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REVENUE REGULATIONS NO. 4-
2012 issued on March 28, 2012
amends Revenue Section 2.6 of Rev-
enue Regulations No. 13-2011 by de-
leting Section 2.6.1 thereof, which
provides that penalties and/or interest
imposed on the taxpayer may be
abated or cancelled on the ground of
one day late filing and remittance due
to failure to beat the bank cut-off time.
REVENUE MEMORANDUM ORDER
NO. 5-2012 issued on March 30,
2012 prescribes the revised guide-
lines, policies procedures in the con-
duct of performance benchmarking
method, amending for this purpose
Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO)
No. 4-2006.Benchmarking Program/
Activities in the Regional/District offic-
es shall cover as many types of tax-
payers by industry as may be applica-
ble. Large Taxpayers, however, may
later be fully covered by the Bench-
marking Program/Activities. Bench-
marking shall be done separately for
corporate and individual taxpayers.
Benchmarking Committee shall be
created, chaired by the Deputy Com-
missioner for Operations. The Assis-
tant Commissioners (ACIRs) of As-
sessment Service, Policy and Plan-
ning Service, Large Taxpayers Ser-
vice (LTS) and the Proponent Region-
al Director for Benchmarking Program
shall be called as Project Directors,
and shall serve as committee mem-
bers with responsibilities specified in
the Order. Said committee shall be
responsible for reporting and recom-
mending the appropriate actions that
may be taken and/or sanctions that
may be imposed against taxpayers or
any other person found to be supply-
ing/submitting false or fabricated data
purportedly to meet the benchmark
requirements.
The Assistant Commissioner (ACIR),
LTS or the Head Revenue Executive
Assistants, in the absence of the for-
mer, the LTS Audit Division Chiefs,
the Regional Directors and all Reve-
nue District Officers (RDOs) shall
cause the implementation of the
Benchmarking Program and activities
under their respective jurisdictions.
For the Large Taxpayers, however,
the Benchmarking Program shall ini-
tially be limited to the gathering and
profiling of data and setting the
benchmark for taxpayers under their
jurisdiction. The RDOs, in close coor-
dination with their respective Regional
Directors, shall have the responsibility
of ensuring the timely conduct of tax
profiling and benchmarking. The
benchmarking cycle shall be strictly
followed and shall be completed with-
in the required timeframe.
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In cases where Letters of Authority
have been issued to taxpayers, the
LT Audit Division Chiefs and RDOs
concerned shall take into considera-
tion the established benchmark in the
industry where the subject taxpayer
belongs before considering the case
closed and terminated. Any down-
trend deviation from the benchmark
shall be fully explained and such data
shall form part of the inputs in the re-
vision of final benchmark rates. All
issues and concerns raised by tax-
payers in the implementation of this
program that call for immediate action
shall be the responsibility of the im-
plementing office. Reports of action
taken thereon must be furnished the
Benchmarking Committee.
Taxpayers whose tax compliance is
below the duly established and ap-
proved benchmark
shall be classified as follows:
Classifications Risk to
Revenue/Gap to Benchmark
High Risk Taxpayers Over 30%
below benchmark
Middle Risk Taxpayers 16%
to 30% below benchmark
Low Risk Taxpayers 15% or
less below benchmark
Taxpayers classified as high risk shall
be the top priority target for enforce-
ment actions, such as surveillance,
CRM/POS Post Evaluation, Oplan
Kandado, inventory stocktaking and
audit.
The Benchmarking Committee shall
be responsible for reporting and rec-
ommending the appropriate actions
that may be taken and/or sanctions
that may be imposed against taxpay-
ers or any other person found to be
supplying/submitting false or fabricat-
ed data purportedly to meet the
benchmark requirements.
The industry benchmark may be re-
vised every two (2) years from ap-
proval hereof or when a law is passed
changing the rate of Value-Added Tax
and Income Tax, whichever comes
first, or as may be directed by the
Commissioner. The guidelines and
procedures in the conduct of bench-
marking as well as the data and/or
reports required to be submitted by
the LTS (Audit Divisions and LTDOs),
Regional and District offices are spec-
ified in the Order.
