred per
cent – when each candidate only mentions the respondent’s issue
priority. The empirical range
is generally between 0 and about .4, with the lowest maximum at
.18 in Slovenia and the highest
at .71 in Ireland (Table 2). The maximum is dependent on the
proportion with which the most
salient issue among the candidates in a country was mentioned.
The distribution of priority
congruence in each country is displayed in Figure 1. In many
countries we see a spike at the
empirical maximum of congruence, which indicates that a large
number of respondents
mentioned the issues that were also highly salient among their
country’s candidates. We also
see that there is quite some variance in congruence within each
country.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
1 Additional analyses that were performed with priority
congruence measures based on different
weighting schemes or only including the most important problem
suggest that the observed effects are
robust to changes in the precise calculation of the measure.
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The effect of priority congruence on satisfaction with
democracy
As a first step, I analyse the effect of priority congruence on
satisfaction with democracy within
each country to obtain an impression of whether the relationship
exists across countries and
how it varies. Satisfaction with democracy is measured by the
item “On the whole, how satisfied
are you with the way democracy works in [country]? Very
satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very
satisfied, or not at all satisfied?” Figure 2 displays the
distribution of levels of satisfaction among
respondents in each country, ordered by countries’ mean level of
satisfaction. For the analyses,
the four answer categories were collapsed into a dummy with 1
indicating that a respondent is
satisfied rather than dissatisfied in order to eliminate
culturally based differences in the
tendency to use the extreme categories and to avoid estimation
problems due to empty cells.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
I include a range of control variables that have been shown to
be related to satisfaction
with democracy. Age, sex (female), education, and social class
are included as socio-demographic
controls. Moreover, I include the strength of party
identification (with 0 indicating no
identification), since “[p]eople who identify strongly with a
party tend to be much more
supportive of the idea that the political system functions
properly than people without strong
party attachment” (Anderson et al. 2005: 76; Miller and Listhaug
1990). The evaluation of the
development of the economic situation over the previous twelve
months and economic
expectations with regard to the next twelve months are included
because perceptions of
economic conditions have been found to be an important predictor
of satisfaction with
democracy (Borre 2000; Dalton 2004; Kim 2009).
Since previous studies have found citizens who are closer to
representatives on the left-
right dimension tend to be more satisfied with democracy
(Curini, Jou, and Memoli 2012; Kim
2009; Uyar 2013), I also include a variable measuring the
distance between a respondent’s self-
placement on the left-right dimension and the mean position of
all parties calculated by
averaging all respondents’ mean party placements in each
country. Similarly to Golder and
Stramski’s (2010) measure, which relies on the most educated
respondents’ perceptions of
parties’ positions, this more objective measure of party
positions avoids a ‘projection bias’
(Kedar 2005: 191; Macdonald, Rabinowitz, and Listhaug 1997),
where respondents who are
more satisfied with democracy might place parties closer to
their own positions.
Table 3 shows the results of the logistic regression analyses
predicting satisfaction with
democracy (only the estimates for priority congruence are
reported but the models include the
control variables listed above). The estimates, and in
particular the standard errors and p-
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values, cannot be directly compared across countries since the
samples are different.
Nevertheless, the results give us an indication of the effect of
priority congruence on satisfaction
in each country. In most countries, we find positive
coefficients, indicating that citizens with
higher levels of priority congruence tend to be more satisfied
with democracy. The eleven
countries in which the effect is significant at the .05-level
are marked in bold. For these
countries, the results confirm Hypothesis 1: Citizens are more
satisfied with the functioning of
democracy in their country if their issue priorities are more
strongly emphasised by political
representatives. The findings also appear to be in line with
Hypotheses 2: Countries vary in the
extent to which priority congruence affects satisfaction.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Exploring variation in the effect of priority congruence on
satisfaction with democracy
I explore variation in the effect in more detail using
multilevel logistic regression analysis.
