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AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS NETWORK SECURITY TEKNIS PELATIHAN KEAMANAN INFORMASI AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS
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Network security

May 18, 2015

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Ammar WK

Technical Workshop Materials about Network Security for BBPT
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Page 1: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

NETWORK SECURITYTEKNIS PELATIHAN KEAMANAN INFORMASI

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

Page 2: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

AGENDA

NETWORK LAYER

INTERNET PROTOCOL

IPV 4

IPV 6

IPSEC

NETWORK PACKET INSPECTION

Page 3: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

AGENDA

ATTACKING IP V4

PASSIVE

ACTIVE

COMMON TYPES OF ATTACK + HANDS ON

EAVESDROPPING

SNIFFER ATTACK

Page 4: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

AGENDA

COMMON TYPES OF ATTACK

SPOOFING

TUNNELING

MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE (MITM) ATTACK

DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACK

DEFENCE

Page 5: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

NETWORK LAYER

NO. 3 FROM OSI MODEL

PROVIDES THE FUNCTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL MEANS OF TRANSFERING VARIABLE LENGTH DATA SEQUENCES FROM SOURCE HOST TO A DESTINATION ON ONE NETWORK TO ANOTHER, WHILE MAINTAINING THE QOS REQUESTED BY TRANSPORT LAYER

FUCTION: PATH DETERMINATION AND LOGICAL ADRESSING; DATA UNIT : PACKET/DATAGRAM

IP (IPV4, IPV6), ICMP, IPSEC, IGMP, IPX, APPLE TALK

[1]: WIKIPEDIA.ORG

Page 6: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

OSI 7 LAYER

[1]: WIKIPEDIA.ORG

Page 7: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

INTERNET PROTOCOL

RESPONSIBLE FOR ADDRESSING HOSTS AND ROUTING DATAGRAM (PACKETS) FROM A SOURCE HOST TO DESTINATION HOST ACCROSS ONE OR MORE IP NETWORK.

[1]: WIKIPEDIA.ORG

Page 8: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

IPV4

FOURTH REVISION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF IP AND THE FIRST VERSION OF THE PROTOCOL WIDELY DEPLOYED

CONNECTIONLESS, NOT GUARANTEE DELIVERY, NOT ASSURING PROPER SEQUENCE OR AVOIDANCE OF DUPLICATE DELIVERY,

32 BIT = 192.168.0.1

IPSEC IS OPTIONAL

[1]: WIKIPEDIA.ORG

Page 9: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

IPV 6

SUCCESSOR OF IPV4 WITH MORE “BETTER” IMPROVEMENTS

NEW PACKET HEADER

MULTICAST (MULTIPLE DESTINATION IN SINGLE OPERATION)

STATELESS ADDRESS AUTO CONFIGURATION

LARGER ADDRESS SPACE 128 BIT = 2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334

IPSEC SUPPORT IS MANDATORY

Page 10: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

IPSEC

PROTOCOL SUITE FOR SECURING INTERNET PROTOCOL (IP) COMMUNICATIONS BY AUTHENTICATING AND ENCRYPTINH EACH IP PACKET OF A COMMUNICATION SESSION.

END-TO-END SECURITY SCHEME

PROTECT ANY APPLICATION TRAFFIC ACCROSS IP NETWORK

AUTHENTICATION HEADER (AH), ENCAPSULATING SECURITY PAYLOAD (ESP), SECURITY ASSOCIATIONS (SA)

Page 11: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

IPV4 V.S IPV6

Page 12: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

NETWORK PACKET INSPECTION

Page 13: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

HANDS ONWIRESHARK PACKET INSPECTION

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

Page 14: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

ATTACKING IPV4

SECURITY ISSUE LIES ON INTERNET PROTOCOL (NETWORK LAYER), NO AUTH AND ENCRYPTION

IPSEC OPTIONAL

UPPER LAYER, CREATED WITHOUT SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS,

TCP PROTOCOLS: FTP, TELNET, SMTP, POP3

Page 15: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

ATTACKING IPV4

PASSIVE : NETWORK PACKET INFORMATION MIGHT BE MONITORED;

ACTIVE: NETWORK PACKET INFORMATION IS ALTERED IN INTENT TO MODIFY, CORRUPT, OR DESTROY TEH DATA OR THE NETWORK.

Page 16: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

EAVESDROPPING

THE MAJORITY OF NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS OCCUR IN UNSECURED OR “CLEARTEXT” FORMAT

THE ABILITY TO MONITOR THE NETWORK COMMUNICATION IS THE BIGGEST SECURITY PROBLEMS THAT WE’VE FACED

HUB NETWORK DEVICE, ACCESS TO THE GATEWAY/ROUTER DEVICE

Page 17: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

SNIFFER ATTACK

SNIFFER IS AN APPLICATION OR DEVICE THAT CAN READ, MONITOR, AND CAPTURE NETWORK PACKET.