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REVENUE MEMORANDUM CIRCU-
LAR NO. 10-2012 issued on March
19, 2012 prescribes the transition
procedures for all Electronic Filing
and Payment System (eFPS) filers in
using the enhanced Income Tax Re-
turns (November 2011 ENCS version
of BIR Form Nos. 1700, 1701 and
1702 prescribed under Revenue Reg-
ulations No. 19-2011).The eFPS ver-
sion of the enhanced BIR Forms are
still in the testing stage. In view of
this, the following work-around proce-
dures shall be adopted by eFPS filers
until the enhanced BIR forms are al-
ready available in the eFPS.
a. eFPS filers are required to use and
manually file the revised Income Tax
forms, with the corresponding pay-
ment to any Authorized Agent Bank
located within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Revenue District Office/Large
Taxpayers Office (RDO/LTO) where
the taxpayer is registered. In case of
no payment returns, the taxpayer
shall file the abovementioned tax
forms to the RDO/LTO where they are
registered.
b. Once the enhanced forms are
available in the eFPS, eFPS filers are
required to encode the contents of the
return previously filed manually, to
wit:
b.1 Enhanced Forms are available on
or before the deadline eFPS filers
shall encode the contents of the re-
turn on or before April 16, 2012
b.2 Enhanced Forms are available
after the deadline of April 16, 2012
eFPS filers shall encodethe contents
of the return within 10 days from date
of announcement of the eFPS availa-
bility via the BIR website.
c. e-Payment shall no longer be re-
quired if the tax due on the e-filed re-
turn is equal to the amount previously
paid. However, if the tax due on the e-
filed return is greater than the amount
previously paid, taxpayer shall e-pay
the unpaid amount, subject to applica-
ble penalties in case e-filing is made
after the due date for payment of In-
come Tax due.
REVENUE MEMORANDUM CIRCU-
LAR NO. 11-2012 issued on March
22, 2012 clarifies the tax conse-
quences of Power Sector Assets
and Liabilities Management Corpo-
ration (PSALM) transactions.
The Electric Power Industry Reform
Act of 2001 (EPIRA), particularly Sec-
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tion 50 thereof, provides that the pro-
ceeds from the sale of the National
Power Corporation (NPC) generation
assets and other real properties
and all its liabilities outstanding up-
on the expiration of its term of ex-
istence shall revert to and be as-
sumed by the National Government.
Based from the foregoing, PSALM will
not derive gain from the said sale of
the NPC generation assets and other
real properties. Accordingly, no In-
come Tax and consequently with-
holding tax is due from PSALM on its
sale of the NPC generation assets
and other real properties.
The enactment of Republic Act (RA)
No. 9337 on July 1, 2005 placed the
electric power industry in the Value-
Added Tax (VAT) System. Particu-
larly, the amendment included the
sale of electricity by generation com-
panies, transmission and distributions
companies, to sales subject to VAT.
Moreover, Revenue Regulations (RR)
No. 16-2005 was accordingly amend-
ed by RR No. 4-2007 and subjected
the sale of real properties not primari-
ly held for sale or for lease, but used
in business, to VAT.
Considering that the sale of electricity
is now subject to VAT, the real prop-
erties sold by PSALM are regarded as
real properties used in the trade or
business. While it is clear under the
Tax Code of 1997 that such sale is
not subject to Income Tax, there is no
provision under the same Code that
exempts it from VAT nor subject it to
VAT at zero rate. Section 106 of the
Tax Code of 1997 imposes VAT on
all kinds of goods and properties
sold in the Philippines, with the term
goods and properties given an all-
encompassing meaning by Con-
gress. Thus, any goods and prop-
erties sold should be deemed in-
cluded unless some provisions of law
especially exclude it. The sale of the
generation assets, real properties and
other disposable assets by PSALM
are no different from the goods and
properties provided under Section
106 of the Tax Code of 1997. It is to
be noted, however, that the VAT im-
posed on the sale of the transferred
assets may be utilized by the buyer
as creditable input VAT.
