LCD's Loan Primer

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A GUIDE TO THEU.S. LOAN MARKET

LEVERAGED COMMENTARY & DATA

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The analyses, including ratings, of Standard & Poors and its affiliates are opinions and not statements of fact or recommendations to purchase, hold, or sellsecurities. They do not address the suitability of any security, and should not be relied on in making any investment decision. Standard & Poors does not act as afiduciary or an investment advisor except where registered as such.

Copyright 2012 by Standard & Poors Financial Services LLC. All rights reserved.STANDARD & POORS and S&P are registered trademarks of Standard & Poors Financial Services LLC

LEVERAGED LOANS.TO UNDERSTAND THE CREDITRISK, INSIGHT MATTERS.

You dont want surprises in your leveraged loan portfolio. Thats whyour bank loan and recovery ratings come with detailed recovery reportsto help you tell the well-secured loans from the ones that arent. Ourdedicated team of experienced analysts specically focuses on recoveryand leveraged credit, to bring you fundamental, scenario-based analyses.And we cover the globe, to help you see whats happening around thecorner and around the world.

Get the details. Talk to Andrew Watt in New York at 212.438.7868 [email protected], or David Gillmor in London at+44.20.7176.3673 or [email protected].

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A GUIDE TO THEU.S. LOAN MARKET

LEVERAGED COMMENTARY & DATA

SEPTEMBER 2012

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STANDARD & POORS RATINGS SERVICES | S&P CAPITAL IQ WWW.LCDCOMPS.COM

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A GUIDE TO THE U.S. LOAN MARKET | SEPTEMBER 2012

CONTENTSA Syndicated Loan Primer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Rating Leveraged Loans: An Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28

Criteria Guidelines For Recovery Ratings onGlobal Industrials Issuers Speculative-Grade Debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32

Key Contacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45


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STANDARD & POORS RATINGS SERVICES | S&P CAPITAL IQ 5WWW.LCDCOMPS.COM

Asyndicated loan is a commercial loan provided by a group of lendersand is structured, arranged, and administered by one or severalcommercial or investment banks known as arrangers.

Starting with the large leveraged buyout (LBO) loans of the mid-1980s,

the syndicated loan market has become the dominant way for issuers totap banks and other institutional capital providers for loans. The reason issimple: Syndicated loans are less expensive and more efficient toadminister than traditional bilateral, or individual, credit lines.

Arrangers serve the time-honored investment-banking role of raising investor dollars for anissuer in need of capital. The issuer pays thearranger a fee for this service, and, naturally,this fee increases with the complexity and riski-ness of the loan. As a result, the most profitableloans are those to leveraged borrowersissu-ers whose credit ratings are speculative gradeand who are paying spreads (premiums aboveLIBOR or another base rate) sufficient toattract the interest of nonbank term loan inves-tors, typically LIBOR+200 or higher, though thisthreshold moves up and down depending onmarket conditions.

By contrast, large, high-quality companiespay little or no fee for a plain-vanilla loan, typi-cally an unsecured revolving credit instrumentthat is used to provide support for short-termcommercial paper borrowings or for working

capital. In many cases, moreover, these borrow-ers will effectively syndicate a loan themselves,using the arranger simply to craft documentsand administer the process. For leveraged issu-ers, the story is a very different one for thearranger, and, by different, we mean morelucrative. A new leveraged loan can carry anarranger fee of 1% to 5% of the total loan

commitment, generally speaking, depending on(1) the complexity of the transaction, (2) howstrong market conditions are at the time, and(3) whether the loan is underwritten. Mergerand acquisition (M&A) and recapitalizationloans will likely carry high fees, as will exitfinancings and restructuring deals. Seasonedleveraged issuers, by contrast, pay lower feesfor refinancings and add-on transactions.

Because investment-grade loans areinfrequently drawn down and, therefore, offerdrastically lower yields, the ancillary business isas important a factor as the credit product inarranging such deals, especially because manyacquisition-related financings for investment-grade companies are large in relation to thepool of potential investors, which would consistsolely of banks.

The retail market for a syndicated loan

consists of banks and, in the case of leveragedtransactions, finance companies and institu-tional investors such as mutual funds, struc-tured finance vehicles, and hedge funds. Beforeformally launching a loan to these retailaccounts, arrangers will often read the marketby informally polling select investors to gaugetheir appetite for the credit. Based on these

Managing DirectorSteven C. MillerNew York(1) [email protected]

A Syndicated Loan Primer


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discussions, the arranger will launch the creditat a spread and fee it believes will clear themarket. Until 1998, this would have been it.Once the pricing was set, it was set, except inthe most extreme cases. If the loan wereundersubscribed, the arrangers could very wellbe left above their desired hold level. After the

Russian debt crisis roiled the market in 1998,however, arrangers adopted market-flex lan-guage, which allows them to change the pricingof the loan based on investor demandin somecases within a predetermined rangeas well asshift amounts between various tranches of aloan, as a standard feature of loan commitmentletters. Market-flex language, in a single stroke,pushed the loan syndication process, at least inthe leveraged arena, across the Rubicon, to afull-fledged capital markets exercise.

Initially, arrangers invoked flex language tomake loans more attractive to investors by hikingthe spread or lowering the price. This was logicalafter the volatility introduced by the Russian debtdebacle. Over time, however, market-flex becamea tool either to increase or decrease pricing of aloan, based on investor demand.

Because of market flex, a loan syndicationtoday functions as a book-building exercise,in bond-market parlance. A loan is originallylaunched to market at a target spread or, aswas increasingly common by the late 2000s,with a range of spreads referred to as price talk(i.e., a target spread of, say, LIBOR+250 to

LIBOR+275). Investors then will make commit-ments that in many cases are tiered by thespread. For example, an account may put in for$25 million at LIBOR+275 or $15 million atLIBOR+250. At the end of the process, thearranger will total up the commitments and

then make a call on where to price, or print,the paper. Following the example above, if thepaper is oversubscribed at LIBOR+250, thearranger may slice the spread further.Conversely, if it is undersubscribed even atLIBOR+275, then the arranger may be forcedto raise the spread to bring more money to

the table.

Loan PurposesFor the most part, issuers use leveraged loanproceeds for four purposes:

U To support a merger- or acquisition-relatedtransaction,

U To back a recapitalzation of a companys bal-ance sheet,

U To refinance debt, U To fund general corporate purposes or proj-

ect finance.

Mergers and acquisitionsM&A is the lifeblood of leveraged finance. Thereare the three primary types of acquisition loans:

1) Leveraged buyouts (LBOs). Most LBOs arebacked by a private equity firm, which funds thetransaction with a significant amount of debt inthe form of leveraged loans, mezzanine finance,high-yield bonds, and/or seller notes. Debt as ashare of total sources of funding for the LBOcan range from 50% to upwards of 75%. Thenature of the transaction will determine howhighly it is leveraged. Issuers with large, stablecash flows usually are able to support higherleverage. Similarly, issuers in defensive, less-cyclical sectors are given more latitude thanthose in cyclical industry segments. Finally, the

Largest Loan Mutual Fund ManagersAssets under management (bil. $)

Eaton Vance Group $12.25 Franklin Funds $2.19

Fidelity Advisors $11.44 Blackrock $1.95

Oppenheimer & Co. $5.88 T. Rowe Price High Yield Fund $1.95

Hartford Asset Mgmt $5.57 DWS Investments $1.89PIMCO $4.48 ING Investment Management $1.61

INVESCO $4.41 RS Investments $1.40

RidgeWorth $3.75 MainStay Investments $1.05

Lord Abbett $2.89 JP Morgan Chase $0.78

Nuveen $2.67 Goldman Sachs $0.68

John Hancock Asset Management $2.50 Pioneer Investments $0.61


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A SYNDICATED LOAN PRIMER


reputation of the private equity backer (spon-sor) also plays a role, as does market liquidity(the amount of institutional investor cash avail-able). Stronger markets usually allow for higherleverage; in weaker markets lenders want tokeep leverage in check.

There are three main types of LBO deals:

U Public-to-private (P2P)also called go-pri-vate dealsin which the private equity firmpurchases a publicly traded company via atender offer. In some P2P deals, a stub por-tion of the equity continues to trade onan exchange. In others, the company isbought outright.

U Sponsor-to-sponsor (S2S) deals, where oneprivate equity firm sells a portfolio propertyto another.

U Noncore acquisitions, in which a corporateissuer sells a division to a private equity firm.2) Platform acquisitions. Transactions in

which private-equity-backed issuers buys abusiness that they judge will be accretive byeither creating cost savings and/or generatingexpansion synergies.

3) Strategic acquisitions. These are similarto a platform acquisitions but are executedby an issuer that is not owned by a privateequity firm.

