Method in Descartes and Utpaladeva' Ishwarprtabhigya karika.

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1Method in Descartes and Utpaladeva

SummaryMethod in Descartes and Utpaladeva .............................................................................. 1Presentation of the philosophical project .............................................. .................................... 2The reasonsTranscendental method ............................................... ............................................. 2Objections Buddhist logicians ............................................. ............................... 7Doubt as essential category of philosophy .......................................... 7 ........The transcendental ego 14Manifestation transcendental ............................................... ................................... 14Conclusion 21

He will be here to compare the theories of Nietzsche and Descartes with those ofa set ofthinkers who lived in the ninth century in Kashmir. It is surprising to see herea thinkerstranger to lights Greece qualified philosopher. What allows us to operatesuch a comparison?Consideration thoughts or "wisdom" gives non-Europeanusually rise to two types of reactions, also ruinous for thought. Either weholds that it is not philosophy, it is assumed that this is like our philosophy.Or it is not philosophy, in which case the comparison with a real philosophy

would not be legitimate or philosophy in question could be reduced to aWestern systems, in which case there would be little interest to confront it.Here we must avoid two pitfalls by showing a thought which, though no otherthing that philosophy, is not less a different philosophy and, as such, deservesbother to see the relevance of his theories examined fairly.But what do we mean by philosophy here? It would appear at first sightthe determination of its essence is a genuine problem for philosophyWestern. If you want to support the idea that the only true philosophy isWest should be able to produce a particular definition can include allWestern thoughts and be able to exclude all other speech. This seems verydifficult. In fact, it is quite clear that many European thinkers holdtheses closer to some authors Orientals as some authors Westerners.

That is why we adopt as a criterion rather the maxims of common sense1proposed by Kant: think for yourself, think putting himself in the place of another;think in accord with himself. Of particular note is the second maxim, that thejudgment. It says in effect that the issue of adequate philosophy - to rise to the pointuniversal view of reason - is primarily an ideal. But it also allows to distinguisha philosophy of simple exegesis of sacred texts. The philosopher relies on


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arguments acceptable by any human being as he is simply not endowed with reasonandnot as it is European or Indian confidant to a particular revelation. The exegeteargues well, but his arguments presuppose more theses accepted by faith."This is true because it is God who said". For the philosopher, the priority isreversed: it is1Faculty of judgment, paragraph 40.

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2(Possibly) because it is true that God has spoken. Seen, there is a back theredifference of degree, and we recognize countless possible intermediate between thesetwo poles. I therefore intend to philosophy by rational discourse aimed knowinglyhumanity and not to a particular community of faith.

Presentation of the philosophical projectThe reasons

But this is precisely the purpose of Utpaladeva. Although the author belongs toa2particular contemplative tradition, he declares at the outset that seeks to makeit possible, in the3justifying the recognition of one's identity with the Lord. It is stated that thisrecognition is the sovereign good, accessible to all, without distinction of any

kind thatcapacity due to its good behavior (that is to say the lead to the true sattarkarather thanto win at all costs - kutarka).But we say, perhaps with Nietzsche, it would be very naive to believe that the researchthe truth is really a search for the truth. Nietzsche tried to show that thedesire for truth is only the mask of a desire for revenge. In short, the projectUtpaladevais it an exotic version of the weak seeking revenge by persuading the strongideas that culpabiliseront? And to formulate an objection to the ways supporterssuspicion in the humanities, the project justification and redemption are universal

Should not be explained rather by a desire to dominate from the social group and4religious represented by the author to ensure its prestige and its domination? But itThis is more so to question the relevance of non-European philosophy, butmore radically about the existence of philosophy itself. Most approachesIndian thoughts specialized explain the effect of a set of "non-factorsepistemic ", such as the social context or language.In other words, we make trial of intentions. However, thinkers ivasme non-


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dual are aware of such an objection. They replied that there was no reason5priori to believe that motivation is not disinterested. We believe ourfrom any fair comparison to the other requires that we will at least accordionsbenefit of the doubt. The review will decide.

Transcendental method

2Utpaladeva (825-875) was the author of a philosophical poem, The stanzas on therecognition Lorditself, as well as two autocommentaires, plus two large comments by Abhinavagupta (975 -1050). These five treaties constitute the corpus of the school recognition (pratyabhij ). They are followers of?? Ivasme non-dualistic, that is to say, this part of the teachings iva (= God) proclaiming the identity ofcreator, creation and creatures, as well as the uselessness of the values ??prescribed in the traditionBrahmin (good-evil, pure-impure etc.).3IPK 1.1.1

4This thesis is supported by one of the greatest specialists?? Ivasme Kashmir, Professor AlexisSanderson Oxford.5Vimar?? 1.1.1 in ...

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Finally, we are aware that it criticizes the lack of Indian thoughtconceptual rigor and his ignorance of the principles of reason, such as the principle ofcontradiction. What is the method used by Utpaladeva? To demonstrate his thesiswhich each is God, he presented his speech as an explicit inferencefive members.What relationship with Descartes and Nietzsche? This: Nietzsche's theses6theses correspond to the Buddhist logicians; theses correspond to Descartesthose of some allies Utpaladeva. Given the problem of the essence of the subjectwesee - in short - what is the solution proposed by Utpaladeva.

Utpaladeva, having declared his plan for a universal salvation by reason Ad78briefly his method: a strategy transcendental. The Aivas seek to showoutset that neither Buddhists nor anyone can disprove the existence of God because God isthe condition of possibility, validity, intelligibility of everything.Descartes with skepticism, utpala will seek to show that the argumentsBuddhist validity condition for the validity of his own theses. In other words,Buddhists, for why should first admit they are wrong. Therefore,as the Buddhist thesis contradicts himself fatally, the thesis is necessarily ut


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palatrue.For this, his immediate goal is to explain how the recognition. Thissystem is itself a target soteriological. She is then seen as "exercisespiritual "(Pierre Hadot). That is to say, the system is also "means for thePerson who is the witness, who is none other than the Unsurpassable (that is tosay about the ultimate9absolute 'unsurpassable' in the sense that it can never be the object of a subject). In addition,Utpala proclaims at the end of his treatise that proposes a new way to men, althoughqu'Abhinavagupta states that this doctrine was already implicit in the textstaught by iva .To do this, utpala designing a project justification particularly complex. They10appropriate the inferential scheme developed by the Ny is called "inferenceothers. "Before briefly describe this scheme, it should be noted however that theutpala speech contains many denials of any method aimed atlight is an absolute condition of possibility of all. Thus the second dicestance, utpala asks, "What could ever be smart or deny establish topicknowing and acting, the self, the Great Lord, establishes from the beginning? ".

