Lecture at NTNU James A. Robinson - Home | scholar …scholar-harris.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/jamesrobinson/... · Lecture at NTNU James A. Robinson Harvard Trondheim, September

Constitutions and Economic DevelopmentLecture at NTNU

James A. Robinson

Harvard

Trondheim, September 22, 2014

Robinson (Harvard) Constitutions and Economic DevelopmentTrondheim, September 22, 2014 1 /

39

Introduction

Institutions and Constitutions: Some Questions

A great deal of evidence suggests that institutions are critical forgenerating economic growth.

In particular in my book (with Daron Acemoglu) Why Nations Fail Iargue that economic growth is generated by inclusive economicinstitutions which create broad based incentives and opportunities.These must be underpinned by inclusive political institutions.

But what is the role of written documents like the constitution increating inclusive institutions?

Does having a constitution matter irrespective of its form or are someconstitutions better than other for generating prosperity?

What role did the 1814 Norwegian constitution play in creating theimmensely prosperous, democratic and egalitarian society we seetoday in Norway?


39

Some Puzzles

Philadelphia versus Cadiz

What explains the institutional divergence between North and SouthAmerica and to what extent is it due to the US Constitution writtenin 1787 in Philadelphia?

Buenos Aires versus Jamestown.

Declarations of Independence: Cadiz and Philadelphia.

US Constitution was an outcome of a very different path ofinstitutional development which started long before Philadelphia.

But could it have played an important role in sustaining thatinstitutional path? Possibly, but many Latin American countries (lessconservative than Mexico) wrote constitutions that were quite similarto that of the US but this did not have a transformative effect onthose countries in the 19th century.

They did better economically when they started to diverge from theUS model.


39

Some Puzzles

American Constitutional Divergence


39

Some Puzzles

The Strange Nature of the US Constitution

The US Constitution included the clause:

“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned amongthe several States which may be included within this Union,according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determinedby adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including thosebound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians nottaxed, three fifths of all other Persons”

Implying that a slave counted as 3/5 of a free person when it came toapportioning representation in Congress for example.Presidential Term Limits were established as a social norm by GeorgeWashington in 1797 who stood down after 8 years in power. Lastedfor 150 years until violated by Franklin Roosevelt.Judicial Review: Marbury versus Madison.So the written constitution had extractive elements and it existed in acontext of many social norms and informal institutions.Robinson (Harvard) Constitutions and Economic Development

Trondheim, September 22, 2014 5 /39

Some Puzzles

Consequences of the Glorious Revolution

A famous institutional argument is that the industrial revolutionemerged in 18th century Britain because of changes in economicinstitutions which could be traced to the political revolutions of the17th century, particularly the Glorious Revolution of 1688.

But 1688 did not create a constitution, it created the very vaguelyworded Bill of Rights’ which included such clauses as

And that for redress of all grievances, and for the amending,strengthening and preserving of the laws, Parliaments ought tobe held frequently.

‘Frequently’ was not defined even though the failure of the Stuartmonarchs to call Parliament was a major source of grievances but as amatter of fact Parliament has met every year since then.

The Glorious Revolution obviously represented a large change in thebalance of power in society but it was institutionalized informally.


39

Some Puzzles

Number of Days per Year Parliament met after 1660


39

Rights or Voodoo?

Voodoo Constitutionalism

In 1957 Francois Duvalier (‘Papa Doc’) became president of Haiti.

Duvalier, a practicing Houngan, or Voodoo priest, produced aconstitution to solidify his power.

In 1961 he proceeded to violate the provisions of that constitution.

He replaced the bicameral legislature with a unicameral body anddecreed presidential and legislative elections. Despite a constitutionalprohibition against presidential reelection, Duvalier ran for office andwon by 1,320,748 votes to zero.

Not content with this sham display of democracy, he went on in 1964to declare himself president for life.

Papa Doc was above the constitution.


39

Derivative, Unnecessary or Irrelevant?

Preliminary Conclusions

These observations suggest that constitutions may be eitherderivative (the US was already on a distinct institutional trajectory),unnecessary (vanquishers of King James II didn’t bother writing aconstitution) or irrelevant (in Haiti).