Estimating the effect of priority congruence as well as the
cross-country variance of the effect in
the pooled sample including all 27 countries measures more
systematically how the effect
differs across countries. The random-slope model is presented in
Table 4. It includes the same
individual-level variables as the previous models and, in
addition, several control variables on
the country level that should predict country-level differences
in satisfaction with democracy.
GDP per capita in 2009 measures a country’s economic
development, which has been found to
affect satisfaction with democracy (e.g. Bernauer and Vatter
2011).2 Furthermore, it has been
argued that citizens in countries with proportional election
systems should be more satisfied
with democracy since election outcomes are more representative
and because democracy has
been argued to be generally of higher quality in consensus
systems (Aarts and Thomassen 2008;
Bernauer and Vatter 2011; Lijphart 1999). I therefore control
for the proportionality of the
electoral system even though empirical evidence regarding its
effect on satisfaction has been
mixed (e.g. Aarts and Thomassen 2008; Anderson and Guillory
1997; McAllister 2005). The
Gallagher Index (Gallagher and Mitchell 2008), or Least Squares
Index, measures the
discrepancy between parties’ vote and seat shares according to
the following equation:3
√
∑
2 Data were obtained from the World Bank
(http://data.worldbank.org/).
3 Data were obtained from the Quality of Government Institute
(http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/data).
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I also include the measure of the quality of democracy and
governance, whose
hypothesised influence on the effect of priority congruence will
be tested further on, since
citizens in more democratic countries should on average be more
satisfied with the functioning
of democracy (e.g. Wagner, Schneider, and Halla 2009). The
quality of democracy and
governance in 2009 is measured by a combined measure of several
indices that are part of the
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators.4 The Voice and
Accountability index combines
several indicators of political rights, civil liberties, press
freedom etc. It functions as the main
indicator of the quality of democracy. The quality of governance
is measured by several indices,
including the Control of Corruption index, which combines a
range of indicators of corruption
perceptions among experts and citizens from a variety of
sources. The Government Effectiveness
index “captures perceptions of the quality of public services,
the quality of the civil service and
the degree of its independence from political pressures, the
quality of policy formulation and
implementation, and the credibility of the government's
commitment to such policies”
(Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2012). Lastly, the Rule of Law
index measures “perceptions of
the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the
rules of society, and in particular
the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the
police, and the courts, as well as the
likelihood of crime and violence” (2012). Each indicator is
composite of a multitude of measures
drawn from different sources, namely citizen and firm surveys,
commercial business
information providers (such as the Economist Intelligence Unit),
non-governmental
organisations, and public sector organisations such as the World
Bank.
The four democracy and governance indices are strongly
correlated: the average inter-
item correlation for the standardised variables is .94. I
therefore construct an additive scale that
combines the four indicators to measure the quality of democracy
and governance. The scale
reliability coefficient is extremely high with Cronbach’s α =
.98. This measure of democracy and
good governance is more suitable for this study than other
commonly used measures of
democracy, such as Freedom House’s Freedom of the World Index or
Polity IV, since these
measures show hardly any variation in the quality of democracy
among the European countries,
whose scores are generally at or close to the maximum. The
Worldwide Governance Indicators,
on the other hand, vary quite substantively across EU countries
(cf. Appendix 1) as they include
a wide range of information.
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
The results of the multilevel logistic regression analyses
estimating the effect of
congruence on satisfaction with democracy are shown in Table 4.
Across the pooled sample of
4 Data were obtained from the World Bank
(http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp).
-
14
all EU countries, priority congruence has a positive significant
(p
-
15
democracy, while the salience of economic issues also has a
significant (p
-
16
significantly correlated with both the quality of democracy
(Pearson’s r = .79, p
-
17
Estonia; the oldest democracies have as much experience with
democracy as the UK and
Sweden. The former are generally less satisfied with democracy
and their satisfaction is not
significantly influenced by priority congruence. Individuals in
societies with a long experience of
democratic rule, on the other hand, are generally more satisfied
with the functioning of their
system and their satisfaction is even higher when their issue
priorities are considered
important by representatives.