RecapitalizationsA leveraged loan backing a recpitalizationresults in changes in the composition of anentitys balance sheet mix between debt andequity either by (1) issuing debt to pay a divi-dend or repurchase stock or (2) selling newequity, in some cases to repay debt.

Some common examples: U Dividend. Dividend financing is straightfor-

ward. A company takes on debt and usesproceeds to pay a dividend to shareholders.Activity here tends to track market condi-tions. Bull markets inspire more dividenddeals as issuers tap excess liquidity to payout equity holders. In weaker markets activity

slows as lenders tighten the reins, and usu-ally look skeptically at transactions thatweaken an issuers balance sheet.

U Stock repurchase. In this form of recap deala company uses debt proceeds to repurchasestock. The effect on the balance sheet is thesame as a dividend, with the mix shiftingtoward debt.

U Equity infusion. These transactions typicallyare seen in distressed situations. In somecases, the private equity owners agree tomake an equity infusion in the company, inexchange for a new debt package. In others,a new investor steps in to provide fresh capi-tal. Either way, the deal strengthens the

companys balance sheet. U IPO (reverse LBO). An issuer listsor, in the

case of a P2P LBO, relistson an exchange.As part of such a deleveraging the companymight revamp its loans or bonds at morefavorable terms.

RefinancingSimply put, this entails a new loan or bondissue torefinance existing debt.

General corporate purposesThese deals support working capital, generaloperations, and other business-as-usual purposes.

Build-outsBuild-out financing supports a particular project,such as a utility plant, a land development deal,a casino or an energy pipeline.

Types Of SyndicationsThere are three types of syndications: an

underwritten deal, a best-efforts syndication,and a club deal.

Underwritten deal

An underwritten deal is one for which thearrangers guarantee the entire commitment,and then syndicate the loan. If the arrangerscannot fully subscribe the loan, they are forcedto absorb the difference, which they may latertry to sell to investors. This is achievable, inmost cases, if market conditions, or the creditsfundamentals, improve. If not, the arranger maybe forced to sell at a discount and, potentially,even take a loss on the paper (known as sellingthrough fees). Or the arranger may just be leftabove its desired hold level of the credit. So, whydo arrangers underwrite loans? First, offeringan underwritten loan can be a competitive toolto win mandates. Second, underwritten loansusually require more lucrative fees because the


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agent is on the hook if potential lenders balk. Ofcourse, with flex-language now common, under-writing a deal does not carry the same risk itonce did when the pricing was set in stone priorto syndication.

Best-efforts syndication

A best-efforts syndication is one for whichthe arranger group commits to underwrite lessthan the entire amount of the loan, leaving thecredit to the vicissitudes of the market. If theloan is undersubscribed, the credit may notcloseor may need major surgery to clear themarket. Traditionally, best-efforts syndicationswere used for risky borrowers or for complextransactions.

Club deal

A club deal is a smaller loan (usually $25 mil-

lion to $100 million, but as high as $150 million)that is premarketed to a group of relationshiplenders. The arranger is generally a first amongequals, and each lender gets a full cut, or nearlya full cut, of the fees.

The Syndication ProcessThe information memo, or bank book

Before awarding a mandate, an issuer mightsolicit bids from arrangers. The banks will out-line their syndication strategy and qualifica-tions, as well as their view on the way the loan

will price in market. Once the mandate isawarded, the syndication process starts. Thearranger will prepare an information memo (IM)describing the terms of the transactions. TheIM typically will include an executive summary,investment considerations, a list of terms andconditions, an industry overview, and a financialmodel. Because loans are not securities, thiswill be a confidential offering made only toqualified banks and accredited investors.

If the issuer is speculative grade and seekingcapital from nonbank investors, the arrangerwill often prepare a public version of the IM.

This version will be stripped of all confidentialmaterial such as management financialprojections so that it can be viewed byaccounts that operate on the public side of thewall or that want to preserve their ability to buybonds or stock or other public securities of theparticular issuer (see the Public Versus Privatesection below). Naturally, investors that view

materially nonpublic information of a companyare disqualified from buying the companyspublic securities for some period of time.

As the IM (or bank book, in traditionalmarket lingo) is being prepared, the syndicatedesk will solicit informal feedback frompotential investors on what their appetite for

the deal will be and at what price they arewilling to invest. Once this intelligence has beengathered, the agent will formally market thedeal to potential investors. Arrangers willdistribute most IMsalong with otherinformation related to the loan, pre- and post-closingto investors through digital platforms.Leading vendors in this space are Intralinks,Syntrak, and Debt Domain.

The IM typically contain the following sections: U The executive summary will include a

description of the issuer, an overview of thetransaction and rationale, sources and uses,and key statistics on the financials.

U Investment considerations will be, basically,managements sales pitch for the deal.

U The list of terms and conditions will be a pre-liminary term sheet describing the pricing,structure, collateral, covenants, and otherterms of the credit (covenants are usuallynegotiated in detail after the arrangerreceives investor feedback).

U The industry overview will be a description ofthe companys industry and competitiveposition relative to its industry peers.

UThe financial model will be a detailed modelof the issuers historical, pro forma, and pro- jected financials including managementshigh, low, and base case for the issuer.Most new acquisition-related loans kick off

at a bank meeting at which potential lendershear management and the sponsor group (ifthere is one) describe what the terms of theloan are and what transaction it backs.Understandably, bank meetings are more oftenthan not conducted via a Webex or conferencecall, although some issuers still prefer old-fashioned, in-person gatherings.

Whatever the format, management uses thebank meeting to provide its vision for thetransaction and, most important, tell why andhow the lenders will be repaid on or ahead ofschedule. In addition, investors will be briefedregarding the multiple exit strategies, includingsecond ways out via asset sales. (If it is a smalldeal or a refinancing instead of a formal


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meeting, there may be a series of calls or one-on-one meetings with potential investors.)

Once the loan is closed, the final terms arethen documented in detailed credit and securityagreements. Subsequently, liens are perfectedand collateral is attached.

Loans, by their nature, are flexible documents

that can be revised and amended from time totime. These amendments require different levelsof approval (see Voting Rights section below). Amendments can range from something assimple as a covenant waiver to something ascomplex as a change in the collateral packageor allowing the issuer to stretch out itspayments or make an acquisition.

The loan investor market

There are three primary-investor consisten-cies: banks, finance companies, andinstitutional investors.

Banks, in this case, can be either a commer-cial bank, a savings and loan institution, or asecurities firm that usually provides invest-ment-grade loans. These are typically largerevolving credits that back commercial paper orare used for general corporate purposes or, insome cases, acquisitions. For leveraged loans,banks typically provide unfunded revolvingcredits, LOCs, andalthough they are becomingincreasingly less commonamortizing termloans, under a syndicated loan agreement.

Finance companies have consistently

represented less than 10% of the leveragedloan market, and tend to play in smaller deals$25 million to $200 million. These investorsoften seek asset-based loans that carry widespreads and that often feature time-intensivecollateral monitoring.

Institutional investors in the loan market areprincipally structured vehicles known as collat-eralized loan obligations (CLO) and loan partici-pation mutual funds (known as prime fundsbecause they were originally pitched to inves-tors as a money-market-like fund that wouldapproximate the prime rate). In addition, hedge

funds, high-yield bond funds, pension funds,insurance companies, and other proprietaryinvestors do participate opportunistically inloans focusing usually on wide-margin (orhigh-octane) paper.

CLOsare special-purpose vehicles set up tohold and manage pools of leveraged loans. Thespecial-purpose vehicle is financed with several

tranches of debt (typically a AAA rated tranche,a AA tranche, a BBB tranche, and a mezzaninetranche) that have rights to the collateral andpayment stream in descending order. Inaddition, there is an equity tranche, but theequity tranche is usually not rated. CLOs arecreated as arbitrage vehicles that generate

equity returns through leverage, by issuing debt10 to 11 times their equity contribution. Thereare also market-value CLOs that are lessleveragedtypically 3 to 5 timesand allowmanagers more flexibility than more tightlystructured arbitrage deals. CLOs are usuallyrated by two of the three major ratingsagencies and impose a series of covenant testson collateral managers, including minimumrating, industry diversification, and maximumdefault basket.

Loan mutual funds are how retail investorscan access the loan market. They are mutualfunds that invest in leveraged loans. Thesefundsoriginally known as prime fundsbecause they offered investors the chance toearn the prime interest rate that banks chargeon commercial loanswere first introduced inthe late 1980s. Today there are three main cat-egories of funds:

U Daily-access funds: These are traditionalopen-end mutual fund products into whichinvestors can buy or redeem shares each dayat the funds net asset value.