But anomalous cases? - they all have large elements of continuity.

Compare with the French Revolutionary Constitution of 1791. Thedeclarations of equality before the law and the abolition of feudalismwere not simply re-asserting some pre-existing equilibrium. They weretrying to coordinate a radical shift in the equilibrium.

Still, how easy is it to change an equilibrium by writing aconstitution? As President Dwight D. Eisenhower once put it to ChiefJustice Warren

“Law and force cannot change a man’s heart”

Is it true that most constitutions have this aim?


39


Do Constitutions Attempt to Rupture the Equilibrium?


39


Can Constitutions change a Man’s Heart?


39

Or Self-Serving

Self-Serving Constitutions

Though constitutions are not always different sometimes they are, andthough they often cannot change men’s hearts, sometimes they do.

This suggests a fourth perspective (in addition to derivative,unnecessary and irrelevant) which is self-serving: some group whichmanages to attain power writes a constitution to help achieve its viewof society.

This force may be particularly potent when such power is transitory -like that of the Chilean military in the 1970s - so that writing yourpreferred constitution may be an effective way of shaping the futureand locking in your ideal point.

No reason that such a constitutional process will create institutionsthat favor economic growth.

From the perspective of Why Nations Fail this might happen if thebalance of power in society at the time the constitution was writtenwas broad. In this case an inclusive constitution might result.


39

Characteristics of Constitutions


“Constitutions should be short and obscure” - NapoleonBonaparte

(and Thomas Jefferson thought they should only last 19 years).

Let’s have a look at some basic facts about constitutions, includingthe Norwegian one, and see what the data suggests.

Some constitutions were written in a much more inclusive way thanothers, some are much longer than others and have much greaterscope and detail. Some constitutions last much longer than others.

Are any of these things inter-related? Are they connected toeconomic development and if so how?