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]
We thus find clear support for the hypothesis that citizens in
countries with high levels
of democratic quality and good governance pay more attention to
the quality of policy
representation when evaluating democracy. For the age of
democracy, the effect is less robust
but points into the same direction. A final robustness check to
test the validity of the results
concerns the low response rates in the candidate surveys in some
of the countries. It might be
the case that the estimates of the salience of issue categories
are less accurate in countries with
very low response rates and, hence, the measure of priority
congruence is less valid there. As a
consequence, then, we might find weaker or no effects of the
priority congruence measure on
satisfaction with democracy in these countries. If, in turn, the
response rate was related to the
quality or the age of democracy, this could then mean that the
interaction effects we have found
are spurious and in fact caused by cross-country differences in
the validity of the congruence
measure rather than in different expectations towards democracy.
Inspecting the correlation
between these variables shows that, indeed, the quality of
democracy and the candidate survey
response rate are strongly and significantly positively
correlated (Pearson’s r=.55; p=.003;
N=27). The age of democracy, on the other hand, is not
significantly related to the response rate
(Pearson’s r=.32; p=.100; N=27).
In order to exclude this possibility of spurious results, I
include the interaction between
priority congruence and the response rate in Models 5-1 and 5-2.
The results show that the
quality of democracy significantly (p
-
18
if they feel that political representatives try to implement
their policy preferences (Aarts and
Thomassen 2008; Anderson 2010; McAllister 2005; Muller 1970). A
number of studies have
shown that citizens whose ideological positions in terms of left
and right are represented are
indeed more satisfied with democracy (Ezrow and Xezonakis 2011;
Kim 2009; Uyar 2013). But
having policy preferences also entails prioritising some issues
over others. Recently, it has been
shown for the German case that citizens whose policy priorities
are shared by representatives
also tend to be more satisfied with democracy (Reher 2012,
2013). This paper studies the
priority congruence-satisfaction link across the 27 European
Union countries. Using European
Parliament candidates’ most important policy concerns as a proxy
for national representatives’
policy priorities, the analysis of European Election Study (EES)
data suggest that in several
countries citizens whose issue concerns are more salient among
representatives tend to
evaluate the quality of democracy in their country more
positively.
However, the existence and the strength of this relationship
vary across countries,
indicated by the random slope variance of the effect of priority
congruence estimated in a
multilevel logistic regression model. Such variation is in line
with theoretical expectations, since
citizens’ satisfaction with democracy should only be affected by
the quality of representation if
they consider it to be an important defining aspect of
democracy. In countries where more
fundamental elements of democracy, such as free and fair
elections, freedom of expression or
the rule of law, are deficient, citizens should place more
emphasis on the quality of these aspects
when evaluating the functioning of democracy. While the quality
of policy representation is
without doubt a crucial component of representative democracy
and a system can be
considered more democratic – ceteris paribus – if citizens’
policy preferences are more closely
represented, it should be lower in individuals’ ‘hierarchy of
democratic needs’ than necessary
and more fundamental elements of democracy. Substantive policy
representation should thus
only be an important criterion for the evaluation with democracy
when more basic criteria are
in place.
We reach the same conclusion if we think about the conditions
under which a high level
of priority congruence indicates that the substantive
representation process is functioning well.
It only does if it is reasonable to assume that, first,
congruence is actually the result of
representatives’ desire to represent their constituents and,
second, that the issue priorities
voiced by representatives will actually be reflected in the
policy-making process. These
conditions are less likely to be fulfilled in countries where
democratic processes and the rule of
law are not functioning properly. If, for instance, political
elites are corrupt, they may prioritise
certain issues because of particularistic interests rather than
the broader population’s
preferences. If office holders are not held accountable, their
incentives to actually implement
-
19
the policies they proposed to gain support might be low. Again,
we would then expect that the
level of priority congruence does not make it into the pool of
criteria citizens use when
evaluating the functioning of their democracy. The results of
multilevel logistic regression
analyses with cross-level interaction effects show exactly this
pattern: priority congruence
affects satisfaction with democracy most strongly in the
European countries with the highest
levels of democracy and good governance but not in countries
with lower levels of democracy.
