LTD Consolitated 3

LAND TITLES AND DEEDSCONSOLIDATED CASES

PART 32014-2015

2NS SEMESTER

#1 Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 115402. July 15, 1998

Arciaga, Ana Liza B.

FACTS: After his mother's death Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng filed a complaint against his father,Lee Tek Sheng to partition the conjugal properties of his parents. Lee in his answer withcounterclaim alleged that the four parcels of land registered solely in petitioner's name underTransfer Certificate of Title (TCT) 8278 are conjugal properties. It was registered in Leoncio’sname only as a trustee since he was then the only Filipino citizen in the family. Accordingly, Leeprayed for the dismissal of the partition case and for the reconveyance of the lots to its rightfulowner — the conjugal regime.To protect the interest of the conjugal regime during the pendency of the case, Lee caused theannotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT 8278. Leoncio moved for the cancellation of saidannotation which was denied by the trial court ruling that (a) the notice was not for the purposeof molesting or harassing petitioner and (b) also to keep the property within the power of thecourt pending litigation. Leoncio appealed to CA, but to no avail. Leoncio resort to the SC contending primarily that in the resolution of an incidental motion forcancellation of the notice of lis pendens (a) it was improper to thresh out the issue of ownershipof the disputed lots since ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case, otherwise, (b) itwould amount to a collateral attack of his title obtained more than 28 years ago. He argues thathis sole ownership as shown in the TCT would be improperly assailed in a partition case andshould be done through a separate suit. On the contrary, private respondent posits that evidenceof ownership is admissible in a partition case as this is not a probate or land registrationproceedings where the court's jurisdiction is limited.

ISSUE: 1 Whether or not the notice of lis pendens on TCT 8278 would amount to a collateral attack

to the Certificate of Title.2 Whether the denial of motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens is valid.

HELD: 1 No. The court held petitioner's claim is not legally tenable. There is no dispute that a

Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked, but that rule is not material tothis case. The annotation of a notice of lis pendens does not in any case amount nor can itbe considered as equivalent to a collateral attack of the certificate of title for a parcel ofland. The concept of no collateral attack of title is based on Section 48 of P.D. 1529which states that:

Certificate not Subject to Collateral attack. — A certificate of title shall not besubject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in adirect proceeding in accordance with law.

What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title. Thecertificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as theTransfer Certificate of Title (TCT). By title, the law refers to ownership which isrepresented by that document. Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The TCTis only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land and cannot always be considered as

conclusive evidence of ownership. Mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name ofany person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be atrustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of thecertificate of title. To repeat, registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the bestevidence thereof. In this case petitioner's certificate of title is not being assailed byprivate respondent. What the latter disputes is the former's claim of sole ownership. Thus,although petitioner's certificate of title may have become incontrovertible one year afterissuance, yet contrary to his argument, it does not bar private respondent fromquestioning his ownership.

2 Yes. The court held that a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only on two grounds,which are: (1) if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverseparty, or, (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party whocaused it to be recorded. Neither ground for cancellation of the notice was convincinglyshown to concur in this case. The annotation of a notice of lis pendens is only for thepurpose of announcing "to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation,serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at hisown risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property." The partiesare still locked in a legal battle to settle their respective claims of ownership. The lowercourt allowed the annotation pending litigation only for the purpose of giving informationto the public that parcel of land is involved in a suit and that those who deal with theproperty is forewarned of such fact.

Baranda vs. Judge Gustilo#2: Marbien L. Verano

G.R. No. 81163. September 26, 1988Gutierrez, Jr., J.

Facts:

This case has its origins in a petition for reconstitution of title filed with the Court of FirstInstance of Iloilo involving a parcel of land known as Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastrecovered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 in the name of Romana Hitalia. Eventually,Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106098was issued in the names of Alfonso Hitalia and Eduardo S. Baranda. The Court issued a writ ofpossession which Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera and Susana Silao refused to honor on theground that they also have TCT No. 25772 over the same Lot No. 4517. The Court, afterconsidering the private respondents' opposition and finding TCT No. 25772 fraudulentlyacquired, ordered that the writ of possession be carried out. A motion for reconsideration havingbeen denied, a writ of demolition was issued on March 29, 1982. Perez and Gotera filed apetition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On August 6, 1982, the Court ofAppeals deemed the petition. Perez and Gotera filed the petition for review on certioraridenominated as G.R. No. 62042 before the Supreme Court. As earlier stated the petition wasdenied in a resolution dated January 7, 1983. The motion for reconsideration was denied inanother resolution dated March 25, 1983, which also stated that the denial is final. This decision

in G.R. No. 62042, in accordance with the entry of judgment, became final on March 25, 1983.The petitioners in the instant case — G.R. No. 64432 — contend that the writs of possession anddemolition issued in the respondent court should now be implemented; that Civil Case No.00827 before the Intermediate Appellate Court was filed only to delay the implementation of thewrit; that counsel for the respondent should be held in contempt of court for engaging in aconcerted but futile effort to delay the execution of the writs of possession and demolition andthat petitioners are entitled to damages because of prejudice caused by the filing of this petitionbefore the Intermediate Appellate Court. On September 26, 1983, this Court issued a TemporaryRestraining Order to maintain the status quo, both in the Intermediate Appellate Court and in theRegional Trial Court of Iloilo. Considering that — (1) there is merit in the instant petition forindeed the issues discussed in G.R. No. 64432 as raised in Civil Case No. 00827 before therespondent court have already been passed upon in G.R. No. 62042; and (2) the TemporaryRestraining Order issued by the Intermediate Appellate Court was only intended not to render thepetition moot and academic pending the Court's consideration of the issues, the CourtRESOLVED to DIRECT the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court not to take cognizance ofissues already resolved by this Court and accordingly DISMISS the petition in Civil Case No.00827. Immediate implementation of the writs of possession and demolition is likewise ordered.

On May 9, 1984, the Court issued a resolution denying with finality a motion forreconsideration of the December 29, 1983 resolution in G.R. No. 64432. On this same date,another resolution was issued, this time in G.R. No. 62042, referring to the Regional Trial Courtof Iloilo the ex-parte motion of the private respondents (Baranda and Hitalia) for execution of thejudgment in the resolutions dated January 7, 1983 and March 9, 1983. In the meantime, the thenIntermediate Appellate Court issued a resolution dated February 10, 1984, dismissing Civil CaseNo. 00827 which covered the same subject matter as the Resolutions abovecited pursuant to ourResolution dated December 29, 1983. The resolution dated December 29, 1983 in G.R. No.64432 became final on May 20, 1984. Upon motions of the petitioners, the Regional Trial Courtof Iloilo, Branch 23 presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo declaring null and void TransferCertificate of Title No. T-25772, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106098 is declared validand subsisting title concerning the ownership of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, all ofSta. Barbara Cadastre. That Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo is further ordered to register theSubdivision Agreement of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia. The above order was setaside on October 8, 1984 upon a motion for reconsideration and manifestation filed by the ActingRegister of Deeds of Iloilo, Atty. Helen P. Sornito on the ground that there was a pending casebefore this Court, an Action for Mandamus, Prohibition, Injunction under G.R. No. 67661 filedby Atty. Eduardo Baranda, against the former which remained unresolved. In view of thisdevelopment, the petitioners filed in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 ex-parte motions forissuance of an order directing the Regional Trial Court and Acting Register of Deeds to executeand implement the judgments of this Court. Motion for reconsideration of the Acting Register ofDeeds was granted. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the Register of Deeds has any legal standing to file a motion forreconsideration of Judge Gustilo’s Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendensannotated in the certificates of titles of Baranda, etc. over the subject parcel of land?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the Register of Dees has no any legal standing to file amotion for reconsideration of Judge Gustilo’s Order directing him to cancel the notice of lispendens annotated in the certificates of titles of Baranda, etc. over the subject parcel of land. TheCourt therefore opined that under Sections 10 and 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, thefunction of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds encumbrance,instruments and the like is ministerial in nature.

That, Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of theRegister of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing withreal or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration. That, if theinstrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentorof such denial in writing, stating the ground or reasons therefore, and advising him of his right toappeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree.

That, Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubtwith regard to the proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuanceof any deed, mortgage or other instrument presented to him for registration orwhere any party in interest does not agree with the action taken by the Register ofDeeds with reference to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted tothe Commission of Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party ininterest thru the Register of Deeds.

It was opined also that elementary rule, in statutory construction is that when the wordsand phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from thelanguage employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. The statuteconcerning the function of the Register of Deeds to register instruments in a torrens certificate oftitle is clear and leaves no room for construction.

#3 Almirol v. Register of Deeds of AgusanG.R. No. L-22486 March 20, 1968

FACTS: On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land situated in themunicipality of Esperanza, province of Agusan, and covered by original certificate of title P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962Almirol went to the office of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan City to register the deedof sale and to secure in his name a transfer certificate of title. Registration was refused by theRegister of Deeds upon the following grounds:

1. That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in the name of Arcenio Abalo,married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by legal presumption, is considered conjugal property;

2. That in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the effectivity of the New CivilCode it is necessary that both spouses sign the document; but

3. Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when the sale was made, the survivinghusband cannot dispose of the whole property without violating the existing law.

In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan on a petition formandamus to compel the Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale and to issue to him thecorresponding transfer certificate of title. In its resolution of October 16, 1963 the lower court,declaring that “the Mandamus does not lie… because the adequate remedy is that provided bySection 4 of Rep. Act 1151” dismissed the petition, with costs against the petitioner. Hence, thispresent appeal. ISSUE:Whether or not the Register of Deeds was justified in refusing to register the transactionappealed to by the petitioner. HELD:No. Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent show a sincere desire on his part tomaintain inviolate the law on succession and transmission of rights over real properties, these donot constitute legal grounds for his refusal to register the deed.Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register of deeds to determine; this functionbelongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction.A register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act 1151 from exercising hispersonal judgment and discretion when confronted with the problem of whether to register adeed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For under the said section, when he is in doubtas to the proper step to be taken with respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him forregistration all that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify the question to theCommissioner of Land Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter an orderprescribing the step to be taken on the doubtful question.

#4GABRIEL vs.REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL,G.R. No. L-17956 September 30, 1963

Libunao,

FACTS:Elisa D. Gabriel, filed with the Registries of Deeds of Manila and Rizal, an adverse claim,against the properties registered in the name of oppositor-appellant, Juanita R. Domingo, hersister. As grounds for the adverse claim, petitioner allege that the foregoing properties areincluded in the amended inventory of the state of their late mother, Antonia Reyes Vda, deDomingo, who is the true owner of said properties, and considering that the registrations in thename of Juanita R. Domingo were only made fraudulently, thus depriving herein adverseclaimant of her lawful rights, interest and participations over said properties.

For the adverse claim on the properties, Domingo presented an opposition, claiming that theAdverse claim was instituted for (1) Harassment; (2) Had no legal basis; and (3) Had done andwill do irreparable loss her.The Register of Deeds of Manila, elevated the matter to the Land Registration Commission enConsulta because it is in doubt as to whether the registration of the claim is proper, whereas, theRegister of Deeds of Rizal denied registration of the Notice of Adverse Claim, stating that it hasbeen found to be legally defective or otherwise not sufficient in law and where there are otherprovision of remedies under this Act, the affidavit of adverse claim is not applicable.Gabriel appealed the above denial to the Land Registration Commission, stating that the questionat bar concerns the fraudulent registration by Domingo, of the properties subject of the adverseclaims, and not their fraudulent acquisition.The Land Registration Commission, resolved only the question on the registration of the twonotices of adverse claim filed with the Registries of Deeds of Manila and Rizal, but not as towhether these adverse claims are valid.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Land Registration Commission can both assail the registrability andvalidity of a registered deed?

HELD: No. It is the concern of the Commission to see whether the documents sought to beregistered conform with the formal and legal requirements for such documents, in determining itsregistrability. However, it is not the duty of the Commission, but a competent court jurisdiction,to decide upon whether the document is invalid, frivolous or only intended to harass a party. Onthe other hand, an instrument’s registration should not be confused with its validity. In the case athand, the registration of the adverse claim will not by itself alone make them valid. The validityof each of Domingo’s and Gabriel’s registered deeds will be decided in a Special Proceedingprovided for in Sec. 110 of Act 496, i.e., a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of theadverse claim.

#5 ANJELO MISA

#6 Egao vs. CA

Taccad, Atheena S.

Facts:Severo Dignos and Severo Bontilao filed a verified complaint for quieting of title and/or recovery of possession and ownership against petitioners Apolonio and Beatriz Egao.

It appears that Marfori bought from the Egao's the parcels of land in question, who in turn sold the same to plaintiff.

Free Patent No. 298112 was issued to petitioner Apolonio Egao over Lot No. 662 on 12 August, 1965. Sec. 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, prohibits the alienation or encumbrance, within a period of five (5) years from the date of issuance of the patent, of lands acquired under free patent or homestead. Assuming, arguendo, the authenticity of the Deeds of Sale executed by the Egaos in favor of Marfori over portions of Lot No. 662 (the land in question), dated 7 May 1964, 14 January and 6 October 1965, it clearly appears that all deeds were executed within the prohibited period of five (5) years.

The CA ruled against the Egao's.

Issue: Whether or not the Egao's registration to the land is binding?

Held:

Yes, a Torrens title, once registered, cannot be defeated, even by adverse open and notoriouspossession. A registered title under the Torrens system cannot be defeated by prescription. Thetitle, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can pleadignorance of the registration.

Contrary to the appellate court's conclusion, respondents are not innocent purchasers forvalue. An "innocent purchaser for value" is deemed, under the Torrens system, to include aninnocent lessee, mortgagee or other encumbrancer for value. Where a purchaser neglects to makethe necessary inquiries and closes his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on hisguard as to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendor's title, and relying on thebelief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor, purchases the property without makingany further investigation, he cannot claim that he is a purchaser in good faith for value.

Furthermore, a private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any action whichwould have the effect of cancelling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of title issuedon the basis thereof, with the result that the land covered thereby will again form part of thepublic domain, as only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead may do so.

The rule of pari delicto non oritur actio (where two persons are equally at fault neither partymay be entitled to relief under the law), admits of exceptions and does not apply to an inexistentcontract, such as, a sale void ab initio under the Public Land Act, when its enforcement orapplication runs counter to the public policy of preserving the grantee's right to the land underthe homestead law.

Sec. 51, par. 2 of the Property Registration Decree (PD 1529), formerly Sec. 50 of the LandRegistration Act (Act No. 496) expressly provides that the registration of the Deed is theoperative act that binds or affects the land insofar as third persons are concerned. The lawrequires a higher degree of prudence from one who buys from a person who is not the registeredowner, when the land object of the transaction is registered land. While one who buys from theregistered owner need not look behind the certificate of title, one who buys from another whois notthe registered owner is expected to examine not only the certificate of title but all factualcircumstances necessary for him to determine if there are any flaws in the title of the transferor,or in his capacity to transfer the land. Failing to exercise caution of any kind whatsoever is

tantamount to bad faith.

The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 09539 is REVERSED andSET ASIDE. Meanwhile, petitioners as registered owners are entitled to remain in physicalpossession of the disputed property. Respondents are ordered to deliver the owner's duplicatecopy of the OCT (No. P-3559) to petitioners, without prejudice to an action for reversion of theland, which may be instituted by the Solicitor General for the State.

#7 Guevarra, Ma. Jessica A. 2014-0551Alfredo Sajonas and Conchita Sajonas vs. The Court of Appeals, Domingo A. Pilares,

Sheriff Roberto Garcia of Quezon City and Register of Deeds of Marikina.G.R. No. 102377. July 5, 1996 (Torres, J).

