IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA CARYN GRATZ : CIVIL ACTION : v. : : KEREY RUGGIERO, et al. : NO. 16-3799 MEMORANDUM Padova, J. May 19, 2017 Plaintiff Caryn Gratz asserts claims pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68, and state law against Defendants Philadelphia Mental Health Clinic, Inc. (“PMHC”), and against Kerey Ruggiero, Donna Moran, Staffmore, LLC, Behavioral Healthworks, LLC, Ruggiero LLC, and Anthony A. Wolf, Inc. (collectively, the “Ruggiero Defendants”). PMHC and the Ruggiero Defendants have both filed Motions to Dismiss. PMHC asks that we dismiss four of the five Counts asserted against it, and the Ruggiero Defendants ask that we dismiss the two RICO Counts asserted against them. For the following reasons, we deny both Motions. I. BACKGROUND The Complaint alleges that, from January 5, 2015 through February 2, 2016, Gratz was the Chief Operating Officer of PMHC, a non-profit corporation that provides mental health services to certain children and is compensated for its services with Medicaid funds. (Compl. ¶¶ 8-9, 11, 23.) Defendant Kerey Ruggiero is the Executive Director and Chief Executive Officer of PMHC. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 7.) Defendants Staffmore, LLC, Behavioral Healthworks, LLC, Anthony A. Wolf, Inc., and Ruggiero LLC are for-profit companies in which Ruggiero holds a controlling interest. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 17-19.) Defendant Donna Moran has held various positions at PMHC in the past, and is currently the Executive Director of Staffmore and a Director of Behavioral Healthworks. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 16.)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CARYN GRATZ : CIVIL ACTION
:
v. :
:
KEREY RUGGIERO, et al. : NO. 16-3799
MEMORANDUM
Padova, J. May 19, 2017
Plaintiff Caryn Gratz asserts claims pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68, and state law against Defendants Philadelphia
Mental Health Clinic, Inc. (“PMHC”), and against Kerey Ruggiero, Donna Moran, Staffmore,
LLC, Behavioral Healthworks, LLC, Ruggiero LLC, and Anthony A. Wolf, Inc. (collectively, the
“Ruggiero Defendants”). PMHC and the Ruggiero Defendants have both filed Motions to
Dismiss. PMHC asks that we dismiss four of the five Counts asserted against it, and the Ruggiero
Defendants ask that we dismiss the two RICO Counts asserted against them. For the following
reasons, we deny both Motions.
I. BACKGROUND
The Complaint alleges that, from January 5, 2015 through February 2, 2016, Gratz was the
Chief Operating Officer of PMHC, a non-profit corporation that provides mental health services to
certain children and is compensated for its services with Medicaid funds. (Compl. ¶¶ 8-9, 11, 23.)
Defendant Kerey Ruggiero is the Executive Director and Chief Executive Officer of PMHC.
(Id. ¶¶ 1, 7.) Defendants Staffmore, LLC, Behavioral Healthworks, LLC, Anthony A. Wolf, Inc.,
and Ruggiero LLC are for-profit companies in which Ruggiero holds a controlling interest. (Id.
¶¶ 14, 17-19.) Defendant Donna Moran has held various positions at PMHC in the past, and is
currently the Executive Director of Staffmore and a Director of Behavioral Healthworks. (Id. ¶¶
15, 16.)
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The Complaint alleges that the Ruggiero Defendants “orchestrated a scheme to divert
PMHC’s funds away from its charitable purpose and into their own pockets.” (Id. ¶ 1.)
Specifically, the Complaint alleges that Ruggiero and Moran “made large, regular [electronic]
payments from PMHC to [Staffmore, Behavioral Healthworks, Wolf, and Ruggiero LLC] and
disguised the payments as program and administrative expenses incurred by PMHC in the
operation of its business.” (Id. ¶ 1.) Using this scheme, Ruggiero and Moran were able to
conceal their income on tax returns they mailed and wired to the Internal Revenue Service, thereby
avoiding tax penalties on excess compensation, and Ruggiero was able to evade taxes altogether.
(Id.)
Immediately prior to joining PMHC in 2015, Gratz was the Managing Director for
Behavioral Health Services at Pubic Health Management Corporation (“PHM”), another
non-profit organization. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 28, 32.) According to the Complaint, Ruggiero, Moran and
PMHC “lured” Gratz away from that position “in order to gain [her] unwitting assistance to
maintain their scheme to divert funds away from PMHC’s charitable purpose.” (Id. ¶ 3.) To
accomplish that purpose, Ruggiero “falsely represented the nature of PMHC’s operations and
falsely stated the reasons for PMHC’s financial plight.” (Id. ¶ 44.)
Gratz began working at PHMC pursuant to a three year contract. (Id. ¶ 24.) During her
first six months of employment, “Gratz gradually discovered that PMHC had several contracts
with Ruggiero’s for-profit corporations whereby PMHC paid an inflated sum for various services
that are normally handled in house or would ordinarily be contracted for at a much lower rate to a
legitimate third party provider.” (Id. ¶ 87.) Gratz also discovered that PMHC was paying
inflated rent for properties owned by or controlled by Ruggiero, that PMHC funds were bring used
to pay Ruggiero’s personal expenses, and that PMHC had made undocumented loans to Ruggiero
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that were never repaid. (Id. ¶¶ 97-99, 101.) When Gratz confronted Ruggiero and Moran about
Ruggiero’s self-dealing, she was assured that Ruggiero’s conduct was both lawful and
board-approved. (Id. ¶¶ 104-06.) Moreover, Ruggiero assured Gratz that she was committed to
Gratz’s cost-cutting initiatives. (Id. ¶ 116.) In spite of these assurances, Gratz could find no
evidence that the board had approved Ruggiero’s actions, and Ruggiero’s self-dealing continued.