In addition to the quality of democracy and governance, a
society’s experience with
democracy was also hypothesised to affect the relationship
between priority congruence and
satisfaction with democracy. Previous research shows that the
conceptions individuals have of
what democracy means differ based on individual characteristics
but also on the context in
which they live. Citizens in countries that have recently made
the transition to democracy tend
to equate democracy with social and economic benefits more
frequently than people in older
democracies (Dalton, Shin, and Jou 2007; Norris 2011). As a
result, we might expect that the
quality of policy representation has a weaker effect on
satisfaction with democracy in the
younger European democracies, for their citizens should pay more
attention to socio-economic
outcomes when evaluating their system. Within the EU, the
societies with the shortest
experience with democracy are in Central and Eastern Europe.
Their Communist legacy might
make their citizens particularly prone to associate democracy
with social and economic output,
since the transition to democracy was strongly linked to the
transition to a market economy
here. While the analyses do show a moderating effect of the age
of democracy on the
relationship between congruence and satisfaction, the effect was
found to be less robust than
that of the quality of democracy when controlling for other
factors.
Since the quality and the age of democracy are strongly
correlated within the EU, it was
not possible to test whether one variable’s interaction effect
wit priority congruence is merely a
reflection of the other’s. Future research should aim at solving
this problem in order to clarify
which societal-level factors really are responsible for whether
policy representation affects
satisfaction with democracy. Moreover, we should try to uncover
in what other ways the
explanations of satisfaction with democracy varies across
contexts: Which other individual-level
predictors of satisfaction differ across countries in their
explanatory power, and which other
contextual variables cause this variation? The effects of other
indicators of policy representation
on satisfaction with democracy across countries should be
analysed in order to establish
whether the patterns we found for priority congruence can be
generalised to substantive policy
representation more broadly defined.
-
20
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TABLES
Table 1. Weighted salience of issue categories among countries’
EP candidates
Belgium Czech Rep.
Denmark Germany Estonia Greece Spain France Ireland Italy Cyprus
Latvia Lithuania Luxem-bourg
Civil rights & liberties
.06 .33 .07 .02 .03 .07 .01 .04 .00 .03 .08 .16 .15 .05
Health .01 .00 .00 .01 .05 .02 .00 .01 .00 .01 .11 .02 .02 .00
Agriculture .00 .00 .03 .00 .00 .00 .01 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Education .01 .02 .00 .05 .00 .04 .19 .03 .00 .05 .05 .02 .02 .05
Environment .07 .09 .18 .05 .01 .00 .00 .07 .04 .02 .03 .00 .00 .02
Energy .00 .03 .00 .02 .03 .00 .00 .01 .03 .00 .00 .00 .13 .01 Law,
crime, and domestic security
.00 .01 .10 .00 .00 .15 .08 .00 .00 .06 .00 .00 .01 .00
Social justice & welfare