Indeed, since the self is what makes possible all thought, it is somethingparadoxical in its demonstration project discursive. It must be admitted that herePratyabhij is influenced to some extent by the specific apophatism Advaita11Ved?-Nta a of kara. The self (tman ), which is the absolute (Brahman) is self-evident( svaprak a). The self knows itself forever in a timeless consciousness virgin6We denote this expression by a particular school founded by rti and Di ... Dharmak n ga. It is a bookcritical epistemology, critical realism background and nominalism, although all

schoolsBuddhists are concerned with logic and epistemology.7By which he here means that which relates to the condition of possibility of experience.8That is to say mainly Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta.9API 1.110Ny Brahmanic there is a school specializing in logic. This is the main opponentof Buddhistsand an ally of Aivas .

11 a kara (700-750), perhaps the most famous Indian thinkers for whom only the self as 'consciousness'is real (as permanent), all objects are false and illusory.

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of discourse (vikalpa), but essential to any worldly cognition. In fact, all thesystem back to highlighting the paradox that nothing can make something that islaw always already there. In his commentary to the second stanza cited above, Abhinavaattempts to show that the only subject that can prove or disprove anything should beidentical to the omniscient and omnipotent Lord. He argues that it is ridiculousto beproves or disproves his own self. In short, we can not prove the absolute.12God or the ultimate principle is indeed Manifestation. He is the source and location ofany event. It can not not be obvious. Be and is to be manifest. The ideathe non-existence of which - for the idea of ??non-existence can happen - must exist,is contradictory. The operation of the means of knowledge, evidence against himinevitably would reverse the dependency relationship.This thesis is itself very old in India. Abhinava cites also afamous passage from B? HAD rayaka Upani?? ad:

in truth, what can one know the knower?

And he added with humor:

As I said: "All are ashamed [when they realize:]13'I was objectified / is an object of knowledge'. How then the Great LordCould it be that the object of knowledge?

Of course, Abhinava is fully aware that the problem of objectification of the Absolutethe word can not be completely overcome. Any talk of God is by definition aspeech in the third person. He also admits that objective discourse is possibleon theempirical subject, who is identified with objects like the body, the internal sensation, theinternal sense etc..

The self is always already known as a kind of a priori intuition.Why then the individual does not recognize it not? The easiest way to explain thisstupidity by some illusion own mechanism to maintain the continuity of the subjectempirically. Therefore, the operation of recognition can only be negative. Thesystem does that eradicating a misconception that we would notaware of our selfhood. The following passage sheds useful light on this point:

Nothing new is done. There is not highlighted in anysomething really hidden. [Rather] the assumption that what ismanifest is not clear is eradicated. Since the liberation [that is to say thehighest good], which is to achieve the status of the Supreme Lord, is that

eradicate this [false assumption]. The Cycle [the alienated existence,sas ra] is nothing else but not eradicating it. Both [conditionsliberation and alienation] are in essence that assumption. And both are14expressed by the Blessed One.

However, we should not believe that this acute awareness of the futility of anyaction to achieve the absolute or thinking has led these thinkers to take refugein the


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quietism. In contrast to all Misologie, Abhinava never misses an opportunity to15remember that this theory should not be used with "asylum of ignorance."

12I'm trying to translate the term prak ?? Was literally means light, illumination, lighting, andapparently came to light, illustration. It is also consciousness.13Mahe vara, one of the names iva.14IPV 2,3,1715Because the denial of any way correlated to grace one of five actions iva .

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5Only this argumentative strategy transcendental denies outright any method,system provides a kind of victory a priori.

Anyway, utpala also uses a method borrowed from the more positive

common logic of India, Ny ya. In this tradition, we list sixteen itemsfor philosophical discourse. And, though in truth not build Recognitionnothing positive, it takes a form consistent with the discursive logical criteria is Ny.Abhinava explains that the system's ability to reach agreement based onthe application of these standards:

The ultimate goal of this [treaty] other [as a justification of the sixteencategories], such as the means of knowledge [pram ], etc ... When the sixteencategories are articulated, the auditor is required to fully understand what is16to understand.

These categories include the means of knowledge (pram n ), the nature ofknowable (prameya) sections corresponding approximately to epistemology and ontology.Followed by a preliminary philosophical debate in good and due form, namelydoubt (his?? aya), purpose (prayojana), empirical (d??? ~ nta) assumptions(Siddh nta ), the line of argument (avayava), the reason (tarka) and rational decision(Niraya). Finally, the categories used to distinguish different forms of debate andsophistry. Of course, some of these topics overlap and no philosophical textIndia will not implement one by one. They simply refer to a set of concernsCommons.The most important for our purposes is the "line of argument" (avayava) as

It is this category that makes possible a universal intelligibility.This scheme comprises the steps of "inference to others" (by rth num na).She receives a thorough explanation to provide a logical justification for anygifted person of common sense:

What is the purpose described in relation to others? This [treaty] is the understanding of others.17And this is possible through inference for others.


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The highlighted segments inference for recognition demonstratethese thinkers seek to make good for their thesis.This inference has five members. Here they are illustrated by an exampleTraditional:1. The thesis (pratij ): "there is fire on the hill." The hill is aboutinference. The fire is what needs to be established.2. Reason (hetu): "Because there's smoke."3. The general principle and example (ud haraa): "where there is smoke, there isfire, as in the kitchen instead of the lake. "4. The application (upanaya): "the hill, because it has smoke has fire. "Thisstep explicit membership subject to the concurrent relationship shown in stepPrevious.5. The conclusion (nigamana): "Therefore there is fire on the hill." Thisrepeats the thesis, as it is now established.

16IPV 2,3,1717LPI 2, 3, 17

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6Abhinava is so aware of the importance of the rational scheme there will seestructure of the poem Stanzas to recognize the Lord himself. This isfully consistent with the ideals for which are Ny

any treaty (?? stra ) actually consists of an inference to others, and [theso] creates for him an adequate understanding.

