MacDonald, B. The Environmental Effects Of Forced Displacement ...

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The Environmental Effects of Forced

Displacement in Burma's Karenni State

Brandon MacDonald

Student Number: 996 401 086

B.Sc. International Developmental Studies Co-op

email: [email protected]

Thesis Supervisor: Professor M. Isaac

Personnel Number: 1042359

Department of Physical and Environmental Sciences & International Developmental Studies

email: [email protected]

Submission Date: April 18, 2012

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Acknowledgements

This thesis was a collaborative effort. My co-workers at Karenni Evergreen stimulated

and challenged my thinking on issues surrounding the displacement of the Karenni people and

the impact that this has had on environmental issues. They helped me find direction in my

research and guided my data gathering process. They played an integral role in identifying the

participants for my research. I am especially indebted to my good friend, roommate and co-

worker Khu Kyi Reh who acted as a translator during many of the interviews. The participants

gave generously of their time and their thoughts. Throughout this process Professor Marney

Isaac was an engaged and thoughtful supporter. I am grateful for her input through both the

research and the writing phases of this thesis. Lastly, I wish to acknowledge the help of my good

friend Taskin Shiraze and my parents for their feedback on my written work.

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Table of Contents

List of Acronyms ............................................................................................................... 4Abstract .............................................................................................................................. 5Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 A Brief History 1.1.1 The Colonial Era ................................................................................ 81.1.2 The Democratic Era ........................................................................... 91.1.3 The Ne Win Era 1962 − 1988 ............................................................ 101.1.4 SPDC Rule 1988 − 2011 .................................................................... 101.1.5 The Saffron Revolution and the Elections in 2010............................. 11

1.2 The Current Situation ....................................................................................... 121.3 Literature Review on the Environmental Issues of Displacement ................... 12

1.3.1 Land Degradation............................................................................... 131.3.2 Natural Resource Depletion .............................................................. 141.3.3 Environmental Management Problems Driven

by the Concentration of People ...................................................... 161.3.4 Loss of Traditional Environmental Protection Mechanisms ............. 171.3.5 Environmental Exploitation through Macro-Development Projects 181.3.6 Exchange of Environmental Knowledge Through Migration ........... 191.4.1 Research Problem .............................................................................. 201.4.2 Research Question and Objectives .................................................... 22

Chapter 2: Methods2.1 Study Area ........................................................................................................ 252.2 Study Samples .................................................................................................. 262.3 Data Collection ................................................................................................ 272.4 Methods for Gathering Information ................................................................. 292.5 Data Analysis Procedures ................................................................................. 302.6 Reasons for Displacement ................................................................................ 31

2.6.1 The Four-Cuts Policy ......................................................................... 322.6.2 Fleeing Poverty, Violence, and Human Rights Violations ................. 332.6.3 Land Seizures for Macro-Development Projects ............................... 34

2.7 Living Situations ...............................................................................................352.7.1 Relocation .......................................................................................... 362.7.2 Villages Where Participants had Kinship Ties ................................... 372.7.3 Newly Formed Villages ..................................................................... 372.7.4 Migrant Settlements Constantly Fleeing Violence ............................ 382.7.5 Refugee Camps .................................................................................. 39

2.8 Temporal Categorizations of Displacement ..................................................... 40Chapter 3: Results and Discussion

3.1 Socio-Demographics of Participants ................................................................ 413.2 Land Degradation and Management ................................................................ 43

3.2.1 Fertilizer Use Dynamics .................................................................... 453.2.2 The Dynamics of Other Agricultural Inputs ...................................... 473.2.3 Plot Size Dynamics ........................................................................... 483.2.4 Changes in the Number of Harvests Per Year ................................... 493.2.5 Crop Diversification .......................................................................... 51

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3.2.6 Fallow Periods ................................................................................... 523.2.7 Land Tenure ....................................................................................... 543.2.8 Community Exchange of Land Management Information ................ 553.2.9 Summary on Land Degradation ......................................................... 56

3.3 Food Security ....................................................................................................573.3.1 Drivers of Food Insecurity ................................................................. 583.3.2 Strategies Implemented in Situations of Food Insecurity .................. 603.3.3 Generation of Economic Vulnerability by Political Organizations ... 62

3.4 Natural Resource Depletion ..............................................................................653.4.1 Deforestation ...........................................................................................693.4.2 Environmental Management ................................................................... 733.4.3 The Role of Animist Religion in Environmental Management .............. 753.4.4 Summary on Displacement's Effect on Natural Resource Depletion ..... 79

3.5 Environmental Recovery of Abandoned Areas .................................................803.5.1 Waste Management ................................................................................. 82

Chapter 4: Conclusions4.1 Final thoughts ................................................................................................... 854.2 Areas for Further Research .............................................................................. 89

References .......................................................................................................................... 91

List of Acronyms

Association of South East Asian Nations ASEAN

Community Based Organization CBO

International Rescue Committee IRC

Karenni National Political Party KNPP

Non Governmental Organizations NGO

State Law and Order Restoration Council SLORC

State Peace and Development Council SPDC

Thailand Burma Boarder Consortium TBBC

Union Solidarity and Development Party USDP

United Nations High Commission for Refugees UNHCR

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Abstract

Displaced Karenni people on the Thai-Burma boarder were interviewed to investigate the

environmental effects of conflict-based displacement on the Karenni's traditional knowledge and

livelihoods strategies. As a framework for analysis the reasons for displacement were

categorized. Living situations were categorized in terms of the characteristics of a location, and

in terms of the sequential stage of displacement (ie. point of origin, second location, third

location and refugee camp).

Results were mixed. It was found that refugee camps, second and third locations had

fewer natural resources which Karenni people depend upon, higher levels of deforestation, lower

levels of food security, higher levels of human rights violations leading to poverty, fewer policies

and systems in place to protect the environment, and, in some cases, shorter agricultural fallow

periods. Refugee camps faced unique environmental problems especially with waste

management. There was not found to be an increase in environmental knowledge exchange with

migration. It was also found that many areas which had been abandoned due to displacement had

their environments degraded and natural resources exploited by government or private

companies carrying out macro-development project or logging operations.

The high density of populations in the refugee camp, second and third locations led to an

exhaustion of natural resources and agricultural land. Poverty was exacerbated by displacement.

It led to a dependance on unsustainable income generating activities, and undermined the

Karenni people's ability to adapt to new environmental challenges. Displacement also removed

traditional environmental protection mechanisms. On the other hand, Karenni is a region of high

conservation importance, and the displacement of people from large regions may be preserving

ecosystems void of human activity, but this is unproven and warrants further study.

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Chapter 1: IntroductionFigure 2: Karenni State's Townships

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Figure 2 Regional Map

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A Brief History of Karenni

1.1.1 The Colonial Era

Karenni State (“Karenni”) is located in north-eastern Burma1 (fig. 1). It’s politically

turbulent history includes conquests and exploitation extending back before the colonial era.

There have been various kingdoms and political centres vying for control of the Karenni people

and their land (Chapman, 1998). British colonization brought political stability to Karenni after

three long wars spanning from 1826-1885, but Karenni was never fully incorporated into British

Burma (CHRE, 2007). The three states of Kantarawadi, Kyebogyi and Bawlakeh were given the

name “The Karenni States” and as a result of a treaty negotiated with the Burmese King Mindon

Min granted independence in 1875 (Chapman, 1998). The Karenni States agreed to become a

“tributary” to British Burma starting in 1892, in exchange for a stipend from the British

government (Chapman, 1998). It was in this time that the Karenni people were first exposed to

British missionaries who converted many Karenni people to christianity (CHRE, 2007).

Burma did not achieve its independence until 1948, but the independence movement,

started in the late 1930’s (Marshall, 2011). The movement was triggered by the famouse actions

of U Wisara, who was a Buddhist monk who launched a hunger strike to protest British rule; his

strike lasted 166 days until finally he died in prison (Chapman, 1998). To this day the Buddhist

monk community is a prominent leader in the democratic movement.

In 1940 Aung San, father of the famous Aung San Suu Kyi and known as the “liberator of

Burma”, formed the Burma Independence Army in Japan (Khin Kyaw Han, 2003). During the

the Second World War, Japanese troops working with the Burma Independence Army, entered the

Burmese capital of Yangoon and within a few months collapsed the British administration (Khin

Kyaw Han, 2003).

1 Karenni State was renamed “Kayah” State, and Burma was renamed 'Myanmar' by the military government, but this paper uses the names 'Karenni' and 'Burma' as they are the preferred names of all of the participants.

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Many Burmese saw the Japanese as their liberators and fought with them initially, but

other Burmese, mostly ethnic minorities including the Karenni, served in the Allies' army in

exchange for the promise of their independence from central Burma at the end of the war (Khin

Kyaw Han, 2003). Aung San and the Burma Independence Army fought with the Japanese from

1942 to 1944 but switched sides and fought with the Allies Forces which launched a series of

attacks that lead to the end of Japanese rule in 1945. in 1945 (Marshall, 2011).

1.1.2 The Democratic Era

After the end of World War II in 1948, Aung San negotiated the Panglong Agreement

with various ethnic leaders signifying the independence of Burma (Aung Zaw, 2006). The

Burmese republic was named the “Union of Burma” with Sao Shwe Thaik as the first President

and U Nu as the first Prime Minister (Aung Zaw, 2006). The departure of the British

administration left a power vacuum that was characterized by ten years of fighting ending in a

coup d'état. General Ne Win was asserted into office.

With the signing of the Independence Constitution the three states of Kantarawadi,

Kyebogyi and Bawlakeh were incorporated into the Union of Burma and were renamed “Karenni

State” (Chapman, 1998). In 1952 Shan state and the Mong Pai states were added to Karenni and

renamed “Kayah State” (Marshall, 2011). Pro-independence groups started emerging in 1957.

The Karenni National Political Party (KNPP) was by far the most dominant group; it was backed

by its own Karenni Army (KA) (Chapman, 1998). The KA has been fighting the central

government ever since with the exception of a brief cease-fire in 1995 (TBBC, 2009). Rival

groups included the Kayan New Land Party (KNLP) and the Karenni National People’s

Liberation Front (KNPLF), but both of these groups are now allied with the Burmese military

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(Chapman, 1998).

1.1.3 The Ne Win Era 1962 − 1988

In 1962 Ne Win commenced his rule and implemented the 'Burmese Way to Socialism'.

This political philosophy was modelled after Soviet-style central planning, and was characterized

by nationalization, and government control of business, media and industry (Fink, 2001). The

country was under a one-party system, the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) (Fink,

2001). During this period Burma went from one of the most developed countries in South-East

Asia to the most impoverished (Tellentire, 2007). Protests were violently repressed (Tellentire,

2007).

1.1.4 SPDC Rule 1988 − 2011

Frustration with the political system erupted in a civil revolt in 1988 called the 8888

Uprising (Khin Kyaw Han, 2003). General Saw Maung responded by staging a coup d'état and

forming the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) which declared martial law

amidst the protests to restore stability (Khin Kyaw Han, 2003). It was the SLORC that changed

the country’s official name from the “Union of Burma” to the “Union of Myanmar” in 1989

(Zaw, 2006). In 1990 the SLORC held the first free election in almost 30 years. Nobel Peace

Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, the National League for Democracy won a 'landslide

victory' (Fink, 2007). Unfortunately, the SLORC did not concede power. Aung San Suu Kyi was

placed under house arrest and the SLORC continued to rule until 1997 when it changed its name

to the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) (Khin Kyaw Han, 2003). It was in 1997

that the SPDC was admitted into the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)

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(Chapman, 1998).

In an attempt to crush the Karenni independence movement the SLORC, in 1996,

launched a displacement campaign to remove villages which supported the KNPP (Chapman,

1998). This campaign lead to the emergence of the relocation sites, and refugee camps (discussed

in more detail in sections 2.11 and 2.14). The SLORC/SPDC was receiving huge sums of money

from private sector firms as well as from the governments of China, India and Thailand in

exchange for off-shore oil, agricultural land, concessions for the extraction of natural resources,

and the construction of large infrastructure projects such as hydroelectric dams (CHRE, 2007).

The rebel groups turned to logging activities to fund the conflict as well (CHRE, 2007).

1.1.5 The Saffron Revolution and the Elections 2010

Buddhist monk led anti-government protests in 2007, known as the Saffron Revolution,

were peaceful protests in reaction to the increase in fuel prices, and was violently cracked down

upon by the government (Fink, 2007). They protested human rights violations, the lack of

democracy and the house arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi (Fink, 2007). More than 110 monks and

many more civilians were killed (CHRE, 2007). The Saffron Revolution led to the Burmese

Constitutional Referendum of 2008 which promised a “discipline-flourishing democracy”

(Marshall, 2011). General elections were held under the new constitution in November 2010

(Marshall, 2011).

Observers described the election day as mostly peaceful. There were, however,

irregularities at the polling stations leading the United Nations and many Western countries to

condemn the elections as fraudulent (Marshall, 2011). The military-backed Union Solidarity and

Development Party (USDP) declared victory with 80% of the seats (Fink, 2007). Positive results

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did however come out of the elections. Amnesties were granted to more than 200 political

prisoners (although many more remain in custody), and Aung San Suu Kyi was released from

house arrest (Marshall, 2011).

1.2 The Current Situation

The total population of Karenni is 259,000 (TBBC, 2007). Of that number 18,674

Karenni refugees living in Thailand. An estimated 81,000 people are internally displaced people

in Karenni, 10,000 of whom are hiding in the jungles (TBBC, 2007). This displaced people

usually go uncompensated for the loss of their land. Some, however, are given 327 Kyat

(Approximately $0.50 CND) compensation for their land, which has lead to the colloquial

saying, “it's only enough to pay for the front stairs” (KDRG, 2006).

1.3 Literature Review on the Environmental Issues of Displacement

The UNHCR has identified three potential environmental issues that can arise in refugee

camps. Firstly, high population densities can lead to natural resource depletion and land

degradation. Secondly, there is a tendency for refugees to migrate to, and for refugee camps to be

set up on, environmentally fragile areas. This can in turn lead to natural resource depletion and

land degradation. Thirdly, there is often a lack of incentive amongst refugees to preserve the

environment, because the land isn’t theirs and they view their land tenure as temporary (Keane,

2004).

These environmental concerns have application inside Burma. There is a high

concentration of populations in places to which displaced people migrate, and they view their

stay is potentially temporary. Furthermore, Karenni is part of a fragile, and diverse ecosystem

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which could be in jeopardy. These claims are based on observation only, and Keane, working

with the UNHCR, admits there is a lack of evidence to support these claims (Keane, 2004). This

displacement could be leading to land degradation, natural resource depletion and changes in

environmental management practices which have negative implications for the environment.

Keane's proposition of three factors leading to environmental issues in refugee camps, will be

used as a benchmark for comparison in this research.