U Continuously offered, closed-end funds:

These were the first loan mutual fund prod-ucts. Investors can buy into these funds eachday at the funds net asset valueNAV.Redemptions, however, are made via monthlyor quarterly tenders rather than each day likethe open-end funds described above. Tomake sure they can meet redemptions, manyof these funds, as well as daily access funds,set up lines of credit to cover withdrawalsabove and beyond cash reserves.

U Exchange-traded, closed-end funds: Theseare funds that trade on a stock exchange.Typically, the funds are capitalized by an ini-

tial public offering. Thereafter, investors canbuy and sell shares, but may not redeemthem. The manager can also expand the fundvia rights offerings. Usually, they are onlyable to do so when the fund is trading at apremium to NAV, howevera provision that istypical of closed-end funds regardless of theasset class.


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In March 2011, Invesco introduced the firstindex-based exchange traded fund, PowerSharesSenior Loan Portfolio (BKLN), which is based onthe S&P/LSTA Loan 100 Index.

The table lists the 20 largest loan mutualfund managers by AUM as of July 31, 2012.

Public Versus PrivateIn the old days, a bright red line separatedpublic and private information in the loan mar-ket. Loans were strictly on the private side ofthe wall and any information transmittedbetween the issuer and the lender groupremained confidential.

In the late 1980s, that line began to blur as aresult of two market innovations. The first wasmore active secondary trading that sprung upto support (1) the entry of nonbank investors inthe market, such as insurance companies andloan mutual funds and (2) to help banks sellrapidly expanding portfolios of distressed andhighly leveraged loans that they no longerwanted to hold. This meant that parties thatwere insiders on loans might now exchangeconfidential information with traders andpotential investors who were not (or not yet) aparty to the loan. The second innovation thatweakened the public-private divide was trade journalism that focuses on the loan market.

Despite these two factors, the public versusprivate line was well understood and rarely con-troversial for at least a decade. This changed inthe early 2000s as a result of: U The proliferation of loan ratings, which, by

their nature, provide public exposure forloan deals;

U The explosive growth of nonbank investorsgroups, which included a growing number ofinstitutions that operated on the public side ofthe wall, including a growing number of mutualfunds, hedge funds, and even CLO boutiques;

U The growth of the credit default swaps mar-ket, in which insiders like banks often sold orbought protection from institutions that were

not privy to inside information; and U A more aggressive effort by the press toreport on the loan market.Some background is in order. The vast major-

ity of loans are unambiguously private financingarrangements between issuers and their lend-ers. Even for issuers with public equity or debtthat file with the SEC, the credit agreement only

becomes public when it is filed, often monthsafter closing, as an exhibit to an annual report(10-K), a quarterly report (10-Q), a currentreport (8-K), or some other document (proxystatement, securities registration, etc.).

Beyond the credit agreement, there is a raftof ongoing correspondence between issuers

and lenders that is made under confidentialityagreements, including quarterly or monthlyfinancial disclosures, covenant complianceinformation, amendment and waiver requests,and financial projections, as well as plans foracquisitions or dispositions. Much of this infor-mation may be material to the financial healthof the issuer and may be out of the publicdomain until the issuer formally puts out apress release or files an 8-K or some otherdocument with the SEC.

In recent years, this information has leakedinto the public domain either via off-line con-versations or the press. It has also come tolight through mark-to-market pricing services,which from time to time report significantmovement in a loan price without any corre-sponding news. This is usually an indicationthat the banks have received negative or posi-tive information that is not yet public.

In recent years, there was growing concernamong issuers, lenders, and regulators that thismigration of once-private information into pub-lic hands might breach confidentiality agree-ments between lenders and issuers and, more

importantly, could lead to illegal trading. Howhas the market contended with these issues? U Traders. To insulate themselves from violat-

ing regulations, some dealers and buysidefirms have set up their trading desks on thepublic side of the wall. Consequently, traders,salespeople, and analysts do not receive pri-vate information even if somewhere else inthe institution the private data are available.This is the same technique that investmentbanks have used from time immemorial toseparate their private investment bankingactivities from their public trading and

sales activities. U Underwriters. As mentioned above, in mostprimary syndications, arrangers will prepare apublic version of information memorandathat is scrubbed of private information likeprojections. These IMs will be distributed toaccounts that are on the public side of thewall. As well, underwriters will ask public


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accounts to attend a public version of thebank meeting and distribute to theseaccounts only scrubbed financial information.

U Buy-side accounts. On the buy-side there arefirms that operate on either side of the pub-lic-private divide. Accounts that operate onthe private side receive all confidential mate-

rials and agree to not trade in public securi-ties of the issuers in question. These groupsare often part of wider investment complexesthat do have public funds and portfolios but,via Chinese walls, are sealed from theseparts of the firms. There are also accountsthat are public. These firms take only publicIMs and public materials and, therefore,retain the option to trade in the public secu-rities markets even when an issuer for whichthey own a loan is involved. This can be trickyto pull off in practice because in the case ofan amendment the lender could be called onto approve or decline in the absence of anyreal information. To contend with this issue,the account could either designate one per-son who is on the private side of the wall tosign off on amendments or empower itstrustee or the loan arranger to do so. But itsa complex proposition.

U Vendors. Vendors of loan data, news, andprices also face many challenges in man-aging the flow of public and private infor-mation. In generally, the vendors operateunder the freedom of the press provision

of the U.S. Constitutions First Amendmentand report on information in a way thatanyone can simultaneously receive itfora price of course. Therefore, the informa-tion is essentially made public in a waythat doesnt deliberately disadvantage anyparty, whether its a news story discussingthe progress of an amendment or anacquisition, or its a price change reportedby a mark-to-market service. This, ofcourse, doesnt deal with the underlyingissue that someone who is a party toconfidential information is making it

available via the press or prices to abroader audience.Another way in which participants deal with

the public versus private issue is to ask coun-terparties to sign big-boy letters. These let-ters typically ask public-side institutions toacknowledge that there may be informationthey are not privy to and they are agreeing to

make the trade in any case. They are, effec-tively, big boys and will accept the risks.

Credit Risk: An OverviewPricing a loan requires arrangers to evaluate therisk inherent in a loan and to gauge investor

appetite for that risk. The principal credit riskfactors that banks and institutional investorscontend with in buying loans are default risk andloss-given-default risk. Among the primary waysthat accounts judge these risks are ratings,collateral coverage, seniority, credit statistics,industry sector trends, management strength,and sponsor. All of these, together, tell a storyabout the deal.

Brief descriptions of the major riskfactors follow.

Default risk

Default risk is simply the likelihood of a borrow-ers being unable to pay interest or principal ontime. It is based on the issuers financial condi-tion, industry segment, and conditions in thatindustry and economic variables and intangi-bles, such as company management. Defaultrisk will, in most cases, be most visiblyexpressed by a public rating from Standard &Poors Ratings Services or another ratingsagency. These ratings range from AAA for themost creditworthy loans to CCC for the least.The market is divided, roughly, into two seg-

ments: investment grade (loans to issuersrated BBB- or higher) and leveraged (borrow-ers rated BB+ or lower). Default risk, of course,varies widely within each of these broad seg-ments. Since the mid-1990s, public loan rat-ings have become a de facto requirement forissuers that wish to do business with a widegroup of institutional investors. Unlike banks,which typically have large credit departmentsand adhere to internal rating scales, fund man-agers rely on agency ratings to bracket risk andexplain the overall risk of their portfolios totheir own investors. As of mid-2011, then,

roughly 80% of leveraged-loan volume carried aloan rating, up from 45% in 1998 and virtuallynone before 1995.

Seniority

Where an instrument ranks in priority of pay-ment is referred to as seniority. Based on thisranking, an issuer will direct payments with


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the senior-most creditors paid first and themost junior equityholders last. In a typicalstructure, senior secured and unsecured cred-itors will be first in right of paymentalthoughin bankruptcy, secured instruments typicallymove the front of the linefollowed by subor-dinate bondholders, junior bondholders, pre-

ferred shareholders, and commonshareholders. Leveraged loans are typicallysenior, secured instruments and rank highestin the capital structure.

Loss-given-default risk

Loss-given-default risk measures how severe aloss the lender is likely to incur in the event ofdefault. Investors assess this risk based on thecollateral (if any) backing the loan and theamount of other debt and equity subordinatedto the loan. Lenders will also look to covenantsto provide a way of coming back to the tableearlythat is, before other creditorsand rene-gotiating the terms of a loan if the issuer fails tomeet financial targets. Investment-grade loansare, in most cases, senior unsecured instru-ments with loosely drawn covenants that applyonly at incurrence, that is, only if an issuermakes an acquisition or issues debt. As a result,loss given default may be no different from riskincurred by other senior unsecured creditors.Leveraged loans, by contrast, are usually seniorsecured instruments that, except for covenant-lite loans (see below), have maintenance cove-

nants that are measured at the end of eachquarter whether or not the issuer is in compli-ance with pre-set financial tests. Loan holders,therefore, almost always are first in line amongpre-petition creditors and, in many cases, areable to renegotiate with the issuer before theloan becomes severely impaired. It is no sur-prise, then, that loan investors historically faremuch better than other creditors on a loss-given-default basis.

