Lcoi reviews 2012 09

LLCCOOII--RReevviieewwss

ЗЗббііррккаа ннааууккооввиихх ппррааццьь ввииддааєєттььссяя ДДооннееццььккиимм ннааццііооннааллььнниимм ууннііввееррссииттееттоомм ((ДДооннееццьькк,, УУккррааїїннаа)) ззаа ппррооееккттоомм

„„ННииззььккоо--ввууггллееццееввіі ммоожжллииввооссттіі ддлляя ііннддууссттррііааллььнниихх ррееггііоонніівв УУккррааїїннии””,, щщоо ффііннааннссууєєттььссяя ЄЄввррооппееййссььккиимм ССооююззоомм

ззаа ТТееммааттииччннооюю ппррооггррааммооюю ддлляя ддооввккіілллляя ттаа ссттааллооггоо ууппррааввлліінннняя ппррииррооддннииммии рреессууррссааммии,, ззооккррееммаа ееннееррггіієєюю

NNoo.. 0099,, 3300..0099..22001122

LLOOWW--CCAARRBBOONN OOPPEENN IINNNNOOVVAATTIIOONN RREEVVIIEEWWSSООГГЛЛЯЯДДИИ ННИИЗЗЬЬККОО--ВВУУГГЛЛЕЕЦЦЕЕВВИИХХ ВВІІДДККРРИИТТИИХХ ІІННННООВВААЦЦІІЙЙООББООЗЗРРЕЕННИИЯЯ ННИИЗЗККОО--УУГГЛЛЕЕРРООДДННЫЫХХ ООТТККРРЫЫТТЫЫХХ ИИННННООВВААЦЦИИЙЙ

ППррооеекктт ффііннааннссууєєттььссяя ЄЄввррооппееййссььккиимм ССооююззоомм

ППррооеекктт ррееааллііззууєєттььссяя ДДооннееццььккиимм ннааццііооннааллььнниимм

ууннііввееррссииттееттоомм,, УУккррааїїннаа

LLCCOOII--RReevviieewwss LLOOWW--CCAARRBBOONN OOPPEENN IINNNNOOVVAATTIIOONN RREEVVIIEEWWSS ООГГЛЛЯЯДДИИ ННИИЗЗЬЬККОО--ВВУУГГЛЛЕЕЦЦЕЕВВИИХХ ВВІІДДККРРИИТТИИХХ ІІННННООВВААЦЦІІЙЙ ООББООЗЗРРЕЕННИИЯЯ ННИИЗЗККОО--УУГГЛЛЕЕРРООДДННЫЫХХ ООТТККРРЫЫТТЫЫХХ ИИННННООВВААЦЦИИЙЙ

NNoo.. 0099,, 3300..0099..22001122 ЗЗббііррккаа ннааууккооввиихх ппррааццьь ввииддааєєттььссяя ДДооннееццььккиимм ннааццііооннааллььнниимм ууннііввееррссииттееттоомм ((ДДооннееццьькк,, УУккррааїїннаа)) ззаа ппррооееккттоомм

„„ННииззььккоо--ввууггллееццееввіі ммоожжллииввооссттіі ддлляя ііннддууссттррііааллььнниихх ррееггііоонніівв УУккррааїїннии””,, щщоо ффііннааннссууєєттььссяя ЄЄввррооппееййссььккиимм ССооююззоомм

ззаа ТТееммааттииччннооюю ппррооггррааммооюю ддлляя ддооввккіілллляя ттаа ссттааллооггоо ууппррааввлліінннняя ппррииррооддннииммии рреессууррссааммии,, ззооккррееммаа ееннееррггіієєюю

ООббооззрреенниияя

ссооццииааллььнноо--ээккооннооммииччеессккиихх аассппееккттоовв ии

ууккррааииннссккиихх ззааииннттеерреессоовваанннныыхх ссттоорроонн

ппррии ввннееддррееннииии ЧЧУУТТ ии УУХХУУ

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Донецк - 2012 ППррооеекктт ффііннааннссууєєттььссяя ЄЄввррооппееййссььккиимм ССооююззоомм

ППррооеекктт ррееааллііззууєєттььссяя ДДооннееццььккиимм ннааццііооннааллььнниимм ууннііввееррссииттееттоомм,, УУккррааїїннаа

УДК 504.062.2, 504.062.4, 504.7 ББК 20.1, 20.3 С 232 Обозрения социально-экономических аспектов и украинских заинтересованных сторон при внедрении ЧУТ и УХУ - Reviews of Socio-Economic Aspects and Ukrainian Stakeholders of the Implementation of CCT and CCS / Под общ. ред. С. В. Беспаловой и Н. С. Шеставина // LCOI-Reviews, No. 09, 30.09.2012. – Донецк: ДонНУ, 2012. – 44 с. Сборник содержит обозрения социально-экономических аспектов и украинских заинтересованных сторон при внедрении чистых угольных технологий и технологий улавливания и хранения углерода с целью смягчения последствий изменения климата. Обозрения подготовлены для проекта «Низко-углеродные возможности для индустриальных регионов Украины», который финансируется Европейским Союзом. Сборник предназначен для научных и инженерно-технических работников, преподавателей высших учебных заведений, аспирантов и студентов естественнонаучных и экономических специальностей. Редакционная коллегия: д.ф.-м.н., проф. Беспалова С.В. (отв. редактор), д.т.н., проф. Семко А.Н. (зам. отв. редактора), к.т.н. Шеставин Н.С. (отв. секретарь), д.т.н., проф. Недопекин Ф.В., к.т.н., с.н.с. Бескровная М.В., к.б.н., доц. Сафонов А.И., к.т.н. Казак О.В. Компьютерная верстка: вед. инж. Рева Е.В. Адрес редакции: 83050, г. Донецк, ул. Щорса, 46/616, Донецкий национальный университет, Биологический факультат, Центр передачи низко-углеродных открытых инноваций, Web: www.lcoir-ua.eu , E-mail: [email protected]

Мнения, отраженные в этой публикации, не обязательно совпадают с взглядами Европейской Комиссии и Правительства Украины

© Донецкий национальный университет, 2012 © Коллектив авторов, 2012

http://www.lcoir-ua.eu/

mailto:[email protected]

СОДЕРЖАНИЕ Bezkrovna M.V., Chebotova O.M. REVIEW of SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS of the IMPLEMENTATION of CCT and CCS 4

1. Carbon intensity in countries with economies in transition 4 2. Energy efficiency in the regions of Ukraine 6 3. Quote trading schemes for greenhouse gas emissions 9 4. The Kyoto protocol mechanisms 10 5. Joint implementation projects in Ukraine 12 6. Green Investment Scheme in Ukraine 14 7. The cost of implementation of CO2 capture and storage technologies 17 8. Methods of analysis of public opinion on CCS introduction 19

Chebotova O.M., Savkevich O.V. REVIEW of UKRAINIAN STAKEHOLDERS of the IMPLEMENTATION of CCT and CCS 32

1. National governmental bodies 32 2. Regional state authorities and local self-government bodies 34 3. Higher educational institutions and research institutes 36 4. Energy and industrial enterprises 39 5. Non-governmental organizations and mass media 40

ANNEX A: GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT A PROJECT “LOW-CARBON OPPORTUNITIES FOR INDUSTRIAL REGIONS OF UKRAINE (LCOIR-UA)” 43

LCOI-Reviews, 2012, No. 09

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REVIEW of SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS of the IMPLEMENTATION of CCT and CCS

M.V. Bezkrovna, O.M. Chebotova

Donetsk National University Donetsk, Ukraine

The European Union, like other industrialized countries, develops and implements technology CCT and CCS in accordance with adopted domestic legislation in the interests of businesses and the public. Significant role in the implementation of CCT and CCS technologies play mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol that allows countries with economies in transition, which include Ukraine, to take part in a real fight against climate change, not only to obtain additional funding for its economic development. The high cost of development and implementation of CCT and CCS technologies requires the introduction of a significant tax on the emission of greenhouse gases, to encourage businesses to participate directly as in the implementation of CCT and CCS technologies, and support their implementation in third countries, which are subject to the mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol. With the introduction of these processes need to be prepared to take into account public opinion and public areas where will be implemented CCT and CCS technologies, as initially negative public perceives any technological innovations regardless of their necessity and safety. Interaction with the public of countries with economies in transition has a number of features that must be taken into account in the future. 1. Carbon intensity in countries with economies in transition Across much of the world, reductions in carbon intensity have not been enough to offset the increase in CO2 emissions associated with economic growth1. However, with some notable exceptions, transition countries remain much more carbon intensive on average than either advanced economies or emerging markets like China. This reflects a global energy supply that is still largely reliant on fossil fuels and, in recent years, an increase in the carbon intensity of energy due to increased use of coal. A decline in the energy intensity of output – reflects global trends, with advances in the transition countries and China even outpacing the relatively fast improvements in the advanced market economies of the US and the EU-15. In contrast, the relative stability in the carbon intensity of energy at the global level between 1990 and 2008 conceals very different trends among the regions. In some developing countries, the carbon intensity of energy increased – by almost 20 per cent in China, for example. The transition countries as a whole has achieved a very significant decline in the carbon intensity of its GDP through a balanced mix of improvements in both the energy intensity of economic output (- 40 per cent) and in the carbon intensity of energy (- 8 per cent). This is akin to developments in the US and the EU-15, but different to China, where the beneficial effects of the reduction of the energy intensity of GDP have been partly eroded by the increase in the carbon intensity of energy. 1 Special Report on Climate Change: The Low Carbon Transition. – European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2011. – 80 pp.


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In absolute terms, the carbon intensity of energy in the transition countries stood at 2.46 tones of CO2 per tune oil equivalent (toe). This is comparable to the US (2.47), much lower than China (3.08), but higher than the EU-15 (2.16). Again, a closer look at trends within the transition countries reveals substantial differences among countries. For example, the reduction in the carbon intensity of energy contributed to about 40 per cent of the total reduction in the carbon intensity of GDP in Ukraine; in Poland, it accounted for only about 14 per cent, with the rest being a result of the sharp decline in the energy intensity of GDP. In Turkey, the only country in the region that experienced a small increase in the carbon intensity of GDP over the entire period, the increase in the carbon intensity of energy has largely offset the effects of a slight decline in the energy intensity of GDP.

Figure 1: Carbon Intensity of GDP in 2008 Despite improvements over the past two decades, the transition countries as a whole remains one of the most carbon-intensive regions in the world. It is also one of the regions with the largest variations in the carbon intensities of GDP among its countries (Figure 1). The average amount of energy-related emissions per unit of GDP in the transition countries is about two and a half times that of the EU-15 and 50 per cent higher than the world average. Several transition countries – Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan – still produce between 50 and 200 per cent more CO2 per unit of GDP than China. However, in the course of the transition, some countries have managed to reduce their carbon footprints by achieving levels of carbon intensity that are now well below the world average. In some cases, these levels are close to, or even lower than, those of advanced market economies.


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According to official statistics of CO2 emissions volumes2 and GDP amount3 in the regions of Ukraine in 2010, carbon intensity index for the whole Ukraine is 1.46, and the distribution of the carbon intensity among all economic activities in specific regions can be traced (Figure 2). It is evident that above-average carbon intensity is observed in the regions with large thermal power plants. Also there are a lot of companies registered in Kyiv, which are physically located in other regions, and thus contribute to the volume of CO2 emissions in these regions, but they add to the regional GDP in the city of Kiev.

Figure 2: Distribution of carbon intensity in the regions of Ukraine in 2010 2. Energy efficiency in the regions of Ukraine Since 2007, energy efficiency in Ukraine declined by 10% in 2010 to 43% of the European Union (EU) level4. This decline was attributed to the heavy contagion of the global economic crisis, and, as a consequence, the energy efficiency decreased in most energy intensive industries. Final energy consumption decreased by 8.1 million tones of oil-equivalent (Mtoe) or 13.2%. Energy consumption in the steel industry dropped by 4.6 Mtoe. Energy consumption in other sectors decreased by 3.5 Mtoe. The decomposition of this 3.5 Mtoe energy change yields the following - the decline in business activity resulted in energy consumption decline by 5.7 Mtoe while jump in energy intensities and structural changes in the economy increased energy consumption by 0.5 Mtoe and 1.7 Mtoe respectively.