.02 .01 .07 .12 .10 .04 .00 .11 .00 .06 .00 .10 .04 .24
Military and defence
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Science, Technology & Communications
.00 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .03 .00 .07 .00 .00 .00 .00
Foreign affairs & EU .01 .00 .10 .01 .00 .00 .00 .02 .04 .01
.39 .01 .00 .00 Elderly .03 .04 .00 .01 .11 .00 .00 .02 .00 .02 .00
.03 .00 .00 Family .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .03 .00 .00 .01
.00 .00 Regional and local administration
.13 .07 .10 .05 .04 .06 .05 .02 .00 .06 .02 .08 .04 .00
Culture .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .02 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01
Church and Religion .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
.00 .00 Multiculturalism and immigration
.13 .02 .12 .02 .06 .05 .00 .07 .00 .09 .02 .09 .06 .00
Economic system .04 .08 .11 .11 .12 .02 .02 .05 .09 .13 .00 .20
.03 .00 Economic and financial situation
.48 .25 .36 .51 .41 .41 .48 .50 .71 .38 .21 .24 .35 .50
Transportation .01 .00 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
.00 .00 Human interest .00 .02 .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
.00 .00 .00
No. of respondents 75 28 31 160 34 33 68 125 8 73 8 54 38 20
-
25
[Table 1 continued]
Hungary Malta Netherlands Austria Poland Portugal Slovenia
Slovakia Finland Sweden UK Bulgaria Romania
Civil rights & liberties .18 .05 .05 .01 .03 .08 .01 .10 .10
.06 .06 .04 .23
Health .00 .01 .00 .00 .05 .00 .00 .02 .02 .02 .01 .00 .01
Agriculture .00 .00 .00 .00 .02 .00 .00 .02 .01 .00 .00 .00
.00
Education .00 .00 .01 .02 .00 .12 .00 .00 .00 .01 .03 .00
.01
Environment .00 .03 .16 .05 .02 .00 .14 .04 .16 .21 .16 .00
.00
Energy .00 .04 .04 .00 .10 .03 .00 .02 .00 .00 .02 .00 .02
Law, crime, and domestic security
.00 .00 .02 .05 .01 .08 .02 .00 .00 .02 .05 .05 .00
Social justice & welfare
.12 .01 .01 .07 .00 .02 .04 .01 .11 .11 .04 .07 .01
Military and defence .00 .00 .00 .04 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01
.00 .00
Science, Technology & Communications
.00 .00 .00 .00 .18 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .01 .00 .04
Foreign affairs & EU .01 .00 .00 .00 .13 .02 .08 .07 .01 .02
.04 .00 .02
Elderly .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 .00 .04 .09 .00 .03 .00 .01
Family .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .02 .00 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00
Regional and local administration
.08 .00 .00 .01 .01 .00 .00 .00 .02 .01 .00 .01 .06
Culture .00 .00 .09 .00 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 .00
Church and Religion .00 .00 .02 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
.00 .00
Multiculturalism and immigration
.12 .38 .15 .18 .04 .00 .01 .11 .04 .05 .02 .00 .01
Economic system .01 .12 .01 .22 .01 .03 .18 .02 .12 .12 .01 .00
.02
Economic and financial situation
.48 .34 .44 .35 .38 .59 .17 .52 .32 .34 .48 .40 .22
Transportation .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .02 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
.00
Human interest .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
.00
No. of respondents 31 14 78 52 40 17 23 35 55 183 258 7 28
-
26