1.3.1 Land Degradation

Seventy five percent of the Burmese population is rural and 60% of those people work

five acres of land or less (CHRE, & South, 2007). This issue of land degradation effects the

majority of Karenni people and is driven through a plethora of processes. Slash and burn

agriculture, for example can be sustainably managed on a local scale (People's Forum on

Ecology, 1999), but only if the land is left fallow for a sufficient amount of time to allow soil

fecundity maintenance without the use of fertilizers or other synthetic inputs (People's Forum on

Ecology, 1999). However, in the face of population growth, or population concentration

(Kondylis uses the term “villigization” to describe this phenomenon) fallow periods may not be

maintained (Kondylis, 2008).

Political conflict, and land mines in particular, limit the mobility of Karenni people. The

restriction on movement to fields and markets was reported by Karenni respondents to be the

largest threat to livelihoods, ahead of arbitrary taxation and forced labour (TBBC, 2007). People

are being forced to put stress on their land because of their poverty (KESAN, 2005) and they are

attempting to increase agricultural yields by prematurely using land that traditionally would have

been left fallow for 7-10 years. Lack of mobility means that people in hiding who return to their

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homes to cultivate their land usually can only harvest 40 to 50% of their crops, and are unable to

guard their crops against pests and animals that eat them (CHRE, 2007). People are also

discouraged from shifting their cultivation leading to shorter fallow periods (KESAN, 2005).

Finally, the conflict in Karenni often involves the burning and shelling of land which can

contribute to degradation (CHRE, 2007).

It has been suggested that when farmers are absent from their fields, they can loose their

agricultural skills and when they return they are more likely to settle in degraded areas, leading

to their further degradation (Kondylis, 2008). This is also true of people new to farming. Political

persecution, as well as displacement, can also lead to the cultivation of cash crops such as opium

that are easy to hide, and transport (Kondylis, 2008). It has also been noted that farmers may

change their crop choice to ones that are less likely to be pillaged which may not be the best

choice from an environmental perspective (Hintjens, 2006).

1.3.2 Natural Resource Depletion

Seed storages have been destroyed by the SPDC, and livelihoods have been threatened by

political persecution and long standing cycles of poverty (KESAN, 2005). This situation is

causing people to become more reliant on forest resources (KESAN, 2005) and to cut down trees

close to home to supplement land, leading to drought and contributing to climate change (Saw

Eh Ka Lu Moo, 2009).

Population growth and the concentration of populations can have huge implications for

the depletion of natural resources and the loss of biodiversity. Keane (2004) suggests that there

are three reasons for which the areas surrounding refugee camps become depleted of forest

resources. Firstly, vegetation is being stripped away for fuelwood and shelter which can lead to a

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change in the soil water balance, erosion, soil fecundity depletion, and decreased productivity of

the land. Secondly, refugees must generally rely on natural resources to feed themselves

especially before aid arrives. It is not only the refugees that rely on the natural resources in the

area, but also the host population. The host population, however, may make efforts to mitigate

this effect and protect the local natural resources, for if refugees exhaust natural resources, the

host population may not want to host them anymore. Thirdly, the sudden arrival of migrants can

have large effects on fragile environments especially for biodiversity, when they infringe on

protected or pristine land.

Kondylis (2008) suggests that in the short term environmental degradation could occur in

locations of concentrated populations, and at the same time allow abandoned areas to go fallow

and be preserved. When conflict ends, populations may migrate back to an environment that is

thriving (Kondylis, 2008). This idea assumes, however, that indigenous people were having a

negative impact on the environment before displacement and that while they’re displaced the

environment would have the ability and opportunity to recover (Agrawal & Redford, 2009).

Displacement of indigenous people off of their land can also lead to a shift from viewing natural

resources as subsistence capital to viewing it as monetary capital (Nesheim, et al., 2006),

therefore making those resources more vulnerable to exploitation.

When considering land degradation and natural resource depletion it is important to

consider how vulnerable the environment is to degrading activities and how quickly it is able to

recover from such activities. This includes the soil’s resilience to degradation as a factor of the

amount of stress put on it (Kibreab, 1997).

Deforestation can lead to erosion. The erosive ability of rainfall, topography, erodibility

of soil, and the density of vegetation cover also play a role in determining the extent of that

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erosion (Kibreab, 1997).

The number of threatened and endangered species that depend on that environment need

to be considered. The Salween basin is the most diverse turtle community on earth, and one of

the last great teak forests (Rutherford, 2005). More than 140 fish species are said to live in the

Salween Basin, one-third of which are endemic to the region (Rutherford, 2005). The World

Wildlife Fund identified ~200 ecological hotspots with Karenni falling within the Kayah-Karen

Montane Rainforest hotspot (KDRG, 2006). The ecological hotspot is second richest in bird

species, and fourth richest in mammal species in Mekong Subregion (KDRG, 2006). The UN

estimated, that between 1990 and 1995, a total of 3,874 km² of forest was lost per year in Burma

(1.38%), and that the forests left are very degraded (Wood, 2007). The forests have been stripped

of valuable species such as hardwoods and what is left behind is malformed and diseased trees,

easy-to-burn waste, and invasive weeds and vines (Wood, 2007). There is no question that

Karenni State has a lot to lose in terms of biodiversity, and that their biodiversity is already quite

threatened.

1.3.3 Environmental Management Problems Driven by the Concentration of People

It has commonly been found that overcrowded cities or towns become unable to provide

social services such as sewage, potable water, health care, education and waste management.

This has huge environmental implications and leads to the emergence of slums (Westing, 1994).

There is a need to address population issues, to support environmental education, to protect

biodiversity, to foster participatory governance, to generate alternative income options, and to

foster political security to avoid these negative environmental impacts (Westing, 1994).

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1.3.4 Loss of Traditional Environmental Protection Mechanisms

The loss of preservation activities and land tenure can be problematic. It is difficult for

ethnic groups to enforce traditional environmental regulations and laws with the army in town, as

they face organizational challenges (Karen Rivers Watch, 2004). Kibreab (1997) argues that land

tenure is a motivating factor for one to protect the quality of their land. Without that incentive,

conservation efforts may not be as strong because the “transformation of peasantries into workers

or proletarians divorces them from their means of rural existence” (Bush, et al., 2011).

Newcomers may even ignore local environmental management mechanisms (Kibreab, 1997).

Furthermore, while displacement may lead to a decrease in incentives for conservation in

places to which displaced people migrate, it may also remove the environmental protection

mechanisms in the places from which they are moving. Unsustainable communities mean

unsustainable environments, for long term projects and management cannot be implemented if

communities are constantly being disrupted (KESAN, 2005). Segregation of populations breaks

up management networks (Kibreab, 1997), and internally displaced people, due to their break

from the state, no longer have access to national channels of appeal for the purposes of

environmental protection (McDowell & Morrell, 2007). Indigenous activism and transnational

advocacy networks have been effective in many places at pushing environmental interests, but

displacement can isolate people from those networks (Gellert & Lynch, 2003). Indeed, a role for

communities, local populations, and indigenous people has been incorporated into the projects of

many conservationists (Agrawal & Redford, 2009), but this is difficult to implement in

government controlled areas, and with members of displaced communities living in hiding.

There is a widely held assumption that dispossessing farmers and limiting people’s access

to land and natural resources is a necessary feature of modernization, increased productivity, and

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government revenue generation (Bush, et al., 2011). The political and business classes have an

interest in this, and often facilitate land deals which dispossess indigenous people (Bush, et al.,

2011). The removal of local systems of environmental management through the process of

displacement, enables groups motivated by political and business interests to exploit

environmental resources (Kibreab, 1997). Bush et al. (2011) note how this phenomenon has

taken hold in many African countries leading to the “current ‘scramble’ on the continent for its

metals, minerals and marine resources”.

1.3.5 Environmental Exploitation through Macro-Development Projects

As has been shown, displacement enables environmental exploitation by the economic

interests of businesses and the political as well as economic interests of governments. These

projects include mega dams, logging operations, infrastructure construction and mining, and are

produced by a combination of material interest and ideological practice (Gellert & Lynch, 2003).

They guide the process toward outcomes that are displacing and ensuring that their effects will

be unequally distributed (Gellert & Lynch, 2003). There is the risk that the state will be an

enabler for private sector actors without any effort to justly distribute economic benefits. As a

result, those within the reshaped landscape lose, while those outside of it are either indifferent or

gain (Gellert & Lynch, 2003). David Harvey takes Marx’s phrase “accumulation by disposition”

to describe this process (Harvey, 1993).

The environmental impacts of these activities are wide ranging. They include

deforestation, displacement of large volumes of rock and soil, changing hydrological patterns,

erosion and the displacement of a variety of species through habitat fragmentation and

transformation (Gellert & Lynch, 2003). It is estimated that Burma is losing 1.4% of its forest

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cover each year (CHRE, 2007). The creation of dams often results in the fragmentation of animal

migration corridors, and logging which leads to increased flooding and landslides due to an

increase run-off (CHRE, 2007).

Furthermore, in January 1989 the Thai government imposed a complete ban on corporate

logging in Thailand. Suddenly, the business of many Thai logging companies was threatened,

and the timber needed to supply Thailand's demand for wood would have to come from outside

of the country. As a result, many Thai logging companies moved their operations into Burma,

and started exporting timber to Thailand, which exacerbated the issue of deforestation in Burma

(CHRE, 2007).

1.3.6 Exchange of Environmental Knowledge Through Migration

Kondylis (2008) has suggested that refugee camps can serve as a hub for the exchange of

agricultural knowledge, and that resettled farmers can produce higher yields because they may

have an increased motivation to succeed. Conversely, Nesheim (2006) writes that language

barriers, disregard for local resource management practices, lack of access to knowledgeable

people or education, lack of social integration, gender roles and confusion about environmental

information are all challenges to local knowledge transfer. Kondylis (2008) found that

environmental knowledge transfer of Rwandans was increased among those displaced by the

1994 genocide. When comparing environmental knowledge transfer in Rwanda to the situation in

Karenni, there are some key considerations to take into account. The degree of environmental

similarity, the language barrier, and the relevance of environmental knowledge all impact the

level of knowledge transfer (Kibreab, 1997). For Karenni people, their traditional knowledge is

less applicable to land that they have not used in the past such as sloped land, virgin forests,

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watershed areas, and wetlands (KESAN, 2005). The level of integration between new comers

and natives may not be high, and therefore, methods of learning (eg. literacy and language skills)

may be inaccessible (Nesheim, et al., 2006). The disruption of culture and loss of species is

putting traditional knowledge, and traditional management bodies at risk of being forgetten

(KESAN, 2005).

One of the major differences between this case study of Karenni and the larger body of

academic literature on the environmental effects of displacement and migration is that Karenni

people are often migrating from land that is not degraded and places where resources are not

depleted to places which are already under high levels of environmental stress. The migration of

Karenni people is usually dictated by political rather than environmental reasons.

1.4.1 Research Problem

This research will examine the environmental effects of conflict-induced migration. To

my knowledge, the impacts on natural resources, agriculture, andthe cultural ramifications of

displacement, including the loss of traditional knowledge and changing livelihood strategies, in a

conflict situation have not been examined. Most of the academic literature focuses on post-

conflict situations (Agrawal, 2009; Hintjens, 2006; Kondylis, 2008). The accumulation of wealth

by the government and the private sector at the expense of the dispossessed and at the expense of

the environment is a common theme in many places around the world (Bush et al., 2011;

Glassman, 2006). This research uses Burma’s Karenni state as a case study to contribute to

academic discussions on the aforementioned subjects. Karenni State is a biodiversity hotspot and

a vibrant ecological zone which has been hosting violent conflict for more than 55 years.

Displacement in Karenni is an issue which has been talked about extensively from a

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human rights perspective, but rarely from an environmental one. A participatory process which

included local organizations was employed in deciding upon a research topic. Stakeholders have

indicated that this research would be useful, with complements to other work being conducted in

the Karenni State. Gaps in the literature and research have been agreed upon, and this work could

help fill such gaps. This research contributes to the scholarly community as well and contributes

to the discussion about displacement in the Karenni State, and in Burma more generally.

There is a pressing need for environmental perspectives on issues related to conflict in

Burma. Empirical research is limited as a result of the difficulty of conducting research in a

conflict zone where foreigners are rarely allowed to legally enter. The empirical research that has

been conducted in Karenni has been limited to a handful of the most stirring topics. Updates of

the status of the conflict, progress of major “developmental” projects such as dams and mines,

and the ensuing poverty and poor health of the people dominate the publications coming out of

Karenni (KRW, 2004; KDRG, 2006; Magee et al, 2006; SSEO, 2006; TBBC, 2009). The

desperation around these situations has caused many other topics to be overlooked.

There exists little empirical research addressing the environmental consequences of the

conflict in Karenni. The closest and most relevant study is entitled “Diversity Degraded”

published by the Karen Environmental and Social Action Network. It focuses on the loss of

cultural and biological diversity as a consequence of the political situation in Karen State. This

research takes a wider lens on environmental issues and focuses on Karenni state (not to be

confused with Karen state, home to ethnic Karen people).

There have been a number of authors who have explored the environmental effects of

migration, notably Locke, Hintjens, Kibreab, Kondylis, and Nesheim. These authors have

analyzed environmental narratives from places like Rwanda. Karenni's unique ecosystem (it is in

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the middle of the Kayah-Karen montane rain forests, included by the World Wildlife Foundation

as an “ecoregion” in their “Global 200” publication), and its unique political situation merit an

expansion on what is currently known. Theoretical contributions mostly deal with migration in

post-conflict situations (Hintjens, 2006; Kondylis, 2008; Nesheim et al., 2006), and don't look at

the direct consequences of war such as displacement, and the loss of social and political

freedoms.

This study contributes to the existing knowledge of the political, economic and social

situation in Karenni by investigating environmental data, and expanding the theoretical

discussion on the environmental effects of displacement by studying Karenni's unique political,

economic and social situation.

1.4.2 Research Question and Objectives

What is the effect of conflict-based displacement on the Karenni's traditional knowledge and

livelihoods strategies and with what consequences for the sustainable environmentally based

livelihood strategies? This question will be answered with four research objectives:

Objective #1: To identify the geographical patterns of displacement and the living situations in

which displaced people find themselves.

Hypotheses:

1. When people are forced to abandon their homes and fields they select where they will go

based on social, economic, environmental and political factors.

2. Living conditions lead people to electively relocate.

23

3. There are environmental effects of condensed living.

Objective #2: To identify and describe the effects of displacement on agriculture and natural

resource availability.

Hypotheses:

1. Displacement affects the sustainability of agricultural practices, soil quality, and

agricultural inputs.

2. Displacement is affecting deforestation, biodiversity and the availability of other natural

resources.