2 Statistical Yearbook of Ukraine for 2010. - Kyiv: State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2011. - 560 pp. (P. 518-519) (in Ukrainian) 3 Statistical Yearbook of Ukraine for 2011. - Kyiv: State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2012. - 559 pp. (P. 48) (in Ukrainian) 4 Energy Efficiency Rankings of the Regions of Ukraine // Ukrainian Energy Index, 2012. – 96 pp. – http://www.energy-index.com.ua


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http://www.energy-index.com.ua/

The major notable changes in energy intensities are a decline in energy intensity in the agricultural (-9%), mining (-29%), and food industries (-14%) as well as an increase in energy intensity in services (+14%) and residential sector (+4%). It is based on an IEA method of energy consumption decomposition by sector. The methodology makes it possible to separate key factors defining energy consumption: structure of the regional economy, business activity, and energy intensity, and provides for more precise estimates of energy efficiency compared to common estimates such as energy consumption per unit of GDP. In order to separate these factors we employed the Logarithmic Mean Divisia I method. Energy consumption in the region is divided in final energy consumption in agricultural, mining, manufacturing, construction, services, road transport, and residential sectors. For each sector, the energy efficiency indicator is calculated, and the average energy consumption in the corresponding EU sector is taken as a benchmark. Vinnytsia, Kherson, and Zakarpattya are the leading regions with energy efficiencies of 66%, 65%, and 62% of the EU benchmark. There were no notable changes in the regions’ energy efficiency rankings in 2010 compared to 2007 – though with several exceptions. Lviv and Poltava oblasts jumped up 9 and 5 positions, while Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts both dropped 14 positions, and Dnipropetrovsk oblast dropped nine positions. The energy efficiency decline in the last three regions is solely attributed to the persistent deterioration in conditions for Ukrainian steel producers on the world market over the last several years. Why the above-mentioned regions have become the leaders of energy efficiency, and the eastern regions of Ukraine are the least energy efficient? First, the residential sector being the major consumer of energy resources in the region is very efficient in the Vinnytsia and Kherson oblasts in comparison with other regions of Ukraine. Second, energy intensive industries, such as steel or chemicals, are almost non-existent in all three. Vinnytsia Oblast leads due to its energy efficient residential sector that has been ranked first among other regions of Ukraine for four years (90.7% of the EU level). Compared with other regions, Vinnytsia has a large rural population (50.4%) which tends to have a low level of energy consumption, and has a relatively lower average income per capita (see Figure 3). As a result, Vinnytsia residents use much fewer energy intensive household appliances than the residents of more prosperous regions. Another factor in its reduced energy consumption is that the availability of hot water in the residential sector (21.3%) is also low. Kherson Oblast ranks second due to the high energy efficiency of its residential and industrial sectors – 82.2% and 54.0% of EU levels. Both sectors have been ranked among the top five sectors in their categories among other regions of Ukraine for four years. The efficiency of the sector is based on the relative efficiency of the food industry (57.0% of the EU level), which is the largest energy consumer among the industries in the region. The efficiency of the residential sector can be explained by one of the lowest levels of hot water availability (9.1%) and a low per-capita income resulting in the less active use of household appliances. Zakarpattya Oblast ranks third mainly due to the relative energy efficiency of its residential sector consuming 73.4% of all energy resources of the region. Although the residential sector of the region is only ranked 11th among other regions of Ukraine, the energy efficiency level of 69.1%, accompanied by a large share in the energy consumption of the region, ensures a high result. In addition to a low per-capita income, this region has a higher share of rural population than other regions (63.1%).


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Dnipropetrovsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts with energy efficiencies of 30.1%, 30.2%, and 34.1% of the EU level ranked the lowest. The low rankings of these regions are caused by the domination of inefficient production processes in their industrial structure (steel, mining, and chemical industries), as well as inefficient resource consumption in the residential sector. The overall results of these regions were substantially affected by the deterioration of the situation in the steel sector during 2009-2010 when world steel prices dropped, while the prices for iron-ore went up. This resulted in the substantial reduction of the value added per tonne of the manufactured products and increased the energy intensity of the production process. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast ranked lowest in the rating and dropped from the 16th position in 2007. This resulted from the substantial reduction in energy efficiency in the region’s industry (from 48.3% to 22.6% of the EU level). The steel industry consumes almost a half of all energy resources in the region. The substantial reduction in this sector worsened the overall result of the region. The energy efficiency of the residential sector was low as well (the region ranked 22nd in terms of energy efficiency, equivalent to 54.6% of the EU level). Luhansk Oblast has ranked second to last since 2007. Low energy efficiency in the steel and chemical industries, which consume more than one-third of all energy in the region, consistently cause this region to be ranked low among other regions of Ukraine. The residential sector of the region ranks 21st in terms of energy efficiency. Zaporizhzhia Oblast ranked 23rd after moving down 14 positions since 2007. Its energy efficiency dropped from 56.8% to 34.1% of the EU level. Since the steel industry consumes 46.3% of all energy resources of the region, its low efficiency and the deterioration of conditions in the steel sector affected the overall performance of the region in a decisive manner.

Figure 3: Gross Value Added Per Capita by Region and Energy Efficiency, 2010


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The ranks of several regions went down substantially, including Zaporizhzhia, down 14 positions (to 23rd); Donetsk, down 14 positions (to 21st); and Dnipropetrovsk, down 9 positions (to 25th). The major reason for the declines was the deterioration of external economic conditions for the steel industry, which accounted for the lion’s share of industry in all these regions. No substantial changes occurred in the energy efficiencies of other regions in Ukraine over these four years. The highest energy saving potential is concentrated in Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Luhansk, Ternopil, Kharkiv, and Kyiv oblasts. It should be borne in mind that even the most efficient regions in Ukraine lag substantially behind the EU energy efficiency average. Thus, the energy saving potential in Ukraine is quite high and amounts to 47.6% of its current energy consumption level. The energy efficiency can become an important factor in economic growth and at the same time help improve the well-being of the population. Higher energy efficiency is also expected to have a positive impact on the flow of investments, especially in energy intensive industries, due to their technological characteristics. 3. Quote trading schemes for greenhouse gas emissions The Kyoto Protocol has become the first global agreement on environmental protection, based on the market mechanism of regulation - the mechanism of the international emissions trading of greenhouse gas emissions. After lengthy discussions and political bargaining, in February 2004, Ukraine has taken an important step for the international community – ratified the Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)5. After the transfer of ratification charter to the UN Secretary General, it became a party to the international agreement. According to the protocol, each country has a maximum limit of emissions. If the country does not fully use permit for emissions of greenhouse gases (quota), it can sell it to another state. Ukraine refers to the category of countries that do not fully use their quota, and can therefore sell them. In reality, this means the beginning of a new era for the world economy, when all financial, investment and production decisions will be influenced by another factor – strict limits on carbon emissions. According to the protocol, the following core obligations have to be met by the industrialized countries: the European Union must reduce emissions by 8%, Japan and Canada – by 6%, Eastern Europe and the Baltic States – by 8% on average, Russia and Ukraine must keep the average emissions in 2008-2012 at the level of 1990, developing countries, including China and India, did not take any obligations. The experience of the U.S., UK and other countries shows that the use of economic incentives to address environmental problems is often much more efficient than direct administrative control. Since January 2005, the internal system of trading carbon emissions came into effect in the European Union, which includes tens of thousands of companies.

5 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto Protocol ratified by Law of Ukraine from 02.04.2004 No. 1430-IV) (in Ukrainian). - http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/995_801 or KYOTO PROTOCOL TO THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE. - UNITED NATIONS, 1998. – 20 pp. - http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf


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http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/995_801

http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf

According to the State Environmental Investment Agency data6, Ukraine has a quota for greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere at a rate of 4.5 billion units for 5 years, which can provide 20-30% of global demand. It uses only 2.8 billion units. During the 5-year period, Ukraine can sell 450 million units of quota, which is a very profitable business in conditions of global crisis.

Thus, the Kyoto Protocol offers the ways of obtaining additional investment from participation in the mechanisms of project financing and carbon emissions trading in conditions of the economic crisis. For Ukraine, the potential market of financial services for the implementation of projects under the Kyoto Protocol in the coming years is estimated by experts at about 3.5 billion Euros per year. 4. The Kyoto protocol mechanisms The Kyoto Protocol provides the following “flexible” market mechanisms:

- Emissions trading, - Joint implementation projects - The clean development mechanism.

These mechanisms provide the developed countries with the opportunities to fulfill their obligations through trading of emission permits with each other, as well as through the purchase of “carbon” credits as a result of emission reduction projects undertaken in other countries. Joint implementation projects (JI) are held between the two countries, having quantified commitments on emission reduction. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is different from JI cause it aims at realization of projects in countries which do not have emission reduction commitments. The basis of these three mechanisms is realization of the fact that greenhouse gas emissions are a global problem and location where emissions are reduced does not really matter. Thus, the emission reductions can be implemented where they are associated with the lowest cost. Detailed rules and supervisory structures have been created to ensure the correct use of these mechanisms. The Kyoto Protocol sets quantitative limits on emissions of greenhouse gases for the world's major economies (Annex I). Industrialized countries have undertaken quantified obligations and committed to meet them. The Protocol allows countries that have emission permits in stock (permitted but unused emission permits), to sell this excess amount to countries that have difficulties in meeting their obligations. Countries that exceed their limits can buy these emission permits. Limitation of emissions of greenhouse gases under the Kyoto Protocol is a way to estimate the monetary value of pollution of our atmosphere. In accordance with the Kyoto Protocol, Joint Implementation projects and Clean Development Mechanism allows industrialized countries to meet part of their obligations by conducting emission reduction projects in other countries. Emission reductions achieved by the implementation of such projects can be offset to investor. Emission reductions resulting from each project activity shall be certified on the basis of real, measurable and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of climate change.

6 State Environmental Investment Agency of Ukraine. – http://www.seia.gov.ua


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http://www.seia.gov.ua/

In the framework of a Joint Implementation project, an industrialized country (Annex I) may realize a project to reduce emissions (e.g. energy efficiency project) on the territory of another countries from Annex I and receive Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) to settle its own obligations. In the framework of the Clean Development Mechanism, an industrialized country (Annex I) may conduct emission reduction project in a developing country (a country not included in Annex I) and use the Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) to meet its quantified obligations. The purpose of the clean development mechanism is to assist Parties not included in Annex I, in achieving sustainable economic development and contribute to the ultimate objective of the Convention. Ukraine has the right to participate in joint implementation projects and use the experience of project implementation under the clean development mechanism. Currently, according to the UNEP Risoe CDM / JI Pipenine Analysis and Database7 756 JI Projects (Figure 4) and 8997 CDM projects are being implemented in the world (Figure 5). There are 315 projects in Ukraine and 183 projects in Russia. And in Asia and Pacific region China is the leader, which carries 55% of the regional projects, receiving 70.5% of all regional CERs. India is at the second place: 29.6% of the projects and 17.9% of CERs, respectively. In Latin America, Brazil is the leader with 35% of all projects and 45% of CERs, followed by Mexico with 18% of projects and 17% of CERs, and then by Chile with 10% of the projects and 9% of CERs.

a) Number of JI projects by host country b) Number of JI projects by type in %

Figure 4: General number of JI projects distributed by countries (а) and types (b)

a) Percentage share of the total number of

projects of in the CDM regions

b) Percentage share of the total number of projects of in the CDM categories

Figure 5: General number of CDM projects distributed by regions (а) and categories (b)

7 UNEP Risoe CDM/JI Pipenine Analysis and Database // UNEP RISOE Centre for Energy, Climate and Sustainable Development. – http://www.cdmpipeline.org


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http://www.cdmpipeline.org/

5. Joint implementation projects in Ukraine As of November 1, 2010 State Environmental Investment Agency of Ukraine8 and Ukranian Registry Carbon Units9 lists 184 JI projects that have received Letters of Endorsement in accordance with CMU Resolution No. 206 dated 22.02.200610. Estimated GHG emission reductions during the fi rst commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol under these JI projects are 171,8 million tones CO2 eq. The number of JI projects by sectors/source categories and estimated GHG emission reductions by sectors/source categories during the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol are represented in following diagrams11 (Figure 6). Also the Figure 7 demonstrates the location of some large projects, which are mainly concentrated in the eastern industrial regions

f Ukraine. o

a) Number of JI projects

by sectors/source categories

b) Est ions by sectors/source categories

Figure 6: Number of J emission reductions by sectors/source categories

imated GHG emission reduct

I projects and Estimated GHG

Figure 7: Location of registered JI projects in Ukraine 8 State Environmental Investment Agency of Ukraine. – http://www.seia.gov.ua 9 Ukranian Registry Carbon Units. – http://www.carbonunitsregistry.gov.ua 10 CMU Resolution No. 206 dated 22.02.2006 “On approval of the preparation, review, approval and implementation of projects aimed at reducing anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases”. - http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/206-2006-%D0%BF 11 Joint Implementation Projects in Ukraine // The National Environmental Investment Agency of Ukraine, 2010. – 8 pp.


