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Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon University Institute for eCommerce, Fall 2000
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Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

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Page 1: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1

20-771: Computer SecurityLecture 3: SSL

Robert Thibadeau

School of Computer Science

Carnegie Mellon University

Institute for eCommerce, Fall 2000

Page 2: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 2

Today’s lecture

• Review

• SSL, SET

• Break (10 min)

• X.509v3

Page 3: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 3

This Week

Chapters 3-4-5 WS

Homework – Discussion GroupsThreads for Windows 2000

Quiz – Chapters 3-4-5

Page 4: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 4

Our Class

Whole Facility / Internet Security – Protocols/Policy/Publicity

Path Security-

Physical security

Proxy/Router Security- Kind of Server

Host Security

Server SecurityClient Security

Server ApplicationsClient Applications

Proxy/Router Applications –

Put in Hardware!

(buy CISCO)

Security Server Applications

WINDOWS 2000

Security Assurance

Applications

Web Server

Security

Web Client

Security

Technology The Law

CryptographyHow To

Integrity/Privacy/Authenticate/

Authorize/Record

Page 5: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 5

Fundamental Elements of Security : IPAAA

• Integrity

• Privacy

• Authentication

• Authorization

• Auditability

Page 6: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 6

Cryptography

• A key is just the parameter that makes a program do something to the plaintext or the cyphertext that is very hard to discover.

• Symmetric Cryptography = Private Key Systems – Great for the Privacy Function, Hiding Secrets

• One Way Hashes = Digest Functions = Integrity Checkers = Password Storage

– Great for Integrity Checking, Hiding Secrets

• Public Key Cryptography = Public/Private Key Pairs = RSA Patent (sept 21)

– Private Reads, Public Writes : Send Secret to Authentic Person– Private Writes, Public Reads = Signing: Authenticate Writer, no

secret– Certificates : Signing, used for Authorization– CA : Authority who guarantees Authentication– Where to hide Private Keys? Key Escrow, Smart Cards, Floppy– PKI – the total system of keys, CA

Page 7: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 7

Internet Cryptographic Protocols

• Cybercash : Electronic Funds Transactions, RFC1898• DNSSEC : Domain Name System, RFC2065• IPSec : Packet-Level Encryption, RFC2401• PCT : TCP/IP-level Encryption• PGP : E-Mail, RFC2015• S/MIME : E-Mail, RFC2311,RFC2634• S-HTTP : Web Browsing, RFC2660• SET : Electronic Funds Transactions• SSL : TCP/IP-level Encryption, Netscape• SSH : Remote Login

– http://search.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-secsh-transport-07.txt

– http://search.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-provos-secsh-dh-group-exchange-00.txt

• TLS : TCP/IP-level Encryption, RFC2246

Page 8: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 8

Secure Socket Layer History

• SSL 1.0 Netscape 1994

• S-HTTP (web only)

• SSL 2.0 Netscape (buggy)

• PCT Microsoft (loser) 1996

• SSL 3.0 Netscape

• TLS 1.0 IETF (now dominant) 1999

Page 9: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 9

SSL

• “TLS, more commonly known as SSL”

• RFC2246 : TLS Protocol Version 1.0 1/99

• RFC2487 : SMTP over TLS

• RFC2712 : Adding Kerberos to TLS

• RFC2716 : PPP TLS

• RFC2817 : Upgrading to TLS within HTTP/1.1

• RFC2818 : HTTP over TLS

• RFC2830 : TLS for Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)

• The Lock or Non-broken Key on Your Browser

• Get the picture? (yes, we like it)

Page 10: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 10

Protocol Stack

Physical Layer

Network Interface – EtherNet/etc.

Internet - IP

Transport - TCP

SSL Interface : Port N

HTTP

FTP

TELNET

NNTP

SMTP

Page 11: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 11

SSL

• Crypto Solves the Problems – You just need to select among good alternatives for each task.

• The “cypher suite”– X.509 Certificates (1991) too.

– First, cypher suite agreement between the TCP peers.

Page 12: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 12

SSL Components

DIFFIE-HILLMAN

Session Encryption with Symmetric Key for Privacy

Message

Message Digest for Checking on Message Integrity

Public Key for Authentication

RSA

TRIPLE-DES/CBCRC4

RC3RC2

MD5 SHA

Establishing Symmetric SessionKey

Page 13: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 13

SSL Cipher SuitesSuite Strength Description

DES-CBC3-MD5 ***** 168bit Session/1024bit RSA

DES-CBC3-SHA ***** 168bit Session/1024bit RSA

RC4-MD5 **** 128bit Session/1024bit RSA

RC4-SHA **** 128bit Session/1024bit RSA

RC2-CBC-MD5 **** 128bit Session/1024bit RSA

DES-CBC-MD5 *** 56bit Session/1024bit RSA

DES-CBC-SHA *** 56bit Session/1024bit RSA

EXP-DES-CBC-SHA ** 40bit Session/512bit RSA

EXP-DES-RC4-MD5 ** 40bit Session/512bit RSA

EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5 ** 40bit Session/512bit RSA

NULL-MD5 * None/RSA authentication

NULL-SHA * None/RSA authentication

CHECK YOUR BROWSER!!!!!!!