Thus the text and comments will be divided into five main partscorresponding to the five members of the inference.The thesis established by this inference is that it is itself identical to the Lord.The subject (pak?: A) the thesis is the person, and probandum (s dhya ) is that h

e or she isLord.What is then the reason (hetu)? The detailed discussion of these arguments formthe bodythe Treaty. But the key is in already in the first stanza. The main argumentis that the Lord is the condition of possibility of any argument. Abhinavacomments:

'All' [referring to all] what is existing and not existing, internal or external, asblue, fun etc.. There are fulfilling or setting all this isthe manifestation as such. [With this system we now justifies therethis achievement has] a complete understanding, that is to say a

deepening of the judgment. This [understanding the performance ofall] the reason [justifying] the [validity] of this recognition. This iswe teach the ultimate realization of the subject [= the Lord] by cognitionslike blue, fun etc.. appears clearly [in the experiencecommon] ... The purpose [eg blue, pleasure] which we explained thatwas designated by the words' the fulfillment of all is at first sightcause / reason of virtue, sin, etc.. which [in turn] cause radicalcycle [= sas ra]. Otherwise it can be explained as [indicating] means18a path of transcendence of the world [as we do now].


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19This passage which plays on the ambiguity Abhinava several terms means thatrecognition is achieved through the study of what makes possible the manifestation, settinglight of objects interiors and exteriors. So we are in the presence of a kindtranscendental investigation. The thesis is justified by highlighting the recognitionwhat justifies everything. The Aivas not trying to justify their argument as ifit werea simple object of experience. They argue instead that their Lord is necessary toboth the justification and the manifestation of these objects.But what is it Lord? According to the myth of origin revealed by iva himself20 iva projects the universe by his power (his consort). The identity of the Lord and HisPower is illustrated by the fire and its heat, or by the sexual union of ahuman couple. It will therefore be to show that the subject is the cause and reason forthe universe. The subject (apparently) is limited iva, iva because as it is thesource of everything.The soul is, without knowing the necessary agent of universal creation:

The recognition of this [Lord] that, although [always already] experienced isunnoticed because of the strength of the delusion, is experienced through the21revelation of [its] power.

18IPV 1.1.119siddhi bed. 'Fulfillment': also means justification, demonstration, proof.20Akti .21

IPK 1.1.2

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7This revelation is made by the detailed arguments in the following text. This one22is divided into two parts corresponding to the two Powers of Knowledge and Action,epistemology and ontology respectively. These powers are those of anyone.

Before proceeding to the presentation of theses Buddhists recapitulate the inference that must23establish recognition: (1) The subject is the Lord. (2) Because he / she has thePowers of Knowledge and Action. (3) Everyone has the PowersKnowledge and Action is Lord, as the Lord described in the Scriptures, andas the king. (4) The subject has since he is the King, the Lord. (5) The subjectisLord. The Aivas also use the notion of dependency:


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That to which something [in] the Lord, like a king on hisfield. [But] the same universe [depends] you. "Or:" He in whomsomething that appears contains something like a cassette [containing] the24jewels. The universe since [feature] Sad Earth to iva, [is] in you, which25the nature of consciousness.

Remains to elucidate the nature of the Lord, to show how it is an ego and justify itsnecessity.

Objections Buddhist logicians

Doubt as essential category of philosophy

This is precisely why all the 'Buddhist logicians' radically challengequestion. However, one may wonder why utpala takes the trouble to collect theseobjections and respond to the challenges they raise. It is here, as inDescartes, doubt is a necessary element of the transcendental method. On thetheological antithesis is a time of procession / conversion divine

We praise iva, which manifests the universe as an argument prima differential

26facie, and then returns to the unit as a conclusion drawn.

In this utpala is no exception. He considers all thinkersin Sanskrit doubt that (her?? yaa) is a (sixteen) of all categories neededphilosophical discourse:

The nature of the Ultimate Reality is here [in the system] explained from theconsideration the views of opponents, their doubts and their refutation and is27this way clearly highlighted.

22na and JN kriy?? akti23IPV 1.1.324A higher degrees in the ontology scalar thirty-six specific categories ivasme ingeneral.25IPV 02/03/1726API 1.2, verse tribute.27API 1.2, introduction.

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8In fact, as we have seen, Utpaladeva will seek to show that the erroneous thesesis possible if and only if hers are real. In other words, the vagaries ofmen contribute to the glory of the Lord:


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Tribute to God, having created the error of those who are lost in theCycle, reduced to nothingness and having hidden bliss beyond [couples]contrary, reveals.

What are theses errors? Are those Buddhists Dharmak ... rti andcommentators. According to them, the criterion of reality of things and our representations isability to produce effects ( arthakriy tvam). Exist is to produce some effect. Beone thing is to be a cause. However, in passing also means cause an effect. Be involvedtherefore not be permanent. Only real entities are instantaneous. LogiciansBuddhists seem to discern two types: atoms and cognitions.28But the key point for our purposes is that the structure of reality is divided into two:29on one side there is the singular realities, seized by intuition of the other categoriesGeneral trumped by the understanding. Both spheres have nothing in common.The images we carry in effect build comparisons and generalizationscollected directly from things. But they are absolutely unique. Each issingle point that nothing we can say there is adequate. This means that in general

language has nothing in common with things as they are. Our interpretations arealways false, if we accept that truth is the character of our discourse whenlike what they are talking with. This means in particular that the concepts orrepresentations resulting from synthesis are as beings of reason. However, the idea of ??a"Lord" agent and universal subject is precisely - as a unit ultimate all - moreillusion of all.These objections are exposed by Utpaladeva in the second chapter of the IPK. Asclearly shows DP Lawrence, Buddhists make their objections are three objects: Self, to know its power and its power of action. These objects each receive threeobjections. First the self, for example, is reduced to a multitude of empiricalstates:

None of the two kinds of cognition [intuition and inference] does not depend onan entityseparate these cognitions themselves in the form of consciousness, since the other30entity is not perceived. So what is so permanent?.

Similarly, the notion of 'I', as expressed, that is to say, always discursivelytoreduced to a variety of states collected. Second, the self is not perceived, andtherefore can notbe inferred. It is therefore by no means proven valid knowledge

(S dhakapram SAM). Thirdly, the notion itself is a contradiction, since itcoexist in both the one and the many. There is therefore a proof to refute(B dhakapram SAM) self.Let us now examine these arguments, especially by our attentionon those who seem to rely on the problem of the one and the multiple, that is tosaythird kind of objection that every time is to show the contradictory naturetheses Utpaladeva.


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28IPK I.2.129svalak Asa litt. 'Which has character [something absolutely] own. "30IPKV 1.2.1-2.