FACTS:On September 22, 1983, the spouses Ernesto Uychocde and Lucita Jarin agreed to sell a parcel ofresidential land located in Antipolo, Rizal to the spouses Alfredo Sajonas and Conchita R.Sajonas on installment basis. Said property was registered in the names of the Uychocde spousesunder TCT No. N-79073 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Rizal. The Sajonas couple caused the annotation of an adverse claim based on the said Contract to Sellon the title of the subject property, on August 27, 1984, and upon full payment of the purchaseprice, the Uychocde spouses executed a Deed of Sale involving the property in question in favorof the Sajonas couple on September 4, 1984. The deed of absolute sale was registered almost ayear after, or on August 28, 1985.Unknown to the Sajonas couple, there has been a compromise agreement between the spousesUychocde and Pilares, Uychocde’s judgment creditor, and a notice of levy on execution wasissued on February 12, 1985. On the same date, sheriff Roberto Garcia presented said notice oflevy on execution before the Register of Deeds and the same was annotated at the back ofTransfer Certificate of Title No. 79073.When the deed of absolute sale dated September 4, 1984 was registered on August 28, 1985,TCT No. N-79073 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. N-109417 was issued in the nameof the Sajonas couple. The notice of levy on execution annotated by defendant sheriff wascarried over to the new title. On January 10, 1986, the Sajonas couple demanded the cancellation of the notice of levy onexecution upon Pilares, through a letter to their lawyer. Despite said demand, Pilares refused tocause the cancellation of said annotation. This prompted spouses Sajonas to institute a complaint in the Regional Trial Court. The trialcourt favored them. But the appellate court reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.Hence this petition.

ISSUE:Whether or not the appellate court based from its decision, was correct in construing theprovision on the registration of an adverse claim under Section 70 of PD 1529?

HELD:In order to resolve the issue, the Supreme Court referred to the law itself. Section 110 of Act 496or the Land Registration Act, where it mentioned the rules on adverse claims, as well as thechanges introduced by Section 70 of P.D. 1529 which provide that, “The adverse claim shall beeffective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration. After the lapse of said period,

the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefore bythe party in interest.”Contrary to the appellate court’s interpretation and construction, the Supreme Court explainedthat the law should be taken together, and means that the cancellation of the adverse claim is stillnecessary to render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will remain annotated and shallcontinue as a lien upon the property. For if the adverse claim has already ceased to be effectiveupon the lapse of said period, its cancellation is no longer necessary and the process ofcancellation would be a useless ceremony.It should be noted that the law employs the phrase “may be cancelled”, which obviouslyindicates, as inherent in its decision making power, that the court may or may not order thecancellation of an adverse claim, notwithstanding such provision limiting the effectivity of anadverse claim for thirty days from the date of registration. To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim as absolute and without qualificationlimited to thirty days defeats the very purpose for which the statute provides for the remedy of aninscription of adverse claim, as the annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed toprotect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where the registration of suchinterest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D.1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and serves as a warning to third parties dealing withsaid property that someone is claiming an interest or the same or a better right than the registeredowner thereof.In sum, the disputed inscription of adverse claim on the Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-79073was still in effect on February 12, 1985 when Quezon City Sheriff Roberto Garcia annotated thenotice of levy on execution thereto. Consequently, he is charged with knowledge that theproperty sought to be levied upon on execution was encumbered by an interest the same as orbetter than that of the registered owner thereof. Also, as to whether or not the petitioners are buyers in good faith of the subject property, aspointedly observed by the appellate court, “there is no question that plaintiffs-appellees were notaware of the pending case filed by Pilares against Uychocde at the time of the sale of theproperty by the latter in their favor. This was clearly elicited from the testimony of ConchitaSajonas, during cross-examination.

Thus, the assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SETASIDE. The decision of the Regional Trial Court finding for the cancellation of the notice oflevy on execution from Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417 is hereby REINSTATED.The inscription of the notice of levy on execution on TCT No. N-109417 is herebyCANCELLED.

#8 Malaga, Liezl Ann L.Aznar Brothers Realty Company vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS: Petitioner Aznar Brothers Realty Co (AZNAR) acquired a lot fom the heirs of CrisantaMaloloy-on by virtue of an Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale.This Deed was registered with Register of Deeds of Lapu Lapu City. After the sale, AZNARdeclared this property under its name for taxation purposes and regularly paid the taxes thereon.The private respondents where allegedly allowed to occupy portions of the lot by mere tolerance

provided that they leave the land in the event that the company would use the property for itspurpose. Later, AZNAR entered into a joint venture with Sta. Lucia Realty DevelopmentCorporation for the development of the subject lot into a multi-million pesos housingsubdivisions and beach Resort. When its demands for the private respondents to vacate the landfailed, AZNAR filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTCC) a case of Unlawful Detainer anddamages.On the other hand, Private respondents alleged that they are successors and descendants of theeight children of the late Crisanta Maloloy-on. They had been residing and occupying the subjectportion of the land in the concept of owner since the time of their parents and grandparents,except for Teodorica Andales who was not a resident in said premises. Private respondentsclaimed that the Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale is void abinitio for being simulated and fraudulent, and they came to know of the fraud only when AZNARentered into the land in the last quarter of 1991 and destroyed its vegetation. They then filed withthe Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lapu-Lapu City a complaint seeking to declare the subjectdocument null and void. MTCC rendered a decision ordering the private respondents to (a) vacate the land in questionupon the finality of the judgment; and (b) pay P8,000 as attorney’s fees and P2,000 as litigationexpenses, plus costs.Aggrieved by the decision of the MTCC, private respondents appealed to the RTC.The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTCC and ordered the issuance of a writ of demolitiondirecting the sheriff to demolish private respondents’ houses and other improvements whichmight be found on the subject premises.On appeal by the private respondents, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision ofthe RTC; declared the private respondents as the rightful possessors de facto of the land inquestion; and permanently enjoined Sheriff Juan Gato or whoever was acting in his stead fromeffectuating the demolition of the houses of the private respondents.In arriving at its challenged decision, the Court of Appeals noted that at the time AZNAR enteredthe property, the private respondents had already been in possession thereof peacefully,continuously, adversely and notoriously since time immemorial. There was no evidence thatpetitioner was ever in possession of the property. Its claim of ownership was based only on anExtrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale, which private respondents, however, claimedto be null and void for being simulated and fraudulently obtained. The Court of Appeals furtherheld that where not all the known heirs had participated in the extrajudicial agreement ofpartition, the instrument would be null and void and therefore could not be registered. Moreover,AZNAR was estopped to assert ownership of the property in question, since it had admitted in apleading in the reconstitution proceedings that the property had never been conveyed by thedecreed owners. Additionally, from 1988 up to the filing of the ejectment case on 4 August 1993,AZNAR never registered the extrajudicial partition despite opportunities to do so. Its allegationthat private respondents occupied the property by mere tolerance was not proved. Pursuant to theruling in Vda. de Legazpi v. Avendano, the fact that the right of the private respondents was soseriously placed in issue and the execution of the decision in the ejectment case would havemeant demolition of private respondents’ houses constituted an equitable reason to suspend theenforcement of the writ of execution and order of demolition.AZNAR then elevated the case to the Supreme Court (SC)ISSUE: WoN the act of registering a document is necessary to give the conveyance legal effectas between the parties and the vendor’s heirs?

HELD: No. It must be borne in mind that the act of registering a document is never necessary togive the conveyance legal effect as between the parties and the vendor’s heirs. As between theparties to a sale, registration is not indispensable to make it valid and effective. The peculiarforce of a title is exhibited only when the purchaser has sold to innocent third parties the landdescribed in the conveyance. The purpose of registration is merely to notify and protect theinterests of strangers to a given transaction, who may be ignorant thereof, and the non-registration of the deed evidencing said transaction does not relieve the parties thereto of theirobligations thereunder. Here, no right of innocent third persons or subsequent transferees of thesubject lot is involved; thus, the conveyance executed in favor of AZNAR by private respondentsand their predecessors is valid and binding upon them, and is equally binding and effectiveagainst their heirs. The petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of public respondent Court of Appeals ishereby REVERSED, and the decision of the Regional Trial Court, is REINSTATED.

#9 Estrallado vs. MartinezLimpin, Eugene G.

Facts:Proceso Martines filed for application for the registration in the registry of property of the

land which covered Lot 1. On 24th of October 1919, a general order of default was entered. Onthe 3rd of February 1920, the court rendered its decision ordering the registration of the land toProceso Martinez and have become final. A decree was issued on April 21, 1920.

Thereafter on the 9th of July 1920, Vivencia Estrallado filed a motion for review of thedecree on grounds of fraud which was heard on the 7th of August 1920. Unfortunately, the courtdenied the review on the same day. It was found that Vivencia Estrallano was found to be the realowner of one-fifth part of one-half of in Bulakin, and one-tenth of Lot 1 but it was deniedbecause it was not proven that Estrallado acted fraudulently in obtaining the decree covering Lot1.

Estrallado petitions for review.Issues:

May a person who is wrongfully deprived of land or any estate or interest therein, withoutnegligence on his part, by the registration of another person as owner of such land, successfullymaintain an action for damages, begun before the action is barred, against the person in whosefavor the decree of registration was issued, where such decree was not obtained by actual fraudand where a petition for review on the ground of fraud has been denied?Held:

Torrens System and Incontestibility of Title:The proceeding for the registration is in rem. It is an assertion of legaltitle. The prime purpose of registration is certainty and incontestability intitles to land. In a lesser degree, the purpose is the facilitation of the proofof titles and the transfer thereof. Many sections of the Land RegistrationLaw are given up to the confirmation of these fundamental ideas.

Remedy under the Torrens system in case of fraudulent deprivation of property and otherremedies:

The Torrens system is careful to guard against the possibility of an ownerbeing fraudulently deprived of his property. The apparent harshness of the

law is relieved by the insertion of... [a provision] recognizing the right ofany person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decreeof registration obtained by fraud to file in court a petition for reviewwithin one year after entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaserfor value has acquired an interest. The same section provides that anyperson, aggrieved by such decree in any case, may pursue his remedy byaction for damages against the applicant or any other person for fraud inprocuring the decree.The authors of the Torrens system also wisely included provisionsintended to safeguard the rights of prejudiced parties rightfully entitled toan interest in land but shut off from obtaining titles thereto. As suppletoryto the registration of titles, pecuniary compensation by way of damageswas provided for in certain cases for persons who had lost their property.For this purpose, an assurance fund was created. But the assurance fundwas not intended to block any right which a person might have againstanother for the loss of his land. Damages were not to be recoverable fromthe assurance fund when they could be recovered from the person whocaused the loss.

The elements required in case of wrongful deprivation of land under the torrens system toprosper:

For an action against any person for damages for the wrongful deprivationof land to prosper, it must be established, first, that the person is in realitywrongfully deprived of his land by the registration in the name of anotherof the land by actual or constructive fraud; second, that there was nonegligence on his part; third, that he is not barred or in any way precludedfrom bringing an action for the recovery of the land or interest therein;and, fourth, that the action for compensation has not prescribed.

The elements for the wrongful deprivation of land is present but even though theelements are present, there was no fraud and the only available remedy is compensation ongrounds of unjust enrichment.

Case # 10: Gatioan vs. Gaffud

JICO RAMARAMA

The land in question was originally registered in the name of Rufina Permison on the basis ofa free patent. Permison sold it to Sibreno, who in turn, conveyed it to appelle Encarnacion Gatioan. Original Certificate of title in the name of Rufina Permisan was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. T-1212 was issued in favor of appelle. Appellee obtained loans several times from the appellant, Philippine National Bank, and as security therefor, mortgaged the land described in TCT No. T-1212. Despite payments of these loans, appellant did not execute instruments releasing or discharging the incumbrance on TCT No. 1212.

In the meantime, defendant spouses Sixto Gaffud and Villamora Logan procured a free patentcovering the identical parcel of land described in TCT No. T-1212 of Encarnacion Gatioan, on the basis of which, OCT was issued in their favor. They also obtained two loans from Philippine National Bank, and as collateral for both, they mortgaged the said land covered byOCT. Upon failure to pay these loans, the mortgaged was executed.

The trial court declared null and void ab initio the patent and certificate of title issued in the name of the spouses defendant; declared real estate mortgage excuted by the spouses in favorof the bank null and void and unenforceable; ordering PNB to surrender to the Register of Deeds of Isabela the owner’s duplicate certificate of said title for its cancellation; order the bank to cancel or release the mortgage on TCT 1212.

ISSUE:

Whether PNB should have been declared as innocent mortgagee in good faith and for value and said mortgage should be carried over to and considered as incumbrances on the land covered by TCT T-1212.

HELD:

The first original certificate is recorded in the public registry. It is never issued until it is recorded. The record is notice to all the world. All persons are charged with the knowledge ofwhat it contains. All persons dealing with the land so recorded or any portion of it, must be charged with notice of whatever it contains. When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its contents and all interest, legal and equitable, includedtherein.

Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. The

rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute.

When the land is once brought under the torrens system, the record of the original certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the world. The holder of the first original certificate and his successors should be permitted to secure in their title against one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had full and complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land included in the second original certificate, by reason of the factscontained in the public record and the knowledge with which he is charged and by reason of his negligence should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such purchaser case rather than hewho has obtained the first certificate and who was innocent of any act of negligence.

Moreover, it is a matter of judicial notice that before a bank grants a loan on the security of land, it first undertakes a careful examination of the title of the applicant as well as a physicaland on-the-spot investigation of the land itself offered as security. Undoubtedly, had herein appellant bank taken such a step which is demanded by the most ordinary prudence, it would have easily discovered the flaw in the title of the defendant spouses; and if it did not conduct such examination and investigation, it must be held to be guilty of gross negligence in granting them the loans in question. In either case, appellant Bank cannot be considered as a mortgagee in good faith within the contemplation of the law.

A more factual approach would lead to the same result. From the stipulated facts, it can beseen that prior to the execution of the mortgage between appellant and the defendant spouses,the appellee had been mortgaging the land described in TCT T-1212. Encarnacion mortgagethe land three times. In the same instances, the PNB had possession of, or at least, must haveexamined appellee’s title, TCT T-1212, wherein appear clearly the technical description,exact area, lot number and cadastral number of the land covered by said title. In other words,by the time the defendant spouses offered OCT P-6038, in their names, for scrutiny inconnection with their own application for loan with appellant, the latter was charged with thenotice of the identity of the technical description, areas, lot numbers and cadastral numbers ofthe lands purportedly covered by the two titles and was in a position to know, if it did nothave such knowledge actually, that they referred to one and the same lot. under thecircumstances, appellant had absolutely no excuse for approving the application of thedefendant spouses and giving the loans in question.

#11Reyes vs. Noblejas

GUILING, ASNIA G.

Facts:The spouses Leonardo Gamboa and Aurora L. Cariaga are the registered owners of the

properties covered by Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. 18230, 18231, 18232, 18233 and18234, of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal. These properties were mortgaged to the Philippine

National Bank and upon the failure of the mortgagors to pay the amount of the indebtednessupon maturity, the mortgage was foreclosed extrajudicially under the provisions of Act No. 3135,as amended.

On February 6, 1963, the mortgaged properties were sold at public auction by theProvincial Sheriff of Rizal for the sum of P6,010. 00 in favor of Arsenio Reyes, the highestbidder, and the corresponding certificate of sale was issued by the sheriff on February 21, 1963.In said certificate, the expiration date of the period of redemption was fixed by the sheriff to be"one (1) year from and after the date of the sale." It should be noted in this connection, that theduplicate of the certificate of sale was not filed (registered) by the sheriff in the office of theRegister of Deeds. A copy thereof which was attached to the Affidavit of Consolidation ofOwnership as a supporting paper, was neither entered in the Primary Entry Book for Act 496.

On February 10, 1964, there were presented for registration in the Registry of Deeds ofRizal, an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership executed on February 8, 1964, by the auction-vendee,

The Register of Deeds denied the registration of the above mentioned documents on theground that the period of redemption has not yet expired. In support of his opinion on the matter,the Register of Deeds invoked the doctrine laid by the Supreme Court in the case of Salazar v.Meneses, G. R . No. L-15378, promulgated on July 31, 1963, wherein it was held that the rulethat the period of redemption in execution sales pursuant to Section 26 of Rule 39 of the Rules ofCourt, which begins to run not from the date of sale but from the date of registration of thecertificate of sale, is also applicable in extrajudicial foreclosure sales of registered land. Claimingthat Section 6 of Act 3135, as amended, is so clear on the point that the redemption period shallbegin to run from the date of sale, the petitioner, thru his counsel, disagreed with the ruling of theRegister of Deeds. Hence, this appeal.

It is the theory of petitioner that in sales of property at public auction pursuant to anextrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage under Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No.4118, the period of redemption should be reckoned from the date of the auction sale which, hecontends, is the express mandate of Section 6 of Act No. 3135:Sec. 6. In all cases in which the extrajudicial sale is made under the special power hereinbeforereferred to, the debtor, his successors in interest, or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor ofsaid debtor, or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed oftrust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of oneyear from and after the date of sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions ofsections 464 to 466 inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, insofar as these are notinconsistent with the provisions of this Act.