Credit statistics

Credit statistics are used by investors to helpcalibrate both default and loss-given-defaultrisk. These statistics include a broad array offinancial data, including credit ratios measuringleverage (debt to capitalization and debt toEBITDA) and coverage (EBITDA to interest,EBITDA to debt service, operating cash flow tofixed charges). Of course, the ratios investorsuse to judge credit risk vary by industry. In addi-

tion to looking at trailing and pro forma ratios,investors look at managements projections andthe assumptions behind these projections tosee if the issuers game plan will allow it to ser-vice its debt. There are ratios that are mostgeared to assessing default risk. These includeleverage and coverage. Then there are ratios

that are suited for evaluating loss-given-defaultrisk. These include collateral coverage, or thevalue of the collateral underlying the loan rela-tive to the size of the loan. They also include theratio of senior secured loan to junior debt in thecapital structure. Logically, the likely severity ofloss-given-default for a loan increases with thesize of the loan as a percentage of the overalldebt structure so does. After all, if an issuerdefaults on $100 million of debt, of which $10million is in the form of senior secured loans,the loans are more likely to be fully covered inbankruptcy than if the loan totals $90 million.

Industry sector

Industry is a factor, because sectors, naturally,go in and out of favor. For that reason, having aloan in a desirable sector, like telecom in thelate 1990s or healthcare in the early 2000s, canreally help a syndication along. Also, loans toissuers in defensive sectors (like consumerproducts) can be more appealing in a time ofeconomic uncertainty, whereas cyclical borrow-ers (like chemicals or autos) can be moreappealing during an economic upswing.

Sponsorship

Sponsorship is a factor, too. Needless to say,many leveraged companies are owned by one ormore private equity firms. These entities, suchas Kohlberg Kravis & Roberts or Carlyle Group,invest in companies that have leveraged capitalstructures. To the extent that the sponsorgroup has a strong following among loan inves-tors, a loan will be easier to syndicate and,therefore, can be priced lower. In contrast, ifthe sponsor group does not have a loyal set ofrelationship lenders, the deal may need to bepriced higher to clear the market. Amongbanks, investment factors may include whetheror not the bank is party to the sponsors equityfund. Among institutional investors, weight isgiven to an individual deal sponsors trackrecord in fixing its own impaired deals by step-ping up with additional equity or replacing amanagement team that is failing.


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Syndicating A Loan By FacilityMost loans are structured and syndicated toaccommodate the two primary syndicatedlender constituencies: banks (domestic andforeign) and institutional investors (primarilystructured finance vehicles, mutual funds, andinsurance companies). As such, leveraged loansconsist of: U Pro rata debt consists of the revolving credit

and amortizing term loan (TLa), which arepackaged together and, usually, syndicatedto banks. In some loans, however, institu-tional investors take pieces of the TLa and,less often, the revolving credit, as a way tosecure a larger institutional term loan alloca-tion. Why are these tranches called prorata? Because arrangers historically syndi-cated revolving credit and TLas on a pro ratabasis to banks and finance companies.

UInstitutional debt consists of term loansstructured specifically for institutional inves-tors, although there are also some banksthat buy institutional term loans. Thesetranches include first- and second-lienloans, as well as prefunded letters of credit.Traditionally, institutional tranches werereferred to as TLbs because they were bulletpayments and lined up behind TLas.Finance companies also play in the leveraged

loan market, and buy both pro rata and institu-tional tranches. With institutional investorsplaying an ever-larger role, however, by the late

2000s, many executions were structured assimply revolving credit/institutional term loans,with the TLa falling by the wayside.

Pricing A Loan In The Primary MarketPricing loans for the institutional market is astraightforward exercise based on simple risk/return consideration and market technicals.Pricing a loan for the bank market, however, ismore complex. Indeed, banks often invest inloans for more than just spread income. Rather,banks are driven by the overall profitability of

the issuer relationship, including noncreditrevenue sources.

Pricing loans for bank investors

Since the early 1990s, almost all large com-mercial banks have adopted portfolio-manage-ment techniques that measure the returns ofloans and other credit products relative to risk.

By doing so, banks have learned that loans arerarely compelling investments on a stand-alonebasis. Therefore, banks are reluctant to allocatecapital to issuers unless the total relationshipgenerates attractive returnswhether thosereturns are measured by risk-adjusted returnon capital, by return on economic capital, or by

some other metric.If a bank is going to put a loan on its balance

sheet, then it takes a hard look not only at theloans yield, but also at other sources of reve-nue from the relationship, including noncreditbusinesseslike cash-management servicesand pension-fund managementand econom-ics from other capital markets activities, likebonds, equities, or M&A advisory work.

This process has had a breathtaking resulton the leveraged loan marketto the point thatit is an anachronism to continue to call it abank loan market. Of course, there are certainissuers that can generate a bit more bankappetite; as of mid-2011, these include issuerswith a European or even a Midwestern U.S.angle. Naturally, issuers with European opera-tions are able to better tap banks in their homemarkets (banks still provide the lions share ofloans in Europe), and, for Midwestern issuers,the heartland remains one of the few U.S.regions with a deep bench of local banks.

What this means is that the spread offered topro rata investors is important, but so, too, inmost cases, is the amount of other, fee-driven

business a bank can capture by taking a pieceof a loan. For this reason, issuers are careful toaward pieces of bond- and equity-underwritingengagements and other fee-generating busi-ness to banks that are part of its loan syndicate.

Pricing loans for institutional players

For institutional investors, the investment deci-sion process is far more straightforward,because, as mentioned above, they are focusednot on a basket of returns, but only on loan-specific revenue.

In pricing loans to institutional investors, its

a matter of the spread of the loan relative tocredit quality and market-based factors. Thissecond category can be divided into liquidityand market technicals (i.e., supply/demand).

Liquidity is the tricky part, but, as in all mar-kets, all else being equal, more liquid instru-ments command thinner spreads than lessliquid ones. In the old daysbefore institutional


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investors were the dominant investors andbanks were less focused on portfolio manage-mentthe size of a loan didnt much matter.Loans sat on the books of banks and stayedthere. But now that institutional investors andbanks put a premium on the ability to packageloans and sell them, liquidity has become

important. As a result, smaller executionsgenerally those of $200 million or lesstend tobe priced at a premium to the larger loans. Ofcourse, once a loan gets large enough todemand extremely broad distribution, theissuer usually must pay a size premium. Thethresholds range widely. During the go-go mid-2000s, it was upwards of $10 billion. Duringmore parsimonious late-2000s $1 billion wasconsidered a stretch.

Market technicals, or supply relative todemand, is a matter of simple economics. Ifthere are a lot of dollars chasing little product,then, naturally, issuers will be able to commandlower spreads. If, however, the opposite is true,then spreads will need to increase for loans toclear the market.

Mark-To-Markets EffectBeginning in 2000, the SEC directed bank loanmutual fund managers to use available pricedata (bid/ask levels reported by dealer desksand compiled by mark-to-market services)rather than fair value (estimates based onwhether the loan is likely to repay lenders inwhole or part), to determine the value ofbroadly syndicated loan portfolios. In broadterms, this policy has made the market moretransparent, improved price discovery and, indoing so, made the market far more efficientand dynamic than it was in the past.

Types of Syndicated Loan FacilitiesThere are four main types of syndicated loanfacilities: U A revolving credit line (within which are

options for swingline loans, multicurrency-borrowing, competitive-bid options,term-out, and evergreen extensions);

U A term loan; U A letter of credit (LOC); and U An acquisition or equipment line

(a delayed-draw term loan).

A revolving credit line allows borrowers todraw down, repay, and reborrow. The facility actsmuch like a corporate credit card, except thatborrowers are charged an annual commitmentfee on unused amounts (the facility fee).Revolvers to speculative-grade issuers aresometimes tied to borrowing-base lending for-

mulas. This limits borrowings to a certain per-centage of specified collateral, most oftenreceivables and inventory (see Asset-basedloan section below for a full discussion of thistopic). Revolving credits often run for 364 days.These revolving creditscalled, not surprisingly,364-day facilitiesare generally limited to theinvestment-grade market. The reason for whatseems like an odd term is that regulatory capitalguidelines mandate that, after one year ofextending credit under a revolving facility, banksmust then increase their capital reserves totake into account the unused amounts.Therefore, banks can offer issuers 364-dayfacilities at a lower unused fee than a multiyearrevolving credit. There are a number of optionsthat can be offered within a revolving credit line:

A swingline is a small, overnight borrowingline, typically provided by the agent.