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9A. The soFirst, the self is contradictory. For, indeed, what the self? It is aeternal cause, that is to say, a thing that produces effects without itself undergoingchange. However, it follows from standard Buddhist reality that this is impossible. In fact,be a cause, this is nothing other than an effect, so to speak, exhausted all hisbe in this realization. In other words, cause it is changed, it is a moment existonly. The relationship of cause and effect here is the "nature of two objects su

ch as31change in one causes a change in the other ", ie a dependencemutual. So if you want to preserve the value of self explanatory as the cause ofall,have to admit that nothing is eternal. But if we chose instead to do somethingeternal, then, plays no role in the explanation of things, it's just a guess32Free and unnecessary.How does he relate to the problem of the one and the many? In fact the self is hereconsidered as a cause from which proceeds a succession of cognitions, that is tosay, a

multiplicity of events inside what remains yet, according Utpaladeva aonly infinite manifestation, he calls the Lord. By transposing the same objectionsin this register, it appears that Utpaladeva is forced to choose between the nature ofconsciousness (cittat ) which is reduced to a succession of instantaneous cognition withoutbeginning or end, and so reduced to witness the successive transformations of thenature, and not universal agent and knower.

B. The power of knowing

Secondly, the power of knowledge is also reduced to cognitionInstant episodic. However, a more unifying cognition cognition is impossible. Carcognitions succeed in different times. Transcendent cognition, to achieveto unify, should be able to keep itself in different times. It should be theit is entirely passed in cognition, and even be entirely in thecognitions later. However, it is impossible for a thing to be also present in two33mutually distinct things.


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In addition, if there is a universal knower, each would know everything or nothing. If I'm about the same as any other, I would know everything simultaneously and the largestconfusion would follow. So that this universal subject knowing that allegedly makespossible all of our knowledge rather destroy.

C. The actionThirdly, and finally, the action is the subject of a review focusing specifically oncontradiction enveloped by the idea of ??a God with the ability to unify multiple.Indeed, what action according to common logic of India? It is an entity whoseEach (a projection of a movie, for example) has a substrate (the projection room), andwhich at the same time manifests itself in a succession of cognitions, "snapshots" (the

31Lalande, p.912.32In the context of explaining the recall: IPKV I.2.6, I.2.6 IPV.

33IPV I.2.7 (I, p.102).

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10images, summaries of traits resulting from the power of knowing). The Power of Knowledge,for example, the power to form a perception, while the Action is Powerto form a series of perceptions. Paradigm criticized the action in the first place

34by Buddhists is that of grammarians. For them, the model of the action isthe sentence. It is what produces a sense from multiple factors such as the actionsubject, object, instrument, etc. instead. The core unifying the verb. Despite the35multiplicity of factors of the action (or rather because of it, according BhartUhari), say "Devadattarice cooked in the kitchen with a pot ", it is describe an action, that is to say, areal entity that exists in addition to the series of images collected.However, for Buddhists, all of this is reduced to a succession of cognitions, wh

ichsimilarities give rise to the impression of continuity of a real identity. But "unity"action is trumped "the same action [does not exist because] it consiststhe appearance of body etc.. in different places etc.., and nothing else, sincenothing more is36perceived. " That Pierre arrived in Paris, it's actually assign a sequence of imagesmental perceptions and assumed invariant to a substrate. This person, one and th


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e same,is not given: it is constructed and projected onto the given.

No substrate is seen more of these moments. Because only moments37appear in succession [and therefore a multiplicity] phenomenal.

And even the idea of ??a sequence or a sequence is constructed and therefore false:

Priority and posteriority times is due to synthesis intellectiondiscursive. However, nothing is so earlier or later. Because there is onlyrealities [singular]. This is why a succession - that is to say before and afteraction which are produced by conceptual construction - has nothing in common with the38momentary reality. Because the moments are not [even] in mutual relationship.Indeed, the concept of sequence depends on those posteriority and priority characterswho are not given the realities singular in question, but they are assignedafter they have summers compared. Now, compare it to connect. This implies thatcompared the two terms appearing in consciousness coexist. For this, it would have

the moments last longer than a moment, which is impossible if they are to produce aeffect and thereby claim to some reality. In addition, real moments are in factso singularcan not be legitimately grouped and assigning them a "before" and "after". Theyhave nothing in common. A "sequence" of time is an order dummywrought by the mind, and has nothing in common with reality as it is given. In other words, asuccession is a synthesis, an abstract generality and as such, a mere fiction.To say that the unity of action can be inferred from its effects, it can not be,inferred because it is linking a perceived object (smoke) to one that is not currently

perceived, but that was (fire). The inference is a synthesis between two perceptions, one objectdirections, the other memory. However, a so-called reality as the action has never been seenIn addition, the singular realities. So we can infer this because supposedly uniquefrom its "effects" multiple. More effect is that the final moment of succession.34Particular philosophical founded by Bhart Uhari (seventh century).35K raka, capital notion, which literally means the different cases (there are seven in Sanskrit nominative

accusative, dative, instrumental, ablative, locative, vocative, genitive being considered as a special case, since it ison a name, not the verb).36IPK 1.2.9.37ibid.38ibid.


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11For example, if we say that we can infer that the action "Peter goes to Paris" is the actual causethat "Peter is in Paris," Buddhists meet this "effect" is the lastwhen a sequence of times and nothing else. Only the multiple is real, because healone productthis is called a "perception".Anyway, and this is the strongest objection Buddhist logicians, the actionitself is contradictory. Indeed, even assuming that we perceive somethingas the 'unit' of the action, still it contradicts the phase sequence componentAction:

It is not permissible [action] is also characterized by one oran estate.

Indeed, the character of the succession envelope multiplicity, since thereno succession where there is unity:

Being an estate is to be a variety, since there is not [inheritance] inwhich is no diversity. Being a diverse and be contradictory. Henceforth, how

[Action] can it be successive and? [...] How the substrate affected byvarious moments of action, which are differentiated by their place, their time and theirform, can it be? Therefore recognition "This one is Devadatta, hearrived at the village, "can not prove a real unity [but only one unitfictitious and conventional relative] (IPV.I.2.9).

In addition, as this is succession and not a mere aggregation, we can notinvoke the example of collective bodies endowed with efficiency and therefore aspecific reality.As in an army, all soldiers are simultaneously present, while39moments of action do not exist simultaneously (except under iva, whose

contemplation phenomenal series in eternity will be precisely defined as aLooking back on the events that we simultaneously appear in succession).So say "we spend a movie" is a false interpretation, unrelatedsuccession of singular realities that delivers sensible intuition, to an extentthat thereal is neither one nor multiple: it is truly indescribable or ineffable.