39


GDP per-capita and Date of first Constitution

albania algeriaangola

argentinaarmenia

australiaaustria

azerbaijan

bahrain

bangladesh

barbados

belarus

belgium

bolivia bosnia and herzegovinabrazil

bulgaria

burkina fasocambodiacameroon

canada

chilechinacolombia

costa rica

cote d'ivoire

croatiacyprus

czech republic

democratic republic of the congo

denmark

dominican republicecuador

egypt

estonia

ethiopia

finlandfrance

georgia

germany

ghana

greece

guatemala

hungary

iceland

indiaindonesiairan

iraq

irelandisraelitaly

jamaica

japan

jordan

kazakhstan

kenya

kuwait

kyrgyz republic

latvialithuania

luxembourg

macedonia

madagascarmalawi

malaysia

mali

malta

mexico

moldovamontenegro

moroccomozambique

netherlands

new zealand

nigernigeria

oman

pakistanperu

philippines

poland portugal

qatar

romaniarussia

saudi arabia

senegal

singapore

slovak republicslovenia

south africa

south koreaspain

sri lankasudan

swedenswitzerland

syria

taiwan

tajikistantanzania

thailand

trinidad and tobago

tunisiaturkey turkmenistan

ugandaukraine

united arab emirates

united kingdom

united states

uruguay

uzbekistan

venezuelavietnamyemen arab republiczambiazimbabwe

norway

050

000

1000

0015

0000

2013

per

cap

ita G

DP

1800 1850 1900 1950 2000Year of first constitution


39


GDP per-capita and number of new Constitutions

albaniaalgeriaangola

argentinaarmenia

australiaaustria

azerbaijan

bahrain

bangladesh

barbados

belarus

belgium

boliviabosnia and herzegovinabrazilbulgaria


canada

chilechinacolombia

costa rica

cote d'ivoire

croatiacyprusczech republic


denmark


egypt

estonia

ethiopia

finland france

georgia

germany

ghana

greece

guatemala

hungary

iceland

india indonesiairan

iraq

irelandisrael italy

jamaica

japan

jordan

kazakhstan

kenya

kuwait

kyrgyz republic

latvialithuania

luxembourg

macedonia

madagascarmalawi

malaysia

mali

malta

mexico

moldovamontenegro

moroccomozambique

netherlands

new zealand

nigernigeria

oman

pakistanperu

philippines

polandportugal

qatar

romaniarussia

saudi arabia

senegal

singapore


south africa

south koreaspain

sri lankasudan

swedenswitzerland

syria

taiwan

tajikistantanzania

thailand

trinidad and tobago

tunisiaturkeyturkmenistan

ugandaukraine


united kingdom

united states

uruguay

uzbekistan


norway

050

000

1000

0015

0000

2013

per

cap

ita G

DP

0 10 20 30Number of New Constitutions


39


GDP per-capita and number of Amendments


argentinaarmenia

australia austria

azerbaijan

bahrain

bangladesh

barbados

belarus

belgium

boliviabosnia and herzegovinabrazil

bulgaria


canada

chilechina colombia

costa rica

cote d'ivoire

croatiacyprusczech republic


denmark


egypt

estonia

ethiopia

finlandfrance

georgia

germany

ghana

greece

guatemala

hungary

iceland

indiaindonesiairan

iraq

irelandisraelitaly

jamaica

japan

jordan

kazakhstan

kenya

kuwait

kyrgyz republic

latvialithuania

luxembourg

macedonia

madagascar malawi

malaysia

mali

malta

mexico

moldovamontenegro

moroccomozambique

netherlands

new zealand

nigernigeria

oman

pakistanperu

philippines

polandportugal

qatar

romaniarussia

saudi arabia

senegal

singapore


south africa

south koreaspain

sri lankasudan

swedenswitzerland

syria

taiwan

tajikistan tanzania

thailand

trinidad and tobago

tunisiaturkeyturkmenistan

ugandaukraine


united kingdom

united states

uruguay

uzbekistan


norway

050

000

1000

0015

0000

2013

per

cap

ita G

DP

0 20 40 60 80 100Number of Amendments


39


GDP per-capita and the Scope of the Constitution

albaniaalgeria angola

argentinaarmenia

australia austria

azerbaijan

bahrain

bangladesh

barbados

belarus

belgium


bulgaria

burkina faso cambodiacameroon

canada

chilechina colombia

costa rica

cote d'ivoire

croatiacyprus

czech republic


denmark


estonia

ethiopia

finlandfrance

georgia

germany

ghana

greece

guatemala

hungary

iceland

indiaindonesiairan

iraq

irelandisrael italy

jamaica

japan

jordan

kazakhstan

kenyakyrgyz republic

latvia lithuania

luxembourg

macedonia

madagascarmalawi

malaysia

mali

malta

mexico

moldovamontenegromorocco

mozambique

netherlands

new zealand

nigernigeria

oman

pakistanperu

philippines

poland portugal

qatar

romaniarussiasaint lucia

saudi arabia

senegal

singapore


south africa

south koreaspain

sri lankasudan

swedenswitzerland

syria

taiwan

tajikistantanzania

thailand

trinidad and tobago

turkeyturkmenistan

ugandaukraine


united kingdom

united states

uruguay

uzbekistan


norway

050

000

1000

0015

0000

2013

per

cap

ita G

DP

.2 .4 .6 .8Percentage of 92 Themes in Const.