Issue: Whether the period of redemption shall begin to run from the date of sale or from the dateof the registration of certification of Sale.Held: The period of redemption shall begin to run from the date of sale or from the date of theregistration of certification of Sale. Section 6 of Act 3135 should be applied to the present case together with: (1) sections 30 to 35 ofRule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court with regard to redemption; (2) Section 27, Rule 39 of thesaid Rules and Section 71 of Act 496 with regard to the filing (registration) of the sheriff'scertificate of sale; and (3) Section 50 of Act 496, with regard to the registration of the certificateof sale so as to consider the land conveyed and affected under the Land Registration Act.

Section 27, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that the certificate of sale executedby the sheriff in a public auction sale must be filed (registered) in the Office of the Register ofDeeds of the province where the land is situated. This is mandatory requirement. Failure toregister the certificate of sale violates the said provision of law and, construed in relation withSection 50 of the Land Registration Law (Act 496), shall not take effect as a conveyance or bindthe land covered by a torrens title because "the act of registration is the operative act to conveyand effect the land." So the redemption period, for purposes of determining the time when a finaldeed of sale may be executed or issued and the ownership of the registered land consolidated inthe purchase at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale under Act 3135, should be reckoned from thedate of registration of the certificate of sale in the office of the register of deeds concerned andnot from the date of the public auction sale.We have to conclude, therefore, that the date of sale mentioned in Section 6 of Act 3135, asamended, should be construed to mean the date of registration of the, certificate of sale in theoffice of the register of deeds concerned. Only after the lapse of the twelve-month redemptionperiod from the date of registration of the certificate of sale and in the absence of anyredemptioner within the said period, may the deed of final sale be executed in favor of thepurchaser who may then consolidate the title of the property in his favor. Consequently, We haveto declare that the Land Registration Commissioner was right in ordering the Register of Deedsof Rizal to deny the registration of the Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of Consolidation ofOwnership, the simultaneous registration of which documents was sought by herein petitionereven before the certificate of sale issued by the sheriff was registered.

ANARNA, NATHANIEL 2012-0683Case # 12

Jose Agbulos vs Jose Alberto

Facts:

On June 15, 1959, a parcel of land located in manila was awarded to appellant Jose Agbulos as thehighest bidder. The officer who made the sale issued the certificate of sale on july 8, 1959, and thesame provided that “the redemption of the above described property from the purchaser may bemade at any time within 12 moths after the sale.

It was also registered in the office of the register of deeds on juky 18, 1959. On june 23, 1960,appellee paid the sheriff the sum of Php6,670 for the redemption of the property and said officerexecuted in his favor the certificate of redemption.

It appears on the same date that appellant filed a verified request for the execution and delivery tohim of the final deed of sale upon the ground that jose alberto failed to redeem the property within 1year period.

Issue: Whether or not the period of redemption has already prescribed.

Held: NO. the period of redemption has not yet prescribed.

The twelve month period of redemption provided in section 26 rule 39 of the rules of court begins torun not from the date of the sale, but from the time of registration of the sale in the office of theregister of deeds.

#12 Agbulos v. AlbertoG.R. No. L-17483 July 31, 1962

Basibas, Analiza

FACTS: By virtue of a writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila on March 16,1959 in Civil Case No. 18644 entitled Jose Agbulos, plaintiff, vs. Jose C. Alberto, defendant, therights, interests and participation of the latter in a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificateof Title No. 24643 of the land records of Manila were levied upon. After due proceedings thecorresponding execution sale thereof was made on June 15, 1959, with herein appellant Agbulos(judgment creditor in the case) as the highest bidder. The officer who made the sale issued thecertificate of sale on July 8, 1959 and the same provided that "The redemption of the abovedescribed property from the purchaser may be made at any time within twelve (12) months afterthe sale."The same was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Manila on July 18 of the sameyear. The entry or annotation made on the back of the title of the property reads as follows:

Entry No. 9221/T24653 — CERTIFICATE OF SALE — In favor of JOSE AGBULOS— Affecting the rights, interest and participation of Jose C. Alberto in the property hereindescribed for the sum of P6,000.00 by the sale having been made at public auction by theSheriff of Manila, pursuant to the Notice of Levy inscribed hereon under Entry No.5324/EO3701 subject to redemption within one (1) year from registration hereof.Date of instrument — July 8, 1959Date of inscription — July 18, 1959 at 3:40 p.m.

On June 23, 1960, appellee herein (judgment debtor in the case) paid the Sheriff of Manila thetotal sum P6,670.00 for the redemption of the property and said officer executed in his favor onthe same date the responding certificate of redemption.It appears that on the same date (June 23, 1960) appellant filed with the Sheriff of Manila averified request for the execution and delivery to him of the final deed of sale upon the groundthat the judgment debtor not redeemed the property within the period of one year after the sale.On June 29 of the same year the Sheriff replied that he could not accede to the request, giving thefollowing as his reasons for the denial: (a) that the certificate of sale in favor of appellant wasregistered only on July 18, 1959, for which reason the period of redemption commenced to runonly from such date; and (b) that the judgment debtor had deposited on June 23, 1960, that is,before the expiration of the one-year period of redemption the total sum of P6,670.00 in fullredemption of property.In view of the action taken by the Sheriff, on July 5, 1960 appellant filed a motion in Civil CaseNo. 18644 praying for an order annulling the certificate of redemption issued by the Sheriff ofManila in favor of appellate and directing said officer to issue the corresponding certificate ofabsolute sale in his favor. Appellee opposed the motion, and on July 22, 1960 the lower courtdenied the same. Hence, this appeal taken by Agbulos who claim that the lower court erred in

ruling that the only period of redemption commenced to run only from the deed of theregistration of the certificate of sale and, consequently erred likewise in denying his motion ofJuly 5, 1960.Section 26, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that "the judgment debtor, or redemptioner,may redeem the property from the purchaser, at any time within twelve months after the sale"(Emphasis supplied) without specifying whether the period should start from (1) the date whenthe execution sale was made, or (2) from the date when the certificate of sale was executed bythe sheriff who made the sale, or (3) from the date when said certificate of sale was registered inthe office of the corresponding register of deeds.The property involved in the present case is registered land. It is the law in this jurisdiction thatwhen property brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act is sold, the operative actis the registration of the deed of conveyance. The deed of sale does not "take effect as aconveyance, or bind the land" until it is registered (Section 50, Act No. 496; Tuason v.Raymundo, 28 Phil. 635; Sikatuna v. Guevara, 43 Phil. 371; Worcester v. Ocampo, 34 Phil. 646).Undoubtedly, to be in consonance with this well settled ruled, Section 24, Rule 39 of the Rules ofCourt, provides that a duplicate of the certificate of sale given by the sheriff who made theauction sale to the purchaser must be filed (registered) in the office of the register of deeds of theprovince where the property is situated.In Garcia v. Ocampo, G.R. No. L-13029, June 30, 1959, we held that the twelve months periodof redemption provided for in Sec. 26, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court "begins to run not from thedate of the sale, but from the time of registration of the sale in the office of the register of deeds."The entry or annotation made on the back of the certificate of title of the property in question onJuly 18, 1959 (supra) was in accordance with this ruling when it provided that the execution salewas "subject to redemption within one (1) year from registration hereof."A case similar to the present is that of Gonzales, et al. v. Philippine National Bank, et al., 48 Phil.824, where we held that the provision of Section 32, Act 2938 (Charter of the Philippine NationalBank) providing for a right of redemption in favor of the bank's mortgagor "within one year afterthe sale of the real estate as a result the foreclosure" should be construed to mean one year afterthe confirmation of the foreclosure sale, because the sale becomes valid only after confirmation.Along same line we may say in this case that the period of year after the sale must likewise startonly from the date of registration of the certificate of sale, because it is only then that thecertificate takes "effect as a conveyance in accordance with Act 496.Aside from what has been said heretofore, appellant now estopped from claiming that the one-year period redemption started earlier than the date when the certificate of sale was registered,for the reason that he failed timely to question the entry or annotation made on the back of thecertificate of title of the property he had purchased, to the effect that the sale thereof in his favorwas subject to redemption within one year from the registration of said certificate of sale.WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed with costs.Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.Paredes, J., took no part.

#13 ANARNA

Beler,Vertine Paul F.# 14. NHA vs BASA (D.Registration of instruments)

FACTSOn April 19, 1983, spouses Augusto and Luz Basa loaned from NHA the amount

of P556,827.10 secured by a real estate mortgage over their properties covered byTransfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) Nos. 287008 and 285413, located at No. 30 SanAntonio St., San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. Spouses Basa did not pay the loandespite repeated demands. To collect its credit, the NHA, on August 9, 1990, filed averified petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage before the Sheriff’s Office inQuezon City, pursuant to Act No. 3135, as amended. After notice and publication, theproperties were sold at public auction where NHA emerged as the highest bidder. OnApril 16, 1991, the sheriff’s certificate of sale was registered and annotated only on theowner’s duplicate copies of the titles in the hands of the respondents, since the titles inthe custody of the Register of Deeds were among those burned down when a fire guttedthe City Hall of Quezon City on June 11, 1988.

On April 16, 1992, the redemption period expired, without respondents havingredeemed the properties. Shortly thereafter, on April 24, 1992, NHA executed anAffidavit of Consolidation of Ownership over the foreclosed properties, and the same wasinscribed by the Register of Deeds on the certificates of title in the hand of NHA underEntry No. 6572/T-287008-PR-29207. On June 18, 1992, NHA filed a petition for theissuance of a Writ of Possession. The said petition was granted by the Regional TrialCourt (RTC) in an Order dated August 4, 1992.A Writ of Possession was issued on March9, 1993 by the RTC, ordering spouses Augusto and Luz Basa to vacate the subject lots.The writ, however, remained unserved. This compelled NHA to move for the issuance ofan alias writ of possession on April 28, 1993.The NHA contends that the annotation of the Sheriff’s certificate of sale in the primaryentry book of deeds and on the owner’s duplicate title is sufficient compliance with therequirement on land registrations, Hence they filed an appeal to the decision rendered bythe court of appeals.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ANNOTATION OF THE SHERIFF’SCERTIFICATE OF SALE IN THE PRIMARY ENTRY BOOK OF THE REGISTER OFDEEDS AND ON THE OWNER’S DUPLICATE TITLE IS SUFFICIENTCOMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF LAW ON REGISTRATION

RULING: YES, The supreme court held that mere annotation of the sheriff’s certificateof sale in the primary entry of book is tantamount to proper registration. In fine,petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction, to prevent the register ofdeeds from registering the subject certificate of sale, had been rendered moot andacademic by the valid entry of the instrument in the primary entry book. Such entry isequivalent to registration. Injunction would not lie anymore, as the act sought to beenjoined had already become a fait accompli or an accomplished act.

Indeed, the prevailing rule is that there is effective registration once the registranthas fulfilled all that is needed of him for purposes of entry and annotation, so that whatis left to be accomplished lies solely on the register of deeds

Bernadette E. Cordero

Case No. 15

LUCIO BUZON vs. MAXIMO LICAUCOG.R. No. L-4966March 27, 1909

FACTS: It appears that on the 6th day of September, 1907, Herrera executed a deed of sale ofthe land in question to Lucio Buzon, which, on the same day, was duly acknowledged before anotary public, but was not presented to the register of deeds until the 4th day of October, 1907,when Buzon secured from the office of the register of deeds of the city of Manila a certificate oftransfer and title to the land in question, which certificate contains, in the memorandum ofincumbrances affecting the property described therein, an annotation of the order of attachmentfiled and registered by Licauco in the office of the register of deeds, on the 1st day of October,1907.

ISSUE: Whether or not the unrecorded sale on 6th day of September, 1907 is superior than theannotation of the order of attachment filed and registered on the 1st day of October, 1907?

HELD: NO, because, by its terms, an unrecorded deed of conveyance does not convey or affectthe land until and unless the transaction is duly registered.Section 50 of that Act expressly provides that —

No deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will, purporting toconvey or affect registered land, shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, butshall operate only as a contract between the parties, and as evidence of authority to theclerk or register of deeds to make registration —

the act of registration being "the operative act to convey and affect the land." Section 51 providesthat —

Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, decree, instrument or entry,affecting registered land, which would, under existing laws, if recorded, filed, or enteredin the office of the register of deeds, affect the real estate to which it relates, shall, ifregistered, filed, or entered in the office of the register of deeds in the province or citywhere the real estate to which such instrument relates lies, be notice to all persons fromthe time of such registering, filing, or entering.

And section 59 provides that —If at the time of any transfer there appear upon the registration book incumbrances orclaims adverse to the title of the registered one, they shall be stated in the new certificateor certificates, except so far as they may be simultaneously released or discharged.

Under these express provisions of the Land Registration Act, it is clear that the deed of sale ofHerrera to Buzon did not take effect as a conveyance, or bind the land, until the 4th day ofOctober, 1907, and that the levy of Licauco's attachment against the land by filing and recordingof the order of attachment in the office of the register of deeds on the 1st day of October was notaffected thereby.Buzon, on the back of whose certificate of transfer and title appears a memorandum of the levyof attachment, had both actual and constructive notice of the fact that the attachment had beenlevied upon the land purchased by him, before he became the owner, and clearly he is not

entitled to an injunction to restrain Licauco from subjecting this land to execution, in accordancewith the provisions of the Land Registration Act touching "attachments and other liens."

#14 Mark Gabriel B. Maranga

#15. DBP vs. The Acting Register of Deeds of Nueva EcijaAlegre, Cristie B.

Facts:The Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), following the extrajudicial foreclosure

sale where it emerged as the highest bidder, presented for registration to the Register of Deeds ofNueva Ecija, the sheriff’s certificate of sale in its favor. After it had paid the required fees, saidtransaction was entered in the primary entry book. However, the annotation of the saidtransaction to the originals of the certificates of title could not be done because the same titleswere missing from the files of the Registry. This prompted DBP to commence reconstitutionproceedings of the lost titles. Four years had passed before the missing certificates of title werereconstituted. When DBP sought the inscription of the four-year old sale transaction on thereconstituted titles, the Acting Register of Deeds, being in doubt of the proper action to take,referred the matter to the Commissioner of the Land Registration Authority by consulta, thelatter resolved against the annotation of the sale transaction and opined that said entry was“ineffective due to the impossibility of accomplishing registration at the time the document wasentered because of the non-availability of the certificates of title involved.”

Issue: Whether or not the annotation in the primary entry book is deemed as sufficient

registration.

Held: Yes. Considering that DBP had paid all the fees and complied with all the requirements

for purposes of both primary entry and annotation of the certificate of sale, the Supreme Courtdeclared that mere entry in the primary book was considered sufficient registration since “DBPcannot be blamed that annotation could not be made contemporaneously with the entry becausethe originals of the subject certificates of title were missing and could not be found, since it hadnothing to do with their safekeeping. If anyone was responsible for failure of annotation, it wasthe Register of Deeds who was chargeable with the keeping and custody of those documents.”The Court cited relevant jurisprudence starting from 1934. In Government of the PhilippineIslands v. Aballe, before the Second World War, the prevailing doctrine was an inscription in thebook of entry even without the notation on the certificate of title was considered as satisfactoryand produced all the effects which the law gave to its registration. During the war, however, inthe case of Bass v. De la Rama, the holding was that entry of an instrument in the primary entrybook does not confer any legal effect without a memorandum thereof inscribed on the certificateof title. DBP noted that Bass v. De la Rama, however, survived only for a little while since “latercases appear to have applied the Aballe ruling that entry in the day book, even without thecorresponding annotation on the certificate of title, is equivalent to, or produces the effect of,registration to voluntary transactions, provided the requisite fees are paid and the owner’sduplicates of the certificates of title affected are presented.”