Pursuant to Section 196 of the Tax
Code of 1997, the sale of real proper-
ties by PSALM will be subject to Doc-
umentary Stamp Tax (DST) at the
rate of P15.00 for every P 1,000
based on the consideration contract-
ed to be paid for such realty or its fair
market value determined in accord-
ance with Section 6(E) thereof, which-
ever is higher. When one of the con-
tracting parties is the Government,
the tax to be imposed shall be based
on the actual consideration subject to
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the proviso that, where one party to
the transaction is exempt, the other
party shall pay the tax.
Accordingly, the sale of the NPC gen-
eration assets and other real proper-
ties by PSALM pursuant to the privati-
zation will be subject to DST based
on the fair market value or the actual
consideration that PSALM will re-
ceive, whichever is higher. After the
transfer of the NPC generation assets
and other real properties to PSALM
but prior to the privatization, PSALM
enters into contracts of lease with pri-
vate entities where the subject of the
lease are the NPC generation assets
and other real properties transferred
to PSALM. The income received by
PSALM from the lease is subject to
corporate Income Tax provided under
Section 27(A) of the Tax Code of
1997 .
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JURISPRUDENCE
G.R. No. 193279 March 14, 2012 ELEANOR DE LEON
LLENADO, Petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and EDITHA VILLAFLORES,
Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner issued checks to secure the loans obtained from
private respondent. Upon presentment, the checks were dishon-ored,
leading to the filing with the MeTC of criminal cases docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 54905, 54906, 54907, and 54908 for four (4)
counts of violation of B.P. 22.
Subsequently, petitioner settled the
loans subject of Criminal Case Nos. 54906, 54907 and 54908 using
the funds of the Children of Mary Immaculate College, of which she
was president. Private respond-ent executed an Affidavit of
Desistance for the three cases;1 thus, only Criminal Case No. 54905
covering a check worth, P1,500,000, proceeded to trial.
The MeTC found that all the following
elements of a violation of B.P. 22 were pre-sent in the last
check subject of the criminal proceedings: (1) the making, drawing,
and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2)
the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of
issue he or she does not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) the drawee banks subsequent dis-honor of the
check for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor of the
check for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
In ruling against petitioner, the MeTC
took note that petitioner admitted knowledge of the checks
dishonor, and that the de-mand letter with Notice of Dishonor
mailed to petitioners residence on 10 May 1999
was received by one Alfredo Abierra on 14 May 1999. Thus,
petitioner was sentenced to pay P1,500,000, the amount of the
dis-honored check, and a fine of P200,000 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolven-cy.
The MeTC also held the Children of
Mary Immaculate College liable for the value
of the check for being the drawer thereof.
The RTC affirmed the Decision of the MeTC.
The CA ruled that the elements of a
violation of B.P. 22 were estab-lished.3 However, it held that
the trial court erred in holding Children of Mary Immacu-late
College civilly liable and petitioner was SENTENCED to pay a fine
of P200,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of in-solvency.
Petitioner is ORDERED to indem-nify private complainant in the
amount of P1,500,000.00, the amount of the dishon-ored check, with
12% interest per annum from the date of judicial demand until the
fi-nality of this Decision plus attorneys fees of P20,000.00 and
litigation expenses of P16,860.00.
ISSUES:
Whether or not herein petitioner rightfully alleged that the
herein respondent failed to prove that there was actual receipt of
the notice of dishonor, a question of fact.
Whether or not the imposition of interest
was proper.
HELD:
1. No. It is an established rule that the remedy of appeal
through a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court contemplates only questions of law and not questions
of fact. The issue in the case at bar is clear-
Volume IV Issue No. 3 M A R C H 2012
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JURISPRUDENCE
ly a question of fact that rightfully be-longed to the proper
determination of the MeTC, the RTC and the CA. All these lower
courts found the elements of a vio-lation of B.P. 22 present.
Petitioner failed to provide any cogent reason for us to overturn
these findings, or to consider this case as an exception to this
general rule.