39


GDP per-capita and length of the Constitution


argentinaarmenia

australia austria

azerbaijan

bahrain

bangladesh

barbados

belarus

belgium



canada

chilechina colombia

costa rica

cote d'ivoire

croatiacyprus

czech republic


denmark


estonia

ethiopia

finlandfrance

georgia

germany

ghana

greece

guatemala

hungary

iceland

indiaindonesiairan

iraq

irelandisraelitaly

jamaica

japan

jordan

kazakhstan


latvialithuania

luxembourg

macedonia

madagascarmalawi

malaysia

mali

malta

mexico

moldovamontenegro

moroccomozambique

netherlands

new zealand

niger nigeria

oman

pakistanperu

philippines

poland portugal

qatar

romaniarussia saint lucia

saudi arabia

senegal

singapore


south africa

south koreaspain

sri lankasudan

swedenswitzerland

syria

taiwan

tajikistan tanzania

thailand

trinidad and tobago

turkeyturkmenistan

ugandaukraine


united kingdom

united states

uruguay

uzbekistan


norway

050

000

1000

0015

0000

2013

per

cap

ita G

DP

0 50000 100000 150000Length in Words


39


GDP per-capita and Executive Powers

albania algeriaangola

argentinaarmenia

australia austria

azerbaijan

bahrain

bangladesh

barbados

belarus

belgium


burkina fasocambodia cameroon

canada

chilechina colombia

costa rica

cote d'ivoire

croatiacyprus

czech republic


denmark


estonia

ethiopia

finland france

georgia

germany

ghana

greece

guatemala

hungary

iceland

indiaindonesiairan

iraq

irelandisrael italy

jamaica

japan

jordan

kazakhstan

kenya kyrgyz republic

latvia lithuania

luxembourg

macedonia

madagascarmalawi

malaysia

mali

malta

mexico

moldovamontenegro

moroccomozambique

netherlands

new zealand

nigernigeria

oman

pakistanperu

philippines

polandportugal

qatar


saudi arabia

senegal

singapore


south africa

south koreaspain

sri lankasudan

swedenswitzerland

syria

taiwan

tajikistantanzania

thailand

trinidad and tobago

turkeyturkmenistan

ugandaukraine


united kingdom

united states

uruguay

uzbekistan

venezuelavietnam yemen arab republiczambiazimbabwe

norway

050

000

1000

0015

0000

2013

per

cap

ita G

DP

0 2 4 6 8Powers granted to the executive


39


GDP per-capita and Legislative Powers


argentinaarmenia

australia austria

azerbaijan

bahrain

bangladesh

barbados

belarus

belgium


bulgaria

burkina faso cambodiacameroon

canada

chilechinacolombia

costa rica

cote d'ivoire

croatiacyprus

czech republic


denmark


estonia

ethiopia

finlandfrance

georgia

germany

ghana

greece

guatemala

hungary

iceland

india indonesiairan

iraq

irelandisrael italy

jamaica

japan

jordan

kazakhstan


latvialithuania

luxembourg

macedonia

madagascar malawi

malaysia

mali

malta

mexico

moldovamontenegro

moroccomozambique

netherlands

new zealand

nigernigeria

oman

pakistanperuphilippines

polandportugal

qatar


saudi arabia

senegal

singapore


south africa

south koreaspain

sri lankasudan

swedenswitzerland

syria

taiwan

tajikistan tanzania

thailand

trinidad and tobago

turkeyturkmenistan

ugandaukraine


united kingdom

united states

uruguay

uzbekistan


norway

050

000

1000

0015

0000

2013

per

cap

ita G

DP

0 .2 .4 .6Powers granted to the legislative


39


GDP per-capita and number of provisions for JudicialIndependence


argentinaarmenia

australiaaustria

azerbaijan

bahrain

bangladesh

barbados

belarus

belgium


bulgaria


canada

chilechina colombia

costa rica

cote d'ivoire

croatiacyprus

czech republic


denmark


estonia

ethiopia

finland france

georgia

germany

ghana

greece

guatemala

hungary

iceland

indiaindonesiairan

iraq

irelandisraelitaly

jamaica

japan

jordan

kazakhstan


latvia lithuania

luxembourg

macedonia

madagascar malawi

malaysia

mali

malta

mexico

moldovamontenegro

moroccomozambique

netherlands

new zealand

niger nigeria

oman

pakistanperu

philippines

polandportugal

qatar


saudi arabia

senegal

singapore


south africa

south koreaspain

sri lankasudan

swedenswitzerland

syria

taiwan

tajikistantanzania

thailand

trinidad and tobago

turkeyturkmenistan

ugandaukraine


united kingdom

united states

uruguay

uzbekistan

venezuelavietnam yemen arab republic zambiazimbabwe

norway

050

000

1000

0015

0000

2013

per

cap

ita G

DP

0 2 4 6Provisions for Judicial independence


39


GDP per-capita and number of Rights


argentinaarmenia

australiaaustria

azerbaijan

bahrain

bangladesh

barbados

belarus

belgium


bulgaria


canada

chilechina colombia

costa rica

cote d'ivoire

croatiacyprus

czech republic


denmark


estonia

ethiopia

finlandfrance

georgia

germany

ghana

greece

guatemala

hungary

iceland

indiaindonesiairan

iraq

irelandisrael italy