# 16 Tuason vs. RaymundoSherry Ann Bolisay

Facts: This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in favor of JuliaTuason and against the defendant Faustino Raymundo for the possession of certain realpropertyThe defendant justifies his entry upon the premises and the ouster of plaintiff's tenantupon the ground of a sale of the property to him on the 1st May, 1911, at which time it appearshe purchased the property described in the complaint under a pacto de retro for the sum of P400,the period of redemption being one year. There was no redemption within the year but thedefendant extended the time within which the redemption might be made without fixing a limitto the extension. The sale with the right to repurchase was not registered in the registry ofproperty and no attempt was made to register it until the 9th day of June, 1913, some time afterthis action was begun, at which time registry was registry for the reason that the property hadnever been registered in the name of the vendors.Issue: The property in question being property duly registered under the Torrens system (Act No. 496)the question arises what effect has a prior unregistered transfer on a subsequent registeredtransfer made for value and in good faith.Held: The provisions of Act No. 496 made the resolution of this question very simple.itc-a1f Section50 of that Act provides in part: "but no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument,except a will, purporting to convey or affect registered land, shall effect as a conveyance or bindthe land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority tothe clerk or register of deeds to make registration. The act of registration shall be the operativeact to convey and affect the land, and in all cases under this Act the registration shall be made inthe office of register of deeds for the province or provinces or city where the land lies."Inaccordance with this section, no act of the parties themselves can transfer the ownership of realestate under the Torrens system. That is done by the act of registration of the conveyance whichthe parties have made. It is clear, therefore, that the property in question, so far as the plaintiff isconcerned, was not transferred by the conveyance from Vicente Rodriguez and Gregoria BarotoCruz to the defendant in 1911. Their instrument amounted simply to a contract for a conveyancewhich would become a conveyance when it was registered in accordance with the requirementsof Act No. 496. Being nothing more than a contract for the sale of land, it had no effect upon thepurchase made by the plaintiff in 1913, she having bought for value and in good faith and herconveyance having duly registered as required by law.The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant

#16 Government of Philippine Islands vs. AballeG.R. No. L-413422, November 28, 1934

Roxas, Rose Ann Claire B.

FACTS: The spouses Gervasio Ignalaga and Petra Maderazo, was the original owners of lots.Nos. 419.762 and 763 of cadastral record no. 27. G.L.R.O. Record no. 284. the subject lot waslevied upon and sold to Levy Hermanos Inc.On March 7, 1933, Levy Hermanos, Inc., filed a petition praying that the register of deeds beordered to cancel the certificates of title to these lots in the name of Gervasio Ignalaga and PetraMaderazo and to issue the corresponding transfer certificate of title in the name of LevyHermanos, Inc., for the reason that the legal period for redemption has expired with nobodyhaving exercised this right. Antonio Alegato opposed with respect to lots nos. 762 and 419, as he claimed that he is theowner, bought from the original owners, and Chiong Bonco with respect to the lot no. 763,claiming that he held a mortgage credit on the said lot.As the court overruled all the oppositions, the registered of deeds of the province of OccidentalNegros to cancel the certificates of title, covering lots 419, 762 and 763 of the cadastral recordand issue the certificate of title free from all aliens and encumbrance in favor of Levy HermanosInc.The attachment of these lots in case No. 8491 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo waspresented and noted in the books of the registry of deeds on November 14, 1930. This notice ofattachment was likewise noted on the original certificate of title covering lot No. 419, but,though, an involuntary oversight on the pat of the register of deeds, was not noted on the originalcertificate of title covering lot No. 762.By virtue of a deed of sale executed by the spouses Gervasio Ignalaga and Petra Maderazo infavor of Antonio Alegato, covering lots Nos. 419 and 762, which was presented in the registry ofdeeds on December 6, 1930, both original certificates of title were cancelled and thecorresponding transfer certificates of title in the name of Antonio Alegato were issued, with anotation of the notice of attachment on that covering lot No. 419, and without this notation onthat covering lot No. 762. Thereafter, the register of deeds, becoming aware of the omission ofthe notice of attachment on the original as well as on the transfer certificate of title covering lotNo. 762, asked permission of the court, which was granted him, to make the annotation thusomitted.As lot No. 419, there is no doubt that the opposition of Antonio Alegato is entirely unfounded. Itappearing in the books of the registry of deeds and on his transfer certificate of title that his rightto this lot is subject to the attachment levied against Gervasio Ignalaga, his vendor, he cannotnow oppose the effects of said attachment (Buzonvs. Licauco, 13 Phil., 354).Neither is his opposition with respect to lot No. 762 founded, notwithstanding the fact that thenotice of attachment had not been noted on the original certificate of title to this lot in the nameof Gervasio Ignalaga and Petra Maderazo or on the transfer certificate of title which was laterissued in his name, inasmuch as this notice of attachment was duly inscribed in the books of theregistry of deeds.

ISSUE: To Whom the Instruments of Registration and the Lot Per Se be named after.

RULING: The instruments of registration and the lt per se should be registered in the name ofLevy Hermanos Inc.According to section 51 of Act No. 496, the registration of the instrument in the books of theregistry of deeds is notice to all as regards such document. It does not provide that it is thenotation thereof on the certificate of title.

And section 56 of the same Act, in prescribing the form in which the registers of deeds shouldkeep their entry books and directing the entry therein, in the order of their reception, of all deedsand other voluntary instruments and all copies of writs and other process filed with them relatingto registered land, noting therein the year, month, day, hour and minute when they received them,provides that inscription or registration shall be regarded as made from the time so noted.According to this, the notation of the attachment of this lot in the entry book of the register ofdeeds produces all the effects which the law gives to its registration or inscription.It is also alleged that, at all events, the levy and sale made by the provincial sheriff in favor ofLevy Hermanos, Inc., should affect only one-half of each of these lots, which representsIgnalaga's share in the conjugal property, it not appearing that the execution entered in case No.8491 was for an indebtedness contracted during the marriage. However, there is no evidence tothe contrary and, on the other hand, the circumstance that execution was issued during themarriage authorizes the conclusion that said indebtedness was contracted during the same. At anyrate, inasmuch as the sale of these lots to Levy Hermanos, Inc., was made with the legalformalities, it is incumbent upon those who seek to annul it to prove the facts justifying theirclaim.

17 lopez Maria Cristina J. Lopez

#17. SIKATUNA v. POTENCIANA GUEVARA and FLORENCIO FRANCISCOBuhain, Divine

FACTS: A contract of lease of a portion of land was entered between the partnership Jacinto,Palma Y Hermanos, as lessor, and Potenciana Guevara, as lessee, covered by an OriginalCertificate of Title No. 8651 issued by the register of deeds of the city of Manila. The said contract contained an option whereby Jacinto, Palma Y Hermanos could purchase thehouse of Guevara built on the leased land within one year from the date of execution thereof. Itfurther states that if the partnership did not exercise such option, Guevara would have the right topurchase the land leased to her. This contract was never noted on the original certificate of titleof the land.The defendant attempted to purchase the said land when the period of the option expired andwithout the partnership having exercised its right. Jacinto, Palma Y Hermanos objected to thepurchase. Guevara then brought an action against the said partnership to compel it to sell the landto her. No notice of the commencement of said action was filed with the office of the register of deeds.While the case was pending, the aforesaid partnership sold to the Sikatuna Corporation all thelands, including the portion leased to Guevara. Said corporation had the transfer recorded in theregistry, under the provisions of Act No. 496, which was issued a Transfer Certificate of Title No.8651 on May 25, 1918. On July 15, 1918, judgement was rendered ordering Jacinto, Palma Y Hermanos to sell toGuevara the portion of land leased to her. Said judgement was affirmed by this Court. However,this judgment was not executed because the land had been sold to the Sikatuna.In both the Original and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8651, there was no record of anyencumbrance upon the land except a mortgage in favor of National Bank.

Nevertheless, Guevara remained in possession of the portion of land leased to her despite the factthat Sikatuna needed the same for some purpose and that she had not paid rentals for the land tothe new owner. On January 1920, Guevara was notified to vacate the premises and to pay her correspondingrents. Upon Guevara's decline to comply with the notice, Sikatuna commenced an action forunlawful entry and detainer and for the payment of rents against her. The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a judgement rescinding the contract of salebetween Jacinto, Palma Y Hermanos and Sikatuna, and ordering the latter to execute the requireddeed of transfer of land to Guevera, among others. Hence, this appeal. ISSUES: Whether or not the order directing the transfer of the land in controversy by Sikatuna toPotenciana Guevera valid?RULING: Under Section 79 of the Land Registration Act No. 496, it provides that actionsconcerning properties registered under the law shall affect only the parties litigant, unless anotice of the commencement of the action is recorded. In the case at bar, it does not appear that the notice of the commencement of the action recordedas required under the Land Registration Act No. 496 was complied with. Therefore, there was nolegal obstacle to the transfer of the title of the said property. Hence, said transfer cannot berescinded. Furthermore, it is rightfully contended that the property is now in the legal possession of a thirdperson who has not acted in bad faith which is not subject to rescission as supported by Art. 1295of the Civil Code.

Bernadette E. CorderoCase NO. 18

FIDELITY and SURETY COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, vs.PASTOR CONEGERO VDA. DE LIZARRAGAG.R. No. L-15466February 18, 1921

FACTS: June 29, 1913 – There was a cadastral survey undertaken by the government. Under cadastral

proceeding, the court ordered that the certificate of title no. 147 be cancelled and that anew certificate title no 194 should be issued to Pastoria Conegero, the holder of thetorrens certificate

March 30, 1916 - Pastoria Conegero sold the property with the certificate title no. 147 to SamuelThomas.April 18, 1916 – The latter’s attorney sent the document to the register of deed in Iloilo. The

register of deed informing the latter that the registration thereof could not be effected forthe reason that the certificate no. 147 had been cancelled and had been supplemented byCertificate No. 194. The register of deed, however, noted in his entry the fact that such adeed had been presented to him.

October 18, 1916 - Pastoria Conegero mortgaged the property described in certificate of title no.194 to the Fidelity and Surety Company. This mortgaged was registered and noted on theoriginal certificate of title no 194 by the register of deeds.

November 2, 1917 – Samuel Thomas commenced an action to the Court of First Instance ofIloilo to compel Pastoria Conegero to produce certificate of title no. 194 for cancellationand to secure the issuance of a new certificate of title under his name.

March 22, 1918 – Fidelity and Surety Company of the Philippine Island brought this action toforeclose its mortgage naming Samuel Thomas as one of the codefendant with PastoriaConegero.

ISSUE : Whether the deed of March 30, 1916 is superior to the mortgage of October 18, 1916,executed in favor of the Fidelity and Surety Company?

HELD: NO, Under section 50 of Act No. 496, "no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntaryinstrument, except a will, purporting to convey or affect registered land, shall take effectas a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the partiesand as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make registration. The actof registration shall be the operative act to convey and affect the land." The steps bywhich registration is accomplished are fully set out in section 57 of the same Act; and byreference thereto, it will be seen that registration of the transfer of registered landdepends upon several vital conditions, among which is the requirement that the grantor'sduplicate certificate, upon which the title is founded, shall be produced before the registerof deeds for cancellation; and that he shall also have before him the original certificate,likewise to be cancelled. This prerequisite condition was not complied with when thedeed to Thomas was presented for registration. On the other hand, the conveyance of theland covered by certificate No. 194, by way of mortgage to the Fidelity and SuretyCompany, was effected in compliance with all legal requirements. As a consequence itmust be held that the title acquired by the Fidelity and Surety Company is superior to thatacquired by Samuel Thomas.

#19 Tenio-Obsequio vs. Court of AppealsBertumen, Yzabel Eden M.

FACTS:Respondent Eufronio Alimpoos mortgaged subject land to Eduardo Deguro, and to guaranty theloan they delivered the original certificate of title to the latter. Eduardo Deguro and his wife, without the knowledge and consent of herein private respondents, prepared a document of sale and through misrepresentation and other manipulations made it appear that private respondents sold the land to them, and the deed of sale was annotated at the back of the certificate of title. Subsequently, a new TCT was issued in favor of Eduardo. Upon the death of Eduardo Deguro, his heirs sold the subject land to Consorcia Tenio-Obsequio. Consorcia alleged to have purchased the land in good faith and without knowledge of any flaw ordefect. Private respondents filed a complaint in the court a quo for recovery of possession and ownership.The lower court ruled in favor of petitioner but was reversed by the Court of Appeals.ISSUE:Whether or not Consorcia Tenio-Obsequio is the rightful owner of the land in dispute.HELD:

Reconveyance of the land in question to the original owner is not in order.Herein respondent Alimpoos, as the original owner of the said land, is assailing the title ofpetitioner on the ground that their original certificate of title over the said land was cancelled byvirtue of a forged deed of absolute sale.Under Section 55 the Land Registration Act, as amended by Section 53 of Presidential DecreeNo. 1529, an original owner, of registered land may seek the annulment of a transfer thereof onthe ground of fraud. However, such a remedy is without prejudice to the rights of any innocentholder for value with a certificate of title.A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property of another, without noticethat some other person has a right to or interest in such property, and pays a full and fair price forthe same at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of someother person in the property. In consonance with this accepted legal definition, petitionerConsorcia Tenio-Obsequio is a purchaser in good faith. There is no showing whatsoever nor evenan allegation that herein petitioner had any participation, voluntarily or otherwise, in the allegedforgery.Nor can said petitioner be charged with negligence since, at the time of the sale to her, the landwas already registered in the name of Eduardo Deguro and the tax declaration was also issued inthe latter's name. It was also clearly indicated at the back of the original certificate of title thatEduardo Deguro acquired ownership over the said land by virtue of the deed of sale executed inhis favor. In fact, it is not disputed that one of his heirs was actually residing therein. There is noannotation, defect or flaw in the title that would have aroused any suspicion as to its authenticity.Such being the case, petitioner has the right to rely on what appears on the face of the certificateof title.The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real estate and tofacilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of aTorrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when theparty concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonablycautious man to make such further inquiry. Where innocent third persons, relying on thecorrectness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire, rights over the property, the courtcannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the certificate. The effect of suchan outright cancellation would be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title, foreveryone dealing with property registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire inevery instance as to whether the title has been regularly or irregularly issued by the court. Everyperson dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of titleissued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determinethe condition of property.The right of the innocent purchaser for value must be respected and protected, even if the sellerobtained his title through fraud. The remedy of the person prejudiced is to bring an action fordamages against those who caused or employed the fraud, and if the latter are insolvent, anaction against the Treasurer of the Philippines may be filed for recovery of damages against theAssurance Fund.It is also significant and worth noting that herein respondents filed the instant complaint onlyafter twenty-two years from the execution of the supposedly forged deed of absolute sale, andafter sixteen years from the date the title was transferred in the name of herein petitioner. Anaction for reconveyance is a legal remedy granted to a landowner whose property has been

wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name, but then the action must be filed withinten years from the issuance of the title since such issuance operates as a constructive notice.

#21. DE LA PAZ

HEIRS OF SEVERA P. GREGORIO, , vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RICARDO SANTOS,ROSALINA PALOMO, SPOUSES WILSON TAN and BENITA LUI TAN, respondents.

FACTS:

Spouses Wilson tan and Benita Lui Tan are the registered owners of a lot located along QuezonBlvd. covered by TCT No.349788 issued by the register of Deeds of Quezon City. The lot waspreviously owned by Severa Gregorio, Severa leased the Lot to shell for 20 years. Severa Diedintestate leaving 3 legitimate children Buenconsejo Vivar, Jesusa aGalang and Cecilio Pineda.after the expiration of Leased from shell vivar, tried to sell the lot to Federico Ng So, he was

shocked to find that her brother's title title was cancelled and thereof was issued to Spouses Tan. The heirs of Severa gregorio filed with the trial court instant complaint against Spouses Tan forcancellation of Title or reconveyance with damages alledging that the deeds of conveyance wereforged and are therefore void. Thereafter, or on June 11, 1988, a fire gutted the Quezon City Hall

Building. The entire records of this case were destroyed. The trial court issued an order for thereconstitution of the records, the parties had hardly started the reconstituion, the heirs filed asupplemental complaint which was admitted by the court, on the other hand spouses Tan filesanswer alleging that the deed of sale was geniune and that the property is purchesed in good

faith. During the trial, the heirs of Gregorio presented as their witnesses Bienvenido Albacea, aQuestioned Document Examiner of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); Dr. Wilhelmina

Vibar, daughter of Buenconsejo Vibar; and Viterbo Cahilig, Records Officer, Quezon CityRegister of Deeds. Spouses Tan presented appellant Wilson Tan; Atty. Jose Ramos Sunga,counsel of spouses Tan; Records Officer Viterbo Cahilig; and June Pangilinan, OIC of the

Records Section of the Regional Trial Court in Kalookan.

The Trial court rendred its decision decalring the deed of sale executed by Ricardo Santos infavor of Spouses Wilson Tan is null and Void and order the cancellation of TCT number 349788.