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http://www.carbonunitsregistry.gov.ua/

http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/206-2006-%D0%BF


The experience of JI in the first commitment period (CP1) shows that the mechanism has achieved its primary goal only partially, whereas it helped to reduce the compliance costs both under the Kyoto Protocol and EU ETS. JI has initiated industry bottom-up approach in emission reduction (ER) efforts and resulted in a number of worthy ER initiatives. In some cases JI has facilitated the transfer of knowledge and ER technologies. But the benefits offered by JI have been often abused and ERUs have been granted to projects that occurred anyway, despite additionality being condition. Due to the lack of stringent national emission cap the country can easily afford issuing ERUs to non-additional projects, and even use JI as a way to export its excess AAUs, while the demand for the latter is very limited. The application of the mechanism at international and national levels has shown flaws that should be addressed for the second Kyoto commitment period to secure its environmental integrity and to ensure the continuation of JI as an emission reduction tool. Desk review and analysis of publicly available information on Ukrainian JI projects has revealed the

llowing12:

ulated. However, the resence of additionality still can be questioned in projects under both tracks.

ole at the time of project implementation, nd was used as an add-on to boost the incomes later on.

he governments are not likely to urchase AAUs from private entities for Kyoto compliance either.

was insignificant. ERU comes can cover a major part of project costs only in few project types.

termined and/or verified by one AIE, which is onsidered to be the most flexible in the market.

fo (1) Project baseline and additionality (including identification of alternatives, investment, barrier and common practice analyses) can be easily manipulated. Some PDD developers present argumentation better than others, and there is a tendency that documents of Track 2 projects are generally of higher quality and the justification of additionality is better articp (2) The timelines of project endorsement, approval and ERU issuance by Ukrainian national DFP lack consistency. It is observed that some projects go through the whole JI project cycle (receive Letter of Endorsement, determination report, Letter of Approval, verification report and get ERUs issued) within only a few months. It is also surprising that many projects initiate the JI cycle in 2011 or 2012, while they were implemented well before 2008. In fact, more than 40% of projects obtained LoE (the first step in JI cycle) only in 2010-2012, which is at least 3-5 years after the project start in most cases. This suggests that JI had no ra (3) Fourteen out of fifteen JI projects that were promptly endorsed and approved in 2011 under Track 1 claimed so-called “early credits” as AAUs for emission reductions prior to 2008. The volume of AAUs issued to the projects is almost 30 million, which is comparable to the volume of 47 million of AAUs sold by Ukraine via the Green Investment Scheme. Such a generous approach of Ukrainian government in distributing AAUs is related to the availability of a big surplus of the country’s assigned amount. However, the application of the early AAUs is rather limited. They are not allowed for the use in the EU ETS for compliance purposes; tp (4) In many projects implementation costs are by far higher than potential incomes from ERUs and may constitute around 2% of the total project costs. This is particularly notable in capital-intensive projects, such as energy efficiency in steel production, industries, power generation and distribution. This suggests that the role of JI for the project implementation decisionin (5) Accredited Independent Entities (AIEs) have a conflict of interests in performing determination and verification of JI projects as they are selected and paid by the project participants. The quality of the audit in some cases is rather low in terms of its due diligence. It was noted that the majority of the registered Ukrainian JI projects were dec

12 Zhenchuk M. The Integrity of Joint Implementation Projects in Ukraine. – Kyiv: The National Ecological Centre of Ukraine, 2012. – 31 pp.


13

(6) In the beginning the investment in truly additional JI projects was deterred by numerous risks associated with the immature mechanism. Nonetheless, some good projects were initiated and launched owing to JI, such as landfill gas or coal mine methane capture. When the regulatory risks reduced, there was too little time remaining until the end of CP1 to implement ER measures that rely on JI. At the same time projects that were not dependent on ERUs did not face such limitations r risks and thrived, driving out additional projects and beating down ERU prices.

cts ay indeed rely on JI for their future operation or implementation if they are not completed yet.

ber of JI projects in 011, followed by Russia that increased project registrations in 2012.

elopment under both Track 1 and Track 2 contained in the UNEP isoe database13 were analyzed.

o (7) The uncertainty of CP2 framework prevents ER projects from seriously relying on CP2 ERUs in their implementation. Even though most of the registered and operational projects are set to claim ERUs beyond 2012, the need for further crediting can be questioned. Nonetheless, some projem As of May 2012, there were 305 registered Track 1 projects, of which 199 projects received 127 million ERUs. There were only 39 Track 2 projects with final determination, of them 27 projects generated almost 17 million ERUs. A significant share of the registered projects and ERUs come from two post-Soviet countries: Ukraine (90 projects) and Russia (42 projects). The numbers of new projects registered each year show that Ukraine produced the highest num2 The Figure 8 graphically show the distribution of JI project types by the number of projects, the projected amount of ERUs in CP1 and the number of ERUs issued so far. For this purpose 550 JI projects at different stages of devR

a) JI project types by t e number of projects

b) JI of

projected and issued ERUs

Figure 8: The distribution of JI project types

. Green Investment Scheme in Ukraine

tional GHG emission quotas surplus during 2008-2012 is estimated at 2 733 586 263 tons O2-eq.

h project types by the number

6 The countries of Central and Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union have the largest greenhouse gas emission quotas surplus as a result of economic recession in the 1990s rather than due to systematic implementation of measures to reduce emissions. Such greenhouse gas emission quotas, acquired by the state without real climate protection efforts, are called “hot air”14. In 2008, the actual level of GHG emissions in Ukraine was 420.6 million tons of CO2-eq. - which is 46% of the allowed quota, set at the level of 1990 (100% = 934.1 million tons of CO2-eq). Thus, the potential use of naC

13 UNEP Risoe CDM/JI Pipenine Analysis and Database // UNEP RISOE Centre for Energy, Climate and Sustainable Development. – http://www.cdmpipeline.org 14 Gree Investment Schemes: Options and Issues / W. Blyth, R. Baron // Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, International Energy Agency, 2003. – 31 pp.


14

http://www.cdmpipeline.org/

From 2009 to 2012, the Government of Ukraine managed to sell 47 million assigned amount of units. Selling price was approx. 10 euro per unit of transferred GHG emission quotas, so the total amount of funds received by Ukraine through the mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol emissions

ading was 470 million of Euros.

vestment Scheme are defined by the CMU Resolution No. 221 dated 2.02.200816, as amended.

vestment Scheme Guidelines. activities were selected for funding:

tal burden, ed Methane,

ioxide (CO2), - Activities for environmental protection (e.g. pollution reduction activity).

ocated to the “soft greening”, i.e. capacity building for rompting of environmental activities.

of Ecology and Natural Resources, the Ministry of Finance and the Prime Minister of kraine.

gy aving projects, including thermal modernization of public buildings and mine waters treatment.

pecific cost of annual reduction of 1 ton of СО2-eq. amounted to UAH 13 917, that is UR 1 278.

2 emissions in Ukraine f 2010) with the total cost of UAH 3 718 972 099 (almost EUR 340 mln).

tr To use funds received by Ukraine within the international emissions trading, the green investment scheme was established, with the State Environmental Investment Agency of Ukraine15 (SEIAU) appointed as the coordinating body. The legal framework of international emissions trading is established by a number of resolutions of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, and the basic provisions of the Green In2 Areas of projects implementation under the international emissions trading of Kyoto Protocol in Ukraine were approved by the buyer country in the relevant Green InThus, the following categories of

- Energy conservation, - Fuel switching for low environmen- Utilization of Coal B- Renewable energy, - Activities for emissions reductions of greenhouse gases other than carbon d

In addition, 5% of resources are allp Proposals for green investment scheme projects may be filed by enterprises and organizations and budget-funded institutions. At first projects proposed in the SEIAU are checked for compliance with the criteria, then they are reviewed by the Interdepartmental Working Group at SEIAU, approved projects agreed with the Party of the greenhouse gas emissions quotas buyer country, The Ministry U As of December 2011, the National Environmental Investment Agency of Ukraine accepted 987 separate projects for consideration for implementation in the framework of a Green Investment Scheme, of which the Ukrainian government finally approved the implementation of 363 eners According to SEIAU, Ukraine completed 37 projects green investment scheme by the end of 2011, which achieved an overall reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2 736.63 tons of CO2eq per year. The cost of works for the project implementation amounted to UAH 38 086 997 (ca EUR 3.5 million), so sE Planned activities for all 987 green investment scheme projects in Ukraine have the total emission reduction potential of 247 577.37 tons of СО2-eq per year (0.069% of all COo

15 State Environmental Investment Agency of Ukraine. – http://www.seia.gov.ua 16 CMU Resolution No. 221dated 22.02.2008 “On approval of the review, approval and implementation of Environmental (green) investments and proposals for activities related to the implementation of such projects and obligations of parties to the Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention UN Climate Change”. - http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/221-2008-%D0%BF


15



Thus, the average cost of 1 ton of annual reduction of СО2-eq. emissions for all green investment scheme projects in Ukraine is UAH 15 021, or approx. EUR 1 373. However, a number of projects proposed for implementation under the green investment scheme are unreasonably expensive and

ith low efficiency of emission reduction.

Accordingly, the rinciple of project selection as well as procedure transparency is questionable17.

of international emissions trading echanism under the Kyoto Protocol is a problem in Ukraine18.

olitical reasons, and thus bstruct from selection of economically and environmentally viable ones.

or the Ministry of Internal Affairs, reconstruction or onstruction of waste incineration plant etc.

ill, replacement of the fleet of xisting police cars of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine.

nization of buildings) and the use of lternative energy sources, particularly in the district heating.

Ukraine are distributed evenly in 22 regions and in Kyiv, which can be nalyzed in Figure 9.

w The efficiency of the results of green investment scheme projects in Ukraine under current procedure is questionable by the disproportionately large cost with little cumulative target level of greenhouse gas emissions reduction. In addition, projects that can be implemented successfully within other flexible Kyoto Protocol mechanism – joint implementation – are also selected to be financed using funds received in Ukraine from the international emission trading under Kyoto Protocol. Such projects create competition for projects in the public sector. p Non-transparency and bureaucratization in the implementation m Disclosure of information on projects implemented under the green investment scheme of the international emissions trading is not properly adjusted, resulting in difficulty to evaluate their quality and efficiency, or even the possibility of corruption signs. In turn, it is still possible that the green investment scheme projects can be implemented in Ukraine for po By the third quarter of 2010 was not selected any project to be implemented on green investment scheme in Ukraine, although the CMU Resolution No. 1036 dated 16.09.200919. The press repeatedly referred to different types of projects for funding from the funds received from international emissions trading - re-equipping of heating systems, emissions reduction in gas transmission system of the country, financing the construction of hydro-pump storage power plants, modernization of subway trains and fleet fc Officially, as of December 2011, the SEIAU selected 987 separate Green Investment Scheme projects for consideration, including, for example, recommended reconstruction of Kyiv subway trains, collection and utilization of methane in solid waste landfe However, finally, by the end of 2011, the Ukrainian government had approved the implementation of 363 projects on energy efficiency (including thermal modera Thus, Ukraine chose project approach ensuring selection and implementation of individual projects to implement the green investment scheme. The funding and number of projects under the green investment scheme ina

17 Tuerk A., Frieden D., Sharmina M. et al. Green Investment Schemes: First experiences and lessons learned / Working Paper Joanneum Research, Institute of Energy Research, Graz, Austria, 2010. – 50 pp. 18 Review of funds expenditure obtained under the international emissions trading in Ukraine. – Kiev: All-Ukrainian Non-governmental Organization “National Ecological Centre of Ukraine”, 2012. – 18 pp. 19 CMU Resolution No. 1036 dated 16.09.2009 “On Approval of Plan for the Preparation and Implementation of Green Investment Scheme Projects Aimed at Reducing GHG Emissions in the Educational and Health Care Facilities”. - http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1036-2009-%D0%BF


16


Figure 9: Geographical distribution of green investment scheme projects in Ukraine

tation of these techniques increases the cost of the end product and, accordingly, absence f profit.