Page 14: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 14

SSL Encrypts

• ALL Browser-Server and Server-Browser except which-browser is talking to which-server

• URL of requested document• Contents of requested document• Contents of any submitted form fill-outs• Cookies sent from browser to server• Cookies sent from server to browser• Contents of HTTP header• Javascript communications• Etc. ??NetShow—cause that’s UDP??

Page 15: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 15

What Could Replace SSL?

Physical Layer

Network Interface – EtherNet/etc.

Internet - IP

Transport - TCP

SSL Interface : Port N

HTTP

FTP

TELNET

NNTP

SMTP

IPSec

Page 16: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 16

IPSec Does Not

• Authenticate Participants

• But then, neither does SSL in practice

• Its does authenticate computers … not done by SSL except during session. SSL can’t stop a proxy.

Page 17: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 17

SSL Transaction

1. Client says Hello & Stuff 2. Server says Hello & Stuff

3. Server sends Certificate

4. (opt) Server requests client Certificate

5. Client sends Certificate

6. Client sends ClientKeyExchange

7. Client sends a Certificate Verify message

8. Both send ChangeCipherSpec Messages

9. Both send Finished Messages

Page 18: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 18

Rules of Thumb

• Always get 128 Bit Browsers– This is called “US” as opposed to “International”

Even though it really means the opposite!!!!!!!

• 128 bits is really really good for securing your transaction against spies

• Unfortunately, hides employee behavior.

• Unfortunately, false sense of security:– Most theft of credit cards is by the employees of credit

card processing operations including retailer, clearing, etc.

– Do you really trust Amazon? Read their privacy statement at http://www.amazon.com/privacy-notice

Page 19: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 19

SET

• Authentication : All parties use certificates including customer, merchant, bank, merchant’s bank.

• Confidentiality : Encrypted and Private

• Message Integrity : Can’t be tampered

• Linkage : Verification of encrypted attachments (blind forwarding)

Page 20: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 20

Set Protocol Supports all Features of Credit Card System

• Cardholder registration

• Merchant registration

• Purchase requests

• Payment authorizations

• Payment capture (funds transfer)

• Chargebacks (refunds to customers)

• Credits

• Credit reversals

• Debit Card (check card) transactions

• Real-time, batch, installment payments, etc.

Page 21: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 21

Problems with SET

• Risk Management leads Banks to use Intermediaries

• Intermediaries have access to the credit card purchasing information

• This is where most theft occurs.

• To be adopted SET really needs to be accompanied with a change in credit card processing.

• BUT: the rate of Internet Charge Backs is HUGE! (Particularly on download purchases and subscriptions). Retailers are now being fined in the hope of reducing this.

• SET does not create a non-repudiatable confirmation of the successful obtaining and use of the product sold. It hides critical information from the retailer!

Page 22: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 22

BREAK!

Lincoln Stein

Page 23: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 23

X.509v3 Certificates• More generally used than SSL

– Used by SSL– Used by nearly every major computer security system

• From Older Standards Groups• ISO/ITU

– International Standards Organization/ANSI– International Telecommunications Union (was CCITT – fax, TIFF)– Part of United Nations as of 1988

• ASN.1 (Abstract Syntax Notation 1) – see www.asn1.com – This is instead of BNF and is pretty arcane, but includes encoding rules (DER)– SGML (predecessor of HTML) used this, X.10 Financial Systems.

• Object Identifier – Tree starting with world, down through countries, companies, etc.,

www.hyperstamps.com fun– Your international phone number is a legal Object Identifier– It is a felony in nearly every country of the world to counterfeit an ISO issued

Object Identifiers

Page 24: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 24

X.509v3 Where to Get

• You have to pay 34 Swiss Francs!– www.itu.org -- search on X.509

– But WAIT! X.509v4 is out, but not yet published!

• Those typical Swiss…always getting rich– No, this is how nearly all older standards bodies have

worked – they sell copies of their standards

– Buy them. They are like the RFCs and the W3 Specifications. They will make you one of the few real experts.

Page 25: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 25

What is X.509?

• A means of authenticating a “directory”

• Uses public/private key exclusively (and that means RSA for all practical purposes … Sept 21, remember?)

• A means for chaining certificate authorities– Didn’t work, people really just chain certificates

• The information about who you are is hashed and signed so this can be compared with the plaintext about who you are in the certificate

• Serial Number : an Object Identifier – It’s a FELONY to copy this even in IRAQ!!!