2. Conforming to prevailing jurispru-dence, we find the need to
modify the ruling of the CA with regard to the impo-sition of
interest on the judgment. It has been established that in the
absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum
to be computed from default, that is, from judicial or
extrajudi-cial demand under and subject to the provisions of
Article 1169 of the Civil Code.9 In Ongson v. People, we held that
interest began to run from the time of the extrajudicial demand, as
duly proved by the creditor. Thus, petitioner should also be held
liable for the amount of the dishonored check, which is P1,500,000,
plus 12% legal interest covering the period from the date of the
receipt of the demand letter on 14 May 1999 to the finality of this
Decision. The total amount due in the dispositive por-tion of the
CAs Decision, inclusive of in-terest, shall further earn 12%
interest per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully
paid.
G.R. No. 171251 March 5, 2012 LASCONA LAND CO., INC.,
Petitioner,
vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVE-
NUE, Respondent.
FACTS: On March 27, 1998, the Commission-er of Internal Revenue
(CIR) issued Assess-ment Notice No. 0000047-93-4075against Lascona
Land Co., Inc. (Lascona) informing the latter of its alleged
deficiency income tax
for the year 1993 in the amount of P753,266.56. Consequently, on
April 20, 1998, Lascona filed a letter protest, but was denied by
Norberto R. Odulio, Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Regional Director,
Bureau of Internal Reve-nue, Revenue Region No. 8, Makati City, in
his Letter6dated March 3, 1999
Anent the 1993 tax case of subject
taxpayer, please be informed that while we agree with the
arguments advanced in your letter protest, we regret, however, that
we cannot give due course to your request to cancel or set aside
the assessment notice issued to your client for the reason that the
case was not elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals as mandated by
the provisions of the last paragraph of Section 228 of the Tax
Code. By virtue thereof, the said assess-ment notice has become
final, executory and demandable.
In view of the foregoing, please ad-vise your client to pay its
1993 deficiency income tax liability in the amount of P753,266.56.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE FAILURE OF THE PETITIONER TO ELEVATE THE
MAT-TER TO THE COURT OF TAX APPEAL 30
DAYS AFTER THE INACTION OF THE COMMISSIONER ON INTERNAL
REVE-
NUE CAUSED THE ASSESSMENT TO BE-COME FINAL.
HELD: the taxpayer has two options, either: (1) file a petition
for review with the CTA within 30 days after the expiration of the
180-day period; or (2) await the final decision of the Commissioner
on the disputed assessment and appeal such final decision to the
CTA within 30 days after the receipt of a copy of such decision,
these options are mutually exclusive and resort to one bars the
ap-plication of the other the CIR should be reminded that
taxpayers
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JURISPRUDENCE
cannot be left in quandary by its inaction on the protested
assessment. It is imperative that the taxpayers are informed of its
action in order that the taxpayer should then at least be able to
take recourse to the tax court at the opportune time. As correctly
pointed out by the tax court: x x x to adopt the interpretation of
the re-spondent will not only sanction inefficiency, but will
likewise condone the Bureau's inac-tion. This is especially true in
the instant case when despite the fact that respondent found
petitioner's arguments to be in order, the assessment will become
final, executory and demandable for petitioner's failure to appeal
before us within the thirty (30) day period. G.R. No. 187073 March
14, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs.
EDUARDO CASTRO y PERALTA and RENERIO DELOS REYES y BO-
NUS, Appellants. FACTS: On 9 September 2002, [around] sev-en
oclock in the evening, [the] victim Ricar-do Pacheco Benedicto
("Benedicto"), a mer-chant and owner of a store selling bakery
supplies and pastries in Bagong Silang, Caloocan City, was tending
his store along with his helpers, one of whom was Emily Austria
("Austria"), when four (4) armed men entered the store and
announced a hold-up. Two (2) of the armed men proceeded to the
table of Benedicto asking the latter to bring out his gun. One (1)
of the armed men stayed outside the store while the other one (1)
guarded Austria. Since Benedicto resist-ed the assault, a commotion
ensued prompt-ing the armed man guarding Austria and the lookout
stationed outside the store to join and help their other
companions. Taking ad-vantage of said commotion, Austria ran
out-side the store and crossed the street. Imme-
diately after crossing the street, Austria heard three (3)
gunshots and saw the four (4) assailants walking out of the store,
one of them carrying Benedictos belt bag. Austria then returned to
the store and saw Benedicto lying in a pool of blood. She
immediately sought the help of their neigh-bors and the Barangay
Captain, who re-sponded to the scene, and summoned the police
authorities. When the police officers arrived at the store, they
checked the body of Benedicto. Sadly though, Benedicto was already
dead. RTC found the defendants guilty, decision was affirmed by the
COURT OF APPEALS ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ADMITTING THE
DE-
FENSE OF ALIBI. HELD: We concur with the trial and appellate
courts in rejecting appellants defenses of denial and alibi. Time
and again this Court has ruled that alibi is the weakest of all
de-fenses, for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to prove; it
cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by
the witness-es.9 Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the
requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not
enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime
was committed, but he must also demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have been at
the scene of the crime at the time the same was commit-ted.10 Such
physical impossibility was not shown to have existed in this case
where appellants testimonies confirmed they were in the same
locality (Bagong Silang) when the robbery-killing took place. G.R.