jamaica

japan

jordan

kazakhstan


latvia lithuania

luxembourg

macedonia

madagascar malawi

malaysia

mali

malta

mexico

moldovamontenegro

moroccomozambique

netherlands

new zealand

niger nigeria

oman

pakistanperu

philippines

poland portugal

qatar


saudi arabia

senegal

singapore


south africa

south koreaspain

sri lankasudan

swedenswitzerland

syria

taiwan

tajikistantanzania

thailand

trinidad and tobago

turkeyturkmenistan

ugandaukraine


united kingdom

united states

uruguay

uzbekistan


norway

050

000

1000

0015

0000

2013

per

cap

ita G

DP

0 20 40 60 80Number of human rights in const.


39


GDP per-capita and Inclusivity

albania algeriaargentina

armenia

australia austria

azerbaijan

bahrain

bangladesh

belarus

bolivia bosnia and herzegovinabrazil

bulgaria


chilechinacolombiacosta rica

cote d'ivoiredemocratic republic of the congo


egypt

estonia

ethiopia

france

georgia

germany

ghana

greece

guatemala

hungary

iceland

indiaindonesiairan

iraq

irelanditaly

japan

jordan

kazakhstan

kuwait

kyrgyz republic

latvialithuania

macedonia

madagascarmalawimali

mexico

moldova moroccomozambique

new zealand

nigernigeria

oman

pakistanperu

philippines

poland portugal

qatar

romaniarussia

saudi arabia

senegal


south africa

south koreaspain

sri lankasudan

swedenswitzerland

syria

taiwan

tanzania

thailand

trinidad and tobago

tunisiaturkey turkmenistan

ugandaukraine


united states

uruguay

uzbekistan

venezuelavietnamyemen arab republiczimbabwe

norway

050

000

1000

0015

0000

2013

per

cap

ita G

DP

0 2 4 6 8Inclusiveness of first constitution


39


Some Lessons

Constitutions have obviously changed over time

they have become more inclusively writtenthey have become longerthey have greater scope and more detailthey include lots of rights

Though it is difficult to say anything about causality this trend isplausibly connected to other world trends

expansion of national states in relative size and rolebroader diffusion of democracy

The cross-section does not tell you much about the impacts oneconomic development: Recall my discussion of Latin Americanconstitutional divergence.


39


Changing Content of Constitutions


39

Voodoo or Egalite?

The Curious case of Papa Doc’ s Constitution

What might the connection be between these trends and economicgrowth?

Would poor countries today be better off adopting 19th century styleconstitutions?

Here is one idea:

The sham nature of Papa Doc’s constitution seems indubitable, right?

But have a look at the first page of his constitution:


39

Voodoo or Egalite?

Papa Doc’s Constitution


39

Voodoo or Egalite?

Path Dependent Effect of the American, French andHaitian Revolutions

As I noted, there are obvious examples where constitutions are writtenby ‘the winners’ who want to use them to solidify their power.

But why this language?

Even if mostly ‘honored in the breach’ it seems that any constitutionhas to include language like this to be considered a constitution.Most likely this is a path dependent outcome of the fact that theearly constitutions in the US, France and Haiti had many radicalelements. Even the most cynical dictator can’t avoid this.

Thus writing a constitution is a double-edged sword for a dictator. Itis handy for institutionalizing your power, but to do it you have to payhomage to universal principles you don’t want to honor.

Is this irrelevant? Often, certainly during the reign of Papa Doc, but Ithink not always. Let me give two examples.


39

Two Examples

The Consejos Comunitarios of Afro-Colombians

For most of the last 50 years Colombia has been the murder andkidnapping capital of the world, despite an 1885 constitutionenshrining all sorts of good things.In 1991 Colombia re-wrote it’s 1885 Constitution in the midst of asocial crisis (the murder of 3 presidential candidates in the 1990election).The constitution got much longer and it introduced a lot more rights.It also recognized indigenous and Afro-Colombian peoples as havingdistinct identities for the first time and guaranteed themrepresentation in the senate and congress, respectively.Though marginalized socially, economically and politically,Afro-Colombians (who make up a larger share of the population thanAfro-Americans in the US do) managed to organize and push for Law70 of 1993 which created a process for them to claim collective titleto their ancestral lands. In the department of the Choco they nowown 60% of the land.In Colombia laws are often honored in the breach (‘obedezco pero nocumplo’) but the ‘rule of law’ is not a total farce andAfro-Colombians managed to use the constitution to induce the stateto intervene in their interests.