. The cost of implementation of CO2 capture and storage technologies

ression, ansportation, injection, monitoring and maintenance of these processes – was highlighted.

n by surface and underwater pipelines, by sea and road transport in a liquefied tate is analyzed23.

Detailed examination of the content of joint implementation projects, as well as “green” investments allows to assert the there are no projects that would be directly associated to the implementation of carbon capture and storage technology. This can be explained by the high cost of such projects and long duration, as well as the lack of incentive for implementation, since the implemeno 7 The question of the cost of full-scale deployment of CO2 capture and storage technologies (CCS) has been raised in the IPCC Special Report on Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage20, where the need to take account of all the processes that occur in the use of CCS – capture, comptr The cost of each individual process and their combination, is described in detail in the Reports European Technology Platform for Zero Emission Fossil Fuel Power Plants21. In particular, for capturing processes the cost for implementation of three basic CO2 capture technologies (post-combustion, pre-combustion and oxy-fuel)22 is considered, as well as for transport processes the cost of transportatios

20 IPCC, 2005: IPCC Special Report on Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage. Prepared by Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Metz, B., O. Davidson, H. C. de Coninck, M. Loos, and L. A. Meyer (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 442 pp. 21 European Technology Platform for Zero Emission Fossil Fuel Power Plants. – http://www.zeroemissionsplatform.eu 22 The Costs of CO2 Capture: Post-demonstration CCS in the EU. - European Technology Platform for Zero Emission Fossil Fuel Power Plants, 2011. – 81 pp. 23 The Costs of CO2 Transport: Post-demonstration CCS in the EU. - European Technology Platform for Zero Emission Fossil Fuel Power Plants, 2011. – 53 pp.


17

http://www.zeroemissionsplatform.eu/

a) Reducing costs: At present, even if CO2 is used for enhanced hydrocarbon, the capture, transport and

(*) upper bound with no enhanced recovery.

storage costs amount to some 60 euros per ton. The goal would be to cut costs by a factor of 4.

b) Avoided CO2: CO2 capture calls for additional energy use, which in turn generates carbon dioxide. Avoided CO2 emissions are thus computed by determining the difference between a plant without and one with capture, this latter consuming more energy. Because of this mechanism, the amount of captured CO2 is always larger than that of avoided CO2.

Figure 10: Cutting the cost of CO2 capture and storage24

ge and re-usable infrastructure), reservoir capacity and quality

than deep saline aquifers (SA);

- High injectivity is cheaper than poor injectivity.

s of implementation of CO2 capture and storage chnologies leads to the following conclusions26:

within a portfolio of technologies, including greater energy efficiency and newable energy.

fuel prices and market positioning, whereas pplicability is mainly determined by load regime.

Evaluation of CO2 geological storage cost was carried out for different storage variants25. Location and type of field (available knowledare the main determinants for costs:

- Onshore storage is cheaper than offshore; - Depleted Oil and Gas Fields (DOGF) are cheaper- Larger reservoirs are cheaper than smaller ones;

The estimate of the total cost of the whole proceste • Post 2020, CCS will be cost-competitive with other low-carbon energy technologies The EU CCS demonstration programme will not only validate and prove the costs of CCS technologies, but form the basis for future cost reductions, enhanced by the introduction of second- and third-generation technologies. The results of the study therefore indicate that post-demonstration CCS will be cost competitive with other low-carbon energy technologies as a reliable source of low-carbon power. CCS is on track to become one of the key technologies for combating climate change – re • CCS is applicable to both coal- and natural gas-fired power plants CCS can technically be applied to both coal- and natural gas-fired power plants. Their relative economics depend on power plant cost levels, a

24 CO2 capture and storage in the subsurface: A technological pathway for combating climate change. – The Geoscience Issues series: BRGM Communication and Publications Division, 2007. – 64 pp. 25 The Costs of CO2 Storage: Post-demonstration CCS in the EU. - European Technology Platform for Zero Emission Fossil Fuel Power Plants, 2011. – 42 pp. 26 The Costs of CO2 Capture, Transport and Storage: Post-demonstration CCS in the EU. - European Technology Platform for Zero Emission Fossil Fuel Power Plants, 2011. – 51 pp.


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• All three CO2 capture technologies could be competitive once successfully demonstrated The study includes the three main capture technologies (post-combustion, pre-combustion and oxy-fuel), but excludes second-generation technologies (e.g. chemical looping, advanced gas turbine cycles). Using agreed assumptions and the Levelised Cost of Electricity as the main quantitative value, there is currently no clear difference between any of the capture technologies and all could be competitive in the future once successfully demonstrated. The main factors influencing total costs re fuel and investment costs.

he development of clusters and over-sized pipelines – with any cross-order restrictions removed.

significant potential and ensure sufficient storage apacity is available – in the time frame needed.

e goal: to make new-uild power generation with CCS more attractive to investors than without it.

. Methods of analysis of public opinion on CCS introduction

and the broader challenges of climate change, when it will be better informed bout these issues.

ormation, people tended not to have an opinion or, if they did, they had a slightly egative view28.

a • Early strategic planning of large-scale CO2 transport infrastructure is vital to reduce costs Clustering plants to a transport network can achieve significant economies of scale – in both CO2 transport and CO2 storage in larger reservoirs, on- and offshore. Large-scale CCS therefore requires the development of a transport infrastructure on a scale matched only by that of the current hydrocarbon infrastructure. As this will lead to greatly reduced long-term costs, early strategic planning is vital – including tb • A risk-reward mechanism is needed to realise the significant aquifer potential for CO2 storage Location and type of storage site, reservoir capacity and quality are the main determinants for the costs of CO2 storage: onshore is cheaper than offshore; depleted oil and gas fields (DOGF) are cheaper than deep saline aquifers (SA); larger reservoirs are cheaper than smaller ones; high injectivity is cheaper than poor injectivity. Given the large variation in storage costs (up to a factor of 10) and the risk of investing in the exploration of SA that are ultimately found to be unsuitable, a risk-reward mechanism is needed to realise theirc • CCS requires a secure environment for long-term investment Based on current trajectories, the price of Emission Unit Allowances (EUAs) under the EU Emissions Trading System will not, initially, be a sufficient driver for investment after the first generation of CCS demonstration projects is built (2015-2020). Enabling policies are therefore required in the intermediate period – after the technology is commercially proven, but before the EUA price has increased sufficiently to allow full commercial operation. Thb 8 To date, the general public is not well informed about CCS technologies27. Several studies which were conducted recently show that this technology would likely be met with less enthusiasm by public compared to other options, such as improving energy efficiency and switching to renewable energy sources. It is also unclear how the public will react to the CCS and other options for reducing emissionsa A study carried out in the UK in 2004 found public awareness and understanding to be low; and in the absence of infn

27 Can the storage of carbon dioxide contribute to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions? - A simplified guide to the IPCC Special Report on Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage // UNEP, Information Unit for Conventions, 2006. - 24 pp. (in Russian) 28 Shackley S., McLachlan C., Gough C. The public perceptions of carbon capture and storage // Tyndall Centre Working Paper No. 44, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, UMIST, Manchester, UK, 2004. – 79 pp.


19

Provision of some, even limited, information on the topic moves public opinion to a more positive stance, but public support tends to depend on concern over climate change and global warming, with CCS being viewed as one positive strategy. Further concluded that uncertainties about the potential risks of CCS, in particular the risks of accident and leakage, need to be addressed and

duced.

north European countries and the USA. Research on perc

immed

logy, with very few examples and experiences in the public omain to draw upon as illustrations.

re Very little research has been conducted to date on public perceptions and perceived acceptability of CCS, with a few completed or on-going studies in

eptions of CCS is challenging because of: a) the relatively technical and ‘remote’ nature of the issue, meaning that there are fewiate points of connection in the lay public’s frame of reference to many of the key concepts; b) the early stage of the techno

d

Figure 11: Assessment of Energy Options within Sub-Groups

o be more suitable than structured uestionnaires, at least as a first step in the research process.

weight the level of nding they would support for each of the following technologies (Figure 11).

logy options which they would most like to see eveloped in order to reduce future CO2 emissions.

rate ategory whilst the others included it implicitly under energy efficiency and demand reduction.

ind power met with unanimous support.

A more indepth research approach is typically required in such circumstances, whereby technical information is provided in an incremental fashion to the target public sample. Methodologically, focus groups and indepth discussion groups are likely tq The disadvantage is that only small samples can be surveyed using indepth methods, as opposed to surveys which can be statistically representative. The three groups were asked tofu This was used as a surrogate indicator for the technod The “radical innovation” category was added by one group, thus reinforcing the idea that current RandD efforts are perhaps not seen as being radical enough. As discussed previously, education and communication were felt to be of utmost importance. Therefore one group created this sepac W


20

The use of Nuclear power was met with some disapproval. The only expenditure on nuclear that was widely supported was that to close down the industry or to develop fusion related technology. However one of the subgroups also noted that nuclear may have to provide the long term solution to climate change if no other technological developments are made, though it was hoped that it would

e made “cleaner”.

le; however, two of the groups did not consider that it would ave a significant impact in the UK.

here was widespread support for Hydrogen, especially in relation to transport.

emand reduction and Energy efficiency were strongly supported throughout all the groups.

he groups were all of the opinion that Biomass had not yet been proven to be effective.

tidal power, although generally less well understood than other renewables, were upported.

keen on CCS than other options - this was the “doubters group” nd so was an expected response.

ike it, or 38% against in total. Only 13% of the sample said that they upported CCS (Figure 12a).

ral, be regarded as an additional reason in support of CCS, rather than counting as reason against.

this would constitute, at 36%, the second most frequently mentioned negative spect of CCS.

b Solar power was supported in principh T D T Wave and s Carbon capture and storage received fairly high ratings from groups two and three. It is promising for the development of CCS that all groups supported some level of expenditure on it. One sub-group was noticeably lessa Respondents were asked their opinion of CCS after a very brief introduction to the technology, i.e. they were told that it would store CO2 under the ground but not the reason for doing this. Figure 12 shows that positive responses were not widespread. It was often stated by respondents that they had to know why it was being done and what the risks were before they could make a judgement. About 25% of the sample stated that they did not know, whilst 23% stated that they were neither for nor against. In other words, nearly half of the respondents were undecided in what they thought of CCS. Most of the other respondents were against CCS, with 14% stating that they did not like CCS at all, whilst 24% said they did not ls The possibility of CCS being used to increase the amount of oil that could be extracted made no difference to their perception of CCS for a large number of respondents (47%) (Figure 12b). However a similarly large percentage (43%) became more favourable toward the idea of CCS. Less than five percent became less favourable after being given this information. This suggests that EOR will, in genea When asked, unprompted, if they could think of any negative effects of CCS (Figure 12c) respondents’ most frequent answer was leakage (49%). The next most frequently mentioned were ecosystems (31%), the new and untested nature of the technology (23%) and human health impacts (18%). Although these practical, physical risks were the most frequently mentioned, there were also a number of negative attributes mentioned in relation to CCS as a part of climate change abatement policy. Avoiding the real problem (13%), short termism (12%) and the policy demonstrating reluctance to change from government (11%) were all mentioned regularly. Grouping these last three responses into a general concern that CCS is treating the symptoms not the cause of excessive CO2 emissions,a


21

When asked, unprompted, if they could think of any positive effects of CCS (Figure 12d), by far the most frequent response was abating climate change (58%). The notion that using CCS could buy time” to develop other solutions was the next most frequently mentioned at 7%.

“

a) Initial reaction to CCS

b) The effect of EOR on opinion of CCS

c) Negative attributes of CCS d) Positive attributes of CCS

Figure 12: Results of the analysis of public opinion on CCS introduction29

and the text in italics is copied from Chapter one to remind of the tionale behind each question.

ublic think about carbon sequestration when the idea is initially presented to them?

rough a brief news item, informal conversation with a friend or half-listened to edia report.

The study allowed to make the following conclusions and interpret the results for the further development of CCS in the UK context. We use the set of eight questions that we posed in Chapter One to structure the discussion ra (i) What do the p(questionnaire) Do people have an immediate ‘like or ‘dislike’ to the idea of CCS or do they simply not know? This question is perhaps the closest we get to a lay, cursory contact with the idea of CCS, as might be experienced thm

29 Shackley S., McLachlan C., Gough C. The public perceptions of carbon capture and storage // Tyndall Centre Working Paper No. 44, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, UMIST, Manchester, UK, 2004. – 79 pp.