No. 185255 March 14, 2012
NORKIS DISTRIBUTORS, INC. AND ALEX
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JURISPRUDENCE
D. BUAT, Petitioners, vs.
DELFIN S. DESCALLAR, Respondent
FACTS: On April 26, 1993, respondent Delfin S. Descallar was
assigned at the Iligan City Branch of petitioner Norkis
Distributors, Inc., a distributor of Yamaha motorcycles. He be-came
a regular employee on February 1, 1994 and was promoted as Branch
Manager on June 30, 1997. He acted as branch ad-ministrator and had
supervision and control of all the employees. Respondent was also
responsible for sales and collection. On August 12, 2002,
petitioners issued a "Notice to Show Cause" to respondent. The
notice reads: It has been reported that during the audit of your
branch last July 2002, serious adverse findings were noted against
you as follows:
a) Refusal to accept redemption pay-ment made by customer Gamboa
on their deposited motorcycle unit which was traced later sold to
one Marvin Joseph Gealon allegedly your neph-ew; b) Unauthorized
use of deposited mo-torcycle unit owned by Ludy Gamboa; c)
Requiring customer Amy Pastor to pay excessive amount over her
ac-count balance; d) Disbursement of sales commis-
sions to unauthorized persons; e) Doing personal business of
selling safety helmets using the facility of the
branch.
Further, it is so disappointing to note that despite management
support and coop-eration, your branch performance continu-ously
failed to reach to an acceptable level as illustrated below:
On August 21, 2002, petitioners terminated respondents services
for loss of trust and confidence and gross inefficiency
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE FAILURE OF THE RESPONDENT TO MEET THE SALES
QUOTA CONSTITUTES A GROUND FOR TERMINATION UNDER LOSS OF CONFI-
DENCE AND GROSS INEFFICIENCY.
HELD: Loss of trust and confidence as a ground for termination
of an employee under Article 282 of the Labor Coderequires that the
breach of trust be willful, meaning it must be done intentionally,
knowingly, and pur-posely, without justifiable excuse. The basic
premise for dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence is that
the employees con-cerned holds a position of trust and confi-dence.
It is the breach of this trust that re-sults in the employers loss
of confidence in the employee.
To our mind, the failure to reach the monthly sales quota
can-not be considered an intentional and unjustified act of
respondent amount-ing to a willful breach of trust on his part that
would call for his termina-tion based on loss of confidence. This
is simply not the willful breach of trust and confidence
contemplated in Article 282(c) of the Labor Code. In-
deed, the low sales performance could be attributed to several
factors which are be-yond respondents control. To be a valid
Volume IV Issue No. 3 M A R C H 2012
9
YEAR SALES QUOTA
ACTUAL AVERAGE
SALES
ACCEPTA-BLE COL-
LEX
ACTUAL AVERAGE COLLEX
2001 (Jan-Dec)
13 units 5 only 70% 43% only
2002 (Jan-Jun)
13 units 5 only 70% 39% only
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JURISPRUDENCE
SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 186030 March 21, 2012 NORMA DELOS REYES
VDA. DEL PRA-DO, EULOGIA R. DEL PRADO, NORMITA
R. DEL PRADO and RODELIA R. DEL PRADO, Petitioners,
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP-
PINES, Respondent. FACTS:
The late Rafael died on July 12, 1978. On October 29, 1979,
Corazon, as a daugh-ter of the late Rafael, and Norma, as the late
Rafaels surviving spouse and representative of their five minor
children, executed a "Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of the
Estate of Ra-fael Del Prado" to cover the distribution of several
properties owned by the late Rafael.