D. The relationshipAll these objections are summarized by the objections to a categorycollects all the others that relationship. The category of relationship is the mostnecessary, it is recognized both in metaphysics, because it is a category withou

twhat to think is impossible, as it is true that thinking is always ask or at leastdiscover relationships. Similarly Lalande defines the relationship as it logicians India."Relationship is the character of two or more objects of thought as they are designedas, or may be included in a single intellectual act, determined nature.These are for example the identity, coexistence, succession, correspondence,40


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causality, affiliation, etc.. "This wording is very similar to the relationshipas"Bilocation" (dvi?? ~ hat) in Utpaladeva. It appears that this group plays afundamental in his system.Indeed, for the thesis utpala be meaningful, it is necessary that the Lord either itself orrelationship with its powers of knowing and acting. In other words, the event39This is specified in Abhinava IPVV I, p.186-87.40Vocabulary, P.911.

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12transcendental, the universal subject, must coexist with an infinite multiplicity ofperceptions and thoughts, and thought of perceived objects (IPV 1.2.10).But how many predicates can co-exist in the same subject? And this beingadmitted, how to account for the causal connection, for example, without admitting

'Relationship' cause and effect? In fact, according to the Buddhists, the relationship of cause and effect isnot really.

There is no relation type action factors of action, since such41'Relationship' is not perceived apart.

According Dharmak ... rti causation is a regular succession "this product is42it. " But M dhyamikas go further in deconstructing saying: "Thisbeing, it appears. " This formula does that describe a relationship that is notone. Car

although the formula unifies and do two things coexist, it is clear that the intention here isnothing to suggest any substrate of 'this' and 'that', but rather meansthis is only the present, beyond judgment.Only regular connections are not they required to operate inthe world and to be able to transcend? Yes, but this meet Buddhists, itJust find regular succession. Discernment requires minimalism in thematerial, and perceived the obvious:

Things appear in conjunction with the presence of certain other: hereeverything we perceive and nothing more. There are no other relationship as thatof cause43

effect.

This is the only permissible relationship, and yet it is a construction of themind:

Anticipation and posteriority proved one thing to another is relativelyheard in everyday life through a mental construct. This is44is meant by 'cause and effect'.


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For example, soft clay and informs is perceived, then there is a perception of abowlclay. But nobody sees, no substance is perceived. Basically, one can not speakrelationship of cause and effect. There is a series of perceptions. And again say that requiresa unit. The only proper speech is the silence that comes naturally inmind (if there is still a mind!) of those who understand it.However, let us remember also that although the Buddhist logicians formulation leads toindescribable beyond any linking the relationship is allowed in terms of the 'truth45conventional 'and necessary for the intelligibility of progress towards enlightenment. ByTherefore, it is equally difficult for them to clarify this 'non-relationship'.For even intheir minimalist description of the relationship of cause and effect, they are forced to admit'Anticipation and posteriority' and therefore the category of relation. In otherwords, somea coexistence of the one and the multiple is in fact accepted. The Buddhist position,trying to describe what in his words is radically indescribable, is doomed tocontradiction. In this sense, these objections are aimed at both objectors.

41IPKV 1.2.10.42Another school founded by the famous N g rjuna.43IPK 1.2.10.44IPK 1.2.1145The Awakening, that is to say, the state of a buddha, with three bodies and five principled knowledge, theDouble omniscience, etc.. So that Buddhists theses are articulated at one end ra

dically differentNietzsche.

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13Anyway, the only relationship recognized by Buddhist logicians can notestablish a relationship between the Lord and cognition, as there is that cognitions:

Therefore we have the experience of momentary entities. Nothing more

46appears in the direct perception.

Finally, at the end of chapter II.2, Buddhists emphasize the contradictory natureany relationship:

[None of the definitions we give the relationship is not eligible] because, asIt is based on two related terms, it can not have the same nature.


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The gloss says:

A relationship is based on two terms (dvi?? ~ Ha) and it is not logically tenable47it is in two while preserving its unity.

The relationship indeed been defined in different ways, but all surround the idea of"Bilocation" (dvi?? ~ hat). According to this view realistic relationship requires that bothrelated terms are also present simultaneously.If the relationship is the unity of many things, it must lose its unity preciselyBecause of this association with a multiplicity:

A relationship is the mutual contact of two things. [Or do you think the relationshipsame time] is one. How is this possible? What are all aplace can not exist in another. Because there would be this consequence unacceptable48it is separated from its essence.

Abhinava gives the example of a jar which exists in two houses (API 202-3).However, can we conceive the relationship as a dependency or need( pek?: A) between particular things? For example, we say that the shoot 'needs'ofseed, or that the genitive in the phrase 'the servant of the king (r ja puru?? )'Requires' name. Dharmak ... rti replied that this was likewise inadmissible, because it impliesas contradiction. First indeed, particular things exist insofareffects as they are produced, they are 'done'. Henceforth, they are perfectthat they are everything they should be. They exist by themselves. They havetherefore need anything "... since a thing is [already] done does not need a49other. " But should we not assume a substrate to these individuals when they are

by products yet? No, because then they do not exist. Or there can be a relationship betweentwo things that do not exist. In other words, if a thing is, it does not need anything, and soit is not, it may have no need. Moreover, this need is not reciprocal. Orrelationship requires mutual dependence. The need must also be present in thetwo terms connected. We must distinguish between the expectation (unmukhat ) thatmay exist between twobeings (for example between two lovers), and the relationship. For this expectation does not coincidenecessarily.When only the relationship accepted by Dharmak ... rti, the cause and effect, itis not a

relationship in the sense understood by realists. Cause and effect are in fact not46IPV I.2.9. (I p. 115).47IPKV 1.2.11.48Ibid.49


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Ibid.

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14simultaneously present: they belong to the contrary at different times. Aswe said above, this relation is false as a relationship (: as itimplies a generalization), being ultimately reduced to a mere successionpresence and absence (bh abh will go).

In other words, the unity of a multiplicity and not as a multiplicityunit. Any judgment - and thus any recognition of a self or a single Lord- Are impossible. For Buddhists, it is all simply imagined.Thus appears better what is at stake in this issue. Indeed, if thingsare not a condition of possibility only one Lord, who has so to speak,then I could not recognize "me that has these attributes, I am the Lord."

Now see the responses proposed by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta.

The transcendental ego

Transcendental ManifestationIn Chapter I, utpala summarizes his argument:

"The establishment [= the existence] of inert entities [= objective] is based onliving [= cognitive operations]. The lives of the living, we want it consistsin the [Power] Knowing and acting. "

This argument is divided into two major movements: (1) be objects dependscognitions. (2) Any cognitive apparatus (including Buddhist objections) depend oncognition unlimited unlimited Manifestation iva what is.