22

On first contact with CCS, most people are slightly against, neither for nor against it or say that

ey do not know.

nale or risks, the majority of people may be somewhat sceptical or just not form an opinion at ll.

h more information on CCS and the problem

ople’s opinions hange as more information is provided, and as group discussions are undertaken.

d Storage is generally recognised as a potentially important carbon mitigation ption for the UK.

ically about CS than when compared to other decarbonisation options (at 35% compared to 24%).

options were considered, including social change as well as the ‘harder’ chnological options.

upport for CCS is, however, conditional on understanding the reasons for CO2 mitigation.

on storage had been explained and, to a variable extent, discussed, during the course f the survey.

er plant emissions to avoid it entering the atmosphere and contributing to global climate hange.

th We found that nearly half of respondents do not express an opinion either in favour or against CCS when the notion of carbon storage is presented without any other information (e.g. concerning why it is being done). 38% of the respondents were either slightly or strongly against CCS and only 13% expressed support. This suggests that on first hearing about CCS without any information as to its ratioa (ii) How do their opinions change when provided witof climate change? (citizen panels and questionnaire) Does a small amount of information on CCS, climate change and the challenge of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 60%, affect people’s perception of CCS? We might expect that as the purpose of CCS is revealed, i.e. to tackle the problem of global climate change by contributing to a reduction of carbon emissions by 60%, there would be a certain proportion of respondents who might express greater support for the concept. We have explored this issue of opinion-change in the survey, whilst in the citizen panels we have explored the underlying reasons why pec Carbon Capture ano The survey results showed that CCS was slightly supported by 43% of respondents, and strongly supported by a further 12%, whilst 22% slightly or strongly opposed CCS, once basic information had been provided. The response was elicited relative to the other major carbon mitigation options (wind, solar, wave, nuclear, energy efficiency, etc.). The support for CCS is somewhat less when respondents were asked just about CCS (i.e. not compared to other decarbonisation options) towards the end of the survey, at about 39% slightly or strongly supportive. A larger number also said that they did not know or were neither in favour nor against CCS when asked specifC Support for CCS can be described as moderate or lukewarm compared to strong support in general for wind, solar and energy efficiency. The citizen panels also show a moderate support for CCS, provided that a range of other decarbonisation options are also supported – in particular renewable energy and energy efficiency. An integrated approach towards decarbonisation was generally preferred in which all te S The survey respondents’ showed a marked shift towards moderate support for CCS once the purpose of carbo Nearly one half of the respondents became more positive in their perception of CCS on receipt of information as to its rationale, with about 17% becoming more negative in their perception. We found that the key information which had to be conveyed was the use of CCS in removing CO2 from powc


23

(iii) Is there a difference in perception depending upon standard demographic variables (age,

ic status in previous urveys of sustainability is less clear, with contradictory findings in past work.

two panels ‘reasoned’ very differently with regards to CCS, they did arrive at similar nd points.

eption depending upon peoples' values and beliefs? (citizen panels,

nge, and several ther questions provide clues as to the underlying world views of the respondents.

ocusing upon world views specifically would be required to improve our nderstanding.

oad Positions vis-à-vis CCS “Pro-, Anti- and Ambivalent” were identified in the Citizen anels.

oral reasons that it is basically wrong to ‘inject mother earth’ with an industrial waste y-product.

socioeconomic status, gender, education, etc.)? (citizen panels and questionnaire) There is no strong a priori reason why we would expect CCS to be more or less preferred according to the standard demographic variables, yet it is important that we at least check if this is the case. The evidence about age-related effects, education and socio-economs There was not a drastic difference between the attitudes of men and women with regard to CCS, though women were marginally more likely to have a positive attitude. At the ‘extremes’, men seemed slightly more likely to really like CCS, whilst women were slightly more likely to not like CCS at all. The influence of the other variables (socio-economic status and education) requires more detailed analysis of the survey findings but may be limited by the relatively small sample size. From the citizen panels we suspect that gender, socio-economic status and education all play a role in influencing perceptions of CCS, though just how important a role it is difficult to ascertain. Although thee (iv) Is there a difference in percand to an extent questionnaire) Previous research on the underlying reasons for different perceptions of sustainability suggest that values, beliefs and ‘world views’ are a more important determinant than standard demographic variables. Attempting to address values and beliefs is notoriously difficult, whether in surveys or focus groups, and in this work we were not able to explore this issue in any depth. In the citizen panels, we were able to infer different values and beliefs from extended discussions with the participants, at least to a limited extent. In the questionnaire we attempted to ascertain beliefs about the role of experts in making decisions about how to respond to climate chao This question proved too difficult to address convincingly in the present research. In the questionnaire we tried to gauge individual’s beliefs in public participation in deciding what should be done about climate change, and to their readiness to accept expert delineation of climate change policies. A strong belief in public participation, together with a reluctance to accept expert-led policy making, might have indicated a more ‘egalitarian’ worldview, whilst the converse (low belief in public participation plus support for expert led policy) might have indicated a ‘hierarchic’ worldview. In practice, we found that many respondents supported both public participation and expert-led policy making, a somewhat contradictory position. We suspect that the two questions did not access respondent’s worldviews, but rather worked at a more superficial level, whereby both public participation and expert input were regarded by most as a ‘good thing’. A more detailed questionnaire fu Three BrP The Citizen Panels were more successful at elucidating broadly different perspectives on CCS which did appear to relate, at least to some extent, to underlying worldviews and different sets of values. A small minority were in favour of CCS, mainly for utilitarian reasons that it is an effective use of geological reservoirs and removes CO2 so reducing the risks of global climate change, which are regarded as larger than the risks of CCS itself. Another small minority were opposed to CCS, mainly for mb


24

Humans have responsibility, according to this perspective, for changing their ways – through new technologies and lifestyle changes – such that CO2 emissions are not produced in the first place. The third, and most common perspective, was essentially ambivalent – at times in favour, at other times against, CCS. Whilst many in this third group were initially sceptical of CCS, they became more favourably inclined as the scale of the decarbonisation challenge was revealed (see (v) below), as the risks of CCS were more thoroughly discussed, and as the risks associated with the other

ajor decarbonisation options were also discussed.

ptions and to promote CCS as a ‘bridging trategy’ to other low- or zero-carbon energy sources.

pon what people think about climate change and

nced oil recovery (EOR) and we explored hether this possibility might change opinion on CCS.

be a necessary prerequisite for including CCS as a erious response option to climate change.

cern that we btained are a consequence of conducting the survey just after the heat wave of 2003.

which provide the context in which carbon capture and storage is

s of the potential threat of climate change impacts to life in

ake very large reductions in carbon emissions (e.g. 60% cuts) over the next 50 years.

eneral a lack of awareness and knowledge of what different carbon mitigation options had to offer.

m The majority view tended to find more support for CCS when the latter was combined with other options which had a (seemingly) more favourable cost-benefit profile than CCS itself, in particular renewable energy, energy efficiency, energy demand reduction, and the hydrogen economy, based at least initially on fossil fuels with decarbonisation. This finding strongly supports the need to embed CCS within a portfolio of decarbonisation os (v) Is there a difference in perception depending uits seriousness? (citizen panels and questionnaire) A sub-set of beliefs relates to the respondents beliefs about whether climate change is a real problem to be concerned about and whether it is caused by human activities. The hypothesis is that if the respondents are concerned about climate change and its human causes, then they may be more favourably inclined towards CCS. Certainly, if the respondents do not believe that climate change is human-caused and/or a problem, then it is more difficult to imagine why they might lend strong support to CCS, since there is no other reason why CCS should be undertaken. The only partial exception relates to the use of CO2 for enhaw Belief in, and concern about, human-caused climate change, plus recognition of the need for major CO2 emission reduction, is likely tos We found that both belief in human-caused climate change and concern about climate change amongst our survey sample was high. These two factors did not, therefore, help to explain the variation in the perceptions of CCS. It is possible that the high levels of belief and cono Although there was an awareness of the issue of global climate change, the potential impacts, government policy on climate change and the extent of CO2 reductions likely to be required was not at all well appreciated. We found that the potential acceptability of CCS in the citizen panels depended on it being clearly understood as a key carbon mitigation option. In other words, there appear to be three prerequisitesregarded as a potential option:

- Acceptance of the basic underlying science of climate change; - Acceptance of the seriousnes

the UK and more generally; - Acceptance of the need to m

Even amongst the most sympathetic and trusting of our citizen panel participants, no one was aware of the enormous scale of the challenge of a -60% reduction in carbon emissions, and there was in g


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(vi) Does (carefully presented) information on alternatives (behavioural change, energy prices, renewables, etc.) influence the perception of CCS? (citizen panels and questionnaire) Since CCS is one of a range of options being considered as a route towards decarbonisation, a comparative approach is necessary. We therefore asked about perceptions of the main other contending routes towards decarbonisation: demand reduction, energy efficiency and the range of renewable energy sources. CCS is not liked as much as wind, wave, tidal and solar power, and energy efficiency measures, but there is slight support for it and CCS is certainly preferred to nuclear and higher energy bills. CCS is not ranked as favourably by the majority of respondents as wind, wave and tidal, energy efficiency and solar, all of which are strongly supported. CCS is, however, much more favourably received than either nuclear power (which c.55% of respondents are either slightly or strongly against, with c.24% either slightly or strongly supportive) or higher energy bills to try and reduce demand (with 69% either slightly or strongly against, and again about 24% either slightly or strongly supportive). (We should note, however, that we did not include any measures to address equity problems arising from higher energy bills in the questionnaire - this could have changed the response, since many objections to higher energy bills appeared to relate to exacerbating fuel poverty). The ‘not known’ response rate was highest for CCS, nuclear and wave and tidal, but is not large enough to explain differences in response rates. The citizen panels show a similar set of preferences for the known and emerging renewable energy technologies and energy efficiency options, though again tended to include CCS as an option which required further investigation and RandD. (vii) What polices and processes would make carbon sequestration more acceptable? (citizen panels and questionnaires) This slightly more free-ranging discussion focused upon what types of changes (technical, risk, environmental, social, economic, policy, etc.) might influence peoples’ perceptions of CCS. More certainty about the risks of CCS in the long-term would help people to come to a clearer decision about the desirability of CCS. The main concerns of the survey respondents about CCS were leakage (49%), ecosystems and environmental impacts (31%), the new and untested nature of the technology (23%) and human health impacts (18%). Many respondents indicated that they would like more information and more certainty in the risk assessments of CCS with regards to the above issues. Although these practical, physical risks were the most frequently mentioned, there were also a number of negative attributes mentioned in relation to CCS as a part of climate change abatement policy. Avoiding the real problem (13%), short termism (12%) and the policy demonstrating reluctance to change from government (11%) were all mentioned regularly (or 36% expressing the sentiment that CCS is ‘treating the symptoms not the cause’). When asked if they could think of any positive effects of CCS, by far the most frequent response was abating climate change (58%). The notion that using CCS could “buy time” to develop other solutions was the next most frequently mentioned at 7%. CCS as one within a portfolio of decarbonisation technologies, options and measures, and as an explicit bridging strategy to a low- or zero-carbon energy system, would do much to increase its public acceptability.


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The citizen panels had the advantage of more lengthy discussions and with expert witnesses. Their ability to cross-examine experts does appear to have influenced their perceptions and to have provided some greater reassurance than was available to the questionnaire respondents. This might, however, be a function of the particular experts chosen and the panel might have responded differently if a ‘sceptical geologist’ had spoken to the group, i.e. one who might have posed more basic questions about the integrity of geological reservoirs for storing CO2. The panels seemed to recognise that most decarbonisation options have a set of associated risks and benefits, and that uncertainties would remain until further implementation of the technologies or other options had proceeded. Hence, they supported further research, alongside RandD on the other major options, and money spent on encouraging energy efficiency and demand reduction. Finding positive applications of captured CO2 (even if only in relatively small volumes) would also be beneficial in influencing public opinion favourably, as there is a strong ethic in favour of recycling waste by-products where possible. Enhanced Oil Recovery, combined with CCS, will, in general, be regarded as an additional reason in support of CCS, rather than counting as a reason against. 47% of respondents did not change their opinion of CCS because of EOR, though 43% became more favourable. Less than five percent became less favourable because of EOR. On the other hand, the citizen panels found that the motivation of those promoting the technology is questioned; if it is thought to benefit the oil companies, reactions are likely to be more hostile. The questionnaire also found that most respondents thought that the oil and gas industries should pay for CCS, followed by government (this response might have been influenced by the order of the questions, since the notion of EOR was introduced three questions before asking about who should pay for CCS). Regulation involving a partnership between Government, the Environment Agency, Environmental organisations and the energy industry would help to reassure the public The questionnaire found that there was widespread support for regulation to involve more than a single agency. In particular, there was support that an Environmental NGO should be involved in a regulatory role, to ensure that the regulatory process is conducted in a due and proper manner. A transparent, inclusive and open decision-making process was advocated by one citizen panel. The York panel was very clear on the importance of a decision-making process which was transparent and in which a range of stakeholders and the public could have faith. A joint meeting of decisionmakers and a sample of the members of the Manchester and York groups was proposed and generally supported. Further elaboration of the concept identified the following decision-makers as important to this process:

- MPs who sit on the Science and Technology and Environment Select Committees; - Senior civil servants; - Leading industrialists; - Leading environmentalists.