Corazon, however, later discovered
that her right over the subject parcel of land was never
registered by Norma, contrary to the latters undertaking. The
petitioners in-stead executed on July 19, 1991 a Deed of Succession
wherein they, together with Ra-fael, Jr. and Antonio, partitioned
and adjudi-cated unto themselves the property covered by OCT No.
P-22848, to the exclusion of Co-razon. The deed was notarized by
Loreto L. Fernando.
When Corazon discovered this, she
filed a criminal complaint against now peti-tioners Norma,
Eulogia, Normita and Rodel-ia. Antonio and Rafael, Jr. had both
died be-fore the filing of said complaint.
Among the witnesses presented dur-
ing the trial was Loreto, who confirmed that upon the request of
Norma and Antonio, he prepared and notarized the deed of
succes-sion. He claimed that the petitioners ap-peared and signed
the document before him.
For their defense, the petitioners de-nied having signed the
Deed of Succession, or having appeared before notary public Loreto.
They also claimed that Corazon was not a daughter, but a niece, of
the late Ra-fael. Norma claimed that she only later knew
that a deed of succession was prepared by her son Antonio,
although she admitted hav-ing executed a deed of real estate
mortgage in favor of mortgagee Prudential Bank over portions of the
subject parcel of land already covered by the new titles.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the petitioners
conviction for falsification, notwithstanding the said petitioners
defense that they never intended to exclude private complain-ant
Corazon from the estate of the late Rafael.
HELD:
Only questions of law may be raised in petitions for review on
certio-rari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
First, the questions being
raised by the petitioners refer to factu-al matters that are not
proper subjects of a petition for review under Rule 45. Settled is
the rule that in a petition for review under Rule 45, only
questions of law may be raised. It is not this Courts function to
analyze or weigh all over again evidence already con-sidered in the
proceedings below, our jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only
errors of law that may have been committed by the lower court. The
res-olution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts,
whose findings on these matters are received with re-spect. A
question of law which we may pass upon must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
liti-gants. This is clear under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, which provides:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme
Court. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment,
final order or
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JURISPRUDENCE
resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court
of Tax Ap-peals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever
authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified
pe-tition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an
application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other
provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which
must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same
provi-sional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action
or proceeding at any time during its pendency.
Contrary to these rules, the petition-ers ask us to review the
lower courts factu-al finding on Corazons exclusion in the subject
deed of succession, to reconsider its contents and those of the
other docu-mentary evidence which they have submit-ted with the
court a quo, all of which involve questions of fact rather than
questions of law. In their assignment of errors, petition-ers even
fully question the factual basis for the courts finding of their
guilt.
Even granting that the present peti-tion may be admitted, we
find no cogent rea-son to reverse the CA decision appealed from,
considering that the elements of the crime of falsification under
Art. 171, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Art. 172
thereof, were duly proved during the proceedings below. Said
elements are as follows:
(a) The offender makes in a public document untruthful
statements in a narration of facts; (b) The offender has a legal
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and
(c) The facts narrated by the
offender are absolutely false. There can be no good faith on
the part of the petitioners since they knew of the untruthful
character of
statements contained in their deed of succession.
SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 185568 March 21, 2012 COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVE-
NUE, Petitioner, vs.
PETRON CORPORATION, Respondent. FACTS:
Respondent Petron is a corporation engaged in the production of
petroleum products and is a Board of Investment (BOI) registered
enterprise in accordance with the provisions of the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987 (E.O. 226) under Certificate of
Registration Nos. 89-1037 and D95-136.
During the period covering the taxa-
ble years 1995 to 1998, petitioner (herein respondent Petron)
had been an assignee of several Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs) from
various BOI-registered entities for which pe-titioner utilized in
the payment of its excise tax liabilities for the taxable years
1995 to 1998. The transfers and assignments of the said TCCs were
approved by the Depart-ment of Finances One Stop Shop Inter-Agency
Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Cen-ter (DOF Center), composed of
representa-tives from the appropriate government agen-cies, namely,
the Department of Finance (DOF), the Board of Investments (BOI),
the Bureau of Customs (BOC) and the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR).