3. Displacement is changing consumption patterns with environmental consequences.

4. Migration has environmentally beneficial and detrimental impacts.

Objective #3: To investigate environmental management problems in relation to changing social

and cultural dimensions and consequential effects on traditional institutions of natural resource

and agricultural management.

Hypotheses

1. Land owners and managers are changing with environmental ramifications.

2. Institutions responsible for protecting traditional knowledge and practices are changing.

3. The ability of longstanding social institutions that address these problems changed due to

displacement.

4. Vast local environmental knowledge bases are being lost as a result of displacement.

24

Objective #4: To identify the effects of activities undertaken by political organizations and

private sector firms, which are environmentally exploitative and enabled by displacement.

25

Chapter 2: Methods

2.1 Study Areas

This research was conducted near the Ban Mai Nai Soi Karenni refugee camp in Mae

Hong Son province, Thailand (fig. 1) from October 2010 to August 2011. Contributors included

people working in the field of environmental conservation and development. Travel into Karenni

State was not possible due to safety concerns, so displaced people who had crossed the border

were relied upon as participants. As Mae Hong Son province borders Karenni state, all Karenni

refugees, the overwhelming majority of Karenni migrant workers, and the Community Based

Organizations that work for Karenni people are located in Mae Hong Son. The hub of cross

border environmental and development work and a high concentration of Karenni people is in

and around Ban Mai Nai Soi refugee camp.

The World Wildlife Fund characterizes Karenni has having monsoonal climate with

warm, moist summers and dry winters that are cool especially at high elevations. Average annual

rainfall is between 1500 and 2000mm. West facing slopes receive more precipitation than their

eastern facing counterparts closer to the Thai-Burma border which lay within a partial rain-

shadow. These forests are a mixture of deciduous and coniferous trees, with more coniferous

species found in the wetter regions. The area is the fourth richest in the Indo-Pacific region for

mammals, and second richest for bird species. The relatively large and intact habitat means that

the region is of conservation importance especially for carnivores such as tiger who require large

ranges (Wikramanayake, 2001).

According to the Myanmar Information Management Unit (2011), the best agricultural

soils in Karenni are found in the flat valleys and plains, covering 341,524 acres of land, with

meadow and meadow alluvial soils. The thick clay/loam soils are suitable for corn, rice,

26

vegetables, and soybean and have intermediate levels of all main soil nutrients including

phosphorus, nitrogen and potassium. These soils are ideal for agriculture and cultivation can be

sustainably managed with the use of fallow periods.

Karenni State sits at the eastern most edge of the Himalayan Mountain range. It is

characterized by lush rolling mountains and steep slopes. As a result, most of Karenni is covered

with mountainous red forest soils which are a mixture of sand, loam and gravel, are of medium

depth, are on sloped land, and cover 2,156,484 acres of land in Karenni State. These soils are not

ideal for agriculture as they are low in phosphorus, high in potassium and have intermediate

levels of nitrogen. These soils are much more susceptible to degradation and erosion, but

population concentration, growth, poverty, and a lack of livelihood options force people to use

these areas for agricultural purposes when no other land is available. They require long fallow

periods to avoid soil nutrient depletion (MIMU, 2011).

2.2 Study Samples

Research participants were sought that were both men and women, from all seven

townships in Karenni State, and from Kayah, Kayin, Bamar, and Pa-O ethnicities. Participants

were refugees living in Thailand's Mae Hong Son Province. There are 23,794 refugees in

Thailand's Mae Hong Son province (according to Thailand Burma Boarder Consortium refugee

camp food distribution records from 2010). Participants were reached via a snowball method,

and through friends, co-workers, and Community Based Organizations (CBOs) with which I

have worked or have connections with.

Local people from grass-roots organizations who have carried out environmental and

developmental work in Karenni state were also approached. Participants were required to be

27

adults of at least 18 years of age, but a variety in the ages of participants was preferable. They

were to have experienced and observed the direct and indirect effects of displacement, be able to

offer first hand observation, and thus were relevant to the research.

2.3 Data Collection

The most significant source of data was gathered through a semi-structured interviews

format. The interview were used to explore displacement's effects on agriculture and natural

resource availability, data on farmer's yields, and variables that could explain those yields.

Natural resource availability data was obtained by inquiring of people how much of a given

resource people were able to collect compared to the product of their efforts.

Interviews were also used to gather data on past and present patterns of displacement,

when and to where people where displaced, on what they perceived their options to be and what

influenced those perceptions. Data was collected on consumption patterns and the level of

accessibility participants had to purchased goods as opposed to the natural resources that their

ancestors traditionally depended on. Finally, data on the dynamics of local knowledge

surrounding environmental protection was gathered though the interview as well as through

ethnography.

Figure 3. Interview Outline

Background Information:

Name, age, ethnicity, number of dependants, location and name of past residence

Displacement:

When were you displaced?

28

What was the reason for your displacement?

Was agricultural land, infrastructure, plants or animals damaged or killed in the process?

Where did you go after you were displaced? Who went with you?

Did you have the power to choose where you moved to? What were your options as you

saw them? Why did you pursue the option you did?

How long did you spend in this new location?

NOTE: The following questions are asked in regards to participants' point of origin, second

location and third location if applicable

Agriculture:

How did you make a living/livelihood for yourself?

(If farmer) What did you grow? How much land did you have? Did you plant one crop a

year or two? What was your average yield? How did these factors change over time?

How did you fertilize your land/maintain the fertility of the soil? What was the average

fallow period?

What agricultural inputs did you use and in what quantities?

If you were forced to put stress on your land/soil why?

Land Management:

Did you own the land you cultivated? What system was in place to divide up the land?

How did your community manage natural resources?

Did the land you cultivated change while you were living in this place? What was the

quality of the new land?

Did you own animals? Which animals, for what purpose and how many?

Natural Resources:

29

What forest products did you use? What did you use them for?

How stable was the supply of these products?

How did you learn to identify and use these products?

How else did you depend on the environment for your livelihood?

How did the aforementioned aspects of your life change before you were displaced

Was the change in any of these factors a cause of your displacement?

Changing Consumption Patterns and Waste Management:

How many shops were there? What things did people purchase? In what quantities?

Were there any waste management issues? How was non-organic waste disposed of?

Religious and Traditional Beliefs:

What is your religion? What is the local religion practised by most people?

What role did religion play (if any) in the respect for or management of natural

resources?

What traditional beliefs do people have about the forest and all forms of life in it?

2.4 Methods for Gathering Information

The most significant method of data collection was through semi-structured interviews.

Which typically took one to one and a half hours. Data was collected from leaders of displaced

communities, Community-Based Organization/Non-Governmental Organization workers who

have worked inside Karenni State, and most importantly, Karenni people who had been displaced

themselves. People who have worked with, lived in, and depended upon Karenni ecosystems

have intimate knowledge of their condition. From the narrative descriptions of their hardships,

experiences, and observations the subtleties of how these changing conditions have effected their

lives was obtained. Interviews consisted of specific questions aimed at exploring all four of the

30

main research objectives.

Interviews were heavily relied upon to obtain information regarding all of the objectives,

which related to both the environment as people experienced it, and people's experiences

themselves. Since it was not possible to go inside Karenni state to examine environmental

conditions first hand, interviews remained the most accessible data collection method. The open-

ended and in-depth nature of interviews suited the objectives most favourably. Information could

not always be encapsulated in a simple answer. Explanation and dialogue was required from the

participant and this could not be reached though other methods.

Parts of the research were ethnographical. This relates to the third objective of exploring

the role of local knowledge and environmental management systems in environmental

protection, and how that role is changing due to displacement. As an outside observer it was

possible to observe religious and cultural practices and beliefs as they relate to the environment.

Related to this third objective a lot of document review was done, especially reading

about Karenni Animist religion and its creation story. A lot of reports were read which were

written by grass-roots organizations working inside Karenni to collect data on the political

situation as well as the state of biodiversity and natural resources in Karenni. These reports were

also useful in gathering information about the state and impacts of development projects such as

hydroelectric dams and logging operations.

Interviews, questionnaires and ethnographical observation data were all conducted

simultaneously from February 2011 – July 2011.

2.5 Data Analysis Procedures

Data was coded and categorized using analytical sub-categorizations. This data was

31

organized into discrete groups on the basis of the types of living situations participants lived in

[existing/long standing villages (2.7.2), relocation sites (2.7.1), migrant communities (2.7.3), and

refugee camps (2.7.4)]. It was further organized based on the reasons for their displacement [the

four-cuts policy (2.6.1), fleeing poverty, human rights violations and violent conflict (2.6.2), and

land seizer for government development projects (2.6.3)]. Details about these subcategories are

presented below. Data was analyzed for relationships and trends relating to the research

questions.

Data was prepared by transcribing interviews and cataloguing data. Data was put into

tables and figures and qualitatively assessed for trends. The data was cross analyzed to see how it

fit with different explanations offered in the literature related to the research question. Finally,

different sets of explanatory factors were explored.

Categorization of Data Groups

2.6 Reasons for Displacement

The reasons for displacement as well as the locations to which displaced people migrate,

have been categorized. This allows for a comparative analysis of environmental degradation

relative to different location categories and categorizations of drivers of displacement. Authors

who have written about displacement categorize the causes of that displacement differently. Most

include violence or armed conflict and threatened livelihoods as drivers of displacement

(Westing, A.H., 1994; CHRE, & South, A., 2007). Others include the escape of political

persecution (Westing, A.H., 1994), or large development projects such as the construction of

dams, or logging operations as an explanation for displacement (CHRE, & South, A., 2007). In

this section three categorizations of drivers of displacement are defined which include the

32

military government's “four-cuts policy”, threatened livelihoods or abuses of human rights and

macro “development” projects.

2.6.1 The “Four-Cuts Policy”

The “four-cuts policy” is an SPDC military strategy that focuses attacks on villages rather

than armed forces, for they believe this is where the ethnic opposition armies get their recruits,

information, supplies and finances (Thailand Burma Boarder Consortium, 2007). In 1997 a letter

was sent to the village headman of Daw Sey (fig 2) ordering the entire village to move to a

relocation site about a one day's walk away. The villagers were went without compensation for

their homes, their land, or the livestock lost in the process of the move. This relocation site was

directly adjacent to an SPDC military barracks, as all relocation sites are. Two other villages had

also been relocated to the same site so that the SPDC could easily monitor them and ensure they

were not assisting the Karenni Army (KA).

The SPDC frequently came to Daw Sey before they were relocated to steal food, take

money, or demand slave labour from the villagers. If anyone was suspected of assisting the KA

they'd be threatened or brutally assaulted. The village headman was shot in the arm to serve as an

example of just how brutal the army could be. As their leader stood on the village's dirt road

reading the eviction notice, clutched in the hand of his bandaged arm which he couldn't even lift,

the villagers were quiet. Their stomaches must have churned and sank as they realized that

defiance would mean risking their lives, and compliance would mean living under the nose of

their oppressors. Using forced-labor the SPDC ordered the construction of a fence around the

relocation site, assisting in the prevention of villagers from leaving the site without permission.

The participant compared the relocation site to a prison, and a concentration camp.

33

In 1996 the SPDC launched a campaign that was designed to displace every Karenni

village east of the Salween river (fig 2). Despite the fact that this area was a KA strong hold, the

campaign was successful. Today there are no villages east of the Salween river that are not under

direct military control. Those displaced from villages near the borders fled into Thailand and

founded the refugee camps.

2.6.2 Fleeing Poverty, Violence, and Human Rights Violations

I spoke with a participant who grew up on the outskirts of Loikaw, the capital city of

Karenni (fig 2) which is home to more than 20,000 people. One year their crops were devastated

by rats that ate all of the rice seeds before they could take root in the ground. To supplement their

income, his father had to travel into the forest for days at a time to find teak trees that he could

sell to logging companies. The SPDC authorities assumed that anyone traveling for long periods

of time in the forest must be doing so to meet the KA in the jungle. He was arrested. He was

thrown in jail where prisoners are malnourished, questioned and routinely tortured.

After three years in prison he was free and called for his son to meet him in a nearby

village where they could start a new life away from the watchful eye of the SPDC. The

participant believes his father must have escaped, because when he arrived in the village anxious

to meet his father, he couldn't find him. His father's body was found murdered in the forest three

months later.

Seed storages are destroyed by the SPDC (Karen Environment and Social Action

Network, 2005). They are known to routinely takes people's food, force villagers to do slave

labor, and arbitrarily tax vilalgers to support the government's military. Arrests, threats, torture,

rape and execution are used to get information out of people and assert government interests.

34

Violence, land mines, and SPDC restrictions are implemented to make the monitoring of small

groups of people easier, but they limit the mobility of many.

Limited mobility is a huge problem undermining the ability of Karenni people to generate

a livelihood. Limited ability to travel to fields and markets is reported by Karenni respondents to

be the largest threat to their livelihoods, ahead of arbitrary taxation and forced labour (TBBC,

2007). Lack of mobility means that people in hiding who return to their homes to cultivate their

land usually can only harvest 40 to 50% of their crops and are unable to guard their crops against

pests and animals that eat them (The Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, 2007). People are

also discouraged from shifting their cultivation which leads to shorter fallow periods (Karen

Environment and Social Action Network, 2005). Many people flee their villages to go to places

of relative safety such as the refugee camps or other villages with less of an SPDC presence.

Many have had to flee violent conflict in Karenni State which often involves the burning

and shelling of agricultural land. The swapping of control over territory between the SPDC and

the Karenni National People's Party (KNPP) means that management of natural resources most

often appears to be non-existent (CHRE, 2007). It is difficult for ethnic groups to enforce

traditional environmental regulations and laws with the army in town because they face

organizational challenges (Karen Rivers Watch, 2004). All of these factors drive Karenni people

into displacement.

2.6.3 Land Seizures for Macro-Development Projects

After a meeting with the director of a Karenni grass-roots, human rights organization, the

Sekhuay (fig 2) village headman went to tell 30 men, sitting on the bamboo floor of his home,

what an NGO worker had told him. He said that 20 kilometres away from Sekhuay a Japanese

35

corporation was beginning construction on the Mobye Hydroelectric Dam under concessions

sold to them by the Burmese military junta. They were told that the Balu river would be

dammed, and when finished, it would create a flood plain that would stretch up stream, flooding

their paddy fields, and washing away their homes. They would need to leave their village and

their fields.

The men sat in disbelief. They could not accept that it was possible to dam a river as wide

as the Balu. The village headman implored the men to take the warning seriously but most

wouldn't. Surely, they had received misinformation, they thought.

In time the dam was completed. The water inched closer and closer to Sekhuay and they

could not deny what was happening any longer. They picked up and went to clear the forest and

build a new village that they would call Shwe San (fig 2). No one would ever come to Sekhuay

or Shwe San to offer information or compensation for their loss.