Utpala demonstrate his thesis that nothing occurs outside theEvent, which is transcendental in that it is the condition of possibility ofall.This argument, of course next to the idealism of Berkeley, is developedin Chapter I, 5. It is pretty much inspired by the Buddhist school of idealism(Yog cara). In this discussion, the opponents are those who believe in the existence of objectsoutside of consciousness (that is to say both the event).Pratyabhij doctrine of the event by itself (or auto-brightness -svaprak ?? ATVA) purports to explain how a conscious epistemologically basedall cognition.Most of the arguments advanced by the idealistic Aivas is that consciousnessis not only a subjective element of any cognition, but is subject to

these cognitions:

If the object was not the nature of consciousness / event, it wouldappearance as before. Being manifest can be different [from50object]. The event is the essence of the object.

50IPK 1.5.2


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15In addition, any event is also representation (Vimar?: A). Because without thisressaisissement self, consciousness is like a mirror or a crystal, that is to sayan object:

The essence of the event is the representation, otherwise the event, althoughthat 'colored' by the objects is similar to an inanimate object, such as a51crystal [which is 'transparent', but unconscious].

Both terms refer to one and the same reality, consciousness.Opponents' idealist critics "make it so that the objection that the objectoutside can not be seen, it can nevertheless be inferred as follows:

The cause of each of the various events is unknown. This makes it necessaryinference of a [subject] outside. For consciousness, which is [itself] without52diversity can not be the cause of the extraordinary diversity of events.

Therefore it must be assumed that the objects are the cause of events as theyreflection in the clear mirror of consciousness.Utpala responds, in agreement with the majority of Indian thought, that the inference of arelationship between cause and effect depends on the observation of their invariable successionDuring a series of direct perceptions. The inference therefore lack of realisticessential empirical basis:

Inference certainly can not be allowed on an object that isnever appeared. [But] there has never been a demonstration outside the object53

event. Therefore it can not be established by inference.

In his commentary, Abhinavagupta offers a rebuttal by the absurdity of this so-called evidence:

Inference, as it is a conceptual construction, is [so] ofawareness / event. If the object - blue for example - is not even includingby this [kind of consciousness that is the inference], then it can not be inferred. If[Object] is included in [the consciousness], then it has the fuelawareness / demonstration under the principle "The object is not setlight / visible / displayed as before. " It is not outside. ByTherefore, any evidence adduced to prove that there is an external object, prove

son the contrary it is not outside. So that [your argument] contradicts itself.However, this does not imply a devaluation mere abstraction, aswe will see later.This inference is not only illogical, but it is more useless on theepistemological. Can account for the ordinary experience without the assumptionof objectsoutside:


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You try to establish external objects with a conjecture whichdifficulty [: inference]. Nothing is explained by the [alleged objectsexternal]. Because the behavior is established worldly / explained simply by51IPK 1.5.1152IPK 1.5.453IPK 1.5.8-9

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16these appearances / events that you have listed. There can be54worldly behavior with something that is always subject to inference.

In other words, let us not the thing itself, the asylum of ignorance. It is unnecessaryto explain the known by the unknown.However, unlike Leibniz and Buddhist idealism, not reduce the Aivas

not the consciousness of individual series, without doors or windows. " Having reduced the object to theconscience, they will then show that consciousness is universal. In other words,there isultimately a single subject. In the first chapter, as they discuss the presencePowers of Knowing and Acting in all beings, and Abhinava utpala explain thatknowledge of others is expected from observing their actions. But thisvision of knowledge / awareness of others, if it can escape solipsism, istemporary. Subsequently Abhinava effectively reduces the supposed conscience inothers asame subject in the same way that objects have reduced summer:

Consciousness does not appear as [an object other than itself expressed as

of] 'this'. As being 'this' [of being outside of consciousness] is non-cognition [: the opposite of awareness]. Something that appears with anature could appear with another. Therefore, only consciousnessappears. And what is not a nature, that the 'I'. Even aware ofother [: objects] is nothing other than our own self. Otherness is fullydue to accidental attributes such as the body, etc.. And it [: attribute accidentalas the body] was determined as not being other [consciousness]. Ofso that everything can be found in the subject category. In reality, there is asingle subject. And he alone exists. Thus he was told: 'There is the consciousness of ourown self in the form of ourselves and of others. " Therefore, astart with the 'Supreme Being knows' to 'the worm knows' - there is

55one subject.

All cognitions, possessions apparently several topics that do not belongthe same consciousness.Consciousness, that is to say, being manifest, that never goes without a consciencewhat is clear, is not a private property. In this respect, it resemblesrather space, the presence of different containers seems accidental breakalso in separate spaces. Individual subjects are only visible boundaries,


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thus appearing within this event that is unlimited consciousness.It is therefore established that consciousness is the condition of possibility of all. Alone isindependent - since it has no contrary - and this is its independentsovereignty. Since consciousness reveals objects without material or instrumentaslike a magician, it is the Lord. This sovereignty is called "will."Abhinava explains that this is because awareness created objects by sheer willqu'Utpaladeva uses the term 'God'.It is clear that this series of idealistic arguments, as they demonstrate that the subjectpossesses this creative power called Power, themselves already point toconclusion: the identity of the perceiver with the Lord.However, all the objections made by the Buddhists have not yet foundreply. Buddhist logicians in effect claiming that any recognition isincorrect definition, since the objects are singular. Each is a kind of absolute, andwords, such as "thieves entering an empty house" are but vain sacrilege.Any language, as it is an aggregate of generalities, is a tissue of error.

54IPV 1.5.655IPV 1.1.4

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17Responses Aivas take advantage of this paradox that "any proposalwrong ", as we have shown in the first part.This second set of arguments focuses on consciousness asrepresentation and self ressaisissement.In any experience, it is the event (called the Lord), which is itselfsame (this is called the Power). As the Lord is the ManifestationUnlimited makes possible any event, the power is limitless Representation

enables all representations, social judgments. This power isidentified with the Supreme Word, the absolute knowledge that takes forever to hissame. It is a recognition that a judgment based all judgments.Abhinava here repeats the arguments of philosopher grammarian Bhart hari who said that "There isno cognition in the world that is not accompanied by speech. Each cognition isthought as woven word. If this eternal condition of cognition / consciousness with thenature of the speech should cease, consciousness can not be conscious. It is this56[Condition] that enables the judgment / recognition. "The Aivas agree

with grammarians say that primordial unity is necessarily our relationshipjudgments and situations to which they apply. Indeed, contrary to what people thinkrelativists, no thought is possible without an absolute foundation. Any interpretationobject, as contingent as it is based on an interpretation not contingent. In otherwords, there is no true perception exists that envelope and also a judgmentSo one interpretation (inner speech is often not discursive: for example insituations of extreme urgency, or animals), but then it is also true that