We would suggest that a joint meeting of this nature on the issues surrounding the desirability of CCS and its uses in different circumstances, with appropriate media coverage, would be a highly valuable exercise (comparable with the debate on Genetic Modification which is currently underway in the UK).


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(viii) What polices and processes would make CCS less acceptable? (citizen panels) CCS should not be considered or presented as a ‘technical fix’. Ownership by the public is important, as one participant expressed it: “we own the problem we should own the solution”. The citizen panels were opposed to regarding CCS as a single ‘fix it’ solution and expressed concerns that such use of CCS would be to treat the symptoms rather than the causes of climate change. There was a sense that CCS could “let us off the hook” of making more fundamental, deep-rooted changes and this avoidance of change was perceived generally negatively. There remained a minority of opponents who saw the concept and practice of CCS as either morally questionable, or as posing too great a risk in terms of geological integrity. There was also concern expressed that CCS would divert RandD resources and attention away from renewable energy technologies, demand reduction and energy efficiency. This concern was largely allayed when the level of new resources being directed to energy RandD, demonstration and support schemes was indicated, alongside the very small amount going into CCS RandD at present. A similar study, but using a different methodology was performed within the framework The Carbon Capture and Sequestration Technologies Program. In September 2009, Knowledge Networks (KN) conducted a study of opinions the public’s opinions about energy use and environmental issues. The primary goal of the study was to gather information on people’s support for measures for reducing green house emission. The bulk of the questionnaire was previously administered to the KN panel in 2003 and 2006 and the current study was also intended to track any changes in public’s feelings on the same issues. Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) 30 provided Knowledge Networks with the survey instrument and in conjunction with MIT, Knowledge Networks revised the instrument so that it met the design requirements of the study as well as those of the MSN WebTV platform. A pretest survey was conducted to determine the survey length and verify all survey functionality worked correctly. Once final changes to the main study had been implemented, the survey was fielded on September 10th, 2009 to 1,846 panel members age eighteen years of age or older who represented a general population sample. The completion goal was to collect a total of 1,200 qualified interviews. A questionnaire with various answers was developed. Most of the questions were related to the problems of global warming, environmental pollution, environmental safety, energy development areas. Some questions and answers were directly related to the prospects of CCS implementation, so below are the graphic illustrations of the answers statistics31. Recently, a great number of research on various social and environmental aspects of implementation of CCS technologies in the form of books32,33,34, as well as post-graduate theses35 was carried out.

30 Field Report: Carbon Sequestration Survey / Conducted for Massachusetts Institute of Technology // Submitted to: Howard Herzog, 2009. – 61 pp. 31 Gaphic Summary – Appendix to the Field Report: Carbon Sequestration Survey / Conducted for Massachusetts Institute of Technology // Submitted to: Howard Herzog, 2009. – 14 pp. 32 Acceptability of CO2 capture and storage: A review of legal, regulatory, economic and social aspects of CO2 capture and storage / H. de Coninck, J. Anderson, P. Curnow et al. // Energy research Centre of the Netherlands, 2006. – 42 pp. 33 CO2-Capture and Geological Storage as a Climate Policy Option: Technologies, Concepts, Perspectives / M. Fischedick, A. Esken, H.-J. Luhmann et al. // Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy, 2007. – 34 pp. 34 Public Outreach and Education for Carbon Storage Projects // National Energy Technology Laboratory, 2009. – 62 pp.


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Figure 13: Consider the following environmental problems. Which is the most important problem facing the US today? [Asked to select the top two, in order]

Figure 14: Have you heard of or read about any of the following in the past year? Check all that apply. [2003 survey included More efficient cars in place of Hybrid cars.]

35 Public Perception of Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage / A dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Sciences presented by Lars Ivar Wallquist, ETH Zurich, 2011. – 216 pp.


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Figure 15: There is a growing concern about increasing levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.

How do you think the following contribute to these levels?

Figure 16: How do you feel we can best address the issue of global warming as it relates to electricity production?


30

F responsible f echnologies

would you use? [The question included definitions not included here.]

t the positive aspects of the implementation of CCS technologies to mitigate climate change.

igure 17: The following technologies have been proposed to address global warming. If you wereor designing a plan to address global warming, which of the following t

For example, in Figures 13-17 show the results of public opinion polls on specific issues in different years (2003, 2006, 2009). These results indicate a negative public perception of the prospects for the introduction of CCS compared with other low-carbon technologies. Therefore, need to perform large amount of information activity to raise public awareness abou


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REVIEW of UKRAINIAN STAKEHOLDERS of the IMPLEMENTATION of CCT and CCS

O.M. Chebotova, O.V. Savkevych Donetsk National University

Donetsk, Ukraine In Ukraine, there are several levels of governmental bodies, enterprises, institutions and organizations interested in implementing CCT and CCS technologies. These are national and regional authorities, who are interested in sustainable development of the country and regions in conditions of climate change. Enterprises, as the main culprits of air pollution and CO2 emissions, are also interested in applying these technologies in their business processes. Representatives of scientific and educational communities are interested in implementing their environmental and climate-friendly methods at the domestic enterprises, and through collaboration with European researchers working in this field. Managers at all levels and public representatives need this information for making informed decisions to promote the introduction of CCT and CCS technologies in Ukraine. Detailed information with contacts on all of these stakeholders is collected in a database, which will be freely available at the project website. 1. National governmental bodies In Ukraine there are a number of ministries36 to be interested in implementing CCT and CCS technologies: - Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine, because agriculture is very sensitive to climate change, and according to the experts in Ukraine moisture indicators and, consequently, yields will change substantially; - Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources of Ukraine, which is determined as a responsible body for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, and, accordingly, should require to reduce CO2 emissions; - Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine, whose function is to ensure innovation and sustainable development of all enterprises, including the promotion of environmentally sound technologies; - Ministry of Industrial Policy of Ukraine, which was established in December 2012 and will contribute to the development of industrial enterprises in the direction of reducing their anthropogenic impact on the environment by reducing emissions of pollutants and carbon dioxide; - Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine, which is the main coordinator of activities in the energy sector of Ukraine, whose enterprises (coal-fired thermal power plants) are responsible for most of the Ukrainian CO2 emissions and harmful substances; - Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine, responsible for transport operations in Ukraine, including the road transport, making a significant contribution to the pollution of the atmosphere by various harmful substances and increasing the concentration of CO2 in the surface layer of the atmosphere;

36 The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. – http://www.kmu.gov.ua


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http://www.kmu.gov.ua/

- Ministry of Regional Development, Construction, Housing and Communal Services of Ukraine, which is in charge of providing thermal control to multi-storey buildings and controls energy losses, including energy efficiency of private residential sector, where a lot of CO2 is emitted (the second biggest source of emissions after energy); - Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, which determines the development of education and science, and shall promote training of specialists in every area of activity, including science, which affects the climate and the environment, and also mitigates the effects of climate change. In the process of implementing of CCT and CCS technologies, the following state services, agencies, inspections and commission of Ukraine will take part as matching, regulatory and licensing authorities in the field: - State Service of Geology and Mineral Resources of Ukraine, as any geological work (research, search, monitoring, etc.) can be carried out by geological enterprises that are under the management of the service, or with the authorization of the service; - State Service of Mining Supervision and Industrial Safety of Ukraine, which oversees the implementation of all geological and promotional activities, as well as controls them from the point of view of compliance with safety regulations; - State Emergency Service of Ukraine will be involved in case of danger or man-made disasters during the implementation of CCT and CCS technologies at the territory of Ukraine; - State Service of Intellectual Property of Ukraine is required to ensure the protection of intellectual property rights on the objects of both domestic and foreign origin that are used in CCT and CCS technologies; - State Agency of Water Resources of Ukraine will be involved to introduction of CCT and CCS technologies in case of use of water resources in Ukraine and will be informed about the possible impact of CCT and CCS technologies on water resources; - State Agency of Land Resources of Ukraine will be involved to introduction of CCT and CCS technologies in case of use of land resources of Ukraine and will be informed about the possible impact of CCT and CCS technology on land; - State Agency of Forest Resources of Ukraine will be involved to introduction of CCT and CCS technologies in case of use of forests of Ukraine and will be informed about the possible impact of CCT and CCS technology on forests; - State Agency of Ecological Investments of Ukraine, which is the executive body for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, and provides the process of preparation and realization of joint implementation projects as well as “green” investment projects, can assist in providing a “green” status to projects implementing CCT and CCS technologies; - State Agency of Energy Efficiency and Energy Saving of Ukraine, responsible for improving energy efficiency and providing energy efficiency in every field of activity and in all processes, can contribute to assessing the effectiveness of implementation of CCT and CCS technologies at specific enterprises and at the selected territories;


33

- State Agency of Science, Innovation and Іnformatization of Ukraine may organizationally and financially contribute to the process of research and implementation of CCT and CCS technologies at the enterprises in Ukraine. - State Ecological Inspection of Ukraine, which will monitor the impact of implementation of CCT and CCS technologies on the environment; - State Inspection of Technogenous Safety of Ukraine, which will monitor the man-made impact of implementation of CCT and CCS technologies on human safety and operation of infrastructure; - National Commission Realizing State Regulation in Energy Sector can contribute to all the processes of implementation of CCT and CCS technologies in Ukraine. All of the above mentioned national authorities may be interested and assist in introduction of CCT and CCS technologies only on its own initiative. To ensure their official commitment, it is necessary to develop and make appropriate decisions at the legislative level to include the introduction of CCT and CCS technologies in the list of priorities for the country. And this requires a decision of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine37 on amending the Laws of Ukraine or adopting appropriate laws. To do this, participation of the following committees will be needed:

- Committee on Agrarian Policy and Land Relations; - Committee on Construction, Urban Development, Housing and regional policy; - Committee on Environmental Policy, Natural Resources and Elimination of

Consequences of Chornobyl Catastrophe - Committee on Economic Policy; - Committee for European Integration; - Committee on Education and Science; - Committee on Fuel and Energy Complex, Nuclear Policy and Nuclear Safety; - The Committee on Industrial and Investment Policy; - Committee on Transport and Communications.

2. Regional state authorities and local self-government bodies In the target regions of the project are the five eastern regions of Ukraine (Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Lugansk and Kharkiv region), the following governmental bodies may be interested in implementing CCT and CCS technologies: - DNIPROPETROVSK OBLAST STATE ADMINISTRATION38:

- Department of Economic Development and Trade; - Department of Industry and Environment; - Department of Infrastructure; - Department of Agriculture and Rural Development; - Department of Emergencies and Protection of Population from the Consequences of

Chornobyl Catastrophe; - Department of Foreign Trade and Investment; - Department of Housing and Communal Service; - Department of Fuel and Energy Complex; - Department of Education and Science.

37 The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. – http://www.rada.gov.ua 38 Dnipropetrovsk Oblast State Administration. - http://www.adm.dp.ua


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http://www.rada.gov.ua/

http://www.adm.dp.ua/

- DONETSK OBLAST STATE ADMINISTRATION39:

- Main Department of Agricultural Development; - Main Department of Economics; - Main Department of Basic Industries, Energy and Energy Efficiency; - Main Department of Emergency, mobilization and defense work; - Main Department of Regional Development, investment and foreign economic relations; - Department of Education and Science.

- ZAPORIZHZHIA OBLAST STATE ADMINISTRATION40:

- Department of Economic Development and Trade; - Department of Agricultural Development; - Department of Industry and Infrastructure Development; - Department of Housing and Communal Sector and Construction; - Department of Education and Science, Youth and Sports.