Large scale 'development' projects, allow the SPDC to exploit and degrade the

environment by eliminating the local people's ability to protect their land. The way is cleared for

hydroelectric dams which disrupt aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems, and logging which leads to

increased flooding and landslides due to the increase in run-off and erosion (CHRE, 2007).

2.7 Living Situations

Karenni people who are displaced move to a wide variety of places. For the purposes of

the study these places have been subdivided into five categories: 1. government controlled

relocation sites; 2. other existing villages where participants have had kith or kinship ties; 3.

newly formed villages; 4. migrant settlements which are usually in the uncleared jungle and

regularly flee conflict between the SPDC and KA; and 5. refugee camps in Thailand.

36

2.7.1 Relocation Sites

Relocation Sites are amalgamations of a number of villages into one village that is next to

a military barracks. This is done to enable the junta to easily monitor the villagers, and make

certain they are not in contact with the Karenni Army. They are heavily regulated and

characterized by abuse, poverty, malnutrition and restrictions on the mobility of inhabitants.

Suicides are very common, and crowding often leads to poor sanitation and disease (CHRE,

2007). One participant described the restrictions on mobility as follows:

“In the summer it’s no water, so the relocation site a lot of people is there... they just

allow to go out at 6am and 6pm. They come back home, if they see in the forest they

shoot.”

There was not enough fertile land near the previously quoted woman's relocation site, so

family had to travel back to their old village to set up a farm. Restrictions on travel made this a

huge risk. Every time they snuck away from the relocation site they risked arrest, physical abuse,

forced labor, rape or death as possible punishment. As a result, less then half of the people in

relocation sites farmed rice (CHRE, 2007) because they could not travel to their fields.

Collecting forest resources was also difficult.

The junta's soldiers would take food, money, labor and anything else they wanted from

the villagers. The exploitation and lack of freedoms in relocation sites lead to poverty and unique

livelihood strategies.

“They free to get like the chicken when they saw, and everywhere they can take, take,

take.”

37

2.7.2 Villages Where Participants had Kinship Ties

Displaced people often go to villages where they have friends or family. These places

have a wide variety of circumstances but are often the most favourable option. Through family

and friends one has access to social support networks which are the most important social safety

nets in Karenni society (3.2.3). Here they would be free from the abuse and restrictions found in

relocation sites. The difficulty is that family and friends have often been displaced themselves, or

were living in non-ideal situations. For example, after 1996 all the villages east of the Salween

River were displaced so there were no unaffected villages in the area.

One of the participants for example was able to move from Parlough to a relative's town

called Layli (fig 2) after some relatives came and told them that good farm land was available.

People aren't always willing to welcome too many new arrivals into their village because they

fear overcrowding, so this situation isn't an option for most participants.

2.7.3 Newly Formed Villages

In very rare cases, entire villages would relocate and clear an area to build a new village.

This occurrs when villages were displaced for the purpose of pursuing macro-development

projects. Flood planes are created by hydroelectric dams or land is cleared for logging which

would displace entire villages. Unlike villages that are displaced as part of the government's

“four-cuts policy”, there may not be a motivation to monitor these population so they may not

have been ordered to relocation sites. Instead they are left to find somewhere new to live on their

own. In these situations entire villages cleared areas of forest and built entirely new villages

somewhere else.

These places may be in areas that have not previously been settled because they are

38

environmentally degraded areas or because they encroach upon the territory of nearby villages.

This necessitated a sharing of agricultural land and natural resources which may increase the

demand on those things leading to degradation.

2.7.4 Migrant Settlements Constantly Fleeing Violence

“The SPDC make the big operation, the whole village, many village move, they afraid

from the fighting... so we afraid and move. And at that time there was very bad

communication and transportation, so we just carrying the burdens carrying the

things...my uncle, relatives or like some of my father’s soldier help us to carry some

things, but we cannot bring the whole things at our house, just the materials we can eat in

the jungle, for eat and sleep.”

People hiding in the jungles survive by clearing areas in forests for small farms, by

fishing in streams, and by foraging for food, all of which has the potential to deplete natural

resources (CHRE, 2007). Migrant communities may also be cut off from markets, and may not

be able to buy or sell food or other goods (CHRE, 2007).

Many Karenni people have, at one time or another, lived along the front lines of the battle

between the junta and the Karenni Army. They live in constant threat of violence and perpetual

migration is a major challenge for agricultural activities. They often live in the jungle without

permanent shelter. The fear of violence limits their ability to collect forest resources. Even

lighting fires to cook food may not be possible because the junta forces may see the smoke

(CHRE, 2007). The people who try to subsist in these places depend on hidden rice storages and

food rations from the KNPP, but their resources are very limited.

There are some benefits to living in these places. If one is in close proximity to the

39

Karenni Army, they will be protected from human rights violations by the junta. The junta cannot

impose forced labor, and arbitrary taxation without going through the Karenni Army.

“If it’s the SPDC comes or the military groups come, there will not ignore the village they

will fight or they will like trouble to them, because it’s like the KNPP controlled area. The

KNPP people are there.”

2.7.5 Refugee Camps

There are two official Karenni refugee camps along the Thai-Burma boarder: Ban Mai

Nai Soi and Ban Mai Surin (fig 2), which together are home to 20,000 people. The Karenni

camps moved many times before settling into their present locations in 1996. The Thailand

Burma Boarder Consortium (TBBC) supplies the refugees with rations.

Refugees are not permitted to practice agriculture. The areas surrounding the camps have

recently been declared the Sa La Win National Park and the Namtok Mae Surin National Park

(Go to Thailand, 2003), so refugees have been forbidden from cutting down trees for use as

firewood or otherwise.

The refugee camps are environmentally and socially unique situations, with people living

in very high densities .This leads to environmental problems that most Karenni People have not

had to deal with in the past such as wet and dry waste management, river pollution, the wide-

spread depletion of natural resources, and water sanitation. An upper level NGO employee

working in the camp described the Karenni as mainly:

“hunter gatherers. And they live in small like 5 or 6 family groups. So when you suddenly

bring everyone together and they’ve never had experience with actually having to

coordinate huge numbers of people, it becomes very difficult.”

40

Environmental management is a huge obstacle in the camps. There are no traditional

systems or practices which address many of the current environmental problems. Environmental

management challenges were articulated by explaining that,

“there’s no single body that is in charge of managing [environmental issues], so

traditionally in a refugee scenario it would be the UNHCR but here they're not quite as

strong as they could be, so camp management is done by a camp committee. By refugees.

And there’s no single person who is overseeing the whole thing, it’s very disorganized…

Normally there should be a whole set of regulations that aren’t in place now and haven’t

been followed.”

2.8 Temporal Categorizations of Displacement

A temporal categorization was developed for the purpose of analyzing the data. Four

categorizations have been separated. Firstly, there is the point of origin which is usually the

location in which participants were born. It is defined as the location where a participant or their

family had lived before they were displaced. The second categorization will be referred to simply

as 'location #2' or 'the second location' and it is the place that a participant or their family

relocated to after the displacement. The third categorization is referred to as 'location #3' or 'the

third location' and is defined as the location the participant relocated to after the second

displacement. The second and third locations include villages where participants have kinship

ties, relocation sites, and migrant settlements. The fourth categorization is a 'refugee camp' which

was the final destination for most participants, but some participants were not refugees and had

never lived in a refugee camp. In no situation had a participant gone onto a subsequent location

after living in the refugee camp.

41

Chapter 3: Results and Discussion

3.1 Socio-Demographics of Participants

Twenty participants were interviewed and make up the data set analyzed in this chapter.

The table below includes the names' of the participants location as well as the categorization of

this location (section 2.7), the temporal categorization of the location (section 2.8) and the

categorization of their reason for displacement (section 2.6). If there is no indication that a

residence is a relocation site, refugee camp or newly built village then it can be assumed that this

is a pre-existing village.

Participant 9 is left out of the table for he was a foreign NGO worker who has never been

displaced. All other participants are ethnically Kayah, and included 5 women and 15 men.

Table 1: Temporal and geographic displacement of participants

Partic-ipant

Birth Year

Point of Origin and Reason for

Displacement

Reason for Displacement

Second Location


Third Location


Refugee Camp

1 1970Pruso

township: Birth - 1989

fled violence

Na Owa, Bawlakeh township:

1989 - 1996

four cuts policy

NA NA

Ban Mai Nai Soi refugee

camp: 1996 - present

2 1987

Phu Kara Khu (pop. 200),

Pruso township:

Birth - 2004

fled poverty and human

rights abusesNA NA NA NA



3 1982

Beb Soe (pop. 250), Pruso township:

Birth - 2011





4 1987

Daw Ta Ma Gyi (pop.

900), Deemawso township:

birth - 2000





5 1986 Daw Soo Kyeh (pop.

500), Shadaw township:

four cuts policy

NA NA NA NA Ban Mai Nai Soi refugee


42

Birth - 1996

6 1980

Daw Ta Ma Gyi (pop.


Birth - 2000


rights abuses

Daw Ta Ma Gyi new village

location(pop. 1200): 2000 -

present

NA NA NA NA

7 1988

Daw Sey (pop. 100) Shadaw


four cuts policy

Daw Saw: new village

location (pop. 40):

1996 - 1998


rights abusesNA NA



8 1987

Daw Sey (pop. 150), Loikaw


four cuts policy

Parlough relocation site (pop.

1200): 1997 - 1999


rights abuses

Lawli village (pop. 400): 1999 - 2005

Fled violence,

poverty and human rights

abuses



10 1985

Sekhuay (pop 600), Tuang

Gyi township: Birth - 1992

land seizure for macro-

development project

Shwe San (pop. 500),

newly created

village: 1992 - present


rights abusesNA NA NA

11 1988

Daw Tar Klue (pop. 650),

Pruso township:

Birth - 1996

four cuts policy

The Poh Gloh

relocation site (pop.

2000): 1996 - 2000


rights abuses

returned to point of

origin: 2000 - 2010


rights abuses



12 1991

Daw Tar Klue (pop. 650),

Pruso township:

Birth - 1996

four cuts policy

Ti-Biang Eh relocation site (pop.

600): 1996 - 2000


rights abuses

returned to point of

origin: 2000 - 2010


rights abuses



14 1992Loikaw (pop. 20,000): Birth

- 2007

fled violence, poverty and

human rights abuses

Weiy Kye (pop. 600): 2007-2008

fled violence, poverty and human rights

abuses

NA NA



15 1983

Loikaw township

(pop. 400): Birth - 1996

four cuts policy

Loikaw township relocation site (pop.

5000): 1996-1997

fled violence, poverty and human rights

abuses

returned to point of origin

NA NA

16 1969

Gay Gah Per (pop. 900), Pasawng township:

Birth - 2003

four cuts policy

Gay Gah Per new village

location: 2003 - present

NA NA NA NA

17 1985 Daw Ga Law Ku (pop. 450),

Loikaw township:

four cuts policy

Loikaw (pop. 20,000): 1996 - present


rights abuses

NA NA NA

43

Birth - 1996

18 1983

migrating settlement on Thai-Burma

boarder: Birth - 1993

fled violence

Ban Kwai refugee camp (pop. 4,500): 1993 - 2002

camp closed, refugees

relocated to another camp

NA NA



19 1989

Daw Ta Ma Gyi (pop.


Birth - 2000


rights abuses

Ban Kwai refugee camp (pop. 4,500): 2000 - 2002



NA NA



20 1982

Karenni Army base, Shadaw

township: 1982 - 1987

fled violence


boarder: 1987 - 1993

fled violence

Ban Kwai refugee camp (pop. 4,500) 1993 - 2002



Ban Mai Nai Soi refugee camp 2002 -

present

21 1976Shadaw

township: birth - 1987

fled violence


boarder: 1987 - 1996

fled violence NA NA



3.2 Land Degradation and Management

Table 2: Quality of land as reported by participants

Participant Point of OriginLocation #2 (Post-

Displacement)Location #3 (Post-

Displacement)

2 declining NA NA

3 very low NA NA

5 good NA NA

6 fine decreasing NA

7 good good NA

8 good worse than in point of origin worse than in point of origin

10 good good NA

11 decreasing continued decrease continued decrease

12 decreasing worse than point of origin same as point of origin

14 not Good same as in point of origin NA

15 fine same as in point of origin NA

16 fine NA NA

17quite variable from year to year

and place to placeworse NA

20 NA extremely variable from year NA

44

to year and place to place

21 very goodextremely variable from year to

year and place to placeNA

Forty four percent of respondents reported that the quality of land in their second location

was of a lower quality than that of the land in their point of origin (table 2). Fifty six percent

replied that land was of the same quality, and no respondents found land of a higher quality in

their second location as compared to their point of origin (table 2). Of the three participants that

lived in a third location before coming to the refugee camp, two found land of similar quality to

their point of origin and the third had to cultivate land of a lower quality than the land in their

point of origin.

Table 3: Food availability as reported by participants

Participant Point of OriginLocation #1 After

DisplacementLocation #2 After

Displacement

1 sometimes struggled NA NA

2 often struggled NA NA

3 often struggled NA NA

5 always had enough food NA NA

6 always had enough food never had enough NA

7 always had enough food now food is not enough NA

8 sometimes struggled70-75% of the food as in point

of origin

1st and 2nd year 80-90% of the amount of food as in the point

of originbeyond that food was 60-65%

10 always had enough foodyields remained the same, but

less food per person because of population growth

NA

11 usually had enough much less food same as in the point of origin

12 usually had enough much less food same as in the point of origin

14 sometimes not enough food same amount of food NA

15 often have food shortages same amount of food NA

16often have food shortages and they're increasing in frequency

and intensityNA NA

45

17 often have shortages often have shortage NA

20 usually had enough food much less food NA

The lower quality of land experienced in second and third locations contributed to

declining agricultural yields leading to food insecurity. Seventy percent of respondents

experienced an increase in food insecurity in the second location relative to their point of origin,

while 30% experienced no change (table 3). There were no instances where participants had

more food in their second location than in their point of origin. Of the three participants who

lived in a third location before they migrated to the refugee camp, two experienced no change in

their food insecurity relative to their point of origin and the third had less food than he had in his

point of origin, but more than he had in his second location. The drivers of food insecurity are

multi-faceted, and will be revisited later. This section will focus on explaining the causes of land

degradation.