Taking ground on a BOI letter issued
on 15 May 1998 which states that hydraulic oil, penetrating oil,
diesel fuels and industrial gases are classified as supplies and
consid-ered the suppliers thereof as qualified trans-ferees of tax
credit, petitioner acknowledged and accepted the transfers of the
TCCs from the various BOI-registered entities.
Petitioners acceptance and use of
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the TCCs as payment of its excise tax liabili-ties for the
taxable years 1995 to 1998, had been continuously approved by the
DOF as well as the BIRs Collection Program Divi-sion through its
surrender and subsequent issuance by the Assistant Commissioner of
the Collection Service of the BIR of the Tax Debit Memos
(TDMs).
On January 30, 2002, respondent
[herein petitioner CIR] issued the assailed Assessment against
petitioner for deficiency excise taxes for the taxable years 1995
to 1998, in the total amount of P 739,003,036.32, inclusive of
surcharges and interests, based on the ground that the TCCs
utilized by petitioner in its payment of excise taxes have been
cancelled by the DOF for having been fraudulently issued and
transferred.
Respondent, on February 27, 2002,
petitioner filed its protest letter to the Assessment.
On 27 March 2002, respondent,
through Assistant Commissioner Edwin R. Abella served a Warrant
of Distraint and/or Levy on petitioner to enforce payment of the
tax deficiencies.
On 03 December 2008, the CTA En
Banc promulgated a Decision, which re-versed and set aside the
CTA Second Divi-sion on 04 May 2007. The former absolved Petron
from any deficiency excise tax liabil-ity for taxable years 1995 to
1998. ISSUES:
Whether or not Petron had participation or knowledge on the
fraudulent issu-ance or transfer of the subject Tax Credit
Certificates hence liable for the payment of excise taxes from
1995-1998.
Whether or not the petitioner is correct in
asserting that the non-applicanility of the principle of
estoppel in the instant
case. HELD:
None. The processing of a TCC is en-trusted to a specialized
agency called the "One-Stop-Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty
Drawback Cen-ter" ("Center"), created on 07 Febru-ary 1992 under
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 226. Its purpose is to ex-pedite
the processing and approval of tax credits and duty drawbacks. The
Center is composed of a representa-tive from the DOF as its
chairperson; and the members thereof are repre-sentatives of the
Bureau of Invest-ment (BOI), Bureau of Customs (BOC) and Bureau of
Internal Reve-nue (BIR), who are tasked to process the TCC and
approve its application as payment of an assignees tax lia-bility.
A TCC may be assigned through a Deed of Assignment, which the
as-signee submits to the Center for its approval. Upon approval of
the deed, the Center will issue a DOF Tax Debit Memo (DOF-TDM),
which will be uti-lized by the assignee to pay the lat-ters tax
liabilities for a specified peri-od. Upon surrender of the TCC and
the DOF-TDM, the corresponding Au-thority to Accept Payment of
Excise Taxes (ATAPET) will be issued by the BIR Collection Program
Division and will be submitted to the issuing office of the BIR for
acceptance by the As-sistant Commissioner of Collection Service.
This act of the BIR signifies its acceptance of the TCC as pay-ment
of the assignees excise taxes. Thus, it is apparent that a TCC
under-goes a stringent process of verifica-tion by various
specialized govern-ment agencies before it is accepted as payment
of an assignees tax lia-bility.
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We agree with the pronounce-ment of the CTA En Banc that Petron
has not been shown or proven to have participated in the alleged
fraud-ulent acts involved in the transfer and utilization of the
subject TCCs. Petron had the right to rely on the joint
stipu-lation that absolved it from any partic-ipation in the
alleged fraud pertaining to the issuance and procurement of the
subject TCCs. The joint stipula-tion made by the parties
consequent-ly obviated the opportunity of the CIR to present
evidence on this matter, as no proof is required for an admission
made by a party in the course of the proceedings. Thus, the CIR
cannot now be allowed to change its stand and renege on that
admission.