A multicurrency line allows the borrower toborrow in one or more alternative currencies (inmost agreements this option is capped).

A competitive-bid option (CBO) allows bor-rowers to solicit the best bids from its syndi-cate group. The agent will conduct what

amounts to an auction to raise funds for theborrower, and the best bids are accepted. CBOstypically are available only to large, investment-grade borrowers.

A term-out will allow the borrower to convertborrowings into a term loan at a given conver-sion date. This, again, is usually a feature ofinvestment-grade loans. Under the option, bor-rowers may take what is outstanding under thefacility and pay it off according to a predeter-mined repayment schedule. Often the spreadsratchet up if the term-out option is exercised.

An evergreen is an option for the borrower

with consent of the syndicate groupto extendthe facility each year for an additional year. Forinstance, at the end of each year, a three-yearfacility would be reset to three years if thelenders and borrower agree. If the evergreen isnot exercised, the agreement would simply runto term.


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A term loan is simply an installment loan,such as a loan one would use to buy a car. Theborrower may draw on the loan during a shortcommitment period (during which lendersusual share a ticking fee, akin to a commit-ment fee on a revolver) and repays it based oneither a scheduled series of repayments or a

one-time lump-sum payment at maturity(bullet payment). There are two principal typesof term loans: U An amortizing term loan (A-term loans,

or TLa) is a term loan with a progressiverepayment schedule that typically runs sixyears or less. These loans are normally syn-dicated to banks along with revolving creditsas part of a larger syndication.

U An institutional term loan (B-term, C-term,or D-term loans) is a term loan facility carvedout for nonbank accounts. These loans cameinto broad usage during the mid-1990s asthe institutional loan investor base grew. Thisinstitutional category also includes second-lien loans and covenant-lite loans, which aredescribed below.LOCsare guarantees provided by the bank

group to pay off debt or obligations if the bor-rower cannot.

Acquisition/equipment lines (delayed-draw term loans) are credits that may be drawndown for a given period to purchase specifiedassets or equipment or to make acquisitions.The issuer pays a fee during the commitment

period (a ticking fee). The lines are then repaidover a specified period (the term-out period).Repaid amounts may not be reborrowed.

Bridge loans are loans that are intended toprovide short-term financing to provide abridge to an asset sale, bond offering, stockoffering, divestiture, etc. Generally, bridge loansare provided by arrangers as part of an overallfinancing package. Typically, the issuer willagree to increasing interest rates if the loan isnot repaid as expected. For example, a loancould start at a spread of L+250 and ratchet up50 basis points (bp) every six months the loan

remains outstanding past one year.Equity bridge loan is a bridge loan provided by

arrangers that is expected to be repaid by sec-ondary equity commitment to a leveraged buy-out. This product is used when a private equityfirm wants to close on a deal that requires, say,$1 billion of equity of which it ultimately wantsto hold half. The arrangers bridge the additional

$500 million, which would be then repaid whenother sponsors come into the deal to take the$500 million of additional equity. Needless tosay, this is a hot-market product.

Second-Lien Loans

Although they are really just another type ofsyndicated loan facility, second-lien loans aresufficiently complex to warrant a separate sec-tion in this primer. After a brief flirtation withsecond-lien loans in the mid-1990s, thesefacilities fell out of favor after the 1998 Russiandebt crisis caused investors to adopt a morecautious tone. But after default rates fell pre-cipitously in 2003, arrangers rolled out second-lien facilities to help finance issuers strugglingwith liquidity problems. By 2007, the markethad accepted second-lien loans to finance awide array of transactions, including acquisi-tions and recapitalizations. Arrangers tap non-traditional accountshedge funds, distressinvestors, and high-yield accountsas well astraditional CLO and prime fund accounts tofinance second-lien loans.

As their name implies, the claims on collat-eral of second-lien loans are junior to those offirst-lien loans. Second-lien loans also typicallyhave less restrictive covenant packages, inwhich maintenance covenant levels are setwide of the first-lien loans. For these reasons,second-lien loans are priced at a premium tofirst-lien loans. This premium typically starts at200 bps when the collateral coverage goes farbeyond the claims of both the first- and sec-ond-lien loans to more than 1,000 bps for lessgenerous collateral.

There are, lawyers explain, two main ways inwhich the collateral of second-lien loans canbe documented. Either the second-lien loancan be part of a single security agreement withfirst-lien loans, or they can be part of an alto-gether separate agreement. In the case of asingle agreement, the agreement would appor-tion the collateral, with value going first, obvi-

ously, to the first-lien claims and next to thesecond-lien claims. Alternatively, there can betwo entirely separate agreements. Heres abrief summary:

U In a single security agreement, the second-lien lenders are in the same creditor class asthe first-lien lenders from the standpointof a bankruptcy, according to lawyers who


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specialize in these loans. As a result, foradequate protection to be paid the collateralmust cover both the claims of the first- andsecond-lien lenders. If it does not, the judgemay choose to not pay adequate protectionor to divide it pro rata among the first- andsecond-lien creditors. In addition, the sec-

ond-lien lenders may have a vote as securedlenders equal to those of the first-lien lend-ers. One downside for second-lien lenders isthat these facilities are often smaller thanthe first-lien loans and, therefore, when avote comes up, first-lien lenders can outvotesecond-lien lenders to promote theirown interests.

U In the case of two discrete security agree-ments, divided by a standstill agreement, thefirst- and second-lien lenders are likely to bedivided into two creditor classes. As a result,second-lien lenders do not have a voice in thefirst-lien creditor committees. As well, first-lien lenders can receive adequate protectionpayments even if collateral covers theirclaims, but does not cover the claims of thesecond-lien lenders. This may not be the caseif the loans are documented together and thefirst- and second-lien lenders are deemed aunified class by the bankruptcy court.For more information, we suggest Latham &

Watkins terrific overview and analysis of sec-ond-lien loans, which was published on April 15,2004 in the firms CreditAlert publication.

Covenant-Lite LoansLike second-lien loans, covenant-lite loans area particular kind of syndicated loan facility. Atthe most basic level, covenant-lite loans areloans that have bond-like financial incurrencecovenants rather than traditional maintenancecovenants that are normally part and parcel ofa loan agreement. Whats the difference?

Incurrence covenants generally require that ifan issuer takes an action (paying a dividend,making an acquisition, issuing more debt), it

would need to still be in compliance. So, forinstance, an issuer that has an incurrence testthat limits its debt to 5x cash flow would onlybe able to take on more debt if, on a pro formabasis, it was still within this constraint. If not,then it would have breeched the covenant andbe in technical default on the loan. If, on theother hand, an issuer found itself above this 5x

threshold simply because its earnings haddeteriorated, it would not violate the covenant.

Maintenance covenants are far morerestrictive. This is because they require anissuer to meet certain financial tests everyquarter whether or not it takes an action. So,in the case above, had the 5x leverage maxi-

mum been a maintenance rather than incur-rence test, the issuer would need to pass iteach quarter and would be in violation if eitherits earnings eroded or its debt level increased.For lenders, clearly, maintenance tests arepreferable because it allows them to takeaction earlier if an issuer experiences financialdistress. Whats more, the lenders may be ableto wrest some concessions from an issuerthat is in violation of covenants (a fee, incre-mental spread, or additional collateral) inexchange for a waiver.

Conversely, issuers prefer incurrenceovenants precisely because they areless stringent.

Lender TitlesIn the formative days of the syndicated loanmarket (the late 1980s), there was usually oneagent that syndicated each loan. Lead man-ager and manager titles were doled out inexchange for large commitments. As leaguetables gained influence as a marketing tool,co-agent titles were often used in attractinglarge commitments or in cases where theseinstitutions truly had a role in underwriting andsyndicating the loan.

During the 1990s, the use of league tablesand, consequently, title inflation exploded.Indeed, the co-agent title has become largelyceremonial today, routinely awarded for whatamounts to no more than large retail commit-ments. In most syndications, there is one leadarranger. This institution is considered to be onthe left (a reference to its position in an old-time tombstone ad). There are also likely to beother banks in the arranger group, which may

also have a hand in underwriting and syndicat-ing a credit. These institutions are said to be onthe right.

The different titles used by significant partic-ipants in the syndications process are adminis-trative agent, syndication agent, documentationagent, agent, co-agent or managing agent, andlead arranger or book runner:


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U The administrative agent is the bank thathandles all interest and principal paymentsand monitors the loan.

U The syndication agent is the bank that han-dles, in purest form, the syndication of theloan. Often, however, the syndication agenthas a less specific role.