3.2.1 Fertilizer Use Dynamics

Table 4: Fertilizers used in different temporal location categories


Displacement)

Location #3 (Post-

Displacement)

1 ash & manure ash & manure NA

2 ash & manure NA NA

3 ash NA NA

5 0 NA NA

6 ash ash NA

7 ash ash NA

8 ash & manure ash & manure (less manure)ash & manure (even less

manure)

10 ash synthetic fertilizers NA

11 ash & manure same same

12 ash & manure ash ash, manure

46

14 ash ash NA

15 ash & manure ash, manure NA

16 ash & leaf litter NA NA

17 ash & manureash, manure & occasionally

chemical fertilizersNA

Only 20% of respondents made a change in their fertilizer use as a method of addressing

land degradation (table 4). These respondents started using synthetic fertilizers as a response to

food insecurity. In all other cases, families used animal manure when possible and ash from the

burning of forests cleared for cultivation. In two cases, the use of manure decreased in the second

location because of the loss of livestock during the violent displacement process. Of the three

participants who went onto a third location before the refugee camp, fertilization methods didn’t

change for two, and one participant lost livestock during the violent displacement process which

decreased their ability to use manure as fertilizer (table 4).

The lack of change in fertilizer use fails to confirm objective 2 hypothesis 1, and should

not be mistaken for an indication that the soil had remained fertile. Synthetic fertilizers are

expensive and so are animals that produce manure suitable for agricultural purposes. Most

respondents did not have capital available to them to make that kind of an investment. Also,

synthetic fertilizers have not been, and are still not widely used in Karenni. Traditional methods

have been effective for a long period of time, so the lack of synthetic fertilizer use was not seen

as the problem. There is a perception that the safest way to maximize one’s agricultural yields is

by using the tried, tested and true methods. The benefit of this is that the negative environmental

impacts, such as eutrophication, associated with unsustainable, petroleum-based fertilizer

production and use are avoided. Synthetic fertilizer production is energy intensive, and relies on

fossil fuels (Lawrence, 2004). Phosphorus and potassium mines are being depleted globally, and

47

synthetic fertilizers use can lead to eutrophication, and may not replenish soils with trace

nutrients that they require to be fertile (Lawrence, 2004).

3.2.2 The Dynamics of Other Agricultural Inputs

Table 5: Participants' use of non-traditional agricultural inputs other than fertilizer


Displacement)

Location #3 (Post-

Displacement)

1 0 0 NA

2 0 NA NA

3 0 NA NA

5 0 NA NA

6 0 0 NA

7 0 0 NA

8 0 0 0

10 0 0 NA

11 0 0 0

12 0 0 0

14 0 synthetic pesticides NA

15 0 0 NA

16 pesticides (rat poison) NA NA

17 0 0 NA

20 0 0 NA

21 0 0 NA

Excluding the use of fertilizers (both natural and synthetic) 92% of respondents did not

use any kind of conventional agricultural inputs (including pesticides, herbicides, fungicides,

non-traditional tools or machinery) in their second location that they did not use in their first

(table 5). This was rarely a strategy employed to increase yields and decrease food insecurity.

Almost none of the participants used any kind of chemical pesticide, herbicide or fungicide and

none of them ever had access to any motorized agricultural tools. One participant began using

48

synthetic pesticides in his second location to boost his yields, but his situation was unique. His

father was a village headman and as a result his family was quite wealthy relative to others in

their community, and could afford to purchase pesticides. None of the other participants were in

an economic situation which allowed the use of agricultural inputs beyond hand tools. KESAN

(2005) claimed that poverty exacerbated by displacement could lead people to put stress on

agricultural land, but the use of agricultural inputs was not a way that this was happening. This

portion of the data does not support objective 2 hypothesis 1.

3.2.3 Plot Size Dynamics

Table 6: Change in agricultural plot size as reported by participants



Displacement)

6 normal size no change NA


8 normal size no change no change


11 normal size smaller normal size

12 normal size smaller normal Size



16 sized Increased NA NA

17 sized Increased no change NA

20 none very limited NA

Seventy percent of plot sizes were similar in second locations relative to participants’

point of origin (table 6). In 30% of cases participants were forced to decrease their plot size due

to limited space. All three participants who went on to cultivate land in a third location did so on

a plot of a size similar to that of their point of origin. In cases where plot size was reduced, this

49

was because of overcrowding. This is not surprising given the concentration of populations into

higher density living situations, such as in relocation sites, or in villages that are receiving an

influx of displaced people.

These statistics do not tell the whole story of overcrowding either. A number of

participants developed strategies to avoid having to cultivate in over-crowded areas. Many

participants traveled long distances, sometimes all the way back to their point of origin from

relocation sites for example, to cultivate land. While this type of strategy may help to alleviate

land degradation in some places, it comes with serious safety risks for the participant. Those who

were living in relocation sites had their mobility restricted by the junta, and traveling away from

the relocation site could have meant beatings, arrests, rape, torture, threats or other forms of

political persecution. The immense risks that people were willing to take are a testament to how

much of a problem land availability was, and how important it was to these people’s livelihoods

to have access to suitable agricultural land. The fact that they would travel back to their point of

origin to cultivate land indicates the relative fecundity of the soil. Others avoided cultivation in

over-crowded areas by employing alternative methods of supplementing their livelihoods as

outlined in section 3.2.3 and table 12.

3.2.4 Changes in the Number of Harvests Per Year

Table 7: Participants' number of harvests per year


Displacement)

Location #3 (Post-

Displacement)

1 1 NA NA

2 1 NA NA

3 1 NA NA

5 1 NA NA

6 1 1 NA

50

7 1 1 NA

8 1 1 1

10 1 1 NA

11 1 1 1

12 1 1 1

14 1 2 NA

15 1 1 NA

16 1 NA NA

17 1 1 NA

20 1 1 NA

21 1 NA NA

All participants harvested a single crop each year in their point of origin, while 90% of

respondents continued to harvest a single crop each year in their second location. All participants

who could provide information on a third location harvested a single crop each year in that

location (table 7).

This portion of the data also does not describe the effect of stress put on land as a result

of poverty as described by KESAN (2005). Increasing the number of crops harvested in a year

was not something that was possible for most. The one participant who could harvest two crops a

year was the son of the relatively wealthy village headman. He had access to synthetic fertilizers,

pesticides, and irrigation in their second location enabling them to grow a second crop in dry

season. Because rice paddy fields need to be flooded, only sunflowers or maize can be grown in

the dry season. These crops require non-traditional agricultural methods, and access to markets,

for sunflower and maize tend not to be dietary staples and are sold for income instead.

Furthermore, a second crop planted in one year on the same land will degrade that land

significantly. One needs access to fertilizers and ideally pesticides to have a successful harvest,

and maintain the fecundity of the soil which only one participant did have. Most found that

51

without access to agricultural inputs they were better off in the dry season to get income via other

means as outlined in section 3.2.3 and table 12.

3.2.5 Crop Diversification

Table 8: Crops grown by participants



Displacement)

1 rice, corn, betelnut none NA

2rice, corn, peanut, vegetables,

maizeNA NA

3rice, corn, vegetables, fruit,

peanutNA NA

5rice, corn, pumpkin,

vegetables, beans, fruitsame NA

6 rice, vegetables, peanutmore peanuts, sesame seeds,

and corn & less brass blowpipe

NA

7rice, vegetables, chilli, beans,

maize, fruitsame NA

8peanuts, rice, veggies, corn,

fruitsame same

10 ricerice, beans, sunflowers, and

chic peasNA

11 rice, peanut, brass blowpipe, same NA

12rice, peanut, sesame seed,

brass blow-pipeonly rice NA

14 rice, peanut, vegetables corn instead of peanut NA

15 rice, peanut, veggies, fruit same NA

16 rice, vegetables, pala (grain) same NA

17rice, bean, corn, peanut,

vegetablessame NA

Crop diversity in this section refers to a high number of crops grown and in fairly

equitable quantities by a participant on their plot. Fifty five percent of participants’ crop

diversification did not change between their first and second location, while 18% grew the same

52

crops but in different quantities (table 8). Twenty seven percent changed their crops as a strategy

to improve food security. All participants who grew crops in a third location before coming to the

refugee camp, maintained crop diversity, and grew the same crops as were grown in previous

locations.

There is no identifiable trend towards the preference of one crop over another. Again, a

failure to confirm objective 2 hypothesis 1 was found in this portion of the data. All participants

grew rice as their main crop. Most also grew peanut, corn, vegetables, beans, and brass blow

pipe which is a kind of grain used to make wine (table 8). All of these are crops which Karenni

people have cultivated for a long time, and the shifts in crop diversity were usually shifts made

within this group of crops. The one notable outlier to the data set was once again the participant

who was the son of the village headman who grew sunflowers and chick peas in the dry season.

They were enabled to do this through their access to fertilizers and irrigation. Generally, changes

in crop diversity were not perceived as viable strategies for increasing yields.

3.2.6 Fallow Periods

Table 9: Fallow periods (in years) employed by participants



Displacement)

1 5, 6, or 7 NA NA

2 3 NA NA

3 5 or 6 (use land for 3 years) NA NA

5 didn't rotate NA NA

7 7 or 8 7 or 8 NA

8 6 or 7 4 3, 4, or 5

10 good amount of time didn't rotate NA

11 3, decreasing same same

12 3 years couldn't rotate 3 years

14 3 or 4 3 or 4 NA

53

15old growth forest cleared for

plotsold growth forest cleared for

plotsNA

16 4 to 8 NA NA

17 3 to 7 5 NA

21 8 to 10 NA NA

Fallow periods are defined as lengths of time in which land is left untouched between

periods of cultivation. The purpose is to allow the soil to regenerate its fertility. Thirty eight

percent of respondents were forced to use land in their second location that had been fallow for a

shorter amount of time than the land that they used in the point of origin. Sixty three percent of

respondents continued to have access to land that had been fallow for approximately the same

amount of time as the land in their point of origin. All respondents who went onto a third

location did not experience a decline in the fallow period of their cultivated land (table 9).

It is important to note that there was a huge range in fallow periods contingent on many

different factors including the fecundity, and resiliency of the soil in various locations. In

respondents' point of origin, land was used that was fallow for anywhere between three to ten

years. Three years may seem like a short period of time, but the best agricultural land, such as

land along the edges of rivers, may only need three years to maintain its fertility.

Those who were displaced and migrated to relocation sites or nearby villages would have

gone to places where the best land would already be picked over. One participant explained that,

“we had problems with new arrivals want to make farm, but people who already in this

place own land near to the village. New arrivals come from other villages, and cannot

make farm near the village in land the people who already there say they own. We have to

go very far to make farm”

In this situation the best land had already been taken. Although the participant employed

a three year fallow period in both her point of origin and in the relocation site, this was enough

54

time to maintain the fertility of the soil in her point of origin, but was not sustainable in the

relocation site area.

The data on fallow periods provides the first part of an explanation on how

marginalization manifests itself as stress put on agricultural land (KESAN, 2005), supporting

objective 2 hypothesis 1. The increased concentration of people was the driving factor leading

participants to shorten fallow periods. That said, many participants still had access to good

quality land despite the concentration of populations, they just needed to travel increasingly

further away from their villages to find it.

3.2.7 Land Tenure

The ownership of land suitable for non-rotational farming among Karenni people is

passed down from father to son, and management of that land is controlled by the father. As

Karenni is very mountainous, there is very little land suitable for non-rotational farming, and

very rarely is that small amount of land not already in use. In situations where families have been

displaced this land may become available, neighbours divide the land between them, but it goes

back to the original owners if they return.

Most Karenni people however practice rotational farming, which uses a very informal

system of land ownership. Individuals find a plot of land that has been fallow for a suitable

amount of time. This is determined by the size of the trees found on this land. Large trees are an

indicator of land that has been fallow for a long time and therefore indicates that the soil is

fecund. Karenni people do not go through any kind of process to receive permission to cultivate

land, and local decision makers (such as village headmen) are not involved in the process of plot

selection.

55

There are some religious practices which restrict the areas where land can be cultivated.

For example, land cannot be cultivated near burial sites, and offerings must be made to the forest

spirit to seek permission to cultivate forested land. Karenni Animists believe that the forest spirit

can communicate to them through their dreams, and nightmares can signify that they do not have

permission to cultivate the land which they hope to.

Further restrictions on land cultivation may arise as a result of the political situation. The

SPDC will sometimes prohibit cultivation in certain areas if they believe the site is near to a KA

base. Especially in relocation sites, the SPDC will limit cultivation to areas that are easily

monitored, so that they know people aren’t going to contact or assist the Karenni Army.

This system of land ownership means that when displaced people arrive in new places

they do not have access to the best land which is passed down through family lines. In this sense,

objective 3 hypothesis 1 is confirmed. New arrivals are pushed onto more marginalized land

which require longer fallow periods in order to sustainably retain their fertility, but this is not

always possible leading to land degradation, showing the validity of objective 1 hypothesis 3

which predicts environmental impacts from condensed living.

3.2.8 Community Exchange of Land Management Information

Table 10: Environmental knowledge exchange as reported by participants

Participant Location #2 (Post-Displacement) Location #3 (Post-Displacement)

2

didn’t learn anything new from people from

other villages that he couldn’t have learned in

his own village

NA

8 didn't gain any new knowledge minimal knowledge sharing

11 minimal knowledge sharing NA

15 knowledge was not shared NA

56

Fifty percent of respondents said that there was some environmental knowledge sharing

in second and third locations between people who came from other places, but in these cases the

amount of knowledge shared was minimal (table 10) such as the introduction of new crops. As

one respondent explained, it only occurred if they were introduced to an educated person or

someone who could share knowledge they had gathered through their work experience.

Objective 3 hypothesis 4 is confirmed; the general consensus was that traditional environmental

knowledge that had been passed down through generations did not vary much from village to

village considering that the people they were introduced to through their migration process were

usually from neighbouring villages that would have had at least a minimum level of

communication before hand. It is interesting that this is in direct contrast to Kondylis' (2008)

findings on migration and exchange of environmental knowledge.

3.2.9 Summary on Land Degradation

The problem of land degradation was very dynamic and while it was experienced by most

participants increasingly after displacement, there were a number of different drivers. The lower

quality of land to which most respondents had access after displacement was due to population

concentration, but it was exacerbated in some cases by deforestation.

Forty four percent of participants experienced an increase in deforestation in their second

location as opposed to their first. Forty four percent experienced a decrease and 11% experienced

no change. All participants (3) who went onto a third location before coming to the refugee camp

experienced an increase or no change in the level of deforestation (table 19). Deforestation by

logging companies causes soil erosion, and the land is less likely to be used by participants if

they can’t burn the vegetation on the plot to use the ash to fertilize the soil. This limits the land

57

available, pushing participants onto more marginalized lands, and leading to stress being put on

the good agricultural land that remains.

Some people cultivated smaller plots of land as a result of deforestation and population

concentration. Problems associated with the use of synthetic fertilizers, and pesticides were not

present, largely due to the lack of access to such products. Few people cultivated during the dry

season, but some participants were forced to use land that was left fallow for an inadequate

amount of time. Unfortunately, objective 3 hypothesis 4 was confirmed by the data and the

exchange of environmental knowledge between different communities was very minimal.