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arguments in general and especially those Buddhists are intelligible only if thethesisof utpala is true.Similarly Abhinava noted that learning a language is conventionalimpossible if not already aware of a linguistic nature. Memory wouldimpossible. Conscience, as soon as it perceives an object, remain mired in virtuallyHe would become inert by itself would lose its nature of consciousness (that isto say the subject).Distraction, versatility are not a defect of consciousness, but one aspect ofits power ressaisissement infinite, which makes it great.It therefore appears that the Aivas invert the Buddhist understanding of the relationship betweenuniversals and singulars. Buddhists hold that consciousness is to grossthe singular, only real and linguistic constructions that are appliedmistakenly take the form of universals or relationships. Aivas the contrary, makercognitifs judgments that are the first syntheses linguistic elements, and takethat are singular developed a second time by synthesizing these summaries! Theseareuniversals which stand by combinations. Abhinava explains the formation ofby singular synthesis of universals with time and place, which are themselvesuniversals, according to taste, purpose and education of the perceiving subject.For example, a pitcher

appear as different things depending on its use as a container designed water sourceprofit or solid object.Finally, the effectiveness causal criterion of reality according to the Buddhistlogicians, is tothe Aivas one manifestation among others, part of a universal synthesis forproduce a singular. Efficiency is reduced to the externalization: cause is simplymanifest itself as other than itself.These are the basic arguments about the transcendental representation.Idealistic arguments associated with the event, they show howrepresentation is constitutive of the object:

56Cited in IPV 01/05/14

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18Here, things exist insofar as they are shown / judged. It isas well as the existence depends on the event. That is to say, the manifestationofexistence depends on the representation that is generated by this consciousness.

Carif something was not represented / rekeying, we could then respond to thequestion of why it is neither blue nor yellow, neither existing nor non-existent.Therefore, there is one thing in the exact extent it is represented and57is not contradicted [by another representation].

It is this idealism that strengthens the arguments against skepticism Aivas Buddhist. Because


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consciousness in which everything has been reduced is unique, any interpretation/ representationmust be a self-representation. The following passage summarizes howthe epistemological argument demonstrates the reality of Manifestation iva-/ akti-Representation:

Power (?? Akti) due to be creative, which has the nature of sovereignty,contains all the Powers. This [creative power] to the nature of theRepresentation. The Supreme Lord, who has the nature of the event, because of itsown self an object of cognition, because there is a knower [...] Inso, because it represents / recognizes his own self, and because everything is58contained in it, it appears as [such objects] as blue etc..

Not only the subject is the cause of thoughts, but it is just as well becausewhat he perceives. But it is not wrong to say that neither is what he thinks.Memory is obviously wrapped up in this argument, and treatedparticularly in two important chapters. According to the Buddhist logicians, rememberingis possible only through the print left by past experiences, and withoutit is necessary to assume a consciousness remaining outside the seriescognitions. The Aivas will show them some of the characters do not recall

beings can only explained by the impressions of memory.First, they start by admitting that impressions can accountthe similarity of cognition memorial with direct experience of the object. ForAbhinava, impressions act as a sort of 'shape memory', comparable toone that allows a branch folded to recover its previous position.But memory is more than cognition cognition similar to the past. If there werethat the recall would result in a type cognition 'is a crock,' and not'I've seen this pitcher. " This recognition memorial in summary form can beexplained without assuming an awareness about both the original experiment andthe present experiment.This argument is based on a thesis shared by Buddhists and Aivas , accordingthat knowledge is not a permanent arrangement of the subject but a succession of

episodic cognitions. Each knows his own cognitive content but is unable tohighlight, demonstrate another cognition. Each being "confined to hersame, "it is necessary to admit that a subject performs synthesis. It can not bein turn inert. It can not be that consciousness:

A memorial cognition is produced by the impression of a past experience.However, since it is contained in itself, it does not knowprevious experience. A cognition highlights herself. It is57IPV 1.1.358IPV 01/05/19

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19not subject to another [cognition] as cognition of taste [not object]59cognition of a color.


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The same applies to the understanding of the similarity of content of experience.Printing memorial itself is inert and incapable of recognizing its similarityto the original experience. Such is the power of recollection, modality of consciousnessself. In other words, if the Buddhists were right, the world would be destroyedduring the. AndThe same would apply if, as the Buddhists still believe, remembering, aslinguistic construction, was an error (since the singular - only for real objectsefficient - by definition are absolutely different from each other). The retort Aivascoherence and congruence observed in worldly behavior they excludebased on errors:

So [the perspective bouddhis you] the course of the world would be destroyed. However, itis not destroyed by this single curse you love "Whetherdestroyed! ". Since it appears it is established. And an effort should be made to make60account.

However, in another chapter on "Power exclusion semantics", which

seeks to show how discursive language is founded in reason and possible from akind of Word, Abhinava admits that the world as a multiplicity contradicted by the unitabsolute consciousness, can not be fully possible:

This [object] which is manifested [and so real it is nevertheless] separated from theconsciousness. Consciousness [separated] from him. Consciousness [separated] fromother consciousnesses. An object of consciousness [separated] from another objectconsciousness. This [triple] exteriority is not really possible. So we sayit is simply a manifestation / appearance of separation. As such, this

[Separation] is not ultimately real. For this [event transcendental]is the ultimate reality of all creation. Because of this externalization of allsides,refers to a state of complete separation. The ability to manifest this [separation]61Power is the exclusion semantics.

This means that any externality, as it appears, exists within theconsciousness, which is being manifest highlighted. The externality is only possiblein the interiority of the show. In this sense, it is an illusion.Now, since the ego is the absolute manifestation / representation, and that it i

sfoundation on which events / performances are only fragments or episodes,it is clear that the empirical ego, which are series of cognition, are only fragmentsthe absolute ego. Donations must recognize that the empirical ego is not reallyaobject sequence. This topic is intended as a summary of objects. But by the powerwhich this synthesis is possible and done, is not subject itself or the result of a


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synthesis. This is the ultimate subject, the ego absolute absolute because it'snever been an issue.So that he who represents himself as an aggregate of objects more or less unifiedsaying, 'I am this body, this sensation,' or this or that idea, as is one of thetenidiots in history when, having crossed a river, each of the ten in nine other accountforgetting to count himself.When the thesis that consciousness is discontinuous because it disappearsduring deep sleep, coma or fainting, she still relies on

59IPK 3.1.260IPV 1.3.761Ibid.