39

Two Examples

Afro-Colombian Lands in El Choco


39

Two Examples

Demanding the State in Chachapoyas

Another example was documented by the anthropologist DavidNugent is his book Modernity at the Edge of Empire.

Like the Colombian state, this historical state in Peru has writtenconstitutions with inclusive language which has never beenimplemented. But this does not mean it is a complete facade.

Nugent shows how Chachapoyas was the fiefdom of elites in the1920s, Peru had a constitution which enshrined things like the rule oflaw, security of property.

During the 1920s social mobilization in Chachapoyas, mostly startedby a few elites who had got an education in Lima, began to demandthe end of elite rule.

They demanded the expansion of state power as a tool to free thesociety from the rule of the elites who they saw as violators of theirbasic rights as Peruvian citizens.


39

Two Examples

Map of Chachapoyas


39

Two Examples

The Argument

Constitutions are a modern device for shaping the institutionalequilibrium in society.As such they have potentially important effects, but:

To be relevant they have to be consistent with the underlying powerrealities.This means they are most effective when they are least necessary!They are often self-serving and written by the winners to consolidatetheir own power or policy preferences.

Nevertheless, the American, French and Haitian Revolutions whichshaped the languages in which constitutions have to be written havehad path dependent effects.Even if this inclusive language is often out of equilibrium with existingpower relations in a country, it has the ability to gradually movesociety in a more inclusive direction.The slow change in the world political equilibrium towards greaterinclusion, growth and democracy may be parts of the fruits of this.


39

Two Examples

The Norwegian Constitution (‘Grunnlov’) of May 1814


39

Two Examples

And What about Norway?

Norway is one of the great success stories of the modern world interms of prosperity, democracy and equality.

After France it had the first Constitution in Europe, like the US andHaiti, struggling for independence (from Denmark then Sweden).

It was a remarkably ‘liberal document’ in some ways Clause 100 reads

“There shall be liberty of the Press. No person may be punishedfor any writing, whatever its contents, which he has caused to beprinted or published, unless he wilfully and manifestly has eitherhimself shown or incited others to disobedience to the laws,contempt of religion, morality or the constitutional powers, orresistance to their orders, or has made false and defamatoryaccusations against anyone. Everyone shall be free to speak hismind frankly on the administration of the State and on any othersubject whatsoever.”


39

Two Examples

Least Oligarchic Society in the World


39

Two Examples

What Role did it Play?

But the data suggest that if the Norwegian Constitution were really arecipe for success then constitutions ought to be

Short (like Napoleon said - it was written in Norwegian so maybeobscure too..)Amendable (flexible?)Written in a not very inclusive wayNarrow in ScopeWith few RightsNo measures for Judicial IndependenceBalance of power between the executive and legislature


39

Two Examples

A Conjecture

My guess is that Norway is more like the US or Britain than Colombia.

The Great Divergence in GDP per-capita we’ve seen over the past250 years arose because in some parts of the world, especially westernand northern Europe, there was a long drift in institutions towardsmuch greater inclusion (end of feudalism/labor coercion, socialmobility, rise in education).

For instance, Norway didn’t need to enshrine rights in the constitutionbecause the nature of society (balance of power) already guaranteedthat people had these rights (just like why Sweden doesn’t have aminimum wage law today).

In other less favored places, like Colombia, there were advantages tomoving away from these minimalist constitutions even though theeffects have been small (least effective in the places where they aremost needed).


39

Two Examples

A Conclusion

This implies that at best the Norwegian Constitution played a modestrole in reinforcing a preexisting path of inclusive institutions.

Therefore the 1814 Constitution is not the main reason why Norwayis the least oligarchic society in the world.


39

Lecture at NTNU James A. Robinson - Home | scholar …scholar-harris.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/jamesrobinson/... · Lecture at NTNU James A. Robinson Harvard Trondheim, September

Documents