Keane (2004) identifies three potential drivers of environmental problems in displaced

communities. The data on land degradation supports his claim that high population densities can

lead to land degradation. There is nothing in the data on land degradation to support Keane’s

claim that displaced people have less of an incentive to preserve the environment because they

view their stay as temporary. Cultivation and land selection practices used in second and third

locations were similar to those the participant used in their point of origin.

3.3 Food Security

Low levels of food security was a common theme amongst participants. Seventy percent

of respondents experienced an decrease in food security in the second location relative to their

point of origin, while 30% experienced no change. There were no instances where participants

had more food in their second location than in their point of origin. Of the three participants who

lived in a third location before they migrated to the refugee camp, two experienced no change in

food security relative to their point of origin and the third had less food than he had in his point

of origin, but more than he had in his second location.

58

The fact that food security decreases after displacement is intuitive in this situation but

different from situations where people migrate for ecological or economic reasons in search of a

better livelihood. In these situations migration is a strategy to mitigate food insecurity. Land

degradation was a commonly sited driver of food insecurity amongst participants as has been

discussed above, but it wasn’t the only driving factor.

3.3.1 Drivers of Food Insecurity

Table 11: Drivers of food insecurity as reported by participants



Displacement)

2

1. Livelihood challenges due to political situation 2.

unsustainable environmental practices by locals and government, 3. Climate

Change

NA NA

31. livelihood challenges due to

political situationNA NA

5 Usually had enough food NA NA

6 Usually had enough food1. Livelihood challenges due to

political situationNA

7 Usually had enough food Usually had enough food NA

8 Usually had enough food

1. climate change 2. decreased price of crops 3. pop growth 4.

challenges imposed by the SPDC

NA

10 Usually had enough food1. climate change and 2.


NA

111. challenges imposed by the

SPDC1. less able to work land as his

parent got olderSame as in the point of origin

121. challenges imposed by the

SPDC1. No space to shift cultivation Same as in the point of origin

141. climate change and 2.


1. climate change and 2. challenges imposed by the

SPDCNA

15 1. lack of development 2. 1. climate change and 2. NA

59



161.climate change and 2.


NA NA

171. Large family with kids too

young to work

1. climate change 2. Deforestation 3. population

growth/concentrations 4. challenges imposed by the

SPDC

NA

20 NA1. challenges imposed by the

SPDCNA

Eleven percent of respondents were driven to land degradation in second locations after

not having to put stress on their land in their point of origin. Seventy seven percent did not

experience land degradation in either location and 11% experienced less land degradation in their

second location than in their point of origin. No respondents experienced land degradation in

their third location (table 11).

Stress is often put on land as a result of food insecurity. Declining yields were caused by a

large variety of factors. Fifty four percent of respondents said that in their point of origin food

insecurity resulted from actions, restrictions or stresses imposed by either the government or the

Karenni Army as a direct result of the political situation (looting of food storages, theft of

livestock, forced labour, limited mobility, arbitrary taxation etc.). Climate change has led to rain

arriving later in the rainy season, meaning that wild animals will eat the seed planted by farmers

in their fields before they can establish roots in the soil; 23% of respondents reported that this

was a problem in their point of origin. One respondent reported that each of the following things

led to food insecurity; large family size, lack of development, and deforestation.

In second locations, 70% said that the political situation, 50% said climate change leading

to late-season rain arrival, 20% said that population growth from either increased birth rates or

60

population concentration as a result of displacement, 10% said that deforestation, and 10% said

that decreasing food prices lowered their food security. In third locations both respondents

reported that the political situation was the only factor contributing to their food insecurity.

3.3.2 Strategies Implemented in Situations of Food Insecurity

Table 12: Strategies for increasing food security in different locations



Displacement)Camp

2support from church,

community food sharingNA NA NA

3

eat a mixture of rice and corn, sell peanuts, work

for meals (farms, industries), sell brass

blowpipe

NA NA NA

5 usually had enough food NA NA NA

7sell forest resources

(turtles, meat)same NA NA

8 use savings, debt same same NA

9 NA NA NAlogging for

income

11 debt sell forest resources, debt debt NA

12 usually enough food, debt increased debt debt NA

14 sell timber (teak), debt same NA NA

15 usually had enough sell wild meat NA NA

16 crowd fields with rice NA NA NA

17 debt, bigger farm debt, chemical fertilizers NA NA

20 NAKNPP support, hidden

food stores in the jungleNA NA

21smuggle animals &

cheroots (cigars) into Thailand

hunting, food sharing NA NA

Strategies for mitigating food insecurity were wide-ranging. Fifty percent of participants

used some form of food sharing, or debt between community members as a strategy for

61

mitigating food insecurity. Of those respondents that went onto a second location, all who used

debts or food sharing in their point of origin continued to do so in their second location (62.5%)

(table 13). This was the most common form of food insecurity mitigation, but there was a wide

variety of other strategies employed.

Communities also often kept hidden food storages in the jungle if they were vulnerable to

looting by the military. Other participants tried changing the types of crops they grew to increase

productivity (corn, peanuts, and brass-blowpipe were experimented with in place of rice). In one

case, a participant started smuggling animals and cheroots (cigars) into Thailand from Burma to

sell for income generation.

Nine percent of participants relied upon the collection and sale of environmental resources

in their point of origin and 38% of participants only started to use environmental resource

collection as a livelihood strategy in their second location in response to increased food

insecurity (table 13). This result supports objective 2 hypothesis 2 which predicts that

displacement is affecting natural resource depletion. All of the participants who employed this

strategy in their point of origin continued to do so in their following locations (table 13).

Primarily, teak wood was cut and sold, but flowers, turtles, and other wild meats where also sold

to supplement family incomes.

It has been well documented that people turn to environmentally degradative livelihood

strategies in times of economic vulnerability and poverty (Keane, 2004; KESAN, 2005; Locke et

al., 2000). This phenomenon was present in most participant's situations, but most were also

found to rely more heavily on kith and kinship security networks than environmentally

degradative livelihood strategies. The one notable exception to this is in the collection and sale of

natural resources, which can lead to natural resource depletion, and the loss of biodiversity

62

(Keane, 2004; Nesheim, et al., 2006; Kondylis, 2008). Natural resource depletion, and its

environmental and ecological effects are revisited in more detail in the following sections.

3.3.3 Generation of Economic Vulnerability by Political Organizations

Table 13: Human rights violations experienced by participants in different locations



Displacement)

1 forced labourforced labour, violence, four

cuts policyNA

2

killings, burn food storage, curfew, restricted mobility,

forced labour, violence, arrests, torture, arbitrary taxation

NA NA

3looting, arbitrary taxation,

forced labour, arrests, torture, threats,

NA NA

5 none NA NA

6 NA looting, forced labour NA

7lack of mobility, looting, forced labour, arbitrary taxation, crop damage,

land-mines, forced labour, NA

8torture, looting, arbitrary

taxation, forced labour, lack of mobility

forced labour, torture, land-mines, looting, arbitrary taxation, lack of mobility

same, but no lack of mobility, arbitrary taxation

10 looting, crop damage, lack of mobility, land mines,

arbitrary taxationNA

11forced labour, torture, arrests, threats, looting, land mines,

lack of mobility

same as in point of origin except no permission to farm

and less mobility, Same as in point of origin

12forced labour, torture, arrests, threats, looting, land mines,

lack of mobility

Same as in point of origin except less mobility and more

lootingNA

14forced labour, arbitrary

taxation, land-mines, arrests, torture

forced labour, arbitrary taxation, torture, killings,

arrestsNA

15forced labour, looting, land-

mines, lack of mobility

forced labour, arrests, killings, land-mines, looting, lack of

mobilityNA

17 noneforced labour, looting, landmines from dams,

NA

63

20 noneconstantly fleeing, violence,

looting, burning cropsNA

21 noneconstantly fleeing, violence, looting, landmines, forced

laborNA

The junta carries out a wide range of activities which compromise the Karenni people’s

food security. In their points of origin:

83% were subject to forced labour

58% had food or money taken from them by the military

50% suffered from political persecution in the form of torture, rape, arrest, threats or

killings

50% had their mobility restricted

33% lived in areas with land-mines in close proximity to their village (table 12)

In second locations:

83% were subject to forced labour

75% had food or money taken from them by the military

42% suffered from political persecution in the form of torture, rape, arrest, threats or

killings

58% had their mobility restricted

66% lived in areas with land-mines in close proximity to their village (table 12)

In second locations however, oppression at the hands of the SPDC was highly contingent

upon the type of location people moved to. All of those who were ordered to relocation sites

experienced an increase in the frequency of things such as forced labour, torture, threats, and lack

of mobility. As one respondent put it,

“they live with the village, they don’t have troop. Because they around to patrol, and then

64

they come to live like one week or two week and live in the village…when they arrive in

the relocation site and the village no body go to outside because the people is very afraid to

SPDC because SPDC when they arrive in the village they have many question and they

arrest village headmaster and the beat and they torture”.

Relocations sites are always in close proximity to SPDC barracks so that the SPDC can

easily monitor and control the population. This close proximity makes those who live in

relocation sites easy targets for exploitation whenever the SPDC is in need of forced labour,

food, information, or other resources.

The experience of participants who fled to new villages where they had kith or kinship ties

was more wide ranging. Some participants had the ability to migrate to villages that would be

more safe from SPDC exploitation and oppression, while others were forced out of the relative

safety of their isolation and migrated to villages that were easier for the SPDC to access. One

participant, for example, had never seen the SPDC in his remote village until they came to burn

it down and order the residents out.

Those living in villages that were perpetually migrating, lived along the front lines of the

conflict between the SPDC and the KNPP. These communities suffered the direct consequences

of violence more than others, such as wounds from conflict or land-mines, as well as restricted

mobility for safety reasons, and looting of food storages and animals when territory was lost. The

KNPP was able to protect them from forms of SPDC exploitation such as forced labour, arrests,

torture, threats, looting, and arbitrary taxation most of the time.

All participants who went onto a third location reported that the problems they

encountered from the SPDC were similar to those experienced in their second locations.

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3.4 Natural Resource Depletion

Table 14: Availability of natural resources used by participants ranked on a five point scale


Displacement)

Location #3 (Post-

Displacement)Camp

1 5 2 NA 1.5

2 4 NA NA 1.5

3 2 NA NA 1.5

4 NA NA NA 2

5 4 NA NA 1.5

6 5 2 NA NA

7 4 1 NA 1.5

8 5 3 2 1.5

9 NA NA NA 1

10 5 1 NA NA

11 4 1 NA 1.5

12 4 2 NA 1.5

14 2 4 NA 1.5

15 5 4 NA NA

16 4 NA NA NA

17 5 2 NA NA

18 NAinitially 4 but

decreased to 2.5NA 1.5

19 NAinitially 4 but

decreased to 2.5NA 1.5

20 NA 4 NA 1.5

21 5 5 NA 2

Table 15: Availability of specific natural resources in the point of origin

ProductNo. of Respondents Using

the ResourceAvailability Average Availability

vegetables 7 #, 2, #, 4, 5, 5, # 4

fruits 5 #, 2, #, 5, 5 4

medicinal plants 3 #, 4 4

timber 8 #, 5, #, 3, #, #, #, 5 4.3

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bamboo 4 #, 5, 3, 4 4

flowers 3 4, #, # 4

animals 8 4, 2, 5, 4, 5, 5, 3, # 4

birds 2 #, # #

chickens 1 # #

wild boar 3 #, 5, 5 5

deer 5 #, #, 3, #, 5 4

frog 1 # #

monkey 5 #, #, 5, 3, 4 4

big rats 4 #, 3, #, 4 3.5

fish 4 #, 5, #, 4 4.5

bear 5 #, #, 5, #, 4 4.5

tiger 3 #, 1, 3 2

wild buffalo 1 # #

turtles 1 4 4

rabbit 1 # #

snake 1 4 4

wild dog 1 4 4

*** The “#” indicates a respondent that reported a natural resource was available but did not

rank its availability

Table 16: Availability of individual natural resources in the location #2



turtles 2 5, 3 4

flowers 2 5, 3 4

vegetables 4 5, 3, 5, 3 4

animals 3 5, 2, 1 2.7

trees 4 1, 1, 1, 5 2

bamboo 2 1, 5 3

fruit 2 3, # 3

animals 3 1, 5, 4 3.3

deer 3 4, #, 4 4

rabbit 1 4 4

birds 2 3, 4 3.5

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cat 1 # #

pig 2 #, 4 4

bear 2 #, 4 4

buffalo 1 # #

rat 1 4 4

monkey 1 4 4

snakes 1 3 3

fish 1 4 4

Table 17: Availability of individual natural resources in the location #3



animals 1 1.5 1.5

bamboo 1 2 2

trees 1 2 2

fruits 1 2 2

vegetables 1 2 2

Table 18: Availability of individual natural resources in the refugee camp


the ResourcesAvailability Average Availability

birds 2 2, 2 2

fish 2 2, 1 1.5

vegetable 1 3, 3

frogs 1 2.5 3.5

turtles 1 5 5

big lizard 1 5 5

bamboo shoots, 1 5 5

mushrooms 1 5 5

“long squiggly vegetable” 1 5 5

Eighty two percent of respondents had fewer natural resources available to them overall

in their second location as compared to their point of origin. Nine percent of respondents had

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about the same access to natural resources in both locations, albeit there was variation in the

specific availability of individual resources, and 9% of respondents had more access to natural

resources in their second location as compared to their point of origin.

Natural resource availability in second locations was on average ranked two points lower

on the five point scale than points of origin. The one respondent who went onto a third location

before coming to the refugee camp experienced a one point drop in overall natural resource

availability as compared to his second location and a drop of 3 points as compared to his point of

origin.

Seventy seven percent of respondents had more natural resource availability in their

second location as compared to the refugee camp, and 100% of respondents had better natural

resource availability in their point of origin as compared to the refugee camp. There was an

average 3 point drop in forest resources in the refugee camp as compared to respondents’ points

of origin.

This stark drop in forest resources with every stage of displacement is startling and the

explanation for such a drop is multi-dimensional. The three dominant explanations are that

natural resource depletion is driven by the concentration of populations into smaller areas

leading to a higher number of people extracting forest resources, for their own consumption and

for sale, from a smaller geographic area. The explanation also includes the exploitation of natural

resources by large logging companies, as well as the government and other armed forces in an

effort to fund civil conflict, and an increased reliance on natural resources as a food insecurity

mitigation mechanism. These findings support Keane's (2004) explanation of natural resource

depletion in refugee settings.

It must also be kept in mind that migrations of people over space overlap with changes

69

that are occurring over time. Population growth as a consequence of high birth rates were

reported by many participants to be a significant trend. Displacement doesn't impact natural

resources in a vacuum. There are other factors creating noise in the data.