U The documentation agent is the bank thathandles the documents and chooses thelaw firm.

U The agent title is used to indicate the leadbank when there is no other conclusivetitle available, as is often the case forsmaller loans.

U The co-agent or managing agent is largely ameaningless title used mostly as an awardfor large commitments.

U The lead arranger or book runner title is aleague table designation used to indicate thetop dog in a syndication.

Secondary SalesSecondary sales occur after the loan is closedand allocated, when investors are free to tradethe paper. Loan sales are structured as eitherassignments or participations, with investorsusually trading through dealer desks at thelarge underwriting banks. Dealer-to-dealertrading is almost always conducted through astreet broker.

Assignments

In an assignment, the assignee becomes adirect signatory to the loan and receives inter-est and principal payments directly from theadministrative agent.

Assignments typically require the consent ofthe borrower and agent, although consent maybe withheld only if a reasonable objection ismade. In many loan agreements, the issuerloses its right to consent in the event of default.

The loan document usually sets a minimumassignment amount, usually $5 million, for prorata commitments. In the late 1990s, however,

administrative agents started to break out spe-cific assignment minimums for institutionaltranches. In most cases, institutional assign-ment minimums were reduced to $1 million inan effort to boost liquidity. There were alsosome cases where assignment fees werereduced or even eliminated for institutionalassignments, but these lower assignment fees

remained rare into 2012, and the vast majoritywas set at the traditional $3,500.

One market convention that became firmlyestablished in the late 1990s was assignment-fee waivers by arrangers for trades crossedthrough its secondary trading desk. This was away to encourage investors to trade with the

arranger rather than with another dealer. This isa significant incentive to trade with arrangeror a deterrent to not trade away, depending onyour perspectivebecause a $3,500 feeamounts to between 7 bps to 35 bps of a $1million to $5 million trade.

Primary assignments

This term is something of an oxymoron. Itapplies to primary commitments made by off-shore accounts (principally CLOs and hedgefunds). These vehicles, for a variety of tax rea-sons, suffer tax consequence from buying loansin the primary. The agent will therefore hold theloan on its books for some short period afterthe loan closes and then sell it to these inves-tors via an assignment. These are called pri-mary assignments and are effectively primarypurchases.

Participations

As the name implies, in a participation agree-ment the buyer takes a participating interest inthe selling lenders commitment.

The lender remains the official holder of the

loan, with the participant owning the rights tothe amount purchased. Consents, fees, or mini-mums are almost never required. The partici-pant has the right to vote only on materialchanges in the loan document (rate, term, andcollateral). Nonmaterial changes do not requireapproval of participants. A participation can bea riskier way of purchasing a loan, because, ifthe lender of record becomes insolvent ordefaults, the participant does not have a directclaim on the loan. In this case, the participantthen becomes a creditor of the lender and oftenmust wait for claims to be sorted out to collecton its participation.

Loan DerivativesLoan credit default swaps

Loan credit default swaps (LCDS) are standardderivatives that have secured loans as refer-ence instruments. In June 2006, the


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International Settlement and DealersAssociation issued a standard trade confirma-tion for LCDS contracts.

Like all credit default swaps (CDS), an LCDSis basically an insurance contract. The seller ispaid a spread in exchange for agreeing to buyat par, or a pre-negotiated price, a loan if that

loan defaults. LCDS enables participants tosynthetically buy a loan by going short the LCDSor sell the loan by going long the LCDS.Theoretically, then, a loanholder can hedge aposition either directly (by buying LCDS protec-tion on that specific name) or indirectly (bybuying protection on a comparable name orbasket of names).

Moreover, unlike the cash markets, which arelong-only markets for obvious reasons, theLCDS market provides a way for investors toshort a loan. To do so, the investor would buyprotection on a loan that it doesnt hold. If theloan subsequently defaults, the buyer of protec-tion should be able to purchase the loan in thesecondary market at a discount and then anddeliver it at par to the counterparty from whichit bought the LCDS contract. For instance, sayan account buys five-year protection for a givenloan, for which it pays 250 bps a year. Then inyear 2 the loan goes into default and the marketprice falls to 80% of par. The buyer of the pro-tection can then buy the loan at 80 and deliverto the counterpart at 100, a 20-point pickup. Orinstead of physical delivery, some buyers of pro-

tection may prefer cash settlement in which thedifference between the current market price andthe delivery price is determined by polling deal-ers or using a third-party pricing service. Cashsettlement could also be employed if theres notenough paper to physically settle all LCDS con-tracts on a particular loan.

LCDX

Introduced in 2007, the LCDX is an index of 100LCDS obligations that participants can trade.The index provides a straightforward way forparticipants to take long or short positions on a

broad basket of loans, as well as hedge theirexposure to the market.

Markit Group administers the LCDX, a productof CDS Index Co., a firm set up by a group ofdealers. Like LCDS, the LCDX Index is an over-the-counter product.

The LCDX is reset every six months with par-ticipants able to trade each vintage of the index

that is still active. The index will be set at aninitial spread based on the reference instru-ments and trade on a price basis. According tothe primer posted by Markit (http://www.markit.com/information/affiliations/lcdx/alertPara-graphs/01/document/LCDX%20Primer.pdf),the two events that would trigger a payout

from the buyer (protection seller) of the indexare bankruptcy or failure to pay a scheduledpayment on any debt (after a grace period), forany of the constituents of the index.

All documentation for the index is posted at:http://www.markit.com/information/affiliations/lcdx/alertParagraphs/01/document/LCDX%20Primer.pdf.

Single-name total rate of return swaps (TRS)

This is the oldest way for participants to pur-chase loans synthetically. In essence, a TRSallows an institution to buy a loan on margin. Insimple terms, under a TRS program a partici-pant buys from a counterparty, usually a dealer,the income stream created by a referenceasset (in this case a syndicated loan). The par-ticipant puts down some percentage as collat-eral, say 10%, and borrows the rest from thedealer. Then the participant receives the spreadof the loan less the financial cost. If the refer-ence loan defaults, the participant is obligatedto buy the facility at par, or cash settle theposition, based on a mark-to-market price oran auction price.

Heres how the economics of a TRS work, insimple terms. A participant buys via TRS a $10million position in a loan paying L+250. Toaffect the purchase, the participant puts $1million in a collateral account and pays L+50 onthe balance (meaning leverage of 9:1). Thus,the participant would receive:

L+250 on the amount in the collateralaccount of $1 million, plus

200 bps (L+250 minus the borrowing cost ofL+50) on the remaining amount of $9 million.

The resulting income is L+250 * $1 millionplus 200 bps * $9 million. Based on the

participants collateral amountor equitycontributionof $1 million, the return isL+2020. If LIBOR is 5%, the return is 25.5%. Ofcourse, this is not a risk-free proposition. If theissuer defaults and the value of the loan goesto 70 cents on the dollar, the participant willlose $3 million. And if the loan does not defaultbut is marked down for whatever


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reasonmarket spreads widen, it isdowngraded, its financial conditiondeterioratesthe participant stands to losethe difference between par and the currentmarket price when the TRS expires. Or, in anextreme case, the value declines below thevalue in the collateral account and the

participant is hit with a margin call.

TRS Programs

In addition to the type of single-name TRSdescribed above, another way to invest in loansis via a TRS program, in which a dealer providesfinancing for a portfolio of loans, rather than asingle reference asset. The products are similarin that an investor would establish a collateralaccount equal to some percent of the overallTRS program and borrow the balance from adealer. The program typically requires manag-ers to adhere to diversification guidelines aswell as weighted average maturity maximumsas well as weighted average rating minimums.

Like with a single-name TRS, an investormakes money by the carry between the cost ofthe line and the spread of the assets. As well,any price appreciation bolsters the returns. Ofcourse, if loans loss value, the investors losseswould be magnified by the leverage of the vehi-cle. Also, if collateral value declines below apredetermined level, the investor could face amargin call, or in the worst-case scenario, theTRS could be unwound.

TRS programs were widely used prior to the2008 credit contraction. Since then, they havefigured far less prominently into the loanlandscape as investors across the capitalmarkets shy away from leveraged, mark-to-market product.

Pricing TermsBase rates

Most loans are floating-rate instruments that areperiodically reset to a spread over a base rate,typically LIBOR. In most cases, borrowers can

lock in a given rate for one month to one year.Syndication pricing options include prime, as wellas LIBOR, CDs, and other fixed-rate options: U The prime is a floating-rate option. Borrowed

funds are priced at a spread over the refer-ence banks prime lending rate. The rate isreset daily, and borrowings may be repaid atany time without penalty. This is typically an

overnight option, because the prime optionis more costly to the borrower than LIBORor CDs.