- LUGANSK OBLAST STATE ADMINISTRATION41:

- Department of Economic Development and Trade; - Department of Agricultural Development; - Department of Industry and Energy saving; - Department of Education and Science, Youth and Sports; - Department of Emergencies.

- KHARKIV OBLAST STATE ADMINISTRATION42:

- Department of Agricultural Development; - Department of Economics and International Affairs; - Department of Education and Science; - Department of Innovation Development of Industry and Transport Infrastructure; - Department of Housing and Communal Sector and Infrastructure Development; - Department of Fuel and Energy Complex.

In 2012, the following governmental bodies, very interested in and very concerned about the possibilities of CCT and CCS implementation, previously subjected to the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources of Ukraine43, were eliminated their functions to be transferred to new units of oblast state administrations (have not yet been created):

- State Department of Environmental Protection in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; - State Department of Environmental Protection in Donetsk Oblast; - State Department of Environmental Protection in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast; - State Department of Environmental Protection in the Luhansk Oblast; - State Department of Environmental Protection in the Kharkiv Oblast.

In Ukraine there is structure of regional authorities - local self-governmental bodies: oblast, municipal and raion councils, which have executive powers, including administrations, departments or units, responsible for environmental issues in the area. So the database of stakeholders includes information about the five oblast councils in the target regions, as well as information on the following councils44:

39 Donetsk Oblast State Administration. - http://www.donoda.gov.ua 40 Zaporizhzhya Oblast State Administration. - http://www.zoda.gov.ua 41 Luhansk Oblast State Administration. - http://www.loga.gov.ua 42 Kharkiv Oblast State Administration. - http://www.kharkivoda.gov.ua 43 Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources of Ukraine. - http://www.menr.gov.ua 44 The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. – http://www.rada.gov.ua


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http://www.donoda.gov.ua/

http://www.zoda.gov.ua/

http://www.loga.gov.ua/

http://www.kharkivoda.gov.ua/

http://www.menr.gov.ua/

http://www.rada.gov.ua/

- Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (district councils - 22; municipalities - 20; district councils in

cities - 18); - Donetsk Oblast (district councils - 17; municipalities - 52; district councils in cities -

10); - Zaporizhzhia Oblast (district councils - 20; municipalities - 14); - Luhansk Oblast (district councils - 17; municipalities - 37; district councils in cities - 4); - Kharkiv Oblast (district councils - 27; municipalities - 17).

3. Higher educational institutions and research institutes The database of stakeholders also includes higher education institutions located in the target regions that may be involved in the development of CCT and CCS technologies and in development of educational process in the direction of climate change and climate technologies, in particular45: - DNIPROPETROVSK OBLAST:

- National Metallurgical Academy of Ukraine; - National Mining University; - Kryvyi Rig National University - Ukrainian State University of Chemical Technology; - Dniprodzerzhinsk State Technical University; - Dnieper State Academy of Civil Engineering and Architecture; - Oles Gonchar Dnepropetrovsk National University;

- DONETSK OBLAST:

- Donetsk National University; - Donetsk National Technical University; - Priazovskkiy State Technical University (Mariupol) - Donbas National Academy of Civil Engineering and Architecture; - Donbass State Engineering Academy; - M. Tugan-Baranovsky Donetsk National University of Economics and Trade; - Donetsk State University of Management; - Mariupol State University;

- ZAPORIZHIA OBLAST:

- Zaporizhzhya National Technical University; - Zaporozhye State Engineering Academy; - Zaporizhya National University;

- LUHANSK OBLAST:

- Donbass State Technical University; - Volodymyr Dahl East Ukrainian National University; - Taras Shevchenko Lugansk National University;

- KHARKIV OBLAST:

- V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University; - National Technical University “Kharkiv Polytechnic Institute”; - Kharkiv National Automobile and Highway University; - Kharkiv National University of Radio Electronics;

45 The Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine. – http://www.mon.gov.ua


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http://www.mon.gov.ua/

- Kharkiv National University of Civil Engineering and Architecture; - M.E. Zhukovskiy National Aerospace University “Kharkiv Aviation Institute”; - Kharkiv State University of Food Technology and Trade.

The following institutes could be potentially involved in scientific research and technological development in the field of CCT and CCS technologies46: - DNIPROPETROVSK OBLAST:

- Іnstitute for Technical Mechanics of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (NASU) and the National Space Agency of Ukraine (NSAU);

- M.S. Polyakov Іnstitut for geotehnіchnical mechanics of the NASU; - Institute of Nature and Ecology NASU; - Institute of Transport Systems and Technologies of the NASU; - Z.I. Nekrasov Institute of Ferrous Metallurgy of the NASU; - Scientific Research Institute “Energotehnologii”; - Research Institute of Mining Problems; - Ukrainian Equity Project Design and Technology Institute “Ukrstalproekt”; - Ukrainian State Institute of Steel (Ukrgipromez); - Ukrainian Scientific-Research and Design Institute of Industrial Technology Scouting

(UkrNIPRIpromtehnologii); - Scientific Research and Experimental Design Institute of Automation of Ferrous

Metallurgy; - Institute “DneprVNIPIenergoprom”; - State Design Institute of Mineral Processing Equipment “Gipromashobogaschenie”; - State Research and Production Enterprise for Surveying, Environmental, Hydraulic and

Geomechanical Studies “MAGGIE” - State Institute for Designing of the Mining Industry “Krivbasproekt” - Research Institute of Mining;

- DONETSK OBLAST:

- Institute of Applied Mathematics and Mechanics of the NASU; - A.A. Galkin Donetsk Physico-Technical Institute of the NASU; - Institute of Physics of Mining Processes of the NASU; - A.M. Litvinenko Institute of Physical Organic and Coal Chemistry of the NASU; - Institute of Industrial Economics of the NASU; - Ukrainian State Research and Design Institute of Mining Geology, Geomechanics and

Mine Surveying of the NASU; - Donetsk Botanical Garden of the NASU; - Research Institute of Medical and Environmental Problems of Donbass and the Coal

Industry; - Donetsk State Research and Design Institute of Nonferrous Metals; - Donetsk State Research Institute of Ferrous Metallurgy; - Donetsk State Research, Design and Research Institute of Experimental and

Comprehensive Mechanization of Mines “Dongiprouglemash”; - Donetsk Scientific and Engineering Center of the Research Institute of Organization and

Mechanization of Coal Mine Construction; - Donetsk Design Institute of Technology; - Donetsk Scientific-Research Institute of Coal Mining; - The Institute of Geological and Environmental Problems of Donbass;

46 A directory of the leading companies of Ukraine. – http://www.rada.com.ua


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http://www.rada.com.ua/

- M.M. Fedorov Research Institute of Mining Mechanics; - Design Institute “Dongipromash”; - State Enterprise “Donetsk Ecological Institute”; - Donetsk Design Research Institute “Teploelectroproject” of the PJSC “Donbasenergo”; - State Maiivka Research Institute for Safety in the Mining Industry; - State Scientific-Research Institute of Power Engineering; - State Regional Geological Enterprise “Donetskgeologiya”.

- ZAPORIZHZHIA OBLAST:

- Ukrainian Scientific-Research Institute of Industrial Gas Cleaning and Sanitizing; - Special Project and Design Bureau “Zaporozhgidrostal”; - State Research and Design Institute “Ukrgiprogazoochistka”; - A.G. Ivchenko Zaporozhye Machine-Building Design Bureau “Progress”;

- LUHANSK OBLAST:

- Ukrainian Scientific-Research and Design Institute of Enrichment and Briquetting of Coal;

- Scientific Research and Design Institute “Water Technologies”; - Research and Design Institute of Chemical Technology “Khimtekhnologiya”; - Subsidiary of “Energosberezhenie” - LLC “Energoresurs”; - State Design Institute of Mineral Processing Equipment “Gipromashugleobogaschenie”; - Scientific Research and Design Institute “Iskra”; - State Scientific-Research Institute of the Safety of Chemical Production; - Lugansk Institute of Design of the Coal Industry “Luganskgiproshakht”;

- KHARKIV OBLAST:

- State Enterprise “State Institute for Design of Coking Enterprises”; - V.Ya. Yuriev Institute of Plant Industry of the NASU; - Public Joint Stock Company “A.S. Berezhnoy Ukrainian Scientific-Research Institute of

Refractories”; - Kharkov Central Design Bureau for the Creation, Modernization and Reconstruction of

Heat-Mechanical Equipment of Power “Energoprogress” - Branch “Kotloturboprom”; - Open Joint Stock Company “Kharkov Scientific-Research and Design Institute

“Energoproekt”; - Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute of Ecological Problems; - A.N. Podgornyy Institute of Problems of Mechanical Engineering of the NASU; - Scientific Research and Design Institute of Automated Transport Management Systems

of Gas, a Subsidiary of State Enterprise “Naukanaftogaz” of the National Joint Stock Company “Naftogaz Ukrainy”;

- Open Joint Stock Company “Special Design and Technological Bureau for Electrical Submersible Drilling and Production of Oil “Potential”;

- Ukrainian Scientific-Research Institute of Natural Gases; - Ukrainian State Scientific-Research Institute of Metals; - State Enterprise “Vostokgeoinform”; - Kharkov State Geological Engineering Department “UkrNIINTIZ”; - Limited Liability Company “Kharkiv Design Institute “TEPLOELECTROPROEKT-

UNION”; - Subsidiary “Agrogeofizika” of the National Joint Stock Company “Nadra Ukrainy”; - Institute of Electrophysics and Radiation Technologies of the NASU; - Limited Liability Company “SPE Ekoenergokom”;


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- Scientific Research and Design Institute of Gas Transportation Branch of PJSC

“Ukrtransgas”; - Ukrainian Scientific-Research Institute for Land Management, Forestry, Environment

and Law; - Limited Liability Company “Ukrgazteh” - Kharkiv Branch; - Limited Liability Company “EkotermoInzhiniring”; - Ukrainian State Research and Production Institute of Engineering and Environmental

Studies “UkrNIINTIZ”; - Limited Liability Company “Research and Consulting Group “Ecology”; - A.I. Kalmykov Center for Radiophysics Sensing of the Earth of the NASU and NSAU; - B.I. Verkin Physical-Technical Institute of Low Temperature Physics of the NASU; - Research Center for Industrial Problems of Development of the NASU.

4. Energy and industrial enterprises A database of enterprises located in targeted regions which are major air pollutants was created based on official reports of the regional units of the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources47 in the form of Ecological Passports of the regions for 2011: - DNIPROPETROVSK OBLAST48:

- Pridneprovskaya TPP of the PJSC “Dneproenergo’; - Kryvyy Rih TPP of the PJSC “Dneproenergo”; - PJSC “Dzerzhinsky Dnieper Metallurgical Plant”; - PJSC “Nikopol Ferroalloy Plant”; - Metallurgical production of PJSC “ArcelorMittal Krivoy Rog”; - OJSC “Pivdennyy GOK”; - PJSC “Pivnichnyy GOK”; - Mining and Processing Complex PJSC “ArcelorMittal Krivoy Rog”; - Coke Production of PJSC “ArcelorMittal Krivoy Rog”; - PJSC “Centralnyy GOK”; - Coke-Chemical Production PJSC “Euras - Petrovsky Dnepropetrovsk Metallurgical

Plant” (OJSC “Dniprokoks”); - PJSC “Euras - Petrovsky Dnepropetrovsk Metallurgical Plant”; - OJSC “INTERPIPE - Nyzhnodniprovsk Rolling Plant”; - PJSC "Euras Bahliykoks”; - PJSC “Euras - Dniprodzherzhynsk Coke Plant”; - PJSC “Ordzhonikidzevsk GOK”;

- DONETSK OBLAST49:

- PJSC «Illicha Mariupol Metallurgical Plant”; - PJSC Metallurgical Plant “Azovstal”; - RC “Zasyadko Mine”; - PC “Donetskstal” - Steel Plant” of the Branch “Metallurgical Complex”; - PJSC “Enakieve Metallurgical Plant”; - PJSC “Avdiivka Coke Plant”;

47 Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources of Ukraine. - http://www.menr.gov.ua 48 Environmental Passport Dnipropetrovsk region 2011 // The State Department of Environmental Protection in the Dnipropetrovsk region, 2012. – 135 pp. 49 Environmental Passport Donetsk region 2011 // The State Department of Environmental Protection in the Donetsk region, 2012. – 142 pp.