Page 26: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 26

X.509 Basic Form

Who you are Message

Message Digest for Checking on Message Integrity

Public Key for Authentication RSA

MD5 SHA

Certificate Serial Number

DateTime and ExpirationSept 21, 2000!

Page 27: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 27

Concepts behind X.509

• user certificate; public key certificate; certificate:

– The public keys of a user, together with some other information, rendered unforgeable by encipherment with the private key of the certification authority which issued it.

• certification path: – An ordered sequence of certificates of objects in the

directory information tree which, together with the public key of the initial object in the path, can be processed to obtain that of the final object in the path.

Page 28: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 28

X.509 NomenclatureXp Public key of a user X

Xs Private key of a user X

Xp[I] Encryption of Information, I, using public key of X

Xs[I] Encryption of I using the private key of X

X{I} Signing I by X : I with hashed summary appended

CA(X) A certification authority of user X

Can(X) (where n>1): CA(CA(…n times(X)))

X1<<X2>> Certificate of user X2 issued by authority X1

X1<<X2>>X2<<X3>> Chain of certificates functionally equivalent to X1<<Xn+1>>

X1p*X1<<X2>> Unwrapping certificate to extract public key.

Ap * A<<B>> B<<C>> denotes using public key A to obtain B’s public key, Bp, from its certificate, followed by using Bp to unwrap C’s certificate. Outcome is the public key of C, Cp.

A -> B Certification path from A to B form of a chain of certificates starting with CA(A)<<CA2(A)>> and ending with CA(B)<<B>>

Note: X’s are names of users, I is arbitrary information

Page 29: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 29

Certificate DefinitionCertificate ::= SIGNED{SEQUENCE{ version version Default v1, serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber, signature AlgorithmIdentifier, issuer Name, validity Validity, subject Name, subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo, issuerUniqueIdentifier ObjectIdentifier, - v3 subjectUniqueIdentifier ObjectIdentifier, - v3 extensions Extensions, }}

Page 30: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 30

Certificate Defined (cont)Version :== Integer (for v1, v2, v3) CertificateSerialNumber ::= Integer AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE{ ..stuff about crypto }Validity ::= SEQUENCE {

notBefore Time,notAfter Time}

SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,subjectPublicKey BITSTRING }

Time ::= CHOICE {utcTime UTCTime,

generalizedTime GeneralizedTime }Extensions ::== SEQUENCE OF extensions

like, critical TrueORFalse – v3

Page 31: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 31

Date Time

• Great Security Technique for Authentication– Challenge-Response, let mother nature be the challenge.

– Very hard to defeat since you have to crack the code too quickly … can be used to put a time limit on things. This is used by many certificates.

• Kerberos uses this in issuing “tickets” for a time.

• Great Security Technique for Auditability– Hash the date-time and sign it.

– Requires an authority or both members of transaction to maintain copy (you can’t deny your signature even if you “fix” your copy!)

Page 32: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 32

X.509 certificate types

• For people

• For web sites

• For companies

• For organizations inside companies

• For software

• Etc. etc. etc.

• You could have X.509 certificates that certify a toaster made a piece of toast.

http://dollar.ecom.cmu.edu/sec/509.doc

Page 33: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 33

What’s Wrong with Them

• Classic HORRIBLE USER INTERFACE ASSOCIATED WITH GOOD CRYPTOGRAPHY

• You have to apply to a root CA for one • They invade your privacy!• They make you PAY!• They make them last only one Year!

– And you pay again.– Hey…their cost is a few cpu seconds…

• Homework: Go to Thawte (www.verisign.com) and get a free personal certificate for your mail browser (outlook, eudora, or netscape).

• See what I mean?

Page 34: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 34

Better root CAs

• There should not be a commercial monopoly here.

• Social Security Admin could issue free personal certificates FOR LIFE.

– This would make your private key very private

– Needs to be on a smart card you don’t lose

– Would make Certificate Revocation Work!

• Now, each individual person can become a CA! – He can establish expirations suitable to him

– He does not himself expire.

• Same for each company (IRS or United Nations through ASN.1 Object Identifiers maintained by United Nations.)

• September 21, 2000!!! Wanna be a root CA?September 21, 2000!!! Wanna be a root CA?

Page 35: Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 1 20-771: Computer Security Lecture 3: SSL Robert Thibadeau School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon.

Lecture 3, 20-771: Computer Security, Fall 2000 35

SSL

• What does SSL stand for?

• Does SSL use X.509v3 Certificates?

• When is the client and server authenticated in SSL?

• Can SSL perform a secure transaction without server authentication?

• Do browsers by default come configured for low grade, exportable, security?