From thje aforesaid decision both the Plaintiffs and Defendants spouses appealed to the CA. TheQuestioned deision of the Trial court is Reversed and Set Aside and declared that the ownership

and title of spouses Tab over the disputed lot are valid.

The Heirs of severa petition for review ob Certiorari from the deciosn of the CA..

ISSUES:

(A.)RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE WEIGHT TOTHE TESTIMONY OF THE NBI HANDWRITING EXPERT FOR THE REASON THAT

WHAT HE TESTIFIED ON IN COURT WAS A MERE XEROX COPY OF THEQUESTIONED DEED OF SALE.

(B.) RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTSPOUSES TAN ARE INNOCENT PURCHASERS FOR VALUE AND IN GOOD FAITH

WITH RESPECT TO THE 2/3 PORTION OF THE SUBJECT LOT CONVEYED TO THEMBY RICARDO SANTOS.

HELD:

First Issue:

Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for not giving credence to the testimony of NBIhandwriting expert Bienvenido Albacea, who examined the deed of sale in question and

concluded that the signature thereon purporting to be that of the late Severa Gregorio, is forged.They contend that, as borne out by the records, (1) on September 10, 1987, Albacea conducted anexamination of the original copy of subject deed of sale dated July 14, 1971 at the Office of the

Register of Deeds of Quezon City; (2) on the basis of such examination, he arrived at theconclusion that the signature appearing thereon was forged; (3) unfortunately, as a result of thefire of June 11, 1988, which destroyed the Quezon City Hall, the records of the case were all

burned including the original copy of the aforesaid deed of sale; and (4) the said original copy ofthe deed of sale could not be produced in court thereby necessitating the presentation of a

certified true xerox copy thereof.Basic is the rule of evidence that when the subject of inquiryis the contents of a document, no evidence is admissible other than the original document itselfexcept in the instances mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. Mere

photocopies of documents are inadmissible pursuant to the best evidence rule.This is especiallytrue when the issue is that of forgery. As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be provedby clear, positive and convincing evidence[8] and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging

forgery. The best evidence of a forged signature in an instrument is the instrument itselfreflecting the alleged forged signature. The fact of forgery can only be established by a

comparison between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of theperson whose signature is theorized upon to have been forged. Without the original document

containing the alleged forged signature, one cannot make a definitive comparison which wouldestablish forgery.

Second Issue:

When a portion of registered property was sold and the sale was duly registered (and annotatedin the certificate of title of the vendor), the vendee technically becomes the owner of the sold

portion as of the registration of the sale although the title to said property is still in the name ofthe vendor.In this case, when the spouses Tan purchased the subject property from defendantSantos, the title was clean and free from any lien and encumbrance except for the claim of the

spouses Palomos by virtue of a final judgment in court awarding 1/3 undivided portion of the lotto the latter. Tan did not know the Gregorio family before he purchased the lot. He learned aboutthe lot being offered for sale through Zapata Realty, a professional real estate broker . RicardoSantos showed Tan the original 1971 deed of sale from Severa Gregorio to him (Santos) and theduplicate original copy of her TCT No. 8787. Tan went to the Office of the Register of Deeds of

Quezon City and satisfied himself with the authenticity of the documents shown by Santos.

With respect to the 1/3 portion, Tan had the title cleaned of all adverse claims before hepurchased the share of the Palomos. Also, before buying the lot , he visited it to check its

condition.Good faith is the opposite of fraud and consists of the honest intention to abstain fromtaking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another.[18] From the evidence on

record, it can be gleaned that respondent spouses Tan were not personally acquainted with Santosprior to the sale. They bought the property through a real estate broker, Zapata Realty, and not

from Santos himself. But they satisfied themselves that subject certificate of title was clean, andof the genuineness and authenticity of the deed of sale of Santos, by personally verifying thesame with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. Such verification, in fact, disclosed that

subject certificate of title was free from any adverse claim except that of the Palomos. Respondent spouses Tan even consulted a lawyer before proceeding with the sale. Verily, the

latter were not amiss in their duty to ascertain their vendor’s capacity to sell the property.

Petition is Hereby Denied..

#21LIEZEL MABANSAG

#22 GARCIA vs COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. 133140, august 10, 1999Jigg Lynnard B. Pagente

FACTS:

On August 1, 1980, Atty. Pedro garcia with the consent of his wife Remedios T. Garciasold his property to to their daughter Ma. Luisa Magpayo and her husband Luisito Magpayo (theMagpayos). Before the Atty. Garcia's title was cancelled, on March 5, 1981, the Magpayosmortgaged the land to the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) to secure a loan.Subsequently, on March 9, 1981, Atty. Garcia's title was cancelled and a Transfer Certificate ofTitle was issued in the name of the Magpayos.

The Magpayos defaulted on their loan resulting for PBCom to extrajuducially foreclosethe property mortgage. They were also the highest bidder in the public auction sale. Thus, titleover the land was consolidated to PBCom and a TCT was issued in its name. The Magpayos fileda complaint before the Regional Trial Court in Makati seeking to nullify the extrajudicialforeclosure of mortgage, the public auction sale and PBCom tilte. However, this action by theMagpayos was dismissed by the RTC.

PBCom then acquired from the RTC of makati a writ of possession over the property. Thepossessor of the land at the time was Jose Ma. T. Garcia, brother of Mrs. Magpayo. Upon serviceof the writ, he did not honor it. Jose Garcia files a suit for the recovery of the realty wherin healleges that he inherited the land and PBCom holds no title to it. The RTC favored Jose Garciabut this was reversed by the Court of appeals. Hence, Jose Garcia filed a petition for reviewbefore the Supreme Court.

ISSUE;

Whether or not mortgage of the property is valid although the land was not yet registeredto the mortgagor at the time it was mortgaged.

RULING:

Yes, the vendee may mortgage the land pending registration thereof.

The supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals in holding that the mortgage to PBComby the Magpayo spouses is valid notwithstanding that the transfer certificate of title over theproperty was issued to them after the mortgage contract was entered into. Registration does notconfer ownership, it is merely evidence of such ownership over a particular property. Thedeed of sale operates as a formal or symbolic delivery of the property sold and authorizes thebuyer to use the document as proof of ownership. All said, the Magpayo spouses were alreadythe owners when they mortgaged the property to PBCom.Vijoseph Anthony P. Jore

Case # 23Bayoca vs Nogales [G.R. No. 138201. September 12, 2000.]

Facts:The petition poses a challenge against the appellate court’s conclusion that the first sale

of a parcel of land to respondent Gaudioso Nogales prevails over the second sale of the saidproperty to petitioners Francisco Bayoca, Nonito Dichoso and spouses Pio and Dolores Dichoso.As such, there is no dispute as to the following facts found by the Court of Appeals:When theSpouses Juan Canino and Brigida Domasig died intestate, before 1947, they were survived bytheir legitimate children, namely, Preciosa Canino, married to Emilio Deocareza, ConsolacionCanino, Dolores Canino, Isidra Canino and Tomas Canino who inherited, from their father, aparcel of land, located in Prieto-Diaz, Sorsogon covered by Tax Declaration No. 9659, in anassessed value of P500.00. Sometime,There was a subsequent unnotarized Deed of Sale of RealProperty with Right of Repurchase in different year by Preciosa Canino in favor of her sister-in-law Julia Deocareza. On January 31, 1951, again Preciosa Canino executed unnotarized Deed ofSale of Real Property with Right of Repurchase by Preciosa Canino in favor of her sister-in-lawJulia Deocareza the entire property. The parties covenanted, under said deed, that the propertydescribed therein was unencumbered and to register the deed under Act 3344. On the basis ofsaid deed, Tax Declaration No. 3489 was issued over the property, under the name of JuliaDeocareza. The latter allowed her brothers, Ambrosio Deocareza, married to Olympia Dichoso,and Emilio Deocareza, the husband of Preciosa Canino, to occupy the said property. However,Preciosa Canino failed to repurchase the property. In the meantime, Gaudioso Nogales, theAppellee in the present recourse, acquired the property abutting the property of Preciosa Caninoand her siblings, on the east, and installed a tenant thereon.

On April 29, 1968, Julia Deocareza executed an unnotarized “Compromise Agreement”, in thelocal dialect, in favor of the Appellee, whereby she sold to the Appellee, for the priceof P3,500.00, the aforesaid property she earlier purchased from Preciosa Canino, with an area of21,080 square meters. She promised, in said deed, to have her brothers, Ambrosio and Emilio

Deocareza, and their families, vacate the said property. On the same day, Julia Deocarezaexecuted a “Deed of Absolute Sale of Realty Property” in favor of the Appellee over theaforesaid parcel of land for the price of P3,000.00. The aforesaid deed was registered with theRegister of Deeds on May 3, 1968. For a time, the Appellee was abroad.However, when the Appellee demanded that Ambrosio andEmilio Deocareza and their families vacate the property, Emilio Deocareza and PreciosaDeocareza refused. The Appellee forthwith filed a complaint, sometime in 1975, with theRegional Trial Court of Sorgoson, against Emilio Deocareza, and Julia Deocareza for “Recoveryof Possession” of property entitled “Gaudioso Nogales versus Emilio Deocareza, et al.” CivilCase No. 975.” In hisAmended Complaint, the Appellee impleaded Preciosa Canino, as partydefendant, Julia Deocareza later filed a cross-claim against Preciosa Canino over the property.

After the remand of the records of said case to the Court a quo, a Writ of Execution was issuedby the Court a quo, dated, February 20, 1992 (Exhibit “D”). Emilio Deocareza andPreciosa Deocareza vacated the property. The Appellee, through Henry Nogales, executed an“Acknowledgment” acknowledging actual possession of the aforesaid parcel of land from theSheriff (Exhibit “F”). However, the Appellee discovered that Francisco Bayoca, Nonito Dichosoand the Spouses Pio Dichoso and Dolores Dichoso, the Appellants in the present recourse,claimed ownership of portion of the said property. The Appellant Nonito Dichoso hadconstructed a nipa hut on a portion of the property. The Appellant Francisco Bayoca likewiseconstructed his house thereon.

Issue:the superiority of right to a parcel of land sold to different buyers atdifferent times by its

former owners.

Held: According to the records, respondent Nogales was the first to buy the subject property

from Julia Deocareza, who in turn bought the samefrom the Canino siblings. Petitioners,however, relied on the fact that they were the firstto register the sales of the different portions ofthe property resulting in the issuance of new titles in their names. And as far as petitionersFrancisco and Nonito are concerned,they declared the properties they acquired respectively fortaxation purposes.HEASaC Art. 1544 of the Civil Code governs the preferential rights of vendees in cases of multiplesales.Under the second paragraph of said law, ownership of an immovable property shall belong to theperson acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property. The undisputedfact is that respondent Nogales had the Deed of Absolute Saleexecuted in his favor registeredwith the Registry of Deeds under Act No. 3344 long before the sale of portions of the property topetitioners. This constitutes constructivenotice of the sale to the whole world and hence, candefeat the right of the second buyer in good faith. Thus, the Court ruled in favor of respondentNogales.

# 24 Iluminado Hanopol vs. Perfecto PilapilAlegre, Cristie B.

Facts:This is a case of double sale of the same parcel of unregistered land. Hanopol claims

ownership of the land by virtue of a series of purchases by means of private instruments,executed by the former owners Teodora, Lucia, Generosa, Sinforosa and Isabelo, all surnamedSiapo. Also, he invokes in his favor a decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Leyteagainst the same vendors, who took possession of the said property through fraud, threat andintimidation, pretending falsely to be the owners thereof and ejecting the tenants of Hanopol andsince then had continued to possess the land. Decision declaring him the exclusive owner of theland was rendered on September 21, 1958.

On the other hand, Pilapil asserts title to the property based on a duly notarized deed ofsale executed in his favor by the same owners in 1945, which deed of sale was registered in theRegistry of Deeds of Leyte in 1948 under the provisions of Act No. 3344.

Hanopol argues that the registration of Pilapil's notarized deed of sale in 1948 under ActNo. 3344 "shall be understood to be without prejudice to a third party with a better right". Hecontends that since at the time the Siapos sold the land in question in 1945 to Pilapil, the formerwere no longer the owners as they had already sold the same to Hanopol since 1938, the first saleto him is a better right which cannot be prejudiced by the registration of the second sale.

Issue: Whether or not the registration of the second deed of sale in favor of Pilapil affects his

right as the first vendee.

Held:Yes. The Supreme Court held that the quoted proviso in Act No. 3344 does not justify

Hanopol’s contention. If his theory is correct, then the second paragraph of Article 1544 of theNew Civil Code (formerly Article 1473 of the old Code) would have no application at all exceptto lands or real estate registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law or the Land Registration Act.Such a theory would thus limit the scope of that codal provision. But even if the Court adoptsthis latter view, that is, that Article 1544 (formerly Article 1473) only applies to registered land,still the Court cannot agree with Hanopol that by the mere fact of his having a previous title ordeed of sale, he has acquired thereby what is referred to in Act No. 3344 as the "better right" thatwould be unaffected by the registration of a second deed of sale under the same law. Under suchtheory, there would never be a case of double sale of the same unregistered property.

In the case of Lichauco v. Berenguer (39 Phil. 643), the effect which the law gives to theinscription of a sale against the efficacy of the sale which was not registered is not extended toother titles which the other vendee was able to acquire independently as, in this case, the title byprescription. It thus appears that the "better right" referred to in Act No. 3344 is much more thanthe mere prior deed of sale in favor of the first vendee. In the Lichauco case, it was theprescriptive right that had supervened. Or, as also suggested in that case, other facts andcircumstances exist which, in addition to his deed of sale, the first vendee can be said to havebetter right than the second purchaser.

In the case at bar, there appears to be no clear evidence of Hanopol's possession of the land incontroversy. In fact, in his complaint against the vendors, Hanopol alleged that the Siapos tookpossession of the same land under claim of ownership in 1945 and continued and were in suchpossession at the time of the filing of the complaint against them in 1948. Consequently, sincethe Siapos were in actual occupancy of the property under claim of ownership, when they soldthe said land to Pilapil in 1945, such possession was transmitted to the latter, at leastconstructively, with the execution of the notarial deed of sale, if not actually and physically asclaimed by Pilapil. Thus, Hanopol cannot have a better right than Pilapil who, according to thetrial court, "was not shown to be a purchaser in bad faith".

CASTRO, JOHN FREDERICK Y. 2011-0444Case # 24

JUANITA P. PINEDA, ET. AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS[G.R. No. 114172. August 25, 2003.]

FACTS:On January 4, 1982, the Spouses Benitez mortgaged a house and lot covered by TCT 8361 infavor of herein petitioners Pineda and Sayoc to secure the loan obtained by the former from thepetitioners. Pineda and Sayoc did not register the real estate mortgage. The owners duplicate ofTCT 8361 was however delivered by the Spouses Benitez to Pineda. On November 9, 1983, the Spouses Benitez, after obtaining the consent of petitioners, sold thehouse to Olivia Mojica who there and then filed a petition for the issuance of a second owner’sduplicate of TCT 8361 alleging that the owner’s duplicate of the same was lost. The courtgranted Mojica’s petition and ordered the Register of Deeds to issue the second owner’sduplicate copy of TCT 8361 in the name of the Spouses Benitez. On December 7 of the sameyear, the Spouses Benitez sold the lot covered by TCT 8361 to Mojica who immediatelyregistered the Deed of Sale. As a consequence of which, TCT 8361 was cancelled and TCT13138 was issued in the name of Mojica.On December 12, Mojica mortgaged the same property to Teresita Gonzales who immediatelyregistered with the Register of Deeds the deed of mortgage. On May 8, 1985, herein petitionersfiled a complaint praying for the cancellation of the second owner’s duplicate of TCT 8361against the Spouses Benitez and Mojica. In their answer, both the Spouses Benitez and Mojicadenied liability; the former alleging that they did not have any knowledge of the fact that Mojicafiled a petition for the issuance of a second owner’s duplicate of TCT 8361, while the latterasserted that she verified with the Register of Deeds of Cavite City the provision in the deed ofsale that the Property was free from all liens and encumbrances and found the same to betrue. They prayed therefore that the complaint be dismissed. During the pendency of the case, Pineda caused the annotation on 18 August 1986 of a notice oflis pendens on the original of TCT 8361 with the Register of Deeds. After trial, the trial courtrendered a Decision declaring the second owner's duplicate of TCT No. T-8361 of the landrecords of Cavite as null and void. However, for failure of Mojica to pay her obligationas they fell due, Gonzales extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and purchased the property ata public auction conducted on January 27, 1988. Subsequently, title to the property was

consolidated in the name of Gonzales after Mojica failed to redeem the same within the properperiod. As a consequence of which, TCT13138 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT16084 was issued in the name of Gonzales. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the court a quo regarding the statusof the second owner's duplicate of TCT 8361. The above decision became final and executory.On motion of Pineda and Sayoc, the trial court issued a writ of execution to enforce thejudgment. The same however could not be satisfied since TCT 8361 had already been cancelled. Hence, herein petitioners filed a motion for the issuance of an order requiring Gonzales tosurrender TCT 16084. The RTC subsequently declared void TCT 16084 and ordered thereinstatement ofTCT 8361 in the name of the Spouses Benitez. Gonzales elevated the above decision to the CAwho ruled in favor of Gonzales after it found that the trial court erred when it voided TCT 16084upon a mere motion for the surrender of the owner's duplicate of TCT 16084 and in ordering thereinstatement of TCT 8361 in the name of the Spouses Benitez. The CA held that petitionersshould have filed the petition to surrender TCT16084 in the original case where the decreeof registration of TCT 16084 was entered and not in Civil Case No. 4654 since the secondparagraph of Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 16("PD 1529") requires the filing ofsuch separate petition.