U The LIBOR (or Eurodollar) option is so calledbecause, with this option, the interest onborrowings is fixed for a period of one monthto one year. The corresponding LIBOR rate is

used to set pricing. Borrowings cannot beprepaid without penalty.

U The CDoption works precisely like the LIBORoption, except that the base rate is certifi-cates of deposit, sold by a bank to institu-tional investors.

U Other fixed-rate options are less commonbut work like the LIBOR and CD options.These include federal funds (the overnightrate charged by the Federal Reserve to mem-ber banks) and cost of funds (the banks ownfunding rate).

Spread (margin)

Borrower pay a specified spread over the baserate to borrow under loan agreements. Thespread is typically expressed in basis points.Further, spreads on many loans are tied to per-formance grids. In this case, the spread adjustsbased on one or more financial criteria. Ratingsare typical in investment-grade loans. Financialratios for leveraged loans. Media and communi-cations loans are invariably tied o the borrowersdebt-to-cash-flow ratio.

LIBOR floorsAs the name implies, LIBOR floors put a floorunder the base rate for loans. If a loan has a 3%LIBOR floor and LIBOR falls below this level, thebase rate for any resets default to 3%.

Fees

The fees associated with syndicated loans arethe upfront fee, the commitment fee, the facil-ity fee, the administrative agent fee, the LOCfee, and the cancellation or prepayment fee.

U An upfront fee is a fee paid by the issuer atclose. It is often tiered, with the leadarranger receiving a larger amount in con-sideration for structuring and/or under-writing the loan. Co-underwriters willreceive a lower fee, and then the generalsyndicate will likely have fees tied to theircommitment. Most often, fees are paid on alenders final allocation. For example, a


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loan has two fee tiers: 100 bps (or 1%) for$25 million commitments and 50 bps for$15 million commitments. A lender com-mitting to the $25 million tier will be paidon its final allocation rather than on initialcommitment, which means that, in thisexample, the loan is oversubscribed and

lenders committing $25 million would beallocated $20 million and the lenders wouldreceive a fee of $200,000 (or 1% of $20million). Sometimes upfront fees will bestructured as a percentage of final alloca-tion plus a flat fee. This happens mostoften for larger fee tiers, to encouragepotential lenders to step up for larger com-mitments. The flat fee is paid regardless ofthe lenders final allocation. Fees are usu-ally paid to banks, mutual funds, and othernon-offshore investors at close. CLOs andother offshore vehicles are typicallybrought in after the loan closes as a pri-mary assignment, and they simply buythe loan at a discount equal to the feeoffered in the primary assignment, fortax purposes.

U A commitment fee is a fee paid to lenders onundrawn amounts under a revolving credit ora term loan prior to draw-down. On termloans, this fee is usually referred to as aticking fee.

U A facility fee, which is paid on a facilitysentire committed amount, regardless of

usage, is often charged instead of a commit-ment fee on revolving credits to investment-grade borrowers, because these facilitiestypically have CBOs that allow a borrower tosolicit the best bid from its syndicate groupfor a given borrowing. The lenders that do notlend under the CBO are still paid for theircommitment.

U A usage fee is a fee paid when the utilizationof a revolving credit is above, or more often,below a certain minimum.

U A prepayment fee is a feature generally asso-ciated with institutional term loans. Typical

prepayment fees will be set on a slidingscale; for instance, 2% in year one and 1% inyear two. The fee may be applied to all repay-ments under a loan including from assetsales and excess cash flow (a hard fee) orspecifically to discretionary payments madefrom a refinancing or out of cash on hand (asoft fee).

U An administrative agent fee is the annual feetypically paid to administer the loan (includ-ing to distribute interest payments to thesyndication group, to update lender lists, andto manage borrowings). For secured loans(particularly those backed by receivables andinventory), the agent often collects a collat-

eral monitoring fee, to ensure that the prom-ised collateral is in place.An LOC feecan be any one of several types.

The most commona fee for standby or finan-cial LOCsguarantees that lenders will supportvarious corporate activities. Because theseLOCs are considered borrowed funds undercapital guidelines, the fee is typically the sameas the LIBOR margin. Fees for commercial LOCs(those supporting inventory or trade) are usu-ally lower, because in these cases actual collat-eral is submitted). The LOC is usually issued bya fronting bank (usually the agent) and syndi-cated to the lender group on a pro rata basis.The group receives the LOC fee on their respec-tive shares, while the fronting bank receives anissuing (or fronting, or facing) fee for issuingand administering the LOC. This fee is almostalways 12.5 bps to 25 bps (0.125% to 0.25%) ofthe LOC commitment.

Original issue discounts (OID)

This is yet another term imported from thebond market. The OID, the discount from par atloan, is offered in the new issue market as a

spread enhancement. If a loan is issued at 99cents on the dollar to pay par, the OID is said tobe 100 bps, or 1 point.

OID Versus Upfront Fees

At this point, the careful reader may be wonder-ing just what the difference is between an OIDand an upfront fee. After all, in both cases thelender effectively pays less than par for a loan.

From the perspective of the lender, actually,there is no practical difference. From anaccounting perspective, an OID and a fee maybe recognized, and potentially taxed, differently.

Voting rights

Amendments or changes to a loan agreementmust be approved by a certain percentage oflenders. Most loan agreements have three lev-els of approval: required-lender level, full vote,and supermajority:


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U The required-lenders level, usually just asimple majority, is used for approval of non-material amendments and waivers orchanges affecting one facility within a deal.

U A full vote of all lenders, including partici-pants, is required to approve materialchanges such as RATS (rate, amortization,

term, and security; or collateral) rights, but,as described below, there are occasionswhen changes in amortization and collateralmay be approved by a lower percentage oflenders (a supermajority).

U A supermajority is typically 67% to 80% oflenders and is sometimes required for cer-tain material changes such as changes inamortization in term loan repayments andrelease of collateral.

Covenants

Loan agreements have a series of restrictionsthat dictate, to varying degrees, how borrowerscan operate and carry themselves financially.For instance, one covenant may require theborrower to maintain its existing fiscal-yearend. Another may prohibit it from taking on newdebt. Most agreements also have financialcompliance covenants, for example, that a bor-rower must maintain a prescribed level of per-formance, which, if not maintained, gives banksthe right to terminate the agreement or pushthe borrower into default. The size of the cove-nant package increases in proportion to a bor-rowers financial risk. Agreements toinvestment-grade companies are usually thinand simple. Agreements to leveraged borrowersare more restrictive.

The three primary types of loan covenantsare affirmative, negative, and financial.

Affirmative covenants state what action theborrower must take to be in compliance withthe loan. These covenants are usually boiler-plate and require a borrower to, for example,pay the bank interest and fees, provide auditedfinancial statements, maintain insurance, pay

taxes, and so forth.Negative covenants limit the borrowersactivities in some way. Negative covenants,which are highly structured and customized toa borrowers specific condition, can limit thetype and amount of acquisitions and invest-ments, new debt issuance, liens, asset sales,and guarantees.

Financial covenants enforce minimum finan-cial performance measures against the bor-rower, such as that he must maintain a higherlevel of current assets than of current liabilities.Broadly speaking, there are two types of finan-cial convenants: maintenance and incurrence.Under maintenance covenants, issuers must

pass agreed-to tests of financial performancesuch as minimum levels of cash flow coverageand maximum levels of leverage. If an issuerfails to achieve these levels, lenders have theright to accelerate the loan. In most cases,though, lenders will pass on this draconianoption and instead grant a waiver in return forsome combination of a fee and/or spreadincrease; a repayment or a structuring con-censsion such as additional collateral or senior-ity. An inccurence covenant is tested only if anissuer takes an action, such as issuing debt ormaking an acquisition. If, on a pro forma basis,the issuer fails the test then it is not allowed toproceed without permission of the lenders.

Historically, maintenance tests were associ-ated with leveraged loans and incurrence testswith investment-grade loans and bonds. Morerecently, the evolution of covenant-lite loans(see above) has blurred the line.

In a traditional loan agreement, as a borrow-ers risk increases, financial covenants becomemore tightly wound and extensive. In general,there are five types of financial covenantscoverage, leverage, current ratio, tangible net

worth, and maximum capital expenditures: U A coverage covenant requires the borrower tomaintain a minimum level of cash flow orearnings, relative to specified expenses,most often interest, debt service (interestand repayments), fixed charges (debt ser-vice, capital expenditures, and/or rent).

U A leverage covenant sets a maximum level ofdebt, relative to either equity or cash flow,with total-debt-to-EBITDA level being themost common. In some cases, though, oper-ating cash flow is used as the divisor.Moreover, some agreements test leverage on

the basis of net debt (total less cash andequivalents) or senior debt.