IF PACKET NOT ENCRYPTED THE ATTACKER CAN VIEW FULL DATA INSIDE THE PACKET

IF PACKET ENCRYPTED THE ATTACKER NEED TO CREATE/USE/HAVE A VALID KEY

TUNNEL ONLY PACKET CAN ALSO BE BROKEN OPEN AND READ

Page 18: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

SNIFFER ATTACK

TCPDUMP

WIRESHARK (FORMERLY ETHEREAL)

ETTERCAP

CAIN AND ABEL

DSNIFF

Page 19: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

HANDS ONWIRESHARK RECOVERY

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

Page 20: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

SPOOFING

SPOOF = MASQUEARADE[1]

IS A SITUATION IN WHICH A PROGRAM SUCCESSFULLY MASQUARADES AS ANOTHER BY FALSIFYING DATA AND THEREBY GAINING AN ILLEGITIMATE ADVANTAGE[2]

[1]: RFC4949[2]: WIKIPEDIA.ORG

Page 21: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

IPSPOOFING, E.G: MODIFY SOURCE ADDRESS

A COMMON MISCONCEPTION: IP SPOOFING CAN BE USED TO HIDE IP ADDRESS WHILE SURFING THE INTERNET, CHATTING, ON-LINE, AND SO FORTH. THIS IS GENERALLY NOT TRUE. FORGING THE SOURCES IP ADDRESS CAUSES THE RESPONSES TO BE MISDIRECTED, MEANING CANNOT CREATE NORMAL NETWORK CONNECTION.[1]

USUALLY COMBINE WITH NETWORK DOS/DDOS ATTACK

SPOOFING

[1]: ISS.NET

Page 22: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

HANDS ONMAC SPOOFING

IFCONFIG (IFACE) HW ETHER (NEW MAC)

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

Page 23: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

TUNNELING

TUNNEL IS A COMMUNICATION CHANNEL CREATED IN A COMPUTER NETWORK BY ENCAPSULATING (I.E., LAYERING) A COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL’S DATA PACKETS IN (I.E., ABOVE) A SECOND PROTOCOL THAT NORMALLY WOULD BE CARRIED ABOVE, OR AT THE SAME LAYER AS, THE FIRST ONE. [1]

HTTP, SSH, DNS, ICMP

SSH FOO@DOO -D PORT

[1]: RFC4949

Page 24: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

HANDS ONHTTP OVER SSH (SSH TUNNELING)

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

Page 25: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE

A FORM OF ATTACK IN WHICH THE ATTACKER MAKES INDEPENDENT CONNECTIONS WITH THE VICTIMS AND RELAYS MESSAGES BETWEEN THEM, MAKING THEM BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE TALKING DIRECTLY TO EACH OTHER , WHEN IN FACT THE ENTIRE CONVERSATION CONTROLLED BY THE ATTACKER.

ATTACKER IMPERSONATE EACH ENDPOINT TO THE SATISFACTION OF THE OTHER

Page 26: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE

Page 27: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

HANDS ONMAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE (MITM) USING CAIN ABEL

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

Page 28: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

DENIAL OF SERVICE

THE PREVENTION OF AUTHORIZED ACCESS TO A SYSTEM RESOURCE OR THE DELAYING OF SYSTEM OPERATIONS AND FUNCTION. [1]

PING OF DEATH (ICMP FLOODING), SYNFLOOD

DISTRIBUTED DOS, BOT NET

[1]: RFC4949

Page 29: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

DENIAL OF SERVICE

DOS ATTACKER MAY:

ATTEMPT TO FLOOD A NETWORK, THEREBY PREVENTING LEGITIMATE NETWORK TRAFFIC

ATTEMPT TO DISRUPT CONNECTIONS BETWEEN TWO MACHINES, THEREBY PREVENTING ACCESS TO SERVICE

ATTEMPT TO PREVENT PARTICULAR INDIVIDUAL FROM ACCESING A SERVICE

ATTEMPT TO DISRUPT SERVICE TO A SPECIFIC SYSTEM.

Page 30: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

DENIAL OF SERVICE

Page 31: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

HANDS ONEXAMPLE DOS

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

Page 32: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

DEFENCE

EDUCATE USER

USING IPSEC (IPV6)

IMPLEMENT BEST POLICY

CONFIGURING FIREWALL, IDS, IPS

REGULARLY AUDITS

Page 33: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

DISCUSSION

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

Page 34: Network security

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS

NETWORK SECURITYTEKNIS PELATIHAN KEAMANAN INFORMASI

AHMAD MUAMMAR !(C)2011 | @Y3DIPS