Table 2. Descriptives of priority congruence
Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum N
Belgium .30 .15 0 .48 690
Czech Republic
.20 .09 0 .33 907
Denmark .19 .10 0 .36 873
Germany .38 .14 0 .51 861
Estonia .27 .12 0 .41 930
Greece .25 .11 0 .41 937
Spain .35 .20 0 .48 982
France .29 .15 0 .50 967
Ireland .45 .22 0 .71 947
Italy .20 .11 0 .38 867
Cyprus .27 .09 0 .39 883
Latvia .17 .06 0 .24 908
Lithuania .25 .09 0 .35 926
Luxembourg .36 .15 0 .50 905
Hungary .30 .13 0 .48 778
Malta .23 .11 0 .38 904
Netherlands .27 .14 0 .44 792
Austria .23 .10 0 .35 829
Poland .23 .12 0 .38 845
Portugal .38 .21 0 .59 948
Slovenia .11 .05 0 .18 910
Slovakia .37 .16 0 .52 927
Finland .21 .10 0 .32 852
Sweden .18 .09 0 .34 916
UK .24 .15 0 .48 866
Bulgaria .22 .15 0 .40 831
Romania .16 .06 0 .23 923
Total .26 .15 0 .71 23904
-
27
Table 3. Effect of priority congruence on satisfaction with
democracy in each EU country
Coefficient Std. error p-value Pseudo R2 LR chi2 N
Belgium 0.44 0.71 .537 .05 30.78*** 460
Czech Republic 0.94 0.88 .287 .06 61.65*** 710
Denmark 4.10 1.49 .006 .07 27.23** 789
Germany 1.64 0.62 .009 .08 65.96*** 672
Estonia 3.17 0.79 .000 .10 87.68*** 610
Greece 1.54 0.81 .058 .08 71.39*** 785
Spain 1.82 0.65 .005 .07 66.54*** 760
France 1.52 0.56 .007 .09 85.40*** 680
Ireland 2.22 0.37 .000 .08 81.25*** 764
Italy 0.65 0.87 .458 .11 82.06*** 549
Cyprus 1.42 1.05 .177 .10 88.04*** 672
Latvia -1.99 2.05 .333 .12 67.38*** 636
Lithuania -0.20 1.07 .849 .07 50.83*** 548
Luxembourg 1.46 0.82 .076 .08 39.42*** 676
Hungary 0.09 0.84 .918 .07 38.85*** 602
Malta 2.79 1.06 .009 .14 76.47*** 395
Netherlands 1.92 0.70 .007 .03 17.61* 683
Austria 0.81 0.87 .350 .05 40.13*** 665
Poland 1.18 0.89 .187 .10 62.72*** 504
Portugal 0.45 0.40 .271 .06 50.29*** 664
Slovenia 2.34 1.72 .175 .06 54.63*** 721
Slovakia 0.68 0.55 .217 .04 39.82*** 646
Finland 2.45 1.00 .014 .09 70.85*** 702
Sweden 4.45 1.09 .000 .12 88.49*** 786
UK 2.25 0.54 .000 .08 76.46*** 711
Bulgaria 1.70 0.91 .063 .07 30.12*** 478
Romania -1.56 1.65 .346 .06 34.96*** 527
Notes: Coefficients are log-odds estimates of logistic
regression analysis. Models were estimated including the following
control variables: age, female, education, social class, economic
situation, party identification, prospective economic situation,
left-right distance. Models with significant (p
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28
Table 4. Effect of priority congruence on satisfaction with
democracy with random slope
estimation for priority congruence
Model 4
Coeff. SE p-value
Fixed effects Constant -2.01 .14 .000
Individual level
Age .00 .00 .104
Female -.09 .04 .010
Education .06 .01 .000
Class .19 .02 .000
PID strength .13 .02 .000
Economic situation .25 .02 .000
Economic expectations .35 .02 .000
Left-right distance -.03 .01 .003
Priority congruence 1.49 .20 .000
Country level
Quality of democracy .21 .08 .007
GDP/capita .01 .01 .113
Gallagher Index -.04 .03 .147
Random variance
Priority congruence .419 .291
Constant .254 .077
Constant-slope covariance .193 .133
Deviance 19368
Notes: Coefficients are log-odds from multilevel logistic
regression, estimated in Stata 12. Level-1 N (individuals) = 17985;
level-2 N (countries) = 27.