U A current-ratio covenant requires that theborrower maintain a minimum ratio of cur-rent assets (cash, marketable securities,accounts receivable, and inventories) to cur-rent liabilities (accounts payable, short-termdebt of less than one year), but sometimes a


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will trigger this provision. Likewise, lenders maydemand collateral from a strong, speculative-grade issuer, but will offer to release under cer-tain circumstances, such as if the issuerattains an investment-grade rating.

Change of control

Invariably, one of the events of default in acredit agreement is a change of issuer control.

For both investment-grade and leveragedissuers, an event of default in a credit agree-ment will be triggered by a merger, an acquisi-tion of the issuer, some substantial purchase ofthe issuers equity by a third party, or a changein the majority of the board of directors. Forsponsor-backed leveraged issuers, the spon-sors lowering its stake below a preset amountcan also trip this clause.

Equity cures

These provision allow issuers to fix a covenantviolationexceeding the maximum leveragetest for instanceby making an equity contri-bution. These provisions are generally found inprivate-equity backed deals. The equity cure isa right, not an obligation. Therefore, a privateequity firm will want these provisions, which, ifthey think its worth it, allows them to cure aviolation without going through an amendmentprocess, through which lenders will often askfor wider spreads and/or fees in exchange forwaiving the violation even with an infusion of

new equity. Some agreements dont limit thenumber of equity cures while others cap thenumber to, say, one a year or two over the lifeof the loan. Its a negotiated point, however, sothere is no rule of thumb.

Asset-based lending

Most of the information above refers to cashflow loans, loans that may be secured by col-lateral, but are repaid by cash flow. Asset-based lending is a distinct segment of the loanmarket. These loans are secured by specificassets and usually governed by a borrowingformula (or a borrowing base). The mostcommon type of asset-based loans are receiv-ables and/or inventory lines. These are revolvingcredits that have a maximum borrowing limit,say $100 million, but also have a cap based onthe value of an issuers pledged receivables andinventories. Usually, the receivables are pledged

and the issuer may borrow against 80%, give ortake. Inventories are also often pledged tosecure borrowings. However, because they areobviously less liquid than receivables, lendersare less generous in their formula. Indeed, theborrowing base for inventories is typically in the50% to 65% range. In addition, the borrowing

base may be further divided into subcatego-riesfor instance, 50% of work-in-processinventory and 65% of finished goods inventory.

In many receivables-based facilities, issuersare required to place receivables in a lock box.That means that the bank lends against thereceivable, takes possession of it, and then col-lects it to pay down the loan.

In addition, asset-based lending is oftendone based on specific equipment, realestate, car fleets, and an unlimited numberof other assets.

Bifurcated collateral structures

Most often this refers to cases where the issuerdivides collateral pledge between asset-basedloans and funded term loans. The way thisworks, typically, is that asset-based loans aresecured by current assets like accounts receiv-ables and inventories, while term loans aresecured by fixed assets like property, plant, andequipment. Current assets are considered to bea superior form of collateral because they aremore easily converted to cash.

Loan maththe art of spread calculationCalculating loan yields or spreads is notstraightforward. Unlike most bonds, which havelong no-call periods and high-call premiums,most loans are prepayable at any time typicallywithout prepayment fees. And, even in caseswhere prepayment fees apply, they are rarelymore than 2% in year one and 1% in year two.Therefore, affixing a spread-to-maturity or aspread-to-worst on loans is little more than atheoretical calculation.

This is because an issuers behavior is unpre-dictable. It may repay a loan early because amore compelling financial opportunity presentsitself or because the issuer is acquired orbecause it is making an acquisition and needs anew financing. Traders and investors will oftenspeak of loan spreads, therefore, as a spread toa theoretical call. Loans, on average, between1997 and 2004 had a 15-month average life.So, if you buy a loan with a spread of 250 bps at


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a price of 101, you might assume your spread-to-expected-life as the 250 bps less the amor-tized 100 bps premium or LIBOR+170.Conversely, if you bought the same loan at 99,the spread-to-expect life would be LIBOR+330.Of course, if theres a LIBOR floor, the minimumwould apply

Default And RestructuringThere are two primary types of loan defaults:technical defaults and the much more seriouspayment defaults. Technical defaults occurwhen the issuer violates a provision of the loanagreement. For instance, if an issuer doesntmeet a financial covenant test or fails to pro-vide lenders with financial information or someother violation that doesnt involve payments.

When this occurs, the lenders can acceleratethe loan and force the issuer into bankruptcy.Thats the most extreme measure. In mostcases, the issuer and lenders can agree on anamendment that waives the violation inexchange for a fee, spread increase, and/ortighter terms.

A payment default is a more serious matter. Asthe name implies, this type of default occurswhen a company misses either an interest orprincipal payment. There is often a pre-set periodof time, say 30 days, during which an issuer cancure a default (the cure period). After that, thelenders can choose to either provide a forbear-ance agreement that gives the issuer somebreathing room or take appropriate action, up toand including accelerating, or calling, the loan.

If the lenders accelerate, the company willgenerally declare bankruptcy and restructuretheir debt through Chapter 11. If the company isnot worth saving, however, because its primarybusiness has cratered, then the issuer and lend-ers may agree to a Chapter 7 liquidation, inwhich the assets of the business are sold andthe proceeds dispensed to the creditors.

Amend-To-ExtendThis technique allows an issuer to push out partof its loan maturities through an amendment,rather than a full-out refinancing. Amend-to-extend transactions came into widespread use in2009 as borrowers struggled to push out maturi-ties in the face of difficult lending conditions thatmade refinancing prohibitively expensive.

Amend-to-extend transactions have twophases, as the name implies. The first is anamendment in which at least 50.1% of the bankgroup approves the issuers ability to roll someor all existing loans into longer-dated paper.Typically, the amendment sets a range for theamount that can be tendered via the new facil-

ity, as well as the spread at which the longer-dated paper will pay interest.

The new debt is pari passu with the existingloan. But because it matures later and, thus, isstructurally subordinated, it carries a higherrate, and, in some cases, more attractive terms.Because issuers with big debt loads areexpected to tackle debt maturities over time,amid varying market conditions, in some cases,accounts insist on most-favored-nation pro-tection. Under such protection, the spread ofthe loan would increase if the issuer in questionprints a loan at a wider margin.

The second phase is the conversion, in whichlenders can exchange existing loans for newloans. In the end, the issuer is left with twotranches: (1) the legacy paper at the initialspread and maturity and (2) the new longer-dated facility at a wider spread. The innovationhere: amend-to-extend allows an issuer to term-out loans without actually refinancing into a newcredit (which obviously would require marking theentire loan to market, entailing higher spreads, anew OID, and stricter covenants).

DIP LoansDebtor-in-possession (DIP) loans are made tobankrupt entities. These loans constitutesuper-priority claims in the bankruptcy distri-bution scheme, and thus sit ahead of all pre-pretition claims. Many DIPs are furthersecured by priming liens on the debtorscollateral (see below).

Traditionally, prepetition lenders provided DIPloans as a way to keep a company viable duringthe bankruptcy process and therefore protecttheir claims. In the early 1990s, a broad market

for third-party DIP loans emerged. These non-prepetition lenders were attracted to the mar-ket by the relatively safety of most DIPs basedon their super-priority status, and relativelywide margins. This was the case again the early2000s default cycle.

In the late 2000s default cycle, however, thelandscape shifted because of more dire


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the arrangers of the financing, along with thelenders that were backing the buyer.

U Break prices. Simply, the price at which loansor bonds are initially traded into the second-ary market after they close and allocate. It iscalled the break price because that is wherethe facility breaks into the secondary market.

U Market-clearing level. As this phrase implies,the price or spread at which a deal clears theprimary market.

U Running the books. Generally the loanarranger is said to be running the books,i.e., preparing documentation and syndicat-ing and administering the loan.

U Disintermediation. Disintermediation refersto the process where banks are replaced (ordisintermediated) by institutional investors.This is the process that the loan market hasbeen undergoing for the past 20 years.Another example is the mortgage marketwhere the primary capital providers haveevolved from banks and savings and loaninstitutions to conduits structured by FannieMae, Freddie Mac, and the other mortgagesecuritization shops. Of course, the list ofdisintermediated markets is long and grow-ing. In addition to leveraged loans and mort-gages, this list also includes auto loans andcredit card receivables.

U Loss given default. This is simply a measureof how much creditors lose when an issuerdefaults. The loss will vary depending on

creditor class and the enterprise value of thebusiness when it defaults. All things beingequal, secured creditors will lose less thanunsecured creditors. Likewise, senior credi-tors will lose less than subordinated credi-tors. Calculating loss given default is trickybusiness. Some practitioners express loss asa nominal percentage of principal or a per-centage of principal plus accrued interes

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