ISSUE: Did the notice of lis pendens bound the subsequent purchaser of the property to the outcome ofthe pending case?HELD:.NO.The notice of lis pendens could not defeat Gonzales' rights over the Property for two reasons.First, Gonzales registered in good faith her mortgage before the notation of the lis pendens,making the registration of her mortgage valid despite the invalidity of TCT 13138. Second, since Gonzales' mortgage was valid, the auction sale retroacted to the date of registrationof her mortgage, making the auction sale prior in time to the notice of lis pendens. Thus, TCT16084, issued to Gonzales as a result of the foreclosure sale, is valid. When Gonzales purchasedthe Property at the auction sale, Pineda and Sayoc had already annotated the lis pendens on theoriginal of TCT 8361 already, which remained valid. However, the mortgage of Gonzales wasvalidly registered prior to the notation of the lis pendens. The subsequent annotation of the lispendens could not defeat the rights of the mortgagee or the purchaser at the auction sale whoderived their rights under a prior mortgage validly registered. The settled rule is that the auctionsale retroacts to the date of the registration of the mortgage, putting the auction sale beyond thereach of any intervening lis pendens, sale or attachment. As the Court explained in Caviles, Jr. v. Bautista: We have also consistently ruled that an auctionor execution sale retroacts to the date of levy of the lien of attachment. When the subjectproperty was sold on execution to the petitioners, this sale retroacted to the date of inscription ofpetitioners' notice of attachment on October 6,1982. The earlier registration of the petitioners' levy on preliminary attachment gave them superiorityand preference in rights over the attached property as against respondents. Accordingly, we rulethat the execution sale in favor of the petitioner Caviles spouses was anterior and superior to thesale of the same property to the respondent Bautista spouses on October 18, 1982. The right ofpetitioners to the surrender of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 57006 covering the subject

property for inscription of the certificate of sale, and for the cancellation of said certificate oftitle and the issuance of a new title in favor of petitioners cannot be gain said. A contrary rule would make a prior registration of a mortgage or any lien meaningless. The priorregistered mortgage of Gonzales prevails over the subsequent notice of lis pendens, even if theauction sale took place after the notation of the lis pendens. Consequently, TCT 16084, issued toGonzales after she presented the sheriff's certificate of sale and her affidavit of consolidation, isvalid. What remained with Pineda and Sayoc after the foreclosure was the mortgagor's residualrights over the foreclosed Property, which rights are the equity of redemption and a share in thesurplus fund, if any. 32 Since Mojica was not a purchaser in good faith, the residual rights ofMojica were subject to the claim of Pineda and Sayoc. Of course, Pineda and Sayoc may still file an action to recover the outstanding debt of theSpouses Benitez, and even go after Mojica for her assumption of obligation under theAcknowledgment of Indebtedness.

#25Rufino Samuel R. Mantos III

G.R. No. 127941 January 28, 1999BIBLIA TOLEDO-BANAGA and JOVITA TAN, petitioners,

vs.COURT OF APPEALS and CANDELARIO DAMALERIO, respondents.

Facts:In an action for redemption filed by petitioner Banaga, the trial court declared that she had losther right to redeem her property earlier foreclosed and which was subsequently sold at publicauction to private respondent. On June 11, 1992 petitioner Banaga tried to redeem the propertyby depositing with the trial court the amount of redemption which was financed by her co-petitioner Tan. Private respondent opposed the redemption arguing that it was made beyond thetime given to her by the court in the earlier case However, the lower court issued an order onAugust 7, 1992 upholding the redemption and ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel privaterespondent's Certificates of Title and issue new titles in the name of petitioner Banaga.Meanwhile, on January 7, 1993, petitioner Banaga sold the subject property to petitioner Tanwith the deed of absolute sale mentioning private respondent's certificate of title which was notyet cancelled. Notwithstanding the notice of lis pendens, petitioner Tan subdivided the propertyin question under a subdivision plan, which she made not in her name but in the name of privaterespondent. There being no preliminary injunction issue and with the expiration of the TRO,petitioner Tan asked the Register of Deeds to issue new titles in her name. On March 24, 1993,such titles were issued in petitioner Tan's name but it still carried the annotations of the twonotices oflis pendens. Upon motion of private respondent, the trial court issued a writ ofexecution on December 27, 1994 ordering the Register of Deeds to reinstate the Certificates ofTitle in the name of the movant — herein private respondent. But the Register of Deeds refusedto comply with the writ of execution alleging that the Certificates of Title issued to petitioner Tanmust first be surrendered. Accordingly, private respondent moved to cite the Register of Deeds incontempt of court which was denied, as the trial court ruled on January 11, 1995 that the former'sremedy is by consulta to the Commissioner of Land Registration. The CA decided in favour ofthe herein private respondent, hence this present case.Issue:

Whether or not Tan is a buyer in good faith thus vesting her with a better right than Damalerio?Held:At the time of the sale, the person from whom petitioner Tan bought the property is neither theregistered owner nor was the former authorized by the latter to sell the same. She knew she wasnot dealing with the registered owner or a representative of the latter. One who buys propertywith full knowledge of the flaws and defects in the title of his vendor is enough proof of his badfaith and cannot claim that he acquired title in good faith as against the owner or of an interesttherein. When she nonetheless proceeded to buy the lot, petitioner Tan gambled on the result oflitigation. She is bound by the outcome of her indifference with no one to blame except herself ifshe loses her claim as against one who has a superior right or interest over the property. Theseare the undeniable and unconverted facts found by the CA, which petitioners even quote and citein their petition. As aptly concluded by the CA that petitioner Tan is indeed a buyer in bad faith.Being a buyer in bad faith, petitioner Tan cannot acquire a better right than her predecessor ininterest, for she merely stepped into the shoes of the latter. Such finding of bad faith is final andmay not be re-opened for the law cannot allow the parties to trifle with the courts.

#26 STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE Inc. vs. CAAnderson Torres

FACTS: Contract to Sell executed by the Spouses Oreta and the Solid Homes, Inc., involving aparcel land of the Capitol Park Homes Subdivision, Quezon City. Upon signing of the contract,they made payment amounting to P7,869.40, with the agreement that the balance shall bepayable in monthly installments of P451.70, at 12% interest per annum.SOLID executed several real estate mortgage contracts in favor of State Investment Homes, Inc.(STATE) over its subdivided parcels of land, one of which is the subject lot.For Failure of SOLID to comply with its mortgage obligations contract, STATE extrajudiciallyforeclosed the mortgaged properties including the subject lot, with the corresponding certificateof sale issued therefor to STATE annotated at the back of the titles covering the said properties.SOLID thru a Memorandum of Agreement negotiated for the deferment of consolidation ofownership over the foreclosed properties by committing to redeem the properties from STATE.The spouses filed a complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, HLRB,against the developer SOLID and STATE for failure on the part of SOLID "to executethe necessary absolute deed of sale as well as to deliver title to said property . . . in violation ofthe contract to sell . . .," despite full payment of the purchase price. STATE, to which the subject lot was mortgaged, averred that unless SOLID pays the redemptionprice, it has "a right to hold on and not release the foreclosed properties.Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) rendered a decision:

1 Ordering respondent, State Investment House, Inc. to execute a Deed of Conveyance ofLot 1, Block 8, in Capital Park Homes Subdivision in favor of complainants and todeliver to the latter the corresponding certificate of title.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent spouses Oreta's unregistered rights over the subjectproperty are superior to the registered mortgage rights of petitioner State Investment House, Inc.RULING: Yes. STATE's registered mortgage right over the property is inferior to that ofrespondents-spouses' unregistered right. The unrecorded sale between respondents-spouses andSOLID is preferred for the reason that if the original owner (SOLID, in this case) had parted withhis ownership of the thing sold then he no longer had ownership and free disposal of that thing so

as to be able to mortgage it again. Registration of the mortgage is of no moment since it isunderstood to be without prejudice to the better right of third parties.

#27 Villanueva vs CA 198 scra 472Bartolome, Ralph Jireh A.

FACTS:Plaintiff Eusebia Napisa Retuya, is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas Retuya, having beenmarried to the latter on October 7, 1926. Out of the lawful wedlock, they begot five (5) children,namely, Natividad, Angela, Napoleon, Salome, and Roberta. Spouses Retuya resided at Tipolo,Mandaue City. During their marriage they acquired real properties and all improvements situatedin Mandaue City, and Consolacion, Cebu, more particularly described as follows:

‘1. A parcel of land located at Pulpugan, Consolacion, Cebu under tax dec. No. 24951;AND SO ON…

Also, defendant, Nicolas Retuya, is co-owner of a parcel of land situated in Mandaue City whichhe inherited from his parents Esteban Retuya and Balbina Solon as well as the purchasers ofhereditary shares of approximately eight (8) parcels of land in Mandaue City.Some of these properties above-mentioned earn income from coconuts and the otherlands/houses are leased to the following:

a Mandaue Food Products Company – for Lot 121-F, Lot 121-G and Lot 121-H underTCT No. 11300 at an annual rental of P10,800.00; AND SO ON..

In 1945, defendant Nicolas Retuya no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited withdefendant, Pacita Villanueva, wherein defendant, Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate son.Nicolas, then, was the only person who received the income of the above-mentioned properties.Defendant, Pacita Villanueva, from the time she started living in concubinage with Nicolas, hasno occupation, she had no properties of her own from which she could derive income.In 1985, Nicolas suffered a stroke and cannot talk anymore, cannot walk anymore and they haveto raise him up in order to walk. Natividad Retuya knew of the physical condition of her fatherbecause they visited him at the hospital. From the time defendant Nicolas Retuya suffered astroke on January 27, 1985 and until the present, it is defendant Procopio Villanueva, one ofNicolas’ illegitimate children who has been receiving the income of these properties. WitnessNatividad Retuya went to Procopio to negotiate because at this time their father Nicolas wasalready senile and has a childlike mind. She told defendant, Procopio that their father wasalready incapacitated and they had to talk things over and the latter replied that it was not yet thetime to talk about the matter. Plaintiff, then, complained to the Barangay Captain forreconciliation/mediation but no settlement was reached, hence, the said official issued acertification to file action. Written demands were made by plaintiff, through her counsel, to thedefendants, including the illegitimate family asking for settlement but no settlement was reachedby the parties. Further, plaintiff’s witness, Natividad Retuya, testified that the parcel of landcovered by tax declaration marked Exhibit "T" was the property bought by her father fromAdriano Marababol for at the time of purchase of the property, defendant Pacita Villanueva hadno means of livelihood.ISSUE: WON the titles are sufficient evidence for the ownership of Eusebia RetuyaHELD:The trial court applied Article 116 of the Family Code, which reads:

Art. 116. All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears tohave been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumedconjugal unless the contrary is proved.

The trial court ruled that the documents and other evidence Eusebia presented constitute "solidevidence" which proved that the subject properties were acquired during her marriage withNicolas. This made the presumption in Article 116 applicable to the subject properties. Thus, thetrial court ruled that Eusebia had proved that the subject properties are conjugal in nature. On theother hand, the trial court found that petitioners failed to meet the standard of proof required tomaintain their claim that the subject properties are paraphernal properties of Nicolas. The trialcourt added that Pacita presented no "factual solidity" to support her claim that she bought LotNo. 1522 exclusively with her own money.

28.) EGAO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

KRISTINE LARA G. DEFENSOR

PRINCIPLES UNDER THE TORRENS TITLE SYSTEM

IndefeasibilityA Torrens title gives constructive notice to the whole world and no one can plead

ignorance of the registration of the land.

EGAO VS. COURT OF APPEALS -G.R. NO. L-79787 June 29, 1989PADILLA, J.:

Facts:Private respondents Severo Dignos and Severo Bontilao filed a complaint for Quieting of

Title and/or Recovery of Possession against petitioners, Apolonio and Beatriz Egao. Thecomplaint alleged that they are the legitimate owners and possessors of two (2) parcels of landsituated at Lonocan, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon; and that Beatriz Egao transferred ownership infavor of Roberto Marfori by a Deed of Absolute Sale executed before the Notary Public ofCagayan de Oro City. Then the land was sold to the Severos through a Deed of Absolute Salewhere they acknowledge the Certificate of Title over the parcels of land have not yet beentransferred in favor of Marfori except for the tax declarations but that the latter is in actual,physical, continuous, uninterrupted, and adverse possession of the above described parcels ofland free from all liens and encumbrances whatsoever. Egaos' answer to the complaint assertedthat Apolonio Egao is the registered owner of the parcel of land known as evidenced by anOriginal Certificate Title issued by the Register of Deeds of Bukidnon pursuant to a grant of FreePatent and his family have been in actual, physical, adverse, open and continuous possessionthereof even before the issuance to him of the free patent; that the land has never been sold byreason of the prohibition against alienation under Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public LandLaw); which prohibits them from alienating the land within 5 years from the grant of Free Patent.

The lower court ruled in favor of Egao and that the sale was made before the issuance ofthe Free Patent, the said Deed of Sale were ipso facto cancelled or superseded by said free

patent. Moreover, it appears from the evidence that defendants never vacated or abandoned theirpossession of the Lots and the as long as the lots remains in the name of Egao it is the ultimateand best evidence of title granted by the government which must be honored and respected bythe courts.

On appeal the Court of Appeals reversed the Regional Trial Court Decision and pointedthat the main issue in such case is whether or not Egao can transfer the land to Marfori. Marforiand Egao were both held in pari delicto for violating the five (5) year restriction imposed againstencumbrance or alienation of lands acquired under a free patent or homestead; hence, theycannot seek affirmative relief, but respondents on the other hand were declared innocentpurchasers for value who obtained the owner's duplicate copy of the OCT from Marfori whotransferred to them the physical possession of the property. Therefore the Court of Appealesordered that Sevaro’s was the owner of the land in dispute and ordered the Registry of Deeds toregister under their name.

Issue: Whether or not the sale to Marfori is valid to resolve the claims of the Sevaro’s?

Held:No. the Original Certificate of Title in the name of the Egaos over the land in dispute was

issued a few months after the execution by the Egaos of the last Deed of Sale in favor of Marfori.A Torrens title, once registered, cannot be defeated, even by adverse open and notoriouspossession. A registered title under the Torrens system cannot be defeated by prescription. Thetitle, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can pleadignorance of the registration.

Contrary to the findings of the CA the respondents are not a purchaser for value, Where apurchaser neglects to make the necessary inquiries and closes his eyes to facts which should puta reasonable man on his guard as to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendor'stitle, and relying on the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor, purchases theproperty without making any further investigation, he cannot claim that he is a purchaser in goodfaith for value.

Deeds of sale of patented lands, perfected within the prohibited five (5) year period arenull and void (Sec. 124, Public Land Act). No title passed from the Egaos to Marfori which couldbe validly transferred the Sevaro’s. Thus, the rule of pari delicto non oritur actio does not applyto an inexistent contract, such as, a sale void ab initio.

#29 Republic vs. UmaliANWAR, AL-RAFFY N.