No, the Petitioner is not correct.
While we agree with petitioner that the State in the performance
of government function is not estopped by the neglect or omission
of its agents, and nowhere is this truer than in the field of
taxation, yet this princi-ple cannot be applied to work injus-tice
against an innocent party.
Petron, in this case, was not proven to have had any
participation in or knowledge of the CIRs allega-tion of the
fraudulent transfer and uti-lization of the subject TCCs.
Re-spondents status as a transferee in good faith and for value of
these TCCs has been established and even stipulated upon by
petition-er. Respondent was thereby provided ample protection from
the adverse findings subsequently made by the Center. Given the
circumstances, the CIRs invocation of the non-applicability of
estoppel in this case is misplaced.
WHEREFORE, the CIRs Peti-
tion is DENIED for lack of merit.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 190293 March 20, 2012 PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN and
ALBERT
LEE G. ANGELES, Petitioners, vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, as Commander-in-Chief and President of
the
Republic of the Philippines, EDUARDO ERMITA, Executive
Secretary, ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP), or any of their units,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE (PNP), or any of their units, JOHN DOES and JANE DOES
acting un-
der their direction and con-trol, Respondents.
FACTS:
On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by the
ruling Am-patuan family, gunned down and buried un-der shoveled
dirt 57 innocent civilians on a highway in Maguindanao. In response
to this carnage, on November 24 President Arroyo issued
Presidential Proclamation 1946, de-claring a state of emergency in
Maguinda-nao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent and
suppress similar lawless vio-lence in Central Mindanao.
Believing that she needed greater au-
thority to put order in Maguindanao and se-cure it from large
groups of persons that have taken up arms against the constituted
authorities in the province, on December 4, 2009 President Arroyo
issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habe-as corpus in that
province except for identi-fied areas of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front.
Two days later or on December 6,
2009 President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress in
accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
which re-quired her, within 48 hours from the procla-
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mation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, to sub-mit to that body a report in person
or in writing of her action.
In her report, President Arroyo said that
she acted based on her finding that lawless men have taken up
arms in Maguindanao and risen against the government. The President
described the scope of the uprising, the na-ture, quantity, and
quality of the rebels wea-ponry, the movement of their heavily
armed units in strategic positions, the closure of the Maguindanao
Provincial Capitol, Ampatuan Municipal Hall, Datu Unsay Municipal
Hall, and 14 other municipal halls, and the use of armored
vehicles, tanks, and patrol cars with unauthorized "PNP/Police"
markings.
On December 9, 2009 Congress, in
joint session, convened pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution to re-view the validity of the Presidents
action. But, two days later or on December 12 before Con-gress
could act, the President issued Presi-dential Proclamation 1963,
lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of
habe-as corpus in Maguindanao. ISSUE:
Whether or not Presidential Proclama-tion No 1959 is
constitutional. HELD:
The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not
unavoida-ble for two reasons:
One. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law
and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before
the joint houses of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to
review and validate or invalidate the same.
Here, President Arroyo withdrew
Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which had
in fact convened, could act on the same. Con-
sequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and the
Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and
restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguinda-nao was a supervening event that oblit-erated any
justiciable controversy.
Two. Since President Arroyo
withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in just eight days, they
have not been meaningfully implemented. The military did not take
over the operation and control of local government units in
Maguindanao. The President did not issue any law or de-cree
affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted by
Congress. No indiscriminate mass arrest had been reported. Those
who were arrested dur-ing the period were either released or
promptly charged in court. Indeed, no petition for habeas corpus
had been filed with the Court respecting arrests made in those
eight days. The point is that the President intended by her ac-tion
to address an uprising in a relative-ly small and sparsely
populated prov-ince. In her judgment, the rebellion was localized
and swiftly disintegrated in the face of a determined and amply
armed government presence.
The problem in this case is that the President aborted the
proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao in just eight days. In a
real sense, the proclamation and the suspension never took off. The
Con-gress itself adjourned without touching the matter, it having
become moot and academic.
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JLs Corner
There is a higher court than
courts of justice and that is
the court of conscience. It
supercedes all other courts.
Mahatma Gandhi
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