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29
Table 5. Moderating effects of the quality and the age of
democracy on the effect of priority congruence on satisfaction with
democracy
Model 5-1 Model 5-2 Model 5-3 Model 5-4
Coeff. SE p-value Coeff. SE p-value Coeff. SE p-value Coeff. SE
p-value
Fixed effects
Constant -2.02 .14 .000 -2.01 .16 .000 -2.01 .14 .000 -2,01 .16
.000
Individual level
Age .00 .00 .112 .00 .00 .095 .00 .00 .109 .00 .00 .096
Female -.09 .04 .011 -.09 .04 .010 -.09 .04 .012 -.09 .04
.010
Education .06 .01 .000 .06 .01 .000 .06 .01 .000 .06 .01
.000
Class .19 .02 .000 .19 .02 .000 .19 .02 .000 .19 .02 .000
PID strength .13 .02 .000 .13 .02 .000 .13 .02 .000 .13 .02
.000
Economic situation .25 .02 .000 .25 .02 .000 .25 .02 .000 .25
.02 .000
Economic expectations .35 .02 .000 .35 .02 .000 .35 .02 .000 .35
.02 .000
Left-right distance -.03 .01 .003 -.03 .01 .003 -.03 .01 .003
-.03 .01 .003
Priority congruence 1.39 .18 .000 1.39 .17 .000 1.39 .18 .000
1.39 .17 .000
Country level
Quality of democracy .28 .07 .000 .28 .07 .000
Age of democracy .01 .01 .146 .01 .01 .146
GDP/capita .01 .01 .256 .02 .01 .003 .01 .01 .241 .02 .01
.003
Gallagher Index -.04 .03 .197 -.07 .04 .076 -.04 .03 .199 -.07
.04 .076
Cross-level interactions Priority congruence * quality of
democracy
.26 .09 .003 .38 .14 .008
Priority congruence * age of democracy
.01 .01 .016 .01 .01 .063
Priority congruence * GDP/capita
-.02 .02 .290 .00 .01 .930
Random variance
Priority congruence .253 .214 .188 .218 .265 .207 .187 .218
Constant .239 .068 .349 .098 .240 .068 .350 .098
Deviance 19362 19376 19361 19376
Notes: Coefficients are log-odds from multilevel logistic
regression, estimated in Stata 12. Level-1 N (individuals) = 17985;
level-2 N (countries) = 27. Constant-slope covariance set to
independent.
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30
FIGURES
Figure 1. Distribution of priority congruence by country and in
pooled EU sample
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31
Figure 2. Distribution of levels of satisfaction with democracy
in EU countries, ordered by mean
level of satisfaction
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Bulgaria
Latvia
Hungary
Romania
Greece
Lithuania
Portugal
Slovenia
Estonia
Slovakia
Italy
Czech Rep.
UK
France
Cyprus
Austria
Spain
Germany
Malta
Belgium
Ireland
Finland
Poland
Netherlands
Sweden
Luxembourg
Denmark
Very dissatisfied
Quite dissatisfied
Quite satisfied
Very satisfied
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32
Figure 3. Predicted effect of priority congruence on
satisfaction with democracy per country
(Notes: Empirical Bayes predictors based on Model 4; predicted
coefficients are log-odds.)
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33
Figure 4. Predicted probability of being satisfied with
democracy across priority congruence
levels at low and high levels of democracy and governance
quality (Notes: Predicted
probabilities at low quality of democracy are average predicted
probabilities for individuals in
the two countries with the lowest levels of democracy (Romania
and Bulgaria); probabilities at
high quality of democracy are the equivalent for individuals in
the two countries with the
highest levels (Denmark and Finland). Predictions are based on a
random-intercept multilevel
logistic model equivalent to Model 5-1 without the random slope
component.)
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34
Figure 5. Predicted probability of being satisfied with
democracy across priority congruence
levels at low and high age of democracy (Notes: Predicted
probabilities at low age of democracy
are average predicted probabilities for individuals in the two
countries with the most recent
transitions to democracy (Romania and Estonia); probabilities at
high age of democracy are the
equivalent for individuals in the two countries with the most
distant transitions (United
Kingdom and Sweden). Predictions are based on a random-intercept
multilevel logistic model
equivalent to Model 5-2 without the random slope component.)