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20

confusion of subject and object. Used during the day to identify objects welldelimited, the subject takes the disappearance of objects to a disappearance ofitself, which isimpossible, because no conscience, no objects could be recognized (and rememberedthe clock). This lack of effect object is still an object, a kind of blueprint of the object andexternality, which can not be revealed by consciousness.Here and in other arguments that we can not explain in detail (especiallythose on the power of action, cognition is a kind of action), the pattern isalways the same: reduce all categories than the relationship. So that all theobjections Buddhists, for whom only the multiple is real, only confirm the unitconsciousness.

Finally, we must show how this consciousness deserves the title of ego. According to thePratyabhij , selfhood is nothing other than what ressaisissement infinite consciousness,synonymous Representation, Judgment Recognition. It is the consciousness of theEvent. However, according Dharmak ... rti, this ego is only linguistic construction,since it not only has the nature of representation, but, like allideas, there is in opposition to another. Indeed, for the Buddhist logicians asFor Derrida, the words do not refer to extralinguistic reality, but onlyother words, like the words in a dictionary that is defined by negation reciprocalby 'diffrance'. The word "I" has no real content, it is the result of a negation,

an arbitrary reduction, since its existence does body as a counterpart"Other", ie both the other series psychic other objects.Utpaladeva replied that the representation "I," which is the essence of the event,is a mental construct, although it is embodied in a nutshell. For constructionis an act of mental determination with a duality. In other words, even associated withspeech, the "I" is not a word, because the words are determinations that arethe negation of the contrary. However, to operate this denial should be able torepresent the same plane somehow the event and its opposite. But this


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For the event, a contrast can not be perceived or represented, since the factto be evident is the essence of any representation. Since then this "I" is not onopposite end, it is the absolute selfhood. It is then necessary to understand isthat the egoego is not worldly, but the ultimate subject, beyond subject and object. Or rather, the egorelative, that is the absolute ego, when it takes a finite object, the other outside, etc.. ButHere it is important to understand that the finite ego is somehow deduced necessarilythe absolute ego, because the self can not help but objectify, to demonstrate andback constantly. Creativity is the only more or less adequate to the conditionsofpossibility of his being. Where a fundamental distinction made between the empirical ego, whichthere is not gasoline, processions in various more or less adequate, andprocession "pure" in which the subject-object duality has recovered adequately asinner consciousness.There are so many "I". The following passage summarizes these points:

The nature of this [so] as Grand Lord consists in the fact that it recognizes

it has a continuous recognition that its existence (= itsevent) does not depend on anything else, and it is [that] a massundivided bliss. Declaratory judgment that presenting himself as an "I" is thepure and absolutely unique knowledge / action of God, which is illustrated in agame etc..Knowledge is Manifestation. Action is representation, which consists of aindependence characteristic of the agent. In addition, the performance envelopeisbe manifest. So that knowledge and action are ultimatelythat representation. However, cognition is in all respects just

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21representation. That is why we said no to it [consciousness] would62an inert object. And the same [representation] is Action.

But if everything is subject to a single topic, everything should appear simultaneously,that is to say atemporellement. And - Utpaladeva answers - this is indeed the case. For God, everything iseternally manifest. How, then a succession of cognitions / events it ispossible? That is to say, how an action is possible? Abhinava think the action

as a transition from a single unit in the unity of a multiplicity:

The essence of things, although under the Representation wrap itcontrary aspects of his essence. Due to their chagrin, these [aspects]appear in a sequence, thereby making this [gasoline] substrate63unifying action.

This is as empirically:


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By force of this consciousness which is a strong recognition [Self] thereapprehension that "this is essentially the same hand." [In thisexperience, there is first] no differentiation of the body (that is to say thehand). However, there are also [ironically] a variety of forms which,Because of their characters to the contrary, can not exist in the same species [iehand in an instant given]. This [diversity unit] is thought of as64action.

Time, where change is a way for God to overcome the contradiction.

Conclusion

Ultimately, Aivas looking for a way to avoid extreme alternativeswhich Buddhists (and both thinkers Brahmanists) wanted to be relegated.In their conceptual syntax and ritual, Buddhists, like the majority ofIndian thinkers tend to focus on the object (ie, factors of actionsemantics, that is the accusative, instrumental, ablative and locative). The Aivas insteadvalue the agent (the nominative). Thus qu'Abhinava sees the supreme agent untilin the grammar Agent empirical

Here [in our] action is in reality nothing more than the will ofSupreme Lord. [This will] is a continuous self-awarenesswhose nature the unfettered freedom [clean agent], which depends on nothingother ... For [subjects such as finite] Caitra and Maitra, willingness / intention[Expressed as] "I cook" is the action. Thus, although [the cook] isin connection with many movements like putting something on thefire etc.., the [intention] "I cook" is uninterrupted. This is nothing other thanfor "I cook" which appears in these movements. However, there can be nosequence in the [intent]. The same self-consciousness of the Lord,consisting of a desire [which can be expressed as] "I reign"

"I is", "I illustrated in the universe," "I created drunkenness" and "I

62IPV 08/01/1163IPV 2.1.164IPV 2.1.5

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22realizes / is me. " The essence of such representations is none other than65"I", and it has no sequence.

So that in a sentence like "Devadatta cooked rice in the pan withwood ", the factors such as wood, pot etc.. appear immersed in the action. Andaction in turn rests on the agent. For Aivas even actions which appear to beobject (such as "move this chariot") based on the agent in its powersynthetic representation.


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Finally, note that this explanation of the action in general as indicative ofthe unity of consciousness that is the subject, is crucial for Aivas because itallowsinterpret ritual activity, as a kind of action designed to implementhighlight the underlying unity in action:

All things rest without separating iva, which has all the perfectionscomplete. Henceforth, through [this kind of action] what worship, [the adept achievesthat] the factors of action [are not separated from the absolute ego, iva]. In the caseof worship [indeed], all factors of the action is shown asare not separated iva. This also occurs in [ordinary activities suchthat] walking etc.. A horse that has been trained to carry loads in no enclosesnot betray his training even on the battlefield. Similarly, one whofactors identified with iva action during training what activityritual eliminates the duality between the factors of action [and selfhood of thefolloweras absolute selfhood], even [when engaged in worldly activities such as]walking, etc.. So, for those who exercised and unity, the universe appearsimmediately and clearly [...] as the fullness of God.

65

IPV 2.1.8

Method in Descartes and Utpaladeva' Ishwarprtabhigya karika.

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