3.4.1 Deforestation

Table 19: Deforestation as reported by participants in different locations


Displacement)

Location #3 (Post-

Displacement)Refugee Camp

1 lots of deforestation not much deforestation NA lots of deforestation

2 lots of deforestation NA NA lots of deforestation

3 lots of deforestation NA NA lots of deforestation

5

none, but the area was completely logged

after the village was displaced

NA NA lots of deforestation

6 lots of deforestation more deforestation NA NA

8none, but the area was

completely logged after displacement

some deforestation lots of deforestation lots of deforestation

9 NA NA NAlots of deforestation

and increasing

10none, but the area was

flooded after displacement

lots of deforestation NA NA

11 lots of deforestation lots of deforestation

slightly less

deforestation than in

the point of origin

lots of deforestation

12 lots of deforestation some deforestation

slightly less

deforestation than in

the point of origin

lots of deforestation

14 lots of deforestation No data NA lots of deforestation

15 lots of deforestationsome deforestation and

decreasingNA NA

16 lots of deforestation NA NA NA

17 some deforestation lots of deforestation NA NA

18 NA some deforestation NA lots of deforestation

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21 some deforestation none NA lots of deforestation

Thirty eight percent of participants that left villages which were completely displaced of

all their inhabitants were able to confirm that the forest surrounding their point of origin had

been either completely or heavily deforested after the area was made vacant due to the villager’s

displacement. Moreover, after being displaced, many participants never returned or received

information about the environmental state of their point of origin, so it stands to reason that 38%

is an underestimation of the number of villages whose forests were cut after they were displaced,

because many logging operations would have been carried out without the awareness of the

participants.

Forty four percent of participants experienced an increase in deforestation in their second

location as compared to their point of origin. Forty four percent experienced a decrease and 11%

experienced no change. All participants (3) who went onto a third location before coming to the

refugee camp experienced an increase or no change in the level of deforestation. Fifty eight

percent of participants said that the deforestation around the refugee camp was more than that in

their previous location, and conversely 42% reported that deforestation in the refugee camp was

less than or similar to that in their previous location (table 19). This result somewhat reflects the

trends identified by Keane (2004) as leading to increased deforestation in refugee camps. It also

supports again objective 2 hypothesis 2; displacement affects natural resource depletion.

The refugee camp has an extremely high population density (~15,000 people on ~2.5

km2 of land). This high level of population density would lead to large levels of deforestation

inside Burma, but there are a number of reasons why deforestation in the area surrounding the

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refugee camp is minimal. Agricultural activities are prohibited in the refugee camp, refugees are

dependent on aid for food as opposed to agriculture. This means that slash-and-burn agricultural

practices which generate a large amount of deforestation in Karenni are not processes occurring

in the refugee camp. Refugees also get monthly rations of charcoal reducing their dependency on

fuelwood. Finally, in 2003 the Thai government established the Namtok Pha Suea National Park,

in which the Ban Mai Nai Soi refugee camp is situated. This means that now any form of

commercial logging or natural resource extraction is illegal in the area. It also means that

refugees are prohibited from cutting down trees for fuelwood.

There is some deforestation however resulting from illegal logging activities, that have

been on the rise over the past few years. One participant explained the situation very clearly.

Over the last five years there has been a dramatic increase in the number of people being

resettled from the refugee camp to third countries. This is in large part due to the fact that the

USA has removed its quota on the number of Burmese refugees it will accept into the country

each year, leading to a flood of refugees being resettled to the USA. Over the past 5 years more

than 5,000 people have been resettled,

“when you had resettlement… refugees resettling to a third country would get a job,

earning US dollars and send it back. So you had the remittance economy, and suddenly

people were able to afford a lot more. So there’s more disposable income in camp and so

there were more shops, prices went up, salaries went up…the other thing that happened at

the same time was that people working with NGOs got salary increases. But people

working with local [community based organizations] didn’t, so you had a big disparity in

incomes. Some people were able to afford more expensive things which were suddenly

available in camp, whilst the majority couldn’t”.

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Refugees are using illegal logging to supplement their incomes. On top of that, the

amount of food offered to refugees has dropped from 2,180 calories per person per day to 1,850

calories per person per day since 2007 (TBBC, 2011). TBBC’s (Thailand-Burma Boarder

Consortium) budget for food basket provision has been cut as a result of a lack of funding due to

the recent global financial crisis. One of the ways in which refugees have started to generate

income is by selling their charcoal rations and cutting down trees for fuelwood to replace it.

Some people have also started selling timber to illegal logging companies. There are Thai people

in the village (Nai Soi) nearby the refugee camp who purchase teak and other woods illegally

taken from the forest by refugees, but the scale of this black market logging operation is limited,

because the Thai authorities do make efforts to limit these activities as they are illegal (the

refugee camp is in the middle of a Thai National Park).

In participant’s point of origin logging companies paid commissions to villagers for trees

(especially teak) in 29% of cases. Twenty percent of participants in second locations, and 33% of

participants in third locations had logging companies near their village that gave commissions to

local villagers for timber.

Logging operations were carried out by the SPDC in forests that participants depended on

for the collection of forest resources in 36% of the participants' points of origin. Ten percent of

participants in second locations were affected by SPDC logging operations, 10% by KNPP

operations, and 0% of participants in third locations were affected by SPDC or KNPP logging

operations.

Driving this deforestation is the vulnerability of Karenni people who do not have

environmentally sustainable income generation options available to them, but it is also generated

by the willingness of the junta to sell logging commissions to international logging companies. It

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provides the junta with quick, easy cash to fund their military efforts, and the logging operations

occur in the ethnic areas, away from where the ethnically Burmese people live. The deforestation

doesn’t directly affect the ethnically Burmese junta, and the hardships and costs of such

operations are outsourced to the ethnic minority groups such as the Karenni.

3.4.2 Environmental Management

As has been hinted at thus far, natural resource management strategies have large

environmental implications especially for natural resource depletion, but also for land

degradation. In the Ban Mai Nai Soi refugee camp there are two bodies responsible for

environmental management; there is the Thai government and the Refugee Committee. In most

refugee settings the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) takes a much

more prominent role, but in Ban Mai Nai Soi,

“they’re not quite as strong as they could be, so camp management is done by a camp

committee.”

The refugee camp is a very different situation than anything inside Karenni. Ban Mai Nai

Soi is the second largest concentration of Karenni people anywhere in the world. The vast

majority of Karenni people in the camp come from small villages of maybe 100 people, so

they’re not used to dealing with the new set of environmental challenges that have arisen in the

refugee camp and they don’t have traditional systems which address those problems.

“Normally there should be a whole set of regulations that aren’t in place now and haven’t

been followed. So things like not putting a pig pen on top of the river, not putting a latrine

close to the river, not putting a rubbish disposal area near to the river. These regulations

aren’t there and they haven’t been followed.”

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This result supports objective 3 hypotheses 1 and 3; 1. land owners and managers are

changing with environmental ramifications, and 3. the ability of longstanding social institutions

that address these problems changed due to displacement. This result is also in line with claims

made by Karen Rivers Watch (2004), KESAN (2005), Kibreab (1997), and Gellert & Lynch

(2003). A more in-depth look at specific environmental management activities and strategies

employed in the camp can be found in the following sections.

Inside Karenni, various natural resources are managed to varying degrees by various

parties. The most stringent party with the most clearly defined rules and regulations would be the

Karenni National Political Party, which imposes natural resource laws in sovereign territories

which the Karenni Army control. The most significant piece of environmental legislation that

they have is the prohibition of commercial logging. Trees can be cut for the clearing of

agricultural land, or for village construction purposes but not for sale to logging companies. They

protect some rare species of trees from logging such as Saw-Noh-Mway (a Kayah word), and

they also enforce hunting regulations which prohibit the hunting of many endangered and

threatened species such as elephants, tigers, wild cows and gibbons.

Most respondents reported that there were no formal structures or restrictions implemented

by the community, on the natural resources they could take or the locations where they could set

up farms with a couple of minor exceptions. Deforestation near burial sites was usually

forbidden out of respect for the dead. Occasionally villages had agreed to prohibit deforestation

near river banks or near the edges of lakes to prevent erosion. In a couple of cases efforts had

been made within the community leadership to limit the number of trees that could be sold to

logging companies to slow deforestation, but this wasn’t often seen as a viable option because it

was usually turned to as a last economic resort for the poorest families to feed themselves.

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Traditional religious practices played a larger environmental management role within those

communities.

3.4.3 The Role of Animist Religion in Environmental Management

Karenni Animism provides an informal kind of environmental protection. Engrained in the

belief is a respect for the natural environment. A participant explained that in,

“animism the belief is that everything has a spirit that protect it. Lets say the mountain,

the mountain spirit protect the mountain, the forest has the forest spirit, and the water

source has a spirit, and the living they also have spirit, the animal has its own spirit, and

everything you have to respect the spirit, not upset the spirit.”

Respecting spirits is done through making offerings and carrying out rituals for the spirits

as well as only taking what one needs and sharing what one takes from the environment with the

whole community. For example,

“there is tradition, we call geh-poh-mi all the big animal you hunt you cannot bring it to...

your own house. You have to bring it to the elder and they help you cut it and divide it no?

So if you hunt, you get 50% of the meat. The rest 50% is divide into small piece equally to

every household”

Animism puts a large emphasis on the management of deforestation. It offers direction

“when you cutting in the forest for selecting your farm” for the belief is that you may,

“upset the forest spirit or the mountain spirit get upset and make you sick or harm you

make you die… The elder in the village they decide that you cannot go and cutting there or

farming there is a strong spirit…We not need police to punish the people.”

It is harder for traditional Animist beliefs to influence the actions of logging companies

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which may or may not share their beliefs, but as one participant put it,

“when the logging community come in I know it already, and there are big tree very nearby

my village, and we believe that the big tree there are spirit, and we never cut that big tree

cause we are scared of the spirit. And the company come for logging and the elder tell them

you cannot. There is spirit. The spirit will be upset. So its a kind of protection.”

Animist beliefs are likely to have an impact on the people who the logging companies

depend upon for cheap labor, the local people who are not formal employees of the companies

but are paid concessions to cut trees from the forest and sell them to the large firms.

Probably the most significant role that Animism plays in environmental protection is the

way in which it promotes the idea that the environment is not something that people are the

owners of, or the conquerors of, or that they are entitled to. The natural world to Karenni people

belongs to something bigger than themselves. They see themselves as interacting with the natural

world rather than having a unidirectional relationship with it that involves them simply taking all

they can. The only control on that exploitative mindset being the threat that they might not be

able to take as much from it in the future. They truly know that the environment can affect them

just as they can affect the environment. This fact is appreciated with a depth that is not seen in

the Western world.

A really interesting example of this in a ritual called Swarma. It was described that

“When you pound rice for cooking you put the rice into the basket this way with the turtle

shell, and it mean the turtle is slow so you take it this way slowly and respectfully. If you

take it quickly it mean the rice will run out. Not to waste it. All this belief if you translate,

in conclusion you save, you care, you respect, but people not fully able to translate what

they are doing into that way. The elder apply the spirit to dread the society to be humble, to

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take only what you need. That what it mean in my interpretation.”

This participant recognizes value in conservation; there is value in taking only what one

needs and no more. And the teachings of this are applicable to the mindset the Karenni take

towards the environment and the ways in which they interact with it everyday. Unfortunately,

traditional Animist practices are being slowly lost as people are increasingly converted to

Christianity, or Buddhism.

Table 20: Historical religious conversion of participants' families

Participant Religion Practice

1 Baptist, grandparents convertedmany religious rituals intertwined with the

culture and they still practice

2converted to Roman Catholicism in 94 -

believes a bit in bothcan’t do any of the rituals, never learned but

believes in them

3family converted to Roman Catholicism in

approximately 1970NA

4 Animist NA

5 Animist NA

6 Animist NA

7 Animist NA

8 Buddhist, grandparents converted still practice many traditional religious rituals

9 Baptist NA

11 converted to Roman Catholicism in 1994 still de facto animists, still do traditional rituals

12Baptist, family converted in approximately

1975/1980NA

14 Buddhist, mother converted still practice traditional practices

16 Baptist NA

21 Animistmost converts, “they practice more

compromised thing with this belief.”

Thirty six percent of participants called themselves followers of the Animist faith. Of the

participant’s families who converted to Christianity or Buddhism from the traditional Animist

religion, 71% did so quit recently (during their parent’s generation, or their own). All of the

Christian or Buddhist participants still practiced some traditional animist religious rituals and

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held many animist beliefs, although to a lesser degree (table 20). As one participant put it,

although there is still a large community of Animists, many converted people have started to

practice a more, “compromised form of animism”, without doing as many rituals or without as

much emphasis on traditional beliefs.

It is hard to know how displacement has affected the level of religious conversion. A few

participants said that the access to social services provided by religious charities was the main

reason they converted. Certainly, exposure to these groups and to people of other religions is

integral to the conversion process. In the refugee camp there are two bible schools funded

privately by an American church in Florida, and the international agency which funds and

manages most of the education system in the camp is Jesuit Relief Services (JRS). Unlike the

bible schools, JRS works with children of all faiths, but these organizations may be

representative of a higher level of exposure to the Christian faith which may influence the rate of

religious conversion amongst people in the refugee camp.

I propose that the findings on the ways in which religious practices have changed, support

objective 3, hypotheses 2 and 4; 2. institutions responsible for protecting traditional knowledge

and practices are changing, and 4.vast local environmental knowledge bases are being lost as a

result of displacement. This is supported by claims made by KESAN (2005).

Inside Burma however, most international aid agencies are still prohibited from working,

and foreigners are prohibited from traveling in Karenni State due to the violent conflict. These

factors may serve as a sort of protection, preserving Animist beliefs from being washed away by

the tides of globalization, which still have not heavily penetrated Karenni. In a lot of ways

Karenni is very shut out from the rest of the world, but many working on the Thai-Burma

boarder claim that this is beginning to change, and Burma is becoming more accessible to

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foreigners and foreign organizations. It will be interesting to see how this affects rates of

religious conversion in Karenni.

3.4.4 Summary on Displacement's Effect on Natural Resource Depletion

The dynamics of changing environmental management practices are impacting the

environment in various ways and it would be inappropriate to make an unconditional claim that

the changes have been positive or negative. Certainly the KNPP’s loss of territory has been

detrimental, as they have been much more responsible environmental managers than the junta

has been. That said, they are not without their negative environmental impacts. They have

granted logging concessions in controlled areas, but on a much smaller scale than the SPDC.