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35
APPENDIX 1. Descriptives of country-level variables
Quality of democracy
and governance Age of
democracy GDP per capita, 2009
(in $1000 ppp) Gallagher Index
Mean (std. dev.) 4.453 (2.326) 45.064 (29.047) 31424.69
(19860.25) 4.91 (3.55)
Range -0.317 – 8.190 9 – 129 6403 – 100541 .72 – 16.73
Belgium 5.873 65 43848 3.37
Czech Republic 3.123 16 18806 5.72
Denmark 8.190 63 56227 0.72
Germany 6.237 59 40275 2.16
Estonia 3.882 9 14264 3.43
Greece 2.301 34 28452 6.99
Spain 4.352 31 31714 4.49
France 5.418 63 40477 13.58
Ireland 6.028 88 50034 5.85
Italy 2.311 61 35073 3.61
Cyprus 4.386 37 29428 2.42
Lithuania 1.956 18 11034 11.14
Latvia 2.108 18 11476 4.77
Luxembourg 7.240 63 100541 3.36
Hungary 2.868 19 12635 5.13
Malta 4.562 45 19564 1.44
Netherlands 7.118 63 48174 1.03
Austria 6.755 63 45859 2.92
Poland 2.642 18 11294 4.67
Portugal 4.678 33 22016 5.75
Slovenia 4.208 18 24051 3.89
Slovakia 2.315 16 16100 5.53
Finland 7.865 65 44838 3.20
Sweden 7.713 92 43640 3.02
UK 6.057 129 35331 16.73
Bulgaria 0.350 19 6403 3.97
Romania -0.317 13 7500 3.74
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APPENDIX 2: Priority congruence and the salience of economic
issues
Figure A1. Mean levels of priority congruence at different
levels of the salience of economic
issues in EU countries
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37
Table A1. Effects of priority congruence on satisfaction with
democracy, controlling for the
salience of economic issues
Coeff. SE p-value
Fixed effects Constant -2.00 .17 .000
Individual level
Age .00 .00 .216 Female -.12 .04 .002 Education .07 .02 .000
Class .19 .02 .000 PID strength .13 .02 .000 Economic situation
.24 .02 .000
Economic expectations .34 .02 .000
Left-right distance -.03 .01 .013 Priority congruence 1.26 .26
.000 Economic issue salience .07 .03 .014
Country level
Quality of democracy .27 .08 .001 GDP/capita .01 .01 .218
Gallagher Index -.03 .03 .236
Random variance
Priority congruence .174 .313
Constant .269 .077
Constant-slope covariance -.005 .117
Deviance 16996
Notes: Coefficients are log-odds from multilevel logistic
regression, estimated in Stata 12. Level-1 N (individuals) = 15340;
level-2 N (countries) = 27.
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38
APPENDIX 3. Moderating effects of the quality and the age of
democracy on the effect of
priority congruence on satisfaction with democracy, controlling
for the moderating effect of the
candidate survey response rate
Model A3-1 Model A3-2
Coeff. SE p-value Coeff. SE p-value
Fixed effects
Constant -1.78 .30 .000 -2.01 .14 .000
Individual level
Age .00 .00 .111 .00 .00 .095
Female -.09 .04 .012 -.09 .04 .011
Education .06 .01 .000 .06 .01 .000
Class .19 .02 .000 .19 .02 .000
PID strength .13 .02 .000 .13 .02 .000
Economic situation .25 .02 .000 .25 .02 .000
Economic expectations .35 .02 .000 .35 .02 .000
Left-right distance -.03 .01 .003 -.03 .01 .003
Priority congruence 1.19 .51 .019 .88 .43 .039
Country level
Quality of democracy .31 .07 .000
Age of democracy .01 .01 .172
Candidate survey response rate -.01 .01 .375 .00 .01 .665
GDP/capita .01 .01 .284 .02 .01 .005
Gallagher Index -.04 .03 .145 -.06 .04 .107
Cross-level interactions Priority congruence * quality of
democracy
.24 .11 .023
Priority congruence * age of democracy
.01 .01 .042
Priority congruence * candidate survey response rate
.01 .02 .672 .02 .02 .200
Random variance
Priority congruence .242 .211 .162 .205
Constant .230 .066 .347 .098
Deviance 19362 19374
Notes: Coefficients are log-odds from multilevel logistic
regression, estimated in Stata 12. Level-1 N (individuals) = 17395;
level-2 N (countries) = 27. Constant-slope covariance set to
independent.