(Id. ¶¶ 108-09.)
In early January 2016, Gratz formally launched an initiative for PMHC to directly hire
service providers rather than obtaining them though Ruggiero’s staffing companies. (Id. ¶¶
128-29.) She also began speaking regularly to Geoffrey Rupprecht, PHMC’s CFO, about her
concerns about Ruggiero’s self-dealing and lack of board approval for various contracts, as well as
her belief that Ruggiero’s conduct was illegal. (Id. ¶¶ 125, 130, 132.) She “informed Rupprecht
that she believed that no Board meetings were being conducted and that Ruggiero was
misrepresenting Board directives that Ruggiero claimed had approved PMHC’s fiscally
irresponsible transactions diverting PMHC funds away from their charitable purpose and into
Ruggiero’s pockets.” (Id. ¶ 151.) On January 27, 2016, Gratz told Rupprecht that they needed to
make copies of documents evidencing Ruggiero’s self-dealing and turn them over to the attorney
general. (Id. ¶¶ 163, 165-66.) Two days later, Ruggiero expressed open hostility towards Gratz
and pushed back against Gratz’s cost-cutting initiatives. (Id. ¶¶ 172-75.) Shortly thereafter, on
February 2, 2016, Ruggiero terminated Gratz’s employment with PHMC. (Id. ¶¶ 26, 177.)
When Ruggiero did so, she presented Gratz with a Confidentiality and Release Agreement and told
Gratz that if she signed the release at that very moment, Ruggiero would provide her with two
months’ salary, but that if she refused to sign it, the offer was “off the table.” (Id. ¶ 181, 184.)
Gratz, however, refused to sign the Release under those conditions, and she never signed the
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Release. (Id. ¶ 186.)
The Complaint asserts five counts.1 Counts I and II assert RICO claims against all seven
Defendants pursuant to § 1962(c) and § 1962(d), respectively.2 Count III asserts a state law
common law claim against PMHC for wrongful termination of employment in violation of public
policy. Count IV asserts a claim against PMHC pursuant to the Pennsylvania Whistleblower
Law, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 1421-28. Count V asserts a state law claim against PMHC for
breach of Gratz’s employment contract. PMHC has moved to dismiss the claims against it in
Counts I through IV, and the Ruggiero Defendants have moved to dismiss the claims against them
in Counts I and II.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), we consider “the
complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, [and] matters of public record, as well as
undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are based upon these documents.”
Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White
Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)). We “may also consider the RICO Case
Statement filed by Plaintiff[,] which ‘is a pleading that may be considered part of the operative
complaint for the purposes of a motion to dismiss.’” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Makris,
Civ. A. No. 01-5351, 2003 WL 924615, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2003) (quoting Allen
1 The Complaint initially included six counts, but Gratz has voluntarily withdrawn Count
VI, which was a claim against the Ruggiero Defendants for tortious interference with Gratz’s
employment contract. (See Gratz’s Mem. in Opp. to Ruggiero Defs.’ Mot. at 48.)
2 Gratz’s RICO Case Statement describes the RICO scheme as one “to unlawfully convert
millions of dollars from a nonprofit corporation into [Defendants’] own pockets, all the while
disguising their conversions as nonprofit business expenses in order to avoid paying taxes or tax
penalties on the income they were taking.” (Gratz’s RICO Case Statement at 1; see also Compl. ¶
245.)
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Neurosurgical Assocs., Inc., v. Lehigh Valley Health Network, Civ. A. No. 99–4653, 2001 WL.
41143, at *3 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Jan.18, 2001)). We take the factual allegations of the complaint as true
and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Props.,
Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen, Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84
(3d Cir. 2011)). Legal conclusions, however, receive no deference, as the court is “‘not bound to
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’” Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct.
2056, 2065 n.5 (2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
A plaintiff’s pleading obligation is to set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim,”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), which gives the defendant “‘fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration
in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). The complaint must contain
“‘sufficient factual matter to show that the claim is facially plausible,’ thus enabling ‘the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for [the] misconduct alleged.’” Warren
Gen. Hosp., 643 F.3d at 84 (quoting Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.
2009)). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “A complaint that pleads facts ‘merely consistent with a defendant’s
liability . . . stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’”
Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “The plausibility determination ‘is a context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’” Id. 786-87 (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). In the end, we will grant a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) if the factual allegations in the complaint are not sufficient “‘to raise a right to relief above
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the speculative level.’” W. Run Student Hous. Assocs., LLC v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 712 F.3d
165, 169 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
III. DISCUSSION
PMHC and the Ruggiero Defendants both argue that that we should dismiss the RICO
counts against them because Gratz does not have standing to pursue a RICO claim. In the
alternative, PMHC and the Ruggiero Defendants argue that we should dismiss those same counts
because they do not adequately allege the elements of a RICO claim. PMHC also argues that we
should dismiss the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law claim against it because that Law applies
only to public bodies, not non-profits, and that we should dismiss the wrongful discharge claim
because such a claim can only be pursued by at-will employees.
A. RICO
The RICO statute authorizes civil suits by “any person injured in his business or property
by reason of a violation of [18 U.S.C. § 1962].” 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Here, the Complaint
alleges violations of subsections 1962(c) and (d).
Section 1962(c) makes it “unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in . . . interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or
indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity . . .
.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). To state a claim under Section 1962(c), a plaintiff must allege “(1)
conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.” Warden v.