Republic of the Philippines vs. UmaliFacts:

The land in question is situated in Tanza, Cavite and consist of 78,865 square meters. Itwas purchased on installment from the government on july 1, 1910 by Florentina Bobadilla, whoallegedly transfer her rights thereto in favor of Martina, Maria and Gregorio. In 1971 theseassignees purportedly signed a joint affidavit which was filed with the Bureau of Lands tosupport their claim that they were entitled to the issuance of a certificate of title over the saidland on which they said they had already made full payment. On the basis of the affidavit, the

Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources executed Deed No. V-10910 ( Sale certificate no.1280) on September 10, 1971, in favor of the said affiants. Subsequently on October 13, 1971TCT No. 55044 (replacing Bobadilla OCT no. 180) was issued by the register of deeds of Cavitein favor Maria Cenizal, Gregorio Cenizal and (in lieu of Martina Cenizal) Rosalina Naval, LuzNaval and Enrique Naval.

Issue:Whether or not the subject land was already covered by Torrens system that in any event

bars all prior claims by prescription or laches.

Ruling:Yes. The herein respondents now accords to them the protection of Torrens system and

renders the titles obtained by them thereunder indefeasible and conclusive. The rule will notchange despite the flaw in TCT No. 55044. That under Section 39 of the Land Registration Actclearly provided: Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree ofregistration and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title forvalue in good faith shall hold the same free of all emcumbrance except those noted on saidcertificate. The certificate issued binds the whole world including the government.

That the real purpose of the Torrens System of land registration is to quiet the title toland; to put stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which werenoted at the time of registration in the certificate or which may arise subsequent thereto. Thatbeing purpose of the law, it would seem that once the title was registered, the owner might restsecure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court or sitting in the “mirador de sucasa” to avoid possibility of losing his land. That the land being now registered under the TorrensSystem in the names of the private respondent the government has no more control orjurisdiction over it. It is no longer part of the public domain or as the Solicitor Generalcontentions. The subject property ceased to be public land when OCT No. 180 was issued toFlorentina Bobadilla in 1910 or at the latest from the date it was sold to the Cenizals in 1971upon full payment of the purchase price. As private registered land, it is governed by theprovision of the Land Registration Act, now denominated the Property Registration Decreewhich applies even to the government. Section 122 Whenever public land in the PhilippineIsland belonging to the government are alienated or granted or conveyed to person or public orprivate corporation the same shall be brought under this act shall become registered land.

#30 Muyco vs CA 204 scra 358Bartolome, Ralph Jireh A.

FACTS:On November 22, 1935, Eugenio Saga filed an application for a homestead patent over a portionof Lot No. 5164 located in Pamplona, Negros Oriental. Sometime thereafter, the Bureau ofLands subdivided the said lot into two smaller lots, described as Lot Nos. 5956 and 6331, Pls-147. Eugenio Saga’s application was approved on July 10, 1937, and on July 6, 1939, he wasissued a Homestead Patent over said portion of Lot 5164 by the Director of Lands.

On February 2, 1952, Eugenio Saga sold his rights over the homestead to his son Sergio Saga,

respondent herein. On the same date, Sergio Saga filed a homestead application over Lot No.5956, Pls. 147. On October 23, 1954, an OCT was issued to Sergio Saga over the said lot.

On the other hand, on March 4, 1946, Leon Tolabing filed a homestead application over Lot No.5956. This application was approved on October 5 of the same year, and on April 11, 1955, hesold his homestead rights to Ambrocio Muyco. On the same date, Muyco filed his homesteadapplication over the said lot. He was not issued a certificate of title as his application covered thesame Lot 5956, over which an OCT had been issued to Sergio Saga.

On May 7, 1955, the Public Land Inspector of Negros Oriental conducted an investigation of thematter and found that Sergio Saga was occupying and cultivating Lot No. 6331; that Sergio hadnot occupied or cultivated Lot No. 5956; that the one who was occupying and cultivating Lot No.5956 was Leon Tolabing. Accordingly, it was recommended that the title issued to Sergio Sagabe recalled and modified to cover Lot No. 6331. These findings were questioned by SergioSaga.chanrobles law library

A subsequent report on December 5, 1957 by the Office of the Public Land Inspector reiteratedthe above findings and that there had been an error in recording the lot number of Sergio Saga.

In the meantime, Sergio Saga filed a case for "Recovery of Possession" against AmbrocioMuyco. The main thrust of his complaint was anchored on the fact that he was the holder of aCertificate of Title covering the lot in question. ISSUE:WON Sergio Saga was the rightful owner of the parcel of land in questionHELD:"It cannot be denied that Sergio Saga was able to obtain a patent over Lot No. 5956, which isnow covered by Original Certificate of Title No. H-V-795 (a xeroxed copy thereofpresented).’Thus, an original certificate of title issued on the strength of a homestead patentpartakes of the nature of a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding and become indefeasible andincontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance thereof (Ingaran v.Ramelo, 107 Phil. 498; Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, L-28591, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 297).Hence, it will readily be seen that it was Eugenio Saga who acquired a vested right over the lot inquestion, and not Leon Tolabing. It was this vested right which Sergio Saga likewise acquired byvirtue of the sale on February 2, 1962 involving the homestead.

#31 LOPEZ CHRISTINA#34 GUILING#35 ANWAR

#36 NATIONAL GRAINS AUTHORITY, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. INTERMEDIATEAPPELLATE COURT, MELECIO MAGCAMIT, NENA COSICO and EMELITA

MAGCAMITBertulfo, Helen

Facts: On December 2,1971, the spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizards, as owners of aparcel of land situated in Bo. San Francisco, Victoria, Laguna, comprising more or less 105,710

square meters, sold for P30,000.00 said property in favor of spouses Melencio Magcamit andNena Cosico, and Amelita Magcamit (herein private respondents) as evidenced by "KasulatanNg Bilihang Mabiling Muli." This sale with right to repurchase was recorded in the Office of theRegister of Deeds of Laguna on December 6,1971 under Act No. 3344. On January 31,1972 thesale was made absolute by the spouses Vivas and Lizardo in favor of the private respondents forthe sum of P90,000.00; P50,000.00 of which was paid upon the execution of the instrument,entitled "Kasulatan Ng Bilihan Tuluyan," after being credited with the P30,000.00 considerationof the "Kasulatan Ng Mabibiling Muli," and the balance of P40,000.00 was to be paid themoment that the certificate of title is issued. From the execution of said Kasulatan, privaterespondent have remained in peaceful, adverse and open possession of subject property.On February 26, 1975, an Original Certificate of Title No. T-1728 covering the property inquestion was issued to and in the name of the spouses Vivas and Lizardo without the knowledgeof the private respondents and on April 30, 1975, said Spouses executed a Special Power ofAttorney in favor of Irenea Ramirez authorizing the latter to mortgage the property with thepetitioner, National Grains Authority. On May 2, 1974, the counsel for the petitioner wrote the Provincial Sheriff in Sta. Cruz, Laguna,requesting for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage executed by Irenea Ramirez on May18, 1975, covering, among others, the property involved in this case covered by OCT No. T-1728, for unpaid indebtedness in the amount of P63,948.80 in favor of the petitioner. On May 31, 1974, the Provincial Sheriff caused the issuance of the notice of sale of the propertyin question, scheduling the public auction sale on June 28, 1974. The petitioner was the highestand successful bidder so that a Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor on the same date by theProvincial Sheriff. On July 10, 1974, the petitioner in its capacity as attorney-in-fact of the mortgagor sold thesubject real property in favor of itself. By virtue of the deed of absolute sale, TCT No. T-75171of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Laguna was issued in the name of the petitioner onJuly 16, 1974. It was only in July 1974, that private respondents learned that a title in the nameof the Vivas spouses had been issued covering the property in question and that the sameproperty had been mortgaged in favor of the petitioner. Private respondent Nena Magcamitoffered to pay the petitioner NGA the amount of P40,000.00 which is the balance of the amountdue the Vivas spouses under the terms of the absolute deed of sale but the petitioner refused toaccept the payment. On July 31, 1974, counsel for private respondents made a formal demand onthe spouses Vivas and Lizardo to comply with their obligation under the terms of the absolutedeed of sale; and soon after reiterated to the NGA, the offer to pay the balance of P40,000.00 dueunder the absolute deed of sale. On August 13, 1974 petitioner in its reply informed counsel ofprivate respondents that petitioner is now the owner of the property in question and has nointention of disposing of the same.On June 4, 1975, private respondents filed a complaint before the then Court of First Instance ofLaguna and San Pablo City, Branch III, San Pablo City, against the petitioner and the spousesVivas and Lizardo, praying, among others, that they be declared the owners of the property inquestion and entitled to continue in possession of the same, and if the petitioner is declared theowner of the said property, then, to order it to reconvey or transfer the ownership to them undersuch terms and conditions as the court may find just, fair and equitable under the premises. Issue: Whether or not violation of the terms of the agreement between the spouses Vivas andLizardo, the sellers, and private respondents, the buyers, to deliver the certificate of title to the

latter, upon its issuance, constitutes a breach of trust sufficient to defeat the title and rightacquired by petitioner NGA, an innocent purchaser for value. Ruling: Court has ruled that the proceedings for the registration of title to land under the TorrensSystem is an action in rem not in personam, hence, personal notice to all claimants of the res isnot necessary in order that the court may have jurisdiction to deal with and dispose of the res.Neither may lack of such personal notice vitiate or invalidate the decree or title issued in aregistration proceeding, for the State, as sovereign over the land situated within it, may providefor the adjudication of title in a proceeding in rem or one in the nature of or akin a to proceedingin rem which shall be binding upon all persons, known or unknown (Moscoso vs. Court ofappeals, 128 SCRA 719 [1984], citing: City of Manila vs. Lack, et al., 19 Phil. 324, 337; Roxasvs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. 31; Director of Lands vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 41 Phil.120; Aguilar vs. Caogdan, 105 Phil. 661). It is thus evident that respondents' right over theproperty was barred by res judicata when the decree of registration was issued to spouses Vivasand Lizards. It does not matter that they may have had some right even the right of ownership,BEFORE the grant of the Torrens Title.While the registration of the conditional sale with right of repurchase may be binding on thirdpersons, it is by provision of law "understood to be without prejudice to third party who hasbetter right" (Section 194 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344). In this case,it will be noted that the third party NGA, is a registered owner under the Torrens System and hasobviously a better right than private respondents and that the deed of absolute sale with thesuspensive condition is not registered and is necessarily binding only on the spouses Vivas andLizardo and private respondents. In their complaint at the Regional Trial Court, private respondents prayed among others, for twoalternative reliefs, such as: (a) to be declared the owners of the property in question or (b) toorder the declared owner to reconvey or transfer the ownership of the property in their favor.It will be noted that the spouses Vivas and Lizardo never committed any fraud in procuring theregistration of the property in question. On the contrary, their application for registration whichresulted in the issuance of OCT No. 1728 was with complete knowledge and implied authority ofprivate respondents who retained a portion of the consideration until the issuance to said spousesof a certificate of title applied for under the Torrens Act and the corresponding delivery of saidtitle to them. The question therefore, is not about the validity of OCT No. 1728 but in the breachof contract between private respondents and the Vivas spouses. Petitioner NGA was never aprivy to this transaction. Neither was it shown that it had any knowledge at the time of theexecution of the mortgage, of the existence of the suspensive condition in the deed of absolutesale much less of its violation. Nothing appeared to excite suspicion. The Special Power ofAttorney was regular on its face; the OCT was in the name of the mortgagor and the NGA wasthe highest bidder in the public auction. Unquestionably, therefore, the NGA is an innocentpurchaser for value, first as an innocent mortgagee under Section 32 of P.D. 1529 and later asinnocent purchaser for value in the public auction sale. Private respondents claim that NGA did not even field any representative to the land which wasnot even in the possession of the supposed mortgagors, nor present any witness to prove itsallegations in the ANSWER nor submit its DEED OF MORTGAGE to show its being amortgages in good faith and for value.As to private respondents' alternative prayer that the declared owner be ordered to reconvey ortransfer the ownership of the property in their favor, it is clear that there is absolutely no reason

why petitioner, an innocent purchaser for value, should reconvey the land to the privaterespondents. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SETASIDE, and the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City, nowRegional Trial Court, is REINSTATED.

# 37 Salao vs. SalaoGr no. L-26699March 16, 1976

Agnir

Facts:

Spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio begot four children named Patricio,Alejandra, Juan and Ambrosia. Manuel Salao died in 1885 while patricio the eldest son died in1886 survived by his only child Valentin Salao.

Upon Valentina’s death, her estate was administered by Ambrosia who prior to the death ofValentina secured a torrens title in 1911 together with her brother Juan Salao Sr in the registry ofdeeds in Pampanga in their names.

The property in question is the 47-hectare fishpond where Juan Salao jr inherited from hisfather Juan Salao Sr ½ of the fishpond and the other half from donation coming from his auntAmbrosia Salao. It was alleged in the case that Juan Salao Sr and Ambrosia engaged in thefishpond business and that Valentin Salao and Alejandra Salao were included in the joint venturehowever there was no documentary evidence to support such theory.

The Lawyer of Benita Salao and children of Victorina Salao in a letter dated January 26,1951 informed Juan Salao jr that his clients had a 1/3 share in the two fishponds he tookpossession of in 1945. However there was no mention of the share of Valentin and Alejandra onthe deed.

Juan Salao jr in his answer stated that Valentin Salao did not have any interest in thefishponds and that the sole owners thereof was his father Juan and his aunt Ambrosia as shown inthe Torrens title issued in 1911 and 1917 and that Juan was the donee of Ambrosia’s half share.

Benita Salao and her nephews and nieces asked for the annulment of the donation to JuanSalao jr and for the reconveyance to them of the Calanuran fishpond as Valentin Salao’ssupposed 1/3 share in the fishpond registered in the names of Juan Salao Sr and Ambrosia Salao.

Issues:

- WON the Calanuran fishpond was held in trust for Valentin Salao by Juan Salao sr andAmbrosia Salao

- WON plaintiff’s action for reconveyance had already prescribed.

Held:

There was no resulting trust in this case because there never was any intention on the partof Juan Salao sr, Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao to create any trust. No constructive trustbecause the registration of the fishponds in the names of juan and ambrosia was not vitiated byfraud of mistake. A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of ownership of the landreferred to therein. A strong presumption exists that Torrens titles were regularly issued and thatthey are valid. In order to maintain an action for reconveyance, proof as to the fiduciary relationof the parties must be clear and convincing. The plaintiffs utterly failed to prove by clear,satisfactory and convincing evidence. It cannot rest on vague and uncertain evidence or on loose,equivocal or indefinite declarations. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title toland so that the owner be secured without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court orsitting in mirador de su casa to avoid possibility of losing his land

Reconveyance had already prescribed and the plaintiff’s action is clearly barred byprescription or laches. Under Act no 190, the statute of limitations would apply if there was animplied trust in this case, the longest period of extinctive prescription was only ten years. In thiscase the fishpond was registered in 1911 while the written extrajudicial demand forreconveyance was made in 1951. Their action was filed in 1952 or after the lapse of more than40 years from date of registration. The plaintiffs and their predecessor in interest Valentin Salaoslept on their riughts if they had any rights at all.

#38 MABANSAG#39 ANDRES

#40 Pajarillo vs. IACTaccad, Atheena S.

Facts:Perfecta Balane de Cordero died in 1945 leaving inter alia a tract of land consisting of about 28hectares and covered by TCT No. 4671 in the Registry of Deeds of Quezon Province. On May20, 1946, Juana and Felipe( brother and sister of Perfecta) executed a public instrument entitled"Extra-judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Perfecta Balane de Cordero" whichdisposed the property by donating the same to Salud Saluterio, the niece of Perfecta, daughter ofJuana, upon the ante mortem wish of wish of the deceased.

The instrument was however never registered, although Salud immediately took possession ofthe land. Salud did not register the land in her name upon the wish of her mother Juana, so thatshe may enjoy the fruits of the land until her death. However, Claudio the brother of Salud whowas living with their mother on the tract of land registered the same to his name by virtue of asale, thereupon after Claudio died.

Salud with her husband filed a complaint for the reconveyance of the property on the ground thatthe deed of sale in favor of Claudio was fictitious and its registration in his name was null andvoid

Issue: Whether or not Claudio's registration should be upheld?