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http://www.menr.gov.ua/

- PJSC “Yasynivskyi Coke Plant”; - PC “Yenakievo koksohimprom”; - PJSC “Donetskkoks”; - PJSC “Makiyivkoks”; - Slovyansk TPP of the PJSC “Donbasenergo”; - Starobeshevo TPP of the PJSC “Donbasenergo”; - Kurakhovo TPP of the LLC “Skhidenergo”; - Vuglegirska TPP; - Zuivka TPP of the LLC “Skhidenergo”;

- ZAPORIZHIA OBLAST50:

- OJSC “Zaporizhstal”; - PJSC “Dniprospetsstal”; - PJSC “Zaporozhye Aluminum Plant”; - PJSC “Zaporizhkoks”; - PJSC “Ukrainian Graphite”; - SE “Zaporizhia Titanium and Magnesium Plant”; - PJSC “Zaporozhye Ferroalloy Plant”; - PJSC “Zaporizhskloflyus”; - PJSC “Zaporozhye Abrasive Plant”; - PJSC “Zaporizhvognetryv”; - SE “Kremniypolimer”; - Zaporizhzhya TPP of the PJSC “Dneproenergo”;

- LUHANSK OBLAST51:

- Lugansk TPP of the LLC “Skhidenergo”; - PC “Alchevsk Metallurgic Plant”; - PC “Alchevsk Coke Plant”; - PC “Lysychansk Oil Investment Company”; - CJSC “Severodonetsk Association “Azot”;

- KHARKIV OBLAST52:

- OJSC “EUROCEMENT-UKRAINE”; - OJSC “Kharkiv CHP-5”; - SE “CHP-2 Eskhar”; - Zmiiv TPP of the PJSC “Centrenergo”.

5. Non-governmental organizations and mass media Associations of citizens – regional environmental NGOs that actively participate in the work of the public councils at the state Department of Environmental Protection in the target regions, and on the basis of which the database was set up – play an important role in shaping public opinion about the prospect of introduction of CCT and CCS technologies:

50 Environmental Passport Zaporozhye region 2011 // The State Department of Environmental Protection in the Zaporozhye region, 2012. – 130 pp. 51 Environmental Passport Luhansk region 2011 // The State Department of Environmental Protection in the Luhansk region, 2012. – 128 pp. 52 Environmental Passport Kharkiv region 2011 // The State Department of Environmental Protection in the Kharkiv region, 2012. – 117 pp.


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- DNIPROPETROVSK OBLAST53:

- Dnipropetrovsk Regional Ecological Association “Green World”; - Dnipropetrovsk Oblast NGO “Academic Centre of Ecological Life Safety”; - Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Organization of Ukrainian Environmental League; - M. Varnyak Pavlograd City Ecological Society; - NGO “Man on Earth”; - Interregional Environmental NGO “World of Water”; - Dnipropetrovsk City Association of Conservation; - Pridneprovsky Centre for Clean Productions; - Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Organization of Ukrainian Society for Nature Conservation; - Public Company “Union Territory for the Creation of a Harmonious Environment”; - NGO “Public Environmental Control”; - Regional Organization of the Public Movement of Ukraine “For the Right of Citizens to

Environmental Safety”; - NGO “Native Land”; - Youth Environmental League of Pridneprovye; - Ecological and Tourist Association “Orlan”; - NGO “Dnipropetrovsk Interregional Ecological Association”; - NGO “Tribal Land”; - NGO “Dnipropetrovsk branch of the National Ecological Centre of Ukraine”;

- DONETSK OBLAST54:

- NGO “Makeevsky City Branch of All-Ukrainian Union of Child “Environmental Guard”;

- Donetsk NGO “Agency for Local Government Development”; - Donetsk Oblast NGO “No Incinerator in Donetsk!”; - Donetsk Regional Public Organization “Association for Environmental Rights”; - NGO “Donetsk Environmental Movement”; - Khartsyzk Urban Socio-Ecological Organization “Eco-Action”; - Donetsk Regional Environmental NGO “To Clean Sources”; - Donetsk Oblast Organization “For the Right of Citizens to Environmental Safety”; - Donetsk Oblast NGO “Society for Conservation - Heritage of Donbass”; - Donetsk City Children NGO Ukrainian Union “Environmental Guard”; - NGO “Center for Sustainable Development “Wind Rose”; - Donetsk Oblast NGO “Mobile Service Environmental Safety”; - Donetsk Oblast Association for Development Education and Science Network; - Donetsk Regional Organization “All-Ukrainian Ecological League”; - NGO Ecological and Cultural Center “Bakhmat”; - Donetsk City Youth Environmental Center “Ecos”; - Donetsk Oblast NGO “Ecological Society of Donbass”;

- ZAPORIZHZHIA OBLAST55:

- Regional Ecological Association “Green Movement of Zaporizhzhia”; - Zaporizhzhya Oblast Charitable Organization “Sozidanie”; - Zaporizhzhya Branch of All-Ukrainian Ecological League; - NGO “Clean Azov”; - Youth NGO “Zaporozhye Center Promoting Local History “Horse”; - Zaporizhia City Environmental Club;

53 The State Department of Environmental Protection in the Dnipropetrovsk region. - http://ecodnepr.dp.ua 54 The State Department of Environmental Protection in the Donetsk region. - http://ecodon.org.ua 55 The State Department of Environmental Protection in the Zaporozhye region. - http://www.zdn.gov.ua


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http://ecodnepr.dp.ua/

http://ecodon.org.ua/

http://www.zdn.gov.ua/

- Zaporizhia Oblast NGO “Cossacks Specialized Command “SICH”; - Zaporizhia Oblast NGO “Ukrainian Society for the Protection of Nature”; - Zaporizhia Oblast Association “Environmental Education”;

- LUGANSK OBLAST56:

- Luhansk Oblast Organization of Ukrainian Society for Nature Conservation; - Luhansk Oblast NGO “Green World”; - Luhansk Oblast NGO “Dawn of Ukraine”; - Severodonetsk Branch of Ukrainian Ecological Association “Green World”; - Rubezhnoe Branch of Ukrainian Ecological Association “Green World”; - Luhansk Branch of Ukrainian Environmental League; - Luhansk Branch of Ukrainian Children's Union “Environmental Guard”; - Children's Environmental NGO “Green Bean”; - NGO “Zelenyy gomin”, Illiriya, Lutuginskyi district; - NGO “Istok-Lubo”, Lugansk; - Club “Parostok”, Lysychansk; - Luhansk Oblast NGO “Ecopark”; - Alchevsk City Society for Nature Conservation; - Regional NGO “Agency for Environment Research”; - Luhansk Oblast Organization “World Wildlife”;

- KHARKIV OBLAST57:

- Kharkov Oblast NGO “Ekologichna bezpeka”; - Kharkov Oblast NGO “Ekologichna varta”; - Environmental Charitable Foundation “ECOS”; - Kharkov Oblast NGO “Eco”; - Association of Kharkov Interbranch Center of Environmental Education, Training and

Scientific Activities “Kharkov Ecocenter”; - Kharkiv Regional Council of the Ukrainian Society for Nature Conservation; - Kharkiv Oblast Public Organization “Committee on Consumer Protection and

Preservation of the Environment”; - Kharkov Youth NGO of Pupils and “Ecocenter”; - Kharkov Environmental Centre “Laguna”; - Kharkiv City Organization “Independent Agency for Environmental Information”

(Ekoinform); - Kharkiv Regional Organization of the All-Ukrainian Ecological League; - Kharkiv NGO “Energiya Myru”; - Kharkiv Oblast Public Organization “Scientific Ecological Society “EkoPerspektyva”; - Interregional Society of Environmental Group “Pecheneg”; - Kharkiv NGO “EcoPravo-Kharkov” - Environmental Public Advocacy Center.

Also significant impact on public awareness on the necessity of introduction of CCT and CCS technologies has an environmental journalism, which is only forming in Ukraine: there are no targeted environmental media, not to count a number of Ukrainian environmental websites. So currently, the database of Ukrainian media (websites, newspapers, magazines, TV programs and individual journalists) that may contribute to the public recognition of the importance of CCT and CCS technologies to mitigate the effects of climate change is being created.

56 The State Department of Environmental Protection in the Luhansk region. - http://ecolugansk.in.ua 57 The State Department of Environmental Protection in the Kharkiv region. - http://ecodepart.kharkov.ua


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http://ecolugansk.in.ua/

http://ecodepart.kharkov.ua/

ANNEX A:

GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT A PROJECT “LOW-CARBON OPPORTUNITIES FOR INDUSTRIAL

REGIONS OF UKRAINE (LCOIR-UA)” The project is implemented by the Donetsk National University (Donetsk, Ukraine) - Research and Education Center “Convergence of Nano-, Bio- and Info- Technologies for Sustainable Regional Development”, - and funded by the European Union Thematic Programme for Environment and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources, including Energy (direction “Cooperation in Clean Coal Technology and technology of Carbon Capture and Storage”). CONCEPTION OF PROJECT Ukraine is the seventh country in Europe in terms of CO2, and more than 70% of these emissions result from the energy sector, mainly from the burning of domestic coal (5th report of Ukraine on Climate Change, Kiev, 2009). Most power plants, located in the eastern part of Ukraine, namely in the regions selected for the project. The remaining industries: metallurgy, mining companies and chemical industries - are enormous users of coal for energy and most of these factories are also located in the regions to be studied. In recent decades, in Ukraine there is a reduction of CO2 emissions from industrial production and folding of the regular closing of factories. To revive the industrial sector without excessive increase of CO2, in Ukraine, as well as in the Donbass industrial region in the main, it is necessary to begin implementation of clean coal technologies and technologies of carbon capture and storage (climate technology). The main problem faced by the Ukrainian energy sector is the deterioration of the equipment: a large part of which has been operating for over 50 years. Equipment is already very old, to be adapted to less emission and climate technologies, and thus should be dismantled and replaced by new technologies. Now is the time for Ukraine to update their technology and choose the most effective. So there is a need and the need to enhance knowledge in the area of climate technology for policy-makers, industrialists, engineers and scientists. AIMS OF PROJECT The overall objectives of the project are: Encourage and assist the actual implementation of activities to introduce climate technologies in

Ukraine; Cooperation in the area of climate technology between Ukraine and the European Community. The specific objectives are as follows: Improve knowledge of Ukrainian context for climate technology; Identify potential targets for the current programs of adaptation to climate technologies Ukraine; Creation of a major stakeholder views on climate technology as a tool to combat climate

change.


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Target groups of selected industrial regions (Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhya, Luhansk and Kharkiv regions) are: Regional governments and local authorities; Administrative and technical staff of regional energy and industrial companies; Representatives of regional educational and scientific communities; Students and graduates of natural sciences and economics departments of universities. COMPONENTS OF PROJECT Donetsk National University (DonNU) has three components of the project: 1. Research on a national and regional context the possibilities of using climate technology The results of this section will be reviews of the global context, the existing Ukrainian political trends, laws and regulations; of stakeholders, as well as advice on building climate technologies in Ukraine. 2. Rating: creation of geographic information systems (GIS) To assess the opportunities and challenges of climate deployment of technologies in Ukraine will be created GIS sources and sinks of CO2, but also provided recommendations for the actual implementation of the climate technology for facilities in the industrial regions of Ukraine. 3. Exchange of knowledge Sharing of knowledge created and accumulated during the project implementation will be carried out by organizing and conducting the following activities: educational sessions and round tables for representatives of government and business, for educators, scientists and engineers, an international scientific-practical conference on topical issues of climate change and the use of climate technologies, lectures for undergraduate students and graduate students DonNU. The project will be published: monograph, manuals on the use of climate technologies, quarterly newsletters, as well as to create a Web site aimed at different target groups of the project. For more information contact:

Donetsk National University Universitetska str., 24 Donetsk, 83001 Ukraine Tel./fax: +380 (62) 302 9223 E-mail: [email protected] Web: http://research.donnu.edu.ua Co-ordinator of project: Dr. Mykola Shestavin Mob. tel.: +380 (50) 217 9443 E-mail: [email protected] Web: http://www.lcoir-ua.eu

The views expressed on this web-site do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Commission and Government of Ukraine


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Lcoi reviews 2012 09

Documents

implementation of cct

ccs technologies

cost of implementation

ccs introduction

technology cct

joint implementation

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