The KNPP is the political organization which holds the vast majority of the support of the

Karenni people, so one could say that their relatively strong efforts to protect the environment

are a testament to the value of local control. On the local level, environmental protection

mechanisms were fairly unorganized and informal, but that comes out of the low impact that

traditional Karenni livelihoods have had on the environment. That said, displacement is changing

the living conditions of the Karenni people. In these situations there has been a limited capacity

to respond to these issues. This is what has been seen in the refugee camp. In many cases there

has been a lack of willingness to change traditional practices to address new problems, because

those practices have been sustainable and effective for such a long time.

The data from this study supports Keane’s (2004) three drivers of natural resource

depletion amongst displaced populations; they rely on natural resources more heavily to sustain

their livelihoods, they extract natural resources on top of what host populations were already

extracting, and rapid changes can affect fragile environments. The last point in particular is

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illustrated in the inability to respond quickly to rapidly degrading environments.

3.5 Environmental Recovery of Abandoned Areas

In large part, I have focused on the environmental impacts that migration has on the

locations to which displaced people are migrating, but as a large portion of the literature states:

environments from which people are displaced are often left fallow and thus given the

opportunity to recover (Locke, et al., 2000; Kondylis, 2008). Access to data on the ability of

environments to recover after displacement was limited, as participants don’t have first hand

experiences with areas after they've left them and it was not possible to conduct research inside

Burma.

There was however a refugee camp on the Thai side of the border which was abandoned

in 2002, as the Thai government chose to amalgamate the five refugee camps that existed in Mae

Hong Son province at that time into two larger camps. One participant explained that this was so

that the refugee population would be easier to control, and so that the refugees could be moved

further away from existing Thai villages. Also, they had just established the Thai Namtok Pha

Suea National Park in which the camps were situated, so they wanted to limit the areas that

would be environmentally degraded to reduce habitat fragmentation of wild populations. It was

possible to visit one of these camp sites that had been abandoned for nine years, and interview

some of the previous inhabitants of that camp.

The camp was home to 4,410 people before they started being relocated to other sites

(TBBC, 2002). People were moved out gradually, and needed to take everything they had which

included taking their houses apart so that they could be rebuilt in the next site. As a result the

only things left behind were a few concrete pads that were floors in some of the old buildings,

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such as the clinic. Limited environmental restoration efforts were made, but the waste was

cleaned up by the refugee community.

Vegetation had begun to return to the area and most of the old site was covered with early

successional species. Few large trees remained as most were cleared while the refugees lived

there, but some teak had been replanted through a tree-planting community initiative in the

nearby Thai village of Nai Soi. These teak trees were still small.

A lot of the land that was cleared for the refugee camp was being cultivated by either

Thai people, or Padaung refugees (The small group of ethnic Padaung refugees were permitted to

live in a village outside the refugee camp, because the “long-neck women” who wear brass rings

around their elongated necks are a tourist attraction which supports the Thai economy). This is

an indicator that the soil remained fecund enough, and uncontaminated enough, so that it was

suitable for cultivation.

Despite the fact that a high concentration of people were living at this refugee camp site

for upwards of ten years, the fecundity of the soil, and the return of vegetation indicate that the

site is recovering, and in time would return to a forested state. I believe that this case study is

representative of what would occur in most Karenni villages after people have been displaced

from them. One unique feature of this case is that people took the materials used to build their

houses with them. None of the participants did this in Karenni when they were displaced, but

their houses are made of bamboo, and the roofs of leaves, so they would be completely

biodegradable. The lack of pollution, and toxic chemicals used in Karenni due to its complete

lack of rural industrialization make it fair to hypothesize that the environments surrounding

displaced Karenni villages would be able to recover quite well in the absence of human activity.

The negative environmental effects of displacement have been highlighted in this paper, but this

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is a beacon of hope for the current environmental situation in Karenni. It confirms objective 2,

hypothesis 4; migration has environmentally beneficial and detrimental impacts.

3.5.1 Waste Management

Waste management was not perceived as a problem by any of the participants in the point

of origin, largely because very few goods were purchased and their villages generated very small

amounts of waste that were not biodegradable, however the small amount of waste that was

generated was usually managed in a fashion that was not ideal. Trash was often flushed down

rivers, or burned, which has implications for the health of terrestrial or aquatic ecosystems and

the people that interact with those ecosystems.

Fourteen percent of respondents perceived waste management to be a problem in their

second location. Those participants migrated to towns near Loikaw (the capital of Karenni)

where people tend to rely much more heavily on industrial goods which generate inorganic

waste. Especially problematic were plastics which were burned in Loikaw.

Table 21: Amount of goods purchased in different locations



Displacement)Refugee Camp

3very little – cloths and

food,NA NA lots

5 none NA NA NA

9 NA NA NA lots

11 some, mostly food lesssame as in the point of

originlots

12 some, mostly food lesssame as in the point of

originlots

15 none very little NA NA

16some, start using

western medicines and other imported goods

NA NA NA

17 almost nothing a lot NA NA

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18 very little less NA quite a lot

19 very little less NA quite a lot

21some - cloths, and

toolssame NA a lot more

The amount of goods purchased in shops by communities relative to the reliance on

natural resources is a strong indicator of waste generation, as non biodegradable waste is almost

always generated through industrial processes. Those purchased goods are, for the most part,

made out of inorganic compounds which don't decompose or have packaging that won't easily

decompose, generating a waste management challenge. Sixty three percent of participants

purchased more things in their second location as opposed to their first, while 25% purchased

less. Of the participants who purchased fewer things in their second location as compared to their

first, this was because of more severe poverty in their second location which didn’t allow them to

purchase very many things. All participants purchased more things in the refugee camp than they

ever had before (table 21).

The most common things that participants purchased from shops, in order of frequency

with which they were purchased, were food, clothes, agricultural tools, medicines and very rarely

motorbikes.

The initial thinking with regards to objective 2 hypothesis 3; 'Displacement is changing

consumption patterns with environmental consequences' was that because the process of

displacement usually sent people to places with higher population densities, people in these

places would have more access to goods for purchase. Indeed, many participants did not have a

shop in their point of origin. The nearest one was, in some cases, a number of days walk away.

There was a general trend of increasing reliance on goods purchased from shops, but I believe

this was a change that happened over time regardless of whether or not people were displaced.

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Many participants saw shops open up over the past twenty years without any population growth

occurring. There has been an increased demand for purchasable goods especially amongst young

people because they are seen as superior to traditionally used natural resources, and in some

cases because of economic changes leading to greater purchasing power.

The refugee camp is an almost urban environment where there are many shops selling all

sorts of things. With the recent increase in remittences from resettled refugees and the exhaustion

of many natural resources because of the high density living, it is easy to understand why

refugees rely on purchased goods much more than those inside Karenni. An International Rescue

Committee employee said that the waste management situation in Ban Mai Nai Soi held similar

challenges to the situations they face dealing with waste in other refugee camps around the

world.

While waste management was not in most cases perceived to be a challenge or of

particular importance, it is a problem that is growing in importance to the Karenni people. Small

villages usually don't have facilities to deal with solid waste so the waste is burned, flushed down

rivers, or left in an open pile. Westing (1994) similarly found that structural management

challenges arising from migration made waste management a problem. It can lead to problems

for wild life that eat garbage or get caught in it and the leaching of toxic chemicals leads to water

pollution if flushed down the river and to atmospheric pollution if burned.

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Chapter 4: Conclusions

4.1 Final thoughts

Forced displacement has had a mixture of effects on the environment. To reiterate, Keane

(2004) provided three channels through which environmental issues can arise in situations of

displacement: firstly, high population densities can lead to natural resource depletion, waste

management problems, sanitation problems and land degradation; secondly, there is a tendency

for refugees to migrate to environmentally fragile areas, which can in turn lead to natural

resource depletion and land degradation; and thirdly, there is often found to be a lack of incentive

amongst refugees to preserve the environment, because the land isn’t theirs and they view their

stay there as temporary (Keane, 2004).

This paper supports Keane’s first two claims. Population concentration in relocation sites

and villages that hosted newly displaced arrivals led to land degradation. Land degradation was

also found to a lesser degree in newly founded villages, usually because they were built in close

proximity to other villages, or because they were forced to build their village on more

marginalized land. Newly arriving populations were forced onto more marginalized lands, and

fallow periods were shortened to meet the demands for agricultural land. These results confirm

objective 2 hypothesis 1. The use of marginalized land supports Keane’s second claim that there

is a tendency for refugees to migrate to environmentally fragile areas (Keane, 2004).

Agricultural practices and land selection methods showed minimal elasticity in trying to

address land degradation due to the lack of education about alternative agricultural methods

leading participants to believe that traditional agricultural methods, which have been used for

generations, were the most sustainable and productive options to them. Contrary to the

hypotheses, participants were rarely able to use modern agricultural inputs and technologies such

86

as fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural machinery due to their severe poverty.

Population concentration led to a strangling of natural resources in relocation sites,

refugee camps, and villages that hosted newly displaced arrivals due to the fact that increasing

numbers of people were extracting forest resources from the forests adjacent to their pertaining

village, and also due to the fact that increasing levels of poverty, driven largely by the oppression

of their political situation, led participants to increasingly rely on the collection and sale of

natural resources to supplement their income. Hypothesis 2 from objective 2 was confirmed with

this data.

Waste management and sanitation issues only became a problem that was perceived by

participants as significant in the refugee camps. Population concentration was part of the

explanation for this, but in places where population growth had occurred inside Karenni these

were not perceived to be significant problems. The different outcomes in different situations

provided a mixture of confirmation and rejection of objective 2, hypothesis 3. The remittence

economy from resettled refugees generated an increase in deposable income in the refugee

camps which allowed refugees to purchase manufactured goods which generate waste especially

through their packaging. There have been some positive behavioural changes through the work

of many NGOs. Refugees have gotten better at participating in the waste management system

over the past 15 years.

I found nothing to support Keane’s third claim that there is often found to be a lack of

incentive amongst refugees to preserve the environment, because the land isn’t theirs and they

view their stay there as temporary (Keane, 2004). The data shows that land degradation, natural

resource depletion, waste management and sanitation problems were usually generated out of a

lack of alternatives. In most cases participants didn’t see any alternatives to their actions that

87

were both viable and environmentally sustainable.

There were incentives for displaced people to attempt to maintain their environments in

their new locations. Relocation sites, refugee camps and villages that hosted newly displaced

arrivals were all in places, or very near to places, where native populations continued to live. As

a result, social forces compelled them to maintain good relations with people who had always

lived there and who would continue to live after they left, which meant taking measures to

conserve the environment. Apathy towards environmental problems was not something that was

found even in the face of other hardship, as opposed to Kibreab's (1997) findings.

Also, many participants view the political situation in Karenni as very bleak. There has

been violent conflict in Karenni since the 1960’s. At the time of this study, most participants had

never known Karenni to be peaceful. They didn't expect to be able to return home anytime soon,

and as a result recognized that they needed to conserve the environments that they were in.

Migrant settlement which are constantly fleeing violence didn’t tend to have a large

impact on their environments in any of the aforementioned ways. Due to the fact that they were

constantly on the move, they couldn’t stay anywhere for long enough to cause any significant

level of neutral resource depletion, land degradation, waste or sanitation problems. In most cases

they could not even cultivate rice paddy fields, as they were constantly on the move, and relied

on the KNPP to provide them with food rations.

Keane’s three drivers of environmental issues amongst displaced populations are

incomplete. Two additional drivers of environmental degradation need to be identified. Firstly,

displacement can exacerbate poverty by stripping people of their land, and people lose a lot of

what they own in the process of displacement. For example, 100% of the participants lost at least

some of their livestock in the process of each displacement. This happened for one of two

88

reasons; either the livestock was taken by the government forces for food, or they had to flee in

such a hurry that some of the livestock were left behind. Furthermore, displacement often

happens in a large context of exploitation and oppression. It certainly does in Karenni. This

context exacerbates poverty and drives people to pursue activities that may be environmentally

degradative in order to sustain their livelihoods.

The other way in which displacement leads to environmental issues is that it enables

industrial exploitation of the environments from which people are displaced, confirming

objective 3, hypothesis 2. This process is well recognized by authors such as Gellert & Lynch

(2003), and led Harvey (1993) to coin the term “accumulation by disposition”. In Karenni this is

the most significant way in which displacement leads to environmental issues. Massive scale

deforestation (largely without any reforestation efforts to follow), habitat fragmentation, and

landscape alteration, caused by logging and hydroelectric dam projects dwarf the effects that

Karenni people have on their environments.

The other side of the environmental effects of displacement is the ability for previously

inhabited areas to recover after people are displaced from them. The case study of previously

inhabited camp three on the Thai side of the boarder indicated that the environments which are

are degraded by the activities of people are able to quickly recover. This supports objective 2,

hypothesis 4 by showing that indeed displacement can have environmental benefits as well as

detriments. However, the application of this case study to villages inside Burma is uncertain, as

the living conditions in camp three were unique in some ways, namely there was a higher

concentration of people than would be found inside Karenni, and there was no agricultural

activity.

There is a massive area of land east of the Salween river, comprising approximately one

89

third of the geographical area of Karenni state which is nearly void of human settlements after

the displacement campaign launched in 1996 by the junta. The extreme remoteness of the area,

lack of infrastructure and difficulty of access has meant that the natural resources in the area

have still been fairly unexploited. This area might be acting as a de facto national park with a

large, un-fragmented natural habitat for thriving biodiversity and wild life populations, but to

what extent this is the case is relatively unknown, because of the difficulty in accessing the area

and the lack of people with knowledge of the current environmental state of the area.

4.2 Areas for Further Research

Research needs to be conducted from inside Karenni on the environmental effects of

displacement. One of the major limitations of this study was that it was based on perceptions of

participant’s environments rather than on direct observation. This could also help control for the

possible bias that came from exclusively using participants on the Thai side of the boarder. It

would also offer more current information, as this study often included participants who hadn’t

been inside Karenni for many years.

There are similar environmental issues in all of the ethnic states found along the

perimeter of Burma. All of these states dominated demographically by ethnic minorities are

fighting against the central Burmese junta, and face issues of displacement and other forms of

political persecution and oppression. Research done in these states would be useful.

It was also wished that there had been more of an emphasis in the study on the ways in

which environmental knowledge is being lost. The issue was touched upon briefly, but the study

didn't go into enough depth. It became clear while living with the Karenni community, that

young people did not have nearly the same level of environmental knowledge as older people,

90

nor did they have the motivation to gain this knowledge. I believe that religious conversion to

Christianity and Buddhism and the view of western education as superior to traditional

knowledge transfer, are parts of this loss of traditional knowledge. This might have been a

phenomenon that is unique to the refugee camps due to the fact that people are not depending on

their traditional environmentally centred livelihoods, and instead relied on the food rations from

NGOs, but there are many unknowns in this field.

91

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