Held: No. The donation became effective upon acceptance by Salud except that, in obedience toher mother's request, she chose not to register the land in the meantime and to allow her motherto enjoy its fruits. What was deferred was not its effectivity but only its enjoyment by Salud.Registration was not necessary to make the donation a binding commitment insofar as the donorsand the donee were concerned.

It is clear that Juana Balane de Suterio had no right to sell the subject land to Claudio becauseshe was no longer its owner, having previously donated it to her daughter Salud. Juana herselfwas holding the land merely as a trustee of Salud, who had transferred possession to her motherat the old woman's request. The deed of sale was itself vitiated by bad faith as Claudio ispresumed to have known of the previous donation to his sister Salud, whose acceptance of thedonation was formally witnessed by hiw own wife, the herein principal petitioner. WhenClaudio registered the land in his name knowing there was a flaw in his title, an implied trustwas created in favor of Salud as the real owner of the property in accordance with Article 1456of the Civil Code, reading as follows:

If the property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the propertycomes.

As trustor, Salud had every right to sue for the recovery of the land in the action forreconveyance against Claudio's heirs.

Public policy demands that a person guilty of fraud or at least, of breach of trust, should not beallowed to use a Torrens title as a shield against the consequences of his own wrongdoing.

An action for reconveyance of realty, based upon a constructive or implied trust resulting fromfraud, may be barred by prescription. The prescriptive period is reckoned from the issuance ofthe title which operates as a constructive notice.

While actions to enforce a constructive trust prescribe in 10 years from registration of theproperty, private respondents' right commenced from actual discovery of petitioner's act ofdefraudation.

The record shows that while the land was registered in the name of Claudio Suterio, Sr. in 1958,the complaint for reconveyance was filed by the petitioners in 1965, or still within the ten-yearprescriptive period.

#42 Torres vs. Court of AppealsBertumen, Yzabel Eden M.

FACTS:The parcel of land located at the comer of Quezon Boulevard and Raon Street (now GonzaloStreet), and the building erected thereon known as "M. Torres Building" is owned by MarianoTorres, the herein petitioner, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 53628-Manilaissued in his name. As far as the records show, Torres was and still is in possession of therealties, holding safely to his owner's duplicate certificate of title, and, at least until 1971, payingthe real estate taxes due thereon, and collecting rentals from his tenants occupying the building.Sometime in 1966, Francisco Fernandez, Torres' brother-in-law, filed a petition with the Court ofFirst Instance of Manila, docketed as LRC GLRO Cad. Rec. No. 133, where he, misrepresentingto be the attorney-in-fact of Torres and falsely alleging that the duplicate copy of TCT No. 53628was lost, succeeded in obtaining a court order for the issuance of another copy of the certificate.Once in possession thereof, Fernandez forged a simulated deed of sale of the realties in his favor.Whereupon TCT No. 53628 in the name of Torres was canceled and TCT No. 86018 was issuedin Fernandez' name.On various dates from December, 1966 to November, 1967 Fernandez mortgaged the realties toRosario Mota, wife of Ernesto Cue, and also to Angela Fermin, who later assigned her credit tothe spouses Cue. The mortgages were annotated at the back of TCT No. 86018 and so was thedeed of assignment.Torres, who up to this time still had possession of his owner's duplicate certificate of title andwho was still collecting rentals from the occupants of the subject building, upon Teaming of thefraud committed by Fernandez, caused, on March 18, 1968, the annotation on the latter's TCT anotice of adverse claim.On March 30, 1968, Torres filed Civil Case No. 72494 against Fernandez to annul TCT No.86018 as well as the proceedings in LRC GLRO Cad. Rec. No. 133. On April 2, 1968, a noticeof lis pendens was annotated at the back of Fernandez' TCT.ISSUE:Whether or not Mariano Torres is the rightful owner of the land in dispute.HELD:There is nothing on the records which show that Torres performed any act or omission whichcould have jeopardized his peaceful dominion over his realties. The decision under review,however, in considering Mota an innocent mortgagee protected under Section 55 of the LandRegistration Law, held that Torres was bound by the mortgage. Inevitably, it pronounced that theforeclosure sale, where Mota was the highest bidder, also bound Torres and concluded that thecertificate of title issued in the name of Mota prevails over that of Torres'. As correctly pointedout by Torres, however, his properties were sold on execution, and not on foreclosure sale, andhence, the purchaser thereof was bound by his notice of adverse claim and lis pendens annotatedat the back of Fernandez' TCT. Moreover, even if we grant Mota the status of an innocentmortgagee, the doctrine relied upon by the appellate court that a forged instrument may becomethe root of a valid title, cannot be applied where the owner still holds a valid and existingcertificate of title covering the same interest in a realty. The doctrine would apply rather when, asin the cases for example of De la Cruz v. Fable, Fule v. De Legare, and Republic v. Umali, theforger thru insidious means obtains the owner's duplicate certificate of title, converts it in hisname, and subsequently sells or otherwise encumbers it to an innocent holder for value, for insuch a case the new certificate is binding upon the owner (Sec. 55, Act 496; Sec. 53, P.D. No.1529). But if the owner holds a valid and existing certificate of title, his would be indefeasible as

against the whole world, and not that of the innocent holder's. "Prior tempore potior jure" as wehave said in Register of Deeds v. Philippine National Bank, citing Bank, No. L Legarda v.Saleeby, Roman Catholic Bishop v. Philippine Railway, Reyes v. Borbon, in C.N. Hodges v. DyBuncio & Co., Inc., We laid down the doctrine that:The claim of indefeasibility of the petitioner's title under the Torrens land title system would becorrect if previous valid title to the same parcel of land did not exist. The respondent had a validtitle ... It never parted with it; it never handed or delivered to anyone its owner's duplicate of thetransfer certificate of title, it could not be charged with negligence in the keeping of its duplicatecertificate of title or with any act which could have brought about the issuance of anothercertificate upon which a purchaser in good faith and for value could rely. If the petitioner'scontention as to indefeasibility of his title should be upheld, then registered owners without theleast fault on their part could be divested of their title and deprived of their property. Suchdisastrous results which would shake and destroy the stability of land titles had not been foreseenby those who had endowed with indefeasibility land titles issued under the Torrens system.Veronica Bareza perpetrated the fraud by making false representations in her petition and the titleissued to her being the product of fraud could not vest in her valid and legal title to the parcel ofland in litigation. As she had no title to the parcel of land, in the same way that a thief does notown or have title to the stolen goods, she could not transmit title which she did not have norpossess.We have applied this doctrine in the case of the Register of Deeds v. P.N.B., supra, where Wenoted that said ruling is "a mere affirmation of the recognized principle that a certificate is notconclusive evidence of title if it is shown that the same land had already been registered and anearlier certificate for the same land is in existence." Again in the case of Baltazar v. Court ofAppeals, We held that as between two persons both of whom are in good faith and both innocentof any negligence, the law must protect and prefer the lawful holder of registered title over thetransfer of a vendor bereft of any transmissible rights.In view of the foregoing, to hold, for the purpose of enforcing the mortgage, that Mota was aninnocent mortgagee would be futile because, as above shown, no certificate of title covering thesubject realties in derogation of Torres' certificate of title may validly be issued.

#43 ESPINO

#45 ABAD VS GUIMBATORRECAMPO, XANTHE YVETTE

FACTS:

Respondent-spouses Ceasar and Vivian Guimba are the registered owners of a parcel ofland. On March 7, 1997 Vivian entrusted her copy of Owner’s Duplicate Certificate of Title toGemma de la Cruz to serve as collateral for Vivian’s application for a loan that was to bereleased in four days. Afterwards, Gemma received a phone call from Vivian informing her thatshe had changed her mind, was no longer interested in obtaining the loan, and therefore wantedher TCT back. Vivian was informed that her TCT had been deposited in the vault of the Bank ofSouth East Asia. Vivian inquired at the bank but was advised that the TCT was not there.

Sometime in November 1997, Vivian received a telegram from the petitioner Abad, astranger, reminding her of the impending maturity of her mortgage. Thus, the respondents filed

an adverse claim on their own title. They filed with RTC of Pasig a complaint against petitionerand Gemma de la Cruz for annulment and cancellation of mortgage. They likewise filed with theMetropolitan Trial Court of Pasig a criminal case against de la Cruz for falsification of publicdocument.

The petitioner countered that the respondents connived with De la Cruz to swindle him ofhis hard-earned savings. He testified that he met a couple posing as Guimba spouses allegedlyasked him for a loan and presented their duplicate TCT as collateral. He claimed that he acceptedthe mortgage only after verifying the authenticity of the Certificate with the Register of Deeds.

RTC ruled in favor of the respondent spouses.

ISSUE:1 Whether or not the petitioner was an innocent third person and holder for value?2 Whether or not respondents were guilty of laches considering their inaction for more

than 9 months prior to the execution and recording of an Affidavit of Adverse Claimover their title?

RULING:1 NO. A person who deals with registered land through someone who is not the registered

owner is expected to look behind the certificate of title and examine all factualcircumstances, in order to determine if the mortgagor/vendee has the capacity to transferany interest in the land. The law requires a higher degree of prudence from one who buysfrom a person not the registered owner, although the land object of transaction isregistered. While one who buys from the registered owner does not need to look behindthe certificate of title, one who buys from one who is not the registered owner is expectedto examine not only the certificate of title but all factual circumstances. Thus, thepetitioner was not a mortgagee in good faith, not because he neglected to ascertain theauthenticity of the title, but because he did not check if the person he was dealing withhad any authority to mortgage the property.

2 NO. The law does not compel the respondents to file an adverse claim. The fact that theirnames appear on the title as absolute owners should notify third persons, such aspetitioner, that they have a clear legal interest in the property. Laches is a doctrine inequity and may not be invoked to resist the enforcement of a legal right. Thus, theassertion of laches to thwart the claim of respondents is foreclosed by the finding thatpetitioner, as a mortgagee in bad faith, is not entitled to the protection of registrationlaws.

#46 PAGENTE#47 LIMJUCO

#48 Register of Deeds vs. PNBANWAR, AL-RAFFY N.

Register of Deeds v. PNB

Facts:The Register of Deeds filed a petition, he prayed that original certificates of title Nos. V-

21, V-20, V-18, V-19 corresponding to lots Nos. 3358, 3359, 3360, 3361 respectively, in thename of Sinarimbo Binasing, be ordered cancelled on the ground that they had been issuederroneously, that Datu Binasing had secured titles upon false representation in an affidavitwherein he alleged that he had never to his knowledge, secured titles for said lands.

The Philippine National Bank opposed the petition because it was the mortgagee of saidlots which were later extrajudicially foreclosed, with the Philippine National Bank itself as thehighest bidder at the foreclosure sale. Datu Binasing was the owner of the said four lots inaccordance with the decrees in cases GLRO no. 552410, 552411, 552412 and 552413 pursuant towhich the four original certificates of titles Nos. 1606, 1607, 1608 and 1609 were issued on July24, 1935 in his name. On July 23, 1938, he sold said lots to Soledad C. De Teruel. The deed ofsale was registered in the office of the Register of Deeds and the corresponding TCT 1253,1254, 1255, 1256 were accordingly issued in her name. The office of the said Register of Deedswas burned during the Pacific War and the records among them, the original certificate of title inthe name of Datu Binasing covering said four lots were destroyed. Datu obtained from PNB, aloan of 10,000 and he gave as security the said lots (covered by said titles) and some otherproperties. On March 20, 1954, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed with the PNB as thehighest bidder at the foreclosure sale.

Issue:Whether or not Soledad C. De Teruel has the preferred rights over the PNB.

Ruling:Yes. The lower court directed the Register of Deeds to cancel original certificate of title

Nos. V-18, to V-21 issued in the name of said Datu in 1947 and declared valid and subsisting thetransfer certificate of title issued in the name of Soledad C. de Teruel. PNB appealed contendingthat being an innocent mortgage for value, it is entitled to protection under Sec.55 Act 496 asamended; that in the case of Blondeau v. Nano and Vallejo, a mortgagee (relying upon a Torrenstitle in good faith and unaware that fraud had been committed by forgery) was protected. Thatinnocent purchaser for value may take good title notwithstanding defects of the mortgagor titledeeds. It must be observed that the titles of the Datu (actually mortgaged to the Bank) wereissued in August 1947 as original certificates whereas in 1938 about ten years before, Soledad C.de Teruel had already acquired a titles issued to Datu Benasing could not prevail against thosepreviously issued to Teruel (Prior in tempore, potior in jure). Bank claims to protection does notdeserve too much attention because its credit against Binasing might still be enforced; itappearing that other property of Datu were also given as security. The petition seeks as relief ofcancellation of original title V18-V21 erroneously issued in the name of Binasing in 1947.Purpose was to protect the Register of Deeds of Cotabato, as administrative official relative tohis liability under the assurance fund provision Soledad C. de Teruel transfer of certificate of titleas may be gleaned from allegation in the petition are not questioned. She does not have toparticipate therefore in the proceedings.

CAMPOMANES, ALYSTER P 2011-0444

Case # 49GARCIA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

This case is about the issuance of two or more transfer certificates of title to different persons forthe same lot, or subdivisions thereof, due to the fact that the original title was allegedly notcancelled when the first transfer certificates of title were issued to replace the original title.A deed of sale for lots E and G of Hacienda Maysilo and covered by OCT No. 983 was executedin favor of Ismael Lapus, a bona fide occupant thereof. The deed of sale was presented forregistration and contained entries showing that it was annotated on the back of the OCT.Contrary to SOP however, the deed of sale was not annotated on the OCT and that consequently,that title was apparently not cancelled.As a result of the registration of the deed of sale, TCT No. 4910 (“Lapus Title”) was issued toLapus. Upon his death, the two lots were inherited by his daughter Carolina Lapuz-Gozon, whohad the land subdivided into 55 lots and sold some to her now co-respondents. Lapus andsuccessors-in-interest have been in possession of the lands even before 1910 of more than 70years.In 1962, the Riveras, alleged heirs of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal filed a motion inland registration cases, alleging that they were deprived of their participation in the HaciendaMaysilo. Since per the OCT the land seemed unencumbered, the court adjudicated the land intheir favor. The OCT was then cancelled and TCT No. 112235 (“Rivera Title”) was issued to theRiveras. Lots 5 and 7 (E and G) were then assigned to Bartolome Rivera to Sergio Cruz andPacifico Garcia, and subsequent TCTs were issued in their behalf.Garcia had Lot 7 (G) subdivided into lots A and B, retained lot A and assigned B to AntonioMunoz. Munoz mortgaged lot B to Associated Banking Corp.On the other hand, Cruz sold Lot 5 (E) to Santiago Go. Go mortgaged Lot 5 to PhilippineNational Bank. Both Munoz and Go did not pay their mortgage debts, hence the two banksforeclosed the properties. PNB bought the mortgaged Lot 5 at the auction, but notice of lispendens was already annotated on the title.Riveras and their successors-in-interest have never set foot on the disputed lots.Gozon finally learned about the Riveras and others acquiring the land, had her adverse claimsregistered on the titles of lots 5 and 7 and filed an action to quiet title and damages.The trial court ruled in favor of Gozon and co-plaintiffs and voided the TCTs issued to theRiveras, others. CA affirmed the decision. Garcia and PNB appealed.Issue:W/N the 1920 Lapus title prevails over the 1963 Rivera title and subsequent titles derived fromit?Held:Yes, Lapus title prevails. Lapus was an innocent purchaser for value who validly transmitted tohis successors-in-interest his indefeasible title or ownership over the disputed lots. That titlecould not be nullified or defeated by the issuance 43 years later to other persons of another titleover the same lots due to the failure of the register of deeds to cancel the title preceding the titleissued to Lapus. This must be so considering that Lapus and his successors-in-interest remainedin possession of the disputed lots and the rival claimants never possessed the same.

The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the sameland, the earlier in date prevails. It is settled that in this jurisdiction the maxim prior est intempore, potior est in jure (he who is first in time is preferred in right) is followed in landresgistration matters.

The contention of PNB that it was a buyer in good faith has no merit because the deed of sale infavor of Lapus and the titles issued to him and his successors-in-interest are all a matter of publicrecord in the registry of deeds. When a conveyance has been properly recorded, such record is aconstructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. Underthe rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of recordaffecting the title. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence and good faithotherwise the very purpose of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. The bank shouldhave made an on-the-spot investigation of the lot mortgaged.Decision affirmed.